By: Darshan Gajjar, Research Analyst, GSDN

The year 2024 is the year of elections, with over 50 countries going to vote in their respective polls, the biggest test of democracy so far. The most notable of them would be those in the US, the UK, and India. As of January 20, 2024 we already saw the conclusion of the general elections in Bangladesh, with incumbent Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League securing the majority, and on the small island of Taiwan, where the current Vice-President and Presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Mr Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, swept the polls.

While the Bangladesh elections were instrumental in deciding the future of the country in the face of rising extremism in the domestic society, the elections in Taiwan have global geopolitical implications. Let us examine how the victory of the DPP in Taiwan can affect the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and can potentially lead to another Taiwan Strait crisis.

Victory of the Democratic Progressive Party

Before going into the geopolitical intricacies of this election, let us first analyse the victory of the DPP in electoral terms and when the new president can likely take over the reign of Taipei. On January 13, 2024 along with the elections of the legislature, the presidential elections were also held in the island of Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, William Lai of the DPP swept the polls, securing 40.1% of the votes, defeating Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), both of whom secured 33.5% and 26.5% of the votes, respectively.

Though William Lai is all set to become the next president of the Republic of China (official name of Taiwan), his party, the DPP, fell short of the majority in the country’s legislature, getting only 51 seats out of 113. By contrast, the KMT was able to secure 52 seats, the TPP 8 seats, and independent candidates two seats, making it difficult for the new president to drive his legislative agenda.

China’s Reaction to This Elections

Citizens of democracies love elections, for periodic elections give them an opportunity to decide who will lead their government, giving them influential power in deciding the fate of their country. Conversely, tyrannical regimes despise elections because they don’t want people to interfere in deciding who governs the country.

When elections happen in Taiwan, it is obvious for totalitarian China to oppose them not only for historical reasons but also for ideological and political reasons. We shall come to historical linkages in a later part of this piece, but for now, let us see how China responded politically and diplomatically to the election in Taiwan.

Just days after the results of the election were announced, China conducted joint combat patrols around Taiwan, a sign of deep discontent against William Lai. China preferred to have the KMT government in Taiwan, which is at this time sympathetic to the current ruling CCP on mainland China, instead of William Lai’s DPP, who is considered to be a China hawk and whom China called a separatist and is well known for his pro-democracy and anti-China stance.

Further, China has started diplomatic efforts to make sure countries around the world do not take cognizance of the Taiwanese polls because China considers Taiwan to be a part of the PRC. Two Southeast Asian countries, Singapore and the Philippines, which congratulated the Taiwanese new president, faced a strong diplomatic reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry, with it even making solemn démarches to Singapore.

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said, “On behalf of the Filipino people, I congratulate President-elect Lai Ching-te on his election as Taiwan’s next President. We look forward to close collaboration, strengthening mutual interests, fostering peace, and ensuring prosperity for our peoples in the years ahead.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning, in response retaliated by telling Philippines against interfering in China’s internal affairs, even stating, “We would like to make it clear to the Philippines that it should refrain from playing with fire on the Taiwan question.” Defence Secretary of the Philippines Gilberto Teodoro Jr. retorted by accusing China of stooping to “low and gutter-level talk.”

Historical Background and Chinese Anxiety vis-à-vis Taiwan

In January of 1912, a few years before the commencement of the great war (World War I), the collapse of the Qing dynasty in October 1912 after more than 250 years of imperial rule, followed by the Xinhai Revolution, led to the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC). Then, revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen was elected as the first provisional president of the ROC. Although Sun Yat-sen tried to establish a centralised governance system, eventually the ROC was fragmented, with regional warlords controlling different parts of the country.

The warlord rule in China coincided with the end of World War I and the signing of the famous Treaty of Versailles, which surrendered German control areas of China to Japan instead of reinstating them with China. The student movement started on May 4, 1919 famously known as the May Fourth Movement, under the influence of which China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. In the aftermath of this movement, the Kuomintang (KMT) was established on October 10, 1919 and the Communist Party of China was founded in July 1921.

Initially, both parties worked together in what historians call a northern expedition that aimed at freeing China from warlords and unifying it, however, the differences between both parties since 1927 resulted in the Chinese Civil War. Though both parties collaborated during World War II against imperial Japan, after World War II, the struggle for power continued.

One by one, the CCP strengthened its hold on mainland China, eventually exiling the KMT and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, to the small island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan. The Chinese Revolution in 1949 established the People’s Republic of China, which claimed to be the sole representative of the Chinese people. In the initial years, western countries, especially America, denied recognising Mao’s China, but with the passing years and the convergence of interests during the Cold War, Americans forced themselves to work with the PRC to weaken the overall sphere of influence of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

China promotes what it calls the One China Policy, under which it claims that there is only one China in the world, and that is the People’s Republic of China, led by the CCP, and Taiwan, though has autonomy in administration and in governance, is also part of mainland China.

Taiwan’s Journey Ahead and Challenges for Mr. William Lai

From time to time, Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, have reiterated their stance to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Further, nationalist Chinese hawks often called for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. In 2022, during a major party meeting, President Xi stated, “We insist on striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and best efforts, but we will never promise to give up the use of force and reserve the option to take all necessary measures,” signalling the possibility of a ground invasion of the island.

In the face of evident Chinese ambitions, Washington, too, is determined to secure Taiwan from any Chinese military aggression. President Biden stated in 2022, in this context, that the U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, a clear shift from its position of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. William Lai, who is already being portrayed as the pro-independence and anti-China president, has to sail carefully amid this great power politics.

It will be interesting to see if William Lai successfully negotiates with America the deal, which the Biden administration already rejected earlier, to procure anti-submarine helicopters, which will help it deter China in the maritime domain. Additionally, it is very unlikely that the legislature, in which the opposition KMT holds the majority of seats, can approve an additional increase in the defence budget, making his agenda repugnant.

Another such critical sector is the semiconductor chip industry in Taiwan, in which the country is a leading manufacturer. Mr. Lai has promised continuous support to the chip-making industry of the country, which is not only instrumental for Taiwan but also for the entire globe due to the heavy demand for its chips in the global electronics and computer markets.

With the US being engaged in proxy wars in eastern Europe and west Asia, in addition to growing domestic discontent against President Xi in China, the possibility of a ground invasion of Taiwan cannot be denied. In the near future, the new president has to take decisions that make it possible to deter such aggressions not only militarily but also economically and ideologically.

By: Deeplaxmi Patil, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

The rise of right-wing politics globally has become a significant challenge to democratic societies, with various countries experiencing an upsurge in right-wing extremist ideas and groups. This phenomenon is characterised by the dissemination of divisive and hateful ideologies, often facilitated by modern communication tools, such as social media platforms. The evolving nature of these ideologies and their means of distribution underscores the need for coordinated international efforts to address the growing threat.

The post-9/11 era, initially dominated by the global war on terror, witnessed the emergence and spread of right-wing extremism as a parallel threat. While the focus was on groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, right-wing extremism gained traction globally. Social media played a crucial role in connecting like-minded individuals across geographical boundaries, enabling the exchange of ideas, and fostering the growth of right-wing movements. Europe, historically familiar with right-wing ideologies, experienced a surge in the 2010s. Factors such as increased immigration from Muslim countries, movement within the European Union, and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas by populist politicians contributed to the rise.

The mainstreaming of right-wing ideologies within political parties and among politicians became a concerning trend in the 2000s. Leaders like Viktor Orban in Hungary incorporated anti-immigrant and exclusionary narratives into their political agendas. Orban’s actions, including undermining democracy and suppressing dissent, led to public protests.

Jair Bolsonaro’s ascent to the presidency in Brazil in 2018-2019 showcased the continued emergence of right-wing extremism. Bolsonaro’s campaign advocated for a return to Brazil’s perceived glory through attacks on institutions, minorities, and violence against various groups. His endorsement of Trump further illustrates the interconnectedness of global right-wing movements.

The rise of right-wing politics globally has marked a notable shift in geopolitical dynamics. Fuelled by factors such as economic inequality, immigration concerns, and a backlash against globalisation, right-wing movements have gained traction in various regions. This shift often manifests in nationalist ideologies, emphasising protectionist policies and a focus on national identity.

Geopolitically, this trend has implications for international relations. Some right-wing leaders adopt an assertive and isolationist stance, challenging existing alliances and fostering a more transactional approach to diplomacy. Multilateral institutions face scrutiny, with a preference for bilateral agreements. The rise of right-wing governments has also led to increased emphasis on sovereignty, impacting global cooperation on issues like climate change and human rights.

Furthermore, these movements may contribute to a more polarized international system, with nations aligning based on shared ideological values. This polarization can complicate diplomatic efforts and potentially lead to increased geopolitical tensions. The impact of right-wing politics varies across countries, and not all movements share identical ideologies. Nonetheless, the global rise of right-wing politics introduces complex challenges to the established geopolitical order, influencing international cooperation and reshaping alliances

Right Wing Politics in Europe and Americas

The rise of right-wing politics globally represents a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, with distinct regional variations. The provided data highlights that this trend is not universal, as some major democracies, such as Germany and the United States, are currently led by centre-left governments. Nevertheless, the overarching pattern suggests a growing inclination towards right-wing populism, characterized by distrust of liberal democratic institutions.

One prominent aspect of this trend is the erosion of confidence in key pillars of liberal democracy, including fair elections, an unbiased media, religious tolerance, and political pluralism. Populist leaders often challenge these foundations, contributing to a sense of uncertainty and instability. The comparison to the early 1930s, a period marked by the rise of authoritarianism, emphasizes the potential threat to democratic norms and values.

In Europe, the data points to a surge in right-wing populist movements. Italy’s Prime Minister, Georgia Melon, associated with movements seeking to resurrect Italian fascism, underscores the shift towards more conservative ideologies. In Hungary and Poland, where democratic traditions may be less deeply rooted due to Soviet domination, hard-right influences have been present for some time. The rise of Marine Le Pen in France and the substantial presence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the German parliament further illustrate the increasing influence of right-wing politics across the continent.

Scandinavia, traditionally a model of political moderation, is not immune to this global trend. The rise of right-wing populists in Sweden and Finland suggests a departure from the region’s historical political landscape.

The diversity within right-wing movements is highlighted, with some primarily driven by nationalism, others by racist or reactionary ideologies, and yet others being Eurosceptics seeking to emulate the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. This heterogeneity makes it challenging to define a cohesive political group but emphasizes a common thread of scepticism towards liberal democratic principles.

The recent victory of Milei’s government in Argentina underlines that the appeal of populism extends beyond Europe, persisting in Latin America. This region, with a history of maverick political leaders, continues to be susceptible to populist influences. The economic challenges faced by Argentina further indicate that populist movements can gain traction during periods of crisis.

The global impact of Donald Trump’s election in 2016 is a significant catalyst for the rise of populism. Trump’s presidency served as a model for other right-wing leaders worldwide, inspiring, and emboldening movements that challenge established democratic norms.

In summary, the rise of right-wing politics globally is a complex and varied phenomenon with regional nuances. While some democracies maintain centre-left leadership, a pervasive trend towards right-wing populism is evident, posing challenges to the foundations of liberal democracy. The diverse nature of these movements underscores the importance of analysing each case individually while recognizing common threads of scepticism towards democratic institutions.

Geopolitical Implications of Right-Wing Politics

Shift in Alliances: Right-wing leaders often pursue a more unilateral and nationalist approach, leading to shifts in traditional alliances. This can create uncertainties and reshape geopolitical dynamics as countries reassess their partnerships.

Trade Policies: Right-wing movements tend to emphasize protectionist trade policies, challenging the existing global economic order. Trade tensions and the renegotiation of agreements can impact international commerce and disrupt established economic relationships.

Nationalism and Isolationism: Right-wing ideologies often prioritize national interests and may advocate for isolationist policies. This can result in reduced cooperation on global issues, hindering collective efforts to address challenges such as climate change and pandemics.

Impact on International Institutions: Right-wing movements may express scepticism or opposition to international institutions. This challenges the effectiveness of organizations like the United Nations and the European Union, potentially weakening their ability to address global issues through multilateral cooperation.

Migration and Border Policies: The rise of right-wing politics is often associated with stricter immigration policies. This can strain relations between countries and contribute to geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions dealing with migration challenges.

Human Rights Concerns: Some right-wing governments have faced criticism for their stance on human rights. This can strain diplomatic relations and influence global perceptions of the commitment to democratic values and individual freedoms.

Regional Stability: Right-wing movements may impact regional stability by influencing regional conflicts or exacerbating existing tensions. Their approach to diplomacy and security issues can have ripple effects on neighbouring nations.

Ideological Polarization: The global rise of right-wing politics contributes to ideological polarization, with countries aligning based on shared values. This can lead to increased diplomatic friction and hinder coordinated responses to shared challenges.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the geopolitical implications of the rise in right-wing politics are complex and multifaceted, affecting international relations, trade, cooperation on global issues, and the stability of regions around the world. To effectively combat the global rise of right-wing extremism, the importance of international cooperation is significant. Building coalitions and leveraging multilateral organizations are proposed as essential strategies to address the transnational nature of the threat. As democratic societies grapple with the implications of these ideologies, collaboration becomes a crucial tool in preserving equality, the rule of law, an inclusive civil society, and respect for human rights on a global scale.

By: Barsha Hazarika, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Narrative Unfolds

In a remarkable turn of events on December 6, 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin embarked on an extraordinary one-day whirlwind tour to the Middle East. This historic journey saw him making a brief stop in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before heading to Saudi Arabia, escorted by an entourage of four fighter jets.

Touching down in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, on a Wednesday, Putin’s arrival coincided with the United Nations COP28 climate talks hosted by the city. The grandeur of the occasion was marked by the presence of four UAE military jets, symbolically trailing smoke in the hues of the Russian flag, as they executed a flyby and a resounding 21-gun salute, welcoming the Russian leader to the Presidential Palace.

Subsequently, Putin hastened to Riyadh, where he engaged in a significant face-to-face meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), marking their first encounter since October 2019.

While in Abu Dhabi, the Russian President took the opportunity to meet with Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), President of the UAE, expressing admiration for the robust state of Russia-UAE relations. Putin also extended congratulations to the Gulf Arab country for hosting COP28, a global event that had commenced six days prior to his visit.

Upon arrival in Abu Dhabi, Putin received a warm welcome from the UAE’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, at the airport. The Ilyushin-96, accompanied by four Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, set the stage for a ceremonial greeting at Qasr al-Watan palace. The welcoming spectacle included a 21-gun salute and Emirati military jets leaving behind trails of smoke in the red, white, and blue colors reminiscent of Russia’s flag.

Noteworthy is the evolving closeness between Putin and key Middle Eastern figures, namely President Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. It was only fitting that Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were chosen as the initial Arab capitals for Putin’s visit, marking a continuation of the diplomatic ties forged since February 2022.

During discussions that spanned a spectrum of topics, from regional conflicts like Gaza to global concerns such as oil production, Ukraine and Sudan, MbZ released a statement emphasizing the leaders’ commitment to “strengthening dialogue and cooperation for stability and progress.”

Simultaneously, Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia witnessed a significant milestone, with MbS declaring that the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia had reached unprecedented heights. Stressing the importance of exchanging information and assessments on regional affairs, Putin echoed the sentiment, highlighting the necessity for ongoing dialogue.

MbS went on to affirm that Riyadh’s collaboration with Moscow had enhanced security across the Middle East, expressing optimism about the positive global impact of their future political interaction and cooperation. The leaders also delved into discussions on Israel’s actions in Gaza and various other sensitive international issues.

Among the multifaceted topics explored during their meeting, energy industry collaboration and advancements in technology emerged as focal points, as reported by Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency.

Background

A noticeable pivot from Ukraine to the escalating Gaza crisis has taken place on the global stage since October 7, 2023 capturing President Vladimir Putin’s government’s strategic attention. The evolving narrative, with reduced emphasis on the 23-month-long conflict in Eastern Europe, conveniently aligns with Moscow’s ambitions to assert influence and pursue interests in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the region has witnessed a surge in anti-American sentiment amid the deepening Gaza crisis.

Against this backdrop, Putin embarked on a one-day visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia on December 6, 2023 marking his inaugural trip to the Arab world since Russia’s comprehensive invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to Al Jazeera, Putin’s meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince occurred against the backdrop of falling oil prices, despite OPEC+ commitments to further cut production. The Russian leader’s international travels have been limited since March 2023, following an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant accusing him of deporting Ukrainian children.

Crucially, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, having not ratified the ICC’s founding treaty, hold no obligation to apprehend Putin on their territories. Moscow has deftly capitalized on the United States’ isolation within the United Nations regarding the ceasefire discourse amid the Israeli war on Gaza in October. This diplomatic maneuvering exploits the Biden administration’s steadfast support for Israeli actions in the besieged enclave, presenting an opportune moment for Putin to navigate international dynamics in the Middle East.

Focus of Putin’s Middle East Visit

Vladimir Putin’s journey to the Middle East serves as a crucial component of his broader campaign to showcase the perceived failure of Western efforts to isolate Moscow through sanctions related to the Ukrainian conflict. His diplomatic mission aims to convey a distinct message to the broader Arab-Islamic world. Russia stands apart from the United States concerning the Palestinian cause.

The core of Putin’s communication is that, in contrast to the US, Moscow aligns with the international community in advocating for a ceasefire and insists on resolving the Palestinian issue in accordance with established international law, rejecting any attempts to sideline or dismiss it.

Despite Moscow’s steadfast stance on Palestine, Russia has historically maintained a nuanced and balanced position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, diverging from Washington’s unequivocal support for Israel. While fostering positive relations with Israel, Russia has concurrently underlined its support for Palestinian statehood. Significantly, Moscow recognizes Hamas not as a mere terrorist organization but as a legitimate political entity representing Palestinian interests.

This diplomatic strategy allows Russia to engage with both sides, navigating the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a pragmatic approach. While fostering ties with Israel, Moscow upholds its commitment to the Palestinian cause, stressing the need for a resolution that adheres to international legal principles. This duality positions Russia as an influential mediator with the capacity to engage diverse stakeholders in the region.

By asserting its unique stance on Palestine and strategically navigating the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Putin’s visit to the Middle East underscores Russia’s role as a key player in regional diplomacy, challenging the narrative of isolation propagated by Western sanctions related to the Ukrainian war.

Outcomes and Implications of the Visit

The diplomatic maneuvers initiated by Vladimir Putin in the Middle East are set to yield significant outcomes, shaping regional dynamics and global perceptions. In a strategic sequence, Putin hosted the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 07, 2023 a day after his visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Putin’s commentary on Israel’s two-month bombardment of Gaza positions and the United States’ diplomatic efforts as unsuccessful, presenting an opportunity for Moscow to step in as a mediator. Leveraging its amicable ties with both Israel and the Palestinians, Russia seeks to redefine its role in regional conflicts, challenging Western dominance.

While the West interprets this move as Russia’s quest for enhanced influence in the Middle East, it is acknowledged that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while unlikely to replace the US with Russia as their security guarantor in the near future, view their ties with Moscow as a means of asserting autonomy from Washington. This aligns with the consistent strategy of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, balancing partnerships with global powers in an evolving, multipolar international order that deviates from Western centrality.

The symbolism of Putin’s warm reception in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh on December 6, 2023 resonates powerfully. It sends a message to Western capitals that Russia is not perceived as a rogue or pariah state in the Arab region. The visit underscores the assertiveness of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, signaling that they don’t merely follow Washington’s directives, even while relying on the US for security.

Despite their security dependencies on the US, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh exhibit a willingness to pursue independent foreign policy agendas when aligned with long-term national interests. This presents a challenge for the Biden administration, which expresses concerns over the growing closeness between the Gulf nations and Russia. Efforts to pull Saudi Arabia away from Russia, particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, have proven challenging, with the US, UK, and EU seeking to pressure the UAE to curb its role in Russia’s sanctions evasion.

However, the ability of the West to create distance between Russia and its Gulf allies remains uncertain. The GCC states, despite their wealth, display a multi-aligned foreign policy approach, refusing to permanently align with a single geopolitical camp. Their relationships with Russia, as seen in responses to the Ukraine invasion, mirror the broader stance of the Arab region and the Global South, navigating partnerships with both Western powers and adversaries like Russia and China.

In this multipolar world with fluid realities, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s preparedness to join the BRICS bloc highlights the shifting geopolitical landscape. As they engage in multi-alignment, the Middle East is becoming a pivotal arena where global powers must navigate nuanced relationships to influence regional outcomes. Welcome to a new era marked by multipolarity, where alliances are dynamic, and strategic autonomy is paramount, an era that is undeniably here to stay.

By: Anjali Mahto, Research Analyst, GSDN

More than a dozen suspected terrorists on New Delhi’s “Most Wanted List” were killed in various Pakistani cities beginning in 2022. All of them were involved in terror attacks on Indian security forces and other assets. The militants were linked to organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), the Khalistan movement, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).

Among those murdered were Zahoor Mistry on March 01, 2022, a terrorist affiliated with JeM was involved in the hijacking of an Indian Airlines IC-814 plane from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999, as were LeT’s Maulana Ziaur Rehman and Mufti Qaiser Farooq who died in 2023 on September 12 and October 01, respectively. On October 11, 2023 Shahid Latif, another prominent JeM operative and alleged mastermind of the 2016 Pathankot attack, was shot dead by three unknown individuals on a motorcycle in Sialkot, Punjab.

The most recent victim was top LeT commander Adnan Ahmed, popularly known as Abu Hanzala, who was assassinated outside his Karachi home in convening night of 2 and 3 December 2023. He was a close associate of terror organization founder Hafiz Saeed and the mastermind of the 2015 attack on a BSF convoy in Jammu and Kashmir’s Udhampur.

A failed assassination attempt in 2021 on the life of LeT founder and mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Hafiz Saeed, happened in Lahore. This followed a series of assassinations following a similar pattern, anonymous men riding motorcycles targeting militants accused of terrorism in India.

Pakistan on Attacks

Pakistani officials involved in the investigations have linked the assassinations to a hostile country’s intelligence organization, hinting India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Some allege that a hostile intelligence agency has set up a network of local assassins, some of whom are discontented former law enforcement officers, to carry out these targeted executions. It is further alleged that India runs this network through operatives stationed in a Gulf state, most likely the UAE, and also that New Delhi has shared the names and whereabouts of several terrorists with Islamabad over the years, and several have been killed by unknown assailants.

Following a press conference held by then-Pakistan Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah in 2021 in response to a blast near Hafiz Saeed’s apartment in Lahore, Islamabad has kept down the mysterious assassinations of militants linked with the LeT, JeM, HuM, and the Khalistan separatist organization. This is interpreted as an attempt to conceal the identities of the “most wanted terrorists” in India. Pakistan has remained silent on the possible executions of these militants, presumably due to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) pressure. Pakistan has guaranteed the international terrorist funding and money laundering watchdog that it will take credible and long-term measures against terror groups operating within its borders.

Three prominent Let/JeM terrorists were killed in the first two weeks of November 2023, including a close friend of Maulana Masood Azhar and the LeT’s head recruiter, but neither the Pakistani government nor the media have publicly acknowledged them as terrorists. Maulana Raheem Ullah Tariq, a JeM leader and close friend of Maulana Masood Azhar, was assassinated on November 13, 2023 in Karachi. The incident was presented in Pakistani media as the assassination of a local preacher. Former LeT terrorist Akram Khan, also known as Akram Ghazi, the chief of the LeT’s recruitment unit, was shot dead on November 9, 2023 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur tribal district. In Pakistani media, he was referred to as a “muezzin,” or someone who announces the call to daily prayers. On November 5, 2023, Khwaja Shahid, also known as Mian Mujahid, was allegedly kidnapped and later found beheaded near the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Shahid was a prominent LeT figure and one of the masterminds behind the 2018 terrorist attack on an Indian Army camp in Sunjuwan, Jammu which claimed seven lives.

Other terrorists killed in Pakistan by unknown gunmen

• On October 21, 2023 Dawood Malik engaged in anti-Indian actions. Malik was a prominent member of Lashkar-e-Jabbar and had a strong relationship with Maulana Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists most sought in India.

•  Syed Khalid Raza (February 27, 2023), a former Al-Badr Mujahideen commander, was assassinated in Karachi. He was connected to Hizbul Mujahideen head Syed Salahuddin and was particularly instrumental in infiltrating militants into the J&K district of Kupwara.

•  Imtiyaz Alam (February 21, 2023) also known as Bashir Ahmad Peer, was a commander in the Hizbul Mujahideen. He was killed in Pakistan’s Rawalpindi. He had been in Pakistan for more than 15 years and had a significant part in the terrorist actions in the Kashmir valley. He had been in Pakistan for more than 15 years and had a significant part in the terrorist actions in the Kashmir valley.

• Syed Noor Shalobar (March 04, 2023) accused for recruiting terrorists in the Kashmir valley and collaborating with the Pakistan Army and Inter-Service Intelligent (ISI) of Pakistan, was killed in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.

• Malik Sardar Singh (May 6, 2023), also known as Paramjit Singh Panjwar, the head of the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and had been placed on India’s most-wanted list,

was slain not far from his Lahore, Pakistan, house.

• Abu Qasim Kashmiri, also from Jammu and also known as Riyaz Ahmad, was the main man behind the Dhangri assault in Rajouri on September 8, 2023. In Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), he met his demise.

Pakistan as Safe Haven

After the 9/11 attacks, several non-state regions of the world were identified as directly endangering national security. These uncontrolled regions, sometimes known as “safe havens,” provide terrorists and other enemies the space they need to plan and prepare for strikes. Extremists are able to plan, organize, raise money, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in certain regions of the world with a degree of relative safety since they are still either ungoverned or poorly governed.

Since December 2001, the United States Secretary of Defense has considered northwest Pakistan to be a safe haven for terrorists. Many Taliban fighters and al-Qaeda members crossed the border into Pakistan after the Taliban’s defeat in Afghanistan. Specifically, al-Qaeda and other militants looking to attack coalition and American forces in Afghanistan as well as launch operations in other nations, such as India, have made the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, a politically unstable region that primarily operates outside the purview of Pakistani civil and military forces, their center of activity.

Pakistan has been charged by India for sustaining the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir by arming and funding militant organizations and smuggling terrorists trained by the state across the border to conduct attacks in both Indian-administered Kashmir and mainland India.

News reports indicate a growing body of evidence tying Pakistani intelligence to militant groups, some of which are responsible for assaults against US interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Since 9/11, Pakistan has been involved in the majority of important terror plots in Great Britain.

On February23, 2023, India used its Right of Reply (RoR) against Pakistan at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), accusing Pakistan of providing terrorists with a place to hide out. The primary point of contention between India and Pakistan that cannot be overlooked, according to S. Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs (MEA), is terrorism. A nation whose “basic industry” is terrorism is unlikely to succeed.

Pakistan has been accused of state-sponsored terrorism

Pakistan’s participation in terrorism through its sponsorship of multiple designated terrorist organizations has led to accusations of state-sponsored terrorism.  Numerous nations, notably the US, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan’s neighbors, have regularly accused Pakistan. Pakistan has persisted in offering sanctuary to a few terrorist organizations that are focused on the region.  It allowed organizations that were aimed toward India, such the LeT and its front groups, and the JeM, to operate from its territory. These groups included the Afghan Taliban.

Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, was killed by US Navy SEALs during Operation Neptune Spear in his bunker at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Although Hafiz Saeed, the co-founder of LeT, was indicted by Pakistani authorities in 2020 and given an extra 31 years in prison in 2022, they have refused to release him into Indian custody. Sajid Mir, a top leader of LeT and one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) most wanted individuals, was successfully convicted in Pakistan in May, 2022 on charges of financing terrorism. After that, he received a 15-year prison sentence.

These actions led the FATF to removed Pakistan from the “gray list” of nations identified as having strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism) systems in October 2022 after Pakistan made notable progress. Pakistan was first placed on the gray list in 2008 and has remained on it since 2018.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are concerns regarding the possible involvement of foreign intelligence services in the wave of targeted killings that have occurred in Pakistan, especially involving people connected to terrorist attacks against India. The pattern of these secret operations which is consistent, and the supposed links to organizations such as RAW, point to a complicated geopolitical dimension. As India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorism on behalf of the state, the designation of Pakistan as a terrorist safe haven continues to be a difficult subject. The recent removal of Pakistan from the FATF’s “gray list” is indicative of the continuous efforts made to resolve issues pertaining to money laundering prevention and countering terrorist financing. The state of affairs highlights the complex security difficulties in the region and the continuous fight against terrorism and the unknown killings are raising questions whether Pakistan is still a safe haven of terrorists.

By: Kashif Anwar: Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Historical relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is intertwined and can be traced to 7^th century AD, as throughout the history, their borders have overlapped one another, as witnessed during ancient kingdoms and empires like the Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Empire, Malacca Sultanate, Johor Sultanate, and Bruneian Sultanate. As a result, it promoted interaction between the Indonesian and Malaysian people, who trace their origins to the other side, which helped them establish diplomatic ties in 1957. A decade later, establishment of the ASEAN in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines highlighted depth of Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. Like other countries of the world who often enjoy a healthy relationship with a particular nation despite their differences and issues, such aspects are visible in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Indonesia-Malaysia relationship

As there has been a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia throughout the history of the Malay Archipelago which continue to enhance connection and cooperation between both nations. Despite such connection, there always suspicion of the other’s military power, possible plans for domination, and hidden agendas which to some extent present in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia. After establishing diplomatic relationship in 1957, the period between 1957 and 1967 and later between 1985-2017 which viewed as troubled phase in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. However, such aspect often results due to government policies and their priorities like when national issues and problems become a priority then concentrating on the issues that involved other country.

With both nations tied by a common religion, language, proximity and cultural heritage, often engage from one diplomatic spat to another over the years. Despite such aspect, Indonesia and Malaysia also enjoys a warm and cordial relation and in 2005 the bilateral relationship was enhanced, allowing both state head to have annual consultation. Further, both nations have also demonstrated their relationship through an active engagement and worked to provide a sound framework for the relations to prosper, economic cooperation which has greatly benefitted both sides. In 2022, the bilateral trade stood at US$ 27 billion which has under-score their economic interdependence and shown willingness to bolster trade through Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) to foster economic growth and integration along their border.

Prospects and Issues in the relationship

Considering the intricate world of international diplomacy, nations are working to strengthen their relationship with other like-minded nations and address the gap in their bilateral relation. Such aspect is clearly visible in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia partnership which stands as a noteworthy example of the effectiveness of collaborative efforts in the realm of global politics. As it allows both nations to strengthen their economic partnership which serves as a foundation upon which both countries have built a harmonious and mutually beneficial connection which allow them to enhance cooperation across various sectors. However, despite such a connection, both countries have difference and issues like the territorial and maritime dispute which emerged due to their colonial past, Indonesian migrant worker condition in Malaysia issue and the trans-border illegal logging are few of them, namely.

Despite the difference in issues, it allows Indonesia and Malaysia to expand cooperation in other fields too like in defence cooperation, strengthening cultural relations and are working to improve in-take of students and tourists. Such steps and interaction and exchange at high level like to counter the Covid-19 pandemic or fighting the threat of extremism and Islamophobia and between people have shaped the framework of the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship and assisted over the years. Further, since 2020, both nations have worked to address the territorial and border issue in the case of Ambalat region and Sulawesi Sea. As during Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s visit to Malaysia in early 2023, two significant agreements were reached regarding the delineation of their territorial waters in specific sections of the Straits of Malacca and the Sulawesi Sea. As a result, both nations have committed to addressing additional land boundary disputes with the goal of resolution by June 2024. 

In the case of trade and economy, they view the potential for expansion in broadening trade horizons and look for ways to look beyond palm oil sector and venture into collaborative infrastructure ventures. As they continue to fortify their trade networks, invest in each other’s economies, and engage in transformative infrastructure projects, Indonesia and Malaysia are not only poised for a remarkable economic growth but also positioned as drivers of regional stability and progress in Southeast Asia. Considering changing geopolitics in the South China Sea and around the Malacca Strait due to expansion of Chinese naval, commercial and maritime activities in the region, Indonesia and Malaysia signed Memorandum of Understanding in 2022 which will strengthen military cooperation and undertake joint military exercises like Malindo Kekar Exercise, periodic bilateral dialogues and consultations on strategic issues related to defence and military as a common interest and also promote strategic information sharing.

With Indonesia and Malaysia being impacted by China’s claim in the South China Sea dispute as later unlawful claim and expansion in the southern most region of the 9-dash line has overlapped maritime territories of Indonesia and Malaysia. On the other hand, considering the economic and trade weight with China has kept Indonesia and Malaysia’s response to the Chinese actions minimal. Furthermore, both nations continue to display the politi­cal intent to oppose Chinese control and long-term strategic intent in the South China Sea region, which so far has resulted in overlapping efforts to improve their own maritime capabilities and increase security cooperation with the US and its allies. As both nations have strategic partnership with the US, they’re viewed as a fulcrum in the Southeast Asian region to counter China and ensure a stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

For many decades, both nations have cooperated in policing the Malacca Strait, and changing geopolitics in the Southeast Asia and South China Sea to provide them an opportunity to enhance their strategic partnership. However, despite such cooperation and understanding between both nations who have only improved their bilateral relationship over the decades from economic to trade to cultural interaction and has solidified their bilateral relationship and partnership.

On the other hand, Chinese activities in the South China Sea region has become a concern for many countries in the Southeast Asia and has often undermine the impact and credibility of ASEAN. Malaysia’s reluctance to accept grand narrative, perception, and role to play to counter China remain a hurdle in the Southeast Asian region is of immense importance. As the 2017 Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, regular patrolling, coordination and intelligence sharing mechanism, provides a sense of hope and has allowed others to address the limitation which comes with Malaysia to counter Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

By: Pinkle Gogoi, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Chile, long hailed for its social and economic progress in Latin America, faced a significant disruption to its positive image in 2019 when widespread civil disorder erupted. While the country’s health system garnered attention for its successes, underlying issues, possibly rooted in a two-tier system, have persisted. Examining the evolution of Chilean health policy in comparison with developments in pensions and education is crucial for a comprehensive understanding. The enduring power of elites, a barrier to reform, is highlighted, suggesting a need for politicians to confront historical legacies and push for changes that go beyond the achievements made thus far. The two-tier system, rooted in policies of the dictatorship, underscores the deep-seated challenges that continue to shape Chile’s social and economic landscape. Further progress in health and other sectors necessitates a nuanced approach that addresses political and historical complexities, challenging the entrenched interests that have impeded reform.

The crisis that erupted in Chile in 2019 has deep-seated roots in the country’s historical trajectory, extending back to the 1950s. The foundation was laid with the legislation of a National Health Service in 1952, a move spearheaded by Senator Salvador Allende, a socialist and physician, representing a significant step towards universal health coverage. However, this reform fell short by excluding certain sectors like the military, police, civil servants, and private employees. Subsequent administrations, including that of President Eduardo Frei Montalva in the 1960s, implemented social reforms, progressive taxation, and substantial investments in healthcare infrastructure, earning both praise and criticism. Allende’s Marxist manifesto in the 1970s aimed at strengthening health services for the poor, but faced immediate opposition. The turning point occurred in 1973 when a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte replaced the government, implementing radical economic policies influenced by Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics. Described as a “shock doctrine” by Naomi Klein, this regime dismantled institutions dating back to the 1950s and transferred significant state activities to the private sector. The impact on crucial sectors like pensions, education, and health during this period laid the groundwork for the crisis that unfolded in 2019, marking a complex interplay of political, economic, and social factors in Chile’s history.

The privatization of pensions and the changes to the education system during the Pinochet regime indeed had significant and lasting effects on Chilean society.

Pensions

Under Pinochet, the decision to privatize pensions in the early 1980s was a central part of the economic reforms. Workers were mandated to contribute 10% of their monthly wages to individual accounts managed by Pension Fund Administrators (AFP). The idea behind this was to promote individual responsibility and create a more market-oriented pension system. However, the outcomes of this policy have been a subject of considerable debate.

One major criticism of the privatized pension system is the excessive management fees charged by the AFPs. These fees have been seen as disproportionately benefiting the pension fund administrators rather than the pensioners. Critics argue that high fees have eroded the potential returns on pension contributions, leaving many retirees with lower-than-expected pensions. This has contributed to widening inequality among pension beneficiaries.

Additionally, the reliance on individual accounts exposed retirees to market fluctuations, leading to concerns about the adequacy and stability of pensions, especially during economic downturns. The privatized pension system has faced calls for reform to address these issues and ensure a more equitable and secure retirement for all citizens.

Education

The Pinochet regime’s reforms in education involved transferring schools from the Ministry of Education to local authorities and introducing a voucher system. The voucher system allowed families to use government-issued vouchers to choose between public and private schools, with the funding following the student. While the intention was to introduce market competition and increase choice, the consequences were mixed.

While some families benefited from the ability to choose schools, critics argue that the voucher system exacerbated social stratification. Affluent families had greater means to supplement the vouchers, leading to an increase in social inequalities in education. Moreover, the shift did not necessarily result in improved educational standards overall.

Research and subsequent analysis have shown that the voucher system did not lead to a significant enhancement in educational outcomes. Instead, it was criticized for perpetuating socio-economic disparities in access to quality education. In later years, there have been efforts to reform the education system to address these issues and promote greater equity and quality in education.

In both the pension and education sectors, the legacies of these policies are still present in contemporary Chilean society. Efforts to reform these systems have been ongoing, with a focus on mitigating inequality and ensuring better outcomes for all citizens.

Health

The Pinochet regime did not change the health system initially, though it progressively cut funding. Then in 1979 it replaced the Servicio Nacional de Salud with the Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud, and replaced a health fund, the Servicio Médico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA) with a new one, the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA). Employees contributed 7% of their gross income. The fund also covered unemployed persons. They implemented reforms, including of taxation and social welfare. President Bachelet reformed pensions in the late 2000s to help the poorest 60% of the population. The reformed pensions did not depend on contribution history, but left core elements of the privatized scheme in place. Education policies from the dictatorship also persisted despite a 2006 “Penguin Revolution”, when high school students revolted against the segregation of public and private schools and a 2011 revolt by university students demanding an end to the free-market approach to education. In the health sector, President Lagos seemed to make substantive reforms in Plan AUGE, enacted in 2004. This required timely access to high-quality health care by public and private providers, along with financial protection, for a list of health conditions. The initial list of 25 health conditions expanded incrementally to the current 85. President Sebastián Piñera announced inclusion of another 5 at the onset of the crisis of 2019. But he also left in place the inherited structures. He did not tackle widespread co-payments required of all except some groups (such as the unemployed, FONASA groups A and B). All others [ISAPRES and FONASA (Groups C and D)] pay from 0 to 20% of the total price of services. The continued strength of conservative forces and, especially the military in the early years of democratic governments, represented a political consensus favouring minimal reforms without dismantling fundamental power structures.

The Crisis of 2019

Protests of July 2020 were no longer on the streets but had merged into popular criticism of the government’s pandemic response, began on 17 October 2019 when students jumped turnstiles in the Santiago subway system to protest against a 30 Chilean Peso (approximately 4 US cents) fare increase during peak hours. The increase was small but imposed during growing discontent with overcrowded carriages and already high fares. Protests soon escalated. Large crowds gathered in peaceful rallies to demand major changes to social protection policies including pensions, education, and health. Then violence erupted; the police were unable to control the situation, despite deploying considerable violence themselves.

The government declared a State of Emergency on October 19, 2019, giving the Armed Forces responsibility to restore order in the capital. The use of troops evoked the history of brutality by the Chilean dictatorship. Deploying the military did not restore calm. On October 20, 2019 the general in command declared a curfew from 10 pm to 7 am, the first during democratic rule in Chile. Violence, including human rights violations, mushroomed. On October 23, 2019 President Sebastián Piñera responded to growing demands with an “agenda social” (social agenda), measures to alleviate concerns about the health system including a ceiling on out-of-pocket spending, an insurance plan to cover drugs, and an agreement between the Central Nacional de Abastecimiento (National Centre for Supply) and the most important private drugstore companies to reduce the price of medicines for those who obtained health care from public providers.

Despite this “agenda social”, peaceful rallies and violent protests continued, now nationwide. On November 15, 2019 representatives of almost all Chile’s political parties represented in the bicameral Congress signed The Agreement for Peace and a New Political Constitution. It included provisions for referenda, a first scheduled for April 26, 2020. It was then postponed to October 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was to ask Chileans if they agreed to creation of a new constitution; and if so, who should prepare it? A new constitution would replace the one left by the Pinochet regime, which prioritized a market economy over social protection. Piñera’s government simultaneously escalated repressive measures. On November 21 & 26, 2019 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published reports on human rights violations in Chile since the start of civil disorder. Both reports included evidence of excessive force by police during protests, including use of shotguns loaded with rubber pellets blamed for more than 220 eyes injuries. The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Office recommended changes to police practices.

Chile’s health system: a success story?

Chile had been making progress economically and socially despite the lack of fundamental reforms. That is why the eruption of widespread public discontent surprised many. Chile boasts the highest per capita Global Domestic Product (GDP) in South America, and, in 2010, was the first country from that continent to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Social progress was especially apparent in the health sector. In 2010, the World Health Report described Chile as an “in the right way country”, highlighting its progress to Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Early analyses of implementation of the Plan AUGE, intended to improve access to facilities near peoples’ homes, reduced waiting times, improved quality, and caps on co-payments (maximum 20% of the price and no more than one month’s family income for the family in a year), reported a 30% an increase in use of health services for conditions such as type 2 diabetes and hypertension and improved survival after acute myocardial infarctions. President Michelle Bachelet extended health coverage further during her second term, enacting the 2015 Ley Ricart Soto. It established Financial Protection System for High-Cost Diagnostics and Treatments, not previously covered, and diagnostic investigations and treatments for oncological, immunological, and rare diseases. The Law also established a commission to set priorities. It was made up of two members of patient organizations and twelve renowned specialists in public health, medicine, bioethics, economy, health law, and drugs named by the Ministry of Health. While attribution of changes in health outcomes to a particular policy is always difficult, there are signs that these policies have improved access to health care facilities. The Health Access and Quality Index, part of the Global Burden of Disease program, measures deaths that should not occur with timely and effective care, adjusted for the risk profile of the population. Despite starting at similar levels, Chile pulled ahead of Argentina and Uruguay after 2000. Use of health services for conditions covered by AUGE increased, in some cases dramatically.

Problems remain

Health reform has been a high priority for Chile’s leaders in since Pinochet’s rule. Wide inequalities remain and benefits from reform have flowed unevenly to groups in the population. Vasquez and colleagues showed that service utilization increased for all groups and inequalities narrowed, but by 2009 a pro-rich pattern of consultations with dentists, specialists, and other physicians persisted, findings that are supported by research on measures such as specialty visits, laboratory tests, and hospitalization. All demonstrate concentration of utilization by the most affluent households, and of emergency visits by those with fewest resources. Patients report continuing barriers to care, especially co-payments. Out-of-pocket spending is high by OECD standards and many households experience catastrophic costs. In 2018 Chile´s health expenditure per capita was US$ 2182, one of the lowest among OECD countries; it has grown rapidly, at a rate among the highest of OECD countries. As a percentage of GDP, spending increased from 6.8% in 2010 to 9.0 % in 2011. Polling reveals persisting disaffection with health care. Wide inequalities persist in availability, affordability, and utilization of health services. Death rates among those waiting for treatment of conditions not covered by AUGE have increased. Chile’s economic system has made it one of the most economically unequal countries in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.49. Wealth inequality is harder to measure but seems to be even higher, with the share of GDP owned by billionaires the highest in the world (excluding tax havens).

Where does the power lie?

The commitment of successive Chilean governments to implement change is not in doubt but they have been unable to make major changes to the two-tier system created by the dictatorship. In the health sector, powerful private insurers remain unscathed. Silva argued that a coalition of business leaders and landowners influenced policies of the Pinochet regime and their power persisted after the democratic transition. The legacy amounts to an implicit agreement between them and subsequent governments to permit democracy, but without challenging much of the status quo. Chile is not unique in this; elsewhere fundamental political and economic reforms. They show that changes in de jure power, such as those brought about by a transition to democracy, can be offset by changes in de facto power, especially where the stakes are high for elites.

Conclusion

The Italian writer Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, in his novel The Leopard, described an aristocratic Sicilian family finding ways to retain influence during the Italian Risorgimento, delivering the famous quotation: “everything must change so that everything can stay the same”. On the surface, everything has changed in Chile. But as to the distribution of power, everything has stayed the same. The recent crisis drew attention to weaknesses in the health system but, if our analysis is correct, to be effective the response will not just be a technical fix but a fundamental reassessment. Recently, Crispi and colleagues wrote: “Chile must decide have left existing power relationships largely intact. Notable examples include the transition from communism in Europe, where many of the previous leaders transformed overnight into “democrats” and the rapid recovery of slave owning families in the Confederate states after the American civil war. Acemoglu and Robinson developed an equilibrium model to explain this, in which they distinguish the “elite” from the “citizens”. The former hold de facto power even though the latter have de jure power if the time has come for a profound structural change, based on a different set of political and ethical principles”.

By: Rajnish Kumar

The BRICS has provided a platform for cooperation for emerging economies that face common challenges. Many countries have applied for membership, but only six of them got the membership and joined the BRICS. BRICS comprises 46% of the world’s population, 29% in terms of nominal GDP, and controls 42% of oil production.

Now membership has been increased from five to eleven nations. Brazil, Russia, India, and China were the founding members of the BRIC. Before the joining of South Africa in 2010, it was BRIC which was then renamed to BRICS. The first meeting was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009. Now six more countries have joined this group from January 01, 2024. The six new member-nations are Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and UAE. Iran was added to this group because of Russia’s manoeuvring. They both are close allies. The emphasis is more on its unity and it is all about the emergence of the Global South and greater representation. This may bring global tensions to the fore, mostly in the West. As emphasised BRICS can be the most solid block globally. BRICS countries want to work a modus operandi. BRICS main cooperation areas are finance, health, technology, security, and business. This shows Global South-South cooperation and multilateral engagement.

Economic Reasons

The BRICS countries comprise 25% in terms of nominal GDP and are emerging markets. It is also emphasized not using dollars anymore for their trade. They want to trade in a digital currency. The BRICS has formed ‘The New Development Bank’ based in Shanghai. The main focus of this bank will be on infrastructural development and financial stability. 

They have developed a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which will protect against global liquidity pressures and the potential for the short-term balance of payment availability. The CRA was formed to compete with the IMF. It was formed in 2014 during Brazil’s meeting by the Treaty of Establishment of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement.

They jointly developed the BRICS payment system and BRICS basket reserve currency. African nations will get more development opportunities and realize industrialization and economic diversification. This will be a win-win situation for the African Nations. They also want to make Africa a Continental Free Trade area which is going to be the engine for their economic development. 

Russia’s supply of food materials to African nations will also continue. BRICS has developed the ‘Vaccine Research and Development Centre’ for preventing large-scale infectious disease and global health governance. BRICS do not want to use the Dollar as their currency anymore. They use the term de-dollarization of the region, which means more trust in the local currency.

Most of the BRICS countries have very little trade between them. But their trade with the G7 countries is more in comparison. European Union uses their currency which is also a reason they want to counter it by trading in their currency.

While paying debt they have to pay more in dollars, so they want an alternative to over-reliance on the US dollar. There will be equal distribution of shares between the shareholders of NDB.

Political Robustness

BRICS is a larger grouping than the G7. Many countries have an interest in joining the group. China was very keen to expand its members. This group can be ‘BRICS plus’ for a wider scope and cooperation at higher level. Although dozens of countries were interested to join, now only six have been added. Indonesia and Mexico also wanted to join the grouping but they might get a chance in the next meeting. The motive of Russia and China to expand the group is to counter the West.

But can it be fruitful for countries like India and Brazil to go against the West? India has very close ties with the West. There are some tensions between India and China related to their border issues. It can be challenging for India to balance with the West while pursuing its multilateral cooperation and national interest within the BRICS

Institutions like the IMF and the World Bank are dominated by the P5 countries; three out of five are from the West. 

Grouping in the BRICS is the rise of rest as they are underrepresented by the dominance of the West in many institutions. Expanding the grouping is for getting more opportunities and engagement of like-minded nations. It is also important for them to have mutual trust, maintain proper communication, coordinate on major international issues, and security cooperation.

Strategic Strength of BRICS

Since the BRICS controls nearly 42 % of oil production, they are not worried that if they start trading in their local currency, there will be little impact on their trade while having sanctions on them. To counter the sanctions imposed by the UN on countries like Russia, and Iran they developed the BRICS payment system and the NDB.

The main grouse of BRICS nations is that the West is using the dollar as a weapon. Hence, they have created a more institutional and multilateral architecture to reflect their desire. 

Global economic platforms and infrastructures are available like the IMF and the World Bank but still, nations are willing to join the BRICS. The reason is simple that they want their representation. Out of the BRICS countries, only two have a permanent seat in the UNSC, and the other three seats are within G7 countries.

G7 countries were not able to help many nations during the global pandemic Covid-19. Most of the nations are victims of colonialization. They have diverse security concerns like terrorism, regional conflicts and cyber threats.

Conclusion

Day by day the functioning of BRICS is getting better. This grouping can be criticized on the basis that this will work as an alternative pole. This may create a situation like the Cold War period. There are some differences within the group if we talk in terms of democracy. If we compare the trading pattern of the European Union trading in their currency EURO it may take a longer time for the BRICS countries. It can be said that they are trying to copy the West on some stances.

Indo-Pacific is a growing region for trade and the US dominates it. These regions may be chaotic in the future; no one can predict the interests of the states.  China wants to expand its economy as much as possible and the US is trying to counter it. If more members join the group there are chances that this group may dominate the globe and can be a threat to the US hegemony, which is diminishing. This may be a power shift or a change of world order by the Global South in general and the BRICS in specific.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Israel-Palestine war is not new, but has been a part of the world for decades. Hamas had never infiltrated Israeli defence before October 07, 2023 killing more Israeli compared to when Egypt, Syria and Jordan was at war with Israel 50 years ago in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Hamas also busted the myth of Israel’s invincibility and having the best defence system in the world by piercing through 22 points. The Indian approach towards the Palestine has changed a lot after India became Independent. In early years of independence, India stud with Palestine against Israel by opposing the Western Colonialism and Domination to the Middle East.

India’s Middle East Strategy

India recognized Israel right after the independence, but never established diplomatic relations until after the cold war in January 1992. This relationship was normalized by India’s Prime-Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and started the cooperation in military area. India-Israel relations became strong when Israel helped India with military aid in Kargil war in 1999. However, Prime-Minster Narendra Modi took this relationship on a whole different level when he came power in 2014.

An Indian Prime Minister visited Israel in 2017 for the first time. This visit was considered a major turning point in India-Israel relationship and India’s stand in Israel-Palestine war. Following the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel, the Israeli Prime-Minister also visited India after few months. This boosted the economic and defence ties between India-Israel. India became Israel’s largest defence customer by importing approximately 45% of arms export showing the interest for the long term strategic relation. India has spent about US $4.2 billion between 2001–2021 on Israeli weapon sysytems.

For a long period of time, India’s Middle-East ties were majorly influenced by Oil and Energy but now there are Strategic deals as well. India has been trying to make economic and defence ties with Middle-East by different diplomatic tools. Israel-Palestine War of 2023 started less than a month after the G20 Summit held in New Delhi, in which they announced ‘The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor’ (IMEC) in the presence of the European Union, the US, France, Germany, and Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Similarly, India became a part of I2U2 which stands for ‘India, Israel, United Arab Emirates and United States’ in July 2021, through which India is trying to tackle the water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security challenges with the Middle-East. Also the Indian Prime-Minister’s visit to Jordan, Palestine, Qatar, Oman, UAE, and Egypt has proven that India’s interest for keeping the good diplomatic relations with the Middle-East. Hamas group might be able to slow down the agendas of all these institutions.

On February 10, 2018 the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Palestine for the first time where he was awarded the highest Palestinian award of the “Grand Collar of the State of Palestine” for providing aid of US$ 42.1 million to Palestine for nation building in education, health, women empowerment and capacity building.

India’s balancing strategy may suffer due to the Israel-Palestine war after 07 October 2023. India is surrounded by Pakistan and China who are not only supporting Palestine but they are also against United States supporting Israel. If not all the governments in the Middle-East, at least some of the Monarchies might reconsider the economical and strategical ties with India.

India’s stands on Israel-Palestine conflicts have also had domestic impact. Considering the fact that the Modi Government is supported by Hindutva ideology and India is one of the largest Muslim populated non-Muslim country, almost 600 million people in South-Asia are Muslims, including 400 million within India itself. Hence, it will have huge political impact in entire South-Asia if India’s balancing act become entirely one-sided.

Change in strategy due the Israel-Palestine war

On the response of Hamas attack on Israel, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted by showing support for Israel and stating that India always stands against terrorism. However, in response to the Hamas attack on October 07, 2023, Israel attacked Palestine killing more Palestinian comparatively. After the Israeli attack on Palestine, Indian Prime-Minister Modi tweeted his shock on the loss lives of the innocent civilians of Gaza in the bombing of Al-Ahli hospital and provided humanitarian aid to Palestine. This proved that India’s defence deals with Israel did not change its principle position on Palestine by keeping the balancing approach towards Israel-Palestine conflict.

India is the largest oil-consumer and importer in the World, thanks to the rising population, the Israel-Hamas conflicts has raised concern for potential impact on oil prices in India. Till September 2023, India imported 44 % oil from Middle-East including 21 % form Iraq and 18 % from Saudi Arabia. The Reserve Bank of India has pegged an exchange rate of 82.5 Rupees against the US dollar with the crude oil prices at $85 per barrel for the year 2024. This could have a huge influence on India’s strategy in the Middle-East. Therefore, India is trying to find other sources for the oil import such as Guyana, Canada, Gabon, Brazil, and Colombia.

Israel-Palestine conflict has also impacted the bordering countries of Palestine. They might speed up their military and defence technological development because of any potential threat from Israel. Iran’s recent nuclear development has also raised concerns for many countries in the world.  If Iran becomes a nuclear state, it could be a big problem for Israel, considered to be the only nuclear country in the Middle-East. Iran is also considered to have links with the 3Hs, i.e. Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis and also links with the other Islamic militant groups. With India being one of the nine nuclear armed states, Hezbollah supporting Hamas linked with nuclear armed Iran could potentially have detrimental effect for not only India-Middle East strategic relations but many others countries in the world.

In the recent years, India has taken more balancing strategy towards Israel-Palestine conflict. On one side, India is against terrorism but also do not support colonization of Israel over Palestine. On one hand, India has been importing arms form Israel along with providing humanitarian aid for Palestine. Indian Prime Minister condemning the Hamas attack on Israel and at the same time India sympathised with the lives lost in Gaza. This balancing act has served India rather well. India is looking forward to build on the I2U2 partnership because United States is one of India’s best friends while Israel is best partner in defence sector. The United Arab Emirates’ defence and economic diplomacy is working better in India’s favour as well. India has transitioned its economic relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council into a strategic partnership. Indian has defence engagements with Arab countries with maritime ships regularly deploying in the Gulf of Aden in the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

India always have managed to maintain strong diplomatic relationship with America, Russia, Israel, Palestine and many other countries in the world. India has used the I2U2 and IMEC to strengthen long-term strategic relations with not only Middle-East but the Europe and the West as well. This is one of the reasons why India is called the Vishwaguru. India supports the Two-State solution to end the Israel-Palestine conflict. Being said that, India could play a big role in the Middle-East conflicts by being the link between the Israel and Palestine. India could help to alleviate the war and provide a solution to the conflict. The best approach for India is to continue the balancing act that India has always opted for the long-term strategic approach.

What Hamas did on Israel on October 07, 2023 is something no country has ever done before and it might leave its mark on entire Middle-East. But the world has been selective about the identification and definition of terrorism. Hamas has been accused of killing about 1200 people in Israel but it the fact can’t be over-looked that Israel has killed approximately 24000 Palestinians, since October 07, 2023. For many countries Hamas is terrorist organization but for Palestine and majority of Arab countries, Hamas is considered as a freedom fighting organization. Considering the fact that Israel is an occupying country while Palestine has been considered to be the biggest open air prison in the world and trying to get freedom and live freely for decades. In this matter, India’s Middle-East balancing strategy is considered the best approach to deal with the Middle-East conflicts, since India condemns all terrorist acts including Hamas, since India has been the victim of both terrorist attacks and border conflicts but at the same time India also supports the Palestinian people by providing Humanitarian aid.

By: Harshit Tokas, Research Analyst, GSDN

The upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential elections scheduled on January 13, 2024 features a three-way race among Vice President William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and former Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). This analysis focuses on Hou Yu-ih’s foreign policy and his stances on critical issues concerning cross-strait relations, defense and international partnerships.

Hou Yu-ih, the KMT’s presidential nominee and current Mayor of New Taipei City, initially lacked substantial foreign policy experience, having primarily served in law enforcement roles before his mayoral positions. However, his campaign for the presidency has pivoted toward positioning the election as a choice between war and peace, framing the KMT as the party prioritizing peace and cross-strait stability, contrary to the DPP’s rhetoric of democracy versus autocracy.

Central to Hou and the KMT’s strategy is the promotion of cross-strait dialogue as a key pillar for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They perceive the absence of dialogue as heightening the risk of conflict, advocating that increased cooperation between Taiwan and China diminishes the likelihood of war. However, the KMT’s reliance on the “1992 Consensus,” where both sides recognize one China but with differing interpretations of the governing entity, creates ambiguity, especially with China interpreting it differently, seeing Taiwan as a part of China.

Initially hesitant to fully embrace the 1992 Consensus due to its lack of resonance among voters, Hou’s stance evolved over time, aligning with powerful KMT figures, and eventually endorsing it in his foreign policy narrative. He emphasizes the importance of Taiwan’s democratic system while opposing moves towards formal independence or absorption into China’s “One Country, Two Systems” framework, aligning with public sentiment against such an arrangement.

On the economic front, Hou intends to resurrect the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), aiming to open Taiwan’s service sectors to Chinese investment. This proposal, which was a flashpoint sparking the Sunflower Movement in 2014, raises concerns regarding increased economic dependence on China. Hou also aims to allow Chinese students in Taiwan to work during their studies, suggesting an opening toward more economic integration.

Regarding defense, Hou highlights the necessity of bolstering Taiwan’s military capabilities as a foundational component in dealing with China. Diverging from the prior KMT administration’s approach of stagnant defense budgets, Hou advocates for a robust defense strategy, emphasizing the importance of deterrence and preparedness in the face of potential threats from mainland China.

Hou also emphasizes the strengthening of Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Japan. He expresses support for initiatives like the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade and desires enhanced security cooperation with the US, intending to conduct joint military exercises, actions that China opposes. Moreover, Hou seeks to improve ties with Japan, understanding its crucial role in the larger regional dynamics.

As the election approaches, Hou’s embrace of more traditional KMT policies, including the 1992 Consensus, aims to secure support within his party. His challenge lies in balancing cross-strait dialogue with defense priorities and managing potential demands from China that could restrict Taiwan’s autonomy or security arrangements.

If Hou secures victory, China may initially reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait, seeking closer ties with Taiwan. However, differing stances on unification might eventually lead to challenges, potentially straining cross-strait relations again. How China under Xi Jinping handles this divergence in goals, whether tolerating the status quo or pushing for resolution—remains uncertain.

Hou Yu-ih’s evolving foreign policy framework presents a delicate balancing act between maintaining peace, asserting Taiwan’s autonomy, and managing relations with China and global allies, a landscape laden with complexities and potential pitfalls as Taiwan navigates its future trajectory.