By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

Artificial Intelligence refers to computer systems capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence, including learning, reasoning, decision-making, and pattern recognition. In military affairs, AI is often described as a force multiplier because it can improve the speed, accuracy, and effectiveness of military operations. China’s military leadership believes that future wars will be characterized by ‘intelligence warfare’,where AI-driven systems will dominate the battlefield. This concept goes beyond the earlier notion of information warfare and focuses on the use of machine learning, big data analytics, autonomous systems, and advanced computing to achieve superiority in combat. The Chinese government’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017) identified AI as a national priority and emphasized its military applications. Since then, China has invested heavily in AI research and development, encouraging collaboration between technology companies, universities, and defence institutions. China’s rapid advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) are transforming not only its economy and society but also its military capabilities. Over the last decade, the Chinese government has identified AI as a strategic technology that can revolutionize warfare and enhance national security. Through substantial investments, military-civil fusion policies, and technological innovation, China is integrating AI into a wide range of weapon systems and military operations. The country’s objectiveis to build a ‘world-class military’ by the middle of the 21st century and to gain a competitive advantage in future conflicts. AI has become central to the modernization efforts of the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), influencing everything from autonomous weapons and intelligence gathering to cyber warfare and command systems.  

AI Strategy and MCF- 

One of the key features of China’s AI development is the policy of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF). Under this strategy, civilian technological innovations are integrated into military modernization efforts. Leading Chinese technology firms such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, and SenseTime contribute to AI development that can potentially support defence applications. Military-Civil Fusion enables the PLA to access cutting-edgetechnologies developed in the commercial sector, including machine learning algorithms, computer vision, natural language processing, robotics, autonomous navigation systems and big data analytics. This approach reduces development costs and accelerates the deployment of advanced military technologies.  

AI and Weapon Systems- 

One of the most significant applications of AI in China’s military is the development of autonomous weapon systems. These systems can operate with minimal human intervention and make decisions based on data gathered from sensors and battlefield environments. China has become a major producer of military drones and is increasingly incorporating AI into their operations. AI-powered drones can identify targets automatically, navigate complex environments, coordinate with other drones, conduct surveillance missions, and carry out precision strikes. Chinese defence companies have demonstrated drone swarms capable of operating collectively using AI algorithms. Swarm technology allows hundreds of drones to communicate and cooperate, overwhelming enemy defences through coordinated attacks. Unlike traditional drones controlled by remote operators, AI-enabled drones can continue missions even when communication links are disrupted, making them more resilient in contested environments. China is also developing AI-enhanced loitering munitions, often referred to as ‘kamikaze drones. These weapons can search for targets independently and strike them once identified. AI improves target recognition and mission effectiveness while reducing the need for constant human control. AI is playing an increasingly important role in improving China’s missile capabilities. Modern missile systems require rapid identification and tracking of targets. AI algorithms help process sensor data from satellites, radar systems, and reconnaissance platforms to improve target acquisition. China has invested heavily in hypersonic missile technology. Hypersonic weapons travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and present significant challenges for missile defence systems. AI contributes to real-time navigation, flight-path optimization, target tracking, and evasion of defensive systems. By processing large amounts of data during flight, AI allows hypersonic weapons to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and improve their effectiveness. Modern warfare increasingly depends on the ability to process information rapidly and make timely decisions. China is integrating AI into command and control (C2) systems to improve battlefield management. AI systems analyze vast quantities of information from multiple sources, including satellites, radar systems, intelligence reports, drones, and communication systems. These systems can identify threats, recommend courses of action, and support commanders in making faster decisions. AI enhances situational awareness by combining data from different sensors into a comprehensive operational picture. This enables military leaders to respond quickly to emerging threats and coordinate forces efficiently. Chinese military strategists believe that decision superiority will be a critical factor in future wars, and AI provides a means of achieving this advantage.  

Impact of AI on Navy- 

China’s naval modernization program increasingly incorporates AI technologies. The PLA Navy is developing unmanned surface vessels (USVs) capable of performing reconnaissance, surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and detection. AI enables these vessels to navigate independently, avoid obstacles, and coordinate with other naval assets. AI-powered underwater drones can conduct long-duration missions with limited human intervention. These systems support intelligence gathering, ocean surveillance, submarine tracking, and my countermeasures. Such capabilities are particularly important in strategically significant regions such as the South China Sea.  

Impact of AI on Airforce- 

China is actively integrating AI into its air force operations. AI assists pilots by processing sensor information, identifying threats, managing electronic warfare systems, and supporting tactical decisions. Future Chinese fighter aircraft may incorporate AI copilots capable of handling routine tasks and assisting in combat situations. China is exploring concepts like ‘loyal wingman’ drones. These AI-powered unmanned aircraft operatealongside manned fighters, extending combat capabilities while reducing risks to pilots. Their roles may include decoy operations and air-to-ground attacks. 

Impact of AI on Cyber Warfare- 

Cyber warfare represents another area where China is employing AI extensively. AI can identify network vulnerabilities, detect security weaknesses, automate cyberattacks, and adapt malware to changing defences. AI-driven cyber tools increase the speed and scale of offensive operations. At the same time, AI strengthens defensive capabilities. The combination of offensive and defensive cyber-AI enhances China’s overall cyber warfare posture. Electronic warfare also involves disrupting enemy communications, sensors, and command systems. China uses AI to analyse electromagnetic signals, jam enemy systems more effectively and adapt electronic attacks in real time. Machine learning algorithms can rapidly process large volumes of signal intelligence and identify opportunities for disruption that human operators might miss.  

Challenges- 

Despite significant progress, China faces several challenges in integrating AI into weapon systems. AI systems can suffer from data quality problems, algorithmic errors, vulnerability to deception, and reliability issues in complex environments. Battlefield conditions are often unpredictable, making autonomous decision-making difficult. The growing use of autonomous weapons raises important ethical questions. Concerns include accountability for AI decisions, civilian casualties, compliance with international humanitarian law, and risk of accidental escalation. Many countries are debating whether fully autonomous lethal weapons should be regulated or restricted. AI systems may themselves become targets of cyberattacks. Adversaries could attempt to manipulate data inputs, hack autonomous systems, disrupt communication networks, and exploit software vulnerabilities. Protecting AI-enabled weapon systems is therefore a major challenge.  

China’s use of AI in weapon systems has significant implications for global security. AI may alter the military balance in the Indo-Pacific region by enhancing China’s operational capabilities. Neighboring countries and major powers are closely monitoring these developments. AI accelerates military competition among leading powers. The United States, China, and other nations are investing heavily in AI-driven military technologies, creating a new technological arms race. The increasing autonomy of weapon systems could shorten decision-making times during crises. While this may improve military effectiveness, it also raises the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. AI is also transforming the nature of warfare itself. Future conflicts may involve extensive use of autonomous systems, cyber operations, and machine-driven decision-making, reducing reliance on traditional military platforms.  

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction  

It is not futuristic speculation that has given rise to the notion of creating a bridge between the Russian Far East and North America through the Bering Strait; the idea of building it dates back a century and has been brought up several times, each time being dismissed due to the difficulties of distance, climate, and finances. Nevertheless, in June 2026, a radical resurgence of the concept of bridging the Bering Strait took place with the name of “Putin-Trump Tunnel.” The reason for such a name was an official declaration of Kirill Dmitriev, Russian Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation. According to him, the project includes a railway tunnel that crosses underwater at about 86 km and cuts the cost of the construction from US$65 billion to less than US$8 billion with the help of modern boring technologies. This article critically assesses the viability of the Russia-Alaska tunnel considering its technological, financial, and geopolitical aspects, as well as the question of whether it will materialize soon. 

Historical Context and the New Proposal  

This concept of joining these two places together has existed for more than a hundred years already. This modern version of this idea was proposed in October 2025 by Kirill Dmitriev, who is the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). He described it as “a 112-kilometre link, symbolizing unity. It started getting a lot of attention during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2026. Dmitriev mentioned that he signed a design agreement with an engineering company. He hoped that the design process would finish no later than December 31, 2026, and the decision about building the bridge would depend on its economic feasibility. It should be noted that the modern project differs greatly from the earlier, too expensive for projects in using tunnel technology. Dmitriev mentioned that applying ideas of The Boring Company of Elon Musk could lower the price of the construction process from US$65 billion to as little as US$8 billion in under 8 years. It was reportedly discussed with the leading figures of the United States, such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and China could be involved too. 

Technical Feasibility and Logistical Hurdles  

Technically, construction of the tunnel under the Bering Strait is possible from the point of view of engineering. Specialists indicate that the underwater stretch of the tunnel is just about 1.5 times larger than that of the Channel Tunnel. Nevertheless, environmental conditions and logistics are extremely challenging. The major problems are not related to building the tunnel itself, but to a lack of auxiliary infrastructure. The closest Russian railroad is situated thousands of kilometers away from Chukotka through the zone of permafrost and mountains. In addition, Alaska is isolated from the railroad system of the United States. Transport of materials, fuel, and food for the building of the tunnel at the distant construction site in Chukotka, where there is an annual “northern supply”, is a highly challenging logistical task. There are no existing roads, cities, or energy systems in the region to support such a megaproject, which means that the transport approach to the construction of the tunnel should be built from scratch. Operating and maintaining the tunnel would be more costly than in the case of developed regions because of the Arctic climate. 

Economic Viability and the Question of Cargo Base  

The main obstacle standing in the way of implementation of the project is the absence of economic feasibility. The core issue here is which cargo can justify the investment in construction of such a massive tunnel. At present, the trade flow between Russia and the US is very low, and there is no apparent freight basis for the project to become commercially successful. As experts note, the project can be viable only as a part of a logisticschain that does not exist at present. Though the tunnel can serve as a shortcut between Asia and North America, the expenses of building the railroad over thousands of kilometers of wilderness tundra outweigh any time savings in comparison to sea routes, which at present handle more than eighty per cent of world trade volume. The claim of about three to five per cent of global sea trade passing through the tunnel seems rather doubtful. In addition, the shorter time it takes to deliver products through a land route is not sufficient due to the requirement of air or marine transportation of cargo up to the tunnel at each end point. According to one specialist, “‘ any saving of a few days compared with maritime travel is quickly wiped out by the staggering costs of laying thousands of kilometres of new track'”. 

Geopolitical Dimensions and Strategic Interests  

This tunnel idea is both a statement on geopolitics and a project of infrastructure development. Even Dmitriev referred to it as a “project that unites continents.” However, in the context of increasingly fragmented geopolitics, the tunnel is offered as a symbol of possible cooperation among Russia, the United States, and China. The geopolitical situation, however, is rather fragmented. It was met with skepticism by the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, who said he was “not happy with this” after Donald Trump mentioned it. Present-day geopolitical tensions, along with sanctions, make this kind of cooperation rather difficult. Besides, China being a possible participant in the project means that there is a complicated situation – although it could become one of the biggest beneficiaries of the new transcontinental land connection. Experts warn that “a key facility owned by one party and a main user being another is a definite time bomb”. 

Conclusion: Will It Fructify? 

Russia-Alaska tunnel project, as it currently exists in 2026, is an ambitious plan but also a highly uncertain one. With its emphasis on revolutionary technology that will dramatically lower construction costs, the new proposal has added a second wind to an idea that had existed for decades already. Completion of technical design by the end of 2026 may help gather some more data on its feasibility. However, there are many barriers to overcome that cannot be easily overcome with the help of technology. First, there is a tremendous logistical barrier connected with building and sustaining required infrastructure in the region, which is one of the most remote in the world. Second, there is no clear rationale or cargo base for it, and third, the serious geopolitical confrontation makes project cooperation highly unlikely. Thus, even though the project is a good example of what can be achieved with peace and investment, it does not seem likely to fructify in the medium term.  

By : Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

China is the foremost global manufacturer with factories producing everything from phones to steel, cities with thousands of occupants, and an economy that has expanded rapidly at an unprecedented rate in the modern age. To operate all of this, China needs a colossal amount of energy. In 2024, China used 163.8 exajoules of energy, more than all North America (including Canada, Mexico, the USA), the European Union and Japan together. This immense figure has important and inappropriate implications that China cannot provide itself with sufficient energy to meet its needs. While China considers national security as its priority above everything else, dependence on outside sources for energy, rather than being an economic concern, is also a strategic weakness that influences foreign policy, military strategy and its relationships with other countries. 

The Scale of the Problem 

In addition to being the biggest importer of crude oil, China is also the biggest importer of natural gas. In 2024, imports were about 74% of China’s total crude oil supply, while 42% came from domestic sources. In 2024, the cost of importing crude oil to China was worth $325 billion which is worth more than the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] of many individual countries. The average amount of crude oil imported to China was 11.65 million barrels daily in 2025, which is up by 5.7% from the previous year. To comprehend China’s energy dependency, one needs to first understand its scale.  

Coal paints a very different picture. China is effectively self-sufficient in coal (the largest coal producer in the world), however, coal imports into China have also increased dramatically in recent years. In 2023, China imported 474 million tons of coal, the largest coal importer and the largest coal producer in the world. The reasoning behind this is simple China’s industrial hunger is far greater than what could be met by the massive resources of coal located within its borders. Coal is responsible for more than half of the electricity produced in China and in 2024, the number of new coal-fired power plants built reached a high point for the last ten years, with 94.5 GW of new coal capacity being added. This situation, however, conflicts with China’s ambitions for complete green energy development worldwide. 

The Malacca Dilemma: A Chokepoint that Haunts Beijing 

The Malacca Dilemma is one of China’s major energy-related challenges described by Chinese military officials under the former President Hu Jintao in 2003. This concept was derived from a geographic feature known as the Strait of Malacca located between Malaysia and Indonesia. This waterway is the shortest maritime link connecting the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Furthermore, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports travel through this bottleneck, meaning that, in times of war the strait could be blocked, thereby cutting off all of China’s oil supplies within a matter of hours. 

This concern is not theoretical. The U.S. Navy is well positioned to enforce a blockade and has done so to various countries before. Thus, China has taken considerable measures over time to develop secondary routes for energy transport through the Strait of Malacca (which is considered to be on the verge of being closed) by pursuing a number of different actions related to its larger Belt and Road Initiative model. One such plan is the construction of a pipeline and road network along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which will transport energy from Gwadar Port in Pakistan directly to China’s western region of Xinjiang. Two other major overland options are the Myanmar-China oil pipelines that were finished in 2013 and 2015 respectively. They are not just economic infrastructure projects they are strategic insurance policies against the day when the sea lanes might be closed. 

Russia, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Oil 

China’s Foreign Policy is heavily influenced by its dependence on energy supplies that are generally hard to separate from overarching aspirations. China’s primary source of crude oil imports were Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Between these three countries, China imported over two million barrels of oil per day (about 20% of all imports) in 2024. After Western nations had imposed economic sanctions against Russia following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China became Russia’s most important customer for energy and purchased large quantities of discounted Russian oil. Both countries thus benefit through China’s acquisition of a stable, low-cost energy source from Russia while Russia has a way to avoid being harmed by Western sanctions. This energy relationship essentially renders China incapable of joining Western led sanctions against Russia regardless of its official position regarding the military conflict. 

Overall energy dependence constrains China’s economic and diplomatic options in the international arena in addition to being an economic issue. The same principle applies to China’s diplomatic engagement with Gulf States. Through a concerted effort, China has endeavoured to develop and maintain solid and ongoing relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchs while simultaneously solidifying relations with their main rival, Iran (the Gulf States). The ability to continue balancing these competing diplomatic relations depends on maintaining a stable flow of energy between China and both groups. 

The Renewable Revolution: Promise and Reality  

Despite that, China’s problems with dependency on oil will still not be solved by the renewable revolution. In fact, 86 percent of China’s total primary energy supply was derived from fossil fuels in 2024. This is principally a result of China’s large and extensive industrial base (i.e., steel mills, cement plants, chemical manufacturing, and heavy manufacturing). Industrial processes require both chemical feedstocks and heat (as well as electricity), both of which today are much more difficult to produce using solar panels and wind turbines than they are from fossil fuels. As a consequence, China will remain dependent upon fossil fuels until industrial processes can be largely or fully electrified or be powered by hydrogen feedstocks. 

Stockpiling as Strategy 

One indication of how seriously China considers its energy vulnerability is the rapid buildup of its oil reserve capacity. By late 2024, China had expanded its total oil storage capacity to more than 2 billion barrels and its total strategic and commercial reserves were estimated to be between 1.2 billion barrels and 1.3 billion barrels. In fact, Chinese state-owned oil companies Sinopec and CNOOC are working on building 11 new storage facilities in 2025 and 2026. Experts say that in 2025 China is stockpiling approximately 1 to 1.2 million barrels of oil each day far more than is necessary to meet current needs providing both a buffer to cover supply interruptions and leverage in global energy markets. However, this also reflects Beijing’s concerns over its supply chain’s reliability amid an increasingly uncertain world. 

Conclusion 

China has an exceedingly high level of energy dependence, making energy dominance an incredible challenge for itself and other countries. With more total energy being produced than all three of the US, EU, and Japan combined, it should come as no surprise that China’s energy production is not sufficient to meet its needs and that it must constantly manage risk associated with its energy sources and global economies. China must ensure that it maintains stable supplier relationships and multiple alternative pipeline/port options in the Middle East, Central Asia, Russia, and Africa simultaneously to minimize the risk of geopolitical instability or supply disruption, while also maintaining existing coal power facilities in use today and diversifying its energy supply by developing renewables at an unprecedented rate. It has taken on significant amounts of reserve energy to protect against catastrophic events that may or may not occur in the future, but that cannot be ruled out. The way in which China handles the challenges related to energy dependence over the next few decades will impactthe development of global energy markets, international trade and geopolitical stability for the entire world. 

By : Prachi Kushwah, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

West Asia is one of the most important regions for India because of its significance in energy security, trade, investment, maritime connectivity, and the welfare of the Indian diaspora. The ongoing conflict in West Asia has emerged as a major geopolitical crisis with consequences extending far beyond the region. As a country that maintains strong relations with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and several other regional actors, India is directly affected by developments in the region. The conflict has generated uncertainty in energy markets, disrupted shipping routes, increased security concerns, and created challenges for global economic growth. For India, the impact is multidimensional and influences foreign policy, economic stability, strategic planning, and national security. The crisis also highlights the importance of balanced diplomacy and preparedness in an increasingly interconnected world. 

India’s Strategic Interests in West Asia 

India’s engagement with West Asia is based on long-standing historical, economic, and cultural ties. The region supplies a large share of India’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas requirements. It is also a major destination for Indian exports and a significant source of investment. Millions of Indians work in Gulf countries and contribute to India’s economy through remittances. In addition, India cooperates with regional countries on security, counterterrorism, maritime safety, and infrastructure development. These extensive interests make peace and stability in West Asia extremely important for India’s long-term development and strategic objectives. 

Impact on Energy Security 

Energy security is the area most immediately affected by conflict in West Asia. India imports a substantial portion of its energy requirements, and disruptions in the region often result in fluctuations in global oil and gas prices. Rising energy prices increase India’s import bill and place pressure on public finances. Higher fuel costs also contribute to inflation by raising transportation and production expenses across sectors. The Strait of Hormuz remains a critical maritime chokepoint through which a significant share of global oil trade passes. Any disruption in this route can create uncertainty in international markets. To reduce risks, India has sought to diversify energy suppliers, expand strategic petroleum reserves, and accelerate the transition toward renewable energy sources. However, continued instability in West Asia remains a significant concern for India’s energy security framework. 

Trade and Economic Consequences 

West Asia is an important trading partner for India. The conflict has affected trade by increasing transportation costs and creating uncertainty in shipping networks. Security concerns in the Red Sea and surrounding waters have forced some vessels to take longer routes, increasing transit times and freight charges. Such developments affect exporters and importers alike. Indian businesses may face higher costs for imported raw materials, while exporters may experience reduced competitiveness in international markets. Financial markets also react to geopolitical uncertainty, resulting in fluctuations in investor confidence and market performance. Although India’s economy has shown resilience, prolonged conflict could create additional economic pressures and affect global growth prospects. 

Impact on the Indian Diaspora 

One of India’s primary concerns during any crisis in West Asia is the safety and welfare of Indian citizens residing in the region. Millions of Indians work across Gulf countries in sectors such as healthcare, construction, information technology, education, hospitality, and retail. Escalating tensions can create concerns regarding employment, transportation, and personal security. Families in India often depend on remittances sent by relatives working abroad, making the economic well-being of expatriate communities particularly important. The Government of India has consistently prioritized the protection of overseas citizens through diplomatic engagement, emergency assistance mechanisms, and contingency planning. The conflict has reinforced the need for robust evacuation and support systems to address potential emergencies. 

Maritime Security Challenges 

Maritime security has become increasingly important because of the conflict’s impact on major shipping lanes. India’s trade depends heavily on sea routes connecting the Indian Ocean with Europe, Africa, and West Asia. Threats to commercial shipping, including attacks on vessels and disruptions to maritime traffic, increase transportation costs, and create logistical challenges. The Indian Navy has enhanced surveillance and operational readiness to safeguard sea lines of communication and ensure the security of commercial shipping. Strong maritime capabilities are essential for protecting India’s trade interests and maintaining uninterrupted access to global markets. 

Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Implications 

India has adopted a balanced diplomatic approach toward the conflict. It maintains strong bilateral relationships with multiple countries in the region and seeks to preserve these partnerships while promoting peace and stability. India’s foreign policy is guided by the principle of strategic autonomy, enabling it to engage constructively with all stakeholders. The conflict has tested India’s diplomatic skills, as it must carefully navigate competing interests while safeguarding national priorities. India has consistently emphasized dialogue, de-escalation, and peaceful resolution of disputes. This balanced approach has strengthened India’s credibility as a responsible and pragmatic international actor. 

Defence and Security Implications 

The conflict carries broader implications for India’s security environment. Regional instability can influence global strategic dynamics and create opportunities for extremist organizations to exploit uncertainty. India closely monitors developments in West Asia because security challenges often have transnational consequences. Lessons from contemporary conflicts also contribute to military planning and modernization efforts. The use of advanced technologies, drones, cyber capabilities, and precision weapons in modern warfare provides valuable insights for defence preparedness. The crisis further highlights the importance of strengthening domestic defence production and enhancing strategic self-reliance. 

Investment and Connectivity Projects 

West Asian countries have become important economic partners and investors in India. Sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the region have invested in infrastructure, renewable energy, logistics, technology, and real estate. Political instability may influence investment decisions by increasing uncertainty, but long-term economic cooperation remains strong because of mutual interests. The conflict may also affect connectivity initiatives linking India with West Asia and Europe. Successful implementation of such projects requires a stable and predictable regional environment. Consequently, regional peace is essential for realizing the full potential of future economic corridors and infrastructure networks. 

Humanitarian Dimensions 

The humanitarian consequences of war extend beyond geopolitical considerations. Armed conflict results in civilian casualties, displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and disruption of essential services. India has consistently supported humanitarian assistance efforts and emphasized the importance of protecting civilians. Humanitarian concerns influence international diplomacy and shape global responses to crises. India’s support for relief efforts reflects its broader commitment to human welfare and international cooperation. 

India’s Policy Response 

India’s response to the West Asia conflict has focused on protecting national interests while supporting diplomatic solutions. The government has monitored developments closely, engaged with regional partners, and taken steps to ensure the safety of Indian citizens. Efforts to strengthen energy security, diversify supply sources, enhance maritime surveillance, and maintain stable diplomatic relations form key components of India’s strategy. By pursuing a balanced and pragmatic approach, India seeks to minimize risks and maintain stability despite an uncertain regional environment. 

Conclusion 

The West Asia war has significant implications for India because of the country’s extensive economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the region. Energy security, trade, investment, maritime transportation, diaspora welfare, and foreign policy are all influenced by developments in West Asia. Rising oil prices, disruptions in shipping routes, and geopolitical uncertainty present substantial challenges. At the same time, the crisis underscores the importance of diversification, strategic autonomy, and diplomatic engagement. India’s balanced approach has enabled it to protect its interests while supporting peace and stability. As the situation evolves, India will continue to adapt its policies to address emerging challenges and safeguard its long-term national interests. 

By : Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The political question surrounding the Iran war is no longer limited to foreign policy. Since the U.S.-Israeli air campaign began on February 28, 2026, the conflict has become a test of presidential credibility, economic management, congressional authority, and party discipline. A ceasefire framework and interim memorandum of understanding were announced in mid-June 2026, but the domestic political damage may already have been done. For Republicans, the issue is not only whether the military campaign achieved its stated objectives. The larger question is whether the war has weakened the party’s ability to defend its narrow congressional majority in the November 2026 midterm elections. 

The war as a domestic political test 

Foreign conflicts often reshape midterm politics when they become linked to pocketbook issues, presidential competence, and public trust. That pattern is especially important in 2026 because the Trump administration tied the campaign against Iran to national security, oil-market stability, and deterrence. Once the conflict disrupted shipping lanes and pushed energy prices higher, the political frame shifted. Voters were no longer evaluating only military action; they were also evaluating inflation, gasoline prices, household costs, and the risk of escalation. 

That dynamic matters because midterm elections are usually a referendum on the party in power. If a war is seen as successful, limited, and decisive, it can produce a rally effect. If it looks open-ended, expensive, or strategically confused, it can depress approval and widen the opposition’s advantage. The Iran war has moved through both phases: initial force, sustained uncertainty, and then an uneasy ceasefire process that did not erase public concern. 

What the polling says 

The public record is unfavorable for Republicans. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted from March 31 to April 02, 2026, found that 66% of Americans wanted the United States to end its involvement quickly, even if the administration did not fully achieve its objectives. In that same survey, 60% disapproved of the strikes on Iran, and only 27% preferred a prolonged campaign to secure the government’s goals. The same polling stream showed that gasoline had crossed US$ 4 per gallon, reinforcing the sense that the war was reaching into everyday economic life. 

Public opinion remained soft until June 2026. A Reuters/Ipsos poll reported on June 08, 2026, found Trump’s approval near a record low at 35%, with the war cited as a major factor in the decline. The same reporting noted that voters were still expecting higher fuel prices, which is politically damaging in an election cycle where inflation remains the dominant issue for many households. 

The coalition picture is more complicated than a simple partisan split. On June 12, 2026, Reuters reported that 54% of evangelicals opposed Trump’s military use in Iran and that his approval among evangelicals had fallen to 52%, down from 61% in August 2025. That matters because evangelical voters are one of the most reliable Republican constituencies. Any fracture there increases the risk of depressed turnout or protest abstention in competitive districts. 

Why the war is politically dangerous for Republicans 

The first source of risk is economic spillover. The conflict strained global energy markets, and even when prices later eased, the initial shock had already translated into higher inflation expectations, transport costs, and consumer anxiety. Republicans usually benefit when voters focus on border security, crime, and cultural issues. They are far less comfortable when the dominant question is whether the party in power made life more expensive. The Iran war pushed the debate toward exactly that terrain. 

The second risk is strategic ambiguity. Trump initially framed the campaign as a short, overwhelming operation with clear objectives. As the conflict stretched on, that promise became harder to defend. On June 15, 2026, Reuters reported that the United States and Iran had signed a memorandum of understanding to halt the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but that agreement immediately generated criticism from Republicans who thought it conceded too much. A policy that can be attacked both as too aggressive and too conciliatory is a political liability. 

The third risk is internal party fragmentation. The Republican coalition is no longer uniformly interventionist. Some lawmakers and commentators support Trump’s use of force, while others in the America First camp are skeptical of foreign entanglements and wary of spending political capital on Middle East operations. Once a conflict generates public division inside the governing party, it becomes harder to sustain a unified campaign message. 

The fourth risk is institutional. On June 03, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a war-powers resolution seeking to end continued military action in Iran without fresh congressional authorization, with several Republicans breaking ranks. On June 16, 2026, the Senate narrowly blocked a similar effort. These votes do not resolve the conflict by themselves, but they signal discomfort inside Congress. In midterm campaigns, such fissures often matter as much as formal policy outcomes because they shape perceptions of control and competence. 

Historical midterm logic 

Historical precedents also point toward risk for the president’s party. Brookings has noted that the president’s party has lost ground in 20 of the last 22 midterm House elections dating back to 1938. The main exceptions, in 2002 and 1998, reflected highly unusual circumstances: the post-September 11 security rally around President George W. Bush and the impeachment fight surrounding President Bill Clinton. In other words, only extraordinary national cohesion has reliably offset the normal midterm penalty. 

Brookings also emphasizes the link between presidential approval and midterm losses: the higher the president’s approval, the smaller the seat losses for the president’s party. That relationship matters because war usually helps incumbents only when it produces a strong rally effect and quick success. The Iran war did not do that. Instead, the conflict appears to have lowered approval rather than raised it, which is precisely the condition that tends to magnify midterm losses. 

House and Senate implications 

The House is the most likely point of vulnerability. Republicans entered 2026 with only a narrow margin, meaning even modest shifts in turnout or persuasion can alter control. A national environment defined by high prices, fatigue with the war, and doubts about the administration’s messaging could be enough to flip several swing districts. The June 03, 2026, House war-powers vote suggests that some Republican incumbents already view the conflict as politically hazardous in competitive seats. 

The Senate is harder to predict because the map is smaller and more state specific. Still, the war may indirectly assist Democrats in states where moderate and independent voters are more sensitive to economic disruption and executive overreach. If the party becomes identified with prolonged military engagement, congressional candidates in suburban and swing-state contests may be forced to defend a policy they did not design but are expected to own. 

Republicans would normally expect a foreign-policy win to stabilize the coalition. In this case, the ceasefire framework may reduce the most immediate political damage, but it is unlikely to create a durable rally unless it also delivers lower energy prices, visible de-escalation, and a convincing narrative of strategic success. Without those follow-through effects, the issue may remain a source of voter doubt rather than a source of credit. 

What would blunt the damage 

Three developments could limit the electoral cost. First, if the ceasefire holds through the summer of 2026 and oil and gasoline prices continue to fall, the economy may reclaim center stage from foreign policy. Second, if the administration releases a coherent post-conflict rationale that appears credible to independents, some of the uncertainty could fade. Third, if Democratic candidates fail to convert anti-war sentiment into a broader affordability message, the war alone may not be sufficient to determine control of Congress. 

Even so, the available evidence suggests that Republicans are more exposed than helped. Polling shows that the war is unpopular, the economic effects are visible, and the party’s internal messaging is fractured. Midterm elections rarely reward a governing party that is defending a costly conflict with uncertain strategic payoff. 

Conclusion 

The Iran war is not automatically a guarantee of Republican defeat, but it is a serious electoral headwind. As of June 2026, the conflict has weakened Trump’s approval, intensified concerns about inflation and energy costs, and exposed divisions inside the Republican coalition. Historical midterm patterns work against the president’s party even in ordinary conditions, and the 2026 environment is not ordinary. Unless the ceasefire solidifies quickly and economic pressure eases, the war is likely to function less as a victory lap and more as a liability in the November 2026 midterm elections. That does not make it the sole determinant of the outcome, but it may well be one of the most consequential factors shaping whether Republicans keep control of Congress. 

By : Soumya Dutta

On May 19^th 2026, India enhanced its Arctic engagement at the Third India-Nordic Summit at Oslo, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nordic counterparts reaffirming their commitment to science, sustainabilityand strategic partnerships. With the Arctic ice melting, the previously inaccessible shipping and trade routes are becoming accessible, and the region also holds immense economic value for its oil, gas and other critical minerals, which has further resulted to its growing geopolitical importance. Moreover, climate change in the Arctic can directly influence India through monsoon disruptions affecting food and water security and rising sea-levels threaten over 1300 of its island territories. The summit therefore reinforced India’s Arctic policy, by strengthening cooperation in polar research, climate and environmental issues and further elevating the relationship through the signing of a Green Technology and Innovation Strategic Partnership. 

India’s involvement in the Arctic however dates to 1920 when it signed the Svalbard Treaty as a part of the British dominion. In 2007 the first Indian scientific expedition reached the Arctic and in the following year the Himadri Research Station was established at Ny-Ålesund in Svalbard, Norway. This not only served India’s scientific utilities but became a strategic asset allowing a year-round research engagement in the region and has also helped in its transition, from a peripheral scientific presence to becoming a stakeholder in the Arctic governance. Established in 1966, the Arctic Council has emerged as the highest-level platform on discussions of the Arctic region and India was granted an observer status in 2013. Even without voting powers, the status however ensures India’s presence in key decision shaping processes in a globally significant region and collaboration with the Arctic states on issues of climate change, sustainable development and environmental protection.  

A signification portion of the Himalayan region also lies within India and because of its ice reserves, it has been referred to as the “Third Pole”. The Himalayas are of immense strategic importance as they influence water security, climate patterns and agricultural productivity by regulating river flows and monsoon rainfall, which sustain millions of people. Despite being geographically distant, the developments in the Arctic such as the melting ice, rising temperatures and shared patterns have highlighted the interconnected nature of the environmental changes in the Himalayas. Consequently, India has increasingly come to view the Arctic, the Antarcticand the Himalayan region as part of its broader polar programme, which reinforces the scientific and the strategic importance of having a sustained presence when it comes to the Arctic. 

In 2014, India deployed its first multi-sensor moored observatory, to provide real time subsea monitoring at Kongsfjorden and in 2016, an atmospheric laboratory was set up at Gruvebadet, one kilometer south of Ny-Ålesund. The momentum has been carried on by the release of the “India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development” in 2022. Based on the six pillars of scientific research, environmental protection, economic development, connectivity, cooperation and national capacity building, the policy laid down a multi-dimensional approach when it comes to the region and aims to create a more coherent framework that would secure India’s environmental, economic and strategic interests. At one level, the policy can be realized as an extension of India’s broader foreign policy approach rooted in multi-alignment and cooperative engagement through partnership with the Arctic states and adherence to a rules-based governance. However, by simultaneously, linking the policy to energy and resource security, shipping routes and drawing on its advances of space-based technologies such as satellite remote sensing and Earth observation, the policy has advanced a vision that situates the Arctic affairs within India’s broader national priorities, especially at a time when competition in regard to access and governance in the region among major powers continues to grow. 

Who Owns the Arctic? 

One of the first issues that emerges, when Arctic politics is considered is the concept of ‘global commons. The status of the region has been debated as many insist that it should not be exclusively controlled by a few states but instead must be seen as belonging to the international community, similar to the idea of the high seas, the region of Antarctica and outer space. The proponents of this idea argue that the Arctic must be governed through collective responsibility and managed in a way so that there is open access, as otherwise the focus becomes limited to narrow national interest and an exclusive influence by the Arctic Council countries. Moreover,issues of climate change have global consequences and a shared approach to preserve the region’s sensitive biodiversity also requires inclusive global governance. 

Those who argue against this state that the Arctic cannot be treated as a ‘global commons’ as most of the region falls under the sovereign jurisdiction of the eight Arctic states. Instead, it can be more accurately described as a “Quasi-Global Common”, particularly as these Arctic coastal states have clearly defined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial rights under the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Only the central Arctic Ocean beyond this EEZs form part of the high seas that can be truly considered as ‘global commons.  Moreover, the governance in the region is Ied by institutions such as the Arctic Council and the non-Arctic countries are given only observer status and therefore have limited influence when it comes to the region. Also, by extending the ‘global commons’ framework to the entire Arctic region it will end up ignoring the existing state sovereignty of the member countries and external powers may also justify greater involvement in the Arctic, particularly in relation to its resources and as new shipping routes emerge, thereby challenging the jurisdictional arrangements when it comes to the region. Moreover, unlike the Antarctic Treaty, there exists no equivalent comprehensive agreement when it comes to the Arctic. 

The Arctic as a Theatre of Great Power Rivalry 

The governance architecture of the Arctic region is sustained by the Arctic Council, as established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996. However, among the Council members, a loose grouping has emerged consisting of five Arctic littoral states, which include the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway to signal unity among the Arctic coastal powers and also to engage in issue specific cooperation, which will directly affect the interests of the coastal states. Since 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly disrupted the working of the Council and the remaining seven members also boycotted and refused participation. This continued till Russia’s chairmanship in the Council ended in 2023 and was succeeded by Norway.  

The present Danish Chairship is being seen as a possible ‘reset’, but even then, its effectiveness has been diminished as the Council must navigate the complex internal political dynamics and other emerging constraints. It has also undermined the idea of “Arctic Exceptionalism” that science and cooperation will separate it from global political conflicts. The shifting dynamics has also been reinforced by Russia, as it has moved closer to China, which it increasingly views as an Arctic partner. With the longest Arctic coastline and a fleet of 40 ice breaker vessels, Russia continues to consolidate its capabilities and operational presence in the region. 

As part of this wider great-power competition, the self-governing Arctic island and part of Denmark, Greenland has also become a region of consternation under the Trump administration, especially with its strategic location. Home to the critical US led Pituffik Space Base used for missile warning and aerospace monitoring purposes, it has become an important element of the North American defence against potential Russianoperations through the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK). Combined with rare earth minerals, the US has considered a range of options including military force to acquire Greenland. This resulted in considerable anxiety in countries such as Canada, as a potential US acquisition of Greenland can alter the balance of control over the contested Northwest Passage resulting in an American claim of jurisdiction through both Alaska and Greenland. France and Canada therefore responded to these developments by opening consulates in Greenland, while Denmark undertook ‘Operation Arctic Endurance’ to strengthen Europe’s strategic determination.  

The entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO has further bolstered its defence capabilities in the Arctic, especially as Russia increases its military buildup and China aims to deepen its strategic footprint in the region. An observer in the Arctic Council, China has positioned itself as an important stakeholder by identifying as a “Near-Arctic State’ and extending its Belt and Road Initiative in the region, through the emerging Arctic shipping corridors called the ‘Polar Silk Road’. The Sino-Russian cooperation has also emerged as a defining feature in the Arctic, through cooperation on energy projects such as LNG, shipping routes and military drills such as a joint military operation in the Bering Sea, near the coast of Alaska that featured naval exercise and bomber patrols. 

This growing contestation over shipping routes, resources and militarization has come to increasingly shape Arctic geopolitics. Russia continues to expand its strategic capabilities and influence in the region, by militarizing its northern coast, securing its key shipping corridors such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and heavily investing in infrastructure development, through which it aims to secure what it views as its sovereign frontier. The US remains security focused and aims to deter the Sino-Russian axis through operational readiness and through coordination with its Arctic allies. On the other hand, China’s strategy to the Arctic has been influenced by its aim to secure resources, to enhance its global status as a leading polar power and to develop alternative trade routes, through strategic partnerships as it lack a territorial presence in the Arctic itself. What therefore emerges in the Arctic is a competitive landscape where states position themselves both strategically and through commercial activities using territorial claims and expanding presence, driven by powers both within and beyond the region.  

India’s Expanding Arctic Footprint 

India is not merely a passive observer of these polar affairs and has increasingly created its own distinct position in the Arctic landscape. 

The Nordic Partnership: India’s engagement with the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Finland) have been largely based on shared democratic values, research driven partnership and deepening trade ties. Realizing the growing importance of countries like India in Arctic affairs, they had also extended their support for admission as an observer in the Arctic Council. In recent years the India-Nordic Summits in 2018 and 2022, focused on Arctic cooperation through polar research, climate change and environmental protection. This trajectory has been continued through the third Summit in Oslo, where they advanced a forward-looking strategic partnership in green technology, innovation, trade and investment, blue economy, STEM collaboration and defence. 

Norway has been the leading partner of India’s Arctic affairs, with its physical and strategic presence maintained through the Himadri research station and collaboration with the Norwegian Polar Institute. Through space collaboration with Sweden’s Esrange Space Centre, India also aims to strengthen its Arctic ground station capabilities and improve monsoon prediction and agriculture management. The inaugural India-Finland Arctic Dialogue at Rovaniemi, Finland in January 2026, has deepened cooperation on Arctic matters and India also aligns closely with polar priorities and environmental diplomacy in the region. 

The Russian Dimension: Amid Western sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, Moscow has increasingly turned towards diversifying its partnerships, with its long-standing bilateral ties with India, extending into cooperation in the Arctic as well. Both countries have agreed at the 23^rd India-Russia Annual Summit, to develop the Northern Sea Route to reduce the transit passage of energy and goods, while also enhancing connectivity through the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor.   Under the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics (RELOS), there is now an increased opportunity for India to gain strategic maritime presence in the Arctic, through shared military access of ports and bases. Moreover, through projects such as joint polar ship building, Russia has clearly established itself as the “gateway to the Arctic” and today serve as a crucial partner to India’s Arctic ambitions. 

The China Factor: A fellow observer of India in the Arctic Council, China’s Arctic strategy has been of commercial expansion, infrastructure development and narrative construction. By normalizing its presence in the Arctic, China wants to integrate itself into the broader economic and security architecture of the region. Moreover, the Northern Sea Route (NSG) offers a more attractive alternative that can overcome the “Malacca Dilemma” that China faces. For New Delhi, in contrast its strategy has been deepening its own scientific capabilities, strengthening its partnerships and positioning itself as a responsible stakeholder in Arctic governance. 

What Lies Ahead 

Moving forward, the Arctic is likely to be more fragmented, where scientific and environmental cooperation will coexist with strategic rivalry, regarding shipping routes and resource access. At the same time, climate change is remaking the Arctic’s physical geography, and these changes are moving faster than what its political geography can adapt to. The consensus-based governance structure that has been developed anchored in the Arctic Council, is also getting challenged by the escalating East-West geopolitical tensions. This may end up creating gaps for more transactional and interest-driven forms of engagement in the region. 

For New Delhi, it has already established a network of partnerships, articulated a comprehensive policy, and maintained a careful balance across competing geopolitics alignments. However, in the coming period its ambitions must be enhanced with investments, establishment of research infrastructure and long-term continuity in the region anchored in sustainability. There is also a need for greater coherence in managing parallel engagements with it Nordic partners and Russia, which may at time end up reflecting divergent strategic expectations. Therefore, these developments reflect that the High North is no longer a distant frontier, but one which increasingly sits at the intersection of India’s core national priorities. 

By : by Ankit Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and the broader international system has undergone profound transformations following decades of tension, proxy conflicts, and intermittent military confrontations involving Iran. While discussing the concept of a “new world order” in the context of Iran requires careful analysis of ongoing developments, the regional and global implications of Iran’s conflicts with various actors have already begun reshaping alliances, economic relationships, security architectures, and power balances that define international relations in the twenty-first century.  

Historical Background of Iranian Conflicts 

Iran’s confrontational relationship with the United States and its regional adversaries traces back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent 444-day hostage crisis fundamentally ruptured U.S.-Iran relations, creating animosity that has persisted for more than four decades. 

Throughout the 1980s, Iran fought a devastating war with Iraq that lasted from September 22, 1980 to August 20, 1988, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and massive economic destruction. This conflict established patterns of regional rivalry and demonstrated Iran’s willingness to endure enormous costs in pursuit of its strategic objectives. 

The United States designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 19, 1984, citing Iranian support for groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, and various militias throughout the Middle East. This designation has remained in place, shaping American policy toward Iran across multiple presidential administrations. 

Iran’s nuclear program has been a source of international concern since revelations in August 2002 about undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted extensive inspections and monitoring, while debates have raged about whether Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons capabilities or maintain exclusively peaceful nuclear energy programs. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, in Vienna, Austria, represented a major diplomatic achievement involving Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union (EU). This agreement placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. However, President Donald Trump announced American withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, reimposing sanctions and initiating a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. 

Tensions escalated dramatically following the U.S. drone strike that killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, near Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020. Iran retaliated with ballistic missile strikes against American forces at Al Asad Airbase in Iraq on January 8, 2020, marking one of the most dangerous moments in U.S.-Iran confrontation. 

Regional Power Dynamics and Proxy Conflicts 

Understanding the potential new world order following intensified Iran conflicts requires examining the complex web of regional rivalries and proxy wars that have characterized Middle Eastern politics. Iran has developed an “axis of resistance” comprising allied governments and non-state actors across multiple countries, creating what some analysts describe as a “Shia Crescent” extending from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. 

In Iraq, Iran has cultivated close relationships with Shia militias collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, which formed to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but have become powerful political and military actors. These groups maintain complex relationships with the Iraqi government while receiving support from Tehran. 

Hezbollah in Lebanon represents Iran’s most sophisticated and capable non-state partner. Established in the 1980s with Iranian assistance, Hezbollah has evolved into a powerful political party and military force with an estimated arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking anywhere in Israel.  

In Yemen, Iran has provided varying levels of support to the Houthi movement, which seized control of the capital Sanaa on September 21, 2014, and has fought against a Saudi-led coalition since March 26, 2015. The Houthis have launched numerous drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and have targeted international shipping in the Red Sea, demonstrating Iran’s ability to project influence across the Arabian Peninsula. 

Saudi Arabia views Iran as its primary regional rival, competing for influence across the Middle East along sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical lines. This rivalry has fueled conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain, creating a regional cold war that periodically threatens to escalate into direct confrontation. 

Israel considers Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for groups hostile to Israel as existential threats. Israeli military operations have targeted Iranian positions in Syria, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and reportedly conducted sabotage operations against Iranian nuclear facilities. The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, on November 27, 2020, near Tehran, attributed to Israel, demonstrated the covert dimension of this conflict. 

Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control 

A major military conflict involving Iran would have profound implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts and arms control frameworks globally. Iran’s nuclear program has been the subject of intense international scrutiny, negotiations, and confrontation for more than two decades. 

The collapse of the JCPOA following American withdrawal in May 2018 eliminated constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran subsequently began exceeding limits on uranium enrichment levels and stockpiles specified in the agreement. By 2023, Iran had enriched uranium to 60 percent purity, significantly closer to the 90 percent threshold typically required for weapons-grade material. 

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, either before or after a major conflict, the regional and global implications would be enormous. Saudi Arabia has indicated it would pursue its own nuclear weapons program if Iran acquired such capabilities. Turkish officials have made similar statements about Turkey’s right to nuclear weapons if regional neighbors possess them. 

A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states would fundamentally alter deterrence calculations, crisis stability, and the risk of catastrophic conflict. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force on March 5, 1970, and has been the cornerstone of global non-proliferation efforts, would face its most serious challenge. Widespread proliferation in the Middle East could trigger similar dynamics in other regions, including Northeast Asia and South Asia. 

Economic Consequences and Energy Markets 

Iran’s role in global energy markets means that major conflict involving the country would have immediate and far-reaching economic consequences. Iran possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves, with approximately 157 billion barrels of oil. 

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day pass, representing about 21 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption, is partially controlled by Iran. Iranian threats to close the strait during periods of high tension have caused oil price spikes and demonstrated Tehran’s potential leverage over global energy supplies. 

Economic sanctions imposed on Iran since the 1990s and intensified after 2018 have severely damaged the Iranian economy, causing currency devaluation, inflation exceeding 40 percent annually during peak periods, and reduced oil exports from more than 2.5 million barrels per day before sanctions to fewer than 500,000 barrels per day during maximum pressure periods. 

A post-conflict scenario could see either the intensification of Iran’s economic isolation if Tehran is decisively defeated, or potentially the lifting of sanctions and reintegration into global markets if diplomatic resolution accompanies military de-escalation. The economic reconstruction of Iran, should such a scenario emerge, would require hundreds of billions of dollars and create opportunities for countries and companies willing to invest. 

China has emerged as Iran’s largest trading partner, importing Iranian oil despite American sanctions and signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on March 27, 2021, covering economic cooperation, political coordination, and potentially military collaboration over a 25-year period. This relationship positions China to play a major role in any post-conflict reconstruction or normalization process. 

Realignment of Global Alliances 

The question of a new world order following the major Iran conflict necessarily involves examining how international alliances and partnerships might be reconfigured. The existing alliance structures, formed largely during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, have already shown signs of strain and transformation. 

The United States has maintained security partnerships with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, since the council’s establishment on May 25, 1981. These relationships have been anchored in American security guarantees, arms sales, and military presence in exchange for energy supplies and regional stability. 

However, confidence in American commitment to Gulf security has periodically wavered. The Obama administration’s pursuit of the JCPOA, perceived by Gulf states as insufficiently addressing Iranian regional activities, created tensions. The Trump administration’s limited response to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais on September 14, 2019, which temporarily removed approximately half of Saudi oil production, raised questions about American reliability. 

The Abraham Accords, announced on August 13, 2020, normalized relations between Israel and the UAE, followed by normalization between Israel and Bahrain on September 15, 2020, Morocco on December 10, 2020, and Sudan on October 23, 2020. These agreements represent a significant realignment in Middle Eastern politics, with Arab states prioritizing shared concerns about Iran over the Palestinian issue. 

Restructuring of International Institutions 

A new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran would likely involve either the reform or marginalization of existing international institutions. The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has been paralyzed on numerous Middle Eastern issues by divisions among permanent members holding veto power. 

Russia and China have repeatedly used their Security Council vetoes to block resolutions targeting Iran, Syria, or other allied states, while the United States, United Kingdom, and France have blocked resolutions critical of Israel or calling for actions against Saudi Arabia. This gridlock has undermined the UN’s credibility and effectiveness. 

The IAEA, established on July 29, 1957, has played a central role in monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and verifying compliance with agreements. The agency’s credibility and authority have been tested by disputes over access to Iranian facilities, interpretation of evidence, and politicization of its work by various parties. 

Technological and Cyber Dimensions 

A new world order following major conflict involving Iran would increasingly feature cyber warfare, drone technology, and artificial intelligence as central elements of military and strategic competition. Iran has developed significant cyber warfare capabilities, conducting attacks against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other adversaries. 

Iranian-supplied drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen and by Shia militias in Iraq have attacked Saudi oil facilities, American bases, and other targets throughout the region. The relatively low cost and increasing sophistication of drone technology democratizes military capabilities, allowing non-state actors and smaller countries to threaten larger adversaries. 

The proliferation of these technologies and tactics to non-state actors and other countries would be accelerated by major conflict, creating new security challenges globally. Cyber weapons, unlike nuclear weapons, cannot be easily contained through non-proliferation regimes, and drones are increasingly available through commercial markets. 

Conclusion 

The concept of a new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran encompasses multiple dimensions including regional power balances, alliance structures, nuclear proliferation dynamics, economic relationships, humanitarian consequences, and the effectiveness of international institutions. While the specific contours of such an order would depend on the nature, duration, and outcome of any conflict, several trends seem likely. 

The Middle East would likely see accelerated realignment of relationships, with traditional divisions between Arab and Israeli states giving way to coalitions based on shared threat perceptions regarding Iran. The role of external powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, would be reconfigured based on their actions during and after conflict. 

Nuclear proliferation risks would intensify, potentially triggering a cascade of additional countries seeking weapons capabilities. The credibility of non-proliferation frameworks would be severely tested, with uncertain prospects for restoration. 

Humanitarian costs would be enormous, creating refugee flows, displacement, casualties, and long-term trauma affecting millions of people across multiple countries. The international community’s capacity to respond would be severely challenged. 

Ultimately, the question of whether a genuine “new world order” emerges or simply a reshuffling of existing power dynamics depends on whether key actors learn from historical mistakes, prioritize diplomacy over military force, and construct inclusive frameworks addressing legitimate security concerns of all parties. The stakes are high enough that failure to achieve such outcomes could reshape the international system in dangerous and destabilizing ways for decades to come. 

By : Dhritiman Banerjee, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The Monroe Doctrine, one of the earliest pillars of American foreign policy envisaged the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of US influence. Cuba, a country in that region extremely close to the US coast of Florida is a prominent feature of the region and a country which has been influenced by the socialist ideals with support from the erstwhile USSR. This has perpetually raised concerns in Washington which views these developments as a threat to its own sovereignty. However, it should be noted that, while US-Cuba relations have been strained, policymakers in Washington have seen the Cuban region as a zone requiring US intervention with the Guantanamo naval base of the US navy located in Cuba. This article maps out the strategic importance of Cuba to the United States and why the US emphasizes on regime change in Cuba as a strategic goal. 

US-Cuba relations and the factors at play 

US-Cuba relations deteriorated rapidly after the Fidel Castro led Cuban Communist Revolution overthrew the US backed Batista regime. The new regime rapidly nationalized all American assets and industries in Cuba affecting American industries and trade between America and Cuba. The US responded by imposing a trade embargo on Cuba and suspending diplomatic relations. However, due to the proximity of the US Coast to Cuba, legal and illegal immigration from Cuba to the United States became a major issue and is now a prominent part of the US discourse on national security. American companies were also locked out of Cuban natural resources which led to major losses in business. Furthermore, support of the USSR to the Castro regime affected Cold War dynamics and posed a direct threat to the goals of the Monroe doctrine. Cuba’s proximity to strategically important waterways near the Gulf shipping route and the Panama and its erstwhile support of the USSR and current close relations with US adversaries like Russia and China pose an existential threat to the continental United States. This can be seen during the dynamics of the Cuban Missile Crisis where Soviet missiles in Cuba posed a direct nuclear threat to America. The events during the Cuban missile crisis highlights the importance of a friendly regime in Havana to Washington which views Cuba not as an insignificant small Caribbean nation but as a strategic chokepoint in the US sphere of influence which can be used by America’s enemies to directly attack the US mainland. 

Thus, Cuba remains one of the perennial foreign policy challenges of the United States. While the Obama administration attempted to thaw US-Cuba relations by restarting diplomatic relations between America and Cuba, relations did not improve and the Trump administration again adopted a hardline approach regarding Cuba. This is mainly due to the proximity of Cuba to the United States and Cuban cooperation with Russia and China. The US previous experience with Cuba makes it wary of Cuban relations with its adversaries as this poses a security dilemma for the United States. 

The American security dilemma regarding Cuba 

America is a country with a unique location with the Atlantic Ocean to the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West, it is largely immune to most military interventions as only large-scale naval invasions are possible directly on the United States which can mitigated by the vast US Navy. However, a potential adversary with a strong military presence in Cuba to strengthen Cuba’s security capabilities against US threats, circumvents this requirement and can directly pose a threat to the Continental United States. The lack of a friendly regime in Havana and its cooperation with Moscow and Beijing therefore poses a direct security challenge for Washington. This is a unique security dilemma faced by the US which sees Cuban cooperation with its adversaries as a threat to its own sovereignty.  

Therefore, while Cuban military and economic capabilities are vastly inferior compared to the United States, its geographic location allows it to become a major adversary of Washington by at once allowing Russian and Chinese military presence within its borders as well as continuing its historical stance of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America and oppose US backed regimes in the region. Therefore, America’s position with respect to Cuba can be compared to the Russian view of Ukraine as Nato expansion in Eastern Europe poses the same security dilemma to Moscow as Chinese and Russian presence in Cuba poses to Washington. Thus, it can be said that the tyranny of geography makes Cuba a major strategic adversary to the US as although their capabilities are asymmetric, Cuba’s geographical features augment its foreign policy position with respect to the US. Thus, it can be said that while the two sides are unequally matched, great power rivalry complicates this relationship which makes Washington cautious with respect to its position on Cuba. 

Conclusion 

This article notes that, Havana matters to Washington mainly because of its geographical proximity and its socialist regime as well as its cooperation with American adversaries. This makes regime change in Cuba a major strategic goal for the United States. However, since the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington has failed to achieve its foreign policy objective of regime change in Cuba. The presence of an adversarial regime in Havana poses a direct threat of the US vision of the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of American influence, a key goal of the Monroe doctrine. This also allows American adversaries including Russia and China to establish a presence in the US zone of influence to directly pose a challenge to American hegemony in the region and use Cuba’s strategic location to gain influence in Latin America, an event that would weaken American dominance over the Caribbean and Latin America and allow its adversaries to have influence on strategic waterways like the Panama Canal. This poses an existential threat for the United States because of which it seeks to assert control over Havana and establish a friendly regime in the country. But US historical strategic failures in Cuba and the recent policies of the Trump administration appear to indicate that tensions are expected to continue. 

By : Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

India has always looked at The Himalayas as an asset. A terrain which was arduous to navigate, providing the subcontinent with a natural barrier against colonial threats from Central Asia. The following geographical advantage seems to be under siege as China develops dual-use infrastructure to transform the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas. The seclusion of the region, which was considered a demerit, has been converted into an operational advantage. These developments have been formidable as China aims at expanding its strategic dominance.  

While the Border Roads Organization publishes yearly updates, with infrastructural advancements gradually progress in the region of Arunachal Pradesh, the question that lingers is the comparative advantage provided by these developments. China has developed roads covering more than 600km in Tibet in the last decade. The runways with the capacity of managing heavy-lift aircraft at Shigatze and Hotan, and a network of villages complement the objective of projecting a strategic dominance even further. 

Moreover, the confrontations as Doklam and Galwan have showcased Chinese intentions at pursuing its objective, even it takes making intimidating advances. India’s approach of investing into pluralistic alliances and pragmatically assessing its strategy to satisfy its national interests can be threatened if China gains geographic leverage. The following article delves into the bells that have rung, trying to assess the extent of the threat and carving India’s path of tackling these jeopardizing advances. 

Background  

It has been six years since the vehement Galwan clash happened, and India has lacked in its response to ensure a safety net in case of a recurrence. The policy recommendations look reactionary and symbolic in nature as India aims at investing in ISR, build infrastructure alongside the LAC, while banning Chinese applications and strict FDI approval screenings. A critical question that arises is whether we are even tackling the right problem?  

China’s buildup along the lines of LAC, have been considered as a measure of projecting its force and dominance in the region, and aid in any kind of aggressive advancements in the future. However, it also serves as a political purpose, where it is altering the baseline of the amount of presence considered normal in a disputed region, from both psychological and legal domains. If India approaches this issue from a strictly militaristic lens, it might tackle the threat of an aggressive Chinese advancement soon but still lose the border dispute. 

Urgency  

The urgency of this matter has intensified in the last three years, established from the two cases as follows: 

• The troop disengagement at Depsang Plains and Demchok in 2024, have been followed by continued construction activities moderated by the Chinese leadership in other non-disengaged sectors like the Pangong – Tso sector. Beijing disengagements instead of reflecting its compatibility, showcases its tactical approach with the strategic build-up sustaining in the background. 
   
   

• China’s multi-billion railway expansion into Tibet, which incorporates the successful completion of the first phase of the buildup the Sichuan – Tibet Railway and the Xinjiang -Tibet Railway, that run close to the LAC. These developments completely alter the current scenario as it facilitates PLA mobilization in delicate border regions. 

However, these developments are not immediate, but a process that has continued for a couple of decades now. It is critical to understand the Chinese strategy of Salami Slicing and then observe the gradual build-up in these regions.  

Sustenance before Strike – The Risk of Salami Slicing  

The most significant change in the military scenario alongside the Himalayas, Tibet, and the LAC is the PLA’s capacity and capability to endure, apart from its overwhelming arsenal. The Chinese expansion via the Salami Slicing way, has been following a consistent series of events, where the build infrastructure in the disputed territory, enhance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the region, gradually gulping it into the new status quo. 

The Case of the Depsang Bulge and Galwan valley  

The Depsang Bulge is a region which is controversial as it finds itself very close to the LAC. In late-2010s and 2020, China started crucial infrastructure buildup in the region. This was followed by a blockade of Indian access to five patrolling points in these Depsang plains. During the clash at the Galwan valley, Beijing had already gained leverage in these regions before the physical clash even began. Each of these steps were too minor for India to take a significant action, but detrimental in establishing influence in the region. 

Recent Developments  

China has created a network of all-weather roads, tunnels and forward supply posts encompassing the region of Tibet, which facilitates the expansion of PLA at LAC flashpoints within 3 days.  

Beijing has also expanded its accommodation capacity alongside the PLA, employing a strategy of Civil-Military Fusion using dual-use villages, with these settlements expanding to more than 600 in the last decade through the Xiaokang Border Village Programme.  

The villages of Mayjam and Pangda in Arunachal Pradesh documented by satellites, have shown reinforcements, communication towers, and infrastructure irregular with agricultural requirements. 

The Moldo-Garrison complex, which incorporates ammunition stores, helicopter landing paddocks, and pre-positioned fuel, portrays the region being prepared for sustaining combat operations, rather than patrolling.  

India, on the contrary, works along the lines of Ladakh, enhancing road connectivity, which was sanctioned more than a decade ago. It also portrays its disagreements regarding these build-ups, protesting these actions in the international arena. 

The gap in infrastructure and promptness is alarming for India, as it can turn out to be a significant factor in the honest assessment.  

The Two Front War 

These developments aren’t limited to LAC but are based on a pattern that has led to the creation of a nexus, afflicting the border dynamics for India. One major example for the following developments can be the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Karakoram Highway Expansion, which is gradually strengthening China and Pakistan’s military-economic relations. Moreover, PLA’s operations alongside the LAC, with Pakistan engaging the LOC has create a two-front scenario. 

The structure of India’s Military forces wasn’t built in a way to sustain a way alongside 4000+ kms of active frontier deployment. Moreover, China’s continuous investment and advancement along the LAC and assistanceprovided to Pakistan for deployment, has proved this possibility to gradually become a potential military strategy.  

Compounding both these threats creates a surveillance of asymmetry which increases the risk exponentially. China’s deployed infrastructure, include its SIGINT stations, and electronic warfare systems with the capability of high-altitude UAV operations near the Pangong Tso, provides Beijing access to view India’s deployments. China also has a leverage in electronic warfare, which gives it an advantage in the first few hours of an active conflict. 

Therefore, we come back to the question of whether we are preparing on the right front. An adversary that can see you better than how you see them, doesn’t require deception to surprise.  

Policy Recommendations and Suggestions 

Asking Appropriate Questions 

India uses the kilometers of road complete as a standard unit of benchmark used by the Border Roads Organization to highlight the border infrastructure progress. Change this metric to one that facilitates border connectivity. The question relevant to discourse is – How quickly can a brigade reach a contested space?  

The Ministry of Defence can publish an Index -LAC Connectivity Index, which compares China’s capability against India’s growing infrastructure sector by sector, and demonstrates India’s operational readiness. 

Create a Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell. 

There is no dedicated Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell to track Chinese construction along the Borders. While the Border Roads Organization, Defence Intelligence Agency, and National Technical Research Organization work in this domain, they function separately. There is no platform where the resources can be pooled, and a more coordinated approach can be taken. 

Build a Minilateral Narrative  

China has created more than just blocs and understandings. China has also created a narrative revolving around connectivity, shared prosperity and development. While India has worked along the same lines, it is reactionary in nature. India has created a security architecture with QUAD, CSC and IONS, while blocs like IMEC for economic strategy.  

India can use these groupings for information sharing through satellite imagery in times of conflict, a diplomatic support against civil military fusion strategy employed by China and boost its strategies of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR with the help of other partners to create a narrative of India’s intent at being the first responder and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean Region to gain credibility countering China’s influence built through the BRI. 

The Mountain Strike Corps 

New Delhi should rewrite the mandate of the Mountain Strike Corps. An offensive response formation can be used as a tool of deterrence with a framework that incorporates a forward deterrence posture, with pre-positioned and pre-delegated authority. 

Prepare for the Emerging Domains of Warfare 

China has been preparing for a multi-domain warfare possibility, and India needs to respond in a similar fashion.  

• A theatre level command structure should be created for electronic and cyberwarfare. 

• Include these areas of warfare in the Joint Military Doctrine and devise a well-structured plan for each of these domains. 

• Joint exercises and training programmes should be held with QUAD countries to improve awareness and enhance preparation. 

Conclusion 

The alarm bells have been rung and the threat on India increases every day. What is crucial right now is to dive into the fundamentals and find the right questions to address. The Chinese Salami Slicing tactic has been in progress since the last two decades now. As the Chinese advancement gets more aggressive India needs to prepare to dissuade, deter and defend its territory. The concept and manifestation of warfare is diversifying, and India needs to take prompt action in each of those directions.