By: Priya Naik, Research Analyst, GSDN

Pakistan’s geopolitical significance has been shaped by three distinct phases of superpower engagement, each reflecting shifting global power dynamics and regional security imperatives. From Cold War alliances to post 9/11 counterterrorism partnerships, the external powers have used Pakistan’s strategic location and military capabilities to advance their interests in South Asia and beyond.

The U.S.-Pakistan alliance emerged as a cornerstone of Washington’s Cold War containment strategy. In 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States, formalising military cooperation aimed at countering Soviet influence. This partnership led to Pakistan’s inclusion in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1959, despite Pakistan’s geographic distance from these regions. These alliances provided the U.S. access to military bases near Soviet borders, including Peshawar Air Base, which hosted U-2 spy planes monitoring USSR activities.

Pakistan’s value stemmed from its position as a “frontline state” bordering Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia. The CIA’s Operation Cyclone (1979–1989) epitomised this relationship, with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) channelling US$ 630 million annually in U.S. and Saudi funds to the Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviet forces. This collaboration transformed Pakistan into a conduit for Western arms, including Stinger missiles, while reinforcing military authoritarian governance under General Zia-ul-Haq.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the USSR’s 1991 dissolution abruptly reduced Pakistan’s strategic utility. U.S. aid plummeted from US$ 4.2 billion in the 1980s to US$ 5 million by 1993, with sanctions imposed after Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. The Pressler Amendment (1990) halted military sales, reflecting Washington’s prioritisation of non-proliferation over alliance politics.

This period saw Pakistan pivot toward China and Saudi Arabia for security partnerships, while its support for Taliban factions in Afghanistan drew international condemnation. The 1999 Kargil conflict further strained U.S. ties, as the Clinton administration pressured Pakistan to withdraw forces from the PoJK (Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir).

The September 11 attacks revived Pakistan’s strategic importance. Under U.S. pressure, General Pervez Musharraf abandoned support for the Taliban, granting the Pentagon access to airbases for Operation Enduring Freedom. Between 2001 and 2010, Pakistan received US$ 18 billion in U.S. aid, including US$ 10 billion for counterterrorism operations. The partnership enabled the capture of 689 Al-Qaeda operatives, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, but fuelled domestic unrest over drone strikes and sovereignty violations.

Post-2011, tensions resurfaced over Pakistan’s alleged support for Afghan Taliban factions. However, the 2021 Taliban takeover reinforced Pakistan’s role as a regional stabilizer, with the U.S. relying on Pakistani mediation during evacuation efforts1. China’s Belt and Road Initiative investments, particularly the US$ 62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have concurrently deepened Islamabad’s ties with Beijing, illustrating Pakistan’s “multi-alignment” strategy in the 21st century.

This historical arc demonstrates how superpowers have alternately embraced and distanced themselves from Pakistan, contingent on evolving security paradigms. The country’s enduring role as a geopolitical pivot ensures its continued relevance despite cyclical crises in international partnerships.

The United States and Pakistan

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan represents one of the most enduring yet complicated strategic partnerships in global politics, spanning over seven decades through periods of intense cooperation and significant tension. Despite fluctuating dynamics, Pakistan has maintained its position as a critical frontline state in counterterrorism efforts, providing essential access to Afghanistan during the War on Terror while receiving substantial military and economic assistance from the United States. Recent developments indicate a shifting focus in the relationship, with the U.S. pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific region while maintaining counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan. However, persistent concerns regarding Pakistan’s alleged dual approach toward militant groups, particularly along the Afghanistan border, continue to create friction in bilateral relations, even as both nations acknowledge the strategic necessity of their partnership in addressing regional security challenges.

• Pakistan as a Frontline State in Counterterrorism

Pakistan has established itself as a crucial frontline state in the global war against terrorism, particularly following the September 11 attacks that fundamentally altered the international security landscape. In the aftermath of these attacks, Pakistan positioned itself at the forefront of counterterrorism efforts, providing critical intelligence sharing, logistical support, and military operations that proved invaluable to United States security objectives in the region. This partnership has come at a significant cost to Pakistan, with the country suffering casualties exceeding 8,500 military personnel and approximately 35,000 civilians in terrorism related violence over the years. The Pakistani government under President Musharraf took decisive action by banning several militant terrorist organisations and detaining thousands of extremists, demonstrating a commitment to rooting out terrorist networks within its borders. These actions directly facilitated American counterterrorism operations and contributed significantly to the capture of high-value Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets, underscoring Pakistan’s strategic value as a partner in combating global terrorism4.

The enduring importance of Pakistan in counterterrorism efforts is further reinforced by ongoing bilateral security dialogues and cooperative initiatives. Senior officials from both nations continue to emphasise the importance of expanded counterterrorism collaboration, including exchanges of technical expertise, investigative and prosecutorial assistance, and border security enhancements. Pakistan’s extensive knowledge of local terrain, cultural contexts, and regional dynamics provides unique advantages that complement American technological and intelligence capabilities, creating a synergy that has proven effective in addressing terrorist threats. This strategic partnership has evolved to address emerging security challenges, with Pakistan adapting its counterterrorism approach to confront more sophisticated and diverse threats while maintaining alignment with broader international security objectives.

• Foreign Military Financing and Coalition Support Funds

The United States has maintained a substantial program of military assistance to Pakistan, primarily through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Coalition Support Funds (CSF), which have been instrumental in building Pakistan’s counterterrorism capabilities. These funding mechanisms have enabled Pakistan to acquire advanced military equipment, enhance training programs for security forces, and develop specialised counterterrorism units capable of addressing complex security challenges. The financial support has been particularly crucial for Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal areas along the Afghan border, where the terrain and operational environment present unique challenges requiring specialised equipment and tactics. This assistance has facilitated Pakistan’s ability to conduct sustained counterterrorism operations against militant groups that pose threats to both regional stability and American security interests.

Coalition Support Funds have served as a reimbursement mechanism for the costs incurred by Pakistan in supporting U.S.-led counterterrorism operations, reflecting the American recognition of Pakistan’s role as a frontline state. These funds have covered expenses related to military operations, logistical support, and the deployment of Pakistani forces in security operations aligned with broader counterterrorism objectives. The financial assistance has been accompanied by technical support, including the provision of border security infrastructure and specialised training programs designed to enhance Pakistan’s capacity to monitor and secure its porous western border with Afghanistan. This comprehensive approach to military assistance has aimed not only at addressing immediate security threats but also at developing sustainable counterterrorism capabilities that can function independently of direct American involvement.

• USAID Programs and Economic Support

Beyond military assistance, the United States has implemented extensive economic support programs through USAID that target development challenges and socioeconomic factors contributing to instability in Pakistan. These initiatives have focused on critical sectors including education, healthcare, energy, and governance, with the dual objectives of promoting economic growth and addressing underlying conditions that can foster extremism. The economic assistance has sought to capitalise on Pakistan’s population of over 240 million people, which represents not only a significant market for American businesses but also a demographic that requires educational and economic opportunities to resist radicalisation. Projects have included infrastructure development, vocational training programs, and investments in renewable energy, all designed to strengthen Pakistan’s economic resilience while fostering closer bilateral ties.

The economic partnership between the United States and Pakistan has extended beyond direct aid to include trade relations, with the U.S. maintaining its position as Pakistan’s largest trading partner. This commercial relationship has created opportunities for technology exchange, investment, and market access that complement the direct assistance provided through official development channels. Despite fluctuations in the overall bilateral relationship, economic assistance programs have provided a degree of continuity and demonstrated an American commitment to Pakistan’s development and stability that transcends periodic tensions in other aspects of the relationship.

• Balancing India-Pakistan Interests

The United States has faced persistent challenges in balancing its relationships with Pakistan and India, two nuclear-armed neighbours with a history of conflict and mutual suspicion. This balancing act has become increasingly complex as the United States has pursued closer strategic ties with India while attempting to maintain its longstanding security partnership with Pakistan. For Pakistani policymakers, American engagement with India raises concerns about regional power dynamics and the potential impact on Pakistan’s security interests, particularly regarding disputed territories like Kashmir. These concerns have influenced Pakistan’s strategic calculations and occasionally affected its willingness to align fully with American counterterrorism priorities, especially when these are perceived as potentially strengthening India’s regional position.

Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state has added another layer of complexity to the relationship, with the United States attempting to promote responsible nuclear stewardship while acknowledging Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India. Pakistan has positioned its nuclear capabilities as a means of deterrence in an unstable region rather than as leverage for aggression, a stance that aligns with American interests in maintaining strategic stability but also reflects Pakistan’s perception of existential threats from its larger neighbour. The nuclear dimension has elevated the strategic importance of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship while simultaneously introducing additional complications regarding non-proliferation objectives and regional security dynamics.

The challenge of balancing these competing interests has led to a relationship characterised by periods of close cooperation interspersed with significant tensions and mutual frustration. American policymakers have struggled to reconcile strategic objectives that sometimes pull in different directions, seeking to maintain counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan while developing a strategic partnership with India focused on broader regional and global challenges. For Pakistan, this balancing act by the United States has created uncertainty about long-term American commitment and occasionally fuelled perceptions that Pakistan’s sacrifices and strategic value are underappreciated in comparison to the growing U.S.-India relationship. These dynamics have required careful diplomatic management to prevent misunderstandings and maintain productive engagement on shared security concerns despite competing regional interests.

• Shifting U.S. Focus Toward Indo-Pacific and Implications for Pakistan

The United States has been strategically pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific region, reflecting growing concerns about China’s rising influence and the changing global power dynamics. This strategic reorientation has significant implications for Pakistan, which must navigate an evolving security landscape where its traditional importance in American counterterrorism efforts may be overshadowed by broader geopolitical considerations. The shift has been accompanied by a deepening U.S.-India strategic partnership, creating potential challenges for Pakistan’s regional standing and its relationship with the United States. Pakistani policymakers are increasingly cognizant of the need to diversify international partnerships and adapt to a changing strategic environment where American priorities may be less centred on South Asia than during the height of the War on Terror.

Despite this shifting focus, Pakistan maintains strategic relevance to American interests through its unique geographical position and potential role in regional stability. Pakistan’s proximity to China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan continues to provide it with significant diplomatic leverage and strategic importance in addressing regional challenges. The country’s relationship with China, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), introduces another dimension to the evolving regional dynamics and American calculations regarding Pakistan’s strategic value. As competition between the United States and China intensifies, Pakistan’s position at this geopolitical intersection may acquire renewed significance, albeit in ways that differ from its traditional role as a frontline state in counterterrorism efforts.

The implications of this shifting focus for Pakistan include potential reductions in American military assistance and changing parameters for bilateral security cooperation. This transition has prompted Pakistan to reconsider its strategic options and explore alternative partnerships, while still seeking to maintain productive engagement with the United States on issues of mutual concern. The evolution reflects broader changes in international relations and regional security dynamics, requiring adaptability from both nations to preserve the elements of their partnership that continue to serve shared interests. Pakistan’s response to this shifting landscape will significantly influence the future trajectory of U.S.-Pakistan relations and determine whether the partnership can successfully transition to address new challenges despite changing strategic priorities.

China and Pakistan

The China-Pakistan relationship stands as one of the most resilient and multifaceted strategic partnerships in modern international relations, forged through seven decades of geopolitical upheavals and mutual strategic calculations. Rooted in shared security concerns following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, this alliance has evolved into a comprehensive framework encompassing military cooperation, nuclear proliferation, infrastructure megaprojects, and coordinated efforts to counterbalance India’s regional ascendancy. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at US$ 62 billion, epitomises this deepening integration by physically linking China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea, while simultaneously addressing Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages and infrastructure deficits. This partnership, however, transcends mere economic interests, functioning as a geostrategic counterweight to India and a critical node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), even as both nations navigate the complexities of great power competition and shifting regional dynamics.

• Post-1962 Sino-India War Foundations

The 1962 Sino-Indian War fundamentally reshaped Asia’s geopolitical landscape, creating the conditions for China and Pakistan to establish their “higher than the mountains” partnership. Following its military defeat, India sought Western assistance to modernise its armed forces, prompting China to cultivate Pakistan as a strategic counterweight. This alignment crystallised with the 1963 Boundary Agreement, which resolved territorial disputes in Kashmir’s Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan regions. By demarcating borders through “mutually beneficial adjustments” that preserved both nations’ administrative control, the agreement eliminated a potential flashpoint while establishing Pakistan as China’s primary South Asian partner.

China’s support during Pakistan’s 1965 and 1971 wars with India cemented this partnership. During the 1965 conflict, China mobilised troops along the Sikkim border, forcing India to divert military resources from Pakistan’s western front. This intervention, coupled with substantial arms transfers including MiG-19 fighters, demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to directly bolster Islamabad’s defence capabilities. The relationship reached its zenith in 1972 when China cast its first UN Security Council veto to block Bangladesh’s admission, a dramatic show of solidarity following East Pakistan’s secession. These actions established the template for China’s “all-weather” commitment, contrasting sharply with the United States’ arms embargoes during Pakistan’s moments of crisis.

• Evolution of Military and Nuclear Cooperation

The partnership’s military dimension intensified following India’s 1974 nuclear tests, with China initiating covert technology transfers that laid the groundwork for Pakistan’s nuclear program. Declassified intelligence assessments reveal that Chinese assistance included uranium enrichment technology, centrifuge designs, and critical missile components, enabling Pakistan to detonate its first nuclear device in 1998. This proliferation network, operated through entities like the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), transformed South Asia’s strategic balance by providing Islamabad with a credible nuclear deterrent against India’s conventional military superiority.

Contemporary defence cooperation has expanded to include joint weapons production, exemplified by the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter. Developed collaboratively by Chengdu Aerospace Corporation and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, over 70% of the jet’s components are now manufactured in Pakistan, showcasing technology transfer commitments. The partnership has recently entered hypersonic weapons development, with Pakistan test-firing the Chinese-designed CM-400AKG missile-capable of Mach 4.5 speeds-aboard JF-17 platforms, directly countering India’s S-400 air defence systems.

• BRI’s Flagship Project

CPEC constitutes the operational core of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, accounting for 20% of BRI’s total investments as of 2024. The corridor’s US$ 62 billion portfolio spans 32 energy projects, 2,700 km of highways, and 1,872 km of rail networks, designed to slash China’s Middle East oil transport distance from 12,000 km to 2,395 km. This infrastructure web positions Gwadar Port-capable of handling 100,000 DWT vessels-as China’s “western oil lifeline,” bypassing the vulnerable Malacca Strait chokepoint that carries 80% of Beijing’s energy imports.

The economic calculus extends beyond logistics: CPEC’s 22 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) aim to relocate Chinese manufacturing capacity to Pakistan, leveraging Islamabad’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP+) status with the EU. Initial successes include the Rashakai SEZ, where Chinese firms have established textile and automotive plants exporting to European markets duty-free. However, security challenges persist, with the Pakistan Army deploying 15,000 personnel exclusively for CPEC protection, reflecting the project’s strategic prioritisation.

Gwadar’s transformation from a fishing village to a deep-water port exemplifies CPEC’s strategic ambitions. The port’s 2023 expansion, featuring 32 new berths and -18 meter draft capabilities, enables it to service supertankers carrying Qatari LNG and Saudi crude to Xinjiang via the 3,000 km China-Pakistan Pipeline. This infrastructure directly challenges India’s regional maritime dominance, providing China with naval access just 400 km from the Strait of Hormuz through which 21 million barrels of oil transit daily.

• Armaments Co-Production Ecosystem

China’s defence exports to Pakistan surpassed US$ 6.4 billion in 2023, making Islamabad Beijing’s second-largest arms client after Saudi Arabia. This trade extends beyond transactions into integrated production networks:

1. Aerial Platforms: The JF-17 Block III, equipped with Chinese KLJ-7A AESA radars and PL-15E missiles, provides Pakistan with 4.5-generation capabilities rivalling India’s Rafale jets. PAC Kamra’s production lines now manufacture 25 fighters annually, with 60% indigenous content.
2. Naval Systems: Karachi Shipyard’s construction of four Type 054A/P frigates-armed with CY-1 anti-submarine missiles-marks Pakistan’s induction of blue-water capabilities, countering India’s aircraft carrier groups.
3. Missile Technology: The recent test of the Shaheen-V ICBM, derived from China’s DF-26, grants Pakistan a 4,750 km strike range covering all Indian territories and Diego Garcia, the U.S. military hub.

This cooperation extends into dual-use technologies, exemplified by the Chashma-5 nuclear power plant. Utilising China’s Hualong One reactor (HPR1000), the US$ 3.5 billion project provides 1,200 MW of electricity while advancing Pakistan’s civil nuclear expertise potential pathway for military applications.

• Cybersecurity and Space Collaboration

The 2022 China-Pakistan Space Cooperation Agreement has borne fruit with the 2024 launch of PAKSAT-MM1, a dual-use communications satellite providing 5G coverage across CPEC routes. Jointly developed by CAST and SUPARCO, the satellite’s synthetic aperture radar capabilities enable real-time CPEC security monitoring while enhancing Pakistan’s reconnaissance capacities along the LOC.

Parallel advancements in cybersecurity include the National Cyber Emergency Response Team (PakCERT), modelled on China’s CNCERT. This collaboration has thwarted 12,000+ cyberattacks on CPEC infrastructure since 2020, utilising AI algorithms developed by Huawei’s Lahore R&D centre.

• The India Factor

China’s partnership with Pakistan has always served as a strategic hedge against India, a calculus evident in three historical phases:

1. 1962-1971: Direct military support during India-Pakistan conflicts, including arms transfers and border mobilisations.
2. 1980s-1990s: Nuclear and missile technology transfers to offset India’s conventional superiority post-1971.
3. Post-2000: Economic statecraft through CPEC to encircle India via Gwadar and PoK infrastructure.

This containment strategy intensified following India’s 2020 Ladakh standoff with China, prompting Beijing to fast-track CPEC’s western alignment highway network traversing Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK). India’s protests over territorial sovereignty have been dismissed, with China arguing these are “legitimate economic activities” in Pakistan-administered regions.

• The Quad Countermeasure

China perceives the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Quad alliance as an Indo-Pacific containment strategy. CPEC and Gwadar directly counter this by:

1. Naval Positioning: Gwadar’s 2024 expansion includes a Chinese-operated naval maintenance facility, enabling PLAN submarines to operate in the Arabian Sea without returning to Hainan, a 7,000 km reduction in deployment range.
2. Energy Security: The China-Pakistan Pipeline transports 18% of China’s Iranian oil imports via Gwadar, circumventing U.S. sanctions enforcement in the Persian Gulf.
3. Economic Interdependence: 82% of the CPEC workforce are Pakistani nationals, creating local stakeholders resistant to Indian-led initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
4.  

Russia and Pakistan

Russia and Pakistan, once considered distant players in international relations, have developed increasingly substantial ties over the past decade. This transformation represents a significant shift from their historically cold relationship during the Soviet era and early post-Soviet period. The partnership now encompasses military cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, economic collaboration, and strategic alignment on regional issues. This evolution reflects broader geopolitical changes in South Asia and the recalibration of both nations’ foreign policy objectives in a multipolar world.

The relationship between Russia and Pakistan has undergone a remarkable transformation since 2010, marking a significant shift from their previously limited engagement. This recalibration began against the backdrop of changing regional dynamics and evolving strategic priorities for both nations.

• Policy Reversal and Diplomatic Warming

In 2010, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin initially maintained distance from Pakistan, stating that Russia was against developing strategic and military ties with Pakistan because of Russia’s desire to emphasise strategic ties with India. However, a notable policy reversal occurred in 2011 when Putin publicly endorsed Pakistan’s bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and acknowledged Pakistan as “a very important partner in South Asia and the Muslim world” for Russia. This diplomatic warming represented Moscow’s recognition of Pakistan’s strategic importance in the region and signalled a willingness to develop a more multifaceted relationship.

The diplomatic engagement continued to strengthen with Russia’s strong condemnation of the 2011 NATO strike in Pakistan, with the Russian foreign minister declaring it “unacceptable to violate the sovereignty of a state, even when planning and carrying out counter-insurgent operations”. This statement aligned with Pakistan’s position and demonstrated Russia’s support on matters of territorial sovereignty.

• High-Level Exchanges and Institutional Frameworks

The post-2010 period witnessed a significant increase in high-level exchanges between Moscow and Islamabad. In October 2012, Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani visited Moscow, where he received a warm reception from Russia’s Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Vladimir Chirkin.

A crucial institutional development occurred on August 31, 2013, when Pakistan and Russia concluded their first strategic dialogue at the foreign secretary’s level in Moscow. The Pakistani delegation was led by Foreign Secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani, while Russia’s First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Georgiyevich Titov, represented the Russian side. This dialogue established an institutional framework for building closer relations through discussions on cooperation in political, economic, defence, and other sectors.

• Shared Concerns Over Terrorism

Both nations recognised the need for collaborative approaches to address extremist threats that could destabilise the region. The SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) became an important platform for enhancing collaborative efforts in countering extremism and terrorism.

Following Pakistan’s admission to the SCO, cooperation intensified further. The Special Representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan, Mohammad Sadiq, noted after his visit to Moscow on September 9, 2022, that both sides share similar views on the situation in Afghanistan and plan to continue consultations on this issue in the future. This alignment on Afghanistan policy represents a critical area of convergence in their foreign policy objectives and security interests.

Joint Military Exercises and Arms Deals

A cornerstone of Russia-Pakistan military cooperation has been the “Druzhba” (Friendship) joint military exercises. These exercises were initiated in 2016 and have continued regularly, with six editions held alternately in Pakistan and Russia. The most recent iteration, “Druzhba VII,” commenced in October 2024, demonstrating the ongoing commitment of both nations to this military partnership. These exercises focus primarily on counterterrorism capabilities, with special forces from both nations participating in counter-terrorism drills under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well.

Security analyst Umair Aslam highlighted that “Counterterrorism is a major domain in which militaries from Pakistan and Russia have been working together for the past few years”. These exercises serve multiple purposes: enhancing interoperability between the armed forces, sharing tactical expertise, and signalling to the international community the deepening defence ties between Moscow and Islamabad.

• Strategic Arms Deals and Military Equipment Sales

In 2015, Pakistan and Russia signed a landmark defence agreement that included the sale of four Mi-35 ‘Hind E’ attack helicopters to Pakistan. This deal marked a crucial milestone as it represented the first major arms transfer from Russia to Pakistan in the post-Cold War era.

The military-technical cooperation has historical roots that were revived in the modern context. In 1996, Russia for the first time signed an agreement on the supply of multi-purpose Mi-17 helicopters to Pakistan, and from 1996 to 2004, the Russian Federation supplied approximately 70 helicopters to Pakistan. This cooperation was expanded under newer agreements, with Moscow supplying Pakistan with a batch of Mi-35 attack helicopters and signing contracts to deliver anti-tank systems, air defence weapons, and small arms as of early 2021.

Pakistan has also shown interest in purchasing additional Russian military hardware, including another 10-12 Mi-35 helicopters and potentially multi-purpose Su-35 fighters with longer range capabilities than the Chinese JF-17s currently in service with the Pakistani Air Force. Although reports from 2018 suggested Pakistan had finalised a contract for the purchase of 54 SU-35 fighters, this information was not confirmed.

The defence partnership extends beyond equipment sales to include military education and training. On August 7, 2018, during the visit of Russian Deputy Minister of Defence Alexander Fomin to Pakistan, a contract was signed providing Pakistani servicemen with the opportunity to study at universities of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This agreement was particularly significant as it came following the first meeting of the Russian-Pakistani Joint Military Advisory Committee (JMCC) and represented a shift for Pakistan, whose officers had previously been trained primarily in the United States.

The JMCC, established in 2018 as the principal bilateral forum for defence cooperation, operates within the framework of the 2014 defence cooperation agreement between Islamabad and Moscow. This committee has become an important institutional mechanism for advancing the military partnership.

The momentum in defence cooperation continues to build. In October 2024, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu of the Pakistan Air Force emphasised strengthening military ties with Russia through collaborative training programs, joint military drills, and industrial collaboration during a meeting with a high-level delegation led by Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister, Colonel General Aleksandr V Fomin.

• Energy and Economic Cooperation

The flagship project in Russia-Pakistan energy cooperation is the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline (PSGP), formerly known as the North-South gas pipeline or PakSteam. This ambitious infrastructure project involves constructing a 1,100 km pipeline stretching from the port city of Karachi to Kasur in Punjab. With an estimated cost of approximately US$2.25 billion as of 2021, the project represents a significant investment in Pakistan’s energy infrastructure.

The history of this project reflects the evolving nature of Russia-Pakistan relations. Initially, the Pakistani government signed an agreement in 2015 under which Russia would build and operate the pipeline for the first 25 years before transferring ownership to Pakistan. However, implementation was delayed, and the agreement was later renegotiated under the government of Imran Khan. The new ownership structure gave Pakistan a 74% equity stake, with Russia retaining 26%, making Pakistan the majority owner from the outset. This renegotiation had the added benefit of avoiding potential violations of U.S. sanctions against certain Russian corporate entities.

The pipeline project is particularly significant for Pakistan, which faces acute energy shortages, especially during winter months when demand for gas soars and the country relies heavily on imports. President Vladimir Putin has confirmed that pipeline gas supplies to Pakistan are possible, and that part of the necessary infrastructure has already been created.

• Trade and Humanitarian Assistance

The relationship has also included humanitarian and trade dimensions. Following catastrophic floods in Pakistan in 2022 and the resulting threat of food shortages, Russia offered to supply wheat to Pakistan in addition to gas supplies. This gesture highlighted the multifaceted nature of the relationship beyond pure strategic calculations.

Both nations have expressed their commitment to expanding trade relations. During high-level dialogues, Pakistan and Russia have agreed to increase high-level contacts, coordinate positions on regional and international issues, and expand trade and investment relations, particularly in energy and power generation1. While the volume of bilateral trade remains relatively modest compared to their respective trade with other partners, there is recognition on both sides of significant untapped potential.

• Russia’s South Asian Balancing Strategy

Russia’s engagement with Pakistan must be understood in the context of India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States. As New Delhi has moved closer to Washington, Moscow has sought to diversify its relationships in South Asia, though it continues to maintain its historically strong ties with India. Russian officials have explicitly stated that “increasing military cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow would not negatively impact Russia’s ties with India”, indicating Russia’s careful balancing act in the region.

This approach reflects Russia’s broader foreign policy objective of maintaining influence in multiple theatres and avoiding excessive dependence on any single partner. By developing ties with Pakistan while preserving its relationship with India, Russia aims to maintain strategic flexibility and leverage in South Asia.

• Pakistan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

From Pakistan’s perspective, the warming of relations with Russia represents a strategic diversification from its traditional reliance on the United States and China. Following periods of strained relations with the U.S., particularly over Afghanistan and counterterrorism policies, Pakistan has sought to expand its diplomatic and strategic options.

As Admiral Naveed Ashraf, Chief of the Naval Staff, expressed, “Pakistan greatly values its relations with the Russian Federation and desires to forge a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Russia.” This statement reflects Pakistan’s aspirations for a more balanced foreign policy that reduces vulnerability to shifts in any single bilateral relationship.

Why Superpowers Continue Supporting Pakistan Despite Challenges

Pakistan’s enduring strategic value to global powers stems from a confluence of geographic, military, and geopolitical factors that outweigh concerns about its internal instability or regional tensions. Superpowers such as China, the United States, and Russia prioritise engagement with Pakistan due to its unique position at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, coupled with its nuclear capabilities and influence in Islamic multilateral forums.

• Geostrategic Location as a Regional Pivot

Pakistan’s borders with China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan make it a critical node for regional security and connectivity. Its proximity to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar Port—a linchpin of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—offers China direct access to Indian Ocean trade routes, reducing reliance on the vulnerable Malacca Strait. For Russia, Pakistan serves as a gateway to warm-water ports and Central Asian energy markets, while the U.S. historically leveraged Pakistani territory for counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The 909 km Iran-Pakistan border, though occasionally tense due to cross-border militancy, also positions Pakistan as a buffer state between Iran and India. This role attracts attention from powers seeking to manage Shia-Sunni or Indo-Iranian rivalries.

• Nuclear Deterrent and Risk Management

As the world’s fifth-largest nuclear arsenal holder, Pakistan’s “massive retaliation” doctrine and evolving tactical nuclear capabilities demand international engagement. Despite concerns about the security of its warheads, highlighted by incidents like the recent 2025 border attacks, superpowers prioritise dialogue to prevent escalation in South Asia. China’s assistance in modernising Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure and the U.S.’s emphasis on safeguarding Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) reflects efforts to mitigate risks of unauthorised access or regional conflict.

• Influence in the Muslim World

Pakistan’s stature in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), where it is the second-largest member by population, amplifies its diplomatic clout. This influence helps superpowers like China and Turkey align with Muslim-majority nations on issues such as Kashmir, while Saudi Arabia relies on Pakistani military support for regional security initiatives. Pakistan’s role as a nuclear-armed Islamic state also provides symbolic value to allies seeking to counterbalance India’s growing global prominence.

• Regional Balancing Against India and Iran

China’s support for Pakistan is evident in arms deals, CPEC investments, and diplomatic backing at the UN, directly counters India’s regional dominance. Similarly, U.S. military aid to Pakistan, though reduced post-2011, historically aimed to prevent outright Indo-Pakistani conflict. Russia’s recent arms sales to Pakistan, including Mi-35 helicopters, signal a diversification from its traditional India-centric South Asia policy, driven by New Delhi’s deepening ties with Washington. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s tensions with Iran over border security and sectarian proxies create opportunities for external powers to mediate or exploit this rivalry.

In conclusion, Pakistan’s geopolitical indispensability, nuclear deterrence, Islamic leadership, and role in regional power dynamics compel superpowers to maintain alliances despite governance challenges or security risks. As competition in South Asia intensifies, this strategic calculus is unlikely to diminish.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

The United States (US) and The People’s Republic of China (China) stepped back from trade decoupling, as the US reduced tariffs from 145 percent to 30 percent, however, the 50 percent tariffs remain on goods exported from China.

China is reducing the tariffs to 10 percent from 125 percent based on the talks organized in Geneva. It was predicted by “The World Trade Organization (WTO)” that the US-China trade could fall by more than 80%, where decoupling includes a separation of ties and dismantling of trade and investment relations.

Modifications in Tariffs

Tariffs imposed before April 02, 2025, known as the “de-minimis rule” would continue, however, ease of tariffs can be attributed to:

• Raising of the US Treasury Yield to 4.5%
• Loss of credit ratings
• Debt ceiling crisis in the US

High debt in the US could result in a default by August 2025 if Congress fails to act. The tariff modifications include the following:

The United States will:

(i)                  Modify the application of the additional ad valorem rate* of duty on articles of China (including articles of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region) set forth in Executive Order 14257 of 02 April 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles pursuant to the terms of said Order; and

(ii)                 Removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Executive Order 14259 of April 08, 2025 and Executive Order 14266 of April 09, 2025.

Ad valorem: An ad valorem rate refers to a tax or duty based on the assessed value of an item.

Role of China in the Modification of Tariffs

China will make the following modifications:

(i)                  Modify accordingly the application of the additional ad valorem rate of duty on articles of the United States set forth in Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 4 of 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining additional ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles, and removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 5 of 2025 and Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 6 of 2025; and

(ii)                 Adopt all necessary administrative measures to suspend or remove the non-tariff countermeasures taken against the United States since April 2, 2025.

Fentanyl Tariffs in China

China is still under “Fentanyl Tariffs” which were imposed in February 2025 and March 2025, however, there is a possibility of a reduction or halt in tariffs after the 90-day lapses. The 90 days is based on the “Geneva Talks” which states that reciprocal tariffs could be based on negotiations with other countries, with the possibility that the US could impose prohibitive tariffs on China. High tariffs could result in adding products including electric vehicles, steel and aluminium, and rare earth minerals to the controlled export list.

China initiated an anti-dumping probe into chemical firm DuPont’s <Dupont De Nemours Inc>, in addition to, the blacklisting of the US defense and tech firms. Elimination of firms from the list which barred trade and investment in China, in addition to the elimination of countermeasures, and stalling anti-dumping investigations could revive trade between the two countries.

The US-China Contention & Drug Transit

The fentanyl crisis is a point of contention between the two countries, where Beijing considers the US responsible for the crisis. The US kept 20% of tariffs in place citing the inaction of Beijing in stopping the export of chemicals used in protection of the opioid. The synthetic drug is manufactured from a combination of chemicals, which was approved by the US regulators in medical settings as a pain reliever in the 1960s.

Fentanyl, however, emerged as a key drug responsible for opioid overdose deaths in the US; it is mixed with illicit drugs, which resulted in the expansion of global supply chains making it harder for law enforcement and policymakers. The chemicals are reported to be sourced by traffickers and turned into finished products in labs in Mexico, before being smuggled into the US. The drug transit is undertaken via the northern border of Canada and the southwest border of Mexico, in addition to the sea routes or checkpoints.

Sinaloa Cartel & Money Laundering

China is not the key source of illicit fentanyl supply to the US; however, it is the key supplier of precursor chemicals used in the production. Any imposition of export controls by Beijing could disrupt global pharmaceutical supply chains. Mexico is reported to be the hub of supply of the drug, where the Sinaloa Cartel undertakes tactics to conceal shipments that incorporate chemicals amongst legitimate goods, mislabelling of containers, and shipping via third-party countries.

The US initiated domestic enforcement of regulations to contain drug smuggling and money laundering, in addition to, increased surveillance. China classified fentanyl as a narcotic in 2019, however, trade in chemicals involved in the manufacturing of the drug remains unrestricted, which could potentially result in evading the law.

Encrypted platforms and cryptocurrency payments are misused to undertake illicit transit of drugs, which is backed by “The House of Representatives Committee Report on China” stating that “subsidies in the form of value-added tax rebates are provided to companies which manufacture and fentanyl and synthetic narcotics outside the country.”

Role of World Trade Organization (WTO)

China dismissed the accusations and scheduled fentanyl analogs as controlled substances in 2019. The Embassy of China in Washington undertook a special campaign to control the illegal smuggling, manufacturing, and trafficking of fentanyl in cooperation with the US authorities. A counter-narcotics group was formed to work on curbing fentanyl production and export; however, concealment of financial transactions, bureaucratic procedures, and money laundering pose a challenge to contain the crisis.

China, in addition, filed a lawsuit at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the US tariffs and implemented countermeasures. China has established legal and administrative systems for scheduled precursor chemicals, where authorities expand the control list of precursors of fentanyl-related substances and supervise their production, sales, purchase, transportation, and export. The customs departments proceed with export clearance with declaration documents and the export permit, there have been no reports of recorded applications for export or selling of fentanyl-related substances abroad by Chinese enterprises. (The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand).

The WTO can undertake active measures against trade protectionism and align multilateral frameworks. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) cautioned that the US growth could fall below the baseline forecast of 2.2% in 2025, where increased protectionism could result in high unemployment, and dampen domestic consumption. The Peterson Institute for International Economics stated that 90% of the costs from the US tariffs on China harm businesses operating in the US, and any escalation of the tariff war could reduce global growth by 0.8% points in 2025 and 1.3% points in 2026 as per the IMF 2025 Global Economic Outlook.

Role of India – Trade Deal & Tariff Exemptions

India is known as the “Pharmacy of the World” and supplies vaccines and medicines on a global scale, however, India’s Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) reported exporting illicit fentanyl to Mexico and Guatemala. The US Department of Justice indicted pharmaceutical companies in India for importing ingredients to make illicit fentanyl.

The ATA Report introduced complexities in the US-India trade relations, which could lead to enactment of targeted tariffs. The US was India’s largest trading partner in 2024, accounting for USD120 billion of bilateral trade, however, a lack of regulatory procedures poses a risk to the reputation of pharmaceutical industry manufacturing and exports. There has been an escalation in the movement of manufacturers from China to India, relocating operations due to weaker regulations and challenges in monitoring.

The US-India discussions have moved to the evolving military and security situation in the Indo-Pacific, operating around “Operation Sindoor”, with any disruptions on tariffs on halt until August 2025. India and the US are undertaking a bilateral trade pact by July 08, 2025, reiterating a mutually beneficial trade agreement to boost investment and manufacturing in India.

New Delhi put forth the demand of undertaking an interim deal for a full exemption of 26% reciprocal tariffs imposed by the US on Indian goods, which is currently under suspension with exporters to pay only 10 percent of the baseline tariff until July 09, 2025. New Delhi seeks permanent suspension of tariffs, which is based on the approval of the Congress to reduce the tariffs below the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate, however, the administration holds the executive authority to lift reciprocal tariffs, New Delhi, meanwhile, offered to drop all tariffs on the US goods.

By: Anuraag Khaund, Guest Author

As the western front of India remains at boil in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, further west in Afghanistan, a new strategic re-alignment was being attempted. On 21 May, Beijing was witness to the coming together of the Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi, Pakistan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar and the Acting Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi on the occasion of the informal China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meet. The meeting coming on the heels of the recent India-Pakistan conflict as well as in the immediate aftermath of the first ministerial level contact between Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar and his counterpart in the Taliban regime has raised eyebrows regarding the said trilateral meeting.

Most voices have raised concerns whether the latter is an attempt to rope in Afghanistan or specifically the Taliban to be a part of the China-Pakistan axis aimed at encircling India which now also includes a hostile Bangladesh. What further vitiates the above sentiment are some of the outcomes of the Trilateral Meeting which appear inimical to India’s strategic and security interests. Foremost amongst them is the elevation of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan including exchange of ambassadors under the aegis of Chinese facilitation and the promotion of the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan thereby making Kabul a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Such actions are aimed only at embedding the Taliban regime into the China-Pakistan strategic nexus and political- economic networks but also undermining India’s position in Afghanistan and the broader sub-continent.

The unprecedented show of solidarity exhibited by the Taliban in its condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack labelling it as ‘undermining regional security and stability’ has rattled Pakistan, especially its military- intelligence establishment which once welcomed the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021 as the return of its ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. However, such hopes were dashed with the rise in tensions between the new Afghan rulers and their former patrons which culminated in the airstrikes and cross border skirmish of December 2024. The eruption of conflict was paralleled by the increase strategic outreach  undertaken by India as seen in the meeting between Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri and Muttaqi in UAE during January 2025 which was preceded by the Indian interactions with figures such as Acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and the presence of an Indian ‘technical team’ in Kabul since 2022 to maintain New Delhi’s engagement with the Afghan people. Such strategic alignment and the resultant strengthening of India’s position in Afghanistan coupled with strained ties with Taliban would have rendered Pakistan into a disadvantageous position and faced with the prospect of conflict on its eastern as well as western fronts.

Hence, the elevation and strengthening of diplomatic ties through the exchange of ambassadors would not only strengthen the channels of communication between Islamabad and Kabul but also create stakes especially for the Taliban regime in maintaining a stable bilateral relationship. The exchange of ambassadors would further elevate the level of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban as compared to the junior technical level Indian presence. For China, the cessation of hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial not only for its interests of stability along its borders with the latter two and the protection of investments like CPEC but also the undermining of Indian opportunity to bolster its position by exploiting the tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.

The extension of the CPEC into Afghanistan not only reflects the long-standing Chinese interest in enhancing its economic footprint in Afghanistan through connectivity and cooperation projects but also ulterior strategic designs specifically aimed at India. Firstly, the above extension  into Afghanistan would transform the Taliban into a stakeholder in the CPEC which passes through the Gilgit- Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) thereby complicating Indian calculations and any actions regarding the area. In addition, the inclusion and participation of Afghanistan in the CPEC would allow Kabul access to the port of Gwadar thereby affecting the prospects of Chabahar as an alternative outlet for Afghan international trade while also diluting its strategic value in enhancing India-Afghanistan economic and humanitarian linkage and connectivity.

At the same time, the embedding of Afghanistan into CPEC by extension, the BRI would also allow Beijing greater influence over the Taliban which it can be used to achieve objectives ranging from unfettered access to Afghanistan’s reserves of Rare Earth Elements (REE) to facilitating Pakistan’s proxy war with India. Reportedly, intelligence agencies have raised concerns that the above expansion of the CPEC and the construction of logistical hubs in Afghanistan could lead to the creation of a ‘Terror Corridor’ allowing Pak-supported outfits as well as ideological bedfellows of the Taliban like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) along with groups based on Afghan soil such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to send militants over to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) along with the cross-border funneling of weapons, funds and drugs. All of these occurring under the plausible deniability of China and in collusion with Pakistan and a pliant Taliban regime bound into a relationship of dependency with both Islamabad and Beijing through Gwadar and CPEC. Such fears are not unfounded given the threat issued by the Afghanistan based outfit Al- Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and a Pakistan seeking to settle scores after its humiliation in the current conflagration with India.

The extension of the CPEC also lays the possibility for its joining with the strategic Wakhan Corridor sharing borders with Pakistan (PoK) as well as China and Tajikistan. While attitudes of both China and the Taliban are at odds vis-a-vis the feasibility and safety of the aforementioned corridor, yet the possibilities created by a pliant Taliban regime and an economically interconnected non-hostile Af-Pak landscape might tempt Beijing to link CPEC with Wakhan thereby creating another outlet for the Terror Corridor utilizing the proximity to PoK. From Chinese perspective, security challenges such as the Uyghur militants and ISKP could be managed by exploiting Taliban’s conflict with the latter  as well as using the ‘good offices’ of Pak sponsored groups like JeM in re-directing the accumulated ‘jihad momentum’ towards India through the CPEC-Wakhan into J&K.

The above-described situation, undoubtedly would put India in a tight spot critically affecting its foothold in an already constrained space in the Af-Pak region. The ‘restriction of Indian influence in Afghanistan’s political and security landscape’ as being the aim of the trilateral meeting was also confirmed by local media outlets. Hence, there should be no qualms about the urgency of India to step up its game to counter the nefarious designs of the China- Pakistan ‘iron brotherhood.’

First and foremost is the need to urgently expedite the development of the Chabahar port and the related infrastructure such as the railway line connecting the port to the city of Zahedan along the Iran-Afghanistan border and further extension of the same to Zaranj in Nirmuz province of Afghanistan. The swift completion of the above railway stretch from Zaranj to Chabahar will facilitate seamless utilization of the port and accomplish Afghanistan integration into the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connectivity project spearheaded by India, Iran and Russia. In addition, New Delhi should also emphasize the benefits and advantages offered by Chabahar and the INSTC vis-a vis CPEC especially in terms of stability and security. Given the frequency of insurgent attacks and blasts along the CPEC and its transit through the restive province of Balochistan, the Taliban’s quest for international trade and commerce would be better suited by Chabahar and the Zahedan-Zaranj line. Iran should also be roped in to highlight the advantages and benefits of the same not only because of Iranian stakes in Chabahar but also the because of shared concerns regarding the re-emergence of a Pakistan-controlled or aligned Afghanistan given the strained relations between Tehran and Islamabad over Pakistani support for anti-Iran militants.

 While concerns might arise due to the Trump administration’s rescinding of the earlier sanction-waiver on Chabahar in February 2025 as well as the uncertainty over the future shape of US-Iran ties in the midst of the Gaza conflict and nuclear talks, India should not budge and remain steadfast in the pursuance of its own interests and issue-based alignment with Iran as an exercise of New Delhi’s strategic autonomy vis a vis Washington and Tehran. The practice of strategic autonomy by India without any hesitation for apparent American displeasure or ire is justified in light of the hastily Trump imposed ceasefire in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and the facilitation of IMF bailout to Pakistan despite evidence of its usage in funding terrorism by Islamabad. Not to mention the detrimental effects to Indian interests in Chabahar on adhering to US preferences. Even as American military assistance for Pakistan continues unabated along with the signing of lucrative cryptocurrency deal between Trump and Islamabad. Faced with such blatant disregard of Indian interests, should New Delhi reciprocate?

Coming to US again, its reviewing of whether to designate the Afghan Taliban as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’  is itself an indication of Washington according primacy to national interest over the concerns of others or the wider international community. Similarly, Trump’s outreach to Syrian interim president Ahmed-al Sharaa, a former US Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the lifting of sanctions upon Syria again underlines the importance attached to pragmatism and strategic interest over consideration of norms or perceptions of others. Hence, it would be duplicity on the part of US to call out India over the pursuance of its own strategic interests regarding Iran. Moreover, the Trump’s administration’s quest of re-establishing its presence in the Bagram air base and the seeking of ‘limited intelligence presence’ ( intelligence cooperation) in Taliban ruled Afghanistan have no chance of fructifying with a Kabul under the control of China and Pakistan. Therefore, it would be in America’s own interest to allow the strengthening of India’s footprint in Afghanistan which is only possible through successful execution of strategic projects such as Chabahar and the INSTC. Vice-versa US presence as a counter to Chinese influence in Afghanistan would also benefit India.

Finally, in view of the fluid and unstable nature of the variables affecting India’s Afghan interests, it would be not be wise for New Delhi to keep all its eggs in one basket or bank only upon a single actor (Taliban regime)− a mistake repeated during the Afghan republic era of Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai administrations. Simultaneous to its incremental engagement with the ruling Taliban regime, New Delhi should also reach out and establish contacts with the exiled anti-Taliban resistance groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF)  based in Tajikistan and led by Ahmad Massoud. In this regard, India can draw upon its legacy of providing support to the erstwhile Northern Alliance, the earlier anti-Taliban resistance from 1996-2001 led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the father of the current NRF leader.

In addition, New Delhi should also utilize the goodwill towards India present among prominent members of the resistance such as ex Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh as evident in the latter’s vocal support for India’s conduction of Operation Sindoor against Pak-based terrorism. However, India should double down in its efforts before it is outmaneuvered by Pakistan whereby Islamabad was reportedly exploring channels of communication with the NRF as well as partnership with Tajikistan aimed against the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the December 2024 border clash.

Let not the winds blowing from the Hindukush and Pamirs blow us away from the soil of Kabul as we hold on.

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of modern international relations’s most transformative and ambitious foreign policy and development projects. Launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the initiative was initially introduced as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), symbolizing the revival of the ancient Silk Road that once connected China to Europe through Central Asia. Over time, the initiative evolved into the Belt and Road Initiative, embodying a multidimensional framework of economic corridors, trade networks, digital infrastructure, energy cooperation, and cultural exchanges. This vision encompasses more than a singular infrastructural project; it represents a strategic endeavor by China to position itself at the center of a new global order, reshape international trade routes, and reinforce its economic and diplomatic reach far beyond its borders.

The BRI comprises two primary components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt consists of land-based corridors that seek to connect China to Europe via Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East. This segment primarily involves the development of transcontinental railways, energy pipelines, roadways, and industrial parks, aiming to reduce the over-reliance on maritime trade routes and to strengthen China’s integration with the Eurasian landmass. Meanwhile, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road focuses on sea routes that stretch from China’s eastern seaboard to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe through the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and beyond. These two prongs envision a vast network of interconnected infrastructure projects that facilitate trade, investment, and political cooperation.

Over a decade into its implementation, the BRI has expanded its geographical footprint extensively, with more than 140 countries and international organizations having signed memoranda of understanding with China to participate in the initiative. These agreements span diverse sectors, including transport, energy, digital infrastructure, and industrial development. Investments under the BRI framework have ranged from constructing high-speed railways in Southeast Asia to deep-water ports in Africa, oil pipelines in Central Asia, and smart city technologies in the Middle East. China’s financial commitments to the BRI are enormous, estimated to exceed US$ 1 trillion, primarily financed through Chinese policy banks such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, as well as commercial lending by state-owned enterprises and local governments.

Despite these ambitious goals and expansive activities, the success of the BRI remains a subject of intense debate and is multifaceted. Proponents argue that the initiative has brought much-needed infrastructure, connectivity, and economic stimulus to developing countries, filling gaps left by traditional Western-led development institutions. They contend that the BRI promotes mutual development and South-South cooperation. However, critics raise concerns about the political and economic implications of the initiative, including fears of debt dependency, erosion of sovereignty, lack of transparency, and the projection of Chinese strategic interests under the guise of economic cooperation. Moreover, geopolitical tensions have intensified as rival powers such as the United States, India, and the European Union increasingly view the BRI as challenging the existing international order.

This paper is dedicated to critically assessing the extent to which the Belt and Road Initiative has succeeded in fulfilling its stated and implicit goals. It does so by examining the initiative’s economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions. The economic analysis focuses on trade flows, infrastructure development, investment patterns, and debt sustainability. The strategic dimension explores China’s use of the BRI to secure energy routes, project military influence, and expand its technological standards. The geopolitical assessment evaluates how the BRI has altered alliances, regional balances of power, and the global perception of China’s rise. Ultimately, the paper contends that while the BRI has achieved several noteworthy accomplishments and consolidated China’s influence in various regions, its long-term success remains uncertain and contingent upon how China addresses the internal and external challenges confronting the initiative.

The Genesis and Objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative

The conceptual roots of the Belt and Road Initiative can be traced to China’s internal economic transitions and strategic recalibration in the early 21st century. After three decades of rapid industrialization, China faced several structural challenges, including overcapacity in heavy industries, declining productivity growth, regional inequality, and the need to move up the global value chain. Moreover, the 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated financial system. It prompted Beijing to seek alternative global engagement models that would not be overly reliant on Western markets or institutions. In this context, the BRI emerged as a forward-looking strategy to export China’s surplus industrial capacity, create new markets for its goods and services, and integrate developing countries into a Sinocentric economic order.

Announced in two speeches by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, the BRI was presented as a vision to promote international cooperation and shared development. On the surface, the initiative appears benign and inclusive, emphasizing principles such as policy coordination, connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchanges. However, the underlying objectives of the BRI are far more complex and strategic. One key goal is to promote economic interdependence between China and other regions, thereby creating leverage in international negotiations and reducing the risk of economic isolation. By deepening infrastructure connectivity and cross-border investments, the BRI helps China to secure stable trade routes, energy supplies, and raw materials essential for its continued growth.

Another primary objective is to expand China’s soft power and diplomatic influence. Through its provision of development finance and infrastructure, China presents itself as an alternative to the West and a Global South champion. Unlike traditional Western development models that often come with governance and human rights conditions, Chinese-led projects under the BRI often emphasize mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. This approach has made the BRI particularly attractive to authoritarian regimes and developing countries that feel marginalized by the global financial architecture. Consequently, the initiative serves as a diplomatic vehicle to enhance China’s standing in the global south and to counterbalance Western influence in key strategic regions.

The BRI also serves a domestic political function. It reflects President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and his ambition to craft a personal legacy of national rejuvenation and global leadership. The initiative is closely tied to the “Chinese Dream” of national resurgence. It is often framed as a key pillar of China’s aspiration to reclaim its historical role as a central player in global affairs. By launching a project of such a global scale, the Chinese leadership aims to project confidence, assertiveness, and an image of inevitable ascendancy.

Additionally, the initiative is designed to address China’s security concerns and geostrategic vulnerabilities. For example, the over-reliance on maritime trade routes, particularly the Strait of Malacca, has long been viewed by Chinese strategists as a potential choke point that rival powers could exploit in times of conflict. Through the development of alternative land routes via Central Asia and Pakistan, as well as strategic port acquisitions in the Indian Ocean and Africa, the BRI attempts to circumvent this “Malacca Dilemma” and ensure energy and trade security. Moreover, by investing in volatile regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa, China aims to promote stability and create favorable conditions for Chinese companies operating abroad.

An important but often overlooked goal of the BRI is exporting Chinese standards and governance models. As China invests in smart cities, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure under the “Digital Silk Road” framework, it simultaneously promotes its technological platforms, regulatory frameworks, and cybersecurity protocols. This technological dimension allows China to shape the rules and norms of emerging digital economies, thereby challenging the dominance of Western firms and institutions in the digital space. The BRI is not merely an economic development project but a multidimensional strategy reflecting China’s global aspirations and internal imperatives. It seeks to address structural challenges within the Chinese economy, expand geopolitical influence, secure critical trade and energy routes, and promote a vision of global order that is more reflective of China’s interests and values. As such, understanding the BRI requires moving beyond its surface-level rhetoric and delving into its complex interplay of economic, strategic, and ideological motivations. In the following sections, this paper will critically examine how these ambitions have translated into tangible success, considering both achievements and the emerging challenges confronting the initiative on multiple fronts.

Economic Dimensions of the BRI: Successes and Limitations

The economic rationale behind the Belt and Road Initiative has always been central to its global appeal and strategic execution. At its core, the BRI was conceived to internationalize China’s economy, mitigate industrial overcapacity, and stimulate trade and investment across borders. In the initial years, this vision bore substantial fruit. Chinese state-owned enterprises, often supported by concessional loans from Chinese banks, spearheaded massive infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Europe. High-speed rail lines in Southeast Asia, energy pipelines in Central Asia, highways in Pakistan, and deep-sea ports in Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Greece demonstrated the initiative’s expansive economic footprint.

One of the early signs of success was the increased trade volumes and improved connectivity among participant countries. Nations with previously poor infrastructure were suddenly linked to regional and global markets, accelerating economic activity. The China-Europe Railway Express, for example, significantly reduced the time and cost of transporting goods between China and Europe, providing a competitive alternative to sea freight. Similarly, the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) opened up new trade possibilities for Pakistan, granting it improved access to energy and transportation networks. In Africa, Chinese-funded infrastructure under the BRI filled substantial gaps left by Western donors and international financial institutions, many of which had retreated from large-scale infrastructural development.

From China’s perspective, the BRI also helped reduce regional disparities within its borders. Western provinces like Xinjiang and Yunnan, which lagged behind the coastal regions in economic development, became key nodes in transnational connectivity projects. The initiative justified massive domestic investment in these regions, enhancing social stability and economic opportunity. Additionally, by facilitating capital outflows and creating external demand for steel, cement, and machinery, the BRI helped absorb surplus industrial capacity, threatening to destabilize China’s domestic economy.

However, the economic success of the BRI is far from uniform and has increasingly come under scrutiny. Several projects have been criticized for being economically unviable, poorly planned, or executed without considering local needs and capacities. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka became emblematic of these concerns when the Sri Lankan government, unable to service the Chinese debt incurred during construction, was forced to lease the port to a Chinese state-owned company for 99 years. This incident intensified fears of “debt-trap diplomacy,” a term critics use to describe how Chinese lending practices could lead to losing sovereignty and strategic assets in host countries.

Debt sustainability has emerged as a significant limitation of the BRI, especially in low-income and politically unstable countries. According to estimates from the World Bank and the Center for Global Development, several BRI participant countries are at high risk of debt distress due to large-scale borrowing from Chinese lenders under opaque terms. Many countries cannot generate sufficient revenue from the funded projects, leading to fiscal strain and growing dependency on Beijing. This has prompted calls for greater transparency in loan agreements, better risk assessment, and more inclusive planning processes involving local stakeholders.

Another significant economic challenge is the limited participation of local labor and firms in BRI projects. Chinese companies often import their workers, machinery, and technology, limiting the transfer of skills and economic benefits to host communities. This approach has led to local resentment, protests, and labor disputes in various countries, including Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Indonesia. Critics argue that instead of fostering inclusive development, the BRI often reinforces a model of dependency that benefits Chinese interests disproportionately. Despite these limitations, dismissing the BRI’s economic impact would be inaccurate. The initiative has catalyzed a renewed global interest in infrastructure development, prompting competing efforts such as the European Union’s Global Gateway and the United States’ Build Back Better World initiative. In this sense, the BRI has forced a global recalibration of development financing and infrastructure priorities, placing connectivity and regional integration at the center of economic policy discourse.

Strategic Dimensions: Security, Influence, and Power Projection

Beyond its economic goals, the Belt and Road Initiative is deeply embedded in China’s strategic calculus. Developing strategic infrastructure—such as ports, energy corridors, and digital infrastructure—has allowed China to project power and secure long-term geopolitical advantages in various regions. One of the most illustrative examples of this is the development of ports under the “String of Pearls” strategy, which includes facilities in Gwadar (Pakistan), Djibouti, Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Piraeus (Greece). While these ports are ostensibly commercial, they also serve dual-use purposes, with potential military logistics and naval presence applications.

Establishing China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, adjacent to a BRI-funded port, highlights how economic initiatives can blur into strategic power projection. This convergence has alarmed rival powers, particularly the United States and India, who see the BRI as a means for China to expand its military footprint under the guise of economic development. The growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and infrastructure development in key chokepoints have intensified strategic competition and altered the security dynamics in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, the BRI facilitates the projection of soft power and ideological influence. China has sought to promote its values and governance model through cultural exchanges, educational programs, media cooperation, and Confucius Institutes. The Digital Silk Road, which includes investments in telecommunications, surveillance systems, and e-commerce platforms, allows China to set technological standards and export its approach to digital governance. In countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Pakistan, Chinese firms have played a central role in developing national surveillance and internet infrastructure, raising concerns about authoritarian technology exports and the erosion of democratic norms.

The BRI has also enabled China to consolidate bilateral relationships and build regional coalitions. By offering attractive financing packages with minimal conditionality, China has been able to bypass multilateral institutions and engage in direct state-to-state diplomacy. This model has been particularly effective in regions where Western influence receded or was viewed suspiciously. For example, in Central Asia, the BRI has reinforced China’s strategic presence at the expense of Russia’s traditional influence. Despite tensions in the South China Sea in Southeast Asia, several countries continue to welcome Chinese investments as part of their national development strategies.

However, China’s strategic gains have not gone unchallenged. The United States and its allies have increasingly viewed the BRI as a tool for Chinese hegemony and have responded with counter-initiatives to limit Beijing’s influence. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, has emphasized infrastructure development, maritime security, and technological collaboration as part of its strategic counterbalance to the BRI. Similarly, the G7-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment aims to offer a transparent and sustainable alternative to Chinese financing. China’s strategic ambitions have also encountered resistance from the BRI partner countries. Concerns about sovereignty, environmental degradation, corruption, and political interference have led to the suspension, renegotiation, or cancellation of several BRI projects. In countries such as Malaysia, Myanmar, and Tanzania, newly elected governments have sought to revise or withdraw from Chinese-funded projects, reflecting domestic pushback against perceived Chinese overreach. These incidents reveal that the BRI’s strategic success is not guaranteed and depends heavily on local political dynamics and public sentiment.

Geopolitical Dimensions: Global Reordering and Resistance

Geopolitically, the Belt and Road Initiative challenges the liberal international order established after World War II. The initiative embodies an alternative vision of global connectivity that prioritizes state-led development, non-interference in domestic affairs, and bilateral cooperation over multilateralism and liberal norms. By positioning itself as the architect of this new order, China seeks to reduce Western dominance in global governance and offer a model of development that aligns with the interests of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.

The BRI’s expansion into Europe has caused divisions within the European Union, as some member states, such as Italy and Hungary, have signed on to the initiative despite opposition from Brussels. This has undermined the EU’s collective foreign policy stance and created opportunities for China to exploit internal differences. Similarly, the BRI’s outreach into Latin America and the Caribbean has brought China into the traditional sphere of influence of the United States, raising concerns in Washington about strategic encroachment and ideological competition.

At the multilateral level, China has used the BRI as a platform to push for reforms in global governance institutions. Through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, China has sought to create alternative mechanisms that reflect its priorities and reduce its reliance on institutions dominated by Western powers. While these efforts have gained some traction, they also raise questions about transparency, accountability, and the long-term consequences of a parallel global order.

However, the geopolitical landscape surrounding the BRI is becoming increasingly contested. The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with growing concerns over Chinese influence, has led to a reassessment of the BRI’s risks and benefits. Supply chain disruptions, rising debt burdens, and geopolitical tensions have caused delays and cancellations of many projects. Additionally, China’s domestic economic slowdown and shifting political climate have prompted a recalibration of the BRI itself. The emphasis has moved toward “small and beautiful” projects that are more sustainable and commercially viable rather than the grandiose infrastructure schemes of the early years.

Nevertheless, the BRI has established China as a central player in the evolving global order. Whether through economic leverage, strategic positioning, or ideological outreach, the initiative has reshaped international perceptions of China’s rise. It has also triggered a wave of counter-initiatives and forced other major powers to revisit their development and foreign policy strategies. In this sense, even amid resistance and recalibration, the BRI has fundamentally altered the geopolitical terrain.

Conclusion

More than a decade since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains one of the most ambitious global undertakings of the 21st century. Framed as an economic connectivity and infrastructure development project, the BRI has evolved into a multifaceted instrument of China’s global strategy, encompassing economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions. This research has shown that the success of the BRI cannot be evaluated in binary terms. Instead, it exists on a spectrum characterized by significant accomplishments alongside notable challenges and recalibrations.

Economically, the BRI has succeeded in expanding trade routes, increasing Chinese foreign direct investment, and addressing infrastructure deficits across Asia, Africa, and beyond. It has facilitated regional integration, improved transportation efficiency, and opened new Chinese goods and services markets. For several developing countries, BRI projects have offered a vital alternative to traditional development financing, allowing for the rapid construction of highways, railways, energy grids, and ports. At the same time, however, this success has been undermined by unsustainable debt burdens, lack of transparency, and limited local participation. The prevalence of Chinese labor and materials in BRI projects and governance issues has generated backlash and accusations of neo-colonialism, leading to delays, renegotiations, or even cancellations of significant contracts.

Strategically, the BRI has served as a powerful extension of China’s geopolitical footprint. Creating dual-use ports, energy corridors, and digital networks has allowed Beijing to enhance its influence beyond its borders. The initiative has helped consolidate relationships with strategically important countries, strengthened supply chains critical to China’s long-term energy and trade security, and challenged existing Western-led global structures. By embedding itself deeply in partner countries’ political and economic infrastructures, China has advanced its ambition to become a global leader. However, this strategic reach has also provoked significant resistance. Regional powers like India and global actors, including the United States and the European Union, have responded with alternative frameworks to curb Chinese dominance. These competing initiatives have triggered a reassertion of influence in regions where China once operated with little contestation.

Geopolitically, the BRI has played a transformative role in reshaping the international order. China has sought to project an alternative global development model that emphasizes state-led investment, non-interference, and bilateral cooperation, thereby presenting itself as a viable counterweight to Western liberalism. The establishment of parallel financial institutions like the AIIB has further enabled Beijing to challenge the primacy of Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, the geopolitical environment has grown more complex and adversarial recently. The pandemic, rising nationalism, a slowing Chinese economy, and geopolitical flashpoints such as the Russia-Ukraine war have exposed the fragility of global connectivity and compelled Beijing to adopt a more cautious and sustainable approach. This has been evident in the shift toward “small and beautiful” projects, more attention to risk management, and an emerging focus on “green” and digital BRI efforts from a Debt-Trap Diplomacy.

In sum, the Belt and Road Initiative has been partially successful. It has achieved much in terms of physical infrastructure creation, market expansion, and China’s global voice amplification. At the same time, it has also encountered structural, political, and ideological resistance that limits its full realization. The BRI’s future will likely depend on its ability to adapt to a rapidly changing global landscape, address concerns about debt and sovereignty, and foster more inclusive and transparent development partnerships. If China manages this recalibration effectively, the BRI could remain a cornerstone of 21st-century globalization. It may become a cautionary tale of overreach and contested ambition if not.

By: Pritam Sarbabdiya

The recent Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir underscores a hard reality in the realm of intelligence, strategic, and security affairs, the idea of achieving or ensuring permanent or absolute solutions to security threats like that of terrorism remains an elusive myth. Despite years of progress and preparedness through intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism strategies, and military presence, the attack has revealed an inherent limitation that no amount of planning or technology can ensure complete security. This piece delves into why the notion of a permanent solution is a myth, highlighting the realistic objectives of any state about the idea of security is about: minimising, retaliating, and safeguarding threats and risks.  

The immediate reaction that ruled the entire discourse points out various aspects that resulted in the deadliest Pahalgam terrorist attacks, many experts and certainly politicians have stressed various reasons whether its ‘intelligence failure or miscalculation’, to that of the government’s incapacitation to ensure absolute security in Jammu Kashmir, which can be unfolded before the citizens in future investigation. Watching the horrors, that have sent shockwaves across India and the world many asked a significant ‘What is the permanent solution’ to this decade-old problem? After the abrogation of Article 370 and extensive military presence in the valley, many expected that the issue of terrorism would be eradicated from the land of Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in chronic normalcy both in the lives of people and the heaven on earth. However, this attack has brought everything back to square one and brought out a debate on the table about ‘Can States ensure complete security?’

The notion of a permanent solution or absolute security to terrorism and strategic threats is not new but remains constantly evasive. Security threats today are no longer traditional, those days are gone when enemies or elements of threats were easily identifiable, the modern threat prospect includes trans-national terrorist networks, equipped with the same modern advantages that the states are also equipped with, for instance, when states rely on intelligence, the adversaries opt for significant counter-intelligence, simultaneously, no matter how many troops are deployed to ensure security, it is not practically possible to secure every inch or corner of the landmass.

Terrorists with the advantage of hiding their identity using both money and influence also succeed in carrying out operations using strategic loopholes employed by security agencies. The challenge is not just limited to India, internationally, for instance countries around the world struggle to guarantee complete protection against threats, whether it’s the United States of America or Israel who are seen as countries having both technology and intelligence to counter threats from enemies. However, history shows a different picture, the 9/11 in America or the recent Hamas attack on Israel on October 07, 2023 question the very claim of strategic edge these countries possess and exemplify how most tactically advanced systems can be circumvented by unforeseen situations. The United States and Israel even after having internationally acclaimed intelligence agencies namely, the CIA and the Mossad failed to stop the mentioned events.

Similarly, in India’s case, the tragic incidents of the 2008 Mumbai attack, the Uri attack in 2016, and later the 2019 Pulwama attack, epitomise that even after extensive efforts of intelligence agencies, and armed forces, the government cannot promise total protection or absolute security. As, ‘Security is a matter of degree, not of totality’, it should be understood in relative terms, as today’s security may be tomorrow’s crisis. Acknowledging, the limitation of ensuring complete security, governments and security agencies must focus on three achievable and practical goals encircled around, minimise risks, retaliate against attacks, and safeguard their citizens and country’s interests. Firstly, minimisation involves reducing the vulnerability and impact of potential attacks by employing a robust intelligence-gathering framework based on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology, risk assessments, preventive security measures, and awareness programs.

Secondly, Retaliation serves as a deterrent and a mechanism of signalling that terrorist acts have consequences, not only for immediate perpetrators but also for their subsequent direct and indirect sponsors and supporters. This can be through diplomacy, economic action, and also demonstrative military action. Thirdly, Safeguard is about actions and policy decisions focused on protecting resources, and citizens, at the time of crisis, and even beforehand using a threat prediction system. These proactive strategies do not fully claim to prevent all attacks but try or aim to mitigate as much as causalities, preserve subsequent order in the state, ensure a sense of confidence among the public, and maintain the continuity of further action. 

In conclusion, The Pahalgam terrorist attack should serve not merely as a moment of grief but as an occasion for strategic introspection. It reminds us that the pursuit of absolute security is not just only futile but also very impractical to promise. As a result, India and other countries must embrace and elevate a strategic doctrine rooted in pragmatic realism, like the one that is currently driving India’s foreign policy, one that emphasises threat minimisation, demonstrative retaliation, and robust safeguarding.

By: Sofiqua Yesmin, Research Analyst, GSDN

Nestled in the eastern Himalayas, the Kingdom of Bhutan has long maintained a delicate balance between its two giant neighbors, India and China. Historically, Bhutan has cultivated a special relationship with India, rooted in the 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which has shaped its foreign policy and ensured close strategic alignment with New Delhi. Bhutan’s lack of formal diplomatic relations with China, combined with its policy of avoiding ties with any permanent members of the UN Security Council, reflects its cautious approach to international engagement However, recent developments particularly Bhutan’s intensified border negotiations with China and Chinese infrastructure activities in disputed territories have sparked debates about whether Bhutan is tilting toward Beijing, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. This article explores Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China through recent examples, assesses the extent of any perceived tilt, and examines the implications for Bhutan, India, and the broader Indo-Pacific region, drawing on reliable sources such as academic analyses, think tank reports, and international media.

Bhutan’s Historical Stance and India’s Influence

Bhutan’s foreign policy has been shaped by its geographical position, sandwiched between India to the south and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region to the north. The 1949 treaty, updated in 2007, allows Bhutan greater autonomy in foreign affairs but maintains close coordination with India, particularly on security matters. India remains Bhutan’s primary trading partner, financier of hydropower projects, and provider of military training, with the Royal Bhutanese Army relying on Indian support to secure its borders. This relationship is critical given Bhutan’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip connecting India’s mainland to its northeastern states, which is strategically vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Bhutan’s historical ties with China have been limited, marked by a lack of formal diplomatic relations and ongoing border disputes along their 477-km frontier. These disputes, dating back to the 1950s when China annexed Tibet, center on areas like the Doklam Plateau in the west and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north, with China recently claiming Bhutan’s eastern Sakteng region. Since 1984, Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of border talks, with agreements in 1988 and 1998 to maintain peace and the status quo along the border. Bhutan’s cautious approach stems from its desire to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries and preserve its sovereignty, guided by its philosophy of Gross National Happiness.

India’s influence has historically deterred Bhutan from pursuing closer ties with China. For instance, during the 2017 Doklam standoff, when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in the disputed tri-junction area, Indian forces intervened on Bhutan’s behalf, halting construction after a 73-day confrontation. This incident underscored Bhutan’s reliance on India for security and its reluctance to engage China independently. However, recent developments suggest Bhutan may be reevaluating its approach, driven by domestic pressures and China’s persistent diplomatic and territorial advances.

Recent Developments Signaling a Potential Tilt

1. Bhutan-China Border Negotiations and the 2023 Beijing Visit

A significant indicator of warming Bhutan-China relations is the resumption and acceleration of border talks. In October 2023, Bhutanese Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji made a historic visit to Beijing, the first by a senior Bhutanese official, marking the 25th round of boundary negotiations the first since 2016. The visit followed a 2021 memorandum of understanding (MoU) outlining a three-step roadmap to expedite border demarcation, finalized during a 2020 expert group meeting. During the 2023 talks, Bhutan and China signed a cooperation agreement establishing a joint technical team for border delimitation, signaling progress toward a potential resolution.

Chinese officials expressed optimism about establishing diplomatic relations, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice-President Han Zheng hosting Dorji warmly. Dorji reportedly indicated Bhutan’s willingness to “strive for an early settlement of the boundary question and advance the political process of establishing diplomatic ties”. This rhetoric alarmed Indian observers, as Bhutan’s traditional policy avoids diplomatic relations with major powers, including China. The timing of the visit, amid strained India-China relations following the 2020 Ladakh clashes, raised concerns in New Delhi about Bhutan drifting toward Beijing.

Bhutan’s urgency to resolve the border issue may stem from domestic pressures. Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, in a 2023 interview with La Libre, emphasized that all three parties Bhutan, China, and India have equal stakes in resolving the Doklam dispute, a departure from Bhutan’s earlier deference to India’s strategic concerns. Tshering’s remarks suggest Bhutan seeks a pragmatic solution to secure its northern borders, possibly involving a land swap where Bhutan cedes Doklam for northern territories like Jakarlung and Pasamlung. Such a deal could grant China strategic access to the Doklam Plateau, threatening India’s Siliguri Corridor.

2. Chinese Infrastructure in Disputed Territories

China’s construction activities in Bhutanese-claimed territories provide compelling evidence of Beijing’s assertive approach and Bhutan’s constrained response. Since 2015, China has built over 22 villages, roads, and military outposts in Bhutan’s northern Beyul Khenpajong region, particularly in the Jakarlung and Menchuma valleys, covering areas revered for their cultural and religious significance. Satellite imagery from September 2023 revealed new outposts in Jakarlung, suggesting China’s intent to establish permanent control. These actions violate the 1998 agreement to maintain the status quo, challenging Bhutan’s sovereignty.

In 2020, China escalated tensions by claiming the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan, a region never previously disputed, during a Global Environment Facility meeting. This claim, alongside construction in the west and north, is seen as a pressure tactic to push Bhutan toward a border deal favorable to Beijing. For example, the village of Gyalaphug in Beyul, developed since 2015, includes extensive infrastructure, indicating long-term Chinese presence. Bhutan’s response has been notably restrained, with officials maintaining “disciplined silence” to avoid antagonizing China or India. This reticence, coupled with ongoing talks, suggests Bhutan may be open to conceding some territories to secure peace, a move that could align it closer to China.

3. Bhutan’s Domestic and Economic Pressures

Bhutan’s evolving stance is also driven by internal factors. Since transitioning to a constitutional monarchy in 2008, Bhutan has faced growing economic challenges, including youth unemployment (19% in 2024) and outmigration, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2024). Hydropower exports to India remain a key revenue source, but non-hydro sectors lag due to high trade costs and a small domestic market. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2024–2029) and the ambitious Gelephu Mindfulness City project aim to diversify the economy through foreign investment and tourism, but these require regional stability.

China’s economic success and Belt and Road Initiative appeal to some Bhutanese elites, who see engagement with Beijing as a path to development. The 2021 MoU and 2023 talks reflect Bhutan’s pragmatic approach to resolving border disputes to unlock economic opportunities, such as trade routes through Tibet. However, Bhutan’s democratic government faces pressure to balance economic growth with sovereignty and India’s security concerns, complicating its China policy.

Assessing the Extent of Bhutan’s Tilt

While recent developments suggest warming Bhutan-China ties, the notion of a significant “tilt” toward Beijing must be qualified. Several factors indicate Bhutan is navigating a delicate balance rather than aligning with China:

1. Continued Reliance on India

Bhutan’s strategic and economic dependence on India remains robust. India finances 70% of Bhutan’s hydropower projects, which account for 30% of GDP, and provides critical security support. The election of Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay in January 2024, whose People’s Democratic Party is seen as pro-India, signals continuity in Bhutan’s India-centric policy. Tobgay, who served as prime minister from 2013 to 2018, is expected to prioritize India’s interests, particularly regarding Doklam, and maintain close consultation with New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swift congratulations post-election underscored the enduring partnership.

Bhutan’s historical perception of China as a threat, rooted in the 1950 Tibet annexation and subsequent refugee influx, persists among its leadership and Buddhist populace, who share cultural ties with Tibet. The 2017 Doklam intervention by India reinforced Bhutan’s trust in New Delhi as a security guarantor, making a full pivot to China unlikely.

2. Bhutan’s Strategic Silence and Non-Alignment

Bhutan’s approach to China reflects its long-standing policy of strategic silence and non-alignment. By engaging China in border talks, Bhutan seeks to reduce tensions without committing to formal diplomatic relations, which would provoke India. Analysts like Yun Sun from the Stimson Centre argue that Bhutan is unlikely to negotiate without India’s involvement, especially on Doklam, which requires tripartite consent. Bhutan’s rejection of China’s Sakteng claim in 2020 and its cautious rhetoric during talks demonstrate its intent to protect sovereignty while avoiding confrontation.

Bhutan’s “disciplined silence” on Chinese construction, as noted by commentator Tenzing Lamsang, is a pragmatic strategy to avoid escalation while maintaining dialogue (India Today, 2023). This approach allows Bhutan to explore economic benefits from China without alienating India, aligning with its GNH philosophy of balanced development.

3. China’s Aggressive Tactics and Bhutan’s Constraints

China’s territorial encroachments, such as the construction of Gyalaphug and Pangda villages, place Bhutan in a difficult position. With a population of 727,145 and a small military, Bhutan lacks the capacity to counter China’s actions directly. Beijing’s “salami-slicing” strategy gradual territorial expansion through infrastructure mirrors its tactics in the South China Sea and along the India-China border, pressuring Bhutan to accept a deal that legitimizes Chinese gains. For instance, China’s offer in the 1990s to cede 495 km² in the northern valleys for 269 km² in Doklam was rejected due to India’s concerns, but recent talks suggest Bhutan may revisit this swap.

Bhutan’s willingness to negotiate does not necessarily indicate a pro-China tilt but rather a pragmatic response to China’s growing presence. The 2023 Beijing visit and cooperation agreement reflect Bhutan’s attempt to manage this pressure diplomatically, but any agreement ceding Doklam would likely involve India’s approval, limiting the extent of Bhutan’s alignment with China.

Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region

Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China has significant implications for the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the context of India-China rivalry and the broader geopolitical contest.

1. India’s Strategic Concerns

A Bhutan-China border deal, especially one ceding Doklam, would undermine India’s security. Control of Doklam would give China a vantage point over the Chumbi Valley and proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, enhancing its ability to threaten India’s northeast. Indian analysts warn that New Delhi cannot afford to lose Bhutan as a “reliable security partner” in the Himalayas, prompting calls for deeper engagement with Thimphu. India’s response includes increased economic aid, such as $500 million for Bhutan’s 13th Five-Year Plan, and military cooperation to reinforce the partnership.

2. China’s Regional Ambitions

China’s push for a border deal and diplomatic relations with Bhutan is part of its broader strategy to expand influence in South Asia, challenging India’s traditional dominance. By establishing settlements in Bhutan, China seeks to create “facts on the ground,” pressuring Bhutan to concede territory and potentially open the door for Belt and Road investments. A successful deal could embolden China to pursue similar tactics with other neighbors, escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

3. Bhutan’s Small-State Agency

Bhutan’s engagement with China highlights the agency of small states in navigating great power competition. By balancing dialogue with China and loyalty to India, Bhutan asserts its sovereignty while mitigating risks. However, its limited resources and China’s territorial assertiveness constrain its options, underscoring the challenges faced by small states in the Indo-Pacific.

4. Broader Indo-Pacific Dynamics

Bhutan’s border talks occur amid heightened Indo-Pacific tensions, with the U.S., India, and allies like Japan and Australia countering China’s expansionism through frameworks like the Quad. A Bhutan-China deal could weaken India’s position, prompting a stronger U.S.-India alignment to secure the Himalayan frontier. Conversely, Bhutan’s balanced approach could inspire other small states to engage China diplomatically without fully aligning, fostering a multipolar regional order.

India’s Perspective

From India’s perspective, Bhutan’s engagement with China is a cause for concern but not yet a definitive tilt. New Delhi views Bhutan as a critical buffer against Chinese aggression, particularly after the 2020 Ladakh clashes, which killed 20 Indian soldiers. The Doklam Plateau remains a flashpoint, with India wary of any agreement that enhances China’s strategic position. India’s close ties with Bhutan, reinforced by economic aid, military training, and cultural affinity, provide leverage to maintain influence. However, India must address Bhutan’s economic challenges and youth unemployment to prevent Beijing’s economic allure from gaining traction.

India’s strategy includes deepening engagement with Bhutan while countering China’s regional influence. Prime Minister Modi’s visits to Bhutan in 2019 and 2024, alongside increased funding for hydropower and infrastructure, aim to solidify the partnership. India also leverages its role in regional forums like SAARC and BBIN to integrate Bhutan economically, reducing its reliance on China. Nonetheless, India must tread carefully to avoid pressuring Bhutan, which values its autonomy and non-alignment.

Conclusion

Bhutan’s recent engagement with China, marked by the 2023 Beijing visit, accelerated border talks, and China’s territorial encroachments, suggests a pragmatic shift rather than a definitive tilt toward Beijing. Driven by domestic economic pressures and China’s assertive tactics, Bhutan seeks to resolve its border disputes to ensure stability and development, but its deep ties with India and strategic caution limit the extent of alignment with China. India remains Bhutan’s primary partner, with Tobgay’s pro-India government and New Delhi’s economic and security support anchoring the relationship. However, China’s infrastructure activities and diplomatic overtures pose challenges, potentially reshaping Bhutan’s foreign policy and Indo-Pacific dynamics.

For India, maintaining Bhutan’s trust requires addressing its economic needs while reinforcing security cooperation. For Bhutan, balancing India and China demands careful diplomacy to preserve sovereignty and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries. The Indo-Pacific region watches closely, as Bhutan’s choices could influence the balance of power in the Himalayas and beyond. While Bhutan is not yet tilting decisively toward China, its evolving stance underscores the complexities of small-state agency in a contested geopolitical landscape.