By: Tushar Jain, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Taiwan Strait has become one of the most sensitive and dangerous regions in global politics in recent years. Rising tensions between China and Taiwan have drawn the attention of not only regional actors but also global powers. Any military conflict between China and Taiwan would not remain limited to these two parties. Instead, it would have serious consequences for the entire Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Among all neighbouring countries, Japan would be one of the most directly affected by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Japan’s geographical proximity to Taiwan, its economic dependence on regional stability, and its long-standing security concerns regarding China mean that it cannot remain unaffected by developments across the Taiwan Strait. Unlike distant powers, Japan shares nearby sea lanes, island chains, and security space with Taiwan. This makes the Taiwan issue not just a foreign policy matter for Japan, but a question of national security.

This makes it important to examine whether Japan can actually help Taiwan in such a situation. The answer is not simple and cannot be reduced to a clear “yes” or “no.” Japan’s response would depend on several interconnected factors, including constitutional limits, military capability, political will, and the strategic consequences of Taiwan falling under Chinese control. Understanding these factors is essential to analysing Japan’s possible role in a future Taiwan crisis.

China’s One China Policy

China follows the One China policy, under which it claims Taiwan as an inseparable part of its territory. According to Beijing, there is only one sovereign Chinese state, and Taiwan is considered a breakaway province that must eventually be reunified with the mainland. This position has remained consistent since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

While China states that it prefers peaceful reunification, it has repeatedly declared that it will not rule out the use of force if Taiwan moves towards formal independence or if external powers interfere in what China considers its internal affairs. Over the years, China has increased military pressure on Taiwan through large-scale military exercises, airspace intrusions, and naval deployments around the island.

Most countries in the world, including Japan, officially accept the One China policy. As a result, Japan does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and does not recognise it as an independent country. However, accepting the One China policy does not mean that Japan supports China’s position in reality. Instead, Japan maintains strong unofficial relations with Taiwan in areas such as trade, culture, education, and technology.

China’s growing military presence around Taiwan and its increasingly assertive posture have transformed the Taiwan issue from a political disagreement into a serious regional security concern. For Japan, the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan represents a direct challenge to regional stability and Japan’s own safety.

Japan and Taiwan: Close Without Recognition

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition, Japan and Taiwan share a close and friendly relationship. Historical connections, cultural exchanges, and strong economic ties have contributed to positive relations between the two societies. Japan is one of Taiwan’s major trading partners, and Japanese companies have long invested in Taiwan’s economy. At the same time, Taiwan is an important market for Japanese goods and technology.

People-to-people relations between Japan and Taiwan are particularly strong. Taiwanese tourists frequently visit Japan, and Japanese public opinion towards Taiwan is largely positive. Opinion polls in Japan often show that Taiwan is viewed more favourably than many other countries, reflecting a sense of trust and goodwill.

A key pillar of this relationship is Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Taiwan produces some of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, which are essential for modern economies. Japan’s automobile manufacturing, electronics sector, and defence industries rely heavily on these chips. If Taiwan were to fall under Chinese control, Japan could lose secure access to these semiconductors, leading to serious economic disruption and technological vulnerability.

Although Japan and Taiwan do not have a military alliance, both rely heavily on the United States for regional security and share concerns regarding China’s growing military power. Japan often stresses the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, using careful language that signals concern without openly confronting China. This cautious approach reflects Japan’s attempt to balance its strategic interests with diplomatic constraints.

Two Questions That Decide Everything

Before analysing Japan’s possible role in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, two major questions arise. The answers to these questions shape not only Japan’s response, but also the overall direction and intensity of the conflict.

The first question is whether Japan has the military capability and legal basis to help Taiwan. Without the necessary legal authority, even a strong military cannot be used effectively. Japan’s constitution plays a decisive role in defining the limits of its military action.

The second question is whether Japan has the political will and strategic motivation to help Taiwan. Even if Japan is capable of acting, it must still decide whether intervention aligns with its national interests. This involves weighing the risks of confrontation with China against the costs of inaction.

Together, these two questions form the foundation of any serious analysis of Japan’s involvement in a Taiwan contingency.

Question One: Does Japan Have the Capability and Legal Basis to Help Taiwan?

Japan does not officially maintain an army. Instead, it operates the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), which include ground, naval, and air components. This structure exists because of Japan’s post-war constitution, which limits the use of military force. Despite these constitutional restrictions, the Japan Self-Defense Forces is widely regarded as one of the most technologically advanced military forces in Asia.

Japan’s maritime and air capabilities are particularly strong. Its navy possesses advanced destroyers and submarines, and its air force operates modern fighter jets. Japan has also invested heavily in missile defence systems to counter regional threats. These capabilities allow Japan to defend its territory, monitor surrounding waters, and respond effectively to regional security challenges.

However, Japan’s biggest limitation is legal rather than military. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces war and prohibits the use of force to settle international disputes. This provision was adopted after World War II to prevent Japan from returning to militarism. As a result, Japan cannot initiate war or engage in offensive military operations.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, by itself, does not automatically allow Japan to use military force. Taiwan is not a formal ally of Japan, and Japan itself may not be directly attacked at the beginning of such a conflict. This legal reality significantly restricts Japan’s ability to act independently.

In 2015, however, Japan introduced security legislation allowing limited collective self-defence. Under this framework, Japan may use force if a close partner, primarily the United States, is attacked and if the situation poses a serious threat to Japan’s survival. This marked a major shift in Japan’s security policy.

If a Chinese invasion of Taiwan involves attacks on U.S. bases in Japan, threatens Japan’s sea lanes, or places Chinese forces dangerously close to Japanese territory, Japan could legally justify military action as an existential necessity. In such a scenario, Japan would not claim to be defending Taiwan directly, but rather protecting its own security and fulfilling its obligations to its ally.

Even within these limits, Japan can still play a significant role. By allowing U.S. forces to operate from bases in Japan, defending its southwestern islands, providing intelligence and surveillance, and intercepting missiles threatening its territory, Japan can indirectly but effectively support Taiwan’s defence.

Question Two: Does Japan Have the Political Will and Strategic Motivation to Help Taiwan?

Japan’s strategic motivation to respond to a Taiwan crisis is strong and continues to grow. Geography plays a central role in shaping Japan’s thinking. Taiwan is located extremely close to Japan, with some Japanese islands situated just over one hundred kilometres away. If China controls Taiwan, Chinese military forces would be able to operate extremely close to Japan’s Okinawa region, significantly increasing security risks.

Another major concern is the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China. Taiwan currently acts as a buffer between China and Japan. If China occupies Taiwan, pressure on the Senkaku Islands is likely to increase, making Japan’s territorial position more vulnerable and increasing the risk of military confrontation.

Economic and technological concerns further strengthen Japan’s motivation. Japan’s heavy dependence on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry means that a Chinese takeover of Taiwan could disrupt global supply chains and force Japan into technological dependence on China. This would weaken Japan’s economic resilience and strategic autonomy.

In addition, most of Japan’s energy imports pass through sea routes near Taiwan. Chinese control over Taiwan would allow China to threaten these vital routes, posing a direct risk to Japan’s economy and daily life. Energy security is a core component of national security for an island nation like Japan.

Because of these combined factors, many Japanese policymakers believe that Taiwan’s security is closely linked to Japan’s own security, even if Japan does not state this openly. This belief increasingly influences Japan’s defence planning and strategic outlook.

The Role of the United States

Japan’s response to a Taiwan conflict cannot be separated from its alliance with the United States. The U.S.–Japan security alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s defence policy. U.S. military bases in Japan play a central role in maintaining regional stability and would be critical in any operation related to Taiwan.

If U.S. bases in Japan are attacked during a conflict, Japan would be legally justified in responding under collective self-defence. This makes Japan’s involvement in a Taiwan crisis closely tied to U.S. actions and decisions.

Other countries, such as Australia and the Philippines, may offer indirect support through logistical assistance or base access. Groupings like the QUAD increase diplomatic and strategic pressure on China, even though they are not formal military alliances.

Conclusion

Japan cannot openly declare war on China to defend Taiwan, nor can it act as Taiwan’s main military protector. Constitutional limits and diplomatic realities restrict direct intervention. Japan’s pacifist constitution continues to shape its military posture and limits its freedom of action.

However, Japan is not powerless. Through logistical support, intelligence sharing, defensive military operations, and close coordination with the United States, Japan can play an important role in shaping the outcome of a Taiwan conflict. Its involvement may be indirect, but it would still be strategically significant.

Ultimately, Japan’s involvement would not come from ambition but from necessity. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would directly threaten Japan’s security, economy, and territorial integrity. Therefore, while Japan may hesitate, strategic reality suggests that it would find it difficult to remain completely neutral in the face of such a crisis.

By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The strategic rivalry between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China has become the central axis of international politics today. Among the many flashpoints arising from this rivalry, Taiwan remains the most dangerous and consequential. Taiwan’s political status, democratic identity, economic importance, and strategic location at the heart of the Indo-Pacific make it a focal point for regional stability and global security. As Washington articulates its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan stands as a core objective. The strategy is expected to outline how the United States of America intends to preserve peace, reassure allies, and manage competition with China without triggering a major war. This article examines whether the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is likely to deter China from attacking Taiwan by analysing the strategic environment, deterrence logic, military posture, economic and technological tools, alliance dynamics, diplomatic signalling, and the broader limitations that shape deterrence outcomes.

Strategic Context of National Security Strategy 2025

The National Security Strategy is the principal document through which the United States of America outlines its perception of threats and defines long-term priorities. By 2025, the international system will likely still be marked by persistent great power rivalry rather than periodic crisis. The rapid economic growth and technological advances of China, as well as large-scale military modernization, have finally positioned China to challenge the United States of America’s influence in various dimensions. The government in Washington increasingly characterizes Beijing’s actions as revisionist, with a particular emphasis on maritime Asia, as China pursues greater dominion over nearby waters and political outcomes.

Taiwan occupies a uniquely sensitive position within this strategic context. The Chinese leadership considers Taiwan as an integral part of the national territory and has proclaimed on several occasions that the issue cannot be passed on indefinitely to future generations. Over the past years, China has mounted pressure on Taiwan through military exercises, frequent air and naval operations near the island, cyber intrusions, and diplomatic efforts aimed at shrinking Taiwan’s international space. These activities aim at signalling resolve, testing responses, and gradually changing the status quo. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is expected to frame Taiwan not only as a regional concern but also as a measure of the United States of America’s credibility and commitment in the Indo-Pacific.

Deterrence Theory and the United States of America’s Policy Toward Taiwan

Deterrence works by affecting an adversary’s calculus about cost, benefit, and probability of success. In the Taiwan scenario, deterrence is intended to persuade the PRC that any employment of force will result either in military defeat or in unacceptable political, economic, and strategic consequences. The integrated deterrence that will most probably be stressed in the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) unites military capability, economic leverage, diplomatic coordination, technological robustness, and informational influence in one strategic framework.

The basis of the policy of the United States of America toward Taiwan has, for decades, been strategic ambiguity. It aims to deter the People’s Republic of China from using force while discouraging Taiwan from unilateral declarations of independence. Strategic ambiguity has contributed to stability in the past, but growing confidence and expanding military capabilities have raised doubts about its continued effectiveness. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) may therefore maintain ambiguity in formal statements while strengthening practical measures that enhance deterrence credibility and reduce incentives for aggression.

Military Foundations of Deterrence

Military power remains the most visible and immediate component of deterrence against a potential attack on Taiwan. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is expected to give priority to the goal of maintaining a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. It includes continuous investments in naval forces, airpower, long-range precision strike capabilities, missile defence systems, space resilience, and cyber operations. These assets are designed to deny China the ability to attain a quick or decisive victory in a conflict over Taiwan.

Force posture adjustments further reinforce deterrence: forward-deployed forces, rotational presence, and access improvements to regional facilities reduce response times and increase operational flexibility. Regular joint exercises with allies build interoperability and signal readiness. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) will probably highlight these measures as concrete expressions of determination and readiness.

Support for Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities is yet another key pillar of military deterrence. The United States of America has increasingly focused on providing asymmetric systems tailored to counter amphibious assaults and air operations. Capabilities such as mobile missile launchers, air defence platforms, maritime surveillance systems, and unmanned technologies are all supposed to increase the operational cost of any invasion. If effectively integrated into Taiwan’s defence planning, these capabilities strengthen deterrence by denial and complicate the Chinese military calculations.

Economic and Technological Aspects of Deterrence

In the modern strategic competition, deterrence is no longer confined to traditional military spheres. Economic strength and technological leadership are increasingly vital in determining national power and strategic consequence. Taiwan’s preeminence in advanced semiconductor fabrication grants it an exceptional status in the international economy. Any disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would impact supply chains crucial for everything from consumer electronics to leading-edge weapons systems.

The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) will likely identify economic resilience and technological security as integral to national defence. Investments in domestic manufacturing capacity, supply chain diversification, and research and development would reduce vulnerabilities, with close technological cooperation with trusted partners, such as Taiwan, being retained. In this way, economic interdependence will not be able to develop into a strategic vulnerability.

Second, economic deterrence encompasses the credible threat of collective sanctions and trade restrictions should aggression occur. Sanctions against a large economy such as China would be costly for all parties involved, but the threat of prolonged economic harm may help alter the Chinese decision calculus. The forthcoming National Security Strategy 2025 ( NSS 2025) will probably highlight multilateral coordination as key to making economic deterrence plausible and impactful.

Alliance and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

The alliance remains one of the greatest strategic advantages of the United States of America. The National Security Strategy 2025 is likely to reiterate that alliances magnify deterrence through the sharing of burdens, pooling capabilities, and signalling collective resolve. In the Taiwan context, Japan’s role is particularly significant due to its geographic proximity and its own security concerns regarding regional stability.

There is also a need to enhance defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint planning with the allies to increase the credibility of deterrence. Strengthening the partnership with Australia, the Philippines, and other regional actors further complicated China’s strategic calculus. The possibility that a conflict over Taiwan could escalate into a broader regional confrontation increases the potential costs of aggression and hence reinforces deterrence.

Similarly, minilateral frameworks and flexible coalitions will also be featured prominently in the National Security Strategy 2025. Minilateral arrangements enable targeted cooperation on discreet security challenges without a set of formal obligations required of traditional alliances. Collectively, these partnerships demonstrate unity of purpose and reduce the likelihood that China could isolate Taiwan diplomatically or militarily.

Diplomatic Signalling and Crisis Management

Deterrence is a function not just of strength, but also of communication. Clear and consistent signalling reduces the prospect of misinterpretation and unintended escalation. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 205) will likely reinforce commitments to channels of dialogue with China, including military communication mechanisms, as a means of crisis management to lower the risks of accidents or miscalculations during times of heightened tension.

At the same time, diplomatic engagement with Taiwan has gradually expanded. High-level interactions, trade initiatives, and support for Taiwan’s participation in international forums signal a sustained commitment without formally altering long-standing policy positions. These actions contribute to deterrence by showing that Taiwan is not isolated and that the United States of America remains invested in its security and resilience.

Limitations and Challenges of Deterrence

These steps notwithstanding, deterrence is intrinsically uncertain and manifoldly constrained. The Chinese leadership may feel that its increasing military power and degree of economic leverage decrease the risks of an attack against Taiwan. Domestic considerations of political nature, such as nationalism and regime legitimacy, may also influence strategic choices being made in Beijing.

Accelerating technological changes further complicate deterrence dynamics. Cyber operations, space capabilities, and information warfare blur the distinction between peace and conflict. Gray zone activities provide the possibility of incremental pressure without crossing thresholds toward a full-scale military response. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) must hence engage with a wide spectrum of challenges extending beyond conventional warfare scenarios.

Sustaining political will is another important factor. Deterrence is a function of credibility, and the latter depends on consistent policy, alliance cohesion, and commitment of resources for the long term. China will closely monitor domestic debates in the United States of America and political splits among allies in assessing whether intervention can be sustained in a Taiwan contingency.

Assessment of Deterrence Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) at deterring China is, of course, a matter of perception. If Beijing believes that the costs of military action would exceed any potential gain, deterrence will likely hold. Integrated deterrence makes this approach more credible by melding military readiness with economic leverage, diplomatic coordination, and technological resilience.

However, deterrence is not a static condition. It requires a continuous adaptation to evolving circumstances and sustained investment over time. While the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) can significantly lower the possibility of war, it is not possible to altogether eradicate the danger element. Strategic miscalculations, domestic pressures, or unforeseen crises could still undermine stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Broader Strategic Implications

Beyond immediate deterrence, the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) shapes long-term expectations across the Indo-Pacific. The way in which the United States of America approaches the Taiwan issue informs regional views on questions of leadership, reliability, and commitment. A coherent and consistent strategy reassures allies and partners, while ambiguity or inconsistency could embolden hedging behaviour and foster strategic uncertainty.

The Taiwan Strait is also one of the most economically important maritime corridors in the world. Any conflict would disrupt trade flow, energy supplies, and financial markets on a global scale. Preventing conflict, therefore, supports not only regional security but also global economic stability and shared prosperity.

Domestic politics and strategic signalling play core roles in driving deterrence outcomes. Bipartisan concern about coercion in the Indo-Pacific in the United States of America strengthens deterrence through policy continuity. Nationalism and regime legitimacy are shaping risk tolerance in China, where signalling is a delicate matter as aggression would create sustained consequences.

Information warfare and strategic narratives also shape deterrence. Countering disinformation, reinforcing shared values, and supporting transparent communication strengthen international support for stability. Stability signalling through consistency, restraint, and preparedness remains essential for preventing miscalculation during periods of heightened tension. Success will depend over time on coordination across military planning, economic policy, alliance diplomacy, and sustained public communication. These reinforce credibility and strengthen deterrence. They produce durable regional stability and have served to manage competition responsibly, diminish escalation risks, and preserve strategic balance.

Conclusion

The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) of the United States of America is designed to prevent an attack by China on Taiwan through an integrated approach that encompasses military strength, economic and technological tools, alliance networks, and disciplined diplomacy. Although deterrence can never be certain, a credible and sustained strategy dramatically increases the likelihood that peace and stability are maintained across the Taiwan Strait. To help manage competition, including preventing a conflict with profound consequences for regional and global security, the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) reinforces the need for commitment, adaptability, and cooperation.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

INAS 335 the Indian Navy’s second MH 60R squadron represents a clear inflection point in the Indian Navy’s rotary wing modernisation, translating years of planning for the MH‑60R Seahawk into a dedicated, shipborne helicopter squadron. Focused on delivering multi‑role, networked air power from the decks of frontline warships, the squadron marks the transition from legacy platforms to a contemporary generation of maritime helicopters.

Rotary Wing Modernisation Thrust

The raising of INAS 335 is part of a deliberate, long‑term effort to recapitalise the Navy’s ship‑borne helicopter fleet. Indian Navy’s drive towards a modern blue‑water force has given a decisive upgrade of its shipborne helicopter fleet. INAS 335 builds on this foundation by fielding a platform conceived from the outset for demanding shipborne roles, bringing rotary wing capability in step with the reach and sophistication of the fleet’s major combatants enhancing their reach.

The MH‑60R aircraft with INAS 335 originate from a 24‑helicopter acquisition programme concluded under Foreign Military Sales, reflecting careful planning of assets, training human capital and sustainment. This programme underpins a broader shift towards network‑enabled, multi‑mission helicopters that can seamlessly plug into task‑group operations in the Indian Navy’s fleet.

A True Multi‑Mission Squadron

INAS 335 will be operating the MH‑60R helicopters designed for all‑weather, day‑and‑night operations across a wide spectrum of missions. The platform is optimised for anti‑submarine warfare, anti-shipping and anti‑surface warfare, while also being configured for search and rescue, medical evacuation and vertical replenishment at sea. This mission versatility makes the squadron a flexible tool in the hands of operational commanders both at shore and afloat.  It can shift rapidly from a high‑end combat role to humanitarian or logistics tasks, ensuring that critical aviation support is available across the full range of naval operations from peacetime presence to crisis response.

Technology Driving Capability

The MH‑60R at the core of INAS 335 represents a substantial technological leap over earlier generations of ship‑borne helicopters. An integrated suite of dipping sonar, sonobuoys, maritime surveillance radar and electronic support measures enables the aircraft to build a detailed picture of surface and sub‑surface activity around the force. Onboard data fusion and secure data links allow sensor information to be combined and shared with ship combat systems in real time.  This compresses the detect‑to‑engage timeline, reduces uncertainty in the underwater domain and helps commanders make timely decisions in demanding tactical situations.

Extending the Fleet’s Reach and Protection

Operating from fleet ships, INAS 335 extends the protective envelope around naval task groups well beyond the horizon. The aircraft enhances the fleet’s awareness and influence on the high seas. It can rapidly investigate contacts and create a protective ASW and ASuW envelope around task groups, directly contributing to the survivability and confidence of surface forces deployed far from shore. Armed with lightweight torpedoes and other precision weapons, the MH‑60R can convert situational awareness into decisive action, when tasked by the Commander’s.

This combination of reach, persistence and credible firepower significantly enhances the survivability and freedom of manoeuvre of surface forces operating far from the mainland. The operational validations gives the modernisation effort practical credibility, proving that new rotary capabilities are not just theoretical enhancements but field‑tested tools which are ready for action.

Proven in Operations and Exercises

Even before the formalisation of it’s second MH‑60R squadron, MH 60R helicopters have already been employed extensively in fleet activities and have proved their worth in Operation Sindoor and major fleet exercises such including bilateral/ multilateral exercises, demonstrating reliability, interoperability and tactical effectiveness alongside Indian and partner‑nation forces.

INAS 335 builds on this operational foundation by providing a dedicated, cohesive unit focused on optimising tactics, procedures and training for the MH‑60R.  The squadron’s work will further refine how these helicopters are integrated with the IN fleet and joint task forces across the Indian Ocean Region.

Building a Future‑Ready Rotary Force

INAS 335 also anchors a new training and professional ecosystem for rotary‑wing operators, maintainers and planners. Exposure to complex avionics, mission systems and ship–air integration norms prepares personnel for a future in which helicopters are tightly woven into the Navy’s wider network‑centric architecture. As a result, the squadron becomes both an operational unit and a template for subsequent rotary‑wing inductions, influencing doctrine, tactics and sustainment model for naval aviation.

In this sense, INAS 335 is not only a new squadron number on the order of battle, but the leading edge of a broader transformation in how the Indian Navy conceives, equips and employs its rotary‑wing force.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Giulio Douhet, the famous Italian army general, regarded as the Father of Strategic Air Power’s statement in the 20^th Century “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur,” holds equal if not more weight in the 21^st Century too, as modern warfare now encompasses six official domains and numerous unofficial domains.

On January 17, 1999, the 8^th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf War, two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui released their book “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s master plan to destroy America”. The date chosen for release of the book had special significance as the Gulf War of 1991 was the first war of the modern era in which computers were used to take out the daily flight plans of over 1000 fighter aircrafts that were operating in Iraq as part of the US-led 42-nation multi-coalition force. For the first time ever, computers were used in live military operations.

The 196-page well-written book had just a simple message to convey that anything that can be weaponised, will be weaponised. The book did not garner much interest in the USA for many years after its release, till it was too late and China had overtaken the USA in economic, military and diplomatic power. The book now is a compulsory-read in most of the US military training institutions and combat formations. A typical example of “Too little, too late”.

After the success of the Gulf War of 1991, militarily known as Operation Desert Storm, which lasted from January 17, 1991 to February 28, 1991 saw the USA led 42-nation coalition, exhibiting unprecedent level of professionalism that included a whopping 1000 aircraft sorties being undertaken daily, which were totally decided by computers based on the daily inputs given, USA promulgated the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, replacing the Airland Battle Doctrine of 1982.

The Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine of 2001enshrined that the cumulative effect of dominance in air, land, maritime, space domains and information environment that includes cyberspace, that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. This would espouse a strategic intent capable of achieving full spectrum superiority in a conflict, enabling the control of any situation across the range of military operations, by defeating any adversary.

Surprisingly, China became the only nation in the world to publicly declare its competency and capability to fight any nation in the world in consonance with the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine. In 2014, PLA in its military doctrine called Joint Integrated Operations stated that it is ready to fight any country anywhere in the world in all the six-domains of war consisting Land, Sea, Air, Cyber, Electromagnetic Spectrum and Space.

Interestingly, such a declaration has not been made till date by any other military of the world including USA, who despite propounding the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, lay basking in its success of the 1991 Gulf War, whilst China stealthily and secretly worked towards establishing supremacy in the full spectrum operations warfare, pretty much understanding well how the future modern wars would be fought.

For China, the first and foremost military aim is annexing Taiwan.

China’s earlier military attempts for Taiwan

The past six decades have seen three major conflagrations between China and Taiwan which are called as the First, Second and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis also called as the Formosa Crisis occurred during the period September 03, 1954 to May 01, 1955. It was a brief conflict between China and Taiwan over a group of islands in the Taiwan Strait that were under Taiwan but China staked claim over them by shelling the Kinmen Island. Subsequently China seized Yijiangshan Islands from Taiwan. This led to Taiwan abandoning the Tachen Islands. This conflict saw 519 Chinese soldiers and 393 Taiwanese soldiers killed. This crisis ended after the USA threatened the use of nuclear weapons on China and the erstwhile USSR refused any help to China. This crisis also resulted in the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty between USA and Taiwan.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis also called as the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis took place during August 23-December 02, 1958 saw China shelling the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. It included a naval battle between China and Taiwan which saw the Taiwanese Navy getting the better of the PLA Navy. This conflict saw 514 Chinese soldiers dead and 460 Taiwanese soldiers killed. China saw it’s one ship and two fighter jets destroyed whilst Taiwan lost 31 fighter jets. The US Navy sent additional warships to the Taiwan Strait as a show of strength of its support to Taiwan. This further escalated the Chinese aggression. This crisis ended as China was faced with a stalemate as its artillery had run out of shells and China declared a unilateral ceasefire as the US Navy moved the warships in the Taiwan Strait.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis which lasted from July 21, 1994 to March 23, 1996 was a result of a series of missile tests conducted by China in the waters surrounding Taiwan as a strong signal to the Taiwanese government under Lee Teng-hui who was seen as having a strong foreign policy and to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. The US sent its naval Seventh Fleet which included the aircraft carriers USS Independence and USS Nimitz. Seeing the heavy American military build-up in the Taiwan Strait, China ended this crisis quietly without any loss of life on either side.

There were two important lessons that China learnt from the earlier failed three military attempts for Taiwan – lack of nuclear weapons and a small navy.

During the First & Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, China had no nuclear weapons. China with the aid of USSR under President Nikita Khrushchev, began its nuclear programme in 1958 and subsequently conducted in first nuclear test in Lop Nur, Xinjiang on October 16, 1964 under a project codenamed as Project 596. Since then, China has progressed steadily and at the end of 2024 possesses 600 nuclear weapons with the aim of acquiring 1000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1500 by 2035.

To capture Taiwan, Xi Jinping realised that China has to have a formidable navy as not only Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will play a pivotal role in the military operations for Taiwan, but it will also have to be formidable enough to take on the US Navy, which in 2013 was the biggest navy in the world, with 287 warships and submarines, while China had 273 warships and submarines in the same year.

Clearly, the numbers were grossly inadequate of PLAN to take on the might of the US Navy and to deal with multiple maritime challenges like securing the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait Dilemma, in case China was to go to war with USA over Taiwan.

Xi Jinping was clear that China’s national maritime power had to stepped-up if the China Dream was to materialise. Though the PLAN had surpassed the US Navy in size in 2015 but Xi Jinping was not contended with such statistics. In April 2018, Xi Jinping stated that “the task of building a powerful navy has never been urgent as it is today”. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper encapsulated the need for a modernised and strong navy that is capable of carrying out missions in the far seas. With this in mind, PLAN was told to construct two aircraft carriers, 21 nuclear submarines and 200 warships by 2030.

In comparison 55 warships and submarines of the US Navy are under construction while 67 warships and submarines of the Indian Navy are being constructed.

Work on constructing the warships and submarines started in right earnest in the six biggest and important shipyards of China – Bohai, Dalian, Jiangnan, Hudong Zhonghua, Wuchang and Huangpu Wenchong.

The results bore fruits. As of 2024 the PLAN with a lead of 90 warships and submarines over the US Navy, has 370 warships and submarines whilst the US Navy has 280 warships and submarines. In contrast, the Indian Navy has 150 warships and submarines as of 2024 whilst the Taiwan Navy has 90 warships and submarines.

China’s war for Taiwan in 2027

On February 03, 2023, William Burns, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA officially tasked with gathering, processing and analysing national security information from around the world, said in a statement that USA and China will go to war over Taiwan in 2027. On January 17, 2024 Grant Shapps, the British Defence Secretary warned of multiple war theatres opening up in the next five years which would involve Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command on October 28, 2024 said that China is carrying out the largest military buildup since World War II, perhaps in world history. And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping on October 06, 2023 while on a visit to Indonesia to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Summit told Vincent Siew, the Taiwanese envoy to the summit that the issue of Taiwan being physical part of China cannot be passed from generation to generation. A clear indication, that during Xi Jinping’s term in office the issue of Taiwan would be settled once and for all.

Since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in 1996, China is now the undisputed leader in all the six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space. Given Russia’s unwavering support to China and USA’s disinterest in the Indo-Pacific region clearly evident in US’ National Security Strategy 2025 made public on December 04, 2025 shows that the three Superpowers are now in an informal alliance called the G3 which this author had correctly predicted in his article on August 31, 2025. USA’s National Security Strategy 2025 talks of “spheres of influences” and disregards Russia & China as threats.

In March 2025, the American Portrait Survey found that 59.6% Taiwanese citizens do not consider the United States trustworthy. The Brookings Institution Report released on April 25, 2025 noted that 60.9% of the Taiwanese disagreed with the statement that “Taiwan is safer than before with Trump as President”. The Taiwanese are absolutely correct and the National Security Strategy 2025 of USA puts all speculations to rest whether USA will aid Taiwan in case of a military aggression by China on the island nation.

Further, the US military has lost its might to take-on the PLA, even if by quirk of circumstances the USA decides to aid Taiwan militarily. On April 12, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the Defence Secretary of the 47^th US President Donald Trump’s administration shocked the world when in a candid statement he admitted that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy the 11 US Navy aircraft carriers in just 20 minutes. He further added that in every war game conducted in the US Military, the Americans always loose to the Chinese. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios.

The Pentagon’s “Overmatch Brief”, the US government’s top-secret document submitted in 2021 but whose details have come in the public domain on December 11, 2025 unambiguously states that China would defeat the US militarily in any conflict over Taiwan.

Ukraine has lost about 20% of its territory (roughly the size of Taiwan) to Russia in the ongoing war between the two neighbours and President Donald Trump has time and again made it clear that Ukraine will never get back this territory as and when this war ends. The USA or any other NATO nation will not help Taiwan militarily.

And, Taiwan alone is incapable of taking on the Chinese military might.

Time for Military Alliance

With USA pulling away from the Indo-Pacific region as clearly enumerated in its National Security Strategy 2025, the Quad has virtually collapsed as was evident after President Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025 and so has AUKUS.

In almost eleven months of President Donald Trump’s second Presidential tenure, no Quad heads of state summit involving USA, India, Japan and Australia has been held. The way USA is going hammer and tongs on India, it is unlikely that any Quad heads of state summit will be held till President Donald Trump’s tenure comes to an end on January 20, 2029.

The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom has announced its decision on December 09, 2025 to reduce its deployment and overseas training in the Indo-Pacific region for a period of four years. Thus, the AUKUS alliance comprising USA, the United Kingdom and Australia too has slipped into comatose.

The Indo-Pacific region stands open for China. And with Taiwan falling, the next two wars that China will wage will be for Spratly Islands and Arunachal Pradesh in India.

The time is now opportune to form a military alliance between the six nations Taiwan, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea which are to go to war with China in the next ten years for three reasons. One, there is no military alliance that exists in the Indo-Pacific Region amongst the countries that are facing the maximum threat due to China’s ever increasing military power. Two, China only understands a strong military language and these seven countries are incapable as on date to fight China singly. Three, no nation has ever won a two-front war.

With the near-collapse of Quad and AUKUS, there is no alliance whatsoever in the Indo-Pacific region which can stand against the growing Chinese aggressiveness. USA, the main pivot of both Quad and AUKUS is no longer the force that is interested in keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open as envisaged in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, also known as the FOIP strategy or simply as the Indo-Pacific Strategy published by the United States Department of State as a formalised concept on November 04, 2019.

History is replete with examples of the formidable strength the military alliances have. The most striking example being the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation whose Article 5 clearly states that an attack on any one NATO member-nation will be deemed as attack on all member-nations. No wonder, Russia till date hasn’t attacked any NATO member-nation.

General MM Naravane (Retd), the 28^th Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army wrote on July 29, 2023 that no nation has ever won a two-front war. China, if confronted with the two-front war threat of engaging militarily with Taiwan on its eastern part and with India on its western part, will not make the move of attacking Taiwan.

With the growing proximity of China, Pakistan & Bangladesh, the security situation for India too is becoming grim. General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces on July 08, 2025 remarked that the convergence of interest between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh will have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.

2027 isn’t too distant away. Stephen Kinzer’s quote “Alliances and partnerships produce stability when they reflect realities and interests” holds deep meaning for the Indo-Pacific region and Asia where China’s reality of its military aims is no secret and for countries like Taiwan, India and the other littoral nations of the South China Sea, the interests have converged to stop China’s hegemonic designs. A military alliance is the only answer. Any delay will be detrimental, for the fall of Taiwan will spell disaster for democracy and rules-based world order.

By: Sanya Singh

In the past ten years, China’s rapid development of hypersonic missile technology has been among the most consequential in global military affairs. Hypersonic weapons, by definition, are those delivery systems that can move at velocities greater than Mach 5 with manoeuvrability, representing a paradigm shift in the balance of strategic power. Unlike classic ballistic missiles, which have fairly predictable trajectories, hypersonic vehicles are able to change course during a flight, making their detection and possible interception much more problematic. Such a combination of speed and precision, with a huge element of unpredictability, endangers deep concern among military planners worldwide and in rapidly reshaping doctrines of national defence, deterrence, and power projection.

China’s hypersonic surge cannot be viewed in isolation. It is the result of long-term investments in science and technology, the transformation of the People’s Liberation Army into a modern fighting force, and Beijing’s growing ambition to assert itself as a leading global power. As the United States, Russia, and China enter an era of renewed great-power rivalry, hypersonic weapons have become emblematic of technological competition and strategic signalling. This article examines the nature of China’s hypersonic missile program, the motivations driving its expansion, and the implications for regional security architectures and global stability.

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons

The two main classes of hypersonic weapons are cruise missiles. Hypersonic glide vehicles are normally launched on ballistic missiles into space at high altitudes, then separate and glide at extreme speeds toward their targets along flattened trajectories. Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered during flight by advanced scramjet engines that can sustain hypersonic speeds within the atmosphere.

The key characteristic of such systems is the ability to avoid traditional missile defences. Existing radar networks and interceptor missiles are optimized either for tracking traditional ballistic trajectories or for cruise missiles flying at low altitudes and much slower. Hypersonic weapons operate in a regime that bridges these two categories, usually too low for ballistic missile sensors and too fast for effective interception by existing air defence systems. Operationally, this creates a compressed decision-making window, reducing the time available to detect, identify, and respond. As a result, hypersonic systems undermine long-standing assumptions about strategic stability that have underpinned nuclear deterrence for decades.

Evolution of China’s Hypersonic Program

Interest in hypersonic technology on the part of China extends as far back as the early years of the 2000s, when research institutions began their work related to high-speed aerodynamics and advanced propulsion. These have, over time, been coalesced into national defence imperatives through heavy funding and state-guided industrial coordination. A major milestone came on January 15, 2014, when it was reported that China conducted one of its first acknowledged tests of a hypersonic glide vehicle, an indication of seriousness in the race against established military powers in this field.

The following years saw a ramping up of the pace of testing, as Chinese laboratories worked to perfect advanced materials that could sustain temperatures generated by hypersonic flight and to upgrade guidance systems to ensure accuracy through turbulence in the atmosphere. Undoubtedly, China’s civil-military fusion strategy has played a decisive role in this progress, coordinating academic institutions, state-owned enterprises, and private technology firms in a common national objective. Investments in artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and advanced manufacturing have further strengthened ecosystems.

Attention spiked after reports of a test of a fractional orbital bombardment system on August 27, 2021, placed a significant international spotlight on China. While Chinese authorities referred to the incident as a regular spacecraft experiment, analysts interpreted it as proof of a system able to launch a hypersonic vehicle into low-orbit trajectories before de-orbiting toward a target. This system, fully operational, would challenge existing missile defence concepts by enabling unexpected approach vectors and global strike capability.

Strategic Motives Behind the Surge

China’s pursuit of hypersonic weapons reflects defensive and offensive motivations. On one hand, Beijing seeks to counter the missile defence networks deployed by the United States and its allies in East Asia. Systems such as land-based interceptors and fleet-based missile defences are perceived by Chinese strategists as undermining the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent. Hypersonic weapons promise to restore the ability to defeat defensive shields and thereby ensure survivable second-strike capabilities.

On the other hand, hypersonic systems also function as tools of power projection. The capability to attack high-value targets with minimal warning strengthens China’s ability to deter intervention in regional conflicts-particularly in contingencies relating to Taiwan or contested maritime territories in the South China Sea. Hypersonic weapons reinforce Beijing’s anti-access and area-denial strategy through complicating the operational planning of adversaries, as well as increasing the costs of military intervention in China’s near seas.

There are also psychological and political layers that are as important as any other. Demonstrations of advanced weapons build and reinforce domestic narratives of scientific progress and national rejuvenation. Internationally, they are a signal of China’s emergence as a peer competitor to the United States and Russia. In a strategic environment where perception often rivals capability, hypersonic breakthroughs carry prestige and signalling value in a world where perception is as important as capability and become symbols of technological prowess.

Regional Implications in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific sits at the heart, or in other words, the epicentre of the fallout from China’s hypersonic surge. Nations such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia are reassessing their defence postures, as with every passing day, intercepting hypersonic threats is becoming harder. Long-established missile defences that were considered robust now seem rather vulnerable, prompting new bets and investments on early warning systems, space-based sensors, and next-generation interceptors.

 For India, China’s hypersonic progress has implications not only along the disputed Himalayan border but also around the Indian Ocean region. While direct deployment of hypersonic systems in a continental conflict is inconclusive, the broader technological imbalance caused by China’s advancements puts pressure on Indian strategic planners to hasten indigenous research and deepen cooperation with technologically advanced partners. It is this evolving recognition that hypersonic technology will be a defining element of future warfare that underpins India’s involvement in the international security framework.

Taiwan holds a particularly precarious position. Hypersonic missiles would further shrink their response time in the case of a dispute and make it difficult to protect key infrastructure. It means Taiwan would rely more strongly on asymmetric defence solutions and raises related arguments for diversified international support. Along with increasing capabilities, China has less room for miscalculations in the cross-strait relations, raising the stakes of political and military decisions.

Global Security and Arms-Control Challenges

China’s hypersonic surge poses serious challenges to existing arms control regimes. Traditional treaties regulating missiles and nuclear weapons were designed in an era when delivery systems were either ballistic or cruise in nature. Hypersonic weapons blur this distinction, making classification and verification far more complex. Without clear definitions and monitoring mechanisms, the risk of unchecked proliferation intensifies.

The complete lack of comprehensive international agreements on hypersonic technology creates a very uncertain environment. States may feel the need to pursue their own hypersonic programs as a hedge against vulnerability, fuelling an arms race reminiscent of Cold War dynamics. Yet this competition unfolds in a far more technologically sophisticated environment, where advancements occur rapidly and transparency is limited.

But perhaps the most disquieting consequence of all is the erosion of strategic stability. By compressing response times, hypersonic weapons ratchet up the pressure on decision-makers during crises. The risk of escalation due to misinterpretation or technical malfunction accordingly grows. For a nuclear-armed world, even the slightest amplification of uncertainty comes with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Responses from major players

The United States has responded to China’s hypersonic progress by expanding its research and development programs. A steady increase in investments into defensive and offensive technologies of hypersonic technologies is noted, with layered missile defence systems and space-based detectors. Integration of artificial intelligence into early-warning frameworks continues in an effort to cut down reaction times and enhance the quality of threat assessment.

Russia, itself a frontrunner in the deployment of hypersonic missiles, looks at China’s rise with a complicated mix of partnership and rivalry. The strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has deepened of late, but their parallel drive for hypersonic leadership now accentuates fundamental competition for influence. Europe, on the other hand, has reacted more cautiously, caught between ambition for technological sovereignty and the pressures of alliance solidarity.

Smaller states are increasingly being drawn into this competition as suppliers, testing grounds, or diplomatic stakeholders. Hypersonic proliferation runs the risk of spreading this gap between technologically advanced powers and militarily weaker states, further exacerbating the existing inequalities within the international system.

Economic and Technological Dimensions

The development of hypersonic weapons requires huge investment, sometimes running into billions of US dollars, depending on research infrastructure, materials science, and advanced computing. China’s state-driven economic model allows this large-scale funding without the political constraints that sometimes rein in defence spending in democratic systems. It is this financial flexibility that accelerates innovation and allows for sustained experimentation.

Beyond military use, research in hypersonic spills over into civilian industries. Advances in propulsion, thermal protection systems, and high-speed aerodynamics have greater relevance in wider technological ecosystems, including aerospace engineering and space exploration. China’s dual-use approach ensures that military and civil innovations reinforce each other, amplifying the return on investment.

But this economic burden is not without cost: the vast resources devoted to developing weapons could be spent in other ways, such as social programs or economic reform. The opportunity cost of sustained militarization constitutes a long-term challenge that may become more daunting should technological competition escalate into an arms race with minimal diminishing returns in actual security.

Future Outlook

China’s path of hypersonic development indicates acceleration. As testing becomes more frequent and deployment more sophisticated, the international community will face growing pressure to respond either through arms control initiatives or technological countermeasures. Adaptation seems unavoidable.

One promising avenue lies in the pursuit of multilateral dialogue. Indeed, setting norms related to hypersonic weapons, even when no formal treaties are likely to be adopted, could reduce uncertainty and favour transparency. CBMs, such as test notifications or information exchanges, though limited, would represent an important step toward stability.

Technological innovation in defence might also restore a degree of balance. Breakthroughs in directed energy weapons, advanced interception techniques, and space-based surveillance may one day undermine hypersonic advantages. But, history suggests that defensive systems are often behind those for offense, underscoring a need for diplomatic engagement alongside technological measures.

Conclusion

The frenetic pace of hypersonic missile development in China signals a new turning point in modern warfare. These weapons complicate established defensive frameworks, compress timelines for decision-making, and alter perceptions of vulnerability among great and middle powers alike. In the Indo-Pacific, hypersonic technology increasingly reconfigures regional calculations, while it fuels strategic uncertainty and complicates arms control globally. The stakes do not end at military balance. Hypersonic weapons symbolize a broader transformation characterised by rapid technological change and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. How states respond to this transformation will shape.

By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala

China and Taiwan have been involved in the conflict dating back to the Chinese civil war which ended in 1949. Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) claimed its sovereignty over the self-governed, democratic island of Taiwan. With its One-China policy, China views Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Taiwan considers itself a sovereign, independent country with its own constitution and democratically elected government. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by President William Lai, maintains that a formal declaration of independence is unnecessary as the Republic of China (ROC) is already a sovereign state. Most Taiwanese citizens support maintaining the current status quo. China has increased its military activity towards Taiwan. It has significantly ramped up military pressure through “grey zone” tactics, frequent incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and conducting large scale military drills simulating blockades or invasions. The question is- WHY?

Why does China want Taiwan? Historical claims, significant geostrategic advantages, and critical economic interests in Taiwan’s high-tech industries are the main reasons responsible for China’s assertiveness. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reclaiming the island is a matter of national pride and political legitimacy. The Chinese civil war never concluded with a peace treaty, the communists took over the whole of China and the nationalists retreated to Taiwan. According to PRC’s belief, it is the successor to the ROC, hence, the whole territory of China including Taiwan should be under their jurisdiction.

Taiwan is located at a strategically vital position. Having control of Taiwan would help China control the western pacific routes and its navy more efficiently which is a major security concern for the US and its regional allies.

Taiwan is a powerhouse in the technology sector, especially in semiconductor manufacturing. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s most valuable chip-making company and controls a majority of the global market share for advanced semiconductors, which are crucial for electronics, phones, and cars worldwide. Taking over         Taiwan’s economy would significantly bolster China’s tech industry and reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

General Secretary Xi Jinping has made the goal of integrating Taiwan a fundamental part of his political narrative because failure to bring Taiwan under Chinese control could be perceived as a weakness and a significant loss of face for the CCP leadership.

China insists on peaceful reunification but has been quite straightforward in stating that it may use force, if necessary, in order to prevent Taiwan from formally declaring independence.

Taiwan’s Military Preparation-

Taiwan is enhancing its military preparedness by resorting to an “asymmetric warfare” strategy, acquiring mobile, hard-to-target weapons, increasing its defence budget, and strengthening international partnerships. Taiwan’s core defence strategy is the ‘porcupine approach’. This aims to prevent a Chinese invasion by making the potential cost of an attack prohibitively high. It focuses on asymmetric capabilities such as using smaller, mobile, and cost-effective weapon systems that can survive an initial Chinese missile barrage and disrupt amphibious landings. Examples include anti-ship missiles (Hsiung Feng II/III), mobile missile launchers, sea mines, and drone swarms. It has started to emphasize on cyber or electronic warfare and guerilla-style tactics for urban defence, preparing for prolonged resistance. This strategy mirrors Ukraine’s defence model, focusing on denial rather than outright victory.

Taiwan’s doctrine emphasizes denial and attrition. The aim is to make any attempted cross-strait seizure physically and politically costly by inflicting losses on invading forces, disrupting sustainment, and prolonging resistance so as to complicate China’s political objectives. Exercises increasingly focus on distributed operations, small-unit anti-landing tactics, joint sensor-to-shooter linkages, and operations under degraded communications. Importantly, Taiwan recognizes that asymmetric defences work only if they are backed by credible logistics, robust command and control, and a trained reserve force that can execute follow-on operations after initial PLA strikes.

Taiwan has increased its defence budget. Taiwanese government has steadily increased the country’s military expenditure and is close to $20.25 billion in 2025 which is approximately 2.45% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). President Lai Ching-te announced an additional $40 billion investment over eight years. It aims to raise its defence spending to 5% of its GDP by 2030. Funds are directed toward advanced missile systems, cyber defence, and indigenous weapons development.

Taiwan is enhancing its grip on land, water and air. It has developed long range precision missiles which enhance deterrence by threatening Chinese bases. Taiwan’s defence ministries and private firms have adapted commercial drones for military use, and procurement plans include hundreds of small drones to provide real-time targeting data and augment artillery and missile effectiveness. Taiwan has also upgraded its domestic weaponry. Its investments include indigenous submarines and modern frigates. Taiwan is upgrading 141 older F-16A/B jets to the advanced F-16V and purchasing 66 new F-16Vs. These jets feature improved avionics and radars, designed to counter China’s J-20 stealth fighters. It has installed a multi-layered air defence systems like the new T-Dome and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors to protect critical assets and counter China’s air and missile threats.

The Taiwanese armed forces have expanded the length and frequency of their annual ‘Han Kuang’ military exercises, covering land, sea, and air operations to improve combat readiness. It runs extensive defence drills simulating Chinese attacks. Taiwanese government has also included civilians in order to keep everyone alert and ready for any situation. In 2025, these defence drills were the largest mobilization of reservists in history, involving civilians across cities and towns. Recognizing that Taiwan’s small active force cannot sustain prolonged high-intensity combat against the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA), It has invested in reserve reforms like reducing the active service gap, increasing training frequency, and improving the equipment and integration of reserve units so they can be a credible second line of defence. President Lai’s government has proposed supplementary defence budgets aimed at strengthening reserve readiness and broadening civil defence capabilities. Taiwanese armed forces and government have integrated civil and military. Exercises extend beyond bases and are held at train stations, supermarkets, schools and other public places reflecting Taiwan’s ‘whole-of-society’ defence approach. Citizens are taught survival skills, first aid, and emergency response. Schools and communities have integrated defence awareness into daily life, fostering unity. The government is preparing the civilian population for potential conflict through civil defence handbooks and developing communication backup networks to ensure societal resilience under attack.

Taiwan’s preparedness strategy depends heavily on international relationships, both in terms of material support and deterrence signalling. While Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic recognition from most countries, it enjoys substantive security ties with the United States and cooperation with like-minded partners. US arms sales, training, intelligence sharing, and political support are central pillars. Recent US approvals of missile defence and other packages underscore continuing US willingness to help Taiwan modernize its air-defence and sustainment capabilities. NATO and Pacific partners’ transits through the Taiwan Strait and statements of concern over coercive actions also create a broader international attention that China must account for during crisis decision-making. United States remains Taiwan’s primary arms supplier, providing advanced fighter jets, missile systems and training. Taiwan also has good relations with Japan and other Indo-Pacific allies and increasing cooperation with these countries is beneficial for Taiwan for a stronger control over the region. Domestic arms production is also essential to reduce foreign dependence to a certain extent and ensuring sustainability during conflict.

Challenges and Limitations for Taiwan

The PLA’s numerical advantage in aircraft, missiles, amphibious lift and sustainment remains daunting. Even a well-designed asymmetric defence can be stressed by a high-intensity, multi-axis campaign that combines cyber, missile strikes and amphibious landings. Taiwan faces demographic decline, reducing available recruits. It lacks manpower in comparison with China. Opposition parties sometimes resist large defence budgets, questioning sustainability. China’s economic and diplomatic coercion complicates Taiwan’s ability to secure enough international support. Modernization programs take years, while China’s military capabilities grow rapidly. Taiwan’s ability to sustain prolonged operations hinges on dispersal of logistics, redundant C2 and assured fuel and munitions stocks. Building these quickly is expensive and politically sensitive. Mobilization requires not only hardware but also a population ready and willing to endure disruptions. Taiwan has made strides in reserve and civil defence reforms, but full societal resilience is an ongoing challenge.