Pakistan Air Force & Bangladesh Air Force logos: source Internet
In the ever-shifting sands of South Asian geopolitics, recent unfolding events suggest that Bangladesh, in one way or another, is gradually distancing itself from its traditionally close ties with India and becoming more and more comfortable engaging with once-foe, Pakistan. Muhammad Yunus has assumed charge as the head of Bangladesh’s interim government following the nation’s longstanding prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, with whom he had maintained a complicated relationship, stepping down from power on August 05, 2024. Not even a year has passed since her exile, the new leader and his administration appears to have already outlined a clear roadmap for dealing with their neighbourhood. His early statements and actions about India, perhaps reveal a mindset that raises strategic concerns about his approach towards its immediate neighbour— so a recently discussed defence deal between the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the Pakistan Air Force, comes as no real surprise.
Not so long ago, a notable visit by high-ranking Bangladeshi defence officials, led by Lieutenant General S M Kamrul Hassan, Chief of General Staff of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, took place at the Pakistan Air Force Headquarters in Islamabad, where the Bangladeshi delegation held a meeting with Pakistan Air Force Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Baber Sidhu. The visit was intended to tighten defence ties and explore new potential areas for collaboration, mostly in defence manufacturing and technological developments.
This deal, to a large extent attempted to solidify the military cooperation between the two Air Forces using cooperative training programs. Harmonizing approaches to work together, such as joint military training and exchange programmes, ranging from basic instruction to operational level. In fact, from February 07-11, 2025 in the northern Arabian Sea near Karachi, Pakistan Navy organised multinational naval exercise “The Aman-25”, where Bangladesh sent a major naval warship BNS Samudra Joy, highlighting more than mere symbolic flag waving.
Sources indicate that the deal covers collaboration on areas such as, Modular and Unmanned Mission Trainers (MUMT–UMT), the unseen architects/simulator systems for real world operations— alongside Tactical Air Data Link System (TDLS), an advanced encrypted communication system for defence aircraft, ships, and ground forces. Moreover, both air forces are in talks of testing Flight SRNL-based Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) systems designed to replicate real-time combat scenarios. These systems mostly used by global elite units— to build resilient networks, provides/enabling rapid data sharing, and awareness of the frontline to optimize mission execution.
Space and simulated warfare along with cybersecurity has been emerging as one of the progressive aspects in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Air Force deal. Beyond traditional aerial assets, the talks reportedly also touched on cooperation in cybersecurity frameworks.
Above all, Dhaka reportedly also has an intent to purchase JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan to modernize its air force. The JF-17 — “Thunder” said to be a lightweight, fourth-generation multirole fighter jet, made capable of carrying a wide range of weapons, which includes air-to-air, air-to-surface, and anti-ship missiles, plus guided and unguided bombs, fitted with a 23 mm GSh-23-2 twin-barrel autocannon, jointly developed by Pakistan and China. These jets cost about US$ 25-32 million per unit, depending on different model, provides a more budget-friendly option than any Western-build fighters, that generally start from US$ 70-80 million per unit, making JF-17 an attractive option for states seeking to align defence modernization and economic affordability.
Moreover, Dhaka is not only receiving equipment and jets, but also operational expertise from Islamabad— knowledge that it had honed with the help of Chinese experts. Pakistan is offering malware-resistant protocols and offensive cyber warfare training. Technology and knowledge sharing are integral in this collaboration between the two the countries for shaping security dynamics.
India, as an immediate neighbour to both the states, having stable relations is very significant, at the same time achieving it is anything but simple. Pakistan’s current and ongoing involvement with Bangladesh, is a significant shift in regional dynamics, seemingly complicating India’s security, and has undeniably drawn attention from Indian defence and diplomatic circles. These developments suggest a carefully calculated reconfiguration in the region, mostly directing to counterbalance India’s influence. Indeed, for India, growing defence partnership between Pakistan and Bangladesh, particularly under China’s shadow— is understandably concerning, but India needs to examine and understand all the potential future implications in order to prepare proactive policy measures.
This deal could have major implications for India— not only because two contemporary “adversarial to India” states are collaborating in defence domain, but also because there is a high probability of more hidden parties to it, who do not want India to grow regionally or internationally. Anyway, with everything going on in Bangladesh, and also having a leader who is not so fond of India, the country could have been inclined to implement a hardline stance against India, similar to what the Maldivian leaders did in 2023-24.
It is noticeable that a shared hostility toward India serves as one of the binding glues between the two states. The regime change in Bangladesh a year ago paved the way for reshaping alignment with Pakistan, regardless of its past record. Pakistan has been seeking to maintain a friendly relationship with Bangladesh, though such efforts were reciprocated in a limited and cautious manner. However, during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, relations with Pakistan, hovered in a grey zone, neither evidently warm, and nor particularly hostile.
But, under the present leadership of Muhammad Yunus, their general outlook for regional politics has moved from opposing Pakistan to a more cooperative mode. By evaluating the activities of both the states, one could easily sense a change in the wind, which leading up to the unavoidable question/concern about India’s course of engagement with the whole matter.
Historically, Pakistan has not only been considered but also proved to be an adversarial state— fought four major wars, needless to say sponsoring terrorist attacks and engaging in conspiracy against India. Evan, Bangladesh has a history of supporting insurgent groups in India’s Northeast region, such as- The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), and other such separatist organisation. For many years, Bangladeshi territory functioned as a safe haven for such anti-India groups — allowing them to shelter, train, and operate against India. But during the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina, no such organisations operated from Bangladesh.
With Bangladesh, India hasn’t faced any war-like situation, thanks to their leaders even though a few of them were often critical of India and, turned a blind eye as their land was used for certain anti-India activities, but never went for upfront military action. Now, with current situation, there is high possibility that Bangladesh could once again be used as a base for anti-India activities. Pakistan has long targeted Northwest India, and now the prospect of potential Pakistani presence close to Northeast India and West Bengal is a big-time concern for New Delhi.
Even from the economic perspective, Pakistan-Bangladesh partnership might be unsettling for India. Bangladesh is India’s one of the biggest trading partners in the region and India is the second biggest export partner, nearly 12% Bangladesh’s imports come from India. In FY24, India’s major exports to Bangladesh amounted to roughly US$ 11.06 billion, major commodities comprise engineering goods (US$ 2.19 billion), cotton yarn, fabrics, made-ups, handloom products, etc. (US$ 1.86 billion), petroleum products (US$ 1.25 billion), organic and inorganic chemicals (US$ 651.33 million), followed by other commodities (US$ 2.39 billion). Now with emerging partnerships with states like China, Pakistan and Turkey, Bangladesh is in the position to diversify its economic imports and explore new trade dynamics.
India has always maintained a non-interference in Bangladesh’s sovereign decisions, including the choice of defence alliance. However, most of its allies have posed significant challenges to India’s security, other than Pakistan, states such as China and Turkey are strong/influential competitor of India in various domains. China already has close relation with Bangladesh, but with India had a turbulent past and persistent strategic competition. Moreover, now increasing defence cooperation with Turkey, including the procurement of Turkish Bayraktar drones, rifles and machine guns acquired by Bangladesh, adds another new level of complexity to the security of India.
Recent reports point out to the formation of a strategic alliance among Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) of Bangladesh and Turkey—with the common intention of countering India, manages finances, arms and weapons but most importantly pumps radical Islamic ideology throughout South Asia. In fact, Justice and Development Party (AKP) — Turkey’s ruling party has started to support the Muslim Brotherhood, across the world. This particular trilateral alliance is taking advantage of the power vacuum and Bangladesh’s strategic location to expand their sphere of influence.
Equally concerning is the maritime dimension — Pakistan-Bangladesh collaboration in the Bay of Bengal possess a risk of eroding India’s naval authority and tightening the strategic squeeze in India’s maritime security. Furthermore, to share experience and expertise in naval platforms, modern combat systems and advance defence technologies, Turkey also has extended support to establish two defence production facilities in Chittagong and Narayanganj, strategically close to India. So, here a serious question arise: is Turkey now is attempting to checkmate India in the South Asia, as China has with its ‘String of Pearls’?
Another major implication for India in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Air-force deal is Pakistan’s increasing defence production sector—an emerging potential supplier that India cannot underestimate. At the forefront of this effort is Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS), the largest, state-owned defence corporation, offering products for military applications. Apart from Bangladesh, Islamabad is planning to export weapons and defence equipment to Sudan and multiple African States. However, Pakistan’s alliances are highly questionable at the global level. Pakistan has long been accused of providing shelter and support to many terrorist organisations, which continue to pose a serious threat to India, and actively attempt to destabilize the region.
It is also evident that advanced weapons and cutting-edge defence technology are never safe in Pakistan’s hands. In 2004, A.Q. Khan, former Pakistani scientist, also known as the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear program” confessed to having supplied confidential nuclear technology and design to so called rogue states, such as- Iran, Libya and North Korea. For India, therefore the problem is not about weapons flowing into neighbourhood but about the credibility of Pakistan as an arms supplier itself.
Over the past couple of years, India has invested substantially in its relationship with Bangladesh, whether in trade, connectivity or energy. Anyway, India is now expected to very carefully set a new course with Dhaka. A combination of economic partnerships, cultural diplomacy, and strategic dialogue will likely to be employed to mend the current strained ties.
India perhaps also need to focus and work more closely with ASEAN nations to increase its regional network, thereby reducing its dependence on any single partner/ally. India-Pak relation is undoubtedly very complicated and delicate, but now we are yet to examine where India-Bangladesh ties stand. Dhaka alienating New Delhi completely will have strong implications for India. The strategic friendliness between Dhaka and Islamabad might still be in its early stages, but it highlights a trend or perhaps “a reality” that India can no longer afford to ignore. “You can change friends but not neighbours”, said Atal Bihari Vajpayee… indeed a timeless reminder for Indian foreign policy makers.
About the Author
Trishnakhi Parashar is an enthusiastic and dedicated learner with a Master’s degree in International Relations/Politics from Sikkim Central University. Her academic journey is further enriched by a certification in Human Rights and Duties, a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management from Tezpur University, and a Diploma in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Indian Institute of Governance and Leadership.
Having begun her career at Tech Mahindra, Trishnakhi transitioned into the research field to pursue her deep-rooted passion for international affairs. She is currently interning at Global Strategic and Defence News, where she continues to refine her analytical skills. Her core interests include international relations, terrorism, diplomacy, and geopolitics—fields she explores with rigor and critical insight. Trishnakhi is committed to meticulous research and driven by a determination to contribute meaningfully to global discourse. With a vision to carve out her own niche, she aspires to leave a lasting impact on contemporary international issues.
Donald Trump’s return to the peak of American power has reshaped the very structure of international diplomacy, displacing the traditional foundations of strategic planning and alliance unity with a far more fragile basis: the appeasement of presidential vanity. What unfolded in Washington during those critical days amounted to the formalization of a troubling new model in transatlantic relations—one in which national security, alliance credibility, and the stability of the post–Cold War order is subordinated to the unpredictable impulses of a single individual. The scenes that played out in the halls of power were at once extraordinary and profoundly disquieting. At present, the United States Sanctions on Russia’s nuclear sector do not exist in a vacuum—they are part of a much broader strategy to constrain Moscow’s energy complex as a whole. At the heart of these sanctions lies the dual recognition that Russia’s civil nuclear industry is both a significant source of revenue for the Kremlin and a potent tool of geopolitical leverage. Through this analysis, I will unpack the geopolitical implications, taking into consideration India’s stance and last but not least the US hegemonic matrix.
In 2025, Washington’s measures against Russia’s nuclear capabilities are not uniform; instead, they combine targeted sanctions, carefully crafted exemptions, and long-term strategies for supply chain resilience. The policy mix is designed to avoid collateral damage to allies’ energy needs while still limiting Russia’s strategic room to manoeuvre. The most prominent example of this balancing act came in June 2025, when the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 115B. This license authorizes certain transactions involving Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom and its subsidiaries, but only under specific conditions. Namely, it applies to civil nuclear energy projects that were initiated or already under construction as of November 21, 2024. The scope of the license is global, which means it is not tied to a particular geographic region or political bloc. Its expiration date—December 19, 2025—ensures that this is a reprieve, allowing for a transitional period rather than a permanent sanction lift. The immediate practical effect was felt in Hungary, where the Paks II nuclear plant, a high-profile joint venture with Rosatom, had been hampered by earlier US sanctions. Budapest welcomed the exemption as a vindication of its long-standing argument that nuclear cooperation with Russia in the civil sphere should not be lumped in with military or dual-use restrictions. The decision by Washington also demonstrated the US’s commitment to its allies, showing that it is willing to apply flexibility when allied governments are heavily invested in long-term infrastructure projects that cannot easily be replaced or cancelled.
This calculated leniency, however, sits alongside an unmistakable tightening of Russia’s nuclear leadership and its broader strategic nuclear ecosystem. On January 10, 2025, the US imposed sanctions on Rosatom’s top executives, including its chief executive officer, along with affiliated companies directly implicated in the development and proliferation of Russia’s nuclear weapons capabilities. These measures were motivated not only by the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine but also by what Washington regards as reckless and destabilizing actions—chief among them, the Russian military’s continued occupation and operational control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine. The facility, Europe’s largest nuclear power station, has been under Russian control since March 2022, and its status has become emblematic of the conflict’s risks to civilian nuclear safety. By targeting Rosatom officials and entities tied to the plant’s management and security, the US aimed to send a clear signal: involvement in military-linked nuclear activities, particularly those violating international safety norms and other protocols.
Parallel to these sanctions, the United States has taken a more systemic step by cutting off Russian access to one of its most important nuclear export markets: Enriched Uranium. In May 2024, President Biden signed the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which bans the importation of enriched uranium from Russia, historically a major supplier to US nuclear power plants. The ban, which came into effect roughly ninety days later, is not absolute; it contains waiver provisions allowing imports through 2028 in cases where the alternative would be the shutdown of reactors or severe disruptions to the US electricity grid. This reflects a complex reality: for all of Washington’s political will to isolate Russia, the US nuclear industry has been heavily dependent on Russian enrichment services, particularly for low-enriched uranium (LEU) used in civilian reactors. The role of the US nuclear industry in this context is crucial, as it not only reflects the economic implications of the US nuclear strategy but also the challenges the industry faces in transitioning away from Russian supplies. Recognizing this, Congress paired the ban with a $2.7 billion investment program to rebuild America’s domestic uranium enrichment capacity. The policy is thus as much about long-term industrial resilience as it is about immediate punishment. It represents an effort to close a vulnerability that Moscow has exploited for years, and to ensure that future US administrations are not forced to choose between energy stability and foreign policy resolve.
Geopolitical Distortion & Spill Over
The geopolitical reverberations of this strategy extend far beyond the bilateral US–Russia relationship. India illustrates the complexity of third-party dynamics. Moscow has long been a key partner in India’s civil nuclear expansion, supplying reactors and fuel under pre-war agreements. While current US sanctions stop short of directly targeting India-Russia nuclear cooperation, the debate in Congress over measures such as the proposed Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 threatens to complicate matters. That proposal, which would impose a punitive 500% tariff on countries importing Russian oil, gas, or uranium, could force India into a difficult choice: absorb the costs of maintaining strategic and energy ties with Moscow, or scale back under US pressure. The potential consequences of India’s response, whether it chooses to absorb the costs or scale back, could significantly impact the geopolitical landscape. From Washington’s perspective, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on preventing third parties from filling the gaps left by Western disengagement. However, from New Delhi’s perspective, such extraterritorial measures threaten its sovereignty and energy security, raising the risk of friction with the United States. Military signalling complements this economic pressure, demonstrating that US resolve extends beyond sanctions. When former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested earlier in the year that direct conflict with the US was possible, President Trump ordered two US nuclear-powered submarines to patrol closer to Russian waters. While the Kremlin dismissed the manoeuvre publicly, its cautionary remarks about nuclear rhetoric revealed the underlying sensitivity. This interplay of rhetoric and force movements highlights how economic measures, arms control positioning, and military signalling are now tightly woven together into a single fabric of deterrence policy.
Taken together, the US approach to Russia’s nuclear sector in 2025 is best understood as a multi-layered strategy. It begins with targeted sanctions against individuals and entities directly linked to unsafe or military nuclear activities, such as Rosatom’s leadership and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. It also allows for selective exemptions to prevent unnecessary ruptures with allies while simultaneously pushing for long-term supply chain diversification through the uranium import ban and domestic enrichment investments. These specific measures are reinforced by the broader sanctions environment constraining Russia’s energy complex, which indirectly limits its nuclear sector as well. Finally, Washington is willing to project military power to underscore the credibility of its economic and diplomatic measures. Together, these layers constitute a posture that accepts greater strategic tension in the present in order to preserve long-term leverage, constrain Russia’s options, and ensure that any eventual negotiations take place on terms favourable to the United States and its allies.
Way Ahead in the US-Russia Nuclear Standoff
Looking ahead, three scenarios frame the trajectory of the US-Russia nuclear rivalry. In the managed competition scenario, New START is either extended or replaced with a limited arms control framework that stabilises deployed warhead levels while allowing both sides to modernise their arsenals. Economic sanctions remain in place but are selectively eased for civil nuclear cooperation under tight verification, preserving a thin layer of cooperation amid rivalry. This would require both Moscow and Washington to compartmentalize the Ukraine conflict and return to pragmatic engagement—a possibility but not the most likely path. In the unbounded arms race scenario, New START expires with no replacement, and both sides embark on parallel force expansions. The US accelerates warhead production and diversifies deployment platforms, while Russia deploys new strategic systems and expands its tactical nuclear arsenal. Economic sanctions remain maximalist, driving Russia into deeper alignment with China and further militarising its nuclear export policy. This path risks destabilizing crisis dynamics, especially if paired with heightened conventional confrontation in Eastern Europe. The fragmented deterrence scenario envisions a breakdown in centralized arms control, but without a full-scale numerical race. Instead, nuclear rivalry plays out through regional deployments, missile defence competition, and selective nuclear sharing arrangements. The US strengthens nuclear cooperation with NATO and possibly Indo-Pacific allies, while Russia seeks to expand nuclear partnerships in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. This scenario would normalize a world of multiple, semi-detached nuclear blocs—unstable, but less apocalyptic than a direct bilateral arms race.
For now, the United States appears to be steering between managed competition and fragmented deterrence, keeping its options open while leveraging its technological and alliance advantages. The enduring challenge will be maintaining a credible deterrent that reassures allies, constrains adversaries, and avoids the kind of uncontrolled spiral that history warns can emerge when arms control regimes collapse entirely. Washington’s nuclear posturing toward Russia is thus less about preparing for war than about shaping a strategic environment in which the risk of war remains contained—but where the balance of leverage tilts toward American and allied interests. The United States’ nuclear posture toward Russia in 2025 sits at the intersection of Deterrence Theory, sanctions-driven statecraft, alliance management, and the slow unspooling of a decades-old arms control order. Unlike the post–Cold War interlude, when strategic forces were largely backgrounded behind cooperative frameworks and confidence-building measures, nuclear signalling is again a visible instrument of policy. It does not operate in isolation. It is braided together with the Ukraine war’s unsettled endgame, a transatlantic debate over deployments and risk, a global reshaping of nuclear fuel markets, and the emergence of dual-use technologies that compress warning and decision timelines. What makes this era distinct is not merely the volume of nuclear rhetoric but the way nuclear tools are combined with economic levers, information campaigns, conventional posture moves, and industrial policies aimed at reducing long-term dependency on Russian capabilities.
Univocally, the current US strategic setting is defined by three converging trends. First, the legacy arms control scaffolding has thinned to its load-bearing beams. Verification habits atrophied through the 2010s and early 2020s; inspections and data exchanges that once anchored confidence now sputter at best. Second, the European theatre has re-entered an era of forward deployments, rotational presence, and rapid reinforcement plans that make the nuclear dimension more salient even when moves are conventionally configured. Third, the Economics of nuclear power—fuel cycles, enrichment capacity, and reactor service contracts—have become instruments of geopolitical competition. The United States’ posture is shaped by all three. It tries to set a floor under escalation while ensuring that Moscow cannot wield civil-nuclear interdependencies as leverage over allies. At the core of the posture is an old idea expressed with modern instruments: Credible, Flexible, and Survivable Deterrence that is highly legible to allies and intentionally ambiguous to adversaries about precise thresholds.
The credibility piece is carried by investments in the triad’s recapitalisation and by deliberately publicised touches of visibility—strategic bombers conducting predictable yet high-profile missions, submarine patrol narratives that are vague but reassuring, and command-and-control exercises that signal continuity of government and continuity of operations under stress. Flexibility now means more than just a range of yields or platforms. It includes the ability to rapidly reconfigure conventional forces around nuclear-relevant signalling, to surge ISR and missile defence assets for crisis windows, and to integrate cyber and space effects in ways that can either dampen or amplify escalatory perceptions. Survivability is still the foundation. Hardening, dispersion, stealth, and redundant communications are the quiet bedrock beneath the day-to-day messaging. Together, they aim to produce an adversary calculus in which nuclear first use or coercive brinkmanship would not change battlefield realities in ways that justify the risks.
The declaratory aspect of US posturing is intentionally restrained. It avoids novel doctrines that might blur thresholds while leaving room to respond to a spectrum of Russian behaviours, from overt nuclear sabre-rattling to subtler forms of nuclear adjacency like exercises near sensitive borders or the messaging use of dual-capable systems. The operational aspect is more dynamic. It accepts the reality of a messy information environment and leverages selective transparency. Announcing specific deployments after the fact, showcasing allied participation in strategic exercises, and emphasising readiness without dramatisation are all designed to reassure publics and parliaments across the alliance while sending Moscow the familiar message that the United States does not require a crisis to be ready for one.
Arms control is not abandoned in this posture, but it is reframed. Instead of a single comprehensive treaty doing all the work, Washington increasingly treats arms control as a spectrum of stabilizers that can be applied piecemeal when politics allow and removed when they do not. This includes informal guardrails around exercises, reciprocal notifications that do not require intrusive inspections, and time-bounded understandings to avoid close-approach incidents or misread tests. The strategic bet is that such thin guardrails are preferable to total opacity, even if they fall short of the verification-rich regimes of the past. The United States also keeps an open door for a more durable framework if there is a credible partner on the other side. However, it accepts that any future agreement will have to address categories of capability that older treaties left untouched, from hypersonic and exotic delivery systems to theatre-range systems that matter just as much as intercontinental ones.
Economic statecraft forms the second pillar. By restricting Russian enriched uranium’s access to the US market and pressing allied utilities to diversify fuel contracts, Washington is executing a medium-term decoupling strategy that reaches into a sector once treated as politically inert. In the near term, narrow exemptions and waivers minimize collateral damage to allied energy security. Over the longer run, investment in domestic enrichment and alternative suppliers is intended to harden the transatlantic grid against market manipulation or policy blackmail. The aim is not simply to punish, but to alter the structural conditions that once let Rosatom bind countries into decades-long dependencies. This economic track sits alongside targeted sanctions on individuals and entities tied to unsafe practices, militarisation of civilian sites, or proliferation-adjacent activities. The more the civil-nuclear sphere is used as a tool of coercion or occupation, the more it becomes a legitimate ground for sanctions escalation.
Alliance management is the third pillar, and it may be the most intricate. Within NATO, the United States must harmonize deterrence moves acceptable to front-line allies with the risk tolerances of more distant capitals. Each publicised bomber rotation, each missile defence test, and each policy paper on nuclear sharing has a different impact in Warsaw, Berlin, Rome, and Oslo. The posture aims to knit these differences into a coherent narrative: NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains credible, the United States’ extended deterrence commitments are unambiguous, and the pathways to crisis stability are preserved. In practice, this means more frequent allied consultations, greater transparency with parliaments on the logic of deployments and exercises, and a careful division of labour between nuclear and conventional moves so as not to heighten salience needlessly. Beyond Europe, the posture intersects with Indo-Pacific priorities. Washington cannot afford a nuclear messaging campaign in Europe that suggests vulnerability in Asia, so it synchronizes signals with allies like Japan and Australia while keeping India at the table even when secondary sanctions debates complicate cooperation.
Russia’s counter-posture exploits ambiguity as a tool. Its doctrine and rhetoric flirt with lowered thresholds and dual-use opacity in order to keep NATO planners guessing and allied publics anxious. Periodic references to nuclear options, high-visibility movements of dual-capable systems, and exercises designed to blur conventional-nuclear boundaries are optimized for political effect. At the same time, Russia tends to calibrate its actions to avoid tripping unmistakable red lines. It seeks to capture the value of nuclear coercion without paying the operational costs of actual nuclear use, which would be catastrophic diplomatically and militarily. This is where the US posture tries to box Moscow in: by combining steady readiness with crisis-time restraint and explicit alliance signalling, it attempts to deny Russia the psychological dividends of nuclear theatrics. Technology trends complicate the dance. Hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, long-range precision conventional strike, more survivable and mobile command posts, and proliferated space architectures collectively compress warning time and challenge traditional notions of “strategic stability.” The United States is leaning into resilience rather than matching every capability like-for-like. Hardened, redundant C3I, disaggregated sensors, and rapid reconstitution capacity are all meant to lengthen decision time rather than shorten it. In a crisis, the posture prefers to widen the aperture for diplomacy by making first-strike payoffs less plausible and by keeping leadership confident that retaliatory options are intact. This logic also animates missile defence investments.
Considering the current scenario, Crisis management remains the most fragile element to tackle. With formal inspections and trusted data exchanges attenuated, the opportunity for misinterpretation grows. Exercises can look like mobilization, ISR surges can look like pre-strike preparation, and conventional raids can look dual-capable. The United States’ answer is to over-invest in communication channels that can work under stress, to socialise patterns of behaviour that are recognisable as “deterrence choreography” rather than prelude, and to embed de-escalation options in operational plans. The art is to avoid performative maximalism that would box leaders into single-step ladders. In Washington’s ideal world, crises contain multiple off-ramps at every rung. The civil-nuclear market piece is often overlooked in public debate, but matters greatly over the medium term. Reactor technology choices lock states into vendor ecosystems for decades, shaping everything from spare parts to safety culture to diplomatic habits. The United States’ push to expand fuel fabrication options, to promote next-generation reactors with safer operating profiles, and to support allied regulatory capacity is not just an industrial policy. It is a geopolitical play that reduces Russia’s leverage over client states and makes sanctions more durable by shrinking the circle of actors with high sunk costs in Rosatom’s ecosystem. The more suppliers there are for enriched uranium, fuel assemblies, and maintenance, the less power Moscow has to threaten outages or price shocks. Over time, this should make allied political coalitions more cohesive in moments of coercion.
All of this feeds into scenario planning. One plausible trajectory is managed rivalry with thin guardrails. In that world, the United States and Russia avoid a breakout race, hover near current deployed levels due to budgetary and operational constraints, and resurrect a handful of reciprocal notifications or exercise guardrails whenever a crisis bites. The signalling is loud but bounded, and civil-nuclear decoupling continues on a measured but persistent path. Stability is probabilistic rather than guaranteed, and shocks can still pierce the membrane, but the default returns after a crisis recedes. A second trajectory is competitive expansion under opacity. Here, arms control lapses entirely, and both sides invest in upload capacity, theatre-range deployments, and ambiguous dual-use capabilities around Europe. In that world, alliance politics become rougher, deterrence crises more frequent, and decision time shorter. A third, less likely trajectory is transactional détente tied to concrete developments around Ukraine and accompanied by narrow, verifiable limits on categories that both sides find risky, perhaps non-strategic systems near NATO’s borders or specific exotic delivery systems. That path requires domestic political narratives that can sell limited compromises as strategic wins and a willingness to re-learn verification disciplines.
The Indo-Pacific and the Global South are not passive backdrops in any of these scenarios. India’s balancing act—deep legacy ties to Russian reactors and fuel on one side, growing strategic convergence with the United States on the other—will shape how aggressively Washington enforces secondary restrictions in civil-nuclear commerce. The more alternatives the United States and partners can credibly offer India and other swing states, the easier it becomes to hold the line on sanctions without losing broader strategic cooperation. Similarly, Russia will keep courting Africa and the Middle East with attractive financing and build-operate-transfer models. The United States’ posture, therefore, includes development finance and export credit tools that can make non-Russian options viable, especially for countries that see nuclear energy as essential to base load decarbonization. Domestic politics inside the United States will colour the posture’s tone but not its basic silhouette. Across administrations, the triad’s recapitalisation enjoys bipartisan support because the cost of letting it slip is judged higher than the cost of modernisation. The debate plays out at the margins—how much public signalling is optimal, how far to go on missile defence, how tight to make sanctions, how generous to be with allied carve-outs—but the core logic of credible deterrence, resilient C3I, and economic decoupling from coercive dependencies is set. This continuity is itself a signal to Moscow that time will not necessarily soften Washington’s position.
The risk ledger is not blank and deserves sober accounting. Accidental escalation in a verification-light environment remains the top concern, particularly with dual-capable systems that are indistinguishable in flight and ISR patterns that can be read as pre-emption. Alliance divergence is the second risk, as uneven threat perceptions inside NATO can be exploited by a Russia skilled at wedge politics. A third risk lies in technological surprise, not in the Hollywood sense of a silver bullet, but through incremental combinations that reduce leaders’ confidence in their understanding of the battle space. The US posture mitigates these by privileging resilience over brittle offence, by investing in allied consultation and shared intelligence pictures, and by rehearsing crisis communication under degraded conditions.
Conclusion
The practical implications for the next several years are straightforward, even if the world they inhabit is not. Expect the United States to keep signalling readiness through visible but reversible actions, to invest heavily in the plumbing of deterrence—the communications links, hardened nodes, and redundant sensors that do not make headlines—and to press forward with a civil-nuclear realignment that gradually drains Moscow’s leverage without imposing sudden shocks on allies. Expect persistent outreach for minimal stabilizers when opportunities arise and prompt tightening of sanctions where nuclear adjacency is abused. Expect, too, a steady cadence of alliance reassurance that keeps publics on board and adversaries uncertain about the payoff of nuclear coercion.
If the rivalry tilts toward managed competition, the payoff is a strategic environment in which crises can be ridden out without catastrophic miscalculation, sanctions can do their work without splintering coalitions, and modernization can proceed without igniting spirals of fear. If it tilts toward competitive expansion under opacity, the posture will harden. Upload options will be exercised, theatre deployments will accelerate, and nuclear salience will rise in public discourse with all the psychological and political costs that entail. A transactional détente is not impossible. It would require verifiable steps that reduce the risk of a sudden breakout and a political moment in which both sides can sell restraint as strength. The posture is designed to be ready for any of these paths, to keep American and allied interests protected while preserving the option space that deterrence seeks to defend in the first place.
In the end, nuclear posturing is not about theatrics; it is about time: buying time for diplomacy to work when it can, for sanctions to reshape incentives, for industrial policy to rebuild resilience, and for alliances to absorb shocks without fraying. The United States’ current approach recognises that there is no return to a neatly compartmentalised nuclear relationship with Russia. The centre of gravity has shifted to a world of mixed instruments and layered signals. In that world, the measure of success is not eliminating risk—an impossible task—but keeping it bounded, legible, and manageable enough that choices made in a hurry do not define the era, but rather an era marked by Ego over Geopolitics.
About the Author
Gayathri Pramod, a research scholar, works on the genealogy of governance over life and death in times of war, with a particular focus on the West Asian front. Her research interests centre on the thematic study of war crimes and other geopolitical flashpoints.
Prime Minister Modi & President Xi in a previous meeting: source Internet
The world of geo-politics is undergoing some serious changes, as United States President Donald Trump changes policies, one tweet at a time. One of the biggest changes has been that in the India-US ties. While this relationship grew under Trump 1.0 and then under President Joe Biden, the second term of Trump has seen this relationship nose dive. An interesting outcome of this has been that as India-US ties plummet, India has started to look at Russia and China anew. India’s ties with Russia have always stayed warm, despite the American embrace. With China, and the tensions on the border, it is actually the India-China ties that were in a freeze for many years.
Add to this the fact that the Quad (a grouping of four comprising of India, US, Japan and Australia) was seen as an anti-China forum where both the US and India stood together. But even the significance of the Quad is now in question as is the entire Indo-Pacific strategy of the US where India was seen as a counter to a rising China.
India seems to have made a conscious decision to make an outreach to China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to China to attend the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) on Aug 31-Sept 01, 2025 is a clear indicator of that shift. India recently had the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visit India and the stage now seems all set for Modi’s China visit. Wang’s Delhi visited yielded positive outcomes going by his comments and the readouts.
He was in Delhi at the invitation of NSA (National Security Advisor) Ajit Doval for the 24th Special Representatives talk on the boundary question. During his visit he also met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar for bilateral talks. Wang was also received by Modi who said that he would travel to Tianjin for the SCO meeting. Modi is scheduled to meet with the Chinese President Xi Jinping during the SCO Summit. Also, during Wang’s visit, India and China agreed to resume border trade at three points, restart direct flights, expand the Kailash Manasarovar yatra slots for pilgrims and relax visas.
“The setbacks we experienced in the past few years were not in the interest of the people of our two countries, and in October last year, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi held an important meeting in Kazan. That meeting pointed the direction for the development of our bilateral relations and provided impetus for the proper settlement of the boundary question,” said Wang in his remarks during the visit, setting a positive tone to the bilateral ties. Later in the evening, Wang called on Modi, where Modi said, “India-China relations have made steady progress guided by respect for each other’s interests and sensitivities.”
Wang also referred to the SCO Heads of State Council meeting in Tianjin and said, “Now the bilateral relationship is facing an important opportunity for improvement and growth. The Chinese side attaches great importance to the Prime Minister’s visit to China to attend the SCO summit at our invitation. We believe the Indian side will also make a contribution to a successful summit in Tianjin. History and reality proved once again that a healthy and stable China-India relationship serves the fundamental long-term interests of both of our countries. It is also what the developing countries all wanted to see.”
These remarks by both the Indian and Chinese side clearly indicate that both are now willing to shed the past animosities and make an outreach to the other. It would be wrong to assume that this implies that contentious issues like the border one is not that significant anymore. Rather, this is a simple calculation where the US bullying of India has led it to re-calibrate its ties with China. And that should worry the US.
Another important development that is taking place is the increased emphasis on the trilateral cooperation between India-China and Russia. India’s foreign minister recently travelled to Russia and during the SCO Summit, the leaders of India, China and Russia will be meeting together. Despite the punishing tariffs being slapped on India by the US for buying Russian oil, India has maintained that it will continue to follow policies that are in its national interests.
Speaking at an event recently, Foreign Minister Jaishankar said, “If you have a problem buying oil or refined products from Russia, don’t buy. But Europe buys, America buys. If you don’t like, don’t buy from us.” His comments clearly underscore the point that India would not bow to pressure from Western nations.
With all this in the background, the SCO Summit then assumes great significance. It will see the Indian and Chinese leader meet as both reach out to the other; and the presence of the Russian leader will add in another significant dimension. The outcomes of the SCO Summit and the meetings between Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will likely decide the next chapter in global politics.
About the Author
Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9
Pictorial representation of the leaders: source Internet
One of the most frequent campaign promises repeated by Donald J. Trump upon his return to the White House in January 2025 remains stark and clear: “I will be quick to end the war in Ukraine, very quickly.” To his supporters, the statement represented Trump as a supreme dealmaker who could solve any of the most intractable conflicts of the world merely with the sheer force of wills and personal negotiations. To his opponents, it was simply the empty dream that failed to realize how unprecedented the war in Europe was since the Second World War.
The Russia-Ukraine War, now in its fourth year of full-scale fighting, has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, displaced millions, disrupted world energy supplies, and forced military and diplomatic realignments on multiple continents. The notion that one man (even the U.S. president), could stop it within a short time has been one of the hottest debates in Washington and Moscow, not mentioning Kyiv and elsewhere.
So is this a promise that Trump can actually fulfil? To respond to this, it is insufficient to refer to the statements used in the campaigns but rather into the actualities of the battlefield conditions, political red-lines with both Moscow and Kyiv, and also the extent of the presidential power. This article analyses the history of war, the overseas policy of Trump, the positions of the most essential players and the scenarios that could take place.
Historical Background – What Led to Staging of the War?
The roots of the strife are laid significantly earlier than the time of Trump holding the position of president. On the one hand, the shift toward closer ties with the West and Europe among Ukraine that was seen after the Maidan Revolution of 2014 prompted Russia to annex Crimea. This triggered a protracted insurgency in eastern Ukraine that was aided by Moscow. The Minsk Agreements of 2015 are only partially successful because the situation proved to be still rather tense.
By February 2022, Russia invaded outright with the Russian war against Ukraine, in an excuse that Ukraine was going to be demilitarized and de-nazified. The war rapidly mutated into a slog with unprecedented destruction, sanctions imposed by the whole world against Russia, and an unprecedented number of Western officials actively participating in providing military aid to Poland.
In 2022-24, the battle line changed but not convincingly. Ukraine recaptured huge swathes of land in counteroffensives, and Russia dug in across the Donbas and south Ukraine. It turned into a war of attrition as was artillery battles, drone wars and loss of large numbers.
By the second term of Trump in office, the war had become a key legitimating test of global security architecture: could the West maintain the principle that borders cannot be adjusted through the use of force? Or would Russia be able to gain concessions that rewarded aggression?
The Trump Foreign Policy Legacy – A Tangled History
The foreign policy of the Trump administration in the United States in the first term (20172021), gives insight into its attitude to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. He was notorious in his distrust of NATO, insisting at various times that it had become obsolete and that its European members needed to spend significantly more on defence. His friendship with Vladimir Putin was rather friendly and this attracted criticism within the nation. In 2019, he held back military support to Ukraine to the centre of a political controversy that resulted in his first impeachment.
Meanwhile, Trump did authorize deadly support to Ukraine (long resisted by Obama) as well as sanctioning Russia on certain matters. His manner was transactional, less on ideology and more on what he thought were the U.S. interests.
The background thus gives Trump the inheritance of a sceptic of traditional allies, a believer in a personal diplomacy where leaders converse face-to-face, and an eagerness to break with long-established policy in order to achieve what he thinks is likely to be advantageous.
Trump Claims-The War ends in a hurry
Since his recent arrival in the office, Trump has not presented a comprehensive description of his plan to end the war publicly. His sweeping assertion is that he can get both parties to the table of negotiations, by using American influence and his personal rapport with leaders. Reports of his inner circle indicate that he visualizes:
Ceasefire as a beginning point – freezing the frontline where it is
Security assurances short of NATO: giving Ukraine military aid but not membership.
Sanctions relief of Russia – as an element of an agreement, in case Moscow ceases major offensives.
Direct negotiations with Putin and Zelenskyy – where Trump plays the key role.
Although the promise of imminent peace is tempting, the grand question is whether Trump will be able to patch up positions that remain hopelessly divided.
The Kremlin standpoint- The red lines of Putin
The demands of Russia have remained constant:
Recognition of the annexed territories (Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia).
A commitment not to accept Ukraine into NATO.
A ban on Western weapons and bases in Ukraine.
These are not simply ploys in the negotiating process to Putin, but rather key to the survival of his regime. The idea of surrendering occupied territories would be unpopular among a domestic audience, whereas yielding territory to NATO would undermine his well-publicized goal of slowing Western expansion.
Therefore, a U.S.-sponsored settlement that does not take these demands into consideration runs the risk of being flat out rejected by Moscow.
The Kyiv Position -The Peace Formula of Zelenskyy
The 10-point Peace Formula as proposed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demands:
A complete restoration of Ukraine to its borders in 1991.
Accountability of the Russian war crimes.
Retreat of the Russians.
It is reliable security that is guaranteed.
The constitution of Ukraine forbids giving up territory. The opinion which is strongly against concessions is prevalent in the country after years of war and atrocities. To Zelenskyy, or any Ukrainian president, such a person could hardly survive politically by acknowledging the results of the Russian annexations.
Therefore, the dissimilarity between the demands in Moscow and position in Kyiv is enormous. How Trump achieves this warfare challenge will depend on how he manages to bridge a gap that has so far defied any diplomatic attempts to resolve the same.
The Battlefield in 2025 – Fluid again
By mid-2025 the war was not at all frozen. There are new offensives by Russia in the Donbas region, whereas Ukraine maintains its position as a defender and limited counterattacks. Advanced weapons used in air defences and long-range missiles are introduced which have made certain areas stable but there is no clear winning side.
That kind of background means both Russia and Ukraine must feel there is still time to centre the battlefield in their favour. This minimizes motives to compromise-why offer to compromise with potential victory or at least greater bargaining advantage to come tomorrow?
Trump may desire speedy peace but it is not generally so, wars do not end because someone on the outside wants it so.
What Trump Can Do- The Levers of Power
Trump has enormous influence being the President of the United States:
Military Aid – He can expedite, slow or impose conditions to the aid to Ukraine.
Sanctions – He can relax or modify sanctions against Russia and alter its financial/economic calculations.
Diplomatic routes – He can call summits, contact back- channels and exert pressure on allies.
NATO Unity – by his formulations on U.S. commitments, he can either consolidate or divide allies.
These tools can be very strong, though they are not omnipotent. Trump cannot push Kyiv to give up territory unwillingly, and can never pressure Putin to give up his goals of regime preservation.
Constraints of U.S. Power
The American presidents work within limits
Congress has control over the financing Trump cannot waive or add aid without congressional manoeuvrings
Allies possess agency of their own Europe, NATO, and others will not settle with a deal which speculates on their security.
Ukraine is independent. Compressing it to make concessions would be disastrous to U.S. credibility in the international environment.
Even the personal preference of Trump to have a deal, therefore, comes to naught without a coalition willing to follow a Trumpian course.
Europe & NATO -The Outer Ring of Limitations
In its Summit of 2024 in Washington, NATO called Ukraine membership in the alliance irreversible. Leaders in Europe have as well signed on to joint communiques indicating that they do not want to give way to territorial concessions to them, such a settlement that will reward Russia with invasion will create a bad precedent.
This is complicated by Trump being sceptical of NATO. In case he forces a deal that Europeans do not appreciate, the alliance may break up, reducing the collective strength of the West.
The presence of China, the Global South and other players
In addition to the two capitals: Washington and Moscow, other powers also affect the conflict. China has projected itself as a kind of potential mediator; however, given its pro-Russian reputations, it has received scepticism in Kyiv. India, Brazil and South Africa have appealed to peace without taking any sides.
These actors allow Russia to take a reprieve in diplomacy to minimise the impact of U.S. pressure alone. In the case of Trump, he cannot sit at the negotiating table alone.
What might happen under Trump?
1. Rapid Ceasefire, and dependable “Freeze”
Both sides are pressured by Trump to cease the offensives and concretize the existing lines of control. Russia maintains de facto control of occupied regions and security assurances to Ukraine; United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom will provide secure, permanent homes to Ukrainians; United States will provide Ukraine with security assurances Threats: unsteady cease-fire, future intensification.
2. Protection under a NATO- Fred Kudlak
Ukraine is supplied with weapons by the Western countries but not offered NATO membership Russia abandons immediate offensives but does not quit the ground Risks: Kyiv will perceive it as a betrayal; Moscow will reorganize itself to attack in the future.
3. Grand Bargain -Sanctions Withdrawal
Russia restores boundaries to pre-2022 levels in exchange for a gradual removal of sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West on troops. Not likely in the absence of heavy Russian loss
4. Instead of Peace, Escalation
In case talks fail and aid is cut, Russia would have the incentive of putting greater pressure militarily, rendering the conflict more protracted. To attain quick peace is also the motive of Trump, which ironically may spur instability.
Why Quick Peace Is Often Impossible
The structural barriers are tremendous
Russia still feels that it can wait down the west
Ukraine is not a country to concede territory either by law or by politics
The NATO allies will not approve the moral rewarding of aggression
There must be credible enforcement of any settlement and this must take time and unity.
Those facts imply that Trump cannot decree peace by decree.
Consequences of the Global Order
The result of this move by Trump will have resonance much beyond Eastern Europe:
In case of success, he would transform international relations and prove the superiority of the U.S. in the third world.
Failed, U.S. credibility might be damaged, NATO unity might be lost and authoritarian states might be emboldened.
The outcome to the war or the extension of it will also determine energy markets and arms trade and international law.
Conclusion – Does Trump Have the Ability to trim the War?
Donald Trump can affect the course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict more than any other single figure not on the battlefield. He holds huge military and economic leverages and his unorthodox diplomacy can open the doors to negotiations.
But influence is not commanding. The destiny of the war is decided by transfer-holders by the interests and survival of Moscow and Kyiv respectively. As long as Russia claims that it wishes to conquer some territories, and Ukraine refuses to give up, no immediate ceasefire can be achieved.
Trump can coerce, cajole and suggest. He can hold summits and guarantee bargains. However, until the underlying positions of the warring parties change, he will always be referring in the same measure to a slogan than a solution of ending the war quickly.
That is to say: A U.S. president can change incentives and influence diplomacy, but he cannot simply order peace to prevail in a war, which is an existential fight on both ends.
About the Author
Shreya Dabral is pursuing her Master’s in Mass Communication from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. She balances her academic journey with active roles in research and digital media. Her research paper on consumer repurchase behaviour in the skincare industry, published in the International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Trends (IJSRET), is a testament to her curiosity, clarity, and commitment to exploring audience-brand dynamics in a digital age.
On July 24, 2025, the long-simmering border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia erupted into the most violent confrontation in more than a decade. What began with rising tensions in May sparked by incidents along their shared frontier escalated into heavy fighting across at least a dozen border sites, including areas near the historic Preah Vihear and Ta Muen Thom temples. Rooted in colonial-era boundary disputes and contested claims over ancient heritage sites, the clashes claimed at least 38 lives, mostly civilians, and displaced more than 300,000 people in both countries.
The fighting, which raged for five days, saw intense exchanges of artillery fire and accusations of indiscriminate attacks, even as both governments accused the other of violating humanitarian norms. On July 28, 2025 a fragile ceasefire was reached in Kuala Lumpur, mediated by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in his capacity as ASEAN chair, with the backing of the United States and China. The high-stakes diplomacy was further propelled by U.S. President Donald Trump’s direct intervention threatening steep tariffs and frozen trade talks unless hostilities ceased while China lent strong support to its ally, Cambodia.
International pressure, including a closed-door UN Security Council session, underscored the conflict’s regional and global significance. While both sides have since agreed to form a joint boundary committee and avoid provocative troop movements, mutual distrust and competing nationalist narratives mean the truce remains fragile. This article examines the 2025 border crisis in depth tracing its historical roots, unpacking the political and military dimensions, assessing the humanitarian toll, and evaluating the diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a return to war.
Background
1. Historical Context of Thailand–Cambodia Relations
Thailand and Cambodia share deep historical, cultural, and political linkages, but these have been intertwined with centuries of disputes, shifting alliances, and contested borders. Their relationship has roots in the ancient Khmer Empire, which once extended over parts of present-day Thailand, influencing the Thai language, architecture, and religion. However, colonial interventions in the 19th and early 20th centuries particularly under French rule in Cambodia and British influence in Siam (now Thailand) reshaped boundaries and sowed seeds of future territorial disputes.
A key point of contention emerged around the Preah Vihear Temple, a Hindu religious site located atop a 525-meter cliff along the Dangrek Mountains. In 1962, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Cambodia, granting sovereignty over the temple. However, Thailand maintained claims over surrounding areas, leading to sporadic tensions. The post-Cold War era initially opened avenues for greater cooperation, as both countries engaged in trade, tourism, and regional integration under ASEAN. Yet, historical grievances and competing national narratives continued to simmer beneath the surface, ready to resurface whenever nationalist politics or external events stirred the waters.
2. Border Disputes and Escalations Prior to 2025
Border tensions between the two countries have periodically flared, often triggered by disputes over territory adjacent to the Preah Vihear Temple and other less-defined boundary sections. The most notable modern escalation occurred between 2008 and 2011, when UNESCO’s recognition of the Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site reignited hostilities. Skirmishes along the border left dozens dead, displaced thousands, and strained bilateral ties.
Although ceasefire agreements were reached and ASEAN mediation was attempted, mutual suspicion persisted. The Cambodian political landscape, dominated by long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen, frequently leveraged nationalist sentiment over territorial integrity, while Thailand’s domestic politics marked by military influence, political protests, and competing power factions sometimes used the dispute to rally domestic support.
In the years leading up to 2025, despite economic interdependence and shared ASEAN commitments, unresolved demarcation issues, local militarization of border areas, and historical mistrust laid the groundwork for renewed confrontations. The combination of resource competition, strategic concerns over cross-border infrastructure, and nationalist rhetoric meant that any triggering incident could reignite tensions setting the stage for the latest conflict.
Recent Developments Leading to the 2025 Escalation
The renewed flare-up in 2025 can be traced to a combination of political, security, and resource-related triggers that gradually intensified over the preceding months. Firstly, nationalist rhetoric on both sides gained momentum, with political leaders in Thailand and Cambodia facing domestic pressures to project a firm stance on sovereignty. Cambodian officials, under scrutiny for perceived concessions in earlier negotiations, began reinforcing their claims through both legal references and symbolic acts such as commemorations at the Preah Vihear Temple. In Thailand, opposition groups criticized the government for “weak border policy,” compelling Bangkok to adopt a more assertive posture.
Secondly, the completion of new road and infrastructure projects near the disputed areas partly funded by foreign investment heightened concerns over de facto territorial control. These developments not only brought more troops and civilians into proximity but also increased the economic stakes for both governments. Reports of road extensions linking to military outposts fueled accusations of strategic encroachment.
Thirdly, sporadic skirmishes between patrol units throughout late 2024 escalated tensions. Incidents included the destruction of temporary border markers, detentions of villagers accused of trespassing and artillery fire during a disputed clearing operation. Social media further amplified the situation, with viral images of troop movements sparking nationalist sentiment and public outrage in both nations.
By early 2025, diplomatic channels had visibly strained. Joint border committee meetings stalled over disagreements on demarcation maps, while backchannel talks failed to prevent the deployment of additional military units on both sides. The combination of domestic politics, contested infrastructure expansion, and persistent low-level clashes created a volatile environment ultimately tipping the dispute into its most serious phase since the early 2010s.
Root Causes of the Conflict
The July 2025 outbreak did not arise from a single mistake or momentary lapse; it was the violent expression of layered and long-embedded causes. At the most basic level, the dispute is a product of ambiguous colonial-era border-making. The Franco–Siamese treaties of the early 20th century and the maps produced by French cartographers left several border segments poorly defined most notably the area around the Preah Vihear temple and adjacent promontory. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1962 that the temple itself lay within Cambodian territory, the court’s decision left adjacent tracts of land unclear. Those legal ambiguities created a recurring gray zone where patrols, roads, and development projects repeatedly collided with competing claims, enabling localized incidents to escalate rapidly.
Cultural and identity claims amplify the raw territorial dispute and make compromise politically costly. Preah Vihear is not merely a piece of land: it is a potent national symbol. Cambodia sees the temple as a tangible inheritance of the Khmer Empire and a vindication of national sovereignty. Thailand, meanwhile, has communities and nationalist narratives that consider parts of the same cultural landscape as historically linked to Thai heritage. The UNESCO listing of Preah Vihear in 2008 crystallized these tensions what for Cambodia was a cultural recognition was viewed by many in Thailand as an encroachment on territory. This symbolic salience means that governments find it difficult to offer concessions without risking domestic blowback, turning a border question into a test of national honour.
Domestic politics in both capitals have repeatedly served as accelerants. In Thailand, the balance between civilian governments, royal prerogatives, and a politically powerful military creates frequent spikes of instability; leaders have at times used assertive foreign-policy gestures to consolidate support or to distract from internal troubles. The 2025 crisis occurred against this combustible backdrop: the political fallout from a leaked phone call between Thailand’s Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodia’s Hun Sen (a figure of outsized influence) inflamed public opinion and strengthened military and nationalist voices that favoured a hard line. Cambodia’s leadership, likewise, has leveraged territorial defence as a means of consolidating domestic legitimacy; the Hun family’s continued prominence in Cambodian politics has made a firm stance on sovereignty both a personal and political imperative.
Security dynamics and militarization along the frontier converted political disputes into kinetic danger. Both states increased troop deployments, hardened positions, and improved outposts on the Dangrek escarpment and surrounding high ground the very terrain that confers tactical advantage. Landmines and unexploded ordnance from past conflicts litter the borderlands, raising the odds that patrols or civilian movements will trigger new violence. That danger was tragically realized in 2025: a landmine incident and subsequent exchanges in late July spiralled into five days of fighting that left dozens dead (at least 38 by official tallies used in this article) and displaced hundreds of thousands. Once artillery, mortars, and rockets enter a contest, the humanitarian cost multiplies rapidly, and local incidents become national crises.
Failures of diplomacy and institutional mechanisms also played a central role. ASEAN’s consensus-based, non-interference model has limited capacity to act decisively when two member states clash and bilateral border committees where progress could be made had stalled or produced little in the months before the outbreak. Cambodia repeatedly turned to international legal remedies (the ICJ) for clarification, while Thailand has consistently preferred bilateral negotiation and has at times rejected the Court’s jurisdiction for further demarcation. This mismatch one side seeking third-party arbitration, the other insisting on direct talks meant that no mutually trusted mechanism existed to defuse disputes before they turned violent.
External geopolitics complicated the picture rather than simplifying it. Closer Cambodian ties with China and Thailand’s security relationships and trade links with other powers introduced an extra dimension of influence and pressure, which domestic actors exploited. In 2025, international actors most visibly Malaysia as mediator and the United States through intense economic pressure helped secure a ceasefire, but their involvement also revealed how quickly outside leverage can alter incentives without resolving the underlying boundary questions.
Finally, the information environment social media, nationalist media outlets, and targeted disinformation fanned mistrusts and hardened public attitudes on both sides. Viral clips, selective leaks (such as the phone audio), and inflammatory commentary raised the political cost of compromise and made measured diplomacy harder to sell to domestic audiences.
Combined, these factors ambiguous colonial borders, symbolic attachment to territory, domestic political imperatives, militarization of the frontier, stalled diplomatic channels, external strategic competition, and a combustible information environment created a tinderbox. The May–July 2025 incidents provided the spark; the structural drivers ensured the spark would ignite into the worst confrontation in over a decade. Without addressing the legal ambiguities, building durable confidence-building measures, and creating credible, mutually acceptable dispute-resolution processes, the border is likely to remain a recurring flashpoint.
Conclusion
The July 2025 ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia marks a rare moment of reprieve in a dispute defined by decades of mistrust, unresolved territorial questions, and cycles of confrontation. It has halted the most intense border fighting in over a decade and created a fragile space for diplomacy to work. Yet, the durability of this pause in hostilities will depend not only on immediate military disengagement but also on the political will of both governments to transform a temporary truce into a sustainable peace.
To succeed, Bangkok and Phnom Penh must move beyond crisis management and invest in confidence-building measures such as troop withdrawals from contested zones, coordinated border patrols, and permanent communication hotlines that reduce the risk of accidental escalation. Expanding cross-border economic, cultural, and tourism ties could help replace zero-sum rivalry with mutual benefit, softening the political cost of compromise.
The risks, however, remain acute. Domestic political volatility in either country could reignite nationalist fervor, turning the border dispute into a tool of internal political mobilization. If the demarcation process continues to stall and neither side shows flexibility, trust will erode, making renewed clashes more likely.
At the regional level, ASEAN’s role bolstered by possible ICJ oversight could prove decisive in steering the conflict toward a formal, mutually recognized settlement. Success would not only resolve one of Southeast Asia’s most persistent flashpoints but also enhance ASEAN’s standing as a credible mediator. Failure, by contrast, risks cementing a “frozen conflict,” where fighting subsides but the underlying dispute remains unresolved, ready to flare whenever political winds shift.
For now, the ceasefire is a doorway, not a destination. Whether it leads to lasting peace or back to the trenches will hinge on what happens in the weeks and months ahead.
About the Author
Megha Mittal is a scholar of International Relations with an academic foundation in Spanish language studies. Her work engages with the study of geopolitics, foreign policy, and global governance, reflecting a broad interest in the dynamics that define and influence international affairs.
A significant paradigm shift is occurring in how Israelis view their enemies in the region, as the forces in the Middle East are yet to realign the balance of power. Since the past decades Iran has been holding the limelight as a threat to the Israel state; a tom open country with possibilities of attaining nuclear weapons whilst having a long track record of close associations to terrorists like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, in the new reality since 2023, the new player is gaining increasing importance: Türkiye. Türkiye was a good partner of W.T.E. that addressed many regional problems in the past, but is currently considered more as a potential adversary by Jerusalem’s defence-related circles. Is Türkiye the new big menace to Israel in the wake of Iran?
New Strategic Emphasis- The Post-Iran
In addition to the consequences of the catastrophic war that took place between Iran and Israel in the years 20232025, commonly referred to as the Second Shadow War, the region started losing a significant portion of the Iranian strength. Its economy was in a shambolic position due to sanctions, but it was even worse after sanctions, when it was isolated internationally. The war has not only disarmed Iran as far as the nuclear structure is concerned, but it has also reduced its operations in Syria and Lebanon in the region. This shift left a new geopolitical vacuum around, and with it, Türkiye quickly crowded into that vacuum.
Iran has been restricted about its direct attack on Israel, and this does not warrant Israel to reduce its defence. Instead, there is attention to the indiscreet yet violent encounter of Türkiye, the amassing of might, the vigorizing of diplomatic enterprise, and the enmity of the ideologies of Israel.
Military Expansion of Türkiye in Syria
The increasing presence of Turks in Syria in military terms has been one of the most disturbing tendencies to Israel. As the Assad regime crumbled, Türkiye was not afraid of establishing a presence in the northern part of the country. Türkiye gained influence in keeping the Syrian National Army (SNA) at its northern border, which consists of breakaway Syrian rebels who have allied with Türkiye.
Türkiye now has several military bases in Syria in the North. These include training and arming rebels and funding rebels, some of whom have strong anti-Israel ideology owing to their geographical region of operation. The presence of militias that are affiliated with Türkiye on its northern border is very problematic for Israel. By attempting to establish immediate order and dispatch its troops there, instead of Iran sending its proxies (Hezbollah, for example), Türkiye is not the same kind of threat, though perhaps more erratic.
Ideological War of Erdogan against Israel
President Erdogan is in the spotlight on various occasions over his provocative speeches against Israel. He has called Israeli leaders Nazis, the Gaza war a genocide, and Türkiye the protector of Jerusalem. He states not only politically expedient things, but there is more to the fact that there is an ideological divide.
By acting on this position under Erdogan, Türkiye will have become an Islamist populist and will have become the guardian of the Muslim identity and values. In this narration, Israel is depicted as a colonial distributor and an Islamic antagonist. This is not exclusive to speeches, as this attitude to the world can be seen in the way foreign policy is made and conducted in Türkiye with respect to foreign relations and policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, had been pursuing the option of working with Israel, whereas in Türkiye, the trend has been on heightening alliances against Israel.
Hamas: A Turkish Red Line to Israeli Dependence
The Hamas supported by Ankara is, perhaps, one of the most open spheres of the conflict between Türkiye and Israel. Whereas most other Sunni majority countries have distanced themselves from the Palestinian militant group, Türkiye has gone a step further and embraced the head of Hamas, providing him with refuge and financial support as well as Turkish citizenship in certain cases.
Hamas officials have been caught in photos with their high-end connections in Ankara. Türkiye has been reported to allow the operation of the financial network and the crowdfunding of Hamas in Turkish territory. This was a warning sign to Tel Aviv, especially following the 2024 rocket attacks from Gaza, which, they assert, were preplanned with the assistance of Turkish-based agents.
In the case of Türkiye, it holds deep affiliations with Hamas to Israel as the ultimate diplomatic insult that, in turn, constitutes a national security risk to the country. Cooperation in the region is a hard-hitting issue because although the U.S and the EU have categorized Hamas as a terrorist organization, Türkiye considers Hamas as a resistance movement and is not ready to declare it as a terrorist organization.
Binding the Horns of the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye Major Battle Groups: Türkiye is experiencing a naval building spree, which encompasses the acquisition of six large-scale battle ships, besides establishing a submarine factory.
Another area of serious conflict in the region has been the Eastern Mediterranean since Israel possesses a lot of natural gas. The hostile maritime policies of Türkiye, especially the Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan), pose a threat to Cyprus and Greece and have an impact on the rights of Israel regarding energy exploration.
Tight security in disputed seas has also seen Türkiye deploy warships and research vessels into exploration areas where it claims maritime rights that overlap with areas of interest claimed by Israel as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Israeli leaders fear that Tk could try to scuttle offshore-gas pipelines or drilling operations, most of which involve Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot players.
In 2025, there was a tense maritime showdown when a Turkish warship trailed an Israeli exploration vessel in the Leviathan gas field. This implication was followed with no shot; the message was clear: Türkiye is ready to apply its power over water even when it will aggravate the condition in the region by the use of regional war.
The Drone Force of Türkiye: An Increasing Menace
The air superiority in the region has remained that of Israel, but the defence industry of Türkiye is quickly catching up. The drone program, spearheaded by firms such as Baykar (owned by the family of Erdoğan), has resulted in the creation of highly capable drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci, which have found good success on battlefields in Libya, Syria, and the Caucasus.
Not only are these the combat-tested drones, but they are also massively exported. Türkiye has been exporting drones to some countries, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Qatar, gaining strategic goodwill and military profit. The Turkish drones in hypothetical future warfare are likely to compete with Israeli superiority in surveillance and precision targeting, especially in war-torn countries such as Syria and the Mediterranean.
Israel, considering this, has begun stepping up counter-drone technology and cyber-defences. Nevertheless, the gap in technology continues to become smaller, and Türkiye’s dreams of entering drone warfare are one of the crucial issues to be worried about.
The Global Islamist Diplomacy of Türkiye
In addition to military and energy conflicts, Türkiye is diplomatically on military and energy fronts to sabotage Israel in the world arena. It has been conducting militant initiatives in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), painting Israel as a rogue state accused of war crimes.
Since the United Nations and International Criminal Court are considered to be the halls of the Global North, Türkiye is also standing up for the rights of the Palestinians and other Global South issues. It employs religious diplomacy, creating mosques, Islamic schools, and investing in cultural institutions to create goodwill where Israel is unrepresented to a large degree.
Taking advantage of such ideology, Türkiye is also deploying its ideological scope to the Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia, and creating narratives that on many occasions present Israel as a plunderer. Such a hearts and minds strategy contributes another level of psychological and diplomatic warfare in the Turkish challenge to Israel.
NATO Paradox: The Western Shield of Türkiye
Türkiye, unlike Iran, is a member of the NATO, which complicates an altercation. The alliance technically requires Türkiye to operate in tandem with the Western powers; however, the acts of Erdoğan have been ones where he has done such actions individually by purchasing Russian S-400 missile systems, countering the U.S policies in Syria, and being a threat to the integrity of NATO.
In the case of Israel, this entails that a blatant confrontation with Türkiye may split the unity of NATO and potentially bring Türkiye closer to Russia or China. Though the West has been quiet about the regional action of Türkiye, it has never really imposed significant sanctions on it due to its strategic position and NATO member status.
Such geopolitical positioning is providing Türkiye with greater diplomatic agility than Iran has ever had, and one far more formidable in matters of grey-zone warfare, hybrid conflict, and geopolitical domination.
Internal Fragility: A Weak Point of Türkiye?
Declaring its bold steps, Türkiye does have its weak points. Its economy is shaky with high rates of inflation, a depreciating currency, and a debt burden. Erdoğan is increasingly challenged in Türkiye, where he is opposed by urban secular voters, as well as by the younger generation. Elections are still held, and at certain times, the opposition has gained substantial ground.
Israel can exploit this internal weakness to include in a non-military containment approach: building relationships with Turkish civil society, promoting moderate voices, and combating the anti-Israel propaganda, via media diplomacy.
Moreover, the Turkish desire to do more than they are doing can often take place. It occupies military bases in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Azerbaijan at a time when its military and treasury are strained. Israel is still able to isolate Türkiye on a diplomatic level without necessarily going to open conflict, without weakening its regional alliances.
Not an Existential Threat; however, it is a Competitive Threat
Türkiye is not Iran, at least not yet. It is neither nuclear nor aspirational, and its danger is ideological, regional, and hybrid but not existential. But it is proving to have strong strategic capabilities, the capabilities of a competitor that is attempting to challenge Israel on various levels, at military, at diplomatic, at economic, and even at ideological levels.
Israel needs to take a future path that requires a reshaping strategy. The development of more robust regional coalitions (particularly with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Gulf countries), as well as investments in naval and cyber capabilities and in controlling the influence of Türkiye through a policy towards it via soft power, are critical junctures.
The rise of Türkiye should not be ignored. However, maximum confrontation is put on it, as in the case of Iran, it can also backfire. The assignment is: to balance somewhere in between: to curb the aspirations of Türkiye, but also, on the other hand, not to run headlong with it end to end, destabilizing even further the region.
About the Author
Shreya Dabral is pursuing her Master’s in Mass Communication from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. She balances her academic journey with active roles in research and digital media. Her research paper on consumer repurchase behaviour in the skincare industry, published in the International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Trends (IJSRET), is a testament to her curiosity, clarity, and commitment to exploring audience-brand dynamics in a digital age.
As early 2025, the US and China’s trade war was reached to its inflicting point. In one step, the Trump administration has imposed a universal 10% tariff on most of countries. China was the worst affected country, whereon Trump ratcheted tariffs on goods up to 145%. In reciprocation, China slapped tariffs as high as 125% on the US goods along with restricting rare-earth shipments vital to the latter’s tech and defense supply chains. Originally, Trump’s tariff blitz was started in 2018, whereby he targeted roughly $360 billion of Chinese imports at a 25% rate. It provoked Beijing to retaliate against $110 billion of U.S. goods with duties averaging 20–25%. After a brief spell of downturn, China’s exports rebounded by late 2019, demonstrated its ability to weather external shocks and sustain its export engine.
Given the US blockage of China in its largest market, the latter doubled down on what is being characterized as the “Southward Shift.” China started getting diversified market options and started getting engaged with the Asian, African and Latin American countries. Resultantly, its exports to ASEAN countries increased from 11% in 2017 to 16% in 2023. It was reported by the World Bank, that the increment was propelled by preferential tariff schedules and the rise of regional manufacturing hubs. For the period of January -July, the trade between China and EU has reached 3.35 trillion yuan ($465.3 billion). It shows 3.9% year-on-year growth making up 13% of China’s total foreign trade. Increasing trade with Germany @ 4.3% ($119.7 billion); France @ 2.7% ($46.53 billion); the Netherlands @ 1.5% ($63.40 billion) has reflected the resilient economic ties amidst the ongoing trade war. On the other hand, engagements with Belt and Road Initiative partner countries in Africa and Eurasia have woven dozens of developing countries into China’s economic orbit.
Notwithstanding of the US liberal policies, the US stepped back from the multilateral trade deals. The geo-economic vacuum created by the US trade war, was seized by Beijing. In September 2021, China applied for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It was a signal on part of China, of its readiness to embrace high-standard rules of market access, labour rights, and environmental protections (New Zealand MFAT). Similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in January 2022. The same created a tariff-free corridor among the 15 Asia-Pacific economies. It accounted for 30% of global GDP. It created geo-economic space for China and cemented China’s leadership in regional commerce (ASEAN Secretariat).
In order to overcome the impacts of tariffs at the home front, President Xi Jinping implemented the strategy of “Dual Circulation Economy.” This strategy turbocharged the domestic demands to remain neutralized from the serious impacts by reducing reliance on changing and volatile geo-economic world. This strategy reduced taxes, provided rural credit facilities and hefty subsidies for green infrastructure and tech start-ups. It increased the household consumption’s share of GDP that rose from 38% in 2017 to 44% in 2024 (National Bureau of Statistics). The services sector now accounts for over 53% of GDP, reflecting a structural pivot toward a consumer-led economy that can absorb external shocks.
China has been taking steps to protect its financial system to overcome the challenges on part of Trump’s regime. It has signed agreements with more than 40 central banks of other countries to swap currencies, providing them access to fund of about $600 billion (People’s Bank of China), if those countries needed. China has also been expanding its new digital yuan for international payments. The same was started with trials in Hong Kong and Thailand (PBoC Digital Currency Research) along with Europe and Asia. By the mid of 2024, it had sold $80 billion worth of bonds in these regions.
In order to curb the Chinese capacity of manufacturing semiconductor, the US has imposed a very steep tariffs. Tech Insights has reported that notwithstanding these challenges, Chinese capacity is set to expand from 631 million square inches (MSI) in 2024 to 875 MSI by 2029. It was propelled by Chinese significant investment in 12-inch fabs for advanced chip production. China has prioritized internal demands while strategically directed the surplus to select export markets. China has encountered the impacts of the US tariffs, which was recently doubled from 25% to 50%. This approach enabled China to sustain its growth along with navigating the tariff challenges, and potentially maintaining a competitive influence in the global semiconductor supply chain.
At last, it is concluded that Trump’s trade war was aimed to cripple the Chinese economy, ironically the same had left catalyst impacts on the latter’s economy. By facing the steep tariffs, Chinese leadership has diversified its market outreach through the geo-economic strategy like “Southward Shift,” by deepening economic ties with regions like Asia, Africa, and the EU. The multilateral trade deal like RCEP has neutralized the impacts of steep tariffs. Concurrently, the “dual circulation” strategy at home front, further boosted production, consumption and services, insulating the economy from external economic shocks. Financially, it has expanded currency swaps along with digital yuan trials. These adaptive measures have transformed a punitive trade war into a Chinese strategic opportunity, positioned per se as a resilient, diversified, and increasingly influential player in the global economic order.
The South China Sea, situated in the southern part of the Chinese mainland, is also bordered by countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The countries have bickered over territorial control in the sea for centuries, but in recent years tensions have soared to new heights. The South China Sea is one of the most strategically critical maritime areas and China eyes its control to assert more power over the region. In 1947, the country, under the rule of the nationalist Kuomintang party, issued a map with the so-called “nine-dash line”. The nine-dash line essentially encircles Beijing’s claimed waters and islands of the South China Sea — as much as 90% of the sea has been claimed by China. The line continued to appear in the official maps even after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power. In the past few years, the country has also tried to stop other nations from conducting any military or economic operation without its consent, saying the sea falls under its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China’s sweeping claims, however, have been widely contested by other countries. In response, China has physically increased the size of islands or created new islands altogether in the sea.
The South China Sea sometimes referred to as the “Asian Mediterranean” is a ‘marginal sea’ as it is largely surrounded by land area with access to those areas, for instance between Western Malaysia and Indonesia, the Karimata Straits in the Southwest and the Philippines and Taiwan, the Luzon Straits to the Northeast. The sea covers an area of 3.3 million-kilometer square excluding the Gulfs of Thailand and Tonkin but if they are included the area would increase to 3.8 million kilometer square.
India-Philippines joint strategy in the South China Sea
India and the Philippines launched a two-day naval drill near the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, overlapping with maritime zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The waterway is a strategic shipping route where $3 trillion of annual shipborne commerce takes place. China also prefers resolving bilateral disputes without the interference of any third party. The Philippines has conducted “maritime cooperative activities” with foreign navies since late 2023 as part of its push to counter China’s expansive claims in the waterway, including joint passages with treaty ally the United States, as well as Japan, Australia, France and Canada.
The dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea first emerged when Chinese fishing vessels fished in the West Philippines Sea, which the Philippines claims to be part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). With the presence of Chinese maritime militia, the Philippines felt that its sovereignty was threatened and accordingly raised diplomatic protests. However, such protests were ignored by China. Following this, the Philippines commenced maritime drills within the West Philippines Sea, which subsequently led China to demand such activity be stopped on the grounds of respect for its sovereignty.
India and the Philippines began the two-day “bilateral maritime cooperative activity” on 2nd of August in waters close to theScarborough Shoal, a focal point of the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines. There are several speculations behind India’s stance on this matter but it is obvious that India is joining these efforts owing to its shared concerns about China’s growing maritime power, including in the South China Sea. Indian Navy ships that took part included guided missile destroyer INS Delhi, tanker INS Shakti and corvette INS Kiltan. The Philippines deployed two frigates, BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Jose Rizal.
Bilateral talks and its significance
Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. is on a 5 day state visit to India and India and the Philippines jointly announced an upgraded strategic partnership on August 5, with utmost focus being on the deepening of defence and maritime cooperation, as both the countries are addressing their security concerns due to China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The two nations signed 14 landmark agreements boosting defense, trade, digital tech, space, law, and tourism. PM Modi hailed the 75-year-old bond as a “partnership by destiny,” while President Marcos hailed India as Manila’s fifth strategic partner. India and Philippines thus celebrated their 75 years of diplomatic relations and both the countries also acknowledged the “long-standing friendship based on mutual respect, trust, civilizational contacts, shared values and culture.”
Both the countries have a long history of jointly signing several treaties like the Treaty of Friendship signed on 11 July 1952, the Memorandum of Understanding on Policy Consultation Talks signed on 28 November 2000, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007, and the Declaration on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007. Thus both the countries are seeking to impart a qualitative and strategic new dimension and long-term commitment to the bilateral partnership and to actively develop cooperation in political, defence and security, the maritime domain, science and technology, climate change, space cooperation, trade and investment, industry collaboration, connectivity, health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, digital technologies, emerging technologies, development cooperation, culture, creative industries, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and other fields in the years ahead.
In the political sphere both the countries are cooperating by strengthening engagement through high-level exchanges on a regular basis and dialogue on bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest. Such instances include the convening of the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), Policy Consultation Talks and Strategic Dialogue; Intensifying dialogue through the various bilateral institutional mechanisms, including the Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on Trade and Investment, Counter-terrorism, Tourism, Health and Medicine, Agriculture and Financial Technology; Encouraging interaction between the legislatures of the two countries, particularly exchanges between young leaders of both countries, to further strengthen mutual understanding;
In the sphere of Defence and Security cooperation, both the countries acknowledged the progress made under the Agreement on Defence Cooperation signed between India and the Philippines on 4 February 2006. To facilitate the regular convening of institutional mechanisms major steps have been taken like the establishment of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) and Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee (JDILC) for dialogue on defence cooperation, with emphasis on defence industrial collaboration, defence technology, research, training, exchanges, and capacity building. When we look at maritime cooperation between India and the Philippines, we see a further deepening of relations which includes the annual India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue, first held in Manila on 11-13 December 2024. India would host the next dialogue as a way to maintain the positive momentum of maritime engagement. Both the countries foster greater security cooperation through regular dialogues, engagements and exchanges of best practice on UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), supply chain management, military medicine, global and regional security environment, traditional and non-traditional security concerns such as maritime security, and cyber security and critical technology issues, as well as the protection of critical information infrastructure, and security-related concerns on economic matters;
Economic cooperation has also reached newer heights where both sides have shown a tendency of promoting business and commercial linkages as a key driver of the India-Philippines partnership. There has been a steady increase in bilateral trade, which reached approximately US$ 3.3 billion in 2024-25. There has been a common agreement of fostering partnerships in infrastructure development and in implementation of connectivity and transport projects, facilitating Joint Customs Cooperation Committee meetings for improved trade facilitation through simplified customs procedures.
Strengthening cooperation in the field of Information and Communication Technology including information sharing and exchange of best practices on Edu-tech and Med-tech; Enhancing all modes of connectivity between India and the Philippines, including physical, digital and financial linkages.
Conclusion
The South China Sea remains a strategic mess as far as China and various South-East Asian countries are concerned. There seems to be a never-ending brawl over maritime access and usage. The recent times have seen smaller powers like the Philippines protecting their maritime rights steadily by partnering with various other countries to give a befitting reply to Chinese domination in that area. The latest confrontations consist of dangerous maneuvers, physical interference, continued disputes over legal maritime boundaries, and growing international attention and involvement as both sides seek to assert their respective claims.
About the Author
Aishwarya Dutta is an independent researcher and academician and is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science SGGS College, Chandigarh.
Cyberspace has become a pivotal arena for global power competition, where nations leverage digital tools to project influence, gather intelligence, and prepare for conflict. Among these actors, China has emerged as a formidable cyber power, developing sophisticated capabilities that alarm the United States. From espionage and intellectual property theft to potential disruptions of critical infrastructure, China’s cyber operations pose a multifaceted threat to U.S. national security, economic stability, and global influence. This article explores the evolution of China’s cyberwarfare capabilities, the strategic motivations driving them, the specific risks they present to the U.S., and why these developments are a growing concern for American policymakers and security experts.
The Evolution of China’s Cyberwarfare Capabilities
China’s ascent as a cyber powerhouse reflects decades of strategic investment in technology, policy, and military organization. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has prioritized cyberspace as a critical domain to advance its national objectives, integrating cyber operations into its broader military and geopolitical strategies.
Historical Development
China’s cyberwarfare journey began in the late 1990s, when it recognized the potential of information technology to offset the military superiority of adversaries like the U.S. The concept of “informatized warfare,” introduced in the early 2000s, emphasized integrating digital systems into military operations to enhance precision and coordination. This evolved into “intelligentized warfare” by the 2020s, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and advanced computing to create agile, data-driven operations.
A key milestone was the 2015 establishment of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which unified cyber, space, and electronic warfare under one command. In 2024, the PLASSF was restructured, with cyber operations transferred to the newly formed PLA Cyberspace Force, signaling China’s intent to further specialize its cyber capabilities. Estimates suggest China’s cyber workforce, including military personnel and civilian contractors, ranges from 50,000 to 100,000, underscoring its significant investment in human resources.
Organizational Structure
China’s cyber operations involve a complex network of state-sponsored actors, including the PLA, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups like APT31 (Zirconium), APT40, and Volt Typhoon. These groups, while sometimes operating independently, are increasingly coordinated under centralized command to align with national objectives. The PLA Cyberspace Force focuses on three core missions: cyber intelligence, defense, and offensive operations. This includes developing advanced malware, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, and conducting large-scale espionage.
China’s domestic technology sector, including companies like Huawei and ZTE, supports these efforts by providing infrastructure that can be leveraged for both defensive and offensive purposes. The 2017 Cybersecurity Law mandates private companies to cooperate with state security efforts, effectively extending China’s cyber reach into the private sector.
Technological Advancements
China has made remarkable strides in technologies that enhance its cyberwarfare capabilities. AI-driven tools enable automated cyberattacks, rapid data analysis, and precise targeting. Cloud computing provides scalable platforms for large-scale operations, while research into quantum computing threatens to disrupt modern encryption standards. China’s dominance in 5G technology, through companies like Huawei, amplifies its ability to conduct surveillance and cyber operations globally, as its telecommunications infrastructure is adopted by nations worldwide.
China’s Cyber Strategy and Motivations
China’s cyberwarfare strategy aligns with its broader national goals: ensuring domestic stability, asserting regional dominance, and challenging U.S. global leadership. Cyber operations allow China to pursue these objectives without triggering open conflict, operating in the “gray zone” below the threshold of war.
Strategic Objectives
Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft: China uses cyber operations to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, and sensitive government data to accelerate its technological and economic growth. These efforts reduce reliance on foreign innovation and bolster industries like AI, semiconductors, and aerospace.
Critical Infrastructure Targeting: China is developing capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure—such as power grids, telecommunications, and transportation systems—in adversary nations. These operations aim to deter intervention in regional conflicts, particularly over Taiwan, by threatening significant disruption.
Influence and Disinformation Campaigns: China employs cyber tools to shape narratives and undermine adversaries through disinformation. These campaigns target domestic audiences to reinforce regime legitimacy and international audiences to sow discord or promote pro-China narratives.
Strategic Deterrence: By prepositioning malware in critical systems, China creates a deterrent effect, signaling its ability to inflict damage during a conflict. This mirrors nuclear deterrence, aiming to dissuade adversaries from actions contrary to China’s interests.
Regional and Global Ambitions
In the Indo-Pacific, China’s cyber operations focus on asserting dominance over neighbors like Vietnam, Japan, and Taiwan. Vietnam has faced frequent cyberattacks tied to South China Sea disputes, while Taiwan endures persistent attempts to disrupt its government and military systems. Globally, China seeks to challenge U.S. dominance in cyberspace and promote a state-controlled internet model, as outlined in its 2015 white paper on a “Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace.” By exporting surveillance technologies and cyber norms to authoritarian regimes, China extends its global influence.
Specific Threats to the United States
China’s cyber operations pose direct and indirect threats to the U.S., targeting government, industry, and critical infrastructure with increasing sophistication.
Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft
Chinese cyber actors have been linked to major breaches targeting U.S. entities. The 2021 Microsoft Exchange Server attack, attributed to the Hafnium group, compromised thousands of organizations, including U.S. government agencies and private firms. APT31 has targeted U.S. officials and critics of the PRC, collecting sensitive data for further intrusions. These operations have resulted in the theft of intellectual property worth billions, undermining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. The U.S. intelligence community has highlighted China’s goal to surpass the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030, with cyber espionage playing a central role.
Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
China’s ability to target U.S. critical infrastructure is a growing concern. The Volt Typhoon group, identified in 2023, has prepositioned malware in U.S. communications, energy, transportation, and water systems. FBI Director Christopher Wray has described this as a “defining threat,” aimed at disrupting civilian infrastructure to deter U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan conflict. In 2024, Chinese hackers breached U.S. telecommunications networks, accessing sensitive data and potentially compromising national security communications. These incidents highlight China’s strategy of embedding cyber weapons for future activation.
Disinformation and Influence Operations
China has expanded its use of cyber tools for disinformation, targeting U.S. public opinion and democratic processes. In 2025, a Chinese-led campaign on WeChat targeted a Canadian politician, demonstrating cross-border influence capabilities. Similar tactics have been used to spread divisive content in the U.S., particularly during elections, undermining trust in institutions and exacerbating social polarization.
Military and Strategic Implications
China’s cyber capabilities enhance its military strategy, particularly in a potential Taiwan conflict. By targeting U.S. military logistics, command-and-control systems, and infrastructure, China could delay or disrupt U.S. intervention, giving the PLA a strategic edge. The integration of cyber operations with space and electronic warfare creates a multi-domain threat that challenges U.S. military preparedness.
Why the U.S. is Concerned
The U.S. views China’s cyberwarfare capabilities as a significant threat due to their potential to disrupt national security, economic stability, and geopolitical influence. Several factors amplify these concerns.
National Security Risks
The ability to disrupt critical infrastructure poses a direct threat to U.S. security. A successful cyberattack on power grids or transportation systems could cause widespread disruption, erode public confidence, and hinder military operations. The Volt Typhoon operation, for instance, underscores the risk of China paralyzing essential services during a crisis, particularly in a Taiwan scenario.
Economic Implications
The economic toll of Chinese cyber espionage is substantial. Stolen intellectual property undermines U.S. competitiveness in high-tech industries, threatening long-term economic growth. Disruptions to supply chains or infrastructure could have cascading effects, impacting global markets and U.S. businesses with international operations.
Geopolitical Competition
China’s cyber capabilities are part of a broader strategy to challenge U.S. global leadership. By promoting a state-controlled internet model and exporting surveillance technologies, China seeks to reshape international cyber norms, clashing with U.S. values of openness and freedom. Cyberattacks on U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and Vietnam, weaken regional stability and challenge the U.S.-led security architecture.
Challenges in Attribution and Deterrence
Attributing cyberattacks to Chinese state actors is challenging, complicating U.S. responses. Groups like Volt Typhoon are believed to be state-sponsored, but China’s denials and counter-accusations of U.S. cyberattacks create diplomatic hurdles. Cyber deterrence is also difficult, as the lack of clear escalation thresholds allows China to operate with relative impunity in the gray zone.
U.S. Responses and Mitigation Strategies
The U.S. is actively countering China’s cyber threat through a combination of defensive, offensive, and diplomatic measures, though challenges persist.
Strengthening Cybersecurity
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) leads efforts to protect critical infrastructure, collaborating with private sector partners to identify vulnerabilities and share threat intelligence. The FBI has emphasized partnerships with industry and academia to build resilience against Chinese cyberattacks.
International Cooperation
The U.S. has sought to build coalitions to counter China’s cyber activities. In 2024, eight nations, including the U.S., Australia, and Japan, issued a joint advisory attributing malicious cyber activity to China. Proposals for an Indo-Pacific cyber intelligence-sharing coalition aim to enhance regional cooperation and deter Chinese aggression.
Offensive Capabilities
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has developed offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt Chinese operations, such as neutralizing Volt Typhoon’s infrastructure in 2024. These actions demonstrate the U.S.’s ability to respond proactively, though they risk escalation if not carefully managed.
Diplomatic Efforts
Diplomatic engagement has yielded mixed results. The 2015 U.S.-China cyber agreement temporarily reduced commercial espionage, but violations have eroded trust. Establishing bilateral cyber norms and crisis management mechanisms remains critical but challenging due to ideological differences.
Conclusion
China’s cyberwarfare capabilities represent a sophisticated and evolving threat to the United States, encompassing espionage, infrastructure disruption, and influence operations. The U.S. is concerned about the immediate risks to national security and economic stability, as well as the long-term implications for its global leadership. China’s ability to operate below the threshold of war, combined with its technological advancements and strategic ambitions, makes it a formidable adversary in cyberspace.
Countering this threat requires a comprehensive approach, integrating robust cybersecurity, international partnerships, offensive capabilities, and diplomatic engagement. However, the complexities of attribution, deterrence, and escalation in cyberspace pose ongoing challenges. As the digital domain becomes increasingly contested, the U.S. must remain adaptive and collaborative to safeguard its interests against China’s cyber ambitions.
About the Author
Sofiqua Yesmin, is doing postgraduation in International Relations from Amity University, Noida, India. Her research interests lie at the intersection of security studies, foreign policy, and geopolitical shifts—particularly in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
Logo of HQ Integrated Defence Staff: source Internet
As the World and South Asia reel in the midst of global & regional uncertainties, three statements merit attention that will have bearing on India after five years. One, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, the Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force expressed concern on January 07, 2025 over the increased militarisation by China and Pakistan and the pace at which technology is growing at a very rapid pace in China.
Two, on March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.
Three, on July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.
From the statements above, it is amply clear that as India is faced with different challenges compared to the one-on-one wars/conflicts/skirmishes fought with either China or Pakistan in 1947-49, 1962, 1965, 1967, 1971, 1999, 2020 and 2025. The war ahead will be of a different dimension and enhanced magnitude.
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was setup after the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. The KRC report tabled in the Indian Parliament on February 23, 2000 recommended the creation of the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and various tri-services organisations to promote jointness and integration amongst the three Services of the Indian Armed Forces comprising the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy.
The Shekatkar Committee headed by Lieutenant General DB Shekatkar in 2016 recommended the creation of three Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs).
After General Bipin Rawat took over as India’s first CDS on January 01, 2020 it was clear that it was a matter of time for the announcement of the ITCs. Next month, in February 2020, General Bipin Rawat announced the setting up of two-five theatre commands.
Thereafter started consultations and conferences amongst the three Services and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials and finally the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 was promulgated, that empowered the commanders of the Tri-Services organisations and the future theatre commanders with full authority over personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force serving under them.
On June 24, 2025 orders were issued empowering the CDS General Anil Chauhan to issue joint orders for the three Services. With the Government of India already having declared 2025 as the “Year of Reforms”, it is imperative that the ITCs are created this year itself as the war clouds on India are darkening.
Why Theatre Commands should not delay beyond 2025?
Pakistan, India’s neighbour on the west has eyes set on the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and China, India’s neighbour on the north & east has eyes set on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
With China commencing the construction of the Medog Dam on July 19, 2025 whose completion year is 2030, India can expect the two-front war jointly by China & Pakistan any time after 2030.
If the ITCs are created this year, the Indian Armed Forces will have a clear five-year window to streamline the newly created ITCs which would include planning, logistics, identifying & making-up deficiencies and operational preparedness.
Subsequent to the PLA defence reforms announced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015, the five theatre commands of the PLA came into effect on February 01, 2016 and since then the Western Theatre Command of China tasked for operations against India has been regularly carrying out combat exercises. China already has a one-decade lead in theatre command creation in relation to India.
After 2013 when Xi Jinping became China’s President for the first time, the military cooperation between China and Pakistan has increased manifold with regular joint exercises being carried out between the nations in all the six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.
It is against this China-Pakistan combine that is in a tight military embrace now, that the Indian ITCs have to be well prepared. With Bangladesh tilting heavily towards the China-Pakistan combine since August 05, 2024, the implementation of the ITCs can’t be delayed beyond the year end for the Indian Armed Forces, as the magnitude and extent of the war on the horizon any time after five years, will be much greater than any war that India has fought in the past.
It is but natural that the ITCs on formation will have teething problems as it accrues in any new raising. As the administrative dust settles after the formation of the ITCs, operational preparedness will have to start in full swing. For, the litmus test of the ITC will be operations when the balloon goes up (military slang means commencement of war).
Even when a battalion comprising about 900-1000 soldiers is newly raised, it takes some time before it can be inducted either in counter-insurgency operations or a conventional war scenario. An ITC on raising will have anything upward of 100,000 soldiers of different Services with equipment that will require streamlining for optimal combat prowess.
There is always a difference between planning on paper and the actual execution on ground which will entail many challenges to be tackled when execution takes effect. The regional uncertainties are getting complicated with each passing day and so are the geopolitical games that the three superpowers are playing.
General Upendra Dwivedi, the Indian Army Chief on August 04, 2025 has stated that India’s next war is closer than what one thinks, is perhaps the clearest indication by any Indian military leader in the present times of the impending war.
For those who say that China & Pakistan will never attack India as China trades in huge volumes in India, should ask themselves that if this is the case then why is China having the biggest military buildup in the world, knowing fully well that no nation including the USA can ever dare attack China? Clearly, China has military designs and the two immediate targets on China’s radar are Taiwan & Arunachal Pradesh, the north-eastern state of India.
As the famous saying goes “If there is even one percent of war, the nation has to be 100 percent prepared”, the chances of the two-front war are definitely a reality and not a possibility any more as has been clearly enumerated by the Indian Army Chief. And hence should be India’s military preparedness accordingly.
The 88-hour conflict between India & Pakistan in May 2025 known as Operation Sindoor in India, brought to fore the close synergy between the three Services which resulted in a thumping military victory for India. It is time to capitalise on this success and create the Theatre Commands before the year ends so that in the flow of this military success, the implementation of the Theatre Commands fructifies.
Operation Sindoor was the trailer of the big future war that awaits the nation in all the domains of modern warfare. On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, during Operation Sindoor. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.
The Theatre Commands are a step in the right direction to increase India’s combat-potential and combat-prowess and they should be created in the next four months to tackle the biggest military challenge that India will face since gaining independence in 1947.
About the Author
Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.
