By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The boundary dispute between China and India is one of the longest unresolved territorial disagreements in the world. Stretching across nearly 2,100 miles of the Himalayan frontier, the disputed boundary has shaped the relationship between the two most populous nations on earth for more than seven decades. The disagreement produced one full-scale war in 1962, a deadly military clash in the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, and several years of tense troop mobilization along the Line of Actual Control, commonly referred to as the LAC. At the same time, the two countries have also periodically negotiated disengagement agreements, resumed high-level political contact, and expanded trade to record levels. This apparent contradiction, tension along the frontier on one hand and deepening economic interdependence on the other, raises an important question. Can China and India ever truly resolve their border disputes, or are they destined to manage an uneasy and indefinite coexistence along a contested frontier? This article examines the historical origins of the dispute, the key flashpoints that have defined it, the diplomatic efforts undertaken so far, and the structural obstacles and opportunities that will determine whether a final settlement is achievable. 

Historical Roots of the Boundary Dispute 

The India-China boundary was never formally demarcated during the colonial period, leaving behind a legacy of competing claims once both countries emerged as modern nation states. The eastern sector of the boundary, covering the present-day Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, is largely defined by the McMahon Line, a boundary drawn during the Simla Convention of 1914 between British India and Tibet. China has consistently refused to recognise the McMahon Line, arguing that Tibet did not possess the sovereign authority to conclude such an agreement independently. The western sector, covering the Aksai Chin plateau, presents a different set of complications. Aksai Chin is administered by China as part of its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but India claims it as part of the union territory of Ladakh. The middle sector, running through the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, is comparatively less contentious but still lacks a mutually agreed boundary alignment. Because no treaty ever formally demarcated the frontier across its entire length, both countries have relied on the concept of the Line of Actual Control, an operational ceasefire line rather than a legally settled international boundary, to manage day-to-day military presence. 

The 1962 War and Its Enduring Legacy 

Tensions between the two newly independent Asian giants escalated through the 1950s as China consolidated control over Tibet and built a strategic road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to Tibet, a project India only discovered after its completion. Diplomatic protests failed to resolve the disagreement, and on October 20, 1962, Chinese forces launched a coordinated offensive across both the eastern and western sectors of the disputed boundary. The war lasted approximately one month and ended in a decisive military setback for India. China declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962, and withdrew its forces to positions behind what later came to be recognized as the Line of Actual Control. The war left a deep imprint on Indian strategic thinking and created a residue of mistrust that continues to influence bilateral relations today. It also hardened each side’s territorial claims, making any subsequent settlement politically difficult, since conceding territory after a military defeat carries a heavy domestic political cost for Indian leaders, while China has shown little inclination to revisit an outcome it regards as settled in its favor. 

Key Friction Points Along the Frontier 

Beyond the broad sectoral disagreements, several specific locations have repeatedly triggered military standoffs. The Doklam plateau, a tri-junction area claimed by both China and Bhutan, became the site of a seventy-three-day standoff between Indian and Chinese troops beginning in June 2017, after India intervened to stop Chinese road construction that New Delhi viewed as a threat to a strategically vital corridor connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. The Depsang Plains and the Demchok sector in eastern Ladakh remained points of friction for years after the 2020 crisis, with Chinese patrols restricting Indian access to traditional patrolling points. Pangong Tso, a glacial lake straddling the Line of Actual Control, was the site of physical clashes between soldiers in 2020 before both sides withdrew heavy equipment from its northern and southern banks. More recently, in January 2026, China revived its historical claim over the Shaksgam Valley, a region in the Jammu and Kashmir union territory that India considers its sovereign territory but which has been under Chinese control since Pakistan ceded it under a bilateral agreement signed in 1963. India has consistently rejected the 1963 cession as illegal and void, and the renewed Chinese assertion added a fresh layer of complexity to an already crowded set of territorial disagreements. 

The Galwan Valley Clash and the 2020 Standoff 

The most crisis in the bilateral relationship since 1962 began in early May 2020, when Indian and Chinese troops clashed at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The confrontation escalated dramatically on June 15, 2020, when a violent hand-to-hand clash in the Galwan Valley resulted in the deaths of twenty Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties, later acknowledged by Beijing to be four soldiers. It was the first fatal clash on the border in forty-five years and triggered a massive mobilization of troops, artillery, and air assets by both sides along the frontier. The crisis fundamentally altered the trajectory of the relationship. India suspended several bilateral initiatives, banned numerous Chinese mobile applications on security grounds, and tightened scrutiny of Chinese investment proposals. Both governments authorized their military commanders to hold a series of corps commander level talks, beginning shortly after the clash and continuing years afterward, aimed at achieving disengagement at multiple friction points. Progress was slow and uneven, with disengagement completed at some locations, such as the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso in February 2021 and at Gogra-Hot Springs in September 2022, while other points, particularly Depsang and Demchok, remained unresolved for an extended period. 

The Long Road to Disengagement and Diplomatic Reset 

A significant breakthrough came in October 2024, when India and China finally reached a disengagement agreement covering the Depsang and Demchok sectors, the last two remaining friction points from the 2020 standoff. The agreement restored patrolling arrangements that existed prior to the crisis, allowing troops from both sides to patrol up to previously agreed patrolling points. Days after this agreement was finalized, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held bilateral talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024, marking the first formal meeting between the two leaders in five years. The two leaders agreed to direct their special representatives, a mechanism led on the Indian side by the National Security Advisor, to resume dialogue aimed at achieving a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Momentum continued to build through 2025. In August 2025, Modi travelled to the Chinese city of Tianjin to attend the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional grouping that includes both countries, where he held extensive talks with Xi Jinping. During the 2025 round of the Special Representatives dialogue, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi agreed to establish an expert group tasked with exploring the possibility of achieving what has been described as an early harvest, meaning a limited but concrete agreement on boundary delimitation in less complicated sectors of the frontier, even while the broader dispute remains unresolved. 

This diplomatic momentum was carried into 2026. On May 27, 2026, India and China held the thirty-fifth round of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, an institutional platform commonly known by the abbreviation WMCC that brings together diplomats from both countries to discuss border management issues, in Beijing. The talks were described by the Ministry of External Affairs as constructive and forward-looking, and it marked the first high-level diplomatic engagement specifically on the border situation since July 2025. Both sides used the meeting to review progress on maintaining peace and tranquility along the frontier and agreed to undertake substantive preparations for the next round of the Special Representatives dialogue, which both governments continue to describe as the principal political mechanism for resolving the boundary question. India also used the occasion to press for an early meeting of the Expert Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers, reflecting an additional area of cooperation tied to the management of rivers that originate in Tibet and flow into Indian territory. 

Economic Interdependence as a Stabilizing Factor 

Even as troops faced the frontier, trade between the two countries continued to expand, illustrating the complex and at times contradictory nature of the relationship. According to figures cited by the Chinese ambassador to India, bilateral trade between the two countries reached a record high of US$ 155.6 billion in 2025, an increase of more than twelve percent over the previous year. China remains among India’s largest trading partners, supplying critical inputs such as electrical machinery, bulk pharmaceutical ingredients, and industrial components that Indian manufacturing depends upon heavily. At the same time, the trade relationship remains heavily skewed in China’s favor. India’s trade deficit with China reached approximately US$ 99.21 billion in the 2024-2025 financial year, the largest trade deficit India runs with any single country, and this imbalance has widened almost every year for the past two decades. This economic interdependence cuts both ways when it comes to prospects for resolving the border dispute. On one hand, the scale of trade gives both governments a strong incentive to prevent military tensions from spiraling into a broader conflict that would disrupt commerce worth over US$ 100 billion annually. On the other hand, the size and persistence of India’s trade deficit have become a political irritant, with Indian policymakers arguing that genuine normalization of ties cannot occur while the border remains militarized and the economic relationship remains so lopsided. 

Structural Obstacles That Persist 

Despite the recent diplomatic thaw, several structural obstacles continue to make a comprehensive and final settlement of the border dispute extremely difficult to achieve. The first obstacle is the sheer scale of the territorial claims involved. China claims approximately 35,000 square miles of territory that India administers, primarily in Arunachal Pradesh, which Chinese officials often refer to as South Tibet. India, in turn, claims sovereignty over Aksai Chin, an area of roughly 15,000 square miles currently under Chinese administration. Neither side has shown any indication that it is prepared to formally cede its claims over these regions, making a full and final settlement covering the entire boundary a distant prospect. The second obstacle is domestic political sensitivity. Any Indian government that appears to concede territory, even in a limited technical sense such as adjusting the alignment of the Line of Actual Control, risks fierce opposition criticism and accusations of weakness, particularly given the legacy of the 1962 war. Chinese leadership similarly faces internal pressure to avoid appearing to make concessions on territorial sovereignty, a politically sensitive issue tied closely to nationalist sentiment. The third obstacle is the absence of a mutually agreed common understanding of where the Line of Actual Control actually runs. Unlike a demarcated international boundary, the LAC exists largely as a set of overlapping perceptions, and the two militaries frequently disagree over the precise location of patrolling points, creating recurring opportunities for friction even in the absence of any deliberate provocation. The fourth obstacle is the broader strategic competition between the two countries, which extends well beyond the border itself into contested spheres of influence across South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and multilateral institutions, making the boundary dispute difficult to isolate from wider geopolitical rivalry. 

The Role of External Factors 

The India-China boundary dispute cannot be understood in isolation from the broader regional and global context. China’s close strategic and military partnership with Pakistan, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a large-scale infrastructure initiative connecting Xinjiang to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, runs through territory in Gilgit-Baltistan that India claims as its own, adding a trilateral dimension to what is nominally a bilateral dispute. India’s deepening security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia through groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is viewed with suspicion in Beijing, which sees these arrangements as part of a broader strategy of containment. China’s construction of dual-use infrastructure, including villages and military facilities in disputed border areas, has similarly alarmed Indian security planners, who have responded with their own infrastructure build-up, including projects such as the Sela Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh designed to improve troop mobility and logistics along the frontier. These external dynamics mean that even a technical resolution of specific friction points along the LAC is unlikely to fully de-link the border dispute from the wider strategic rivalry between the two Asian powers. 

Possible Pathways Toward Resolution 

Notwithstanding these obstacles, several pathways could allow China and India to manage, and eventually substantially resolve, their border disagreements over time. The most realistic near-term pathway is incremental progress through confidence building measures rather than a single comprehensive settlement. This approach, sometimes described by officials as pursuing an early harvest, involves resolving less contentious and more clearly defined sections of the boundary first, such as portions of the middle sector, while leaving the more politically fraught eastern and western sectors for later negotiation. A second pathway involves strengthening existing institutional mechanisms, including the Special Representatives dialogue and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, to build sustained mutual trust through regular, predictable engagement rather than crisis-driven negotiation. A third pathway involves expanding economic and people-to-people ties as a means of creating broader constituencies within both countries that have a vested interest in stability, even if this does not directly resolve territorial claims. A fourth pathway, which remains more distant, involves formal boundary delimitation and demarcation across the entire frontier, potentially modelled on agreements China has previously reached with other neighbors, such as its 2004 boundary settlement with Russia, though the scale, historical baggage, and strategic stakes involved in the India-China case make such a comprehensive settlement considerably more difficult to achieve in the near term. Ultimately, most independent analysts and former diplomats suggest that a full and final resolution remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, and that the more realistic and achievable goal for both governments is to manage the dispute responsibly, preventing it from triggering renewed military conflict, while allowing the broader relationship to develop in parallel. 

Conclusion 

The question of whether China and India can ever resolve their border disputes does not have a simple answer. The historical depth of the disagreement, the scale of the territorial claims involved, the absence of a mutually agreed boundary line, and the weight of domestic political sensitivities on both sides make a comprehensive final settlement extremely difficult to achieve soon. At the same time, the events of the past two years, including the October 2024 disengagement agreement, the resumption of leader-level dialogue at Kazan and Tianjin, and the continued institutional engagement through mechanisms such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination in 2026, demonstrate that both countries retain a strong shared interest in preventing their disagreements from escalating into open conflict. Rising trade, now exceeding US$ 155 billion annually, further reinforces the incentive for stability. The most plausible trajectory for the coming years is therefore neither a dramatic breakthrough nor a return to open confrontation, but a continued process of careful, incremental management, punctuated by periodic disengagement agreements and confidence building measures, that gradually narrows the scope of active disagreement even as the underlying territorial claims remain formally unresolved. Whether this process eventually culminates in a full and final settlement of the boundary or simply produces a durable and peaceful modus vivendi along a still-contested frontier, will depend on the political will of leaders in both New Delhi and Beijing over the coming decades. 

By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala , Research Analyst , GSDN

India and Japan share one of the most important strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Although the two countries have different histories, cultures, and geographical locations, they are connected by shared democratic values, mutual trust, and a common vision for peace, stability, and economic prosperity. Over the last three decades, their relationship has expanded from limited economic cooperation into a comprehensive partnership covering trade, infrastructure, defence, technology, energy, education, and regional security. Today, Japan is one of India’s most trusted development partners, while India has emerged as a key strategic partner for Japan in Asia. 

The importance of this partnership has increased because of the changing global politics. China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, disruptions in global supply chains after the COVID-19 pandemic, and rapid technological competition have encouraged both countries to work more closely. India and Japan support a rules-based international order where international law is respected, sea routes remain open, and disputes are settled peacefully. Recent meetings between the leaders of the two countries in 2025 and 2026 have further strengthened cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, defence technology, and economic security. 

Historical Evolution 

The relationship between India and Japan has deep cultural roots. Their earliest connection came through Buddhism, which spread from India to Japan through East Asia more than a thousand years ago. Buddhism greatly influenced Japanese religion, philosophy, art, and architecture, creating a lasting cultural bond between the two countries. Modern diplomatic relations began in 1952 after Japan regained its sovereignty following the Second World War. India was among the first countries to establish peaceful diplomatic relations with Japan by signing a separate peace treaty. During the Cold War, however, relations remained limited because India followed a policy of non-alignment while Japan remained closely allied with the United States. The situation changed after India’s economic reforms in 1991. As India opened its economy, Japan recognized the country’s growing economic potential and increased investments in manufacturing and infrastructure. In 2000, both countries established a ‘Global Partnership’. This was upgraded to a ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 2006 and further elevated to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 2014. These developments reflected the growing political trust and expanding cooperation between the two nations. 

Economic Cooperation 

Economic cooperation remains the strongest pillar of India–Japan relations. Japan is one of India’s largest investors and one of the biggest providers of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japanese companies such as Suzuki, Toyota, Honda, Sony, Panasonic, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi have made major investments in India’s automobile, electronics, manufacturing, and technology sectors. Among these companies, Maruti Suzuki has played a particularly significant role in transforming India’s automobile industry. Japanese investment has not only created employment opportunities but has also introduced advanced technology, modern management practices, and high manufacturing standards. Japan has also contributed significantly to India’s infrastructure development. Through low-interest loans and technical assistance, it has supported landmark projects such as the Delhi Metro, the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Dedicated Freight Corridors, and metro rail projects in several Indian cities. These projects have improved connectivity, strengthened industrial growth, and boosted India’s economic development. The Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor, commonly known as the Bullet Train project, remains one of the biggest symbols of India–Japan cooperation. Built using Japan’s famous Shinkansen technology, the project reflects the high level of trust between the two countries. Although construction has faced delays because of land acquisition and administrative challenges, both governments reaffirmed during their meetings in 2025 and 2026 that the project remains a priority. Economic cooperation has recently expanded into emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, quantum technology, digital infrastructure, and critical minerals. Both countries are working together to build resilient supply chains and reduce dependence on a small number of countries for advanced technologies. During the 2026 India–Japan Annual Summit, new initiatives were announced to strengthen cooperation in these sectors, reflecting the importance of technology in future economic growth. India’s large market, skilled workforce and rapidly growing manufacturing sector complement Japan’s advanced technology, financial strength and industrial expertise. This combination has made the economic partnership stronger than ever and has laid the foundation for broader strategic cooperation. 

Defence and Security Cooperation 

Over the past decade, defence and security cooperation has become one of the most significant aspects of India–Japan relations. The changing geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific has brought the two countries closer than ever before. Both India and Japan are concerned about the growing security challenges in the region, including China’s increasing military presence, tensions in the East and South China Seas, cyber threats, and the need to protect important sea lanes through which a large portion of global trade passes. India and Japan support a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific where international law is respected and disputes are resolved peacefully. Their shared commitment to a rules-based international order has strengthened strategic trust and encouraged closer military cooperation. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises involving their navies, armies, and air forces. The Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) has become an important platform for improving coordination between their naval forces. Japan is also a permanent participant in the Malabar Naval Exercise, along with India, the United States and Australia. These exercises enhance interoperability, improve maritime security, and prepare the participating countries for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Another major milestone was the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which allows the armed forces of both countries to use each other’s military facilities for logistics, fuel, maintenance, and supplies during joint exercises and humanitarian missions. In recent years, defence cooperation has expanded further to include cyber security, space security, maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, and defence technology. During the 2026 India–Japan Annual Summit, both governments agreed to strengthen cooperation in defence innovation and emerging technologies, reflecting the increasing strategic importance of the partnership. 

Challenges 

Despite remarkable progress, some challenges continue to affect the relationship. Bilateral trade remains below its true potential, and Japanese companies sometimes face delays related to land acquisition, regulatory procedures, and project implementation in India. Differences in language, work culture, and business practices can also slow commercial cooperation. Another challenge is managing relations with China. While India and Japan share concerns regarding China’s growing strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific, both countries also maintain important economic ties with Beijing. Therefore, they must carefully balance strategic competition with economic engagement while avoiding unnecessary tensions. 

Despite these challenges, the future of India–Japan relations appear extremely promising. India’s rapidly growing economy, expanding manufacturing sector, young workforce, and digital transformation complement Japan’s advanced technology, financial resources, and industrial expertise. Both governments have identified cooperation in defence production, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, critical minerals, cybersecurity, and resilient supply chains as priorities for the coming decade. The recent developments of 2025 and 2026 clearly demonstrate this commitment. New agreements on economic security, emerging technologies, defence innovation, and supply-chain resilience show that both countries are preparing together for future global challenges. Japan has also continued to support India’s aspiration for permanent membership of a reformed United Nations Security Council, highlighting the growing political trust between the two nations. India–Japan relations have evolved into one of the strongest and most comprehensive strategic partnerships in Asia. Built on shared democratic values, mutual trust and common strategic interests, the partnership now extends far beyond trade and investment. Japan has played a vital role in India’s economic development through infrastructure financing, technology transfer, and industrial investment, while India has become an indispensable strategic partner for Japan in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Although certain challenges remain, they are outweighed by the vast opportunities for cooperation. The expanding collaboration in defence, advanced technologies, clean energy, infrastructure, and regional diplomacy demonstrate that the partnership is becoming deeper and more future-oriented. As global politics continues to evolve, India and Japan are expected to work even more closely in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Their growing partnership is not only beneficial for the two countries but also contributes significantly to regional security, sustainable development, and a more balanced and rules-based international order. 

By : Shaurya Pandey, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

When Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, New Delhi was among the capitals that welcomed his victory with the greatest enthusiasm. Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly congratulated his friend on social media, and External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told reporters that, unlike many other nations, India was not nervous about a second Trump presidency. The optimism rested on the perceived personal chemistry between Modi and Trump, visible in the Howdy Modi rally in Houston on September 22, 2019, and the Namaste Trump event in Ahmedabad on February 24, 2020, as well as on the belief that a shared strongman political style and a shared wariness of China would keep the relationship on an upward trajectory. Barely a year later, optimism has evaporated. The United States has imposed the highest tariffs of any major trading partner on Indian goods, the two leaders reportedly went months without speaking to each other, and Washington has simultaneously courted Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership in ways that have unsettled New Delhi. This article examines why the second Trump administration has turned unexpectedly cold towards India, tracing the interplay of trade disputes, the fallout from the India-Pakistan military conflict of May 2025, Washington’s tilt towards Islamabad, disagreements over Russian oil purchases, a weakening strategic consensus on China, and the personality-driven nature of Trump’s diplomacy. 

A Reset That Never Materialized 

Modi travelled to Washington on February 12, 2025, only weeks after Trump’s inauguration, hoping to lock in early momentum. The visit began awkwardly, overshadowed by images of shackled Indian deportees being flown home on a United States (US) military aircraft just before the summit. In the Oval Office meeting held on February 13, 2025, Modi offered to expand purchases of American weapons, oil and natural gas while pressing Trump to spare India from punitive tariffs. The two sides did launch an ambitious-sounding initiative, the US-India Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce and Technology (COMPACT) framework, intended to deepen defence manufacturing, artificial intelligence cooperation and energy trade. Yet Modi did not secure the one assurance he wanted most: protection from tariffs. Within weeks, Washington signaled that Indian exports would face a 27 percent reciprocal tariff unless a better arrangement could be negotiated, a rate notably higher than the 10 percent initially applied to Chinese goods. The gap between the warmth on display at the podium and the harshness of the trade signals emerging almost simultaneously set the tone for the year that followed. 

The Tariff Shock and Trade Discord 

Trade quickly became the most visible irritant in the relationship. After a ninety-day pause on Trump’s broader Liberation Day tariff programme, Washington confirmed a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods in early August 2025, only to double it to 50 percent by the end of August 2025, explicitly as a penalty for India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian crude oil. Jaishankar publicly described the increase as unfair and unreasonable. Commerce officials in the administration, notably trade advisor Peter Navarro and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, framed India as an economy resistant to opening its markets, with Lutnick pointedly questioning why a nation of 1.4 billion people would not import even modest quantities of American agricultural produce. Modi, in turn, declared that India would never compromise on the interests of its farmers, signaling that agriculture and dairy, sectors employing more than 40 percent of India’s workforce, would not be sacrificed for a trade deal. Trump escalated the rhetoric further by describing the Indian and Russian economies as dead in a social media post, prompting anger in New Delhi. Five rounds of bilateral trade negotiations through mid-2025 failed to produce an agreement, even as both governments continued to signal, by the final quarter of the year, that a deal worth potentially several billion US dollars in annual trade remained within reach. 

Operation Sindoor and the Ceasefire Controversy 

The single most consequential rupture came from South Asia’s security landscape rather than economics. On April 22, 2025, terrorists killed twenty-six people, most of them Hindu tourists, in Indian-administered Kashmir. India responded on May 7, 2025, with strikes on what it described as militant camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, under an operation New Delhi named Operation Sindoor. Four days of drone and missile exchanges followed before both sides stepped back from further escalation. Before either New Delhi or Islamabad issued an official statement, Trump announced on social media that the two countries had agreed to a full and immediate ceasefire, credited his own administration with brokering it, and suggested he would help mediate the underlying Kashmir dispute. Pakistan welcomed the claim; India rejected it outright. New Delhi’s position, held consistently for more than two decades and previously respected by successive US administrations, is that any dispute with Pakistan must be resolved bilaterally, without third-party mediation. The Modi government’s official language described the pause in hostilities as an understanding reached directly between the two militaries, not an agreement brokered by Washington. Trump’s insistence on taking credit, and his repeated references to it in subsequent months, is widely seen as having personally offended Modi, who reportedly avoided taking calls from the American president for more than two months afterwards. Because the episode touched Modi’s domestic image as a decisive, strong leader, analysts have argued that this personal affront did more lasting damage to the relationship than the tariff dispute itself. 

Washington’s Pivot towards Islamabad 

Compounding New Delhi’s unease has been a marked warming in US ties with Pakistan. Trump hosted Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, for a lunch at the White House in June 2025, the first time a sitting US president had hosted a Pakistani military chief without accompanying civilian leadership. Munir was received again within two months, seated prominently at a change-of-command ceremony hosted by the US Central Command in Florida. On September 25, 2025, Trump welcomed both Munir and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to the White House together, formalizing what commentators described as a significant recalibration of Washington’s South Asia policy. Islamabad secured the lowest tariff rate of any major market it trades with, Washington designated the Balochistan Liberation Army a foreign terrorist organisation, a long-dormant joint counter-terrorism dialogue was revived, and American officials signalled fresh interest in Pakistani critical minerals and hydrocarbon reserves. For a bilateral relationship long defined by mutual suspicion and periodic drift, the pace of engagement in 2025 was striking, and it arrived just as ties with India were fraying. Whether this warmth endures is uncertain, since the same pattern of transactional, minerals-driven American interest in Pakistan has waxed and waned before, but it’s timing left New Delhi with the uncomfortable sense that its strategic value in Washington was being taken for granted. 

The Russian Oil Question 

India’s continued purchase of discounted Russian crude oil, a practice that expanded significantly after Western sanctions followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, became a central flashpoint. The Trump administration, having shifted its own posture on the Ukraine war, applied direct pressure on New Delhi to curtail these purchases, framing India’s position as effectively subsidizing the Russian war effort. Officials close to Trump argued that India had become a conduit for laundering discounted Russian oil into global markets, though other major economies, including China and Türkiye, also continue to purchase significant volumes of Russian crude without facing comparable tariff penalties, a double standard New Delhi has pointed to repeatedly. By October 23, 2025, reports suggested Indian refiners were moving to reduce their dependence on Russian crude towards near-zero levels, partly under sanctions pressure and partly as a goodwill gesture ahead of a possible trade agreement. The episode illustrated how a foreign policy dispute rooted in a conflict thousands of miles away, in Ukraine, was allowed to spill directly into the core of the US-India economic relationship, with the US trade deficit with India, then estimated at close to US$ 46 billion, adding further pressure on negotiators. 

A Fading China Convergence 

For two decades, shared concern over the rise of China provided the strategic glue binding Washington and New Delhi together, sustaining the relationship through disagreements over trade, human rights and Russia policy. That convergence has weakened under the second Trump administration. Trump has expressed a clear personal preference for a broader deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and a draft of the United States’ National Defense Strategy under consideration in September 2025 reportedly contemplated a version of great-power accommodation with Beijing in the Asia-Pacific region. Simultaneously, Trump reversed an earlier ban on selling advanced computer chips to Chinese firms, actions that led many observers to question the depth of his administration’s commitment to countering Chinese influence in Asia. For India, whose own outreach to China has included Modi’s visit to Tianjin on August 31, 2025, to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and his first visit to China in seven years, the erosion of a shared American resolve on China removes one of the strongest incentives Washington previously had to manage disagreements with New Delhi carefully. 

Personality, Ego and Domestic Politics 

Several analysts argue that the deterioration cannot be explained by policy disagreements alone and instead reflects the personality-driven nature of Trump’s diplomacy. His repeated, unsolicited claims of having ended the India-Pakistan conflict, and his apparent frustration at New Delhi’s refusal to credit him publicly, appear to have coloured his broader approach towards India through much of 2025. Unlike the previous administration of former President Joe Biden, which was comparatively attentive to Modi’s domestic political sensitivities on issues such as the Group of Twenty (G20) presidency and allegations of extrajudicial activity, the Trump White House has shown little inclination to coordinate messaging with New Delhi or soften its public statements for the sake of the relationship. This has created a genuine domestic vulnerability for Modi, since years of messaging in India’s pro-government media have promoted the idea of an exceptionally close personal bond between the two leaders and depicted India as a rising global power. Trump’s blunt public statements, including his description of India’s economy as dead, have made that narrative difficult to sustain. 

Structural Strains and India’s Strategic Autonomy 

Beyond the immediate disputes, the relationship’s difficulties expose deeper structural questions. India’s foreign policy has long rested on a principle of strategic autonomy, avoiding firm alignment with any single power. Under ordinary circumstances, Washington’s traditional willingness to tolerate friction with valued partners, sometimes described by scholars as an act of long-term strategic altruism towards India, allowed New Delhi considerable room to pursue independent policies on Russia, Iran and elsewhere without serious consequence. A more transactional and short-term-oriented Trump administration appears less willing to extend that patience. Analysts at institutions including Chatham House have noted that despite ongoing defence and technology cooperation, through frameworks such as the Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative and the India-US Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), and despite both countries refreshing their ten-year defence framework agreement on October 31, 2025, the underlying pillars of the relationship, namely shared democratic identity, shared concern over China, and India’s role as a manufacturing alternative to China, have all weakened simultaneously. The result, some argue, is that India’s long-standing preference for equidistance between major powers, while consistent with its principles, risks being read in Washington as disengagement rather than genuine strategic value. 

Signs of Recalibration 

Despite the acrimony, neither side has moved to inflict deeper damage on the relationship. Modi’s government chose not to retaliate against American tariffs or public criticism, and by September 2025 both leaders had exchanged more conciliatory public statements, suggesting an interest in repairing ties. Reports through the final months of 2025 indicated that negotiators were close to a bilateral trade agreement that would lower tariffs on Indian goods in exchange for reduced Indian purchases of Russian oil, though a comprehensive deal had not been finalized by the year’s end. Visits by senior American officials in 2026, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s trip to India on May 21, 2026, described by observers as a mission of repair, point to a deliberate, if gradual, effort on both sides to stabilise the partnership even as the underlying sources of friction remain unresolved. 

Conclusion 

The coldness that has characterized Trump’s approach to India during his second term is best understood not as the product of any single dispute but as the convergence of several distinct pressures arriving together. A punishing tariff regime driven by trade imbalances and Russian oil purchases, an unresolved and deeply personal disagreement over credit for the India-Pakistan ceasefire, a surprising American tilt towards Pakistan’s military establishment, and a weakening of the shared China-focused strategic logic that once underpinned the entire relationship have combined to produce the most difficult period in US-India ties in roughly a quarter of a century. Whether the relationship recovers its earlier trajectory will depend heavily on whether both governments can separate transactional irritants, namely tariffs, oil purchases and trade imbalances, from the deeper strategic partnership that both sides still describe as indispensable. For India, the episode has reinforced the value of its long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy, while also exposing the risks of relying too heavily on personal rapport between leaders rather than durable institutional ties. 

By : Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN

An Analytical Brief 

The spreading catastrophe in the West Asian region has led many people to believe that the reason for this never-ending conflict is an intent of nurturing the conflict. For a major part of the past three decades, the strategic planning in the Israeli camp has revolved around two significant schools of thought, which are conflict resolution and conflict management. While the domain of conflict resolution emphasizes a negotiated closure to the persistent hostilities, the latter focuses on controlling the situation without working on the underlying causes. Scholars like Sapir Handelman talk about how the conflict management school of thought has prevailed within the Israeli security circles after the Oslo proceedings didn’t see fruition. This also reflects in the policy circles and the approach that is taken by the Israelis towards pursuing a settlement with the Palestinians. 

The Military Strategy Magazine has also provided evidence of how this thought manifested itself in practice. Through the accounts of a former commander who served in the Israeli Defence Forces’ Special Forces Directorate, the articles delved into a policy known as the “no comment policy”. This policy entails covert operations, sabotages, air strikes, targeted killings, to deter major confrontations to an indefinite time. This practice treated the absence of war as a temporary condition that required management, rather than a condition to be seeked permanently. 

The collaboration of Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and the Forum for Regional Thinking concocted research which was revered and publicized by more than 100 Israeli and Palestinian academicians. The paper highlighted that the Israeli governments avoided any critical battles with Iran or its regional allies before the massacre on October 7, 2023, because that could have resulted in both the countries marching towards actual settlement under tremendous international and domestic pressure. Therefore, the dormancy before the Hamas attack was an attempt towards maintaining the historical rivalry rather than seeking regional peace  

A similar pattern was noticed by Chatham House as they observed 75 years of Israeli Palestinian relations, as they highlighted how Israeli forces who prevail in the asymmetric warfare between the two entities, have it in their best interests to nurture the rivalry, rather than negotiating the political and economic costs that would be incurred in case a settlement is in order.  

The Camp David Accords in 1978, The Treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the 2020 Abraham Accords are a part of this pattern, where normalizing the relations with Arab states proceeds as the case of Palestine is deferred rather than providing a closure. 

The Leap from Management to Permanent Security 

Several analysts have suggested that the attack on October 7, 2023, led to the dissolution of the containment model employed by the Israelis thus far. This is evident from the commentaries published in 2025 after Israel and Iran locked horns, deliberating on how Israel’s approach to retaliate was not resolution centric, rather aggravating an already sensitive regional rivalry. The posture witnesses the extension of military operation under the umbrella of establishing permanent security across Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Yemen, etc, with ceasefires being considered as a temporary pause rather than a long-term commitment. 

However, the strategy has not been delivered adequately yet. Iran went through critical missile strikes on its nuclear facilities and senior leadership and survived a regime collapse. They were also able to transform a military attack into a political bargain on their own. Therefore, if the goal of the permanent security model was lasting deterrence, the record has been miserable. 

The Economic Structure to this Continued Conflict  

The domain that is not explored enough in this situation is the institutional and economic structures that have been built around this sustained conflict. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has recorded a 65% of real time increase in Israeli military expenditure in 2024, which is the most visible single year rise since the war in 1967. The amount of spending eased by five percent in 2025, after the 2025 Gaza Ceasefire. The military spending reached up to 7.8% of Israel’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which was the highest burden entailed by any country that year. Israeli debt also rose by at least 30% over the same period. This could be dodged if Israelis moved towards initiatives that promise durable peace. However, this would also hinder the defence sector, reserved linked sectors of the economy and settlement-adjacent industries, who hold a direct financial stake in the market of continuous mobilization. 

Israel’s defence exports have grown despite the continuous confrontation. The exports revenue went off the charts as it recorded a record of 14.8 billion dollars in 2024. SIPRI’s 5 – year comparison showed Israel’s share of global arms exports, rising from 3.1% in 2016 to 4.4% between 2021-2025, overtaking the U.K. as they became the seventh largest exporter, as they conduct operations on multiple fronts simultaneously. The air defence systems that have been tested under live fire against Iranian and Houthi missiles, made up almost half these exports. These weapons being battled get a significant advantage over their competitors. These resources have sustained also because of the U.S. support, which have enhanced its stores with an investment above 130 billion dollars, with 12 billion dollars in new Foreign Military Sales, and a further 4 billion dollars in expedited assistance, which were authorized during 2025. 

While none of this proves intent, it does elucidate the stake of defence manufacturers, reservist economies and alliances, in the continuation of these confrontations and contestations, in spite of a strategic rationale offered by a single operation. 

The Domestic-Political Dimension 

Another less examined path is the relation between the confrontation and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s corruption trial, which started in 2020, on the charges of bribery, breach of trust and fraud across three separate cases. There have been document accusations from opposition figures through reports from Associated Press and Middle East Eye, including Yair Lapid, about the appeal for national unity in the name of wartime emergency has led to severe malpractices including delayed trial proceedings, shifting public attention away from these accusations, which are rejected by Prime Minister Netanyahu on the ground of political motivation. 

The Times of Israel has also reported that the governing coalition has advanced the repealing of fraud and breach of trust statute, which can afflict the capabilities of judicial oversight of the executive. These tactics are often called out by the opposition leaders as an attempt to the Prime Minister’s effort at a political and legal survival. Research done by Carnegie Endowments for International Peace has also talked about these phenomena depicting a right-wing shift in the Israeli Politics, which exists despite the leaders, embedding incentives against a peaceful and diplomatic resolution. 

Criticisms 

However, there are observations made by other separate camps as well. Many Israeli officials and scholars have rejected the above school of thought. Israel’s strategic doctrine, which has been articulated since the Begin Doctrine in 1981, has considered preventive and pre-emptive measures as a defensive necessity against actors that have declared their intent of harming the nation. Based on this understanding, many controversial decisions taken by the Israeli Government are considered as a national strategy to deter the repeated and documented threats of Iran and its proxies.  

Research Analysts who have favored a negotiated settlement, say that the absence of political will is a strong tenet of this Israeli government, and the long-term demographic and democratic costs of the current skirmish, which the current leadership is aware of. Many scholars have warned against treating Israel as a state with a single intent, as the society has many diverse opinions over the war’s conduct and objectives. There have also been large scale protests directed towards the Govt’s decisions rather than the state’s security posture. 

Conclusion  

There is recorded evidence of institutional and economical stakes involved in continuous low-grade conflicts. However, there are valid counterarguments to the same as well, which define how the environment is perceived by the Israeli leadership and keeps it at war. The perceptions and opinions vary between people, countries, international blocs, and lawmakers. What is to notice is the nature of the conflict in the region, which has evolved over decades, but not resolved, massacring millions of lives. 

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The war between Israel and Hamas that began on October 07, 2023, became one of the most destructive and politically significant conflicts in the recent history of the Middle East. The war began after Hamas-led fighters launched a surprise attack on southern Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking approximately 250 hostages. Israel responded by launching a massive military campaign in the Gaza Strip, with the declared objectives of destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and securing the release of the hostages. 

What followed was a prolonged conflict that caused enormous destruction in Gaza, significant military losses for Hamas and a humanitarian crisis that attracted worldwide attention. Israel used its overwhelming conventional military superiority to target Hamas’s leadership, tunnel networks and military infrastructure. Hamas, on the other hand, relied on asymmetric warfare and attempted to survive against a much stronger military force. 

But deciding who actually won the war is not as simple as comparing battlefield gains or casualty figures. Israel achieved major military successes and significantly weakened Hamas, but questions remain over whether all its broader strategic objectives were achieved. Hamas suffered enormous losses but survived as an organization and remained relevant to negotiations surrounding Gaza. Meanwhile, Palestinian civilians paid the greatest price through death, displacement and destruction. 

To understand who really won, we need to look beyond the battlefield and ask a more important question: did either side actually achieve what it set out to do?  

The October 07 Attack and the Beginning of the War 

The conflict began with the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 07, 2023. Hamas fighters crossed the border from Gaza and attacked Israeli communities and military positions. Around 1,200 people were killed and approximately 250 were taken hostage. 

The attack represented one of Israel’s most serious security failures. For years, Israel had invested heavily in border surveillance, intelligence systems and military technology designed to prevent attacks from Gaza. The ability of Hamas to cross the border and carry out such a large-scale assault challenged the perception of Israeli military and intelligence superiority. 

For Hamas, the attack was intended to change the political situation surrounding the Palestinian issue. Before October 07, regional diplomacy was increasingly focused on possible normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian issue appeared to have become less central to regional politics. 

The attack dramatically changed this situation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict once again became a major international issue, although at an enormous human cost. 

Israel responded by declaring war and launching an extensive military campaign in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the destruction of Hamas and the return of Israeli hostages’ central objectives of the campaign. From that point onward, the question of victory became closely connected to whether Israel could achieve these objectives. 

Israel’s Military Achievements 

From a purely conventional military perspective, Israel clearly possessed overwhelming superiority. The Israel Defense Forces carried out extensive air strikes and ground operations throughout Gaza, targeting Hamas fighters, commanders, weapons storage facilities and tunnel networks. 

Israel succeeded in eliminating several senior Hamas leaders and significantly disrupting the organization’s military structure. Large parts of Hamas’s infrastructure were damaged or destroyed, while its ability to operate openly was severely restricted. 

Israel also established military control over significant areas of Gaza during different stages of the conflict. These operations gave Israeli forces greater ability to monitor Hamas activity and prevent another attack like October 07. 

The weakening of Hamas’s leadership represented an important achievement for Israel. Hamas had spent years developing a military organization capable of operating through underground tunnels and decentralized command structures. Destroying or weakening these networks requires prolonged military operations. 

But battlefield dominance is not the same as a strategic victory. Israel clearly weakened Hamas, but it did not completely remove the organization as a military and political force. 

Despite suffering severe losses, Hamas was not destroyed. Its continued survival created a difficult question for Israel: if the objective was to eliminate Hamas, could Israel claim complete victory while the organization continued to exist?  

Hamas: Defeated or Still Standing? 

Hamas entered the war facing one of the most powerful militaries in the Middle East. It had no conventional air force, navy or advanced armored forces capable of competing directly with Israel. Its strategy therefore depended heavily on asymmetric warfare. 

The organization used underground tunnels, small fighting units, improvised explosive devices, and rocket attacks. These tactics were designed not necessarily to defeat Israel’s military conventionally, but to survive and prolong the conflict. 

Hamas, however, entered the war with a very different understanding of what victory would look like. 

Israel needed to demonstrate that it could dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities and prevent it from governing Gaza. Hamas, by contrast, could present its own survival as a form of victory. 

This does not mean that Hamas emerged from the war militarily stronger. The organization suffered major losses to its leadership, fighters, and infrastructure. Gaza itself was devastated, significantly reducing Hamas’s ability to operate as it had before the conflict. 

Nevertheless, the fact that Hamas remained relevant to ceasefire and hostage negotiations demonstrated that it had not disappeared completely as a political and military actor. 

This created a strange outcome. Israel could point to major battlefield successes, while Hamas could point to the simple fact that it had survived. In other words, both sides could claim success, but for completely different reasons.  

The Hostage Question 

The hostages taken during the October 07 attack became one of the most important political and emotional issues inside Israel. 

The Israeli government faced enormous pressure from the families of hostages and the wider public to secure their return. At the same time, the government maintained that continued military pressure on Hamas was necessary. 

However, diplomacy also became essential. 

Qatar and Egypt emerged as important mediators between Israel and Hamas. Qatar’s relationship with Hamas’s political leadership gave it influence over negotiations, while Egypt’s geographical position and long-standing involvement in Gaza made Cairo another important diplomatic actor. The United States also played an important role in supporting negotiations. 

The temporary ceasefires made one thing clear: military force alone could not bring all the hostage’s home. Negotiations, involving difficult compromises and prisoner exchanges, became equally important.  

The hostage crisis further complicated any straightforward claim of victory. Israel’s ability to secure the return of hostages represented an important achievement, but the dependence on negotiations also demonstrated the limitations of military power in achieving every objective of the war. 

The Human Cost in Gaza 

Any discussion about who won the Israel–Hamas war must recognize that Palestinian civilians in Gaza suffered devastating consequences. 

Large areas of Gaza were destroyed during Israeli military operations. Homes, hospitals, schools, and other infrastructure were damaged, while a large proportion of the population was displaced. 

The humanitarian crisis became one of the most controversial aspects of the conflict. Israel argued that Hamas operated from densely populated civilian areas and used underground infrastructure, making military operations extremely difficult. Critics of Israel, however, argued that the scale of the military campaign caused unacceptable civilian suffering. 

For Hamas, the destruction of Gaza also created difficult questions. Although the organization could claim that it survived militarily, Palestinians themselves paid an enormous price. 

This, in my view, is one of the biggest problems with describing Hamas’s survival as a victory. 

An organization may survive, but if the territory it claims to defend is devastated and its population suffers enormously, the meaning of victory becomes deeply questionable. 

The humanitarian consequences also damaged Israel’s international reputation. As images of destruction and civilian suffering spread around the world, international criticism of Israel increased. 

Therefore, even though Israel maintained military superiority, the humanitarian consequences created significant diplomatic and political costs. 

Israel’s Diplomatic and Political Costs 

Israel entered the war with strong support from the United States and several Western governments, particularly following the October 07 attacks. 

As the conflict continued, however, international criticism of Israeli military operations increased. The humanitarian situation in Gaza became a major subject of debate in international organizations, governments, and public demonstrations. 

Israel maintained the support of the United States throughout crucial periods of the conflict, which was strategically important. However, disagreements emerged regarding civilian casualties, humanitarian assistance, and the future governance of Gaza. 

Relations with Arab countries also became more complicated. Before October 07, the possibility of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia was considered one of the most important diplomatic developments in the Middle East. The war disrupted this momentum. 

From Hamas’s perspective, this represented political achievement. The Palestinian issue returned to the center of international diplomacy and discussions surrounding Palestinian statehood gained renewed attention. 

However, this political outcome should not be confused with a complete Hamas victory. Hamas itself faced widespread criticism for the October 07 attacks, while its future role in governing Gaza remained deeply controversial. 

Politically, the outcome was far less clear. Israel succeeded in weakening Hamas militarily but faced growing international criticism, while Hamas brought renewed attention to the Palestinian issue at the cost of devastating organizational and human losses. 

The Battle of Narratives 

The struggle over how the war was interpreted became almost as politically significant as developments on the battlefield itself.  

Israel presented its military campaign as an act of self-defence following the October 07 attacks. Its central argument was that no country could accept the continued presence of an armed organization capable of carrying out another attack on a similar scale. 

Hamas presented the conflict through the language of Palestinian resistance and argued that its survival demonstrated Israel’s inability to eliminate the movement. 

The problem, then, is that Israel and Hamas were never measuring victory by the same standard.  

For Israel, victory meant restoring security, returning hostages and dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. For Hamas, simply surviving an overwhelming Israeli military campaign allowed it to claim that resistance had continued. 

This difference explains why both sides could claim achievements despite suffering serious costs. 

However, narratives cannot resolve the underlying political conflict. The war may have changed the military balance in Gaza, but it did not eliminate the broader dispute between Israelis and Palestinians. 

The Regional Impact 

The Israel–Hamas war also had consequences far beyond Gaza. 

The conflict increased tensions across the Middle East and involved regional actors with connections to the broader Israeli-Palestinian struggle. Iran’s regional network, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, became increasingly relevant to the wider security environment. 

At the same time, Qatar and Egypt strengthened their positions as important diplomatic mediators. Their involvement in ceasefire and hostage negotiations demonstrated the continuing importance of regional diplomacy. 

The United States remained Israel’s most important international ally while simultaneously participating in diplomatic efforts aimed at limiting escalation and addressing the humanitarian crisis. 

The war also showed that whatever happens next in Gaza will not be decided by Israel and Hamas alone. Regional and international actors became essential to negotiations surrounding ceasefires, humanitarian assistance, and post-war governance. 

Did Hamas Achieve a Strategic Victory? 

Hamas’s strongest claim to strategic success rests on two things: it survived, and it pushed the Palestinian question back to the centre of international attention.  

Hamas survived a massive Israeli military campaign, remained part of negotiations and succeeded in returning the Palestinian issue to the center of global attention. The war also disrupted the regional diplomatic environment that existed before October 07. 

However, describing this as a complete victory would ignore the enormous losses suffered by Hamas and Gaza. 

Many senior Hamas leaders were killed, much of its military infrastructure was destroyed or damaged and its ability to govern Gaza was severely weakened. More importantly, Palestinian civilians suffered catastrophic consequences. 

Therefore, Hamas may claim symbolic or political achievements, but these came at an extraordinarily high cost. 

Did Israel Win? 

On military terms, Israel has the stronger claim to victory.  

It demonstrated overwhelming military superiority, eliminated senior Hamas leaders, destroyed significant military infrastructure and reduced Hamas’s ability to operate freely. 

Israel also secured the return of hostages through a combination of military pressure and diplomacy and strengthened security arrangements designed to reduce the possibility of another October 07-style attack. 

Yet Israel’s victory was incomplete if measured against its broadest objectives. 

If Hamas remained armed, politically relevant or capable of rebuilding, then the objective of eliminating the organization was not fully achieved. Israel also faced significant international criticism and deterioration in its global image. 

Therefore, Israel achieved major military successes without necessarily securing an undisputed strategic victory. 

Who Actually Won? 

So, who actually won? The answer depends largely on what we mean by victory. Israel was unquestionably the stronger military power and inflicted severe damage on Hamas. But if victory meant eliminating Hamas and permanently resolving the security threat from Gaza, the outcome was less decisive. 

Hamas, meanwhile, survived and remained politically relevant, but survival came at an extraordinary cost. Gaza was devastated, Hamas’s own capabilities were severely weakened, and the Palestinian population suffered enormously. 

For this reason, neither side can convincingly claim an absolute victory. Israel won important battles, while Hamas survived the war, but the political conflict that existed before October 07 remained unresolved. 

Conclusion 

The Israel–Hamas war demonstrates how difficult it is to define victory in modern asymmetric conflicts. Israel emerged as the clear military superior and inflicted enormous damage on Hamas’s leadership, infrastructure and fighting capabilities. From a conventional military perspective, Israel achieved substantial successes. 

However, military success did not automatically produce complete strategic victories. Hamas survived as an organization and remained relevant to negotiations surrounding Gaza. The Palestinian issue, rather than disappearing from international politics, returned to the center of global diplomatic attention. 

At the same time, describing Hamas as the winner would be equally misleading. Its leadership and military capabilities suffered major losses, while the Palestinian population of Gaza endured extraordinary destruction, displacement and suffering. 

In my assessment, Israel has the stronger claim to military victory, having severely weakened Hamas’s leadership and military capabilities. Yet this was not an absolute strategic victory. Hamas’s survival meant that Israel fell short of eliminating the organization, while the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained unresolved.  

Ultimately, the greatest losers were civilians. Israelis experienced the trauma of the October 07 attacks and the hostage crisis, while Palestinians in Gaza experienced death, displacement and widespread destruction on an enormous scale. 

Therefore, the Israel–Hamas war produced no simple or undisputed winner. Israel changed the military balance but did not resolve the underlying conflict. Hamas survived but at an extraordinary cost to itself and to Gaza. Ultimately, neither military dominance nor organizational survival can resolve the deeper Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Without a sustainable political settlement, any claim of victory by either side is likely to prove temporary.