By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The renewed U.S. emphasis on Cuba, following what Washington increasingly interprets as the strategic stabilization of Venezuela, is neither accidental nor merely ideological in nature. For almost twenty years, Venezuela held the central role in American initiatives to counterbalance progressive or leftist administrations and to limit external influence across Latin America. Yet, as U.S. decision-makers adjust their expectations and redefine achievement not in terms of outright regime overthrow, but rather in terms of containment, predictability, and measured engagement, the strategic spotlight has gradually shifted.

Within this shifting geopolitical terrain, Cuba, long regarded as a persistent anomaly rather than an immediate menace, has once again surfaced as a focal concern. This reorientation underscores broader transformations in hemispheric dynamics, the intensification of global power rivalries, and the evident constraints of American coercive diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar international order.

Moreover, this evolution illustrates how Washington’s foreign policy calculus is moving away from binary notions of victory and defeat toward a more pragmatic framework that values stability, predictability, and managed competition. Cuba’s reemergence as a priority is not simply about ideology, but about its symbolic weight, its strategic location in the Caribbean, and its potential role as a partner or spoiler in broader contests involving global actors such as China, Russia, and the European Union.

In essence, the American pivot toward Cuba reflects both the waning centrality of Venezuela and the recognition that enduring anomalies can become pivotal players when the regional balance of power and the limits of unilateral pressure are fully acknowledged.

Reframing the Venezuelan Experience as Strategic Containment

The depiction of Venezuela as a relative American “achievement” does not signify triumph in the traditional sense. Nicolás Maduro continues to retain authority, and the Venezuelan political framework has not experienced a transition into liberal democracy. Yet, from Washington’s vantage point, the Venezuelan state has been substantially diminished in its ability to exercise regional influence. Years of punitive economic measures severely cut oil revenues, restricted diplomatic flexibility, and compelled Caracas into financial reliance on a limited circle of partners. Gradually, Venezuela shifted from being a revolutionary disseminator of anti-U.S. rhetoric into a fractured, crisis-stricken nation preoccupied with domestic survival.

Furthermore, targeted diplomatic outreach enabled the United States to re-establish itself as a gatekeeper to Venezuela’s economic rehabilitation. By linking partial easing of sanctions to electoral stipulations and energy collaboration, Washington illustrated that it still possessed leverage without escalating into direct confrontation. Consequently, Venezuela evolved into a managed challenge, contained, supervised, and partially reintegrated under American parameters.

This strategic adjustment created space for renewed focus on Cuba, a nation that remains ideologically unyielding, diplomatically adaptable, and symbolically disruptive within the broader hemispheric and global context.

Cuba’s Enduring Symbolic Challenge to U.S. Power

Cuba’s importance in U.S. strategic calculations is anchored less in tangible strength than in symbolic weight. Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Havana has embodied a direct challenge to American authority within its immediate geographic sphere. In contrast to Venezuela, whose ideological boldness fluctuated with oil revenues, Cuba’s unyielding defiance has remained steady across decades of economic adversity, leadership changes, and diplomatic isolation. This enduring resilience has transformed Cuba from a mere policy challenge into a psychological litmus test for U.S. credibility.

The island’s continuance under one of the most prolonged sanction regimes in contemporary history weakens the perceived effectiveness of American coercive instruments. Each year that Cuba survives without surrender strengthens a narrative of resistance that reverberates throughout the Global South. From Washington’s perspective, permitting Cuba to persist as a viable alternative political experiment, even one beset by difficulties, creates reputational hazards that extend well beyond the Caribbean basin.

Geography and the Logic of Hemispheric Security

Cuba’s close physical proximity to the United States intensifies perceptions of threat in a manner unmatched by any other left-oriented Latin American nation. Situated scarcely ninety miles from the coast of Florida, Cuba occupies a strategically sensitive position that intersects with enduring American doctrines of hemispheric defence, ranging from the Monroe Doctrine to Cold War containment policies. This nearness transforms Cuba from a remote ideological challenger into a persistent symbol of vulnerability within America’s immediate neighbourhood.

Historically, U.S. officials have regarded the presence of antagonistic powers near national borders as fundamentally intolerable, irrespective of their actual military strength. Within this framework, Cuba’s political alignment is interpreted not simply as an expression of sovereign will but as a potential conduit for external penetration, intelligence activities, and strategic messaging by rival global actors.

Great Power Competition and Cuba’s Renewed Strategic Value

The escalation of U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia competition has profoundly reshaped Cuba’s strategic significance. For Moscow, a renewed engagement with Havana carries both symbolic resonance and practical utility. Against the backdrop of conflict in Ukraine and ongoing disputes over NATO enlargement, Russia’s diplomatic and economic overtures toward Cuba serve as a reminder that American manoeuvres in Eastern Europe can generate reciprocal consequences in the Western Hemisphere. Even modest forms of cooperation, whether cultural, economic, or military, carry psychological weight, rekindling Cold War-era apprehensions within U.S. strategic circles and reinforcing the perception that Cuba remains a sensitive fault line in hemispheric security.

China’s role in Cuba, by contrast, is structural, enduring, and future-oriented. Beijing has steadily expanded its economic presence through infrastructure investment, technological collaboration, and telecommunications initiatives. These projects not only provide Cuba with critical development opportunities but also embed the island more deeply into Chinese economic and technological ecosystems. From Washington’s vantage point, the establishment of Chinese digital infrastructure raises alarms about surveillance potential, intelligence collection, and the possible militarization of ostensibly civilian technologies. In a global environment where data, connectivity, and digital networks are increasingly regarded as strategic assets, Cuba’s integration into Chinese systems is interpreted as a serious security challenge.

Taken together, the dual involvement of Russia and China elevates Cuba from a regional irritant to a symbolically charged and strategically contested space. Russia’s presence underscores the geopolitical reciprocity of great-power rivalry, while China’s footprint highlights the long-term transformation of global competition into technological and infrastructural domains. For the United States, Cuba is no longer merely a neighbouring anomaly but a potential platform for rival powers to project influence, test resilience, and signal defiance. This layered dynamic ensures that Cuba’s relevance in American strategic thought will persist, not because of its material strength, but because of its capacity to embody the broader struggles of a multipolar world.

Cuba as a Hub in Alternative Global Networks

Cuba’s strategic significance also derives from its role in upholding alternative global alignments that contest Western predominance. Havana preserves strong connections with nations facing U.S. sanctions and diplomatic isolation, thereby contributing to the formation of parallel economic and political frameworks intended to circumvent American oversight and influence. These networks, though fragmented and uneven, collectively dilute the potency of sanctions as a universal policy mechanism.

Through its active participation and facilitation of such arrangements, Cuba functions simultaneously as a recipient and a catalyst of resistance to U.S.-centred order. This dual role enhances its weight in Washington’s strategic calculations, especially in an era when sanctions fatigue and non-aligned postures are increasingly gaining traction across the international system.

The Erosion of U.S. Influence in Latin America

American states emphasize political autonomy, diversification of external partnerships, and pragmatic engagement rather than strict ideological alignment with U.S. preferences. This shift reflects a regional recalibration, where sovereignty and flexibility are valued over adherence to a singular geopolitical order.

Against this backdrop, Cuba has reasserted itself as a credible regional participant rather than being relegated to the status of an outcast or pariah state. Its active involvement in multilateral forums, coupled with a persistent diplomatic footprint, directly contests American attempts to marginalize or isolate Havana. By maintaining visibility and relevance in regional dialogues, Cuba demonstrates resilience and underscores its ability to navigate shifting political currents. This transformation highlights how the island has moved beyond symbolic resistance to become a recognized interlocutor in hemispheric affairs.

For Washington, this process of normalization signifies more than a policy setback; it represents a potential precedent for other nations seeking to assert greater independence from U.S. influence. The Cuban case illustrates how endurance under pressure can eventually yield legitimacy, thereby encouraging states to experiment with alternative alignments and challenge the traditional hierarchy of power. In this sense, Cuba’s trajectory is not merely about its own survival, but about the broader implications for American credibility and authority in a region where pluralism, autonomy, and non-alignment are increasingly shaping the strategic landscape.

Domestic Political Drivers of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Domestic political dynamics in the United States play a decisive role in maintaining Cuba’s prominence within the foreign policy agenda. The political weight of Cuban American constituencies, especially in electorally pivotal states such as Florida, guarantees that Cuba remains a highly sensitive and contested issue. Adopting hardline stances toward Havana frequently produces domestic political advantages, reinforcing a bipartisan inclination toward caution, scepticism, or outright hostility, even when the broader strategic environment shifts.

Consequently, Cuba emerges as a politically convenient target for projecting toughness and resolve. Unlike direct confrontation with major global powers, exerting pressure on Cuba entails minimal immediate costs while simultaneously providing symbolic reassurance to domestic audiences. This dynamic foster policy inflexibility and complicates attempts at substantive recalibration or reformulation, ensuring that Cuba’s position in American foreign policy remains rigidly entrenched despite evolving international circumstances.

The Limits and Risks of Renewed Pressure

Despite heightened scrutiny and renewed attention, American leverage over Cuba remains sharply constrained. Decades of punitive sanctions and economic restrictions have failed to produce the desired political transformation, leaving the Cuban regime intact. Any further escalation of pressure risks serious humanitarian repercussions for the island’s population and could provoke widespread international criticism. Moreover, intensifying coercion may inadvertently accelerate Cuba’s integration into rival-led networks, thereby deepening the very strategic challenges Washington seeks to mitigate.

This situation illustrates a broader paradox within U.S. foreign policy, the persistent tension between coercive instruments and adaptive strategies. In the Cuban case, the traditional toolkit of sanctions, isolation, and diplomatic pressure has reached a stage of diminishing returns, producing limited tangible outcomes while reinforcing Cuba’s narrative of resilience. Yet, despite this evident stagnation, political imperatives at home and strategic caution abroad continue to discourage meaningful innovation. The result is a policy posture that remains rigid and repetitive, even as circumstances demand greater flexibility.

Ultimately, Cuba embodies the limits of unilateral pressure in a multipolar world. The island’s endurance under decades of sanctions highlights the constraints of coercive diplomacy and raises questions about the sustainability of Washington’s approach. Genuine recalibration would require the United States to balance domestic political pressures with strategic adaptation, exploring avenues beyond exclusion and punishment. However, the reluctance to embrace such change underscores how Cuba functions not only as a foreign policy challenge but also as a mirror reflecting the broader dilemmas of American power and credibility in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion: Cuba as a Measure of American Adaptability

Cuba’s renewed visibility on the American foreign policy radar in the post-Venezuelan context reflects a broader transformation in global politics. As power becomes more diffused and forms of resistance prove more sustainable, states with limited material resources can nonetheless acquire outsized relevance through their symbolic resonance, geographic positioning, and strategic affiliations. In this light, Cuba is no longer simply a lingering Cold War anomaly; it has become a test case for whether U.S. foreign policy can adapt to a multipolar order without relying exclusively on coercion, isolation, and exclusionary practices.

The way Washington chooses to respond to Cuba will serve as a signal of its broader approach to managing relative decline, intensifying geopolitical competition, and ideological diversity within its own hemisphere. If the United States continues to lean on traditional instruments of pressure, it risks reinforcing perceptions of rigidity and diminishing returns. Conversely, a willingness to experiment with engagement, adaptation, and pragmatic coexistence could demonstrate that American strategy is capable of evolving in step with the realities of a pluralistic international system.

In this sense, Cuba is not merely a renewed focal point of attention but a mirror reflecting the evolving boundaries of American influence. Its endurance and defiance highlight the limits of unilateral dominance, while its symbolic role underscores the possibilities of recalibration in the twenty-first century. For Washington, the Cuban question is less about the island itself and more about the credibility of U.S. power in a world where authority must increasingly be negotiated rather than imposed.

By: Sk Md Assad Armaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The United States’ recent military operation in Venezuela involving strikes, capture of President Nicolás Maduro, and efforts to reshape political authority has reverberated far beyond Latin America. The move triggered global condemnation, particularly from Russia and China, which framed the action as a violation of international law and an affront to sovereignty. At an emergency United Nations Security Council meeting, both Moscow and Beijing condemned the U.S. military action as an act of aggression, asserting Venezuela’s right to determine its own future absent foreign intervention.

While the operational fallout in Venezuela continues to unfold, Russia and China are already positioning themselves to leverage the situation. The U.S. move offers these powers multiple strategic advantages in the broader contest with Washington, reinforcing narratives of Western overreach, weakening U.S. legitimacy in global governance, and providing opportunities to expand their influence in Latin America and beyond.

Russia and China have both capitalised on the optics of the U.S. intervention to critique American foreign policy. Beijing described Washington’s action as a “clear violation of international law” that undermines the UN Charter and infringes on Venezuela’s sovereignty. Similarly, Moscow labelled the operation an act of “armed aggression” threatening the principle of self-determination. These condemnations serve multiple purposes. First, they reinforce sovereignty and non-intervention core pillars of Russian and Chinese diplomatic rhetoric. For China, in particular, this narrative bolsters its own arguments against perceived Western interference in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan by portraying the U.S. as the real threat to international norms.

For Russia, which has defended regimes in Syria and elsewhere, critically positioning itself against U.S. unilateralism helps maintain its claim to be a defender of a multipolar world. These portrayals align with broader efforts by both states to delegitimise U.S. global leadership and promote alternative norms of international order. Moreover, sustained criticism resonates in the Global South. Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia frequently cautioned against external intervention and warned of a dangerous precedent. This shared concern provides Russia and China with an opening to build diplomatic coalitions and present themselves as partners willing to engage on terms that emphasise mutual respect and sovereignty.

Strategic Economic Levers and Narrative Competition

The Maduro regime’s capture also has significant implications for global energy politics, particularly for China, which has been Venezuela’s largest oil buyer and a key financier of its economy for years. U.S. efforts to assert control over Venezuelan oil resources and reopen markets to Western producers could disrupt existing commercial arrangements favoured by Beijing. China’s strategic response is likely to involve economic recalibration rather than direct confrontation. Beijing’s investments in Venezuela have been extensive, involving loans, joint ventures, and long-term contracts for heavy crude exports. Chinese authorities have criticised U.S. actions as targeting these economic interests under a veneer of law enforcement and have used this framing to argue that Washington’s intervention threatens stable commercial relations and discourages long-term investment.

In response, China can pursue diversified engagement with other Latin American economies, offering infrastructure financing, trade partnerships, and investment packages to countries that may feel threatened by U.S. unilateralism. These economic relationships, often delivered through mechanisms like the Belt and Road Initiative, provide Beijing leverage in diplomatic and geopolitical conversations, effectively offsetting losses in Venezuela with expanded influence elsewhere. Russia, although less economically intertwined with Venezuela than China, also stands to benefit strategically. Moscow’s energy companies have historically supplied petroleum products and technical assistance to Caracas, and Russia has used such ties to symbolise opposition to Western dominance. The erosion of the Maduro alliance could prompt Russia to seek new forms of political and economic cooperation with other states wary of U.S. actions, particularly in Africa and Central Asia.

Beyond diplomacy and economics, Russia and China are intensifying efforts to shape global perceptions of the Venezuela crisis. State-backed information operations have amplified narratives questioning the legality and legitimacy of the U.S. intervention, portraying Washington as unpredictable and imperialistic. These campaigns are not restricted to traditional media channels; they use social media platforms and AI-driven content to sow confusion, highlight perceived U.S. hypocrisy, and appeal to audiences sceptical of Western media. Such narrative competition serves multiple strategic goals.

It undermines confidence in U.S. leadership among allied publics, strengthens scepticism about Western intentions in the Global South, and reinforces the image of Russia and China as defenders against external coercion. In ideologically aligned media spaces, these narratives can tilt public opinion and influence political elites in key regions, further entrenching geopolitical blocs.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Logic of Opportunistic Escalation

Beyond narrative and economic leverage, the Venezuela episode may also create permissive conditions for Russia to recalibrate its military posture in Ukraine. Moscow closely monitors U.S. strategic bandwidth and political focus. Any perception that Washington is stretched across multiple theatres. Latin America, Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific creates what Russian strategists describe as a “window of opportunity.” This does not automatically translate into immediate large-scale offensives, but it lowers the perceived costs of escalation. From Moscow’s perspective, U.S. actions in Venezuela reinforce a pattern of selective intervention driven by political expediency rather than consistent adherence to international norms.

This perception strengthens Russia’s long-standing argument that power, not law, governs global politics. In such an environment, restraint becomes strategically irrational. If Washington is willing to use force to reshape political outcomes in its perceived sphere of influence, Russia can justify intensified military pressure in Ukraine as reciprocal behaviour rather than escalation. Importantly, escalation need not mean dramatic territorial breakthroughs. It may take the form of intensified missile strikes or renewed offensives designed to test Western resolve and Ukrainian resilience. The goal would be strategic signalling rather than decisive victory demonstrating that U.S. credibility erodes when it applies norms selectively. Even limited escalation serves a broader purpose: forcing the West to divide attention, resources, and political capital.

Thus, Venezuela does not cause escalation in Ukraine, but it contributes to a permissive strategic environment where Russia calculates that the risks of intensified pressure are manageable and potentially advantageous.

China, Taiwan, and the Precedent Problem

China’s response to U.S. actions in Venezuela is unlikely to be immediate or overtly military, but the precedent matters deeply for Beijing’s Taiwan calculus. Chinese strategic thinking places enormous emphasis on patterns of behaviour. If Washington demonstrates willingness to use force to remove or detain political leadership in another sovereign state, Beijing will study not the justification offered, but the international response it generates. For China, the critical lesson is not Venezuela itself, but the elasticity of global norms. If international opposition remains fragmented, short-lived, or symbolic, it reinforces Beijing’s belief that decisive action particularly when framed as law enforcement, counterterrorism, or internal security can be absorbed without catastrophic consequences. This does not mean China is preparing for imminent invasion of Taiwan.

Rather, it strengthens confidence in incremental coercion. The most likely outcome is intensified grey-zone pressure rather than immediate kinetic action. China may expand military drills, legal warfare, economic coercion, and political influence operations while closely observing U.S. responses. Each step tests thresholds and normalises higher levels of pressure. The Venezuela episode contributes to this logic by weakening the moral clarity of U.S. deterrence messaging. Beijing can argue both domestically and internationally that Washington itself violates sovereignty when convenient. This rhetorical symmetry reduces reputational costs for Chinese coercive actions around Taiwan. In strategic terms, Venezuela becomes another data point reinforcing China’s belief that power precedes legitimacy, not the other way around.

From Regional Crisis to Systemic Signal

What makes the Venezuela episode particularly consequential is not its regional impact, but its systemic implications. Great power competition today is increasingly shaped by how crises in one region recalibrate expectations elsewhere. Russia and China do not require direct involvement in Latin America to benefit strategically. They benefit when U.S. actions weaken the coherence of the normative order Washington claims to defend. This dynamic accelerates a broader shift toward a precedent-based international system, where states justify actions not through law, but through comparison. If intervention becomes a tool selectively applied by great powers, restraint loses its strategic value. In such a system, escalation is not triggered by intent alone, but by opportunity.

For Russia, this means testing limits in Ukraine when U.S. attention is fragmented. For China, it means refining coercive strategies against Taiwan without crossing thresholds that would unify opposition. For both, Venezuela becomes a reference point used to legitimise future actions, even if those actions occur thousands of kilometres away. The danger is cumulative rather than immediate. Each precedent lowers barrier to the next. Each selective intervention erodes the credibility of deterrence built on rules. Over time, this transforms the international system from one governed by constraint to one governed by competitive permissibility.

Conclusion: Strategic Advantage Through Narrative and Structure

In multilateral forums, Russia and China are leveraging the Venezuela situation to advocate for reforms in global governance that mitigate U.S. dominance. Their calls for emergency UN Security Council sessions and demands for respect for sovereign rights, even if symbolic, allow them to project leadership on principle and challenge U.S. narratives about international law and intervention. This movement toward an alternative multilateral discourse resonates with many states in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East that share concerns about unilateral military actions.

For China and Russia, positioning themselves as proponents of a more equitable international system enhances their soft power and paves the way for broader strategic partnerships including cooperation on technologies, infrastructure, and defence. The U.S. operation in Venezuela has presented Russia and China with a strategic opportunity: to delegitimise American unilateralism, reinforce their own narratives of sovereignty and non-intervention, and strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with states wary of Western dominance. While neither Russia nor China has direct military options to reverse U.S. actions in Latin America, they can exploit the situation to shape global norms, strengthen alliances, and expand their influence in ways that counterbalance U.S. power.

In the contest of global influence, the Venezuela crisis provides an example of how great powers use moments of geopolitical tension not just for immediate gain, but to reshape narratives, recalibrate economic alignments, and build alternative architectures of authority in the international system.

By: Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The early months of 2026 have witnessed a dramatic recalibration of United States foreign and strategic policy under the Trump administration’s reasserted hemispheric dominance framework. On January 3, 2026, the United States executed a large-scale military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture and exfiltration of President Nicolás Maduro, marking a significant escalation in American intervention in Latin America. Simultaneously, the Trump administration has pursued an aggressive diplomatic and strategic campaign to acquire or gain direct control of Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, signaling a new phase in great power competition in the Arctic region. These two contemporaneous initiatives, one demonstrating demonstrated military willingness and the other revealing emerging strategic priorities raise critical questions about American regional ambitions and the consistency of policy objectives. This article examines whether Greenland represents a subsequent target of American strategic expansion following the Venezuela precedent, analyzing the drivers, strategic rationale, geopolitical implications, and comparative dynamics between these two distinct but interconnected policy trajectories.

Venezuela: Strategic Rationale and Military Precedent

Background and Escalation Timeline

The United States has maintained sustained interest in Venezuela’s political trajectory since the rise of Hugo Chávez in 1999, but American pressure intensified dramatically under successive administrations beginning with George W. Bush through the Obama and Trump years. However, the 2025-2026 period witnessed a qualitative shift in American operational capacity and political resolve. Beginning in August 2025, the United States initiated a substantial military buildup in the southern Caribbean, deploying multiple naval assets and military personnel to forward positions across the region. By late December 2025, military operations had escalated beyond maritime interdiction to include land-based strikes, including strikes on a remote northern Venezuelan port allegedly used by criminal organizations for smuggling activities.

The military operation that unfolded on January 3, 2026, represented the culmination of months of strategic preparation. According to public reporting, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had deployed personnel into Venezuelan territory months prior to establish surveillance networks, and specific operational planning for the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, was executed with substantial advance coordination. President Trump has indicated that additional military waves were contemplated but subsequently canceled following reported Venezuelan cooperation with American demands. The operation demonstrates several critical capabilities: sustained covert operational presence, real-time tactical execution against a recognized sovereign state’s leadership, and political willingness to employ military force against Latin American governments opposed to American interests.

Strategic Drivers: Energy, Drugs, and Hemispheric Control

Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at approximately 305 billion barrels as of 2023, substantially exceeding Saudi Arabia’s confirmed reserves. While Venezuela’s oil production capacity had collapsed from approximately 2.8 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1997 to roughly 400,000-500,000 b/d by 2025 due to decades of infrastructure underinvestment and sanctions pressure, the strategic value of controlling these reserves remained central to American calculations. American energy security interests, coupled with desires to ensure Western Hemisphere energy independence and to prevent rival powers such as China from expanding influence through energy relationships, constituted significant motivating factors.

Beyond hydrocarbon resources, American officials articulated narcotics trafficking concerns as a critical justification for intervention. The Trump administration designated Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization in early January 2026, accusing Maduro of directing this criminal enterprise. Trafficking in cocaine and synthetic drugs from Venezuela through Caribbean corridors into North American markets affects domestic security policy and public health outcomes. However, this framing obscured the broader geopolitical objective: preventing anti-American governments from consolidating regional influence and preventing rival powers, particularly China and Russia, from expanding military and political presence in America’s traditional sphere of influence.

The “America First” Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine Corollary

The Trump administration formalized a comprehensive strategic doctrine on January 20, 2025, through the “America First Policy Directive” to the Secretary of State. This directive explicitly ordered that “from this day forward, the foreign policy of the United States shall champion core American interests and always put America and American citizens first”. This language signaled a departure from multilateral institutional frameworks and post-Cold War consensus diplomacy toward a more transactional, interest-based approach to statecraft.

The 2025 National Security Strategy, published by the White House, made explicit reference to establishing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine and signaled intentions to “assert and enforce” American dominance throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. The Monroe Doctrine, originally articulated by President James Monroe in 1823, opposed European colonization and political interference in the Americas. The Trump Corollary extends this framework to oppose any non-American great power influence and to position the United States as the sole arbiter of hemispheric affairs. Under this doctrine, the Venezuela operation represented enforcement of this hemispheric primacy, eliminating a government deemed ideologically hostile to American interests and geopolitically aligned with rival powers.

Greenland: Strategic Rationale and Arctic Imperative

Geographic, Mineral, and Strategic Significance

Greenland occupies a singular position in contemporary Arctic geopolitics. The island, covering approximately 2.166 million square kilometers (836,000 square miles) of territory, sits at the intersection of European, North American, and Arctic maritime domains. With a current population of approximately 56,000 inhabitants, Greenland qualifies as one of the world’s least densely populated territories, yet its geographic position carries outsized geopolitical significance.

The melting Arctic ice, accelerated by climate change, has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus surrounding Greenland. Three major Arctic shipping routes have either emerged or become increasingly viable: the Northwest Passage along Canada’s northern Arctic coast, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Arctic coast, and the prospective Transpolar Sea Route crossing the central Arctic Ocean. Greenland’s position along these emerging trade corridors provides strategic leverage over future global commerce and international maritime transport. The island also lies adjacent to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, a critical maritime chokepoint through which Russian and Chinese naval vessels must transit to reach North Atlantic operations areas.

Beyond maritime geography, Greenland possesses substantial mineral wealth previously inaccessible beneath layers of permanent ice and permafrost. A joint geological survey conducted by Denmark and Greenland in 2023 identified significant deposits of critical raw materials essential to modern industrial economies and advanced technology sectors. These resources include rare-earth elements (REEs), graphite, platinum-group metals, titanium, and other strategic minerals. The global energy transition toward renewable electricity generation, electrified transportation, and advanced defense systems has dramatically increased demand for these materials, particularly rare-earth elements used in wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries, permanent magnets, and military radar systems. As climate change continues melting Greenland’s ice sheet, extracting these resources becomes progressively more economically feasible.

American Strategic Interests: Military, Economic, and Technological

President Trump has repeatedly articulated national security justifications for acquiring Greenland, emphasizing military defensive capabilities as the primary rationale. The Trump administration highlighted the strategic imperative of preventing rival powers, specifically China and Russia, from establishing military or political influence over Arctic regions and resources. Trump stated that “Greenland lies along two potential Arctic shipping routes: the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route. With climate change making these routes more feasible, commercial interests also enhance the national security significance of the island”.

The United States maintains limited military infrastructure in Greenland. Currently, the U.S. military operates Thule Air Base in northwestern Greenland, established during the Cold War era and utilized for missile early warning, air defense, and space operations. However, full American control of Greenland could enable substantial expansion of this footprint, potentially accommodating the so-called “Golden Dome” missile defense system, a centerpiece of the Trump administration’s strategic defense initiative announced on January 20, 2025. This system, designed to provide comprehensive missile defense protection for North American territory, would benefit operationally from forward-positioned sensors and interceptors in Greenland’s strategic Arctic location.

From a resource security perspective, controlling Greenland’s rare-earth deposits would provide the United States with diversified sourcing of critical minerals currently concentrated in geopolitically sensitive supply chains. China dominates global rare-earth element processing and refining, controlling approximately 85 percent of global processing capacity. The majority of rare-earth mining occurs in China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Acquiring or controlling Greenland’s mineral wealth would reduce American technological and industrial dependence on Chinese supply chains and provide strategic leverage in technology competition and potential future conflict scenarios.

Vice President JD Vance visited Greenland in March 2025 and articulated the American strategic position that “it was the policy of the United States” to seek advantageous changes regarding Greenland’s governance structure. Vance’s statement, while acknowledging that Greenlanders themselves should determine their future, signaled explicit American preference for political transitions that would facilitate American interests.

Acquisition Strategy: Purchase, Coercion, and Military Options

The Trump administration has explored multiple strategic pathways toward acquiring Greenland. Initially, the administration proposed a direct purchase arrangement, suggesting financial compensation to Denmark in exchange for sovereignty transfer over Greenland. Estimates of the potential purchase price have ranged up to US$ 700 billion according to various media reports, though no official American or Danish estimates have been released. This figure, while extraordinary, situates Greenland’s perceived strategic value within comparable international agreements regarding territorial acquisition, military bases, and resource rights.

When Danish and Greenlandic officials categorically rejected the purchase proposal, the Trump administration escalated its strategic messaging. On January 15, 2026, following high-level White House meetings between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President JD Vance, and Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the American position hardened. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that “the President has made his priority quite clear. He wants the United States to acquire Greenland. He thinks it is in our best national security to do that”. When questioned about potential military action, Leavitt did not rule out such options, stating that “I don’t think troops in Europe impact the president’s decision-making process, nor does it impact his goal of the acquisition of Greenland at all”.

Trump himself signaled this escalatory trajectory when he stated that anything short of American acquisition would be “unacceptable” and remarked that the United States would pursue this objective “one way or the other”. In public statements, Trump suggested that military force was a potential instrument to achieve this objective, stating “we need Greenland from the standpoint of national security,” implying that this necessity overrode conventional diplomatic constraints.

Comparative Analysis: Venezuela and Greenland as Linked Strategic Initiatives

Temporal Sequencing and Policy Signaling

The temporal proximity of the Venezuela military operation (January 3, 2026) and the intensified Greenland acquisition campaign (January 13-16, 2026) was not coincidental. The successful execution of the Venezuela operation, which involved projecting military power into a sovereign nation’s territory without comprehensive international authorization and executing the removal of a sitting president, demonstrated both American operational capability and political willingness to employ military instruments for strategic objectives. This demonstration preceded the Greenland campaign by mere days, creating a powerful signal regarding American strategic intent and instrumental capacity.

Trump’s public statements directly linked these initiatives as manifestations of a unified strategic doctrine. Referencing the Venezuela operation in January 2026, Trump remarked that “the day after US forces snatched Maduro from his home,” he reiterated that the U.S. requires Greenland “from the standpoint of national security”. This sequential articulation suggests that Trump conceptualized these initiatives as part of a comprehensive American strategic repositioning in its traditional spheres of influence and newly prioritized regions.

Doctrine of Hemispheric and Arctic Dominance

Both the Venezuela intervention and the Greenland acquisition campaign operate within the framework of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine formalized in January 2025. The Venezuela operation enforced the principle that anti-American governments cannot persist in the Western Hemisphere. The Greenland campaign similarly enforces the principle that American security interests in strategically vital regions override conventional international law and alliances.

However, the Greenland case introduces significant complications absent in the Venezuela precedent. Venezuela was fundamentally isolated internationally following years of humanitarian crisis, sanctions, and regime delegitimization. Greenland, by contrast, remains within the Danish kingdom, and Denmark is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), America’s primary military alliance. Pursuing Greenland through military means would directly contradict Article 5 collective defense obligations and could precipitate NATO alliance fragmentation.

Strategic Asset Hierarchy: Resources, Geography, and Power Projection

Venezuela and Greenland represent distinct but complementary resource and strategic assets within Trump’s hemispheric dominance framework. Venezuela offers energy security through proven oil reserves, albeit currently underdeveloped and requiring substantial capital investment for production recovery. Venezuela also provides geographic control over Caribbean maritime corridors and counter-narcotics leverage. However, Venezuela’s primary value lies in negative control, preventing rival powers from consolidating influence rather than positive resource acquisition or power projection capability.

Greenland, by contrast, offers both resource acquisition (critical minerals) and forward power projection capabilities (Arctic military infrastructure, missile defense, Arctic shipping route control). Greenland provides access to resources essential to American technological and industrial competitiveness and positions American military forces in territories adjacent to both Russian and Chinese expanding Arctic presence. From this perspective, Greenland represents a higher strategic tier asset than Venezuela, strategically superior in technological and industrial importance, though requiring substantially greater political and diplomatic capital to acquire.

The Precedent Question: Does Venezuela Enable Greenland?

A critical analytical question concerns the causal relationship between the Venezuela operation and the Greenland campaign. The Venezuela precedent demonstrates American willingness to employ military force against sovereign nations to achieve strategic objectives. However, this precedent does not automatically translate to NATO member territory or allied nations.

The more significant mechanism linking these initiatives involves signaling American strategic intent and demonstrating capability credibly. By executing the Venezuela operation with swift effectiveness, Trump administration officials conveyed to international audiences that American military capacity and political will to employ it had not atrophied despite decades of inconclusive military engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. This demonstration enhanced the credibility of American threats regarding Greenland, suggesting that Trump officials were not merely rhetorical in threatening military options.

Denmark responded to this signaling environment by mobilizing both national and NATO allied resources to strengthen Greenland’s defense posture. Beginning in January 2026, Denmark announced substantial increases in military expenditures for Greenland, including deployment of fighter jets, naval vessels, and enhanced air defense systems. NATO allies including Germany, France, Sweden, and Norway confirmed participation in joint military exercises with Denmark in Greenland, specifically titled “Operation Arctic Endurance,” designed to demonstrate collective defense commitment and raise the costs of any American military attempt to acquire the territory.

Constraints and Complications: Why Greenland Differs from Venezuela

Alliance Structures and Article 5 Dynamics

The most fundamental distinction between the Venezuela and Greenland cases involves alliance dynamics. Venezuela has declined to NATO membership and occupies no special position within American alliance structures. Greenland, conversely, exists within Denmark’s territory, and Denmark holds full NATO membership status. An American military operation against Greenland would trigger NATO Article 5 provisions regarding collective defense, potentially forcing NATO allies to choose between alliance obligations and American security demands.

Atlantic Council Northern Europe Director Anna Wieslander articulated this strategic dilemma bluntly: “Should the darkest hour come and the United States uses military force to annex Greenland, the essence of Article 5 and collective defense within NATO would lose its meaning”. This statement captures the fundamental incompatibility between pursuing Greenland through military means and maintaining NATO cohesion. American strategists, aware of this constraint, have indicated preference for diplomatic compromise over military confrontation, though without entirely foreclosing military options.

Greenlandic Self-Determination and Democratic Opposition

Popular opposition to American acquisition of Greenland is overwhelming and constitutes a significant political-psychological constraint on American action. Polling conducted by Reuters in January 2026 indicated that approximately 85 percent of Greenlanders oppose American control over their territory. While this opposition has not prevented American strategic initiatives in other contexts, the democratic legitimacy of this opposition creates political costs within democratic discourse and alliance politics that distinguish the Greenland case from Venezuela, where popular opinion had already been extensively mobilized against the Maduro government.

Economic Negotiation Pathway: The Working Group Compromise

Rather than pursuing military options immediately, the Trump administration agreed to establish a working group with Denmark and Greenland to explore potential arrangements short of full American acquisition. Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen indicated that “both Denmark and Greenland are open to the idea of the United States establishing additional military bases on the island, but he stressed that there are certain ‘red lines’ that Washington must not cross”. This negotiation framework suggests recognition by American officials that military options carry substantial costs that might be mitigated through creative arrangements regarding military cooperation, resource access, and enhanced strategic partnership.

Strategic Implications and Future Trajectory

Arctic Great Power Competition and Chinese and Russian Responses

The American focus on Greenland acquisition occurs within the broader context of intensifying Arctic competition between the United States, Russia, and China. Russia has substantially expanded Arctic military infrastructure and exercises Arctic capabilities with increasing sophistication. China, despite lacking territorial Arctic claims, has pursued Arctic resource agreements, shipping route participation, and technological investments positioning it as an “Arctic stakeholder”. The Trump administration’s explicit prioritization of Arctic dominance through Greenland acquisition represents a direct American response to rival power expansion in this strategically vital region.

Implications for NATO Cohesion and European Security Architecture

The Greenland dispute has strained American relationships with European NATO allies, particularly Denmark, but also with France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway, which have publicly demonstrated support for Denmark and Greenland through “Operation Arctic Endurance” and other coordinated responses. The Trump administration’s willingness to threaten military action against NATO members over territorial acquisition challenges fundamental assumptions regarding alliance solidarity and collective security commitments.

This dynamic creates potential bifurcation within NATO, with American strategic focus prioritizing Arctic competition and hemispheric dominance while European allies prioritize Atlantic security and preservation of alliance institutional structures. Resolving this tension will likely require significant diplomatic negotiation and possible restructuring of alliance burden-sharing arrangements and strategic priorities.

Precedent Implications for International Law and Territorial Acquisition

The simultaneous prosecution of the Venezuela operation and the Greenland acquisition campaign raises precedent questions regarding international legal norms and territorial acquisition. The Venezuela operation involved military intervention against a sovereign nation without United Nations Security Council authorization or formal international legal justification beyond American national security claims. While regime change operations have occurred throughout contemporary international history, the explicit American willingness to articulate this objective and to execute it through military means represents a departure from post-World War II diplomatic norms emphasizing formal international legal authorization.

The Greenland campaign, if pursued through military means, would represent the first instance of a great power attempting to forcibly acquire territory from an alliance partner since World War II. Such a precedent, if established through successful American action, could fundamentally alter international law regarding territorial integrity and alliance obligations. Conversely, if this attempt fails, it may strengthen norms regarding territorial inviolability and collective defense principles.

Conclusion

Greenland does appear to represent the next item on the American strategic agenda following the Venezuela precedent, but not as an automatic extension of the same strategic logic. Rather, Venezuela and Greenland constitute linked manifestations of a broader Trump administration doctrine emphasizing American hemispheric and Arctic dominance, military capability demonstration, and reassertion of American power in traditionally subordinate regions.

The Venezuela operation demonstrated American military capacity and political will to employ force against sovereign governments deemed contrary to American interests. This capability demonstration enhanced the credibility of American threats regarding Greenland, though the strategic logic differed substantially between these initiatives. Venezuela represented enforcement of negative control, preventing rival powers from consolidating influence in America’s traditional sphere of influence. Greenland represents pursuit of positive control, acquiring critical strategic assets including military positioning, Arctic shipping route influence, and rare-earth mineral resources essential to technological and industrial competitiveness.

However, significant constraints distinguish the Greenland case from Venezuela. NATO alliance structures, article 5 collective defense obligations, overwhelming Greenlandic democratic opposition to American acquisition, and European allied mobilization in response to American threats create substantially higher political, military, and diplomatic costs for American acquisition of Greenland than those incurred in the Venezuela operation.

The trajectory of American Greenland policy will likely involve sustained diplomatic pressure coupled with incremental military expansion, resource agreements, and strategic partnerships falling short of full territorial acquisition. However, the Trump administration has explicitly refused to foreclose military options, suggesting that escalation remains possible should diplomatic and economic negotiations fail to achieve American strategic objectives.

The global strategic system continues adjusting to American strategic repositioning. The outcome of the Venezuela and Greenland cases will substantially influence how rival powers perceive American strategic resolve, constrain or enable future American interventions in contested regions, and shape international legal norms regarding territorial acquisition, military intervention, and alliance solidarity in the twenty-first century geopolitical environment.

By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

Tensions between the United States and Venezuela intensified significantly during Trump’s second presidency. Prior to the January operation, the US had imposed escalating sanctions targeting Venezuelan oil exports and financial flows, arguing that Caracas’ revenue streams funded drug trafficking, corruption, and authoritarian governance. These sanctions were paired with naval deployments in the Caribbean and repeated seizures of Venezuelan-linked oil tankers, part of a broader strategy to strangle the Venezuelan economy and curb what the US termed illicit maritime trade. From September 2025, US military forces began direct strikes on maritime vessels alleged to be involved in drug trafficking. These operations, which the administration claimed were necessary to stop narcotics shipments to the US, resulted in significant loss of life and sparked controversy over their legality. Chavez-era militia mobilization and formal condemnation by the Venezuelan government underscored the escalating confrontation. The situation reached a climax with the January raid that ousted Maduro’s government, an act the US portrayed as both a law-enforcement mission and a strategic intervention.

On January 3, 2026, the United States launched a dramatic military operation in Venezuela. US forces struck strategic targets in Caracas and elsewhere, ultimately capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and flying them out of the country to face US legal charges. The Trump administration justified this unprecedented action as part of a campaign against ‘narco-terrorism’ and criminal networks, while also framing it as a move to liberate Venezuela from what it termed an illegitimate and corrupt regime. The operation, titled Operation Absolute Resolve, marks one of the most significant US military incursions in Latin America since the invasion of Panama in 1989. The repercussions of this intervention extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders. From legal and ethical challenges to geopolitical realignments and strains on international norms, the US action has deep and complex implications for the current global order.

One of the most immediate and widely discussed implications of the US operation is its impact on international law, especially the principles governing sovereignty and the use of force. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state except in self-defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council. Critics argue that the US operation violated these foundational norms, raising accusations of a ‘crime of aggression’ at emergency UN Security Council meetings. While the US administration has defended the operation as a legitimate effort to enforce indictments and protect US national security, legal scholars and diplomats question whether such justifications hold under international law, particularly when action is taken without UN endorsement or broad international consensus.

This controversy fuels a dangerous precedent, if great powers can unilaterally justify military intervention based on broad or contested criteria, the international rule-based system risks erosion. Observers warn that undermining rules against unilateral force makes other conflicts, whether in Europe, the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific, more volatile, as states feel emboldened to set their own rules of engagement. The US intervention has reverberated across global geopolitics. Countries long skeptical of US hegemony have condemned the operation, framing it as blatant aggression. Nations such as China, Russia, Cuba, Brazil, and others called the attack a violation of international norms and a threat to regional stability. For Russia and China, in particular, the US incursion presents strategic fodder.

Both powers have longstanding alliances with Venezuela, particularly in energy and military cooperation, and the US actions give them rhetorical leverage to highlight what they view as Western interventionism. Some analysts argue that this dynamic could indirectly embolden Russia’s own assertive strategies elsewhere, including in Ukraine and against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) interests, suggesting a broader weakening of US moral authority to champion peace and stability. Meanwhile, countries in Latin America are split, with some neighboring democracies expressing alarm at the precedent of forceful regime change, and others welcoming the collapse of Maduro’s regime as a potential stabilizing turn. Still, the risk of regional polarization and potential insurgency by pro-Maduro elements poses long-term security challenges. The decision to carry out a major military operation without explicit congressional authorization has sparked heated debate within the United States itself.

The US Senate advanced a War Powers Resolution aimed at restricting further unilateral military action by the president, citing constitutional requirements that Congress authorize war. This legislative push, crossing party lines, reflects deep institutional unease over executive overreach in foreign military policy. Trump’s rejection of such constraints as unconstitutional underscores a broader struggle within US governance over the balance of war powers, a struggle that could have lasting effects on how America engages militarily abroad, potentially reshaping the executive branch’s latitude in foreign interventions. At the core of Venezuela’s strategic importance lies its oil reserves, the largest proven reserves in the world, and broader natural resource wealth.

By seizing control of Venezuelan oil infrastructure and redirecting production, the US potentially alters global energy markets. While Venezuela’s output represents a small percentage of global oil production, its reintegration into markets under US influence could shift supply dynamics and reduce reliance of certain countries on Russian or Iranian energy. However, this strategy carries risks, including market volatility and resistance from state actors seeking alternative partnerships. Furthermore, demands from the US that Venezuelan authorities sever ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba in exchange for resuming oil production add a geopolitical layer to what might otherwise have been an economic transaction. The military operation and subsequent power vacuum in Venezuela raise pressing humanitarian concerns. Venezuela already suffered years of economic hardship, political polarization, and mass migration prior to the intervention.

The immediate aftermath, including civilian casualties during strikes in and around Caracas, illuminates the high human cost of military interventions. Moreover, if Venezuelan society fragments along ideological and regional lines, the potential for sustained conflict or insurgency could create prolonged instability. This, in turn, could trigger new waves of displacement across Latin America, placing additional pressure on neighboring states. One of the most profound long-term consequences of the Venezuela intervention is its impact on the global rules-based order, the network of treaties, norms, and institutions designed to regulate international conduct and prevent unilateral force. The UN Charter, diplomatic immunity, and the sanctity of state sovereignty are foundational pillars of that system. By bypassing these frameworks, powerful states signal that force can be used outside established rules when it suits their interests. This has serious implications not only for weaker states, but also for future crises, whether in the South China Sea, the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Europe, or the Middle East, where interpretations of international law will increasingly be contested.

President Trump’s intervention in Venezuela fundamentally challenges longstanding assumptions about how global power operates in the 21st century. Beyond Latin America, the operation reverberates through international law, US constitutional debates, geopolitical alignments, energy markets, and regional stability. Whether this chapter becomes a harbinger of renewed great-power competition, a recalibration of US foreign policy, or a catalyst for reform in international institutions remains to be seen.

What is clear is that unilateral military interventions by major powers, particularly without broad international support, reshape the global order not just in the immediate theater of conflict, but in the norms that govern global affairs. Such actions test the resilience of the rules-based system that many nations have relied upon for decades, bringing into question whether that system, or something new, will prevail in the decades ahead.

By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

In today’s era of climate diplomacy, renewable energy milestones, and ambitious net-zero pledges, oil is often depicted as a relic of the industrial age, an outdated fuel destined to fade into irrelevance. Yet the realities of global politics tell a different story. Far from disappearing, oil remains a central axis of international power, shaping alliances, fuelling rivalries, and driving interventions. It is not simply an energy source but a strategic instrument, deeply embedded in the calculations of major powers.

Venezuela, endowed with the largest proven oil reserves in the world, offers one of the most compelling illustrations of this paradox. Despite the rhetoric of energy transition, Venezuela’s oil wealth continues to attract intense geopolitical interest. The evolving role of the United States in Venezuela’s political economy demonstrates how energy security, strategic competition, and economic pragmatism frequently override ideological commitments to decarbonization.

The so-called American “takeover” of Venezuela is not a conventional military occupation or colonial annexation. Instead, it represents a modernized form of dominance, subtle yet powerful, exercised through sanctions, selective diplomatic engagement, privileged corporate access, financial leverage, and conditional negotiations. This is a twenty-first century strategy of control, where influence is asserted not through territorial conquest but through the manipulation of economic lifelines and political dependencies.

This dynamic reveals a broader truth: Oil remains a cornerstone of global order. Control over oil-rich states continues to shape the architecture of international relations, even as governments publicly champion renewable energy. Venezuela’s predicament highlights the dual nature of resource wealth, it can empower national development, but it also exposes states to external pressures, interventions, and dependency.

Venezuela: An Oil State Par Excellence

Venezuela’s contemporary trajectory is inseparably bound to petroleum. Since vast oil deposits were uncovered in the early twentieth century, hydrocarbons have shaped the nation’s economic framework, political institutions, and external relations. By the 1970s, Venezuela had risen to prominence as one of the globe’s foremost oil exporters, channelling petroleum revenues into social welfare initiatives, infrastructure development, and regional diplomacy.

At present, Venezuela holds more than 300 billion barrels of confirmed oil reserves, exceeding even Saudi Arabia. The majority of these resources lie within the Orinoco Oil Belt, composed of extra-heavy crude that demands sophisticated technology and immense capital to extract and refine. This technical challenge has left Venezuela reliant on foreign expertise, particularly from American and Western energy corporations.

Yet decades of mismanagement, entrenched corruption, chronic underinvestment, and the politicization of the state-owned oil giant PDVSA have devastated production capacity. From a peak of over 3 million barrels per day, Venezuela’s output plummeted to unprecedented lows by the late 2010s. The collapse of its oil sector unleashed a broader economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, widespread poverty, mass emigration, and humanitarian turmoil, transforming the country from a regional energy leader into a weakened petro‑state struggling for survival.

This decline underscores the paradox of resource wealth: while oil endowed Venezuela with immense potential, it also entrenched dependency, vulnerability, and external pressures. The nation’s modern history illustrates how petroleum can simultaneously empower and destabilize, serving as both a foundation of prosperity and a catalyst of crisis.

The United States and Venezuelan Oil: A Historical Relationship

The oil relationship between the United States and Venezuela stretches back well before the Cold War era. American energy giants such as Exxon and Chevron were instrumental in laying the foundations of Venezuela’s petroleum sector throughout the twentieth century. Even after the landmark nationalization of the industry in 1976, Venezuela remained firmly tied to U.S. energy markets, channelling vast quantities of crude to American refineries specifically engineered to process Venezuela’s dense, heavy oil.

This mutual dependence endured despite recurring political frictions. During the presidency of Hugo Chávez, an era defined by fiery anti-U.S. rhetoric and sweeping socialist reforms, the flow of oil between the two nations continued largely uninterrupted. Venezuela relied on American markets and technological expertise, while the United States depended on Venezuelan heavy crude to sustain its refining system.

The eventual rupture was driven less by ideology than by shifting geopolitical alignments. As Caracas deepened its partnerships with China, Russia, and Iran, Washington began to view Venezuela not only as an unreliable energy partner but also as a broader strategic risk. What had once been a pragmatic interdependence evolved into a contested relationship, where oil was no longer simply a commodity but a lever of geopolitical rivalry.

This trajectory underscores a larger truth: energy ties are rarely severed by rhetoric alone. They unravel when strategic realignments alter the calculus of power, transforming economic partners into perceived threats. Venezuela’s pivot toward alternative global allies illustrates how oil remains at the heart of international politics, binding nations together when interests converge, and driving them apart when alliances shift.

Sanctions as a Tool of Energy Warfare

Starting in the mid‑2010s, Washington enacted sweeping sanctions against Venezuela, aimed at government elites, financial institutions, and most decisively the petroleum sector. These measures effectively severed Venezuela’s access to international capital markets and curtailed its ability to sell crude abroad, particularly to the United States.

Although officially justified as instruments to restore democratic governance and penalize human rights violations, the sanctions carried a clear strategic energy dimension. They:

• Undermined Venezuela’s ability to operate autonomously within global oil markets
• Stripped the Maduro administration of vital revenue streams
• Established conditions under which American companies could potentially re-enter the sector on advantageous terms

In this way, oil was weaponized not only against the Venezuelan state but also against rival powers such as China, Russia, and Iran that sought to expand their influence in Caracas. Yet these punitive measures also deepened Venezuela’s economic collapse, fuelling hyperinflation, worsening humanitarian distress, and accelerating mass migration.

The sanctions thus embody a dual reality: they functioned as tools of geopolitical leverage while simultaneously intensifying the suffering of ordinary Venezuelans. This raises profound ethical and political questions about the underlying motives of U.S. policy, whether the true objective was democratic restoration, strategic containment of adversaries, or the reconfiguration of Venezuela’s oil industry in ways favourable to American interests.

From Maximum Pressure to Strategic Pragmatism

By the early 2020s, Washington’s stance toward Venezuela began to undergo a notable recalibration. Global energy markets had been thrown into turmoil first by the COVID‑19 pandemic, which disrupted demand and supply chains, and then by the Russia–Ukraine war, which destabilized oil and gas flows worldwide. In this volatile context, the continued isolation of a nation holding the world’s largest proven oil reserves suddenly appeared strategically self-defeating.

In response, the United States introduced selective sanctions relief, authorizing limited licenses for American firms, most prominently Chevron, to restart operations in Venezuela under tightly managed conditions. This represented a clear departure from the earlier policy of uncompromising regime‑change pressure, shifting instead toward a framework of cautious engagement and pragmatic coexistence.

This policy evolution underscores a deeper reality: when energy security is imperilled, ideological rigidity gives way to flexibility. The United States did not discard its democratic discourse, but it adjusted its hierarchy of priorities. Oil, once again, assumed primacy serving as both a stabilizing resource in global markets and a strategic lever in U.S. foreign policy.

More broadly, this shift illustrates the enduring paradox of energy geopolitics. Even as Washington champions renewable energy and climate diplomacy, the imperatives of oil supply continue to dictate foreign policy choices. Venezuela’s re-entry into the U.S. energy calculus demonstrates that hydrocarbons remain central to global power dynamics, reminding us that the transition to a post-oil world is neither linear nor insulated from geopolitical realities.

The Nature of the American “Take-Over”

The American presence in Venezuela is best interpreted not as a territorial occupation but as a structural form of dominance. It functions through interconnected mechanisms that embed U.S. influence deep within Venezuela’s political economy and energy system:

Corporate Reinsertion: By permitting U.S. energy companies to re-establish operations in Venezuela’s oil sector, Washington ensures that production processes, technological expertise, and export channels remain aligned with American interests. This diminishes Venezuela’s reliance on Chinese and Russian firms while weaving U.S. influence into the very fabric of its energy infrastructure.

Financial and Institutional Control: Reviving Venezuela’s oil industry requires access to global capital, debt restructuring, and regulatory modernization arenas where U.S. sway over institutions such as the IMF and World Bank is decisive. Through these levers, Washington shapes the terms of Venezuela’s economic recovery, effectively dictating the conditions under which investment and reform can occur.

Conditional Diplomacy: Sanctions relief is neither permanent nor unconditional. Its reversibility grants Washington leverage over Venezuela’s political behaviour, creating a framework of constrained sovereignty. In this system, Venezuela’s economic survival hinges on compliance with external expectations, embedding U.S. oversight into the country’s domestic decision-making.

Market Reintegration: By reintegrating Venezuelan crude into U.S. and Western energy markets, Washington stabilizes global oil prices while curbing the influence of alternative energy blocs led by China and Russia. This re-entry not only secures supply but also reasserts U.S. dominance in shaping the architecture of global energy flows.

Taken together, these mechanisms illustrate how modern power operates less through territorial conquest and more through structural entanglement. Venezuela’s sovereignty is not erased but conditioned, its oil wealth transformed into a lever of geopolitical influence. The American “take‑over” thus reflects a twenty-first century model of dominance where finance, diplomacy, corporate access, and market integration replace traditional military occupation as instruments of control.

Geopolitical Rivalry: China and Russia in Venezuela

Venezuela has historically functioned as a strategic outpost for non-Western powers within the Western Hemisphere, drawing significant involvement from China and Russia. Beijing extended billions in oil‑collateralized loans, embedding itself in Venezuela’s economic lifelines, while Moscow provided military cooperation and forged energy partnerships that bolstered Caracas’s international standing. For Washington, this convergence transformed Venezuela into a critical arena of great‑power rivalry.

The recent American re-engagement is therefore not merely about oil supply but about geopolitical recalibration. By reasserting control over Venezuela’s energy sector, the United States seeks to dilute the influence of its rivals, curtail their strategic reach, and restore its own primacy in Latin America. In this sense, Venezuela becomes more than an energy partner it is a battleground for spheres of influence, where oil serves as both a commodity and a geopolitical weapon. This dynamic underscores how resource politics continues to shape global power struggles, even in an era ostensibly defined by energy transition.

The Energy Transition Paradox

The Venezuelan experience highlights the deep contradictions embedded within the global narrative of energy transition. Even as the United States presents itself as a champion of renewable energy and climate leadership, oil continues to underpin its strategic calculations. Petroleum remains indispensable for stabilizing international markets, sustaining industrial and military strength, and preserving geopolitical leverage. This reliance does not necessarily render the energy transition disingenuous, but it does reveal its uneven, pragmatic, and power-driven character.

In practice, the transition is less a clean break from fossil fuels than a managed reordering of priorities, where hydrocarbons remain vital during the interim phase. As a result, nations endowed with vast reserves, such as Venezuela, retain significant geopolitical weight, serving as both energy suppliers and strategic battlegrounds. The case demonstrates that while the rhetoric of decarbonization dominates global discourse, the realities of oil politics continue to shape international order, ensuring that resource-rich states remain central to the balance of power in the twenty-first century.

Implications for Venezuela

For Venezuela, renewed American involvement presents a dual reality of promise and peril. On one hand, expanded oil production has the potential to ease economic hardship, generate much-needed revenue, and support national reconstruction. On the other hand, it risks deepening structural dependency, constraining policy autonomy, and perpetuating extractive models dominated by entrenched elites.

Absent meaningful institutional reform and genuine economic diversification, Venezuela may remain locked in a recurring cycle where petroleum wealth functions less as a driver of national development and more as a magnet for external control. In this scenario, oil ceases to be a foundation for sovereignty and instead becomes a conduit through which foreign powers shape the country’s trajectory, reinforcing vulnerability rather than resilience.

Conclusion

The American reassertion of influence in Venezuela highlights a fundamental truth of global politics: oil continues to matter. Despite lofty climate pledges and the pursuit of renewable energy, fossil fuels remain central to shaping power dynamics, guiding foreign policy, and structuring international hierarchies. Venezuela’s immense petroleum reserves guarantee its status as a coveted strategic asset in an increasingly competitive world order.

The United States’ shifting posture from punitive sanctions to calibrated engagement demonstrates how energy security, geopolitical rivalry, and economic pragmatism consistently outweigh ideological uniformity. In the era of energy transition, oil has not lost its significance; rather, its role has been transformed, becoming a more nuanced instrument of statecraft. Venezuela serves as a vivid reminder that mastery over energy resources equates to mastery over influence, sovereignty, and the trajectory of global order itself.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

On December 31, 2025 at 8.15 pm Venezuela Standard Time (VET) as the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores sat for dinner with Delcy Rodriguez, the Vice President and the Defence Minister Vladimir Lopez in in the Boyaca Room of the Miraflores Palace, the residence of the Venezuelan President, the atmosphere was tense, though it was the New Year eve dinner. 

Little earlier in the day, at 5 pm VET when the Venezuelan President in his customary New Year address broadcast spoke to his nation, he expressed confidence that Venezuela was “in the best condition” to overcome external attacks and blockades. Clearly, it was a façade as Maduro knew that his time at the helm of the affairs since 2013 was now ticking.

After the sombre New Year eve dinner, as the Venezuelan President and his wife retired for the night to one of his 37 secret abodes, he had the uncanny feeling that the noose was tightening around him. Unknown to President Maduro, the US intelligence agencies were tracking his every move since July 01, 2025 using human intelligence and modern intelligence methods including space satellites and cyber tracking.

Just a week earlier on December 24, 2025 on Christmas eve, at 1.45 pm VET, the US President Donald Trump in a private telephone call had told Maduro that he had to step down as the Venezuelan President. But Maduro had refused, even as the US Naval blockade that had commenced on December 01, 2025 had been gaining strength and lethality with each passing day.

But Maduro’s luck wasn’t to last long. At 11.46 pm VET (10.46 pm EST) on January 02, 2026, President Donald Trump gave the go-ahead for the execution of Operation Absolute Resolve.

At 1.50 am VET on January 03, 2026, in one of the 37 secret abodes, Maduro in deep sleep sensed some movement in his room. As he switched on his bedside lamp and looked around in the room, he saw seven Delta Force soldiers of the US Military pointing their Sig Sauer MCX Spear Light assault rifles at him and his wife. Maduro woke his wife Cilia who was still fast asleep.

The First Couple of Venezuela were informed by the Delta Force sub-unit commander that they were under arrest and without any murmur, at 2.20 am VET, the Venezuelan First Couple were airborne in separate helicopters of the 160^th Special Aviation Regiment of the US Military heading towards USS Iwo Jima, the US Navy warship after a brief halt in an undisclosed US military base.

At 1.37 am EST, General John Caine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Military got up from his chair and walked to the US President and after saluting him quipped “Operation Absolute Resolve Successful Sir”.

All present in the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House monitoring Operation Absolute Resolve, clapped in euphoria and the US President got up from his chair and saluted back at General Caine.

The brilliantly executed Operation Absolute Resolve conducted by the USA in Venezuela has taught many lessons to the world.

Why countries face internal unrests and external interference

It is commonly taught in Indian families that internally if a house is weak, the outsiders take undue advantage. Hence, unity of families has immense value in India. On a larger scale, nations which face internal unrests like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal and countries facing external interference like Venezuela, Iraq and Libya have all few issues in common which result in internal unrest and external interference.

Unfair and manipulated elections: Whenever elections in any country are unfair and manipulated, the discord commences amongst the general populace. Many can’t speak up for fear of state crack-down, but the resentment only increases. Be it the Presidential Elections of Venezuela on July 28, 2024 or on May 20, 2018, both were rigged and Maduro continued as the Venezuelan President. The Presidential Elections held in Venezuela on April 14, 2013 after the death of President Hugo Chavez saw Maduro elected as the President for the first time with the wafer-thin majority of 1.49%.

But the first Presidential tenure of Maduro proved disastrous and in the face of certain defeat in the 2018 elections, Maduro manipulated the elections. Repeating the same act in the 2024 elections. Clearly, this proved the Achilles Heel for Maduro and the perfect platform for the US to intervene in Venezuela, as most nations in the world rejected the 2018 and 2024 election results of Venezuela. The famous adage says “Justice should not only be done, but seem to have be done”. Similarly, elections in any nation need to be totally fair and any doubts about its conduct must be answered by the authorities concerned to the last question possible.

Control of government institutions:           The strength of a nation is directly proportional to the independence of its governmental institutions like the courts, election commission and other statutory agencies. For, whenever any citizen feels aggrieved on any pretext, he can approach the governmental institutions for justice. A common citizen who doesn’t have any connections whatsoever, has the only hope of the government institutions to hear his voice.

And if a citizen’s faith in the government institutions crumbles, the nation starts fragmenting within giving rise to internal unrests and external interference. Ever since Pakistan has been created as a nation in 1947, the government institutions have been compromised resulting in the nation having frequent internal strifes and external interference be it the USA or China who indirectly influence the day-to-day happenings in Pakistan.

Corruption:   Every youth wants to excel in life and has great aspirations. When a level playing field is provided, the unsuccessful understand that in the era of merit, they were probably not fit enough to succeed. After all, Charles Darwin’s theory of survival of the fittest still holds true. But survival and progress amongst a nation’s citizen has to be on merit. When corruption seeps in every possible facet of public interaction, resulting in lower meritocracy surging ahead due to money power, it increases frustration in the youth. Countries like Syria and Sri Lanka are deeply mired in corruption where merit has no value, only money rules the roost. Thus, a disgruntled population struggling against the ill-effects of corruption in daily life is an ideal recipe for internal unrests and external interference.

Nepotism:      When the youth of a country combat real life challenges in pursuit of their dreams and desires, what hurts them the most is nepotism. Every person in the world wants to work hard. But when hard work doesn’t count and the family that one is born in gives unprecedent advantages in the journey of life, vexation in the country starts rising. And at an opportune moment, it explodes resulting in even toppling of the government. On September 04, 2025 Nepal saw unprecedented internal unrest as the common man started sharing videos and reels on social media under the hashtag NepoKids of children of prominent Nepali politicians enjoying life, while the average Nepali was struggling for his daily bread. Such was the ferocity of the protests that the Nepal government headed by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli had to resign on September 09, 2025.

Clearly, if the internal intent and policies of a country are fair, transparent and just, a nation will never see internal unrest and hence no external interference. Examples are the Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden and Iceland where the happiness index is the highest in the world with no cases of internal unrest and external interference.

Lessons from Venezuela for the world

Operation Absolute Resolve that was carried out in the wee hours of January 03, 2026 by the USA in Venezuela which resulted in the capture of its President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores was a brilliantly executed operation which apart from military lessons has taught many non-military lessons to the world.

Multi-domain operations:    Modern warfare now encompasses six official domains-land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum & space and numerous unofficial domains which includes the half-front too. In short, anything that can be weaponised, will be weaponised.

While there are theories galore on what made Operation Absolute Resolve successful, no clear one domain has emerged as the only factor that made this operation a resounding success. How much weightage of success is attributable to each of the contributing factors in Operation Absolute Resolve, only Pentagon and President Donald Trump would know. And they both will never divulge.

But Operation Absolute Resolve has heralded the success of the Full Spectrum Operation Doctrine that was transcribed by the US in 2001. Till date only one country in the world ie China has claimed in 2014 that it is ready to fight a war in any part of the world in multi-domains. After Operation Absolute Resolve, the USA has become the second nation in the world to be ready for multi-domain operations which has been demonstrated effectively in a live-combat situation.

The future wars will have multi-domain warfare in full force and fury and the nations at war-risk will have to adequately prepare for the multi-domain warfare. Two nations at immediate war-risk are Taiwan in 2027 and India any time after 2030.

Era of Alliances:       With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the USA’s seamless military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of its President as Venezuela’s 30 million population is hapless and helpless and Ukraine’s 38.8 million population is devastated and distressed, the learning is that the era of strategic autonomy is over. It is now the era of alliances with defence pacts wherein an attack on one nation will be counted as an attack on all nations of the alliance.

Russia has not attacked any country-member of NATO as such a defence pact under Article 5 of NATO exists. Israel has not attacked Pakistan, the only Islamic nation with a nuclear weapon, as such a defence pact exists between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Nations facing the threat of war need to enter a military alliance without any further loss of time. No nation is prepared to face the military might of the three superpowers ie USA, Russia and China.

Hard Power-the need of the hour:  The author in an earlier article published on August 31, 2025 had written that the three superpowers ie USA, Russia and China have divided the world into three parts and have formed an unofficial alliance which can be termed as Group of Three or G3. The assessment of the author proved correct with the publication of the US’ National Security Strategy 2025 which was released on December 04, 2025 which has stated that Russia and China are not the adversaries of the US and these three countries have their respective spheres of influence.

Thucydides, the famous Greek historian’s quote in 430 BCE “The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” is as relevant in today’s era as it has always been centuries down the line. Nations which face the possibility of war in future have to prepare themselves economically and militarily. Dialogue and diplomacy are inconsequential in today’s era. Only hard power matters.

Media’s role: In any nation a free, fair and independent media plays the most important role in ensuring that a common citizen’s grievances reach the highest authority in land. When a common citizen finds that his voice is being heard, internal unrests don’t happen and subsequently no foreign interference takes place.

But when a nation’s media is controlled and curbed, the common citizen starts feeling suffocated and strangulated. Though it may take years or probably decades before internal unrests start in the country for the fear of those in power, but it will invariably happen someday. As a dormant volcano definitely erupts someday, so will the internal unrest in a nation start if a nation’s media is not free and fair.

Ever since the radicals seized power in Iran in the Islamic Revolution on February 11, 1979, the Iranian government since the last 47 years has stifled the media with an iron hand, but the unprecedented level of internal unrest that Iran has been seeing since December 28, 2025 till the time of going to press, has made President Donald Trump remark twice in the last 14 days that America will intervene in Iran if the protestors are harmed.

As reports are coming in of numerous fighter aircrafts being moved from the US and the UK to Israel and Russia vacating its embassy staff in Israel since January 07, 2026, the war on Iran is imminent. USA & UK know that this is the opportune time to strike in Iran, which is regarded as the biggest adversary for both the nations.

Had the Iranian media projected the woes and worries of its citizens in the last 47 years, neither the unrest in Iran would have commenced nor the USA and Israel been prepared to strike Iran.

The way ahead

Being ambitious is not wrong but stifling any opposition or critic is a sure recipe for disaster. Every global citizen wants to progress in life and independent governmental institutions and free media, immensely help a nation progress and prosper. Time has also come to be pragmatic of the geopolitical changes are happening at a rapid pace ever since President Donald Trump came to power for the second time on January 20, 2025.

Also, the era of peace ended in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia and China became the world’s second largest economy in 2010 and started flexing its muscles militarily.

Nations across the world need to ensure that there is no internal unrest, for that will be the perfect recipe for external interference. The three superpowers is the USA, Russia and China are waiting for the opportune moment to gobble up territories.

By: Ishan Singh

“To suppress free speech is a double wrong. It violates the rights of the hearer as well as the speaker” – Frederick Douglass

In September 2025, Nepal experienced a significant youth-led uprising. Gen Z protesters took to the streets to challenge the country’s entrenched political elite and demand change. Their nonviolent initiatives were encountered nationwide by social media shutdowns, curfews, and lethal force. The use of power and authority to suppress the youth led to significant tension and struggle between the young voices fighting for their demands and Government of Nepal.

International human rights law guarantees many rights to individuals, but in the digital age, these rights can be oppressed by various methods. Online platforms can be easily blocked and regulated by governments which can greatly impact online communication between individuals. The Gen Z protest in Nepal has revealed a serious issue which is, the enforcement of International human rights law in this digital era depends heavily upon the government, although there are Legal frameworks such as the ICCPR and UN standards, they frequently fail when governments use force to stifle dissent.

In this article, we will explore how international human rights law are unable to protect people’s freedom in the modern digital world. Nepal’s case highlights the pressing need for more accountability and legal frameworks that safeguard both offline and online freedom of expression. This article examines how the Nepalese government responded to the demands of their citizens by using force, suppressing digital rights, and toying with human rights legislation. It also demonstrates how citizens are left vulnerable by weak enforcement and also suggests the ways by which contemporary protests can be better protected by international law.

Immediate Causes of the Gen Z Protests in Nepal

The immediate cause of Nepal’s Gen Z protests was the government’s decision to ban 26 popular social media platforms. However, the deeper issues emerged from years of corruption carried out by those in power, high unemployment rate and a stagnant economy.

On 4th September 2025, the government suddenly banned social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, YouTube, and X, citing non-compliance of these platforms with the required registration. Young people in Nepal use digital platforms to communicate, to engage in learning, to do business, and to participate in civic life, and this decision was not received well in the public.

This digital crackdown revealed a broader frustration. For years, people have accused Nepal’s political class of corruption and poor governance. They enrich themselves while ordinary citizen’s struggle. Anger intensified with the viral “Nepo Kids” campaign, where politician’s children showcased their lavish lifestyles online. For many young Nepalis, this became the ultimate symbol of inequality. The privileged elite enjoy unchecked benefits while the majority face hardship.

Economic hardships had further increased the discontent among the young workforce, and on top of that the government did not show any efforts to address this. According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate for youth aged between 15 to 24 reached around 21% in 2024, one of the highest rates in South Asia. With few opportunities at home, many people depend on migration to neighbouring countries such as India because this became the only way to keep the wolf from the door. Remittances make up a large share of Nepal’s GDP, leaving the economy built on shaky ground and heavily reliant on money sent by workers abroad. This situation highlights the lack of real development within the country.

In this context, the ban on social media was not just a technical imposition of a new policy; it was the final blow for the youth to come out and call the government. To an entire generation that had grown up using social media platforms, it felt like an attack on their last bastion of resistance. Platforms that had been used to reveal corruption, voice concerns, and organize protests were suddenly blocked. Thus, the Gen Z uprising was not a reaction to a single government policy but rather a series of longstanding frustrations related to corruption, elite privilege, youth unemployment, and economic inequality, which had been made worse with time by the government which seemed to oppress the opinion of common people in both physical and digital spaces.

International Law Framework: Rights at Stake

The right to peaceful assembly is stated in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),  yet in Kathmandu and elsewhere, protesters faced curfews and reports of violent crackdowns. While international law allows restrictions on assembly, they must be necessary and proportionate. The UN Human Rights Committee has specifically warned states against blanket bans and to avoid the use of excessive force, since it attacks the basis of democratic participation. In Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom (1980), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) clarified that peaceful assembly encompasses not merely static gatherings but also participation in marches and processions.

Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. This includes the right to seek, receive, and share information through any media of choice. Nepal government’s ban on major social media platforms directly impacted the young citizens ability to express criticism and mobilize. The Human Rights Council has confirmed that rights in the real world must also be protected online. By shutting down the channels where people voice dissent, Nepal effectively silenced free expression. The ECOWAS Court in SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria looked at Nigerian government’s decision to ban the social media platform ‘Twitter’. The court pointed out that modern technology allows for the sharing of ideas, views, and opinions, which supports freedom of expression. It also stated that access to Twitter is a “derivative right” that complements the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.

Internet shutdowns represent a new challenge where international law is having trouble keeping up. Nepal’s reasoning that platforms did not register with authorities reflects a wider global pattern where governments use technical reasons to limit access, but their motives are clearly political. In Amnesty International v. Togo, the Court ruled that internet shutdowns implemented by the Togolese government in 2017 were illegal and held it as an unjustifiable violation, stating that online access improves expression and therefore needs legal protection.

Together, these episodes show how fragile protection of rights are in the digital age. The ICCPR and UN’s frameworks offer strong guarantees on paper, but enforcement is often depended on the government and to silence people, they usually don’t comply with these standards. Nepal’s case is a clear example that there is an urgent need for a binding global enforcement of fundamental human rights.

Enforcement Gap and Accountability Challenges

The ICCPR guarantees rights of freedoms of expression, assembly, and association to individuals, but their protection often rests on the state’s goodwill, leaving citizens at the mercy of governments. The concerned stakeholders can suggest solutions, yet their words are not binding and thus, carry no real weight. This gap between law on paper and rights in practice shows that promises without enforcement are useless.

Digital activism is a great medium to express dissent against governments, however, by pulling the plug on online platforms, governments can easily silence dissent against them. This tug-of-war between state sovereignty and global norms shows how vulnerable human rights are in 21^st Century and without sharper regional and global safety measures, states will continue to oppress both online and offline expression with little fear of consequences.

It is important to address these gaps and doing so will not only protect the rights of young people today but also stop states from using technology to undermine fundamental civic freedom. Nepal’s situation is a warning, showing the importance of respecting the autonomy of individuals and protect their basic rights, otherwise not doing the same could lead to dire consequences.

Recommendations and Forward-Looking Analysis

In order to address the gaps revealed by the Gen Z protests in Nepal, states should create clear legal protections for both online and offline expression. For instance, a guideline can be framed that would require any state-imposed digital restriction to be time-bound depending upon the situation like – Internet shut down for a period of maximum 3 months. Virtual restrictions should also be publicly justified – They should be implemented only in view of protecting public order, national security, preventing internal instability, etc.

These restrictions should also be subject to independent judicial review by an Independent and fair Judiciary and should be minimally restrictive which means that the government’s actions limit rights only as much as necessary to achieve a legitimate goal, without unnecessarily silencing basic human rights. This would ensure that genuine criticism is being heard by the government. International and regional institutions, such as the UN Human Rights Council, ASEAN or SAARC could each help hold states accountable in case of violation of rights.

Encouraging young people’s engagement must go beyond mere promises. Policies and programs should be open for young people in policymaking (subject to limitations) to create safe platforms for debate, thus providing young people a voice at the table and protection on the ground. This would ensure that young people have an opinion in the policies being made concerning them and would increase trust between them and the government. Understanding digital rights as a necessity and building participatory structures, would uphold human rights obligation.

Conclusion

Nepal’s scenario highlights the sharp gap between digital-age civic action and the enforcement of international human rights on the ground level. Online restrictions and violent crackdowns show how fragile freedom of expression and assembly really are today. Legal protections, recognition of digital rights, and creating spaces for youth to be involved will be critical to solving these issues. Nepal’s experience is a reminder that international law must evolve to keep fundamental freedoms of concerned individuals relevant in this increasingly interconnected world.

By: Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The global semiconductor industry stands at an unprecedented inflection point where technological prowess directly translates to geopolitical dominance, economic supremacy, and military capability. As artificial intelligence revolutionizes computing, autonomous systems, and defense technologies, control over semiconductor manufacturing and design has transformed from a purely commercial competition into a full-scale technological war between the United States and China, with profound implications for global stability, supply chain resilience, and the distribution of power in the international system.

Strategic Importance and Market Dynamics

The semiconductor industry, valued at approximately US$ 681.05 billion in 2024 and projected to reach US$ 755.28 billion in 2025, represents far more than a commercial sector. Semiconductors constitute the foundational layer of artificial intelligence, 5G telecommunications, advanced defense systems, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and virtually every critical technology that will define the next decade. The global semiconductor market is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 15.4 percent, reaching approximately US$ 2,062.59 billion by 2032, indicating explosive expansion driven primarily by AI chip demand, data center infrastructure buildout, and emerging technologies.

Asia-Pacific dominates semiconductor production, accounting for 81.3 percent of global semiconductor market revenue in 2024, with the region projected to grow at 6.9 percent compound annual growth rate through 2030. Within this landscape, Taiwan commands a unique and increasingly vulnerable position as the world’s critical semiconductor chokepoint, while South Korea and Japan maintain essential roles in memory production and specialized materials.

United States Strategic Position and Policy Initiatives

The United States maintains substantial strategic advantages in semiconductor design, intellectual property, and fabrication technology, though this leadership has been steadily eroding across multiple dimensions. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, United States-based semiconductor companies held 50.2 percent of global market share in 2023, the highest of any nation’s semiconductor industry.

However, this apparent leadership masks concerning vulnerabilities. The United States currently controls approximately 12 percent of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity, down from 37 percent in 1990. This fundamental shift reflects decades of outsourcing and off-shoring to Asia, leaving the United States dangerously dependent on Taiwan and South Korea for advanced chip production.

In response to strategic vulnerability, the United States enacted the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022, representing the largest government industrial policy investment in decades. The legislation provides US$ 39 billion in direct subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing and US$ 13 billion for research and workforce training, bringing total semiconductor and related technology investments to approximately US$ 106 billion. The legislation includes 25 percent investment tax credits for semiconductor manufacturing equipment costs, creating powerful financial incentives for domestic production expansion.

As of December 2024, over US$ 32 billion of the US$ 39 billion designated for manufacturing incentives had been allocated. Intel received up to US$ 7.86 billion in direct funding in November 2024, in addition to US$ 3 billion for secure enclave programs, to support its US$ 100 billion investment in domestic manufacturing across Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. Texas Instruments announced US$ 1.61 billion in CHIPS Act funding in December 2024 to support three new 300-millimeter wafer fabrication plants in Texas and Utah.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company received US$ 6.6 billion in CHIPS Act funding in April 2024 to construct advanced fabrication capacity in Arizona, with construction slated to commence in 2028 for 2-nanometer process technology. Samsung Electronics secured up to US$ 6.4 billion in CHIPS Act funding to support expansion of its Austin semiconductor facilities and construction of a new advanced manufacturing plant in the United States.

These investments represent unprecedented commitment to reshoring semiconductor manufacturing, though implementation challenges remain substantial. United States manufacturing costs for advanced semiconductors remain 30 to 50 percent higher than equivalent Asian production, driven by elevated energy costs, labor expenses, and raw material expenses. Additionally, the United States faces severe talent shortages in specialized semiconductor manufacturing and engineering disciplines, requiring sustained workforce development investments.

China’s Strategy and Self-Sufficiency Drive

China has adopted a fundamentally different approach to semiconductor dominance, pursuing vertical integration across the entire semiconductor value chain while simultaneously implementing “Made in China 2025” policies explicitly designed to achieve technological self-reliance across semiconductors, advanced materials, and critical technologies.

China originally targeted 70 percent semiconductor self-sufficiency by 2025, though current assessments indicate China will achieve approximately 30 percent self-sufficiency by the end of 2025. However, this apparent shortfall obscures remarkable progress in specific semiconductor segments, particularly mature-node production where China has become increasingly competitive.

According to United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission analysis, China’s mature-node semiconductor capacity grew more than four times faster than global demand between 2015 and 2023. China is projected to account for nearly half of new mature-node capacity additions over the next three to five years, with China’s share of global mature-node production expected to expand from 31 percent in 2023 to 39 percent by 2027.

China’s primary chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), is developing advanced production capabilities targeting 5-nanometer class processes, potentially achieving true 5-nanometer capability by 2025 or 2026 despite persistent exposure to United States export controls on advanced manufacturing equipment. SMIC reportedly achieved 28-nanometer production yields exceeding 90 percent and is steadily advancing process technology despite restrictions preventing access to cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment manufactured exclusively by Netherlands-based ASML.

China made record purchases of foreign semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2024, spending over US$ 28 billion on equipment imports as officials accelerated domestic production expansion before anticipated further tightening of United States export controls. This extraordinary equipment procurement surge reflects China’s determination to acquire remaining equipment capable of supporting advanced node development before international restrictions become more comprehensive.

Taiwan’s Irreplaceable Role and Geopolitical Vulnerability

Taiwan has become the single most important semiconductor manufacturing location globally, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company commanding unprecedented market dominance that creates both strategic advantage and profound vulnerability.

TSMC secured a record 71 percent share of the global pure-play foundry market in the second quarter of 2025, up from 65 percent in 2024, according to TrendForce analysis. TSMC’s quarterly revenue surged to approximately US$ 32.47 billion by the third quarter of 2025, driven by explosive demand for advanced artificial intelligence chips, high-performance computing infrastructure, and mobile processors. The company’s dominance in 3-nanometer and leading-edge processes is unparalleled, with approximately three-quarters of TSMC’s revenue derived from nodes of 7-nanometers and below, and approximately one-quarter from 3-nanometer production.

TSMC’s competitive position reflects extraordinary technological achievement, sophisticated manufacturing operations, and unmatched capital investment. The company operates fabrication capacity exceeding 16 million 12-inch equivalent wafers annually, with facilities distributed across Taiwan, China, the United States, and Japan. TSMC announced new fabrication plants in Germany scheduled for commissioning in 2027, further diversifying production capacity.

However, TSMC’s concentration in Taiwan creates strategic vulnerability. Taiwan faces unprecedented geopolitical tensions as China continues military modernization and develops capabilities potentially enabling forced reunification or coercive scenarios. Academic research utilizing tabletop exercises and scenario analysis suggests that if China were to seek control over Taiwan, a quarantine approach targeting economic blockade would likely be adopted, with maximum effectiveness before 2027.

A Taiwan semiconductor supply chain disruption would inflict catastrophic damage on global technology industries. The entire advanced semiconductor supply chain depends on TSMC’s production, with major customers including Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, MediaTek, and Qualcomm. Disruption of TSMC’s 3-nanometer and 5-nanometer production would paralyze artificial intelligence chip supply, halt smartphone manufacturing, cripple data center expansion, and create cascading failures across dependent industries.

Taiwan’s leadership recognizes that semiconductor dominance constitutes a “silicon shield” providing strategic deterrence, yet simultaneously fears being “hollowed out” if excessive production relocates abroad. TSMC founder Morris Chang warned that excessive offshoring of Taiwan’s chip capacity could undermine the island’s strategic deterrent value by eliminating the unique concentration of advanced manufacturing capability unavailable elsewhere.

Advanced Node Competition: TSMC, Samsung, and Intel

The competition for supremacy in advanced semiconductor manufacturing has intensified dramatically as TSMC, Samsung Electronics, and Intel race to achieve leadership in the most technologically sophisticated nodes, where production expertise, yield rates, and capital investment determine competitive positioning.

TSMC commenced customer volume production of 2-nanometer chips in the second half of 2025, employing gate-all-around transistor architecture for the first time. The 2-nanometer process offers 10 to 15 percent better performance, 25 to 30 percent power reduction, and 15 percent increased transistor density compared to current 3-nanometer processes. TSMC has achieved yield rates exceeding 60 percent, crossing the threshold for stable volume production. According to TSMC Chief Executive Officer C.C. Wei, demand for 2-nanometer technology in the first two years is expected to exceed demand for 3-nanometer and earlier nodes.

Samsung Electronics initiated mass production of 2-nanometer chips in the second half of 2025, targeting production for its Exynos 2600 application processor for forthcoming Galaxy S26 smartphones expected in early 2026. However, Samsung faces significant manufacturing challenges, with reported yield rates approximately 40 percent, substantially below TSMC’s performance levels. Samsung was the industry’s first manufacturer to adopt gate-all-around architecture at 3-nanometer, but experienced low initial yield rates, illustrating the extreme difficulty of manufacturing at advanced technology nodes.

Intel, facing unprecedented competitive pressure and technical challenges, is betting its foundry business revival on an 18-nanometer process node branded as “18A,” positioned as approximately equivalent to competitors’ 1.8-nanometer capability. Intel has experienced substantial schedule delays in 18A development, with company officials acknowledging failure to deliver planned schedules. However, Intel maintains that 18A is now on track for high-volume manufacturing in the second half of 2025, with the company asserting it will soon challenge TSMC and Samsung in advanced nodes.

Intel’s new Fab52 facility in Chandler, Arizona, represents a Hail Mary effort to revive Intel’s manufacturing capabilities, with the facility comprising over one million square feet of cleanroom manufacturing space interconnected by 30 miles of overhead transport tracks. The plant is equipped with over 15 extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the most critical and expensive equipment in advanced chip fabrication. However, wafers produced on the 18A node have exhibited defects limiting yields, with Intel officials admitting yield remains a persistent concern at advanced nodes.

Supply Chain Control and Critical Chokepoints

The semiconductor supply chain contains several critical chokepoints where single companies or countries exercise near-monopolistic control over essential technologies, creating profound vulnerabilities and leverage points in the ongoing geopolitical competition.

The Netherlands’ ASML maintains a near-absolute monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography systems, the essential technology enabling production of nodes below 7-nanometers. ASML’s machines cost approximately US$ 120 to 150 million each and require extraordinary technical sophistication. The Dutch government, responding to United States pressure, has restricted ASML’s export of extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment to China, effectively constraining China’s ability to develop leading-edge chip production independently.

Japan dominates production of critical semiconductor materials including photoresists, silicon wafers, and rare-earth elements essential for chip manufacturing. South Korea controls a substantial share of dynamic random-access memory and NAND flash memory production through Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, creating additional vulnerability points.

China controls substantial reserves and refining capacity for rare-earth elements essential for semiconductor equipment, magnetic materials, and other critical technologies. China accounted for approximately 60 percent of global rare-earth element production and has increasingly weaponized export restrictions on these materials as leverage in geopolitical disputes.

The fragmented nature of semiconductor supply chains creates mutual vulnerability where no single nation or company can achieve complete independence, yet concentration in specific locations, particularly Taiwan, creates critical vulnerabilities threatening global technological systems.

Export Controls and Strategic Technology Restrictions

The United States has implemented increasingly stringent export controls targeting China’s access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence capabilities. The Department of Commerce imposed restrictions on exporting advanced computing chips exceeding specific performance thresholds, particularly targeting NVIDIA’s artificial intelligence accelerators destined for Chinese customers.

In response, China discouraged state-linked enterprises from purchasing NVIDIA’s H20 chip, designed specifically to meet United States export control thresholds while remaining legal for export. The deliberate rejection of nominally compliant technology demonstrated China’s determination to develop independent capabilities rather than accept compromised products.

In December 2025, the Trump administration announced a fundamental policy shift, authorizing conditional exports of NVIDIA’s H200 chip to approved Chinese customers in exchange for 25 percent revenue sharing with the United States government. Advanced Micro Devices was similarly authorized to export MI308 processors following Commerce Department approval. This policy reversal represents recognition that comprehensive export controls cannot indefinitely prevent China’s access to advanced semiconductors and reflects calculated judgment that controlled revenue-generating exports provide superior strategic outcomes compared to complete embargoes.

However, China has reportedly considered imposing restrictions on some approved chip imports while excluding them from domestic subsidy programs, indicating Beijing’s complex calculus regarding technology dependence versus strategic autonomy. This dynamic exchange illustrates the fundamental tension between commercial opportunity and strategic vulnerability driving semiconductor policy at the highest governmental levels.

Emerging Technologies: Quantum Computing and Next-Generation Semiconductors

Beyond conventional silicon-based semiconductor competition, emerging quantum computing technologies represent the next frontier of technological warfare where early advantages could yield irreversible strategic superiority.

China has mobilized state-scale investment and industrial coordination in quantum computing, achieving near-parity with the United States in superconducting quantum computer development while achieving leadership in quantum communications. In December 2024, China announced the Tianyan-504 superconducting quantum computer, with subsequent advancement to Zuchongzhi-3 featuring 105 qubits, becoming accessible to remote users via the Tianyan quantum computing network in October 2025.

The United States maintains distributed research efforts across universities, private companies, and government laboratories, with IBM releasing a 1,121-qubit chip and the Quantum Nighthawk processor featuring 120 linked qubits enabling computing requiring up to 5,000 two-qubit gates. Amazon, Microsoft, and others are pursuing alternative quantum computing architectures, potentially providing multiple pathways to quantum advantage.

China’s centralized, state-directed approach to quantum development provides advantages in concentrating resources and coordinating disparate efforts, whereas the United States’ decentralized model potentially provides advantages in spurring innovation through competition and diverse technical approaches. However, quantum technology remains nascent, with commercialization projected 5 to 10 years in the future, making current competition primarily focused on research dominance and foundational capabilities.

Current Status and Future Trajectory

As of December 2025, the United States retains technological leadership in advanced semiconductor design and specialized manufacturing, supported by renewed commitment through CHIPS Act investments and policy initiatives prioritizing domestic production expansion. However, this leadership faces erosion as China accelerates mature-node production and develops indigenous advanced capabilities despite United States export controls, while Taiwan’s concentration of advanced manufacturing capacity creates critical vulnerabilities threatening global technological systems.

The semiconductor war represents not a conclusion but rather an intensifying competition with no clear victor, where technological sophistication, capital investment, supply chain resilience, and geopolitical positioning determine outcomes across dimensions that reshape global economic and security relationships.

TSMC’s extraordinary market dominance, commanding 71 percent of pure-play foundry market share, creates overwhelming competitive advantage in artificial intelligence chips, the most commercially valuable semiconductor category. Yet this dominance remains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption, supply chain restriction, and the emergence of alternative suppliers developed through sustained Chinese and American investment.

The distributed geographic expansion of semiconductor manufacturing, with TSMC, Samsung, and Intel establishing new capacity in the United States, represents strategic response to geopolitical vulnerability. However, decades of outsourcing cannot be reversed through industrial policy alone, and manufacturing capacity developed today will require years to achieve maturity and competitive efficiency comparable to Asian production ecosystems.

Conclusion

The semiconductor war does not feature a clear victor but rather an evolving competitive landscape where different nations and companies dominate specific segments while facing distinct vulnerabilities across others. The United States maintains design and technology leadership but lacks manufacturing capacity; China rapidly expands production of conventional and mature-node chips while remaining constrained in advanced nodes; Taiwan commands unparalleled advanced manufacturing capability while facing extraordinary geopolitical vulnerability; and other nations including South Korea and Japan maintain critical roles in memory and specialized technologies.

The integration of semiconductor competition into broader United States-China technological rivalry ensures that semiconductors will remain at the center of national security strategy, industrial policy, and geopolitical positioning for the foreseeable future. The outcome of this competition will determine not merely commercial success but fundamental technological dominance, economic power, and strategic capability defining global security architecture in the artificial intelligence-driven era.