By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The concept of Non-Alignment has, since the mid-20th century, shaped debates about sovereignty, great power politics, and the agency of states outside dominant blocs. It emerged not merely as a diplomatic strategy, but as an ideological and ethical challenge to superpower domination and hierarchical global governance. Originating during the Cold War, Non-Alignment became institutionalised through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) — a coalition of states asserting independence from both American and Soviet blocs in pursuit of peace, economic development, and political autonomy. But in the post-Cold War era, characterised by multipolar competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of new power centres, scholars and policymakers differ sharply on whether Non-Alignment retains relevance. This article traces the historical evolution of Non-Alignment, examines its theoretical foundations, critically assesses its contemporary manifestations and relevance, and identifies the challenges and opportunities it faces in the current global order.

In today’s geopolitical landscape, the debate has regained urgency. The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, the protracted Russia–Ukraine war, renewed conflict in West Asia, supply-chain fragmentation, and the securitisation of technology and energy markets have revived bloc-like tendencies in international politics. Yet, unlike the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War, the present system is fluid and multi-layered, marked by issue-based coalitions and strategic hedging. Many states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America increasingly resist binary choices, preferring diversified partnerships that preserve autonomy in defence, trade, and diplomacy. This evolving posture—often described as “strategic autonomy,” “multi-alignment,” or “issue-based alignment”—echoes the foundational logic of Non-Alignment while adapting it to contemporary realities.

At the same time, structural inequalities in global governance—visible in debates over UN reform, vaccine inequity during the COVID-19 pandemic, climate finance disputes, and debt crises in the Global South—have reinforced calls for collective Southern agency. Non-Alignment, therefore, must be re-evaluated not as a relic of Cold War diplomacy, but as a dynamic normative framework that continues to inform how states navigate power asymmetries, protect sovereignty, and negotiate space within an increasingly contested international order.

Historical Foundations of Non-Alignment

Cold War Origins: From Bandung to Belgrade

Non-Alignment first took substantive intellectual and political form in the Bandung Conference of 1955, where leaders from Asia and Africa articulated shared principles of sovereignty, peaceful co-existence, and anti-colonial solidarity. This conference, often considered the ideological precursor to NAM, articulated the desire of newly independent states to navigate between superpower competition without succumbing to bloc politics.

The Non-Aligned Movement was formally created at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), and Sukarno (Indonesia). These leaders envisioned a “third way” that rejected alignment with either the capitalist West or the communist East, emphasising autonomy, anti-imperialism, and multi-vector foreign policy.

Key Principles

The founding principles of Non-Alignment included:

• Respect for sovereign equality and territorial integrity;
• Non-interference in internal affairs;
• Peaceful coexistence;
• Opposition to colonialism, imperialism, and foreign domination.

These were not abstract doctrines; they reflected lived experiences of colonial subjugation and the strategic imperative for newly independent states to assert their agency in international affairs.

Cold War Role and Impact

During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) played multiple practical and political roles that extended far beyond rhetorical neutrality. Although it did not constitute a military alliance, its collective diplomatic weight significantly shaped international debates, particularly within the United Nations and other multilateral forums.

Diplomatic Leverage in the United Nations and Decolonisation

Non-aligned states collectively influenced UN voting patterns and global debates on decolonisation, apartheid, disarmament, and economic justice. During the 1960s and 1970s, NAM members formed a decisive voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), helping pass landmark resolutions on colonial independence. For instance, UNGA Resolution 1514 (1960), the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” was strongly supported by newly independent Afro-Asian states aligned with NAM principles. This resolution accelerated decolonisation across Africa and Asia, contributing to the independence of countries such as Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique.

Similarly, NAM played a pivotal role in mobilising global opposition to apartheid in South Africa. NAM members consistently supported sanctions and diplomatic isolation of the apartheid regime, reinforcing UN resolutions that eventually led to comprehensive international sanctions in the 1980s. The collective stance of NAM amplified the moral and political pressure on the South African government, contributing to the dismantling of apartheid in the early 1990s.

In disarmament debates, NAM countries were vocal critics of nuclear weapon monopolies. They advocated for universal nuclear disarmament and opposed the discriminatory nature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), arguing that it entrenched a hierarchy between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” NAM’s persistent advocacy ensured that nuclear disarmament remained central to UN discussions, even if tangible progress remained limited.

Buffer Against Superpower Coercion

By staying outside the two dominant blocs, many members sought to avoid becoming direct arenas of proxy warfare. Countries such as India and Yugoslavia pursued independent foreign policies that resisted formal alignment with either Washington or Moscow. Although some NAM states inevitably became embroiled in superpower rivalries, the movement provided diplomatic space and legitimacy for resisting external pressure.

For example, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, while Cuba itself was closely aligned with the Soviet Union, several NAM members called for de-escalation and peaceful negotiation rather than military confrontation. Similarly, countries like Indonesia and Egypt leveraged NAM membership to balance relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, extracting economic and military assistance from both without committing exclusively to either bloc.

Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito is another illustrative case. After its split with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia used Non-Alignment as a framework to secure Western economic aid while maintaining socialist governance, thus avoiding absorption into either bloc.

Advocacy for Economic Justice and the NIEO

NAM also championed transformative ideas aimed at restructuring the global economic order. In 1974, NAM states were instrumental in pushing for the UN General Assembly’s declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO sought fairer trade terms, regulation of multinational corporations, sovereign control over natural resources, and improved technology transfers to developing countries.

This initiative was closely linked with the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77 (G-77), many of whose members overlapped with NAM. The oil-producing NAM members within Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) further demonstrated economic leverage during the 1973 oil crisis, when coordinated production cuts reshaped global energy politics and highlighted the bargaining power of developing countries over strategic resources.

Although the NIEO ultimately faced resistance from industrialised Western economies and was never fully implemented, it marked a historic moment in which the Global South collectively challenged structural inequalities embedded in the Bretton Woods system.

A Collective Voice Beyond Military Power

NAM’s strength was not derived from military alliances or collective defence mechanisms but from normative influence and numerical strength. By representing a majority of newly independent states, it reframed international legitimacy. Its members collectively shifted the moral centre of gravity in debates on colonialism, racial discrimination, sovereignty, and economic inequality.

In essence, during the Cold War, Non-Alignment functioned as both shield and platform: a shield protecting smaller states from automatic alignment and coercion, and a platform enabling them to articulate a shared vision of a more equitable international order. While it could not eliminate superpower rivalry, it undeniably altered the diplomatic landscape by ensuring that the voices of the Global South were neither silent nor peripheral in shaping twentieth-century international politics.

Post-Cold War Transition: Decline or Transformation?

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 transformed the geopolitical landscape. Bipolarity gave way first to unipolarity under U.S. dominance, and then gradually towards a complex multipolar world with the rise of China, India, Brazil, and regional powers. Many scholars argued that NAM’s raison d’être had evaporated with the end of Cold War bipolar rivalry, leading to perceptions of obsolescence and institutional inertia.

However, this view, while understandable, oversimplifies both NAM’s purposes and the nature of contemporary global politics. Critics overlooked how Non-Alignment was not strictly about Cold War blocs but about state autonomy and resisting hierarchical power structures in general. Recent analyses argue that NAM retains normative relevance even in an era dominated by economic interdependence, regional conflicts, and emerging geopolitical blocs.

From Ideological Neutrality to Strategic Autonomy: Reinterpreting Non-Alignment in a Multipolar Age

In recent academic work, the concept of Non-Alignment has been reinterpreted beyond rigid Cold War binaries. Rather than viewing it as passive neutrality between two superpowers, contemporary scholarship understands the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a normative framework and political language for contesting global hierarchies. It embodies claims to legitimacy, sovereign equality, and decision-making autonomy in world politics — directly challenging the assumption that smaller or developing states must align with dominant powers for security guarantees or economic advancement.

This scholarly re-reading argues that while the term “non-alignment” may have evolved into “strategic autonomy” or “multi-alignment,” the underlying logic remains intact: states seek to avoid structural subordination within great-power rivalries. In the contemporary context of intensifying U.S.–China competition, this logic is visible in the foreign policies of several middle and emerging powers. For instance, India maintains defence cooperation with the United States through the Quad while continuing energy and military engagement with Russia, reflecting calibrated autonomy rather than bloc loyalty. Similarly, many Southeast Asian states engage economically with China while relying on U.S. security partnerships, resisting pressure to make binary choices.

The Global South’s response to the Russia–Ukraine war further illustrates this reinterpretation. Numerous Asian, African, and Latin American countries avoided fully aligning with Western sanctions regimes, instead calling for dialogue and negotiated settlement within the United Nations framework. Their stance was less about indifference and more about preserving diplomatic flexibility and national interest.

Thus, Non-Alignment today functions less as institutional rigidity and more as strategic positioning — a deliberate assertion that sovereignty, developmental priorities, and policy independence cannot be subsumed under renewed great-power competition.

Multipolarity, Global South Assertion, and the Contemporary Relevance of NAM

The contemporary international system is increasingly defined by multipolarity and fragmentation. Power is no longer concentrated in two rigid blocs but distributed among multiple influential actors, including the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and several emerging regional powers. In this fluid environment, many states pursue issue-based or multi-vector alignments rather than fixed alliances. This evolving practice reflects the modern adaptation of Non-Alignment in the form of “strategic autonomy.” Countries such as India exemplify this approach: deepening defence cooperation with the United States, sustaining energy and military ties with Russia, expanding trade with the European Union, and engaging actively with ASEAN-led regional frameworks. Such calibrated diplomacy allows states to maximise economic and security benefits while avoiding structural dependence on any single power centre. In essence, the logic of Non-Alignment has shifted from ideological neutrality to pragmatic flexibility in a competitive multipolar order.

Within this context, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) remains one of the largest international groupings, comprising around 120 member states representing a majority of the Global South across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Its demographic and diplomatic weight gives it potential leverage in multilateral platforms such as the United Nations General Assembly, where voting coalitions often shape normative outcomes. The 19th NAM Summit held in Kampala, Uganda, in January 2024 reaffirmed this collective relevance. With participation from approximately 90 delegations and 30 heads of state, the summit emphasised cooperation, development, and reform of global governance. Notably, NAM adopted a unified position on the Israel–Gaza conflict, condemning Israel’s military actions as illegal and calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire and support for Palestinian statehood based on pre-1967 borders. Beyond Gaza, NAM members continue to articulate shared concerns regarding conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, instability in the Sahel, tensions in the South China Sea, and crises in Yemen. While the Movement lacks military cohesion, it serves as a diplomatic platform through which developing nations collectively address war, inequality, debt distress, and structural marginalisation — reinforcing its evolving relevance in an era marked by geopolitical uncertainty and systemic imbalance.

Assessing Contemporary Relevance: Enduring Utility or Institutional Limitation?

The relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in today’s geopolitical order remains contested. Supporters argue that its emphasis on strategic autonomy and sovereignty strongly resonates amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. For example, India has expanded defence cooperation with the United States through the Quad while continuing to purchase discounted oil from Russia after the Ukraine war — demonstrating calibrated autonomy rather than bloc alignment. NAM also amplifies Global South concerns such as climate justice and debt relief. During debates in the United Nations General Assembly on the Gaza crisis in 2024, many NAM members collectively supported resolutions calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, reflecting coordinated diplomatic positioning. Furthermore, its long-standing advocacy for peaceful coexistence retains normative significance in conflicts where smaller states fear external intervention.

However, critics highlight structural limitations. NAM’s consensus-based, non-binding framework constrains enforcement capacity and coherent strategy. Internal diversity often dilutes collective action; for instance, member states adopted varied positions on UN resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, alternative platforms such as BRICS have demonstrated greater institutional traction by expanding membership and advancing initiatives like discussions on alternative financial mechanisms. Thus, NAM’s contemporary relevance lies less in operational power and more in its symbolic and normative influence within an increasingly fragmented multipolar system.

Conclusion

Non-Alignment was born in a bipolar world, but its core impulse was never confined to Cold War geometry. At its heart lay a deeper political claim: that sovereignty, equality, and autonomous decision-making are non-negotiable foundations of international order. While the rigid bloc politics that shaped the mid-twentieth century have dissolved, the structural realities of power asymmetry, strategic coercion, and economic inequality persist. In this sense, the relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement lies not in reproducing Cold War neutrality, but in adapting its normative core to a multipolar and fragmented world.

Today’s global environment—marked by U.S.–China rivalry, prolonged regional conflicts, debt crises, climate injustice, and technological bifurcation—has revived pressures on states to align. Yet many countries continue to hedge, diversify partnerships, and assert strategic autonomy. This behaviour reflects the enduring logic of Non-Alignment, even if expressed through new vocabulary such as multi-alignment or issue-based coalitions.

NAM may lack enforcement capacity or institutional cohesion, but its symbolic and diplomatic value remains significant. It provides a collective platform for the Global South to contest hierarchy, demand reform, and articulate alternative visions of global governance. Ultimately, Non-Alignment endures less as a bloc and more as a principle—an assertion that in an unequal world order, autonomy itself is a form of power.so amplifies Global South concerns such as climate justice and debt relief. During debates in the United Nations General Assembly on the Gaza crisis in 2024, many NAM members collectively supported resolutions calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, reflecting coordinated diplomatic positioning. Furthermore, its long-standing advocacy for peaceful coexistence retains normative significance in conflicts where smaller states fear external intervention.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), accelerated by the global prominence of tools such as ChatGPT, has transformed governance and state capacity across the world. While AI enhances efficiency and automation, its integration into surveillance infrastructures raises serious concerns about privacy, autonomy, and civil liberties. In authoritarian contexts, AI does not merely support governance—it expands the state’s ability to monitor, predict, and regulate behavior. The deployment of AI-enabled surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region represents one of the most advanced and controversial examples of this transformation. Home to approximately 11–12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority with deep historical and cultural ties to Central Asia, Xinjiang has long been central to China’s security discourse. Following episodes of unrest, particularly the 2009 Ürümqi riots, Beijing intensified securitization policies in the region, framing them as counter-terrorism and anti-separatism efforts.

What distinguishes Xinjiang is the scale and technological sophistication of its surveillance regime. AI-driven systems—including facial recognition networks, biometric data collection, and predictive policing tools such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)—have been used to aggregate data from checkpoints, smartphones, and financial records to identify individuals deemed “suspicious.” Surveillance technology firms such as Hikvision have been linked to this expanding infrastructure. In authoritarian systems where legitimacy rests on stability rather than electoral consent, surveillance becomes a preventive instrument aimed at deterring mobilization and regulating minority populations. In Xinjiang, digital monitoring has reportedly intersected with restrictions on religious practices, language use, and transnational communication, fueling international criticism and debates over human rights. This paper argues that AI in Xinjiang functions not merely as a security tool, but as a mechanism of algorithmic governance that reshapes state–society relations and raises critical questions about the future trajectory of digital authoritarianism.

Historical Consolidation and Cultural Reconfiguration: China’s Expanding Control over Xinjiang

The consolidation of Chinese control over the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region must be understood within a long historical arc of imperial expansion, internal colonization, and contemporary technological governance. The Qing dynasty formally incorporated the region in 1884, designating it “Xinjiang,” meaning “newly returned frontier.” This nomenclature itself reflects a state-centric territorial claim and continues to inform official narratives; contemporary government platforms emphasize that Xinjiang has “never been East Turkestan,” directly countering separatist discourse. Following the fall of the Qing and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing institutionalized administrative control while promoting demographic restructuring. Large-scale migration of Han Chinese—initially through state-led settlement programs and later through economic incentives—gradually altered the ethnic balance of the region. Scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin describe this as a strategy of internal colonization, echoing earlier imperial “divide and rule” practices. While earlier decades relied on physical coercion and ideological campaigns under Mao Zedong, the 1990s onward witnessed indirect migration policies and economic integration efforts that masked deeper assimilationist objectives.

In the twenty-first century, control has expanded from demographic engineering to cultural and digital governance. Uyghur identity—rooted in Islam, Turkic linguistic heritage, Central Asian traditions, and a rich poetic culture—has increasingly come under regulatory scrutiny. Influential literary figures such as Abdurehim Ötkür, often regarded as the father of modern Uyghur poetry, symbolize a tradition where literature and communal memory are central to identity formation. Reports by journalists including Lily Kuo have highlighted restrictions on Uyghur intellectuals, poets, and educators, signaling a broader cultural contraction. Since 2017, state policies have reportedly included re-education campaigns, mosque demolitions or renovations aligned with “Sinicization,” and curriculum reforms privileging Mandarin over Uyghur language instruction. Recent updates (2023–2025) indicate a strategic shift: while mass detention facilities appear reduced in visibility, digital monitoring, data-driven governance, and heritage “repackaging” for tourism continue. Beijing simultaneously promotes Xinjiang as a hub within the Belt and Road Initiative, projecting stability and development. Thus, historical patterns of territorial consolidation have evolved into technologically mediated assimilation, where demographic change, cultural regulation, and algorithmic surveillance operate together to redefine state–society relations in Xinjiang.

From Imperial Censorship to Revolutionary Surveillance

Surveillance and censorship in China long predate the contemporary leadership of Xi Jinping. During the Qin and Han dynasties, political orthodoxy and loyalty to the ruler were central pillars of governance. Criticizing imperial authority was prohibited, and censorship mechanisms were institutionalized through the office of the Censorate. Censor officials monitored bureaucratic conduct, judicial proceedings, and public works, reporting directly to the emperor. Although framed as anti-corruption oversight, these institutions reinforced centralized authority and ideological conformity.

During the Qing dynasty, intelligence practices became more formalized. The spy manual Jianshu, authored by Zhu Fengjia, reflected an awareness of covert operations and counter-rebellion strategies. Surveillance thus evolved from bureaucratic oversight to proactive intelligence gathering. Under Mao Zedong, espionage networks initially used against Japanese forces were retained and repurposed domestically. Maoist campaigns institutionalized mass mobilization and neighborhood monitoring, embedding surveillance within everyday social life. What distinguishes contemporary China is not the existence of surveillance, but its technological scale and sophistication.

Digital Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Xinjiang

Modern surveillance intensified significantly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, particularly after the 2009 Ürümqi riots. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe Xinjiang as one of the most securitized regions globally. The state implemented grid-style policing, recruiting thousands of officers and introducing the “one policeman per village” model. Chen Quanguo’s tenure as regional party secretary after 2016 marked a dramatic escalation in security infrastructure.

Digital surveillance now complements physical policing. Biometric data collection, facial recognition systems, mandatory smartphone applications, and predictive platforms such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) enable real-time monitoring. Leibold characterizes this system as “ethnic sorting,” where individuals are categorized according to perceived ontological worth. Surveillance is framed as governance or “social management,” shifting its language from coercion to administrative normalcy.

Recent developments (2023–2025) indicate a transition from overt mass detention to normalized digital monitoring. International scrutiny led to sanctions on several Chinese technology firms, yet Beijing continues to promote AI governance domestically and export surveillance technologies abroad. Simultaneously, the state highlights economic development and tourism in Xinjiang, presenting stability as proof of policy success.

Continuities of Ethnic Management and Cultural Regulation

The securitization of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region reflects broader and historically embedded patterns of ethnic management and demographic engineering. Han migration policies—traced by scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin—illustrate long-standing strategies to recalibrate the region’s demographic balance and bind it more closely to the Chinese mainland. State-led development initiatives, expansion of railway networks, and consolidation of cotton and energy industries have strengthened economic integration while reinforcing dependence on central authority. Xinjiang’s cotton sector, for instance, remains central to China’s textile supply chain, yet it has also been the focus of international scrutiny and import restrictions imposed by the United States and parts of Europe over allegations of forced labor—claims Beijing firmly denies.

Cultural governance operates in parallel with these economic and demographic strategies. Policies promoting Mandarin-language instruction in place of Uyghur-medium education, restructuring mosque architecture under “Sinicization” guidelines, and regulating Islamic practices indicate that governance extends beyond security into the domain of identity formation. David Tobin argues that narratives portraying Uyghurs as security risks cultivate mutual insecurities between Han and Uyghur communities, thereby legitimizing expanded state control. Since 2023, China has further formalized AI governance regulations emphasizing “security” and “controllability,” embedding digital monitoring within broader administrative reforms. Although reports suggest that some re-education facilities have become less visible, digital surveillance infrastructures—facial recognition systems, biometric databases, and grid-style management—remain operational. Simultaneously, Beijing has promoted tourism campaigns showcasing Xinjiang’s cultural heritage, signaling a strategic shift from overt coercion to managed representation.

Taken together, current developments reinforce the argument that China’s approach represents continuity rather than rupture. Surveillance has evolved from imperial oversight and Maoist mass campaigns into technologically sophisticated digital governance under Xi Jinping. The integration of AI, economic modernization, and cultural regulation demonstrates a layered strategy: territorial consolidation is pursued not only through security apparatuses, but through demographic restructuring, economic dependency, and symbolic reconfiguration of minority identity. Contemporary policy in Xinjiang thus exemplifies how historical modes of control have been recalibrated for the digital age, blending modernization with centralized authority in ways that redefine state–society relations.

Algorithmic Governance and the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) represents the operational core of digital surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Designed as a data-driven policing system, IJOP aggregates information from CCTV networks, biometric databases, smartphone monitoring applications, and police checkpoints. According to investigations by Human Rights Watch, the platform compiles behavioral data and flags individuals for investigation or detention based on algorithmic risk indicators. Leaked documents—often referred to as the “Karakax List”—revealed that individuals were reportedly detained for non-violent behaviors such as foreign contacts, religious observance, or possession of certain digital materials. Authorities maintain that the system enables “precision” counter-terrorism and prevents extremism; however, critics argue that predictive policing in this context expands suspicion to everyday life.

Screenshots of IJOP databases reportedly display detailed identity fields including name, ethnicity, gender, ID numbers, and behavioral flags. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe this as a shift from reactive law enforcement to algorithmic pre-emption—where risk is inferred rather than proven. This mirrors global debates following the 9/11 surveillance expansions in the United States exposed by Edward Snowden, yet the Xinjiang case differs in scale, ethnic targeting, and integration with mass political campaigns such as “Strike Hard.” Since 2023, although Beijing claims vocational centers have been phased out, reports indicate that digital monitoring remains deeply embedded, supported by AI governance regulations emphasizing national security. International sanctions against firms linked to surveillance supply chains coexist with China’s continued export of “smart city” technologies abroad, suggesting Xinjiang functions both as a domestic security project and a model of digital authoritarian governance.

Global Contestation, Sanctions, and Competing Narratives (2023–2026)

The international response to developments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has intensified over the past few years, transforming the issue from a human rights debate into a focal point of geopolitical contestation. In 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released an assessment stating that serious human rights violations in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity. Although Beijing rejected the findings as politically motivated, the report institutionalized global scrutiny within multilateral frameworks. Parallelly, the United States enacted and implemented the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, presuming goods produced in Xinjiang to be linked to forced labor unless proven otherwise. This legislation significantly impacted global supply chains, particularly in textiles and solar panel components, given Xinjiang’s centrality to cotton and polysilicon production. The European Union and several G7 countries have also imposed targeted sanctions on Chinese officials and entities allegedly linked to surveillance and detention systems.

Technology firms associated with surveillance infrastructure—most notably Hikvision and Huawei—have faced export restrictions and blacklisting measures. These actions underscore the growing recognition that Xinjiang is not merely a regional security matter but a test case for the global governance of AI. At the same time, China has deepened partnerships with countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, exporting “smart city” technologies that integrate facial recognition, biometric data systems, and predictive policing software. Critics argue that this diffusion risks normalizing algorithmic authoritarian practices beyond China’s borders, while Beijing frames such exports as neutral tools for modernization and crime prevention.

Domestically, official narratives emphasize stability, economic growth, and poverty alleviation in Xinjiang. State media highlights increased tourism, infrastructure development, and employment statistics as evidence of policy success. Beijing maintains that vocational training centers have been dismantled and that counter-terrorism efforts were necessary responses to violent incidents in the 2000s and early 2010s. However, diaspora testimonies, investigative journalism, and leaked documents such as the “Karakax List” continue to challenge these claims, arguing that digital monitoring, biometric databases, and algorithmic risk scoring remain embedded within everyday governance.

From a critical perspective, the Xinjiang case demonstrates three core dynamics.

First, AI-enabled surveillance transforms suspicion into a predictive category, where algorithmic flagging substitutes individualized judicial process.

Second, ethnic identity becomes datafied—reduced to quantifiable markers within systems such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP).

Third, international fragmentation over human rights norms enables competing narratives: liberal democracies frame Xinjiang as a site of systemic repression, while China presents it as a successful model of stability-oriented governance.

Thus, the contemporary debate is not solely about Xinjiang; it concerns the future of digital governance globally. As AI becomes central to administrative capacity worldwide, the Xinjiang model raises urgent normative questions: Can predictive policing coexist with due process? Does algorithmic efficiency erode minority rights when embedded in securitized frameworks? And will economic interdependence dilute accountability mechanisms? The trajectory of international responses between 2023 and 2026 suggests that Xinjiang has evolved into a defining case in the politics of algorithmic authoritarianism—where technology, sovereignty, and human rights intersect in unprecedented ways.

Conclusion

AI-driven securitization in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has transformed everyday Uyghur life into a domain of constant monitoring. Through systems like the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), routine actions—phone calls abroad, VPN usage, possession of Uyghur-language texts, or visible religious practice—can reportedly trigger investigation or detention. Policies restricting Islamic expression and promoting assimilation reflect a broader objective tied to the “One China” framework: integrating the region through control. In this context, AI does not merely enhance security—it systematizes identity regulation, compresses space for cultural and religious autonomy, and leaves limited scope for dissent or preservation of distinct Uyghur identity.

By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, stands as one of the most ambitious experiments in transnational infrastructure development and geo-economic integration in the twenty-first century. Conceived in 2013, CPEC aims to link Gwadar Port on Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast with Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through an extensive network of highways, railways, pipelines, energy projects, and digital infrastructure. With commitments exceeding US$62–65 billion, the corridor is envisioned not merely as a bilateral development programme but as a transformative initiative capable of reshaping regional connectivity, trade flows, and strategic alignments across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. More than a decade into its implementation, CPEC presents a complex picture it has achieved significant gains in energy generation and infrastructure development, yet it continues to face structural, political, security, and economic challenges that complicate its long-term success. 

At its core, CPEC reflects a convergence of strategic and economic interests between China and Pakistan. For China, the corridor offers a shorter and potentially more secure route to the Arabian Sea, reducing reliance on the congested Strait of Malacca, through which a large share of its energy imports currently passes. For Pakistan, CPEC promises to address chronic infrastructure deficits, mitigate energy shortages, attract foreign direct investment, and position the country as a regional trade and logistics hub. Pakistan’s strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia enhances its potential to serve as a gateway for landlocked Central Asian states seeking access to warm-water ports. This convergence of geographic advantage and economic necessity explains why both Beijing and Islamabad continue to describe CPEC as a cornerstone of their “all-weather strategic partnership.” 

One of the corridor’s defining features is that, unlike other Belt and Road corridors, it runs almost entirely through a single country. Most of its infrastructure traverses Pakistan before terminating at Gwadar, a deep-sea port of immense strategic significance due to its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy chokepoint through which a substantial share of the world’s oil shipments passes. Gwadar’s development as a port, free trade zone, and logistics hub has the potential to transform Pakistan’s maritime profile while offering China a direct gateway to markets in the Middle East and Africa. By linking overland Silk Road routes with the Maritime Silk Road at Gwadar, CPEC occupies a central position in China’s broader vision of intercontinental connectivity. 

The first phase of CPEC, often described as the “early harvest” period, focused primarily on addressing Pakistan’s severe energy crisis and infrastructure gaps. Prior to 2015, Pakistan faced daily electricity shortages of 4,000–6,000 megawatts, which constrained industrial productivity and economic growth. CPEC-related power projects including coal-fired plants, hydropower facilities, solar parks, and wind farms added over 6,000 megawatts to the national grid, significantly stabilizing electricity supply and reducing load shedding in major urban centres. Projects such as the Sahiwal Coal Power Plant, Port Qasim Power Plant, and the Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park contributed to a more reliable energy mix, enabling industries to operate more consistently and improving investor confidence. While the reliance on coal raised environmental concerns, these initiatives laid out the foundation for a more diversified energy portfolio that may evolve toward cleaner sources in the corridor’s second phase. 

Infrastructure development has been another major area of progress. CPEC-funded projects have constructed and upgraded hundreds of kilometers of highways and motorways, including the Multan–Sukkur Motorway, the Hakla–Dera Ismail Khan Motorway, and key sections of the Karakoram Highway. These transport corridors have reduced travel times, improved freight efficiency, and enhanced domestic market integration. Fiber-optic links between Pakistan and China have strengthened digital connectivity, facilitating telecommunications, data exchange, and e-commerce growth. Developments such as the Gwadar Eastbay Expressway and the New Gwadar International Airport further reinforce the port’s potential as a future logistics hub. Collectively, these projects have improved internal connectivity and laid the groundwork for Pakistan’s emergence as a regional transit state. 

CPEC has also produced measurable socio-economic benefits, though their distribution remains uneven. Corridor-related projects are estimated to have generated over 200,000 jobs, benefiting engineers, technicians, and skilled workers across Pakistan. Improved electricity supply has supported small and medium enterprises, while infrastructure expansion has enhanced access to healthcare, education, and markets in remote areas. In Balochistan, Gwadar’s development has introduced vocational institutes, healthcare facilities, desalination plants, and industrial zones, contributing to local economic activity. However, perceptions of unequal benefit distribution and limited local participation continue to fuel grievances, highlighting the need for more inclusive development strategies. 

Foreign direct investment linked to CPEC has provided a critical stimulus to Pakistan’s economy. China has emerged as Pakistan’s largest bilateral investor, with investments spanning energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and industrial parks. Trade between the two countries has expanded, reinforcing economic interdependence. Special Economic Zones (SEZs), including Rashakai in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Allama Iqbal Industrial City in Faisalabad, aim to attract export-oriented industries, promote technology transfer, and integrate Pakistan into global value chains. These zones offer tax incentives, modern infrastructure, and streamlined regulations designed to stimulate industrialization and diversify exports beyond traditional sectors such as textiles. 

The transition to CPEC Phase 2 reflects a strategic shift from infrastructure-led development toward industrial cooperation, agricultural modernization, digital connectivity, and green energy. This phase emphasizes business-to-business partnerships, export-oriented manufacturing, and technological innovation. Agreements have been signed to establish industrial parks in sectors such as home appliances, steel, textiles, and electronics. Agricultural collaboration focuses on modern farming techniques, water management, and value-added agro-exports. The digital corridor aims to expand broadband access, promote e-commerce, and bridge Pakistan’s digital divide. These initiatives align with Pakistan’s long-term development goals while reflecting China’s growing emphasis on sustainable and green development. 

Despite these achievements, CPEC’s long-term success remains uncertain due to persistent challenges. Security concerns are paramount, particularly in Balochistan, where insurgent groups have targeted Chinese nationals and infrastructure projects. High-profile attacks on diplomatic missions, educational institutions, and economic facilities underscore the risks facing foreign workers and investors. Such incidents not only threaten lives but also increase project costs and deter investment. Addressing local grievances through inclusive development, improved governance, and community engagement is essential for enhancing security and ensuring the corridor’s sustainability. 

Pakistan’s macroeconomic instability presents another major obstacle. Rising external debt, currency depreciation, inflation, and fiscal deficits have constrained the country’s capacity to finance large-scale projects and meet repayment obligations. A significant portion of Pakistan’s external debt is owed to Chinese lenders, raising concerns about debt sustainability and financial dependence. While CPEC investments have stimulated growth in certain sectors, the anticipated broad-based economic transformation has been slower than expected. Several SEZs remain underdeveloped, and bureaucratic inefficiencies continue to delay industrial projects. 

Political instability and governance challenges further complicated implementation. Changes in political leadership have introduced uncertainty regarding CPEC’s transparency, cost structures, and alignment with national priorities. Allegations of corruption, inadequate provincial consultation, and politicization of projects have undermined public trust. Ensuring policy continuity, transparency in contracts, and equitable provincial participation will be critical to maintaining investor confidence and fostering national consensus. 

Regional disparities and public resentment also pose significant challenges. Critics argue that CPEC projects disproportionately benefit Punjab and Sindh while neglecting less-developed regions such as Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. Local protests in Gwadar have highlighted concerns over limited access to electricity, clean water, and employment opportunities for residents. Addressing these concerns through inclusive policies, local hiring quotas, and community development programmes is essential for building social legitimacy and preventing further unrest. 

Environmental sustainability remains an increasingly urgent issue. The reliance on coal-fired power plants in CPEC’s initial phase has drawn criticism due to carbon emissions and ecological degradation. Infrastructure projects have disrupted local ecosystems and fisheries, particularly in coastal areas. As Pakistan faces climate vulnerabilities such as water scarcity and extreme weather events, integrating renewable energy and environmental safeguards into future CPEC projects is imperative. The emphasis on green energy in CPEC Phase 2 signals progress, but effective implementation will determine its impact. 

CPEC’s geopolitical implications extend beyond bilateral relations. For China, the corridor enhances strategic depth and diversifies trade routes. For Pakistan, it elevates geopolitical significance by positioning the country as a transit hub linking Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, the project has generated apprehension among regional actors, particularly India, which opposes CPEC on sovereignty grounds because segments of the corridor pass through Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India views the corridor as part of a broader Chinese strategy to expand its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean region. In response, New Delhi has invested in alternative connectivity initiatives such as Iran’s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor. 

Afghanistan and Central Asian states view CPEC as both an opportunity and a risk. Integration into corridor networks could facilitate trade, infrastructure development, and access to global markets. However, concerns persist regarding dependency, sovereignty, and equitable benefit distribution. Regional cooperation, transparency, and multilateral engagement will be essential to transforming CPEC from a bilateral initiative into an inclusive regional framework. 

Ultimately, the question of whether CPEC is seeing success in Pakistan does not yield a simple affirmative or negative answer. The corridor has undeniably transformed Pakistan’s energy landscape, improved infrastructure, attracted investment, and enhanced the country’s strategic relevance. Yet persistent security threats, economic vulnerabilities, governance weaknesses, environmental concerns, and regional tensions continue to constrain its full potential. CPEC’s future success will depend on Pakistan’s ability to implement structural reforms, ensure transparent governance, promote inclusive development, and prioritize environmental sustainability. 

As CPEC enters its second decade, it presents an opportunity for recalibration. By shifting focus toward industrialization, technological innovation, human capital development, and green growth, the corridor can evolve into a comprehensive development framework rather than a purely infrastructural project. If managed effectively, CPEC could reshape Pakistan’s economic trajectory and redefine patterns of regional connectivity. However, its ultimate success will hinge on whether the benefits extend beyond physical infrastructure to foster inclusive prosperity, institutional resilience, and sustainable development. 

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Aid diplomacy has emerged as a central instrument of contemporary statecraft, enabling states to project influence, cultivate goodwill, and secure strategic interests. In South Asia, India’s engagement with its eastern neighbours—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—illustrates a calibrated blend of developmental partnership and geopolitical strategy. Rooted in deep historical, cultural, and economic linkages, India’s neighbourhood policy increasingly relies on development cooperation to promote regional stability and shared prosperity.

India’s aid diplomacy in the eastern sub-region is shaped by three interrelated imperatives. First, the stagnation of SAARC and persistent India–Pakistan tensions have shifted New Delhi’s focus from broad regionalism to sub-regional frameworks such as BBIN (Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal). These arrangements prioritize functional cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and economic integration. Second, China’s expanding footprint through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has intensified geopolitical competition, compelling India to offer an alternative development model emphasizing demand-driven assistance, capacity-building, and relatively fewer political conditionalities. Third, development cooperation serves India’s security interests by addressing transnational challenges including migration, energy insecurity, border instability, and climate vulnerabilities. While India projects itself as a development partner rather than a traditional donor, its aid diplomacy remains closely aligned with strategic concerns. Balancing geopolitical competition with genuine partnership constitutes the core challenge of India’s eastern engagement.

Patterns of Aid Allocation and Geostrategic Drivers

Between 2003 and 2023, India allocated approximately ₹57,884 crore in grants and assistance to Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Bhutan received the largest share—nearly 75 percent—reflecting the depth of bilateral trust and institutionalized cooperation, particularly in hydropower development. Bangladesh received a comparatively smaller grant share but benefited from growing Lines of Credit and infrastructure investments, especially after 2013, when China expanded its economic footprint.

Bhutan’s dominant allocation underscores India’s long-standing strategic partnership. The India–Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement (1972, renewed in 2016) institutionalized free trade and transit access. Hydropower cooperation—covering projects such as Chukha, Tala, Mangdechhu, and Punatsangchhu—anchors the economic relationship. Electricity exports to India constitute a major portion of Bhutan’s revenue, embedding deep economic interdependence.

In Nepal, aid allocations fluctuated alongside geopolitical developments. Following China’s increased engagement under BRI and President Xi Jinping’s 2019 visit to Kathmandu, India expanded assistance to reaffirm its role as Nepal’s primary development partner. Infrastructure, post-earthquake reconstruction, and cross-border transmission lines became focal points.

Myanmar’s aid trajectory corresponds closely with political transitions and border security concerns. Democratic reforms after 2011 saw expanded Indian cooperation, particularly in connectivity and border development. Following renewed instability after 2021, India adopted a pragmatic approach—maintaining development engagement to preserve border stability and safeguard strategic projects.

Overall, India’s aid allocation patterns reveal strategic responsiveness. Assistance increases during periods of heightened Chinese involvement or political instability, demonstrating that development cooperation functions as an instrument of geopolitical calibration.

BBIN and Sub-Regional Reorientation

The paralysis of SAARC since 2014 prompted India to pivot toward sub-regionalism. BBIN emerged as a pragmatic alternative, allowing functional cooperation in connectivity, transport, and energy without broader political deadlocks. A core objective is integrating India’s North Eastern Region (NER) with neighbouring economies. Historically isolated yet strategically vital, the NER connects India to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and China. Aid-funded infrastructure projects aim to transform the region into a gateway linking South Asia with Southeast Asia under the Act East Policy.

India–Bangladesh connectivity has advanced significantly. Restoration of pre-1965 rail links, operationalization of the Akhaura–Agartala railway, inland water transit routes, and the Maitri Setu bridge have reduced logistical barriers. Access to Chattogram and Mongla ports enables northeastern states to access sea routes, lowering transportation costs. The BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement, operational among Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, facilitates cargo movement despite Bhutan’s pending ratification.

With Myanmar, projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway seek to link the NER with Southeast Asia. India has also funded border development initiatives in Chin State and the Naga Self-Administered Zone to manage insurgency risks and migration flows.

In Bhutan, hydropower cooperation, customs modernization, and proposed rail connectivity reinforce deep economic integration. India’s support for BIMSTEC complements BBIN by embedding sub-regionalism within a broader Bay of Bengal framework. Sub-regionalism thus functions as both developmental strategy and geopolitical instrument—enabling India to consolidate influence while counterbalancing external actors.

Energy Diplomacy and Regional Grid Integration

Energy cooperation represents one of the most consequential pillars of India’s eastern diplomacy. Cross-border power trade has evolved into a mechanism of structural interdependence linking Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and India within an emerging regional electricity market.

India–Bangladesh energy ties expanded following the 2013 Power Purchase Agreement. Bangladesh now imports over 1,000 MW from India through multiple interconnections. The Maitree Super Thermal Power Project at Rampal further institutionalized cooperation. Significantly, Bangladesh began importing Nepali hydropower via India’s grid—marking South Asia’s first trilateral electricity trade arrangement and a milestone for BBIN energy integration.

Nepal and Bhutan possess vast hydropower potential—approximately 40 GW and 23 GW respectively. India has invested heavily in transmission lines such as the Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar corridor, enabling Nepal to export surplus monsoon electricity. By 2024–2025, Nepal increasingly utilized the Indian Energy Exchange for cross-border trade, generating valuable foreign exchange earnings. Bhutan’s hydropower cooperation remains the bedrock of bilateral relations. However, cost overruns and rising debt have sparked debates in Bhutan regarding economic dependence and financing models. India’s gradual shift from grant-based assistance to loan financing has introduced new sensitivities.

From India’s perspective, hydropower imports diversify renewable energy sources, support decarbonization goals, and reduce the need for politically contentious dams in its Northeast. Acting as a transmission hub enhances India’s centrality within the regional energy architecture. Nevertheless, climate change, glacial melt, and basin-level ecological concerns complicate hydropower geopolitics. Long-term sustainability will require equitable financial models and transparent water governance mechanisms.

Economic Integration and Digital Statecraft

India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion. In Nepal, India supported constitutional transitions and continues engagement amid coalition volatility. High-level exchanges in 2023–2025, cooperation on parliamentary training, and assistance in infrastructure and energy projects reflect India’s preference for institutional continuity despite frequent government changes in Kathmandu. In Bhutan, India assisted the 2008 democratic transition and continues institutional capacity-building, including digital governance cooperation and parliamentary exchanges following Bhutan’s 2023–2024 electoral cycle. Myanmar presents a complex case: after the 2021 military coup, India adopted a calibrated approach—advocating restoration of democracy while maintaining engagement to secure border stability, manage refugee inflows into Manipur and Mizoram, and protect connectivity projects such as the Kaladan corridor. Additionally, India has participated in ASEAN-led consultations on Myanmar and provided humanitarian assistance to affected populations, reflecting its dual-track policy of democratic advocacy and strategic engagement.

In Bangladesh, India emphasized constitutional continuity following the January 2024 general elections, reiterating support for democratic processes while deepening cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and security coordination. The operationalization of cross-border railway links, expansion of power trade exceeding 1,000 MW, and collaboration on coastal shipping agreements underline the interlinkage between governance stability and economic integration. Counterterrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing remain central, particularly given concerns over extremism and cross-border insurgent networks. India has also expanded election management training and capacity-building programs for officials from neighbouring countries under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) framework, alongside digital public goods cooperation such as the rollout of UPI-based payment connectivity and digital identity partnerships. Across the region, New Delhi increasingly links governance assistance with digital public infrastructure, e-governance platforms, and institutional modernization. India’s democratisation strategy thus reflects pragmatic liberalism—supporting representative institutions and governance reforms while simultaneously safeguarding strategic interests, border security, and regional stability in a fluid geopolitical environment.

Energy Geopolitics in the Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal constitutes a critical maritime energy frontier. UNCLOS rulings in 2012 and 2014 resolved maritime delimitation disputes among Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India, reducing conflict risk and enabling offshore exploration. Bangladesh, confronting declining domestic gas reserves and rising LNG import costs after the global energy shocks triggered by the Ukraine conflict, has accelerated offshore bidding rounds and revised its Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) to attract foreign investment in deep-water blocks. India, under its Open Acreage Licensing Policy (OALP), has expanded exploration activities along its eastern offshore basin, encouraging greater participation by domestic and international energy firms. Meanwhile, China’s operationalization of the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines linking the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan province has added a strategic dimension, reducing Beijing’s dependence on the Malacca Strait while strengthening its presence in the eastern Indian Ocean.

India’s response integrates maritime diplomacy, energy cooperation, and security initiatives under its SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine. Cooperation with Bangladesh includes the operationalization of the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, expanded cross-border electricity trade, and growing coordination on LNG supply and coastal shipping. India has also intensified naval exercises, coordinated patrols, and maritime domain awareness sharing with Bangladesh and Myanmar to safeguard offshore energy assets and sea lanes of communication. Through BIMSTEC, India promotes regional frameworks for coastal shipping, grid interconnectivity, and blue economy collaboration. Although territorial disputes have largely subsided, the Bay of Bengal continues to function as a theatre of economic rivalry and strategic balancing, where energy security, maritime governance, and great-power competition remain deeply intertwined.

Democratisation and Political Stability

India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion.

India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion. In Nepal, India supported constitutional transitions and continues engagement amid coalition volatility. High-level exchanges in 2023–2025, cooperation on parliamentary training, and assistance in infrastructure and energy projects reflect India’s preference for institutional continuity despite frequent government changes in Kathmandu. In Bhutan, India assisted the 2008 democratic transition and continues institutional capacity-building, including digital governance cooperation and parliamentary exchanges following Bhutan’s 2023–2024 electoral cycle. Myanmar presents a complex case: after the 2021 military coup, India adopted a calibrated approach—advocating restoration of democracy while maintaining engagement to secure border stability, manage refugee inflows into Manipur and Mizoram, and protect connectivity projects such as the Kaladan corridor.

In Bangladesh, India emphasized constitutional continuity following the January 2024 general elections, reiterating support for democratic processes while deepening cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and security coordination. Counterterrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing remain central, particularly given concerns over extremism and cross-border insurgent networks. India has also expanded election management training and capacity-building programs for officials from neighbouring countries under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) framework. Across the region, New Delhi increasingly links governance assistance with digital public infrastructure, e-governance platforms, and institutional modernization. India’s democratisation strategy thus reflects pragmatic liberalism—supporting representative institutions and governance reforms while simultaneously safeguarding strategic interests, border security, and regional stability in a fluid geopolitical environment.

Conclusion

India’s aid diplomacy in its eastern neighbourhood represents a nuanced strategy that integrates development cooperation with geopolitical pragmatism. Through infrastructure development, energy integration, digital financial systems, and sub-regional frameworks such as BBIN and BIMSTEC, India has repositioned itself as a central stabilizing actor in eastern South Asia. Aid allocation patterns demonstrate strategic responsiveness, particularly amid China’s expanding regional presence. Cross-border power trade and grid connectivity underscore India’s ambition to act as the energy hub of the sub-region. Meanwhile, economic integration through trade liberalization and Digital Public Infrastructure reflects evolving forms of economic statecraft.

Yet challenges remain. Bureaucratic delays, debt sustainability concerns, perceptions of asymmetry, climate vulnerabilities, and intensifying geopolitical competition complicate India’s neighbourhood policy. Sustaining credibility will require balancing strategic leadership with sensitivity to sovereignty and equitable partnership. As regional geopolitics grow increasingly complex in 2024–2025, India’s eastern aid diplomacy underscores a broader transformation: from traditional donor–recipient hierarchies toward structured interdependence. The long-term success of this model will depend on transparent governance, inclusive development, and India’s ability to harmonize strategic interests with the aspirations of its neighbours.

By: Sagnik Sarkar

As South Asia grapples with rising energy demand, climate commitments, and the need for regional cooperation, cross-border renewable energy partnerships are emerging as a crucial pillar of sustainable growth. India and Bhutan, long bound by cooperation in various fields and levels, are now extending their collaboration into the bright new domain of solar energy, marking a subtle but significant shift in the region’s clean energy landscape.

In lines with the national vision of ‘Neighbourhood First’, the India Power Corporation Limited (IPCL) has recently highlighted that it has formed a strategic collaboration with Bhutan’s Green Energy Power Private Limited to create a 70 MW solar power project in the neighbouring country’s Paro district. The project is part of the West Bengal-based power utility’s goal to install 1.5 GW of solar capacity in Bhutan over the next five years, according to a press statement.

Bhutan’s power consumption is predicted to get more than double in the next two years, led by initiatives like the Gelephu Mindfulness City, the rise of energy-intensive businesses like ferrosilicon, and increased demand from digital infrastructure and crypto-mining operations, according to the report. And while hydropower continues to dominate Bhutan’s energy mix, the government aims to reach 25,000 MW of installed power capacity by 2034, including 5,000 MW from solar energy.

According to IPCL, the Tenchuka location in Paro was chosen after a preliminary review of technical criteria. The project location is claimed to have approximately 200 acres of south-facing terrain with good solar irradiation and is located about 3.5 kilometers from the Jamjee 220/33 kV substation, thereby opening the doors to seamless power evacuation. Indeed, this project is not just a capacity addition, but rather reflective of India’s commitment to cross-border energy cooperation. This is in line with the country’s bigger goal of becoming a 1.5 GW solar player by 2030.

According to Tandi Dorji, founder of Green Energy Power Private Limited, this will be Bhutan’s first independent power producer (IPP) project. Bhutan is attracting increased attention from Indian powerhouses. Recently, Tata Power and Druk Green Power Corporation (DGPC) have joined hands and are progressing towards creating about 5,000 MW of clean energy projects, while Adani Power has inked an MoU with DGPC to explore hydropower potentials of up to 5,000 MW. Likewise, Reliance Power, in collaboration with Druk Holdings and Investments, is creating a 500 MW solar project and planning additional hydropower capacity.

IPCL, founded in 1919, is an integrated power company with interests in electricity distribution, smart metering, renewable energy, and thermal generating.
The corporation has reported that renewable energy currently accounts for more than 70% of its portfolio.

This recent collaboration represents more than a single solar installation, as it reflects a gradual broadening of India–Bhutan energy cooperation in response to evolving demand patterns and climate priorities. As Bhutan looks to diversify its energy mix beyond hydropower and India advances its neighbourhood-first approach through renewable energy partnerships, such initiatives underline the strategic role of cross-border solar projects in shaping a resilient and sustainable regional energy architecture.

By: Ankit Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

The geopolitical history of Spain has had a progression of selective steps, beginning with the central place in the first world empire, to its long-term isolation, and finally to the modern-day renaissance that has placed the country in an influential role in the European arena. The 1492 expedition of Christopher Columbus in effect gave Spain a monopoly to the new lands discovered in the Americas. The scale of the modern Spain relevance is established on the basis of the Treaty of Tordesillas signed on 7 June 1494, dividing the non-European territories between Spain and Portugal. This way, Spain was able to gain control of most part of the American continent, thus creating the foundation of a large transcontinental empire. The Spanish Empire later became the first real global polity enforcing its control over lands in North and South America, the archipelago of the Philippines, parts of Africa and Europe, such as the Dutch Republic and a number of Italian states. The Spanish military conquests in Europe as well as its economy and the Real de a Ocho, the first currency to circulate in the world were all funded and fueled by the presence of silver and gold deposits in Bolivian Potosí and Mexican mines.

But the heights of the Spanish hegemony faded away with the emergence of the rule of competing forces taking the form of the gradual decline of its territorial possessions, power as well as the hegemony. This phenomenon is captured in an African maxim, El que mucho abarca, poco aprieta, which means ‘’Has so much to hold, but little to squeeze’’ and is a useful summary of the overstretched imperialism of Spain. During the centuries, the Spanish Crown ruled a vast American empire concurrently, fought continental wars against France, Protestant Dutch and England as well as against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. This dispersion of resources, ambition and attention eventually led to its downfall as it exemplifies the real world example of geopolitical power when diluted to an undesirable extent loses its effectiveness. 

The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) that ended the war of the Spanish Succession was a turning point in geopolitics of Europe. Spain in its turn had to hand over territorial property to Italy and the Netherlands, even more important to deliver the bases of naval strategic location Gibraltar and Menorca to the United Kingdom. This moved the balance of power in the Mediterranean theatre permanently. Another pivotal that can be considered the watershed moment in history is the attack of Spain by Napoleon, which caused a significant economic and social disaster on the territory of the country. Internal political instability that was rooted in the nineteenth century included civil wars, a stagnant economy and constant economic decline.

 Spain did not industrialise in a similar way to Britain, France, and Germany hence hindering its status as a supplier of power in European matters. Spain adopted a policy of neutrality in the World War I, which can be explained by relatively weak military position of the country, antagonized by the constant struggles in Morocco, as well as its domestic political unsteadiness which did not allow active involvement in the war. The civil war in Spain (1936–1939) turned to be a proxy war as a foreshadowing of the beginning of the Second World War. Although Spain proclaimed its neutrality in World War 2, it changed sides and openly supported the Axis powers adopting a non-belligerent stance.

The cold war period also made Spain very diplomatically isolated; the state was not a participant in the United Nations, the Marshall plan, and the establishment of NATO and thus lost the perceived importance in international scene The Pact of Madrid (1953) institutionalised the sale of the land by Spain to establish the U.S. military bases in return on key economic and military aid, and the isolation of Spain came to an end, and the Franco rule was cemented. The peaceful shift to democracy in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975 tied the concept of geopolitical relevance in Spain fundamentally.

 The Indispensable Pivot: Spain and the World Geopolitics.

 Spain rarely appears in the vast list of world geopolitics as much as the United States, China, and Russia do. The most common argument presented by geopolitical experts explains the relative marginalisation by the absence of nuclear armaments and permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council.

However, Spain is a geopolitical key actor not because of its raw, military or economic power, but its strategic location, which can never be replicated, its critical connections with various continents and peoples, and the bargaining power it can exercise in the major institutions which create the twenty-first century brought its importance. Spain is on the crossroad of the most crucial geopolitical routes of the world since it is the gateway linking Europe and Africa to facing the core of the European Union and NATO. As a result, Spain has become an essential partner, a key node, and a frontline state that is facing numerous international issues, including security and defense, migration and energy.

The Geographic Pivot: Continents and Oceans Intersection

 The most basic asset of Spain is the geography; it is not a geographical position but an intersection of sea and land networks. Alongside its enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, located on the North African coast, Spain shares control of the Strait of Gibraltar a key marine chokepoint in the world. In excess of over 100, 000 ships per annum pass through this narrow route, handling around 25 per cent of the world shipping. The security and control in this strait are one of the most vital issues in the whole international economy since the instability of this Gulf would have a cascading effect which would far outshine the effects seen in Suez Canal or the Red Sea. Spain is also a country with a major Atlantic and Mediterranean coast, the second one in the entirety, the other country is France. This two-sided positioning offers Spain as an excellent hub in maritime security in Europe. The geographical importance of this area is strategic because it is a military and geopolitical factor. The Navigable docking station Rota, is a Spanish-American station; one of the most vital naval bases in Europe. It is the hub of the U.S Navy 6th fleet and houses four of the Aegis armed destroyers that comprise the backbone of the NATO ballistic missile defense network over the European continent. With the assistance of Moron Air Base, the base gives Spain a strong structural power within the NATO alliance.

The European Leader: A Big Four Leader in Brussels. Spain has been transformed into a core participant of the European project since it joined the then European Economic Community in 1986 as a peripheral state. Since the exit of the United Kingdom, Spain is now considered one of the so-called Big Four in the European Union, along with Germany, France, and Italy. Being the fourth-largest economy in the Euro zone, the economic health and the decisions of the policies made by Spain, have a direct effect on the stability of the common currency.

Spain has a very delicate external border of the EU as the country has to cope with one of the most fluid migration paths; the western African, through the Canary Islands, and the western Mediterranean routes. This gives Spain a huge bargaining power in Brussels. The EU cannot do without cooperation with Spain that handles the whole migration policy with asylum issues and that has often used the position to the country’s advantage to obtain funding and political goodwill.

Spain is also turning out to be an important gas energy hub in Europe with the largest regasification capacity of liquefied natural gas (LNG) which has a value of about one-third of the total liquid natural gas capacity in the EU countries.

The Atlantic Bridge: The Hispanidad Vector of Latin America

The deep, unmatched and multidimensional relation with Latin America is the geopolitical resource peculiar to Spain. Spain occupies the key location of the Hispanosphere, a linguistic bloc with more than 580 million speakers of Spanish language and, thus, it is ranked as the second-most spoken native language in the world. The common language, combined with a deep culture and historical relationship, provides Spain with a rich amount of soft power and intrinsic sympathy, which facilitate a diplomatic and business interaction in the world arena.

 In case of the European Union, Spain is the representative which interacts with Latin America on default terms. It is the leading advocate of strengthening the EU-Latin American relations, facilitates the trade agreements like the EU Mercosur one and directs the development help. In the process of dealing with the region, Madrid has often been consulted first when Brussels tries to do so. The Spanish corporations have powerful influence on the Latin American continent. Large companies like banking, Telefonos and energy workforce (Santander, Telefonos, and Repsol) have made the region a base of their international business. This enhanced integration economically ensures Spain an investment interest and a strong economic bargaining in not only the stability of the region but also, which also forms a significant political influence in the region.

The North African Frontier: A Complex and Critical Relationship

 The relationships of Spain with its southern neighbors, in the Maghreb, most especially between Spain and Morocco, Spain and Algeria are probably the most complex, unstable and sensitive in terms of geopolitics. The relations with Morocco contain the main issues of migration and the territorial conflicts. The fact that Spain has been relying on Morocco to control the migration flows gives it substantial bargaining power which has been used to achieve political compromises through what has come to be known as the opening taps.

The Spanish strategic shift of recent days in support of the scenario of Moroccan autonomy, shifting its traditional stance of neutrality is seen as a geopolitical gangland act that may intervene the Spanish in convincing Morocco to join it in managing migration and permit them to resolve a diplomatic crisis. Along with mending relations with Morocco, Spain also broke the ties with Algeria, the other power of the region and the main rival of Morocco. Another example of what a high-risk balancing act would require Spain to carry out is the Algeria that is the source of much of its natural gas needs, balancing between its interests in energy security and the inter-regional competition of the two most significant southern neighbors. This Spanish policy is a southern one that makes Spain indispensable. This is referred as soft power and economic specialization.

 The Spanish position in the world arena is characterized not only by the high level of soft power, but also by the high level of professional economy in the world. The nation is always in the list of top ten contributors of world soft power. This popularity can be minded by global popularity of its language, its globally renowned tourism sector, one of the most frequented destinations on planet Earth, its distinguished football clubs (Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) and its cultural exports in the form of film, cuisine and even arts. In addition to the tourist industry, Spain leads the quiet world on a number of major sectors with the renewable energy sector being one of them, giving particular focus to wind and solar energy.

 Conclusion: The Indispensable ‘Pivotal Power’

The significance of Spain does not involve the urge to control but rather centrality. It happens to be the geographical hinge and as the institutional screw serving as part of the EU the consistent and consistent policy of the south, the cultural and economic pivot between Europe and Latin America, what cronies the military pivot of the whole NATO coalition. It is true that other power may be greater, but Spain roots and its tactics are more deeply implanted in the very problems and possibilities of our era. Disregarding Spain is tantamount to disregarding one of the geopolitical pinpoints of the world.