By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction  

The complex South Asian geopolitics sees the changing equation between Bangladesh and Türkiye as one of the important variables that could affect the prevailing power equilibrium in the region. The emerging relationship based on the intersection of economic and defence cooperation and political coordination on some global issues has seen a major development over the past few years. Up until July 2026, it seems that the path that this bilateral equation takes is now from being one of merely exchanging good intentions to becoming one of strategic collaboration. In terms of India, whose “Neighborhood First” policy includes Bangladesh as an integral part of it, there is the possibility that this growing closeness between Dhaka and Ankara might prove to be a diplomatic hurdle. 

The Geopolitical Context: From Distant Acquaintance to Strategic Powers  

Conventionally, Bangladesh and Türkiye had been enjoying friendly, yet rather subdued ties based upon their common Islamic majority and past links that go back to the assistance provided by the Turks during the 1971 Liberation War. But the situation has changed dramatically since 2020 because of active diplomatic expansion by Türkiye, headed by its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the desire of Bangladesh to develop varied foreign ties outside its immediate neighborhood. The change of the paradigm became obvious after the political changes occurred in Dhaka in August 2024. This approach is underlined by the concept of “Asia Anew” that has been developed by Türkiye as an overarching strategy for this interaction. It is important to understand that Bangladesh has become not just a country receiving development assistance but also the key link through which Turkey can gain access to markets in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 2025, there was a rapid escalation of activities. 

Economic and Defence Convergence: Tangible Pillars of Partnership  

One of the essential pillars of the developing partnership is defence cooperation, which has created the biggest concerns among regional analysts. Türkiye has established itself as a leading defence equipment provider to Bangladesh, leaving behind its traditional partners. Starting from 2022, Bangladesh has made purchases of various military hardware from Turkey, ranging from armored vehicles to unmanned aerial vehicles and naval patrol boats. Talks in early 2026 on the possibility of purchasing Turkish corvettes and long-range artillery systems demonstrate further development in the area. Technology transfer and joint production initiatives offered by Turkish defence corporations, such as Baykar and Aselsan, present an attractive option for Bangladesh to expand its sources of defence hardware. Economically, the tie-up has been cemented through substantial investments made by the Turks in the Bangladeshi infrastructure and readymade garments industries. Turkish construction firms have won tenders to construct bridges and build power plants. The Turkish brands in the retail and textile sector have begun importing from Bangladeshi factories. The ratification of a Preferential Trade Agreement in March 2026 has brought down the duties on certain export products. On the cultural front, the Turkish Maarif Foundation runs some schools in the major Bangladeshi cities of Dhaka and Chittagong. 

Diplomatic Alignment and the “Ankara Effect”  

Besides economics and security, there is another aspect of the diplomatic partnership between Dhaka and Ankara that makes India’s strategic environment even more complicated. Turkey has been actively supporting Bangladesh in its Rohingya refugee crisis and providing humanitarian and political assistance in international organizations. On the other hand, Bangladesh has demonstrated readiness to support the diplomatic positions of Turkey concerning issues connected with the Muslim world at international institutions such as the OIC and the UN. The alignment also exists in maritime security, with Turkiye’s presence in the Indian Ocean and its strategic base in Somalia providing an existing basis for maritime cooperation in the form of patrols of the Bay of Bengal. This cooperation, however, is still in its early stages, indicating that Dhaka wishes to diversify its security cooperation that has long depended solely on India. Turkey’s plan to open a consulate in the city of Chittagong, which was announced in October 2025, shows the importance Turkey attaches to its ties with Bangladesh’s economic and maritime capital.  

Implication for India: Strategic Challenges and Diplomatic Pressure  

For India, however, there are many layers of challenges associated with rising relations between Türkiye and Bangladesh. First and foremost, it marks the dilution of India’s traditionally enjoyed predominance in both economic and security terms in relation to Bangladesh. India has always been the largest trading partner of Bangladesh within South Asia, although now it seems that Bangladesh has actively sought out new ties. Secondly, the defence-deal factor becomes especially sensitive for India, since it has always played an important role in Bangladesh’s military buildup. Thirdly, there might also be an opportunity in this partnership for Bangladesh to gain greater leverage in the international sphere. In previous negotiations involving bilateral issues like sharing river water and border management, India has used its economic and security links to tilt the balance. With a Bangladesh that has alternative relationships, it would likely have to mount stiffer resistance when negotiating over unresolved matters. Lastly, in the event of tensions in the region, having a powerful Turkey present in the region would create a variable for the Indian Navy to consider in its maritime partnership with Bangladesh. It is crucial to place these developments in context. Bangladesh has India as an indispensable neighbor, and it is unlikely that the economic and geographic considerations of the region will be overtaken by that of a distant relationship. The official relationship that exists between India and Bangladesh, in spite of the current problems, still has deep institutional ties, particularly when it comes to infrastructural development and energy trade. 

Conclusion  

The emerging alliance of Bangladesh and Türkiye provides a great example of how power dynamics in the world continue to be restructured, where middle powers carve out their own spheres of influence. It marks the diplomatic success of the country, increasing its sovereignty and room for manoeuvre. For Türkiye, it is a way to establish itself in the Indo-Pacific region. For India, it means that it should approach this relationship with great caution and reconsider its engagement strategy with Bangladesh. Neglecting all signs of Dhaka’s increased strategic independence might cause serious miscalculations. A better approach on the part of New Delhi would consist of improving its value proposition to Bangladesh by increasing connectivity, collaborating in water management and responding to its economic needs. In the end, India’s long-term strength remains its geography and culture, but these can only prove useful in the case of proper statecraft. 

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly following recent breakthroughs in generative AI, has transformed governance and state capacity across the world. While AI enhances efficiency and automation, its integration into surveillance infrastructures raises serious concerns about privacy, autonomy, and civil liberties. In authoritarian contexts, AI does not merely support governance—it expands the state’s ability to monitor, predict, and regulate behavior. The deployment of AI-enabled surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region represents one of the most advanced and controversial examples of this transformation. Home to approximately 11–12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority with deep historical and cultural ties to Central Asia, Xinjiang has long been central to China’s security discourse. Following episodes of unrest, particularly the 2009 Ürümqi riots, Beijing intensified securitization policies in the region, framing them as counter-terrorism and anti-separatism efforts. 

What distinguishes Xinjiang is the scale and technological sophistication of its surveillance regime. AI-driven systems—including facial recognition networks, biometric data collection, and predictive policing tools such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)—have been used to aggregate data from checkpoints, smartphones, and financial records to identify individuals deemed “suspicious.” Surveillance technology firms such as Hikvision have been linked to this expanding infrastructure. In authoritarian systems where legitimacy rests on stability rather than electoral consent, surveillance becomes a preventive instrument aimed at deterring mobilization and regulating minority populations. In Xinjiang, digital monitoring has reportedly intersected with restrictions on religious practices, language use, and transnational communication, fueling international criticism and debates over human rights. This  article argues that AI in Xinjiang functions not merely as a security tool, but as a mechanism of algorithmic governance that reshapes state–society relations and raises critical questions about the future trajectory of digital authoritarianism. 

Historical Consolidation and Cultural Reconfiguration: China’s Expanding Control over Xinjiang

The consolidation of Chinese control over the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region must be understood within a long historical arc of imperial expansion, internal colonization, and contemporary technological governance. The Qing dynasty formally incorporated the region in 1884, designating it “Xinjiang,” meaning “newly returned frontier.” This nomenclature itself reflects a state-centric territorial claim and continues to inform official narratives; contemporary government platforms emphasize that Xinjiang has “never been East Turkestan,” directly countering separatist discourse. Following the fall of the Qing and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing institutionalized administrative control while promoting demographic restructuring. Large-scale migration of Han Chinese—initially through state-led settlement programs and later through economic incentives—gradually altered the ethnic balance of the region. Scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin describe this as a strategy of internal colonization, echoing earlier imperial “divide and rule” practices. While earlier decades relied on physical coercion and ideological campaigns under Mao Zedong, the 1990s onward witnessed indirect migration policies and economic integration efforts that masked deeper assimilationist objectives.

In the twenty-first century, control has expanded from demographic engineering to cultural and digital governance. Uyghur identity—rooted in Islam, Turkic linguistic heritage, Central Asian traditions, and a rich poetic culture—has increasingly come under regulatory scrutiny. Influential literary figures such as Abdurehim Ötkür, often regarded as the father of modern Uyghur poetry, symbolize a tradition where literature and communal memory are central to identity formation. Reports by journalists including Lily Kuo have highlighted restrictions on Uyghur intellectuals, poets, and educators, signaling a broader cultural contraction. Since 2017, state policies have reportedly included re-education campaigns, mosque demolitions or renovations aligned with “Sinicization,” and curriculum reforms privileging Mandarin over Uyghur language instruction. Recent updates (2023–2025) indicate a strategic shift: while mass detention facilities appear reduced in visibility, digital monitoring, data-driven governance, and heritage “repackaging” for tourism continue. Beijing simultaneously promotes Xinjiang as a hub within the Belt and Road Initiative, projecting stability and development. Thus, historical patterns of territorial consolidation have evolved into technologically mediated assimilation, where demographic change, cultural regulation, and algorithmic surveillance operate together to redefine state–society relations in Xinjiang.

From Imperial Censorship to Revolutionary Surveillance

Surveillance and censorship in China long predate the contemporary leadership of Xi Jinping. During the Qin and Han dynasties, political orthodoxy and loyalty to the ruler were central pillars of governance. Criticizing imperial authority was prohibited, and censorship mechanisms were institutionalized through the office of the Censorate. Censor officials monitored bureaucratic conduct, judicial proceedings, and public works, reporting directly to the emperor. Although framed as anti-corruption oversight, these institutions reinforced centralized authority and ideological conformity.

During the Qing dynasty, intelligence practices became more formalized. The spy manual Jianshu, authored by Zhu Fengjia, reflected an awareness of covert operations and counter-rebellion strategies. Surveillance thus evolved from bureaucratic oversight to proactive intelligence gathering. Under Mao Zedong, espionage networks initially used against Japanese forces were retained and repurposed domestically. Maoist campaigns institutionalized mass mobilization and neighborhood monitoring, embedding surveillance within everyday social life. What distinguishes contemporary China is not the existence of surveillance, but its technological scale and sophistication.

Digital Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Xinjiang

Modern surveillance intensified significantly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, particularly after the 2009 Ürümqi riots. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe Xinjiang as one of the most securitized regions globally. The state implemented grid-style policing, recruiting thousands of officers and introducing the “one policeman per village” model. Chen Quanguo’s tenure as regional party secretary after 2016 marked a dramatic escalation in security infrastructure.

Digital surveillance now complements physical policing. Biometric data collection, facial recognition systems, mandatory smartphone applications, and predictive platforms such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) enable real-time monitoring. Leibold characterizes this system as “ethnic sorting,” where individuals are categorized according to perceived ontological worth. Surveillance is framed as governance or “social management,” shifting its language from coercion to administrative normalcy.

Recent developments (2023–2025) indicate a transition from overt mass detention to normalized digital monitoring. International scrutiny led to sanctions on several Chinese technology firms, yet Beijing continues to promote AI governance domestically and export surveillance technologies abroad. Simultaneously, the state highlights economic development and tourism in Xinjiang, presenting stability as proof of policy success.

Continuities of Ethnic Management and Cultural Regulation

The securitization of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region reflects broader and historically embedded patterns of ethnic management and demographic engineering. Han migration policies—traced by scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin—illustrate long-standing strategies to recalibrate the region’s demographic balance and bind it more closely to the Chinese mainland. State-led development initiatives, expansion of railway networks, and consolidation of cotton and energy industries have strengthened economic integration while reinforcing dependence on central authority. Xinjiang’s cotton sector, for instance, remains central to China’s textile supply chain, yet it has also been the focus of international scrutiny and import restrictions imposed by the United States and parts of Europe over allegations of forced labor—claims Beijing firmly denies.

Cultural governance operates in parallel with these economic and demographic strategies. Policies promoting Mandarin-language instruction in place of Uyghur-medium education, restructuring mosque architecture under “Sinicization” guidelines, and regulating Islamic practices indicate that governance extends beyond security into the domain of identity formation. David Tobin argues that narratives portraying Uyghurs as security risks cultivate mutual insecurities between Han and Uyghur communities, thereby legitimizing expanded state control. Since 2023, China has further formalized AI governance regulations emphasizing “security” and “controllability,” embedding digital monitoring within broader administrative reforms. Although reports suggest that some re-education facilities have become less visible, digital surveillance infrastructures—facial recognition systems, biometric databases, and grid-style management—remain operational. Simultaneously, Beijing has promoted tourism campaigns showcasing Xinjiang’s cultural heritage, signaling a strategic shift from overt coercion to managed representation.

Taken together, current developments reinforce the argument that China’s approach represents continuity rather than rupture. Surveillance has evolved from imperial oversight and Maoist mass campaigns into technologically sophisticated digital governance under Xi Jinping. The integration of AI, economic modernization, and cultural regulation demonstrates a layered strategy: territorial consolidation is pursued not only through security apparatuses, but through demographic restructuring, economic dependency, and symbolic reconfiguration of minority identity. Contemporary policy in Xinjiang thus exemplifies how historical modes of control have been recalibrated for the digital age, blending modernization with centralized authority in ways that redefine state–society relations.

Algorithmic Governance and the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) represents the operational core of digital surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Designed as a data-driven policing system, IJOP aggregates information from CCTV networks, biometric databases, smartphone monitoring applications, and police checkpoints. According to investigations by Human Rights Watch, the platform compiles behavioral data and flags individuals for investigation or detention based on algorithmic risk indicators. Leaked documents—often referred to as the “Karakax List”—revealed that individuals were reportedly detained for non-violent behaviors such as foreign contacts, religious observance, or possession of certain digital materials. Authorities maintain that the system enables “precision” counter-terrorism and prevents extremism; however, critics argue that predictive policing in this context expands suspicion to everyday life.

Screenshots of IJOP databases reportedly display detailed identity fields including name, ethnicity, gender, ID numbers, and behavioral flags. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe this as a shift from reactive law enforcement to algorithmic pre-emption—where risk is inferred rather than proven. This mirrors global debates following the 9/11 surveillance expansions in the United States exposed by Edward Snowden, yet the Xinjiang case differs in scale, ethnic targeting, and integration with mass political campaigns such as “Strike Hard.” Since 2023, although Beijing claims vocational centers have been phased out, reports indicate that digital monitoring remains deeply embedded, supported by AI governance regulations emphasizing national security. International sanctions against firms linked to surveillance supply chains coexist with China’s continued export of “smart city” technologies abroad, suggesting Xinjiang functions both as a domestic security project and a model of digital authoritarian governance.

Lived Experiences, Cultural Suppression, and Political Implications

Interviews conducted with Chinese and Uyghur respondents reveal the human dimension of algorithmic control. One interviewee described surveillance cameras “popping up” in the early 2000s, characterizing them as tools for cultural destruction and family separation. Another, a Uyghur living abroad, emphasized the symbolic politics of naming—rejecting “Xinjiang” in favor of “East Turkestan”—highlighting how territorial language itself becomes a site of contestation. A scholar interviewed linked AI surveillance directly to safeguarding the “One China” principle, arguing that digital monitoring enables authorities to track religious practice, separatist sentiment, and social networks with unprecedented efficiency.

Reports of restrictions on protest (more than three people gathering), alleged forced labor, and suppression of Islamic practices reinforce claims that surveillance extends beyond security into identity regulation. While Beijing frames these measures as counter-extremism and poverty alleviation, critics argue that algorithmic sorting, mass DNA collection, and “virtual fences” transform citizenship into a condition of continuous evaluation. Recent tourism campaigns and state media portrayals of stability contrast sharply with diaspora testimonies and ongoing international scrutiny.

Critically, the Xinjiang model illustrates how AI amplifies long-standing state objectives: territorial integrity, ideological conformity, and cultural assimilation. Surveillance here is not incidental but systemic—merging predictive analytics, biometric governance, and political campaigns into a comprehensive architecture of control. The case raises broader questions about the global diffusion of AI-enabled policing and whether technological modernization, absent robust accountability, risks normalizing permanent states of exception under the banner of security.

Global Contestation, Sanctions, and Competing Narratives (2023–2026)

The international response to developments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has intensified over the past few years, transforming the issue from a human rights debate into a focal point of geopolitical contestation. In 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released an assessment stating that serious human rights violations in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity. Although Beijing rejected the findings as politically motivated, the report institutionalized global scrutiny within multilateral frameworks. Parallelly, the United States enacted and implemented the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, presuming goods produced in Xinjiang to be linked to forced labor unless proven otherwise. This legislation significantly impacted global supply chains, particularly in textiles and solar panel components, given Xinjiang’s centrality to cotton and polysilicon production. The European Union and several G7 countries have also imposed targeted sanctions on Chinese officials and entities allegedly linked to surveillance and detention systems.

Technology firms associated with surveillance infrastructure—most notably Hikvision and Huawei—have faced export restrictions and blacklisting measures. These actions underscore the growing recognition that Xinjiang is not merely a regional security matter but a test case for the global governance of AI. At the same time, China has deepened partnerships with countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, exporting “smart city” technologies that integrate facial recognition, biometric data systems, and predictive policing software. Critics argue that this diffusion risks normalizing algorithmic authoritarian practices beyond China’s borders, while Beijing frames such exports as neutral tools for modernization and crime prevention.

Domestically, official narratives emphasize stability, economic growth, and poverty alleviation in Xinjiang. State media highlights increased tourism, infrastructure development, and employment statistics as evidence of policy success. Beijing maintains that vocational training centers have been dismantled and that counter-terrorism efforts were necessary responses to violent incidents in the 2000s and early 2010s. However, diaspora testimonies, investigative journalism, and leaked documents such as the “Karakax List” continue to challenge these claims, arguing that digital monitoring, biometric databases, and algorithmic risk scoring remain embedded within everyday governance.

From a critical perspective, the Xinjiang case demonstrates three core dynamics. First, AI-enabled surveillance transforms suspicion into a predictive category, where algorithmic flagging substitutes individualized judicial process. Second, ethnic identity becomes datafied—reduced to quantifiable markers within systems such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). Third, international fragmentation over human rights norms enables competing narratives: liberal democracies frame Xinjiang as a site of systemic repression, while China presents it as a successful model of stability-oriented governance.

Thus, the contemporary debate is not solely about Xinjiang; it concerns the future of digital governance globally. As AI becomes central to administrative capacity worldwide, the Xinjiang model raises urgent normative questions: Can predictive policing coexist with due process? Does algorithmic efficiency erode minority rights when embedded in securitized frameworks? And will economic interdependence dilute accountability mechanisms? The trajectory of international responses between 2023 and 2026 suggests that Xinjiang has evolved into a defining case in the politics of algorithmic authoritarianism—where technology, sovereignty, and human rights intersect in unprecedented ways.

Conclusion

The case of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region demonstrates that artificial intelligence, when embedded within an authoritarian political framework, becomes more than a governance tool—it becomes an architecture of control. From the historical consolidation of Xinjiang to the deployment of predictive platforms such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), China’s approach reflects continuity in ethnic management, now recalibrated through algorithmic governance. Surveillance in Xinjiang is not episodic or reactive; it is systemic, preventive, and data-driven—integrating biometric collection, facial recognition, grid policing, and digital profiling into everyday administration.

Critically, the Xinjiang model reveals how AI transforms suspicion into quantifiable risk and identity into data. Under the language of counter-terrorism, stability, and modernization, algorithmic systems restructure state–society relations by normalizing constant monitoring and pre-emptive intervention. International sanctions, multilateral reports, and supply chain restrictions underscore global unease, yet competing narratives persist between human rights advocacy and sovereignty-based security claims. Ultimately, Xinjiang stands as a defining case of algorithmic authoritarianism—illustrating how technological sophistication can reinforce centralized authority and raise urgent questions about accountability, minority rights, and the global future of AI-enabled governance.

By : Ritika Biswas, Research Analyst, GSDN

“The Quad Is Dead, Long Live the Quad” “Did Trump Kill the Quad?” “The US Built the Quad, But Now It’s Letting It Fail”. Throughout 2025, headlines across the United States and international media were saturated with titles like these, fueling a growing sentiment that the Quad was falling apart. These reports suggested that the partnership, once seen as a key part of security in the Indo-Pacific, was losing strength because the administration of the United States of America under President Donald Trump seemed to be pulling back from its leadership role. Although these news articles do not claim that the Quad’s strategy or its goals were dead, they pointed to a shift in how the partnership functions, showing that the regional stability remains active. 

But What Is the Quad? 

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a team of four democracies: Australia, India, Japan and the United States of America acting as a strong partner against China’s growing power and to help keep the Indo-Pacific region free and open for everyone. The Quad traces its origins to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the United States, India, Japan and Australia worked together to provide emergency help, even though they didn’t have a formal group set up for it. The success of that cooperation led the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, Shinzo Abe, to propose a more structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. However, the group stopped meeting in 2008, largely because Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd withdrew, being unwilling to go against Beijing at the height of the Sino-Australian economic boom. The Quad was restored in 2017 during the Trump administration, driven by shared anxieties over China’s bold behavior over territory in the South China Sea, the building of military bases on man-made islands and the fast growth of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. 

 Since its revival in 2017 under the first Trump administration and its subsequent major summit-level partnership under President Joe Biden, the Quad has been seen as a key part of maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific.  The Biden era transformed the Quad from a consultative forum into a summit-level coalition, with leaders holding their first virtual meeting in March 2021, followed by face-to-face meetings at the White House in September 2021, in Tokyo in May 2022, in Hiroshima in May 2023, and in Wilmington, Delaware, in September 2024. Under President Biden, the Quad began working on a long list of goals, spanning maritime security, vaccine distribution, climate change, technology standards, infrastructure financing and cybersecurity. Critics felt the group was taking too much, but supporters believed this wide-ranging plan showed an affirmative vision for the region. Despite this ambitious agenda, the momentum slowed. Now, in the middle of 2026, leaders in cities like New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra are all asking the same worried questions: Is the Quad finished, or is it just taking a break? 

The second Trump administration began with what appeared to be a strong signal of continuity in the Quad. On January 21, 2025, the Quad foreign ministers met in Washington under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, promising to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open. This indicated that the Quad had strong support from both U.S. political parties. However, these hopes did not last long. President Trump’s “America First” policy focused on making direct, one-on-one deals rather than working with a group of partners. Washington soon imposed high tariffs of up to 50 percent on Indian products and criticized India for buying cheap oil from Russia. These actions hurt the trust that the four countries had spent years cultivating. 

India was supposed to host the Quad Leaders’ Summit in 2025. Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally invited President Trump to New Delhi in June 2025. Yet 2025 came and went without any leaders’ meeting. Trump reportedly canceled his trip because of the trade disagreements. Because India was also unhappy about the new taxes and the criticism regarding Russia, it did not push for the meeting to be rescheduled. By September 26, 2025, it became clear that the summit would not take place at all that year. As a result, the Quad’s most important event – the annual leaders’ meeting – did not happen in 2025.  

Is the Quad Really Dead? 

Even when news articles and media headlines in 2025 painted a dark picture, they never actually claimed that the Quad’s main goals were dead. While they focused on the fact that the leaders were not meeting and the partnership seemed to be “dying” in the public eye, they were really describing a shift in style. These reports highlighted that while the “public face” of the Quad- the grand summits and media spectacle were gone, the core mission was not. In reality, the Quad has not been entirely inactive. In fact, behind that silence, the Quad’s actual work has continued. Exercise Malabar, the yearly naval drill featuring all four countries, was held in Guam from October 28 to November 8, 2025, and was one of the largest in recent years. A workshop on disaster response was held in Honolulu and the third Quad Counterterrorism Working Group met in December 2025. Foreign ministers met in Washington in July 2025 and again in New Delhi on May 26, 2026. These meetings proved that the partnership remains very active. In short, the Quad has not stopped working; it has simply lost its “voice” at the top level. 

On February 7, 2026, the United States and India made a big breakthrough by announcing a new trade plan. As part of this deal, the U.S. agreed to lower the tariffs on Indian products from 25 percent down to 18 percent. This was a partial fix for the high taxes that had been put in place because India was buying oil from Russia. This agreement helped fix the relationship between the two countries, which is the foundation needed for the Quad to work. It was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Quad revival. 

On May 26, 2026, the Quad foreign ministers met in New Delhi. Many observers characterized it as a damage control exercise and an attempt to rescue the grouping’s relevance. The meeting led to several major results. First, the four ministers announced a plan called the Quad Critical Minerals Framework. This plan aims to strengthen supply lines, so countries do not have to rely on just one nation – a clear reference to China’s near-monopoly on the processing of important minerals. Second, they started the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC). It enhanced real-time maritime domain awareness across the region. Finally, they moved forward with the Ports of the Future Partnership, especially promising to work with Fiji to build and improve its ports. 

Will India Be Replaced in the Quad? 

Yet even as the New Delhi meeting produced these deliverables, a more uncomfortable question was being whispered in the strategic cycle: Was India still the right member, or could it simply be replaced? 

The question gained real attention in 2025 with the quiet rise of a new group called the “Squad,” which includes the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines.  Unlike India, the Philippines is an official U.S. military ally, has no complicated ties to Russia and has been on the front lines of direct standoffs with China in the South China Sea. The “Squad” has already conducted naval exercises. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out bluntly that India is seen as a weak link in the Quad. They argue that India is not a formal ally, is hesitant to join freedom of navigation patrols and is often pulled in many different directions at once. 

However, the Squad and Quad have different goals. The Squad is narrowly focused on hard maritime security in the South China Sea. The Quad has a wider vision for the whole Indo-Pacific region, which requires India’s massive size, its key position in the Indian Ocean and its large population and economy. Replacing India would not save the Quad; it would simply create a different grouping entirely. The real question is not whether India can be replaced, but whether India and the United States can rebuild enough trust to make the Quad worth keeping. 

Is the Australia Summit a last chance for the Quad? 

The clearest sign that the Quad is not finished is what is now planned for later in 2026. Australia is the leader of the group this year and is expected to host a Quad Leaders’ Summit that never happened in India in 2025. All four countries’ defence and foreign ministers continue to talk through regular channels, and the militaries are working together even more closely than before. The question now is not whether the Quad is working. Clearly it is, but whether President Trump will attend a leaders’ meeting and bring back the political importance that the group has been missing for over a year. If he does, the Quad gets a genuine second wind. If he does not, the gap between the group’s hard work on the ground and its lack of political attention will become impossible to ignore. 

In the end, while the Quad might not be in the news as much as it used to be, it is still doing important work behind the scenes. The idea of “Long live the Quad” means that even when things get difficult, the group’s mission to keep the region stable and safe continues to be a vital part of world politics. 

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed the United States and Israel as its principal strategic adversaries. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between Tehran and Washington have remained hostile, while tensions between Iran and Israel have steadily increased due to disagreements over Iran’s nuclear programme, regional influence and support for armed groups across the Middle East. Although the possibility of a direct war between Iran, the United States, and Israel appeared remote for many years, Iranian leaders consistently prepared for such a scenario. Rather than attempting to match the military capabilities of its adversaries, Iran developed a strategy focused on deterrence, asymmetric warfare, missile technology, regional partnerships, and economic leverage. 

The conflict that intensified during 2025 and expanded further in 2026 demonstrated that Iran had spent decades preparing for a confrontation with militarily superior opponents. Despite facing two technologically advanced powers equipped with modern air forces, intelligence networks, precision-guided weapons, and substantial military resources, Iran managed to sustain its resistance and continue military operations. In my opinion, this was not simply the result of chance. It reflected years of planning that focused on strengthening Iran’s military capabilities, regional influence and ability to withstand prolonged conflict.  

Iran’s preparations were shaped by several historical experiences. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 convinced Iranian leaders that the country needed self-reliant defence capabilities. Later, economic sanctions, regional conflicts, the killing of General Qasem Soleimani on January 03, 2020, and increasing Israeli concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities reinforced Tehran’s belief that future military confrontation was possible. Consequently, Iran invested heavily in missile forces, drone technology, underground military infrastructure, and relationships with regional partners that collectively became known as the “Axis of Resistance.” 

This article examines how Iran prepared for its war with the United States and Israel. It explores the historical foundations of Iranian strategy, the development of missile and drone capabilities, the strengthening of internal security institutions, the role of regional proxy networks, and the importance of economic pressure points such as the Strait of Hormuz. 

Historical Background and Strategic Thinking 

Iran’s approach to national security has been heavily influenced by its modern history. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War left a profound impact on Iranian military thinking. During the conflict, Iran faced extensive missile attacks, chemical weapons, and international isolation. The experience convinced Iranian leaders that dependence on foreign suppliers was dangerous and that the country needed indigenous military capabilities. 

Following the war, Iran began investing heavily in missile development and defence industries. Over time, sanctions and diplomatic isolation further encouraged self-sufficiency. Tehran concluded that it could not compete directly with the conventional military power of the United States. Instead, it adopted an asymmetric warfare strategy designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of stronger opponents. 

Iranian leaders often argue that major wars are forced upon Iran rather than started by it. This belief has influenced the country’s defence planning for decades. This concept became central to Iranian strategic doctrine. According to this thinking, Iran must prepare not only to defend its territory but also to ensure that any adversary pays a heavy price for military action. 

The United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 08, 2018 further reinforced these perceptions. The return of economic sanctions, combined with increasing tensions in the Gulf region, convinced many Iranian officials that military confrontation could eventually occur. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 deepened these concerns and accelerated efforts to improve deterrence capabilities. 

By the mid-2020s, Iranian strategic planning increasingly focused on surviving a potential war, preserving state institutions, maintaining retaliatory capabilities, and ensuring that adversaries could not achieve rapid victory. 

Building the Largest Missile Arsenal in the Middle East 

One of the most important parts of Iran’s military strategy was the expansion of its missile programme. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. Over the years, Tehran invested heavily in ballistic and cruise missiles to strengthen its deterrence capabilities. 

Missiles such as the Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr-1, Sejjil, and Khorramshahr provide Iran with the ability to strike targets across the Middle East, including Israel and United States military bases. Iran also improved the accuracy and survivability of these weapons by constructing underground missile bases and mobile launch systems. 

In addition, Iran gained valuable combat experience through missile operations in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and against United States forces in Iraq between 2017 and 2020. These operations gave Iranian forces practical experience and helped improve how missiles would be used during a larger conflict.  

The Rise of Drone Warfare 

Alongside missiles, unmanned aerial systems became a crucial component of Iran’s military strategy. Recognizing its limitations in modern combat aircraft, Iran invested heavily in drone technology as a cost-effective alternative. 

Systems such as the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 became internationally known due to their operational use in several conflicts. These drones provided Iran with the ability to conduct long-range strikes while imposing significant costs on adversaries. 

Iran’s investment in drones provided several military advantages. Drones were cheaper to produce than advanced fighter aircraft, could be manufactured in large numbers, and could overwhelm air-defence systems through saturation attacks. They also provided valuable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 

The effectiveness of Iranian drone technology became particularly evident during the September 14, 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities. The operation temporarily disrupted a significant portion of global oil production and demonstrated the strategic impact that relatively inexpensive weapons could achieve. 

By the mid-2020s, drones had become one of the main tools in Iran’s overall military strategy 

Strengthening Internal Security and Political Stability 

Iran’s preparations extended beyond military capabilities. Iranian leaders believed that any future war would likely involve attempts to destabilize the regime from within. As a result, significant attention was devoted to internal security and political resilience. 

Following periods of domestic unrest and external pressure, Iranian authorities strengthened security institutions and increased coordination among intelligence agencies. Border regions received additional attention, while measures were introduced to counter foreign influence and potential sabotage operations. 

The government also enhanced wartime decision-making structures. Reports indicated that the Supreme National Security Council received expanded responsibilities, while new defence coordination mechanisms were introduced to improve crisis management. 

Iranian leaders believed that future wars would involve not only military attacks but also political pressure, cyber operations and economic sanctions.  

The Axis of Resistance and Regional Influence 

Another important part of Iran’s preparation was the development of the Axis of Resistance, a network of state and non-state groups that oppose American and Israeli influence in the Middle East. Over the years, Iran strengthened its ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Palestinian armed groups. 

These partnerships gave Iran strategic depth by creating multiple fronts that could deter or complicate military action against it. Following the October 07, 2023 Hamas attack and the subsequent regional escalation, the importance of these alliances became even more evident. Iran continued to strengthen coordination among its regional partners, viewing them as an essential part of its overall deterrence strategy and regional influence. 

Protecting the Nuclear Programme and Strategic Infrastructure 

Iran’s nuclear programme has remained a major source of tension with the United States and Israel. Anticipating that nuclear sites would be among the first targets in any conflict, Tehran invested heavily in protecting strategic infrastructure. Facilities such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were reinforced with underground tunnels, hardened structures, and additional fortifications to improve their survivability against air and missile strikes. 

Iran also strengthened the protection of missile bases, command centres, and drone production facilities by dispersing and hardening them across different locations. These measures were intended to preserve critical military capabilities and ensure continuity of operations during a prolonged conflict. 

Preparing for Economic Warfare 

Iranian leaders understood that any major conflict would involve significant economic consequences. Therefore, economic warfare became an important component of Iranian strategic planning. 

One of Iran’s most powerful tools in this regard is the Strait of Hormuz. Located between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, the strait serves as one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. A substantial portion of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports passes through these waters each day. 

For decades, Iranian officials have periodically warned that the Strait of Hormuz could be disrupted if Iran faced existential threats. While such actions would also impose costs on Iran itself, Tehran viewed the ability to threaten global energy flows as an important deterrent. 

Military exercises conducted in the Persian Gulf often demonstrated Iran’s capability to operate in and around the strait. Naval units practiced asymmetric tactics involving fast attack craft, anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and drone systems. 

The idea behind these preparations was relatively simple. If Iran could not match American military power directly, it could still impose substantial economic costs on its adversaries and the wider international community. 

Many analysts argued that any prolonged disruption of the Strait of Hormuz would affect global energy markets, increase oil prices, and create economic uncertainty far beyond the Middle East. By maintaining this capability, Iran sought to ensure that military action against it would carry consequences extending well beyond the battlefield. 

Military Exercises and Readiness 

Military exercises played an important role in Iran’s preparations. Throughout the years leading up to the conflict, Iranian armed forces regularly conducted large-scale drills designed to test operational readiness and demonstrate capabilities. 

These exercises involved the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regular armed forces, naval units, missile forces, and air defence systems. Scenarios often simulated attacks on foreign military bases, protection of strategic infrastructure, defence of coastal regions, and disruption of maritime traffic. 

These exercises had several purposes.They allowed military commanders to identify weaknesses, improve coordination, and test new technologies under realistic conditions. They also sent political signals to foreign governments regarding Iran’s willingness and ability to defend its interests. 

Joint exercises with partners such as Russia further demonstrated Iran’s efforts to strengthen international military relationships. Although these exercises did not create formal military alliances comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they provided opportunities for cooperation and knowledge-sharing. 

Iran’s preparations were not limited to conventional military exercises. Iran also invested heavily in cyber capabilities, intelligence collection, electronic warfare, and information operations. These tools provided additionalmeans of influencing events without relying solely on traditional military force. 

By the time conflict intensified, Iran had spent years developing a multidimensional approach to warfare that integrated conventional, unconventional, economic, and informational instruments of power. 

Wartime Performance and Strategic Resilience 

When conflict eventually erupted, Iran faced immense challenges. The United States and Israel possessed overwhelming advantages in air power, intelligence capabilities, and technological sophistication. Iranian military infrastructure suffered significant damage, while several senior commanders and officials were killed. 

Despite these setbacks, Iran demonstrated a degree of resilience that surprised many observers. Although significant damage was inflicted on military infrastructure, the state continued to function and retained the capacity to respond militarily, which was one of Tehran’s primary objectives from the outset. 

Iran also retained the ability to threaten regional infrastructure, military bases, and maritime routes. These capabilities prevented its adversaries from achieving a quick and decisive victory. 

One of the main reasons Iran managed to continue fighting was the preparation it had carried out over several decades. Underground facilities, dispersed military assets, established command structures, and extensive missile inventories allowed Iran to continue operating under difficult conditions. 

Equally important was Iran’s ability to frame the conflict as a struggle for national survival. Government narratives emphasized sovereignty, resistance, and defence against foreign aggression. This messaging helped strengthen domestic cohesion during a period of extraordinary pressure. 

Although Iran suffered substantial military and economic losses, its preparations enabled it to avoid complete strategic defeat. In this sense, Tehran achieved one of its primary wartime objectives: survival. 

Implications for Regional Security 

Iran’s preparations and performance during the conflict carry important implications for regional and international security. 

The conflict also highlighted several broader lessons for regional security. One lesson was the growing importance of missiles and drones in modern warfare. Another was the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, where any disruption could affect global energy markets. The war also demonstrated how regional allies and non-state actors can shape conflicts beyond national borders. Finally, it showed that resilience and long-term preparation are now as important as conventional military strength.  

Conclusion 

Iran’s preparation for a possible war with the United States and Israel developed gradually over several decades rather than through one single policy. Instead, it reflected decades of strategic planning shaped by historical experiences, regional competition, economic pressures, and security concerns. 

Iran invested heavily in missile technology, drone warfare, underground infrastructure, and regional partnerships. It strengthened internal security institutions, developed economic pressure tools centered on the Strait of Hormuz, and expanded its ability to conduct asymmetric warfare. These measures were designed not to match the military power of the United States and Israel directly, but to ensure that any conflict would be costly, prolonged, and uncertain. 

The conflict demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of Iran’s approach. While Tehran remained at a conventional military disadvantage, its preparations enabled it to preserve key capabilities, maintain resistance, and avoid political collapse. The ability to survive sustained military pressure and continue retaliatory operations reflected years of deliberate preparation. 

In my opinion, the biggest lesson from this conflict is that military strength alone does not determine the outcome of modern wars. Resilience, adaptability, economic leverage, regional partnerships, and technological innovation have become equally important. Iran understood this reality and structured its preparations accordingly. 

As tensions continue to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, Iran’s experience will likely influence military planning across the region. Regardless of whether Iran’s strategy is viewed as defensive or expansionist, its long-term military preparations clearly influenced the course of the conflict. The war demonstrated that even when facing stronger adversaries, a state that has prepared patiently and strategically can remain a significant actor in regional and international affairs. 

By : by Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

A nation that has been discussed repeatedly during negotiations in the Middle East is Iran. They have created a vast infrastructure of Allied Militias across the region including Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Gaza. Collectively, these groups are referred to as the “Axis of Resistance” by various media organizations. At first glance, it may appear as though Iran has a very dominant position within the Middle East; however, recent developments indicate that Iran’s grip on the area is not complete nor as strong as it once seemed. This paper focuses on understanding how Iran established its influence within the Middle East so that we can analysewhether Iran truly has control over the region today. 

How Did Iran Build its Influence? 

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has been trying to increase its influence throughout the Middle East and develop its power by exporting its ideology to as many other Muslim nations as possible to reduce the amount of influence the United States and Israel have in the region. To do this, the Iranian regime has created and supported armed proxy groups throughout the region that can advance Iranian interests and fight on Iran’s behalf without engaging in conventional warfare. The largest proxy organization supported by Iran is Hezbollah, a Lebanese organization formed in 1982, which has grown into an extremely powerful military organization with an estimated 150,000 rockets/missiles and thousands of trained fighters.  

The Iranian regime has been able to establish relationships with Shia militia groups in Iraq post-2003, when the US-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein and created a power vacuum that Iran quickly filled. Many of these groups have been formed and managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian military that manages and funds proxy groups globally. Iran reportedly spends $1-2 billion annually supporting these groups. 

Iran’s Reach: From Lebanon to Yemen 

 Iran has a considerable amount of influence in Yemen-through the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) who seized control of Yemen’s capital (Sanaa) and started a civil war there in 2014. Iran began to supply the Houthis with weaponry and military training, and because of Iranian assistance and training over time the Houthis demonstrated their growing capabilities by launching missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia and subsequentlyachieving long-range accuracy against Israeli targets.  

After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Houthis began to attack vessels in the Red Sea (a vital global shipping lane) disrupting international trade and forcing ships to reroute around Africa with the potential to cripple the global economy. Additionally, after January 2024, the US and UK conducted a series of air strikes against the Houthis, which included an air campaign (Operation Rough Rider) that comprised approximately 1,100 strike missions conducted in 2025. However, despite these operations the Houthis continued their conflict demonstrating how heavily Iran has invested in developing this militant group over many years. 

Recent Setbacks for Iran 

The years between late 2023 and 2025, were a significant period of decline for Iran, and thus Iran’s strength in the region suffered greatly from this period. Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria at the time, was ousted from power in December 2024, which would be the biggest blow to Iran to date. Syria was considered one of Iran’s most important allies and was the main route for Iran to send arms and fighters to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Once Assad was no longer in power, the new Syrian government would not allow Iranian citizens to enter Syria and would not permit shipments of Iranian weapons to be sent into Syria. A leader of the Syrian opposition said that the fall of Assad would delay Iran’s regional plans by over 40 years. 

In addition to losing its major ally and dispensing with the ability to send arms and fighters to its main ally in the region, Hezbollah, Iran also suffered a significant loss in Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel in 2024. In September 2024, Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader for many years, which was a huge loss for the organization. By April 2025, Hezbollah would have given up 190 of its 265 military positions in southern Lebanon to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which was a significant retreat for an organization that had been viewed as one of the most powerful non-state armed forces in the world. 

Iran Itself Came Under Attack 

One of the most shocking things was the fact that attacks on Iran were really something that one wouldn’t be able to guess. In July 2024, for example, Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This was humiliating to Iran. Showed clearly that even the capital of Iran was not safe from being attacked. In June 2025, Israel attacked Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile facilities with air strikes that were fired from outside of Iran. After this, in April and October of 2024, Iran launched large scale missile and drone attacks against Israel; however, the majority of these were intercepted and did not do nearly as much damage to Israel as had been anticipated. This demonstrated that although Iran has considerable military strength, it also has many weaknesses. 

So, Is the Middle East in Iran’s Grip? 

There are a lot of things to consider when it comes to Iran’s influence in the Middle East, so it may not be easy to answer whether Iran has total control of the region. From one perspective, Iran has accomplished something extraordinary: despite being a heavily financially sanctioned country, it was able to build and maintain influence outside of its own borders across numerous countries with very low investments in proxy organizations. No other country has accomplished over time anything like the construction and maintenance of an entire country’s influence spread across five countries/territories. Iran has continued to have active allies in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and it has attempted to rebuild its influence in areas where it has had difficulty or lost its ability to continue its support for its proxy organizations. 

From the other side, recent events during 2024 and 2025, demonstrate that Iranian control over the Middle East is not absolute. Syria was lost as a supporting ally and supply route, Hezbollah was weakened, Hamas was devastated in Gaza as an indirect result of an Israeli attack on Iranian territory, and in July 2025, Iranian military support in the form of a large shipment of approximately 750 tons of deadly weapons to Houthi forces was intercepted demonstrating the pressure there are on Iran’s logistical supply chains as well. 

Conclusion 

The last several decades, Iran has undoubtedly demonstrated its importance as a major actor in the Middle East. By using a strategy of supporting allied militias, Iran has been able to project its power into regions far outside its borders. Many recent events have revealed the limitations of this influence. Iran’s network is being challenged on multiple fronts simultaneously, and the setbacks of 2024 and 2025 have been profoundly significant; whereas the Middle East cannot yet be said to be completely under Iran’s control, Iran has ensured that no matter what happens next in the region, it will remain an essential and unavoidable player. 

By: Nivriti Rathi, Research Analyst, GSDN

The world’s biggest green energy players are betting on India. In the renewable energy sector, smart capital is driven by three key factors: scale, long-term demand, and a stable policy environment. Few countries globally offer this powerful combination at the scale India does today. That is precisely why India is starting to feature prominently on the radar of global green energy players. In a developing country like India, it has become vital to be self-reliant in fields like renewable energy. Renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar, emit little to no greenhouse gases, are readily available and in most cases cheaper than coal or oil. Self-sufficient countries benefit from economic stability, enhanced national security, environmental sustainability, and a higher quality of life. This has led to the implementation of transformative government green energy schemes across this South Asian country.

Since 2000, India has been responsible for more than 10% of the increase in global energy demand. On a per capita basis, energy demand in India has grown by more than 60%. By 2030, India’s reliance on energy imports is predicted to exceed 53 percent of total energy consumption. An increasing proportion of domestic generation of green energy in India’s energy mix will lessen the country’s reliance on fossil fuels and also lower the country’s import bill.

India, with a population of 1.4 billion and a fast-growing economy, has seen its energy demand increasing rapidly as the country continues to urbanize and the manufacturing sector develops. This growing demand is met through various energy sources, with coal set to remain the largest source of energy supply. India also continues to develop the institutional framework needed to attract the investment required to satisfy this growing energy need.

Electricity security has improved through the creation of one national power system and major investments in clean energy. India is now working on integrating higher shares of variable renewable energy into the energy mix. For the period 2016-2018, the share of solar PV and wind doubled in the electricity generation mix from 4% to 8%. Energy efficiency increases have enabled the avoidance of an additional 15% of energy demand and 300 MtCO2 emissions over the period 2000-2018. India has also been prioritizing access to electricity and clean cooking. Progress in both have been remarkable: 700 million people gained access to electricity since 2000, and 80 million new LPG connections for clean cooking were created.

The scale of India’s renewable energy expansion over the past 15 years is substantial. Total installed capacity grew from 17GW in 2010 to 190 gigawatt by 2025, a compound annual growth rate of nearly 18%. Solar power has dominated this effort, growing almost 30-fold over a decade. Solar energy now accounts for 57% of India’s grid-interactive renewable power. Wind energy has also expanded significantly, reaching 47 gigawatt last year. While solar power has higher installed capacity, the wind sector has developed a more self-sufficient domestic supply chain. India has built a globally competitive wind manufacturing base, meeting 70-80% of its domestic equipment needs and even exporting components to Europe and the United States. When it comes to harnessing the power of wind, India has already moved from being a buyer of technology to a builder of technology. The clearest sign of the country’s early momentum is the progress made on its Paris Agreement commitments. Having pledged to reach 40% non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030, India reached its target in 2021, nine years ahead of schedule. This is a huge achievement for a country of 1.4 billion people, still industrialising at speed, and facing the kind of growth in energy demand that most developed nations have never had to manage.

According to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, the installed renewable energy capacity as on June 30, 2026 is 162152.00 megawatt for solar energy and 57443.39 megawatt for wind energy. Including this and other energy sectors, the total renewable energy capacity sums up to 288589.39 megawatts.

India combines the key ingredients that global investors seek — scale, demand, and clear policy direction. As one of the world’s fastest-growing energy markets, India’s renewable energy investments are driven not only by environmental goals but also by the fundamental need to meet rising energy demand sustainably. The government has laid out an ambitious clean energy roadmap. To support this, several initiatives are already in place:

1. 1. The National Green Hydrogen Mission, launched in 2023, aims to make India a global hub for hydrogen production. It targets an annual production of 5 MMT of green hydrogen by 2030. The mission has an outlay of over $2053.38 million. to facilitate the production, distribution, utilisation and export of hydrogen globally. It positions India to achieve a $8 billion green hydrogen market by 2030 and $340 billion by 2050. The SIGHT program (Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition) offers financial incentives for manufacturing electrolysers and producing green hydrogen.
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3. 2. The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme has been launched to promote the manufacturing of solar modules and batteries. Under the scheme, the government launched the National Programme on High Efficiency Solar PV Modules to promote solar PV manufacturing in India with an outlay of over $468 million. Under the scheme, 11 companies have been allocated the total domestic solar PV module manufacturing capacity of 39,600 MW.

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• 3. To further promote green energy-related manufacturing initiatives, the government is allowing 100% FDI in renewable energy within India under the automatic route, further helping global investors and enterprises. Thanks to a liberalised FDI regime, foreign investment in non-conventional energy sources has been increasing year-on-year, reaching $12.67 Bn as on March 31, 2025.
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• 4. India is strengthening its position through key international collaborations, which began with the launch of the International Solar Alliance, in partnership with France. The European Union (EU) remains one of India’s closest partners in this space. The third phase of the India-EU Clean Energy and Climate Partnership is already underway, focusing on enhancing green hydrogen production — a critical component of the clean energy transition. Through the India-Australia Renewable Energy Partnership, the countries will collaborate on a range of renewable energy-related areas, including green hydrogen, solar photovoltaics, capacity building, and more. India is also a founding member of the Global Biofuel Alliance with the US, UAE and Brazil.

This policy stability, combined with a growing domestic energy market and export opportunities, is transforming India into a dependable destination for long-term green energy investment.

India is also dedicating energy projects across the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat. The two western Indian states continue to lead India’s solar expansion initiatives. Through projects like the Bhadla solar park with a capacity of over 2,000 MW, India continues to demonstrate its dedication to renewable energy initiatives. The upcoming Khadva Solar Park, being developed in collaboration with Adani Power, is already operational and expected to be the world’s largest solar energy project after completion. Projects like these not only increase renewable generation but also present clear investment opportunities in associated infrastructure and services. Moreover, the government is developing Ladakh as a strategic renewable energy corridor, which includes setting up 13 GW of renewable power and a 12,000 MWh Battery Energy Storage System (BESS). The project is anticipated to be completed by FY 2029-30. The region’s ambitious solar and transmission projects aim to supply clean power across the northern grid, supported by investments from central and state governments.

In a press conference dated April 8, 2026, Union Minister for New and Renewable Energy and Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Shri Pralhad Joshi stated that India ranks third globally in Renewable Energy Installed Capacity, according to the Renewable Energy Statistics 2026. India achieved a total non-fossil capacity addition of 55.3 GW during FY 2025–26. The Minister also highlighted that in July 2025, India reached its highest-ever renewable energy share in electricity generation. The renewables met 51.5% of the country’s total electricity demand of 203 GW. He also said that a total of 283.46 GW of capacity from non-fossil fuel sources has been installed in the country as on 31.03.2026. Shri Joshi said India’s total power generation during 2025-26 (up to March 2026) reached 1,845.921 BU. The share of non-fossil fuels in total generation reached 29.2% in 2025-26 (538.97 BU). So far, a total of 283.46 GW of capacity from non-fossil fuel sources has been installed in the country as on 31.03.2026. This includes 274.68 GW Renewable Energy (150.26 GW Solar Power, 56.09 GW Wind Power, 11.75 GW Bio Energy, 5.17 GW Small Hydro Power, 51.41 GW Large Hydro Power) and 8.78 GW Nuclear Power capacity.

However, geopolitical shocks, from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and West Asian tensions to Indonesia’s coal export ban, have exposed how fragile global energy supply chains remain. For India, the world’s third-largest energy consumer, these disruptions compound an already acute domestic challenge: the country imports 88 per cent of its crude oil, nearly 48 per cent of its natural gas, and about 26 per cent of its coal, with over 93 per cent of its primary energy supply still met by fossil fuels. As India pursues its goal of energy independence, this issue briefly assesses how secure the country’s coal, oil, and gas supply chains truly are, using a three-pillar framework of accessibility, reliability, and affordability. Accessibility is threatened by supply-chain concentration in geopolitically volatile regions such as Russia and the Middle East, and exposure to logistical chokepoints. Reliability is compromised by the deteriorating quality of domestic coal and the lack of strategic reserves for oil and gas. Affordability is affected by rising domestic extraction costs and global price volatility, which significantly increase India’s import bill and fiscal deficit. The average gross calorific value (GCV) of domestic non-coking coal fell from about 4,480 kcal/kg in 2014-15 to 4,150 kcal/kg in 2023-24, reflecting growing dependence on shallow, high-ash seams. Over the same period, the stripping ratio rose from 2.23 to 2.93. India’s coal accessibility challenge is not one of reserve scarcity but of quality mismatch, allocation constraints, and concentrated external dependence. Over 87 per cent of India’s crude oil consumption is met through imports, up from 70 per cent in the early 2000s. Output from mature basins such as Mumbai High and Assam is in natural decline. India’s post-2022 shift to Russian crude improved affordability, with cumulative savings of USD 12.6 billion, but the gain depends on the continuation of Western sanctions and available shipping and insurance channels. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for India’s LNG imports stood at 2,381 in 2024-25, notably higher than the crude oil import HHI of 1,988. Qatar alone accounts for 41 per cent of India’s LNG imports, followed by the US (19 per cent) and the UAE (13 per cent). Despite easing spot prices since the 2022 crisis, price-sensitive sectors remain exposed to volatile global markets. Unlike fossil fuels, renewable energy relies on domestic resources that are not subject to geopolitical blockades. Once capacity is installed, RE sources are perennially accessible and not dependent on continuous fuel imports. However, the transition introduces new vulnerabilities in critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, rare earths) and manufacturing inputs (polysilicon, semiconductors), requiring deliberate diversification.

While India has boldly committed to achieving net zero by 2070, 500 gigawatts (GW) of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030, and 50% of its energy from renewable sources by the same year, the credibility of these aims is the question. In the initial stage of its shift, India has built renewable energy capacity at a startlingly quick pace, surpassing almost everyone’s expectations. However, reaching energy self-sufficiency in the second phase is more difficult. It necessitates resolving a technological dependency issue that is not apparent from the installation numbers alone.

India’s ability to achieve that will impact not only its climate objectives but also the course of its future economic aspirations.

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The very first foreign visit of an incoming chief executive has a certain level of political significance, especially within the South Asia region whose politics is governed by its complex history and interdependencies. When Mr Tarique Rahman became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh after winning the parliamentary elections in February 2026, it was widely anticipated that his very first foreign tour would be according to the protocol: he would pay his first state visit to New Delhi in order to reinforce the special relationship that Bangladesh and India share. In contrast, Rahman chose Kuala Lumpur and Beijing as the destination for his very first foreign tour that took place from June 21st to June 26th, 2026. The fact that he decided not to follow the diplomatic tradition raises many questions regarding Bangladesh’s foreign policy strategy and the potential impact on India, which has been Bangladesh’s closest ally of Bangladesh before. This paper will explore the economic and political significance of this trip and try to interpret the message it gives to New Delhi. 

The Economic Imperative: Malaysia and China as Strategic Partners 

The itinerary of Prime Minister Rahman reflected the government’s pragmatic approach, prioritizing economic accomplishments over diplomacy. The first stop in Kuala Lumpur, from June 21 to June 22, was for discussions on labour migration and economic partnership. There are close to one million Bangladeshi migrants who are working in Malaysia, and they form almost one-third of the total number of foreigners working in the country. It is important to note that remittances received by Bangladesh from its citizens working in Malaysia form an essential part of its foreign currency. The discussions involved the recruitment process, workers’ well-being, a framework for free trade agreements, and cooperation in the new fields such as semiconductors, halal industry, and digital industry. The China leg, from June 22 to June 26, had much more economic cloutthan the other two countries combined. The memorandum of understanding that Bangladesh entered with China was seventeen in number, with an action plan for deepening relations. The most important result of this trip was the official endorsement of the US340 million Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chittagong, supported by US$ 200 million of concessional loans from China, estimated to create about 100,000 jobs and to receive foreign direct investment worth more than US$ 500 million during its first phase. Talks on the Teesta River management, which involved dredging and building embankments, were another topic of discussion. This is because the Teesta is the only one among fifty-four cross-border rivers where Bangladesh and India failed to come to an agreement, and the Chinese move into this strategic vacuum has riled India. The Foreign Minister, while answering questions on money lending, clarified that no leader goes for diplomacy abroad with a “begging bowl.” This visit is meant to define “the direction, content, calibre, extent, and depth of the relationship between the two countries.” On returning from abroad, the Prime Minister himself said that he went there under the policy of “Bangladesh First” and all benefits accrued to the people of Bangladesh who had entrusted him with the job of looking after their interests. 

The Diplomatic Signal: Third-Way Diplomacy and Strategic Autonomy  

The ordering of the visit to Malaysia first, followed by China, while India is noticeably missing from the schedule, is part of the strategy of “third-way diplomacy” as described by some experts. Traditionally, a newly elected president in Dhaka had to choose between two options: either to appease India or to please China. In choosing the third option of going to Malaysia first, Rahman decided on neutrality. However, the real test of the new approach will be the priority given to travelling to Beijing rather than New Delhi. The itinerary chosen by Rahman has raised eyebrows among Indian commentators and security experts due to the concern that he is visiting China before visiting India. In the highly sensitive environment of South Asian geopolitics, such a scheduling can be interpreted very conveniently as a clear tilt towards Beijing. Adding to these fears are recent problems in the bilateral relations of the two countries. The relationship between Bangladesh and India worsened significantly after the revolt on August 5, 2024, which resulted in the removal from power of the former Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who is now residing in India. The diplomatic protests related to the arrest of a Bangladeshi advisor at the New Delhi airport, accusations against each other concerning border issues and “push-in” of migrants, and the politically charged issue of Sheikh Hasina residing in India have added strains to the relationship. But to think of Rahman’s tour as the final breakaway from India is too simplistic. Geography makes it imperative for India to be an essential partner for Bangladesh in matters of security cooperation, river-water distribution, and regional commerce. According to a Bangladeshi minister who chose to remain anonymous while speaking to The Wire, “India is a vital partner”, and “Malaysia invites first, China second, and India third” was just pragmatic thinking. Humaiun Kobir, Adviser to Foreign Affairs, said that “a trip to India will happen when the temperature cools down, and a conducive atmosphere prevails.” In fact, taking Malaysia into account as a buffer destination was calculated perfectly well to ease India’s fears, as this shows that Dhaka values neutrality in terms of economy prior to dealing with big players in the region. As noted by Asif Shahan, Professor of Development Studies at the University of Dhaka, “The visits are as economically as they are diplomatic. China is important for investment, whereas Malaysia is vital for foreign employment.”  

Implications for India: A Strategic Recalibration 

The relevance of Rahman’s visit to India for the country goes beyond the immediate two-state relationship. It is a part of the overall regional trend; wherein nearby states have tried to alter their foreign policy orientation away from Indian hegemony. As soon as Nepal became democratic in 2008, its Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal chose to make his first significant international visit to China. In 2017, the Maldivian President, Abdulla Yameen, visited China before visiting India. The most recent example includes the Maldivian President, Mohammed Muizzu, who initiated the “India Out” movement and focused on developing relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh’s new government needs to prove its independence in conducting foreign policy due to the political change. As an analyst notes, Rahman has to consider the possibility of not going to India because of the necessity to prolong his tenure and save himself from political problems, since people of Bangladesh still believe that the presence of Hasina in Delhi is a significant barrier for relations between the countries. Rahman chose to go through Kuala Lumpur and Beijing, trying to show that Bangladesh would not let other countries define its foreign policy by their concerns. It is worth mentioning that the Chinese dimension plays a crucial role. The signing of seventeen instruments and the resuming of discussions about Teesta projects show that Beijing is going to take the positions of strategic vacuums that appear after diplomatic mistakes made by India. Bangladesh is going to join the Global Development Initiative of China, which implies not only project cooperation but also political and economic ones. For India, the concern of China getting access to the regions close to the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow neck connecting India’s northeast part with the country, is crucial.  

Conclusion  

The foreign journey of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to Malaysia and China in June 2026 is one of the major deviations from the typical diplomatic conduct of Bangladesh. The visit came about owing to immediate economic concerns: access to the labour market in Malaysia, investments, and cooperation in technology in China. However, the diplomatic significance of the visit cannot be underestimated either. Rahman deliberately avoided making the first visit to India and declared a “Bangladesh First” doctrine with an attempt to shift his country away from the role of a mere playing field of rivalry between regional powers to an independent player in the international political arena able to balance different positions. This shift causes certain worries in India but cannot be seen as a complete break with the neighboring state because of the geographical, security and historical links between the countries. It is rather a more fragmented and multi-aligned policy of Bangladesh in international relations aimed at multiplying its options. 

By : Shaurya Pandey, Research Analyst, GSDN

On June 22, 2026, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer stood outside 10 Downing Street and announced his resignation as leader of the Labour Party and as head of government. The announcement came less than two years after Labour’s landmark landslide election victory in July 2024, which had ended nearly fifteen years of Conservative Party governance. Starmer’s departure, shaped by internal party revolt, plummeting approval ratings, and the dramatic electoral resurgence of the far-right Reform UK party, marks another turbulent chapter in Britain’s increasingly volatile political landscape. With his exit, the UK is now preparing for its seventh prime minister in a decade a statistic that underlines the deep structural difficulties confronting any leader who occupies the office of the Prime Minister. 

Background: A Landslide Victory and a Swift Decline 

When Keir Starmer led Labour to a sweeping general election victory in July 2024, the expectation was one of transformational governance and long-overdue political stability. After years of turbulence under Boris Johnson, Liz Truss (whose 50-day premiership remains the shortest in British history), and Rishi Sunak, the British public delivered an emphatic verdict at the ballot box in favor of Labour. The scale of that majority one of the largest in modern British history should, in theory, have provided ample room for a bold programme of government reform. 

Yet, from almost the very beginning, Starmer’s administration found it difficult to translate parliamentary dominance into meaningful public confidence. His government inherited a strained fiscal position, an underfunded National Health Service (NHS), significant pressure on immigration numbers, energy cost instability, and a deeply polarized electorate. Public satisfaction with the government’s handling of these areas deteriorated rapidly. By September 2024, polling by YouGov indicated that 67% of respondents held negative views of Labour’s immigration policies, while 64% considered the NHS to be poorly managed under the government. By November 2025, Starmer’s net approval rating had plunged to an average of 46%, placing him among the most unpopular prime ministers in modern British history. 

The Unravelling: Internal Rebellion and Ministerial Exits 

The formal unravelling of Starmer’s authority accelerated dramatically in May 2026. Labour’s performance in the May 2026 local elections was, by almost any measure, disastrous. The far-right populist party Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage, won big, seizing council seats that Labour had hoped to defend. The results triggered a wave of pressure from Labour’s parliamentary party urging Starmer to step aside in the national interest. 

The cascade of ministerial resignations that followed signaled that Starmer’s authority within his own cabinet had fundamentally collapsed. On May 14, 2026, Health Secretary Wes Streeting resigned, publicly stating that it was “clear that [Starmer] will not lead the Labour Party into the next general election.” Safeguarding Minister Jess Phillips also departed, declaring that “deeds, not words, are what matter.” The Defence Investment Plan (DIP) triggered a further crisis when, on June 11, 2026, Defence Secretary John Healey resigned followed by Armed Forces Minister Al Carns and Parliamentary Private Secretary Pamela Nash citing Starmer’s failure to commit sufficient resources to defence in a period of acute global insecurity. The loss of the two senior-most defence officials in a single day sent shockwaves through Westminster. 

Adding to the instability, the appointment of Peter Mandelson as British Ambassador to the United States in December 2024 intended to strengthen the UK’s relationship with the incoming administration of US President Donald Trump backfired dramatically when, in September 2025, the full extent of Mandelson’s relationship with convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein became public following the release of the Epstein files. Starmer dismissed Mandelson, but the episode damaged the government’s credibility. Starmer’s Chief of Staff and close ally Morgan McSweeney accepted responsibility and resigned in February 2026. 

The Makerfield By-Election: The Final Trigger 

The defining blow to Starmer’s grip on power came from an unusual constitutional manoeuvre. In a coordinated strategy to install Andy Burnham the popular and widely respected Mayor of Greater Manchester as a credible leadership challenger, Labour MP Josh Simons resigned his Makerfield parliamentary seat on May 14, 2026, specifically to create a vacancy through which Burnham could enter Parliament and thereby become eligible to contest the party leadership. 

The resulting by-election, held on June 18, 2026, was the first such event since the 1965 Leyton by-election to be called specifically to provide a parliamentary seat for a person not currently in the legislature. Burnham won the contest with nearly 25,000 votes and a majority exceeding 9,200 for a performance that surpassed the expectations of most opinion polls, which had predicted a narrower margin. The fact that Burnham defeated a strong Reform UK challenge in an area where Reform had recently swept all local council seats made his victory particularly potent. As Burnham declared in his victory speech, “everyone knows that politics isn’t working,” adding that his win could be a “turning point” a final chance for Labour to renew itself and reconnect with the public. 

The following Monday, June 22, 2026, the political arithmetic had become undeniable. Starmer informed His Majesty King Charles III of his decision. Standing outside Downing Street, Starmer said: “The question my party is asking now is whether I am best placed to lead us into the next general election. I have heard the answer of my parliamentary party to that question, and I accept that answer with good grace.” 

The Succession: Andy Burnham and the Road Ahead 

With Starmer announcing his intention to remain as caretaker Prime Minister until a successor is chosen, a leadership timetable was established. Nominations for the Labour leadership contest are set to open on July 9 and close by the summer recess of July 16, 2026, ensuring that a new leader is in place before Parliament returns in September. Burnham immediately confirmed his candidacy, and the contest quickly took on the character of a near-coronation. Wes Streeting, who had previously been Burnham’s most formidable potential rival, announced on the same day as Starmer’s resignation that he would instead endorse Burnham for a decision that significantly narrowed the field. The Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, projected that Burnham would take office as Prime Minister on approximately July 18 or 19, 2026. 

Burnham brings a distinctive political identity to the contest. Regarded as a unifying figure who can speak to Labour’s traditional working-class base while appealing to urban progressives, he had previously sought the Labour leadership in 2010 and again in 2015. His record in Greater Manchester overseeing housing investment, public transport reform, and integrated health and social care gave him credibility as a pragmatic executive rather than a purely ideological figure. His Makerfield by-election triumph, achieved against a Reform UK tide in a region susceptible to populist right-wing messaging, positioned him as the candidate best equipped to recapture the voters Labour was hemorrhaging to Farage’s movement. 

Structural Crisis: Britain’s Leadership Instability 

Starmer’s resignation must be situated within the broader pattern of profound leadership instability that has characterized British governance in recent years. Since 2016, the United Kingdom has now witnessed seven prime ministers in approximately ten years. This phenomenon wholly without precedent in modern British democratic history raises urgent questions about whether the difficulties confronting successive prime ministers are primarily personal and political failures, or whether they reflect something deeper and more structural in British public life. 

Analysts point to several systemic pressures. The protracted political and economic aftermath of Brexit, which the UK formally left the European Union (EU) on January 31, 2020, continues to distort trade relationships, labour markets, and fiscal planning. The COVID-19 pandemic imposed fiscal costs and structural damage from which the economy has not fully recovered. Successive governments have confronted energy price shocks exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine war beginning in February 2022 inflation spikes, and chronic underfunding of public services. The NHS represents a perennial political vulnerability, with waiting lists remaining at historically high levels despite record spending commitments. 

Reform UK’s rapid rise is itself partly a symptom of this structural disillusionment. Opinion polling following the May 2026 local elections found that in England, only 5% of those who had voted Labour in the 2024 general election had switched to Reform, while 32% had moved to the Greens or the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems). This data suggests that Labour’s primary challenge is not simply the threat from the populist right, but a broader fragmentation of its electoral coalition with centrist and progressive voters also drifting away. 

Economic and Market Implications 

Starmer’s resignation triggered measured concern in financial markets, though the initial reaction was notably restrained. This relative calm was partly a function of the orderly transition process Starmer had outlined, and partly a reflection of the expectation that Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves who has been the anchor of the government’s fiscal credibility would be retained, at least in the short term, by any successor administration. Burnham was reported to be actively considering keeping Reeves in post, a move that would signal continuity in the UK’s fiscal framework and its adherence to rules designed to put public borrowing on a sustainable trajectory. 

Sterling remained broadly stable in currency markets in the days following the announcement, though traders noted that it remained sensitive to any campaign pledges that deviated significantly from the established fiscal rules. Gilt yields the interest rates the UK government pays to borrow were also closely watched. Market participants drew pointed comparisons with the disastrous mini-budget tabled by the Truss government in September 2022, which had triggered a gilt market crisis and the near-collapse of UK pension funds, ultimately precipitating Truss’s resignation after only 50 days in office. The institutional memory of that episode functions as a powerful constraint on any future UK government contemplating unorthodox fiscal measures. 

The independent oversight provided by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the Bank of England (BoE) has become a genuine anchor of market confidence in the UK’s fiscal and monetary frameworks. Any incoming prime minister who respected the judgements of these bodies would likely receive a more favorable market reception than one who sought to challenge their authority. Analysts at RBC Wealth Management noted that UK equity markets were ultimately more sensitive to company fundamentals than to political transitions, and that a well-managed handover of power was unlikely to materially alter the outlook for diversified investors. 

Beyond domestic politics, global economic factors particularly the gradual and fragile reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant proportion of the world’s energy supply passes were assessed as potentially more consequential for UK gilt markets in the near term than the change of government. A sustained reopening would ease energy costs and reduce inflationary pressure, lessening the need for fuel bill subsidies of the kind that had cost the Treasury significant sums during the energy crisis of 2022. 

International and Geopolitical Dimensions 

The international reaction to Starmer’s resignation was broadly muted, though significant. The United States, under President Donald Trump, had developed an increasingly difficult relationship with Starmer particularly in the context of the fallout from the Iran conflict and divergences over energy policy, with Trump publicly criticizing Starmer for “failing badly” on immigration and energy. Trump’s early commentary on the resignation, while formally polite in wishing Starmer well, was widely interpreted as reflecting a degree of satisfaction at the departure of a leader with whom his administration had frequently clashed. 

For the UK’s relationship with the European Union, the leadership transition presents both risks and opportunities. Starmer had cautiously sought to repair some of the trading and diplomatic frictions that had accumulated since Brexit, though his government had explicitly ruled out rejoining the EU’s single market or customs union. An incoming Burnham government would face pressure from within Labour’s progressive wing to adopt a more openly cooperative posture towards Brussels, though the domestic political constraints given Reform UK’s nativist positioning would counsel against any move that could be framed as a return to EU integration. 

Conclusion: Systemic Lessons and the Way Forward 

The resignation of Sir Keir Starmer on June 22, 2026, is more than a personal political failure; it reflects the profound difficulty of governing Britain in an era of fragmented public trust, accelerating geopolitical instability, and structural economic strain. Starmer entered office with genuine democratic authority and a historically large parliamentary majority. His departure in less than two years underscores the degree to which the machinery of popular consent has become extraordinarily difficult to maintain. 

For Andy Burnham, or whoever ultimately leads the Labour Party into the next general election now expected no later than 2028 the structural challenges are unchanged. Reform UK’s populist insurgency will not abate simply because a more charismatic personality occupies Downing Street. The NHS, housing affordability, energy costs, and the fiscal constraints imposed by decades of underinvestment will demand difficult trade-offs that any government must make. The credibility of independent institutions in the OBR, the BoE, and the Civil Service remains the most important buffer against the kind of market shocks that have punished previousgovernments that overreached. 

Britain’s political crisis, in other words, is not simply one of leadership. It is one of governance of the capacity of democratic institutions to translate complex, contested mandates into durable, credible policy. Until that deeper challenge is addressed, the revolving door at 10 Downing Street is unlikely to stop turning anytime soon.