By: Dhritiman Banerjee

The MENA region and Afghanistan have become increasingly important focal points among experts on National Security issues. While, these states have been prominent throughout the modern history of armed conflict because of their natural resources and their geo-political significance. They gained the attention of experts particularly in the final years of the Cold War following the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq conflict as well as the rise of international terrorism and more prominently the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This emphasis continued throughout the 1990s and gained prominence post 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan and later the formulation of the Bush doctrine and the Iraq War. The Bush doctrine was the cornerstone of the early years of the Global War on Terror and aimed to provide a Grand Strategy to counter the new threat posed by violent non-state actors like terror groups to international security. The doctrine focused on US military intervention in states identified to be sympathetic to terrorist organizations and thus ‘rogue states.’

Some of the key principles of the strategy can be said to be pre-emptive military intervention to topple regimes friendly to terrorist groups and establish liberal democratic regimes. This strategy is based on the theory of democratic peace which holds that democracies have a lower probability of going to war with other democracies and thus, it was assumed that support of terrorism and religious extremism was a direct result of authoritarian rule and political oppression. Therefore, introduction of market based liberal democracy to the targeted states would lead to a decrease in sympathy for extremist sentiments and reduce international terrorism. However, it can be said that this strategy in retrospect suffers from some severe lacunae particularly in its validity as a cogent grand strategic doctrine. A grand strategy for a state can be defined as related to the long-term national interest of the state. Thus, for a cogent grand strategy, there should be an attempt to analyze from a long-term lens rather than formulate a doctrine for short term gains. This is the most important drawback of the Bush doctrine as a viable grand strategy. This is because to be long term, Grand Strategy has to be proactive and not reactive which in the case of the Bush doctrine was the latter as it was more a response to 9/11 rather than a long term solution to the problem of international terrorism which was a reality since the 1980s and had escalated in the 1990s with the 1993 World Trade Center Attack (also one of the targets of 9/11) and attacks on foreign missions of the United States.

Therefore, it would be wrong to say that international terrorism as a threat emerged as a direct result of 9/11 but 9/11 did start the Global War on Terrorism as the event directly had a paradigm shift on the perception of terrorist groups as a threat to national security. This is because terrorist groups are an example of violent non-state actors just like insurgent groups. The only difference being insurgents and terrorists being that terrorists not only attack high value political targets but also innocent citizens to send a political message while insurgent groups attack only high value targets associated with governments to create political change. However, differences in political messaging being also one of the major differences between insurgents and terrorists. This is because insurgents generally are dissatisfied with their government and want political change through violent means while terrorists have their own radical vision of government and often follow a larger meta-narrative of politics and society. Both insurgent groups and terrorist groups as seen during the Cold War can also be used by powerful states to fulfil objectives of foreign policy particularly while pursuing adversarial relations with other equally powerful states.

Thus, the non-recognition of these features by the Bush doctrine made the strategy very limited in its objectives and a sub-optimal response to the threat. One of the important features of the Bush doctrine also was its lack of recognition of sectarian conflict within religious extremists and ignorance of the support to terrorist groups more as state policy rather than ideological agreement. The doctrine also did not recognize political repression by authoritarian states based on sectarian lines and using religion as a political tool rather than an ideology. In fact, the only two proper examples of terrorist regimes would be the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ISIL rule in parts of Iraq and Syria both of which were on the radical, hardline, internationalist, totalitarian and extremist understanding of religion. The latter is particularly important in this discussion as the emergence of ISIL was a direct effect of the fallout of the American withdrawal in Iraq in 2011. In contrast, Iran stands as more a theocratic authoritarian state which uses a sectarian idea of religion to reaffirm its authoritarian rule and supports violent non-state actors like terrorist groups and militias more as foreign policy goals against its adversaries rather than as supporting them as distinct allies in the regime.

While regimes under Saddam Hussein, Colonel Gaddafi and Bashar Al Assad were more despotic civilian dictatorships which may also cater to religious extremists to make them instruments for the security of their despotic regimes. All these different types of regimes including terrorist regimes, theocratic authoritarian regimes and despotic civilian dictatorships may pursue capabilities to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction which may include chemical weapons and may escalate to a  nuclear arsenal for propagation of their despotic rule, to pursue sectarian conflict, elimination of insurgent groups, effective weapons in international armed conflict and particularly for terrorist regimes to escalate their attacks on civilian and political targets. The last of these is the most dangerous reality confronting the present international order and thus requires a strong military strategy to effectively counter it. While all these types of regimes engage in egregious violation of human rights which may escalate to crimes against humanity, their objectives and motivations behind them vary and while such acts should be rightly responded through effective military action focusing on R2P (responsibility to protect) doctrine, the strategies of response are different and must vary according to the type of actor performing the act.  Oversimplification of such a complex reality made the Bush Doctrine extremely ineffective as a grand strategy.

However, what is more important with regards to the Bush doctrine is its implications for military actions focusing on counter-terrorism. Carl Von Clausewitz famously describes war as the continuation of politics by other means whereby force is used to bend the adversary to one’s will. But the great General also makes another important point i.e., military strategy is subservient to political objectives and the political will to fight. The assumptions of the Bush doctrine make the political objectives of military action extremely vague and thus make appropriate military responses difficult to effectively neutralize terrorist groups. An important example in this regard can be the American relationship with Pakistan during the start of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and its transformation during the Obama administration when military action for counter-terrorism purposes was authorized in North-West Pakistan particularly in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region and finally the US-Pakistan relationship post Operation Neptune Spear. The transformation of Pakistan as a key American ally in the War against Terror due to its strategic connection with Afghanistan to a potential candidate of distrust highlights the limitations of Bush doctrine. In fact, the serious lacunae of the Bush doctrine were reflected in the American perception of Pakistan as an ally. This is because while Pakistan may not be a theocratic state or a completely despotic dictatorship, it is nevertheless a state with authoritarian tendencies and has a connection with promoting and supporting violent non-state actors in South Asia and does promote extremist religious organizations in domestic politics often with the support of the Pakistani military establishment which has a record of subverting democratically elected regimes in the country. Pakistan also has a considerable history of proliferating dual use to nuclear technologies to states such as North Korea and Iran to fund its own nuclear weapons program.

Therefore, due to the sub-optimality of the Bush doctrine as a grand strategy, the American approach to the emergence of terrorist groups as a new and important national security threat remained inadequate particularly if understood with regards to its strategy of military action and its decision to select states to be key allies in this new and innovative campaign. However, the need to create an effective military strategy to counter international terrorism through military means is the need of the hour if the tendency of terrorist groups to act like militias and participate in civil wars and inter-state international conflict is considered and their use of the internet to promote their extremist ideologies and make gullible citizens unconnected with these actors conduct lone-wolf actions is considered. The threat of these actors developing nuclear weapons or at least having access to chemical and radiological weapons accentuate the present danger of international terrorism. Thus, to conclude, while it should be noted that the Bush doctrine was not an optimal grand strategic doctrine, nevertheless it was significant because it recognized international terrorism as a serious threat to global security and realized the need to create a robust military response to neutralize this threat which was a step in the right direction and is part of its enduring legacy. In fact, as a fitting ending to this article it will be correct to point out the struggles faced by the Afghan people after they failed to resist the temptations of choosing to replace the democracy endorsed by the Americans with the Taliban regime.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2018 Shangri-La address provided a broad framework for India’s Indo-Pacific vision. The speech asserted India’s geographic definition of the Indo-Pacific as being “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas,” providing a comprehensive physical boundary for its initiatives. One of the major highlights of India’s Indo-Pacific vision, as was evident from Modi’s speech, was the importance of partnerships and the benefit of collaborations highlighting a shift from “isolation to active engagements.” Thus India showed a clearer interest in deepening engagements with the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Indo-Pacific region, reinstating its agenda for a Free, Open and Inclusive Indo-Pacific.

For these smaller nations or island states, New Delhi perhaps wished to position itself at the forefront and to play a crucial role in stabilizing a hostile and unstable environment laden with security issues through cooperation and ingenious solutions in an era of new great power competition. India is also granting development assistance to the SIDS countries. It was not until China began to shift the security contours in the Indian Ocean that New Delhi started to look toward its neighboring island states and even beyond that. In this article we would try to understand India’s changing focus and its relations with four vital small island states- Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives and Sri Lanka, in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2016 India created a new division within the MEA, called the Indian Ocean Region Division (IOR), which brings together the island nations of Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka for better coordination of initiatives and policies in the Indian Ocean. The division created a noticeable shift in India’s foreign policy approach, acknowledging the importance of the maritime domain in its foreign policy arrangements. The islands in the Indian Ocean are located closer to prime sea-lanes, thereby providing trouble-free access and influencing over important chokepoints and waterways. Securing the maritime neighborhood in western Indian Ocean has gained high importance. Some of these island nations provide immensely critical sea-lanes (trade routes) that connect eastern Africa and the Gulf with Southeast and East Asia and beyond. Preceding the creation of the IOR Division, Maldives and Sri Lanka were part of the South Asia neighborhood while Mauritius and Seychelles were under the Africa Division. Thus, the IOR Division is a necessary and indispensable effort to view the island states through a maritime prism as opposed to a continental South Asian one.

India and Seychelles signed several MOUs/Agreements including: Renewable Energy Cooperation, MOU for Cooperation in the field of Hydrography, Bilateral Air Services Agreement, MOU on cyber security (2018); MoU on Small Development Projects, MOU between the Foreign Service Institute India and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Seychelles; Cultural Exchange Programme for the years 2018-2022, to name a few.

Maldives occupies an important spot under India’s “Neighbourhood First” Foreign Policy, which aims to bring stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Also, both Maldives and India are key players in maintaining safety and security of the IOR, thus contributing to India-led Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision. Despite all the controversies which arose between the two states a few months back, Maldives has accepted the fact that India is an indispensable partner that they can’t lose.

With diplomatic relations dating as far back as 1948, India and Mauritius have been involved in several high-level political engagements with the two countries’ leadership based on mutual respect and trust. Since 2005, India has been among the largest trading partners of Mauritius. Apart from providing grants, investing in several projects and also giving aid from time to time, India has also signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) with Mauritius in 2021(Mauritius being the only African country to have such an agreement with India). There are several Indian Public Sector Undertakings in Mauritian land like Bank of Baroda, Life Insurance Corporation to name a few. The key reason for the special ties between both the countries is the fact that Indian origin people comprise nearly 70% of the island’s population of 1.2 million.

Despite the existence of two maritime agreements of 1974 and 1976 there are certain irritants between India and Sri Lanka. The major issue is the current status of Katchchativu, a small barren island in the Palk Bay area. Through the 1974 agreement, India agreed to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over Katchchativu but with some safeguards to its Indian fishermen through Article 5. But the article was vague enough for the Sri Lankan government to argue that the agreement did not give any fishing rights, but only the rights to dry their fishing nets, to rest, and to the right of pilgrims to visit the island for religious purposes. After the civil war in Sri Lanka in 1983, the Indian fishermen found it difficult to operate their fishing activities. The Sri Lankan Navy became unfriendly to Indian fishermen owing to their inability to distinguish between genuine fishing vessels and boats used for smuggling goods for Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Consequently, indiscriminate firing and killing of Indian fishermen became common. Despite various uproars, the humanitarian aspect of the problem was overlooked by both countries. Various options like issuing identity cards to Indian fishermen and letting the islet, in perpetuity, to India have been explored, but not converted into action.

The maritime domain is significantly new in India’s strategic thinking and driven by the leadership at the top. It is no surprise that despite creating the IOR Division in the MEA, New Delhi failed to view the region as a whole. While India placed Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka under the IOR umbrella, it left out the western islands of Comoros and Madagascar, the only two other islands in the Indian Ocean, until December 2019, which reflects India’s tendency to be reactive in its approach rather than to have a coherent, vision-oriented framework. This, of course, continues to change and develop within New Delhi’s foreign policy discussions.

While both Maldives and Sri Lanka now have a much warmer relationship with India, the political shift in Malé and Colombo was a loud wake-up call for India. New Delhi found itself in need of a better relationship with its island neighbors, as well as challenged to offer better alternatives to Beijing-led initiatives. As India examined its options in the wake of a dramatically altered neighborhood led by an increasing Chinese presence, the potential of maritime partnerships became clear in India’s choices. By 2018 the Indo-Pacific had provided excellent opportunities for New Delhi to re-emerge as a key security player aimed at securing its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. At this point the government finally took steps to provide a vision statement for the Indo-Pacific (as presented in Modi’s keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018). As India announced its Indo-Pacific vision, partnerships became the central pillar of New Delhi’s strategy in realizing this vision.

By: Aastha Agarwal

On January 01, 2024, the BRICS, in line with Johannesburg Declaration of the 15^th Summit, opened its doors to embrace 5 new countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The expanded body rechristened as BRICS+ carries massive politico-economic weight accounting for 46% of global population and 35.6% of global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity. The expansion shows the group’s attractiveness for emerging countries while providing a fresh, fertile pitch for India to stage its south-south cooperation diplomacy. 

India’s diplomatic prowess shone in full swing in February 2024 with the release of EIGHT Indian Navy veterans sentenced to death / life imprisonment/ other terms by Qatari agencies on charges of espionage. MEA leveraging its legal assistance and varied diplomatic channels enabled the commutation of their sentences and their safe repatriation home. The episode reflects India’s robust amplitude in Gulf!

It’s been a SUPERNAL year for India in the sporting universe as well. The nation celebrated Men’s ICC World Cup victory coming in after more than a decade with overwhelming ecstasy, tears, traffic jams and tequilas. A SIXER in the Paris Olympics and the latest stellar World Chess Championship 2024 conquest of “Lord of the Board” Gukesh D. becoming the 18th and youngest undisputed world champion, at the age of 18 years and 195 days.

With Israel Hamas conflict spiralling out in all wrong directions bringing in new actors, India has shown a genius diplomatic manoeuvre maintaining strong relations with both Israel and Arabs. It condemned the terrorist acts on Israel while staying committed to Palestinian statehood through a two state solution. India also supported the UN Resolution calling for ceasefire and humanitarian aid to Gaza.

“Trump 2.0 and Modi 3.0 combo” is set out to bring economic advantages to India with shared pro-business posture and focus on decoupling supply chains from China possibly placing India as US manufacturing hub. QUAD may be intensified providing strategic safety in the Indo-Pacific churning. Trump’s return also ignites hope for India’s increased access to US oil and LNG resources. However, tariffs from reciprocal trade, H1B restrictions, and Trump’s polarising tendencies need to be navigated skilfully.

India and China have a charged border with frictions occurring in Arunachal Pradesh lately. The resolution was reached in October on following key pillars – disengaging from contentious points and patrolling as before 2020 standoff. The agreement was triangular in nature with military and diplomatic engagements on one hand and high-level discussions between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. EAM S Jaishankar, has called this as cautious optimism, with complete cognizance of fundamental disagreements in sectors like Depsang and Demchok. 

Sheikh Hasina, the ex -Prime Minister of Bangladesh, was ousted in August 2024 after a wave of intense protests against her touted “authoritarian” regime. On one hand, India sheltered Hasina, while maintaining diplomatic ties with interim government for the sake of regional security. India has been vocal on protection of minorities and revival of democratic norms in Bangladesh despite being wary of increasing Bangladesh-China-Pakistan axis. India’s foreign secretary visited the riot torn country to project India’s commitment to stability while high level talks have been scheduled to explore and revitalise stalled economic and trade relations. 

Finally, after a decade of recognising 21^st June (summer solstice) as International Day of Yoga, the world celebrated its inaugural World Meditation Day on 21^st December 2024, (winter solstice) on the theme “Meditation for Inner Peace and Global Harmony,” clearly aligning with UN Sustainable Development Goals. Gurudev Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, piloted a global ‘dhyana’ session as he emphasised the benefits of meditation in mental clarity, emotional resilience and societal harmony. The date also marks the start of Uttarayana in Indian tradition, an auspicious period for inner reflection. Another feat in India’s Soft Power Diplomacy!

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, has increasingly become a battleground as pro-independence groups, particularly the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), escalate their attacks on Pakistani security forces and infrastructure. This surge in militant activity is a manifestation of long-standing grievances related to resource exploitation, political marginalization, and a fervent quest for autonomy that has characterized the region for decades.

In mid-December 2024, the BLA and BLF executed a series of coordinated attacks across various districts in Balochistan, strategically targeting military installations, logistical operations, and communication infrastructure. Notably, on December 15, BLA fighters assaulted a military post in Mirabad, resulting in the deaths of at least two soldiers and injuries to four others. The following day, they targeted a truck transporting minerals in Dukki, shooting its tyres and rendering it immobile while also destroying communication towers. Meanwhile, on December 16, BLF fighters attacked a military camp in Heronk, leading to one soldier’s death and injuries to two more. Additionally, earlier on December 13, the BLF executed Abdul Ghafoor, a military informant. These incidents reflect a broader strategy by both groups to disrupt state operations and assert their claims over Balochistan’s resources.

The roots of the conflict in Balochistan date back to its incorporation into Pakistan in 1948. Since then, various insurgent movements have emerged, fuelled by grievances over political representation and economic exploitation. The BLA and BLF have positioned themselves as key actors in this struggle for autonomy. The Pakistani government has historically been accused of neglecting Balochistan while extracting its rich natural resources such as coal, copper, gold, and oil without adequately compensating local communities. Reports indicate that between 2020 and 2024, at least 62 individuals working on projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) were killed in various attacks across Pakistan. The BLA’s Majeed Brigade has been particularly active in targeting Chinese nationals associated with these projects.

Recent assessments indicate that the threat posed by Baloch separatist groups is escalating. A report from the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies noted that the frequency of attacks attributed to the BLA reached alarming levels in November 2024, with 12 attacks resulting in 45 fatalities, more than those attributed to the Pakistani Taliban during the same period. This trend underscores a notable advancement in the operational capabilities of these groups.

The implications of these recent attacks are profound and multifaceted. Firstly, the human cost is significant; these assaults have not only resulted in military casualties but also threaten civilian lives, exacerbating an already precarious humanitarian situation in Balochistan. The ongoing violence disrupting communities and heightens fears among civilians who often find themselves caught between state forces and insurgents. Secondly, targeting communication infrastructure undermining state operations and hampers emergency services, isolating affected areas and making it difficult for security forces to respond effectively. Lastly, the psychological impact on security personnel is considerable; the increasing frequency of attacks creating immense pressure that leads to potential retaliatory actions against civilians as frustrated military forces grappling with their battlefield losses.

In response to this escalating violence, Pakistani authorities initiated “Operation Azm-i-Istehkam” aimed at countering separatist militant groups operating. However, this operation has largely failed to tackle the underlying issues fuelling unrest. Despite extensive military operations throughout 2024 attacks have continued unabated with minimal success reported against insurgent groups like the BLA and BLF. In fact, during just the first half of 2024 alone, the BLF claimed responsibility for 108 attacks resulting in 112 security personnel deaths a stark indication that military offensives have not effectively curbed insurgent activities or addressed local grievances.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there were 72 incidents linked to the BLA recorded in 2024 alone that resulted in at least 253 fatalities, 55 civilians among them alongside significant losses among security forces (144 personnel). In contrast, during the same period in 2023, only 34 incidents resulted in just 69 fatalities overall.

Moreover, Pakistan has increasingly relied on Chinese military support to secure CPEC projects and counter threats from groups like the BLA and BLF. The Chinese government has provided not only financial investments but also military assistance aimed at bolstering Pakistani forces’ capabilities against insurgents. Reports suggest that Chinese security personnel have been deployed alongside Pakistani troops to protect critical infrastructure linked to CPEC initiatives.

Moreover, major operations conducted by these insurgent groups reveal their growing capabilities; for example, Operation Hereof carried out by the BLA involved coordinated attacks across seven districts on August 25-26, 2024. This operation resulted in at least 130 military personnel reported killed.

As Pakistan grapples with this escalating violence from separatist movements like the BLA and BLF while simultaneously managing international scrutiny over its human rights record regarding counterinsurgency operations against local populations the path forward remains fraught with challenges for Pakistan.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analsyt, GSDN

With the return of Trump in the White House again, the question of US-Iran Nuclear deal has come to the attention again and how is he going to deal with the issue in the second term. Iran anticipates the reintroduction of his “maximum pressure” policy, which could severely damage its economy and international relations. Iranian officials have signalled openness to a direct political approach, warning that a return to a maximum-pressure 2.0 approach will only result in ‘maximum defeat 2.0.’

Iran is feeling uneasy with the future of their Nuclear Program especially after becoming a part of Israel-Palestine war in order to stop the current genocide going in the Gaza and West-Bank and now spreading in Syria, Lebanon and other Arab countries as well. Now, all eyes are on Trump administration to make decision on Iran Nuclear deal. The objective is to get Iran to accept zero nuclear enrichment which looks less compelling for Iran.

US-Iran Nuclear Deal

The not-so-unexpected victory of former president Donald Trump on November 5 has renewed the discussion on how Trump’s approach towards Iran Nuclear deal will change from his first tenure and the Biden administration. In his first term, he imposed more than 1,500 sanctions on Iran as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign with the intent to destroy the economy of Iran and bring the country to its knees. Trump also withdrew from the JCPOA and issued a twelve-point set of conditions for talks with Iran, which included terminating the military dimension of its nuclear program, allowing rigorous and sudden inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, halting Iran’s ballistic missile program, ceasing support for regional proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, and disarming Iraqi militias and integrating them into Iraq’s security forces. Trump also ordered the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, which makes difficult for the Iranian regime to engage in negotiations with a leader they hold responsible for Soleimani’s death.

The Abraham Accords, establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan were undoubtedly the most prominent foreign policy achievement and legacy of the first Trump administration. Israel appears to favour a compartmentalized approach, Saudi Arabia, however, seems to prefer a comprehensive approach, with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan reiterating the need for a recognized Palestinian state as a precondition for any deal with Israel.

The Biden Administration was not as extreme as Trump, against the Middle-East Policies. In the Biden’s Presidency, US was trying to restore the 2015 nuclear deal but it broke in September 2022, due to accusation made by France, Germany and the UK for the violation of  ‘Security Council Resolution-2231’ last year when Iran supplied drones to Russia during the Russia-Ukraine conflict even though Iran knows that Russia might use the Drones to target the Nuclear Facilities. Although Biden said the US is ready to make a deal if Iran is willing to comply. This 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal has been wavering since Trump abandoned it in 2018.

Iran has been under the close inspection for last few years due to recent nuclear development. Iran war also accused to nearing to becoming a nuclear state. Although, CIA director Bill Burns stated that US intelligence has found no evidence against Iran’s uranium weaponization. In the beginning of 2023, Burns stated that Iran can make at least one ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’ in ‘the matter of weeks‘. The US defence authority Colin Kahl said Iran might make one nuclear bomb’s worth of fissile material in just 12 days instead of 12 months. But now in the end of 2024, it is considered that Iran has enough fissile material to produce three nuclear missiles within weeks.

Other than that there are few EU sanctions including missile, nuclear and other weapon, that has expired in October 18, 2023. On which Iran said it will be illegal for the EU to maintain sanctions on Iran. Re-establishing 2015 JCPOA deal and limiting Iranian stockpiling at this point will not stop the Uranium weaponization in Iran, because Iran has enough material to develop two Nuclear bomb. Thought one nuclear bomb is not enough to deter Iran from nuclear threat. Grossi said that there will be instability if the IAEA is unable to tell world that the nuclear program of Iran is completely peaceful.

Trump’s approach towards Iran Nuclear deal in his second term

It is estimated that, Trump might continue his “maximum pressure” campaign, possibly endorsing more aggressive actions, like supporting Israel to strike Iranian nuclear facilities like Israel has done previously. Such scenarios could create significant friction with some Middle-eastern countries and United States. Trump has signalled on several occasions that he does not seek regime change in Tehran and that he wants an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian Vice-President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, has indicated that Tehran would enter into talks with Trump if it is treated with “respect.”

Before election 2024, Tehran said its tactics might change but who ends up winning the White House won’t alter its strategies. While President Joe Biden’s administration has worked to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East and act as a moderating influence on Netanyahu, Trump’s return to power could signal a much tougher approach. This could also create friction between the GCC ‘Gulf Cooperation Council’ states and Iran. This will force the GCC countries to make a delicate balance between their strategic partnership with Washington and their efforts to maintain stability with Tehran.

The escalating conflict between Iran and Israel is currently the most pressing regional issue, with a risk of evolving into an all-out, multi-party, multi-front war. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has promised a “tooth-crushing” response to Israel in retaliation for air strikes on Tehran and multiple other provinces on October 26. It is expected that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might involve the Iranian army as well after four army soldiers were killed by Israeli bombs.

Besides war scenario, Iran has been dealing with economic crisis high inflation by U.S. sanctions. Following the withdrawal of 2015 JCPOA deal, Trump imposed vital oil sanctions as part of his “maximum pressure” campaign.  This plummeted the oil export of Iran to 300,000 barrels per day or less by 2019. During the Biden’s administration the relation of Iran and US were getting better because of which Iranian oil export has improved to 1.5 Million barrels per day currently, up from 400,000 barrels per day in 2020. This changed Iranian economy significantly, roughly 70%, since oil export is Iran’s primary source of revenue generation.

Easier access to oil revenues also will be an attractive proposal for the Iranian government. This could give Iran an opportunity to sale Iranian oil to other nations more than China. If Iran could export oil out of U.S. sanctions, it could find potential buyers elsewhere at higher prices, contributing to Iran’s economy. This can help de-escalating the worsening relationship between US-Iran, giving Trump an opportunity to negotiate a deal with Iran.

Trump wants to make a deal with Iran, though many will try to block it, including Trump’s foreign policy advisers, some donors, and the Israeli government. All are pushing Trump to revert back to maximum pressure, arguing that this will “bankrupt” Iran and deprive its resources to pursue its nuclear and regional goals. Therefore, Trump might choose from two distinct track to follow. He can either putting ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ which is destined to escalate the current war in Middle-East or he can try lifting oil sanctions from Iran to increase their economic growth and to ease the relationship in order to negotiate a deal with Iran, on which both nations agree peacefully.

Impact on US-Arab Relationship

Post October 07, 2023, attack Israel and US both has been in continuous conflict with not only Palestine but also Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, other non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi movement. All of these state and non-state actors in the war are heavily influenced by Iran. Which makes Iran Nuclear deal even more problematic for Donald Trump. US Supporting Israel unconditionally can fuel the conflict and it will work against the Trump intent to de-escalate the global conflict. 

Russia might be helping to advance Iran’s missile system. Russia supported U.S. and European efforts to compel Iran to limit its nuclear program a decade ago. However, Iran has developed close relations with Russia in last few years. Tehran’s agreement to supply Moscow with sophisticated armed drones during Russia-Ukraine war. Russia and Iran continued cooperation to secure the Assad regime in Syria. Russia and China have recruited Iran into several multilateral organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, that can help Iran mitigate the effects of intensified U.S. sanctions. Though Iran will take some time to restarting a complete weaponization program which was stopped in 2003, but with Russia’s help and it advanced technology, it could be sooner than expected.

Saudi Arabia has shown signs of obtaining the nuclear weapon if Iran ever successfully detonates one. Although, it is too early to warry about Saudi Arabia right now. The Arab Gulf states have all improved ties with Iran since Trump left office after his first term. They all seek to de-escalate several regional conflicts in Middle-East, because they are concerned that Israel-Iran conflict might affect the economic growth of gulf countries.

Syria is a transit point for weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has dragged them into the Israel Palestine conflict. Syria always has the territorial dispute with Israel over Golan Heights. Though, Syria was a primary base of the ISIS, they have not been a part of this conflict yet. The small military present in Syria trying their best to keep a close watch on ISIS activities to prevent them out of the war.

The relation between Iraq and Iran has also grown recently. Both Iraqi army and Iran-led Resistance group continues to attack US forces in Iraq and Syria. This has worsened the relationship between US and Iraq, despite the Strategic Framework Agreement they signed in 2008. Approximately 2,500 US troops are stationed in Iraq, to keep a watchful eye on ISIS activities. Recently, US has done an agreement with Iraq to withdraw US army from Iraq by the end of 2026. The second term of Trump administration might find it hard to go along with this agreement or Trump might even go against this deal and decide to keep the troops in Iraq, according to Iraq’s behaviour towards this conflict.

Conclusion

It is still too early to determine which approach would the Trump administration chose in his second presidency. Tensions between Tehran and Washington have steadily worsened, primarily due to the unwavering and unconditional support of U.S. for Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu playing a key role in widening the gap with the current conflict. The assassination of Soleimani in first Trump’s presidency and attempt to kill Trump before the election of 2024, could influence Trump’s personal stance, adding another layer of complexity to the US-Iran Nuclear issue.

Trump could decide to do ‘maximum pressure’, considering Iran has been expanding ties with Russia, China, and Gulf states to increase their economy and military power. However, this could not only have a deteriorating effect in the relation of U.S. with Iran but other gulf countries as well. A diplomatic approach between Iran and the U.S. can give both parties a chance to negotiate and accept a compromised US-Iran Nuclear deal. This will help both countries to return to diplomatic successes similar to the Obama era.