By: Dhritiman Banerjee

The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) was formed on April 4^th,1949 as the Western Counterweight to the Soviet Union in the newly emerging Cold War. NATO describes itself as the most successful military alliance because it deterred a nuclear war with the Soviets rather than winning a military conflict. This sums up the objective of the alliance perfectly i.e., deterrence rather than aggression. However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviets, Nato pursued an aggressive expansionist stance with respect to the newly formed Russian federation by expanding eastwards and integrating erstwhile communist states into the alliance and changing the alliance’s goal to global military interventions. This has led to a security dilemma on the Russian part.

However, recent developments including the war in Ukraine have highlighted Nato’s new role while the Trumpism movement in the United States have raised concerns as to US commitment to Nato as its main supporter. Thus, the limitations as well as the scope of the alliance with respect to Russia have recently been exposed which raises serious questions as to the future of the alliance. Therefore, questions arise as to the survivability of Nato as a military alliance and its role in the emerging multipolar world order. This article opines that while Nato may survive, it faces a difficult future ahead without serious reforms to its mission and goals and explains that Nato in its present form is not sustainable without significant support and considering the new US foreign policy goals, the new Nato should expect less American support and thus change its role from expansion to an alliance of deterrence against Moscow.

Trump and NATO

President Donald Trump has approached Nato in a different way compared to previous administrations. He has criticized the low defence spending of the European countries and in his interpretation the increasing imbalance of European commitments with respect to the US. He has also criticized the military contributions of European Nato members to global US military interventions involving Nato in states like Afghanistan, statements which have drawn sharp criticism from European leaders. The President has also criticized former President Biden’s collaboration with Nato in aid to Ukraine and has drastically reduced US military aid to Ukraine. This has increased distrust among European allies regarding US commitment to Nato which has been exacerbated by the President’s statements regarding the annexation of Greenland which is a territory of Denmark, a Nato member. Therefore, it can be said that the erstwhile US-European alliance may be seeing fractures due to the foreign policy of the Trump administration. Europeans believe that Nato is more than a military alliance as it is the backbone of European security and therefore, survival of the alliance is key to European security in the face of emerging Russian expansionism under Vladimir Putin.

Therefore, it can be said that the future of Nato may be different due to US-European emerging distrust and the Europeans may upgrade the security infrastructure of Nato to be less dependent on US support. Also, it should be noted that European leaders have avoided supporting the recent US intervention in Iran and have criticized unilateral US military action in the region. This has deepened Trump’s animosity towards Nato and has led to his Secretary of State Marco Rubio who has criticized the alliance in the past to call for a re-examination of the US-Nato relationship. These developments have raised questions as to the future of Nato amidst the growing US-European animosity. Thus, doubts about the future of the current structure of Nato have started to arise and questions and concerns over continued participation in the organization have become points of recent debate in the discourse of international relations.

In fact, differences with the Americans have led the Europeans to realize the limits of US aid to their security and revisit their military policies. Donald Trump has significantly highlighted the role played by the US in Nato and has termed the alliance unfair. His shift from multilateral commitments to institutions like Nato to a foreign policy based on unilateral expansionism of American power primarily based on hard power calculations show that Nato in its current form may not be sustainable both due to current US foreign policy priorities and the reluctance of Nato members to support US unilateral military actions through deploying their own military assets for American missions. Therefore, it can be said that, US commitment to Nato and European security is set to decrease and European powers may have to view Nato more as a solely European alliance and thus take more measures to be self-reliant for military security.

These developments have raised significant debate on the position Nato vis-à-vis Moscow and how the future of European engagement with the Ukraine war will play out considering Europe’s continuing energy reliance on Russia and decreasing American support to the Ukrainian war effort.

NATO, Europe and Moscow: Deterrence or Expansionism?

It should be noted that, Nato as an alliance was a result of the US Cold War foreign policy of containment and was an alliance meant to deter Soviet aggression on Eastern Europe. The alliance mainly resulted as part of the politics of the bipolarity of the Cold War and was meant to be a counter-weight later to the USSR led Warsaw Pact. However, after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War the bipolarity of international relations ended and a unipolar system emerged with the US as the sole superpower and Nato as a military alliance functioned under the leadership of the Americans. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the mission of the Nato changed from deterrence to expansionism and military intervention. Nato in this period expanded into eastern Europe with the joining of erstwhile Communist states like Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic in 1999 and later states like Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia in 2004. Nato also during the unipolar era functioned as a multilateral alliance of military intervention with military action in the Balkans, Middle East, Afghanistan and other regions. Nato in the unipolar system served as a vital part of the liberal institutional hegemony propounded by US.

The new shift in Nato policy reflected the new power dynamics of the Post Cold War and was seen with concern in Moscow as Nato expanded closer to the borders of the new state of Russia and tensions between Washington and Moscow remained. John Mearsheimer notes that Nato expansionism into Eastern Europe led to an existential security threat for Russia as it perceived a crisis in its own borders and thus initiated conflict with Ukraine. But it should be noted that Nato expansionism was a result of US policy in the new era and Europe then and even now depends heavily on the Americans for their military security. This makes American commitments and security guarantees to Europe an important factor in Nato operations and in the security policies of the European states. This factor becomes more important when the Europeans view their animosity with the militarily superior Russia and its actions in Ukraine which is a key flashpoint in European security. It should be noted that the previous policy of Nato expansion to counter Russian aggression is heavily dependent on American support and decreasing American commitment to Nato makes this policy unsustainable in the long run. This creates a security crisis for the European Nato members as their distrust of the trump administration is in direct contrast to their need for American support to contain Moscow.

Moscow’s expansionist foreign policy in Ukraine and its creation of a sphere of influence with states like Belarus in Eastern Europe present a security challenge for the Europeans in the new politics of the multipolar world as the Europeans alone cannot sustain a prolonged military competition with Russia and also dependent on them for their energy security. Therefore, the Post-Cold War calculus of expanding Nato as a counter-weight to Moscow has to be changed and Europe must develop a capability of deterrence to replace their vision of expansion. In this new security scenario, it should be noted that Nato as an alliance requires significant reforms. The alliance has to be aligned to the politics of a multipolar world and must make a trade off between the European priorities of security and continuing to rely on American leadership. Therefore, while Europe is economically stronger than Russia, militarily Russia is superior and Europe’s military capability is heavily dependent on the American nuclear umbrella. This creates a unique security challenge for the Europeans. In fact, the importance of Nato from a European security perspective to counter Russian expansionism can be seen through the recent decisions by Finland and Sweden to join Nato.

Thus, while Nato remains relevant for Europeans to contain Moscow, it is difficult to sustain the alliance in its present role without continuing American support which is unlikely. The European states recognize this and thus have increased military spending to reduce military dependence on the US. However, it is also necessary to redefine the goal of Nato from an expansionist global military bloc to a local military alliance meant to deter Moscow rather than conduct military interventions around the world.

Conclusion: Death of Nato as we know it?

It can be said that Nato in its current form is a dead alliance that cannot serve its function. However, it is still extremely relevant for European powers as a collective security alliance against Russia. In this context, it is imperative for Europe to decrease its military dependence on the US and rebrand Nato to its limited goal of military deterrence in Europe. Nato cannot be viable if these reforms are not done and may fracture due to American-European distrust which will give an advantage to Moscow. It should be noted that while Nato has grown stronger after the Ukraine War due to concerns of Russian expansionism, it faces criticism from America, its main backer from inception. Therefore, Nato cannot serve its current role efficiently in the new multipolar order where US foreign policy is rapidly changing. The new era does not point towards continuing partnership between the Americans and the Europeans but signals that their mutual distrust and reluctance to cooperate on unilateral military actions is likely to increase. Washington will remember Europe’s response during the Iran War and may reformulate its Europe strategy accordingly.

Thus, to conclude it should be asserted that Nato policies of the unipolar world can no longer guide the alliance now. Instead, Europe should recognize its limitations and strive to design Nato in the more limited capability as a deterrent to Moscow based on European commitment to their own security as it can be unlikely that Washington will respond to an article 5 invocation in Europe in the future considering its own requests in Iran were denied by Europe.

By: Prof. ML Meena & Ravi D. Bishnoi

There is a quiet mistake that often shapes how wars are understood. We tend to focus on visible actions like airstrikes, missile launches, naval deployments and we assume that these define the real sense of conflicts. Yet the current Iran-US-Israel confrontation suggests something more complex. What matters is not only what is happening, but where and why real control lies, is more important and grounded. Now, Increasingly, that control is shifting away from the battlefield and into systems that determine how the global economy and security architecture function.

To understand this, one must begin with a grounded geographical observation. This conflict is not being fought to secure a decisive military victory. It is being fought to shape economic, strategic, and psychological conditions in ways that make victory itself uncertain and costly. As Iran’s Supreme Leader himself indicated, “this is the end of the war,” reflecting a strategic approach where conflict is seen as an ongoing process shaped through pressure, endurance and leverage.

This becomes evident when examining the Strait of Hormuz strategic dilemma. Approximately 17-20 million barrels of oil per day pass through this narrow waterway, accounting for nearly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In addition, around 25-30 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, particularly from Qatar, transits through this corridor. Iran has not attempted a full closure of the Strait in the early stage of the war. Instead, it has engaged in intermittent disruption strategies like small naval and fast-attack craft deployments, drone surveillance or selective harassment of commercial vessels. This approach mirrors earlier incidents, such as the 2019 tanker attacks near Fujairah, which triggered immediate spikes in oil prices and insurance costs.

The impact of such disruptions is qualitative and measurable. During previous Gulf tensions, war-risk insurance premiums for tankers rose by 200-300 percent, while Brent crude prices experienced short-term increases of 8-12 percent within days. Even minor incidents have forced shipping companies to reroute or delay cargo, affecting supply chains across Asia and Europe. In this strategic wall, we see clearly that a localized disruption thus generates systemic consequences.

This reveals a fundamental shift. World understood the basic theory means power is no longer defined solely by military superiority in contemporary affray. It is increasingly defined by the ability to manipulate interconnected systems. Iran’s conventional military capabilities remain limited compared to the United States and Israel. However, by leveraging geography and economic interdependence, it has demonstrated an ability to exert influence disproportionate to its military strength. From Iranian military response during the blockade, says that ‘If the security of Iran’s ports… is threatened, no port… will be safe’, is directly shows system-level retaliation logic.

The American response highlights another dimension of this transformation. The United States maintains a so-called significant naval presence in the region, including the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, supported by carrier strike groups and advanced surveillance systems. Despite this, the ability to guarantee uninterrupted maritime flow remains constrained. This limitation is structural, because United States is deeply integrated into the global energy economy. Although it is one of the world’s largest oil producers, global oil prices remain interconnected. A sustained increase of $10-15 per barrel has historically contributed to measurable rises in inflation. For instance, energy price shocks in previous crises have added 0.3-0.5 percentage points to U.S. inflation rates, while also increasing transportation and manufacturing costs.

This creates a geo-strategic paradox. The stronger power must operate with caution to avoid economic blowback, while the weaker power employs disruption to amplify costs. Iran clearly shows that, it does not need to achieve battlefield dominance. Actually, its core objective is to ensure that prolonged engagement becomes economically and politically burdensome for its adversaries.

In this scenario, Israel’s actions introduce a distinct strategic timeline. Its actions are shaped by concerns over Iran’s nuclear capabilities. According to reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has accumulated many kilograms of enriched uranium, including material enriched up to 60 percent purity. While weapons-grade uranium is typically enriched to around 90 percent, the current level significantly reduces the time required to reach that threshold.

This creates what analysts describe as a “breakout window,” potentially measured in weeks rather than months. Israel’s strategy is therefore preventive, aimed at disrupting this trajectory before it reaches an irreversible stage. This explains the frequency and precision of its strikes on nuclear-linked infrastructure and military assets.

However, this forward-leaning approach generates divergence within the broader strategic framework. Now, new idea emerge that the United States seeks to extend indirectly timelines through negotiation and controlled pressure. Second hand, Israel seeks to compress timelines through pre-emptive action. Iran operates between these positions, balancing resistance with calculated escalation.

Here, it is particularly important to understand the nuclear dimension; thus far, the United States and Israel have presented it from a unilateral perspective. The concept of “threshold capability” refers to a state’s ability to assemble a nuclear weapon rapidly without having formally done so. This ambiguity alters deterrence dynamics. It creates a situation where adversaries must respond to potential capability rather than confirmed possession. It is essential to understand the nuclear issue not merely in terms of capability, but also as the discrepancy between the actual situation and the assessment thereof. The concept of threshold capability highlights this very distinction: while the technical capacity exists, the decision and process to convert it into a weapon have not yet been finalized.

In the context of Iran, this distinction has been the subject of the most intense controversy. Various reports have clarified that Iran has enriched uranium to a high level; however, these same reports have also noted that ‘no credible evidence has been found to suggest that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.’ Thus, a clear distinction persists between capability and the actual construction of weapons.

In this same context, U.S. intelligence assessments also warrant attention. Some of reports have repeatedly stated that, since 2003, Iran has not made the decision to restart an organized nuclear weapons program, even as it has continued to develop its technical capabilities. This implies that while the threat is potential, portraying it as an immediate reality is not entirely accurate.

History, too, aids in understanding this distinction. The claims made by the United States prior to the 2003 Iraq War, specifically regarding “Weapons of Mass Destruction’ were subsequently proven to be false. Consequently, the international community today exercises greater caution in accepting any intelligence claims without independent verification. This same prudence is evident in the case of Iran, where technical capability is acknowledged, yet there is no broad consensus regarding the assumption that this capability will be directly converted into a weapon.

Thus, the distinction between ‘capability’ and ‘reality’ is not merely technical, it’s also deep political and layer based strategic. Iran leverages this distinction as a form of strategic equilibrium: it formally maintains a stance of not possessing nuclear weapons, while simultaneously sustaining a deterrent posture through its technical capabilities.  This is why, today, the nuclear issue is not focused merely on whether or not a country possesses weapons, but rather on how quickly it can reach that stage, and whether, in fact, it has taken the final step in that direction.

Meanwhile, ceasefires observed in this time, including the Israel–Lebanon front, provide temporary stabilization. However, such pauses often function as operational resets rather than conflict resolution. Historical patterns, including previous Israel-Hezbollah confrontations, indicate that ceasefires frequently precede phases of rearmament and strategic repositioning. This highlights another Geopolitical transformation. In this we see that, Modern conflicts increasingly operate as continuous processes rather than discrete events. Periods of reduced violence often conceal ongoing strategic adjustments. The absence of active combat does not equate to the absence of conflict. Non-state actors further complicate this environment. Hezbollah, for instance, possesses an estimated arsenal of over thousands of rockets and missiles, according to various security assessments. Its operational autonomy introduces unpredictability into the conflict.

Looking ahead, we can discern three potential paths within this broader discourse. The first is negotiation-based stabilisation, which may entail certain interim agreements; however, rather than resolving core disputes, these serve merely to alleviate immediate tensions. Recent behind-the-scenes negotiations, particularly proposals involving partial sanctions relief in exchange for control over uranium stockpiles, point toward this very possibility. Nevertheless, past experiences, specifically the gradual erosion of previous nuclear accords, make it evident that such agreements often serve not as definitive solutions, but rather as a means to buy time.

The second path is controlled confrontation, characterized by periodic escalations in tension followed by strategic pauses. This pattern is clearly discernible in the events of the current month. The temporary ceasefires between the U.S. and Iran, as well as the lull on the Israel-Lebanon front, were not indicative of any permanent resolution; rather, they can be viewed as opportunities for strategic rebalancing. Concurrently, incidents involving the intermittent disruption, and subsequent partial restoration, of oil supplies in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that pressure is not being applied continuously, but rather manifests within a specific cycle or pattern. In the coming days, we may observe this conflict unfolding in a rhythmic cadence, marked by a recurring sequence of tension, pauses, signaling and repetition.

The third path is unplanned escalation, which may arise from miscalculation or misinterpretation. In the current climate, this risk is significantly heightened, given that multiple actors are simultaneously active. Drone operations, missile interceptions, and naval maneuvers create a volatile environment where a localized incident could easily be misconstrued as a broader strategic signal. The presence of non-state actors further compounds this complexity, as their actions do not always align with official state policy. In such an atmosphere, the margin for error narrows to a vanishing point.

At present, the second path appears to be the most probable outcome. It affords all parties the opportunity to maintain their strategic positioning without precipitating a decisive confrontation. Upon close examination, the United States appears to be steering clear of total war while simultaneously balancing economic and political pressures. Meanwhile, Israel seeks to maintain limited operations, keeping long-term threats firmly in view. Iran, for its part, will continue to exert pressure by leveraging its geographic and economic position, all while maintaining its stance of strategic ambiguity. Nevertheless, this equilibrium remains exceedingly fragile, contingent upon constant adjustment and restraint.

This situation also gives rise to a profound geopolitical discourse, wherein the essence of power is shifting from direct control to influence, and where the capacity for endurance is becoming more critical than the pursuit of swift victory. A glance back at history reveals that the greatest threats often do not stem from the decisions that are made, but rather emerge from the voids, the spaces where uncertainty, misperception, and structural pressures converge.

We must now consider, if modern conflicts are no longer confined solely to the battlefield, that is, if they are being waged within interconnected systems that impact the entire globe, then who, truly, are the participants in this war? Is this merely a conflict between states, or have global economies and civil societies also unwittingly become stakeholders? And if disruption itself becomes the very instrument of power, then the real question ceases to be, who wins the war? and instead becomes, how much instability can the international order withstand before it begins to transform itself?