By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

India’s emergence as the world’s fourth-largest economy and its projected ascent to the third position by 2028 signals a transformative phase in its economic trajectory. Contributing nearly 16 percent to global growth in 2023, India’s rise is underpinned by robust domestic demand, demographic advantage, and expanding industrial sectors. Within this broader growth story, the maritime sector is increasingly being recognised as a strategic enabler of economic expansion, global trade integration, and geopolitical influence.

Historically, India’s prosperity was deeply rooted in its maritime prowess. From the Indus Valley Civilisation to the Chola naval expeditions, India maintained vibrant trade linkages across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). However, colonial disruptions eroded this dominance, reducing India’s share of global GDP dramatically. Today, under the vision of Amrit Kaal 2047, India seeks not only economic resurgence but also the restoration of its maritime legacy through the development of a robust Blue Economy.

The Blue Economy: Scope, Potential, and Strategic Significance

India’s Blue Economy encompasses a wide spectrum of sectors, including shipping, port-led development, fisheries, renewable energy, marine biotechnology, and deep-sea exploration. With an 11,098 km coastline, a 2.3 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, and 14,500 km of inland waterways, the country possesses immense untapped maritime potential. Currently contributing about 4 percent to GDP, the Blue Economy is projected to reach double-digit levels by 2047. This ambition aligns with global trends, where maritime economies significantly contribute to national output—over 20 percent in several ASEAN countries and 7.9 percent in China. Shipping remains the backbone of India’s trade, handling 95 percent of volume and 70 percent of value. Its cost-effectiveness, lower fuel consumption, and reduced carbon emissions compared to road and rail transport make it central to sustainable logistics. Complementing this, sectors like offshore wind energy, deep-sea mining, and fisheries are emerging as high-growth domains, with fisheries alone supporting over 60 million livelihoods.

Policy Architecture Driving Maritime Transformation

India’s maritime transformation is anchored in a comprehensive policy ecosystem. Flagship initiatives such as the Sagarmala Programme, Maritime India Vision (MIV) 2030, and Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision (MAKV) 2047 collectively provide a phased roadmap for sectoral expansion. Sagarmala focuses on port-led development and logistics efficiency, identifying over 800 projects worth INR 5.8 lakh crore. MIV 2030 outlines 150 initiatives across infrastructure, digitalisation, and sustainability, while MAKV 2047 extends this vision with over 300 action points aligned with long-term national goals. Financial instruments such as the Maritime Development Fund (INR 25,000 crore) and policy incentives like 100 percent FDI under the automatic route, tax holidays, and infrastructure status for large vessels are designed to attract private and foreign investments. Collectively, these initiatives aim to mobilise investments of up to INR 89 lakh crore by 2047.

A decisive factor in realising India’s maritime ambitions will be its ability to mobilise sustainable and diversified financing for large-scale infrastructure and technological transformation. The maritime sector is inherently capital-intensive, requiring long gestation periods and substantial upfront investments, which often deter private participation. While initiatives such as the Maritime Development Fund mark an important step, there remains a need to deepen financial innovation through instruments such as blue bonds, infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs), and blended finance models that combine public and private capital. Leveraging multilateral financing from institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank can further de-risk projects and attract global investors. Additionally, developing a robust domestic ship financing ecosystem is critical, as Indian shipping companies currently rely heavily on foreign lenders, exposing them to currency volatility and external shocks. Establishing maritime-focused financial hubs, strengthening ship leasing frameworks (such as those emerging in GIFT City), and providing credit enhancement mechanisms can significantly boost domestic capacity. Furthermore, aligning financial flows with sustainability goals—through green financing and ESG-linked investments—can position India as a leader in responsible maritime development. By creating a resilient and innovative financial architecture, India can not only accelerate project execution but also ensure long-term competitiveness in the global maritime economy, transforming its Blue Economy vision into a financially viable and globally integrated growth engine.

Shipping, Ports, and Infrastructure Expansion

India’s maritime infrastructure is undergoing rapid expansion. Port capacity is expected to grow threefold to 10,000 MTPA by 2047, supported by the development of mega ports such as Vadhavan and Galathea Bay. Inland waterways are also being scaled up, with cargo capacity projected to reach 500 MTPA. Despite progress, structural gaps remain. India’s merchant fleet accounts for only 1.3 percent of global capacity, and shipbuilding contributes less than 1 percent to the global market. To address this, the government has launched targeted schemes like the Shipbuilding Development Scheme and National Shipbuilding Mission, aiming to position India among the top five shipbuilding nations by 2047. Importantly, India paid US$75 billion in sea freight to foreign shipping lines in 2023, highlighting strategic vulnerabilities. Expanding domestic shipping capacity is therefore not just an economic necessity but a geopolitical imperative.

Digitalisation, Green Transition, and Emerging Technologies

Technological transformation is central to enhancing efficiency and sustainability in the maritime sector. Initiatives such as AI-based berth allocation, maritime single-window systems, and digital platforms like SAGAR-SETU and ULIP are streamlining operations and improving ease of doing business. Simultaneously, India is pursuing an ambitious green maritime agenda. Policies like the National Green Hydrogen Mission and Harit Sagar Guidelines aim to decarbonise ports and shipping. Targets include 23 percent renewable energy usage at ports and participation in 25 global green shipping corridors by 2030. However, challenges persist in scaling alternative fuels, managing high retrofit costs, and building technical capacity. Bridging these gaps will require international collaboration, risk-sharing mechanisms, and sustained investment.

An equally crucial pillar underpinning the success of India’s maritime ambitions is the development of a skilled workforce and robust institutional capacity. As the sector transitions towards high-technology domains such as green shipping, autonomous vessels, and offshore renewable energy, the demand for specialised skills is set to rise significantly. However, India currently faces a shortage of trained maritime professionals, particularly in areas like marine engineering, port digitalisation, and environmental compliance. Strengthening maritime education through institutions such as the Indian Maritime University, alongside industry-led skilling initiatives, will be essential to bridge this gap. Furthermore, enhancing regulatory coherence and institutional coordination remains imperative. The multiplicity of agencies governing ports, shipping, fisheries, and environmental protection often leads to fragmented decision-making and implementation delays. Streamlining governance through integrated maritime authorities and single-window clearances can significantly improve efficiency and investor confidence. Additionally, fostering public-private partnerships (PPPs) in port management, shipbuilding, and logistics infrastructure can unlock innovation and capital infusion. Lessons can be drawn from global best practices, where countries have successfully combined state support with private sector dynamism to build competitive maritime ecosystems. Ultimately, aligning human capital development with institutional reforms will ensure that India’s maritime growth is not only rapid but also sustainable and globally competitive, enabling the country to fully harness the economic and strategic potential of its Blue Economy.

Inland Waterways and Multimodal Connectivity

The development of inland waterways represents a strategic shift towards cost-effective and environmentally sustainable logistics. With cargo share rising from 0.5 percent to 2 percent and a target of 5 percent by 2030, initiatives like the Jal Marg Vikas Project are transforming riverine transport. Complementing this is the PM Gati Shakti initiative, which integrates ports, railways, roads, and logistics through a GIS-enabled platform. By reducing logistics costs from 14 percent to 9 percent of GDP, it enhances India’s global competitiveness and supports maritime-led growth.

A critical yet underexplored dimension of India’s maritime transformation lies in its evolving geopolitical strategy within the Indo-Pacific. As global trade increasingly pivots towards the Indian Ocean Region, India’s maritime policies are no longer confined to economic considerations but are deeply intertwined with strategic security imperatives. Initiatives such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and enhanced naval diplomacy underscore India’s intent to shape regional maritime governance. The development of strategic port partnerships in countries like Iran (Chabahar), Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia reflects a calibrated response to expanding Chinese maritime influence under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, India’s emphasis on maritime domain awareness, capacity building for littoral states, and participation in multilateral frameworks such as the Quad highlights a shift towards cooperative security architecture. This strategic maritime outreach not only safeguards sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which carry over 80 percent of India’s trade, but also enhances India’s role as a net security provider in the region. Integrating economic initiatives with security frameworks ensures that the Blue Economy is protected against emerging threats such as piracy, geopolitical tensions, and supply chain disruptions. In this context, maritime strength becomes a force multiplier, linking economic resilience with geopolitical influence and reinforcing India’s position as a pivotal Indo-Pacific power.

Challenges and Structural Constraints

Beyond existing constraints, India’s maritime sector also faces deeper structural and systemic challenges that could impede its long-term competitiveness. One critical issue is the inefficiency in hinterland connectivity, where inadequate last-mile linkages between ports and industrial corridors increase logistics costs and turnaround time, undermining the advantages of port-led development. Procedural complexities, including lengthy customs clearances and fragmented regulatory compliance, further reduce ease of doing business compared to global maritime hubs such as Singapore and Rotterdam. Additionally, India’s relatively low levels of research and development (R&D) investment in maritime technologies limit its capacity to innovate in areas such as autonomous shipping, smart ports, and advanced vessel design. The absence of a globally competitive maritime cluster ecosystem—integrating shipbuilding, financing, insurance, and legal services—also weakens India’s position in the global value chain. Furthermore, geopolitical uncertainties, including disruptions in key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait, expose India’s trade routes to external vulnerabilities. The sector is also constrained by policy implementation gaps at the state level, where coordination challenges and land acquisition issues delay critical infrastructure projects. Lastly, the lack of a robust data governance framework for maritime operations limits the effectiveness of digitalisation efforts. Addressing these multifaceted structural bottlenecks will require not only policy intent but also institutional reform, technological investment, and enhanced coordination across stakeholders to ensure that India’s maritime ambitions translate into tangible outcomes.

As India accelerates its maritime expansion, embedding climate resilience and environmental sustainability into the Blue Economy framework becomes imperative. Coastal regions, which serve as hubs of economic activity, are increasingly vulnerable to climate-induced risks such as sea-level rise, coastal erosion, extreme weather events, and biodiversity loss. Ports and maritime infrastructure must therefore be designed with climate-adaptive features, including resilient construction standards, early warning systems, and disaster risk management frameworks. At the same time, the ecological sustainability of marine resources is critical for long-term economic viability. Overfishing, marine pollution—particularly plastic waste—and habitat degradation threaten not only marine biodiversity but also the livelihoods of millions dependent on fisheries. Strengthening regulatory enforcement, promoting sustainable fishing practices, and investing in marine conservation initiatives such as blue carbon ecosystems (mangroves, seagrasses, and coral reefs) can generate both environmental and economic benefits. Furthermore, integrating climate considerations into maritime policy through tools like coastal zone management plans and environmental impact assessments will ensure balanced development. India’s leadership in global climate platforms also positions it to advocate for equitable and sustainable ocean governance. By aligning economic growth with ecological stewardship, India can build a resilient Blue Economy that not only drives development but also safeguards marine ecosystems for future generations, reinforcing its commitment to sustainable and inclusive growth.

Conclusion

India’s maritime sector stands at a critical juncture, poised to play a transformative role in the country’s journey towards becoming a developed economy by 2047. The convergence of strategic geography, policy momentum, and economic ambition provides a strong foundation for growth. However, realising this potential will depend on sustained policy coherence, effective implementation, and the ability to integrate technological innovation with human capital development. Strengthening domestic shipping, enhancing infrastructure, and advancing sustainability will be key to building a resilient maritime ecosystem. Ultimately, the Blue Economy is not merely an economic construct but a strategic pathway to national power, enabling India to secure its trade routes, strengthen supply chains, and assert its influence in the Indo-Pacific. If effectively harnessed, it can serve as a vital gateway to Viksit Bharat, restoring India’s historical maritime prominence while shaping its future as a global maritime leader.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The trajectory of India–Russia economic relations since 2022 reflects a paradox of expansion and imbalance. Bilateral trade has surged to unprecedented levels, reaching US$68.7 billion in FY2024–25, more than doubling the earlier target of US$30 billion. This dramatic rise is overwhelmingly driven by India’s import of discounted Russian crude oil, which constitutes nearly 80 percent of total trade, underscoring a structurally skewed partnership. While this surge demonstrates resilience amid Western sanctions, it simultaneously exposes vulnerabilities rooted in overdependence on a single commodity.

To mitigate the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, and G7 countries, both nations have adopted innovative financial mechanisms. The rupee–ruble settlement system, introduced by the Reserve Bank of India in 2022, now accounts for over 90 percent of bilateral transactions, significantly reducing reliance on Western financial systems. Complementing this, logistical initiatives such as the Vladivostok–Chennai maritime corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) have enhanced connectivity and trade facilitation.

However, the structural imbalance remains stark. India’s exports to Russia have grown only modestly—from US$3.1 billion in FY2022–23 to US$4.9 billion in FY2024–25—highlighting persistent asymmetry. This imbalance is compounded by regulatory barriers, limited market knowledge, and risk-averse private sector participation. Thus, while trade expansion signals opportunity, it also necessitates diversification and deeper structural reforms.

Sanctions, Slowdowns, and the Limits of Trade Expansion

Despite impressive growth, India–Russia trade is showing signs of stagnation. By late 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that trade volumes had plateaued, indicating a potential ceiling in current dynamics. Western sanctions have played a decisive role in constraining further expansion, particularly in non-energy sectors. A notable example is the collapse of Russia’s diamond exports to India, which fell sharply from US$1.4 billion to US$400 million following the 2024 G7 and EU ban on Russian-origin diamonds. This has disrupted India’s diamond processing industry, traditionally reliant on Russian raw materials. Similarly, sanctions targeting Russian oil companies and tanker fleets in 2025 have complicated energy shipments, forcing Indian refiners to recalibrate sourcing strategies. Moreover, the persistence of a one-sided trade structure remains a fundamental constraint. India’s inability to match Russia’s export scale—particularly in energy—limits the scope for balanced growth. Non-tariff barriers, logistical inefficiencies, and compliance risks further deter Indian exporters. While sectors such as electronics and pharmaceuticals have shown incremental growth, these gains remain insufficient to offset the broader imbalance.

Thus, the current phase of India–Russia trade reflects not just external pressures but also internal structural limitations, necessitating a shift from volume-driven growth to value-based diversification.

Investment Cooperation: From Energy Dominance to Sectoral Diversification

Investment cooperation between India and Russia has evolved beyond traditional sectors, though energy continues to dominate. The landmark acquisition of Essar Oil by Russian energy giant Rosneft for US$12.9 billion remains the largest single Russian investment in India. Operating under Nayara Energy, the company has expanded to over 6,750 fuel stations, reinforcing Russia’s deep footprint in India’s downstream energy sector.

In the nuclear domain, Russia’s state corporation Rosatom has played a pivotal role in constructing the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, with Units I and II operational since 2014 and 2016. The project exemplifies long-term strategic cooperation, supported by concessional financing and technology transfer. Beyond energy, diversification is evident across metallurgy, chemicals, and manufacturing. Russian aluminium giant Rusal’s US$244 million investment in an Indian alumina refinery and the establishment of KuibyshevAzot’s engineering plastics plant in Andhra Pradesh signal growing industrial collaboration. Similarly, Russian firm NLMK’s investment in transformer steel production highlights integration into India’s manufacturing ecosystem.

An equally significant yet evolving pillar of India–Russia economic engagement lies in the digital economy and fintech cooperation, which is gradually reshaping the architecture of bilateral transactions. As Western financial systems remain partially inaccessible to Russian institutions, both countries have accelerated efforts to build alternative payment ecosystems and digital financial linkages. The expansion of Russia’s SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) and its potential interoperability with India’s domestic financial messaging systems reflects a broader push to bypass SWIFT-dependent channels. Simultaneously, India’s globally recognised Unified Payments Interface (UPI) has emerged as a model for scalable, low-cost digital payments, opening avenues for cross-border integration. In 2025, discussions around mutual acceptance of payment cards and digital settlement mechanisms gained traction, signalling a move toward deeper financial interoperability. Moreover, Russian banks such as Sberbank establishing IT hubs in Bengaluru highlight a shift toward embedding themselves within India’s digital innovation ecosystem. This convergence is further reinforced by India’s rapid fintech expansion—projected to reach US$150 billion in market size by 2025—making it an attractive destination for Russian capital seeking diversification. Importantly, such collaboration is not merely transactional but strategic, as it enables both nations to co-develop sanctions-resilient financial infrastructures, enhance cybersecurity cooperation, and reduce systemic dependence on Western-controlled platforms. Over time, this digital-financial synergy could serve as a cornerstone for a parallel geoeconomic architecture, aligning with the broader ambitions of a multipolar global financial order.

In the railways sector, the Transmashholding–RVNL joint venture represents a transformative partnership. With a contract worth US$6.5 billion, it includes the production of 120 Vande Bharat sleeper trains and long-term maintenance commitments, embedding Russian expertise into India’s infrastructure modernization.

An additional and increasingly important vector of India–Russia economic cooperation lies in the defence-industrial and technological partnership, which continues to anchor bilateral ties even amid shifting geopolitical realities. Historically, Russia has been India’s largest defence supplier, accounting for nearly 60–70 percent of India’s military inventory over the past decades. Although this share has gradually declined due to India’s diversification strategy, recent developments indicate a transition from a buyer–seller dynamic to joint production and technology co-development. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile programme, a flagship Indo-Russian joint venture, has gained renewed momentum, particularly after India’s efforts to expand its export footprint to Southeast Asia. Additionally, agreements on the licensed production of AK-203 assault rifles in Uttar Pradesh and ongoing cooperation in areas such as air defence systems and nuclear submarines reflect deepening industrial linkages. In 2025, both countries reiterated commitments to defence indigenisation under India’s “Make in India” initiative, emphasising local manufacturing and technology transfer. This shift aligns with India’s broader goal of reducing import dependency while retaining strategic autonomy. Furthermore, in the context of Western sanctions on Russia, defence cooperation has acquired a new dimension, with India emerging as a reliable partner for sustaining Russia’s defence exports and industrial base. However, challenges such as payment delays, sanctions risks, and technology-sharing limitations persist. Strengthening this partnership through co-innovation, joint R&D, and export-oriented production could transform defence ties into a cornerstone of long-term strategic and economic cooperation.

A critical yet underexplored dimension of India–Russia economic engagement is the growing strategic alignment in critical minerals and supply chain security, which has gained urgency in the post-2024 global economic landscape. As countries increasingly weaponise resource access, India has intensified efforts to secure inputs essential for energy transition technologies such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements. Russia, possessing vast reserves of nickel, cobalt, and rare earths, has emerged as a potential long-term partner in this domain. In 2024–25, bilateral discussions explicitly focused on technology transfer and joint exploration in mining, culminating in the inclusion of cooperation on mining technologies in the August 2025 protocol on industrial modernisation. This aligns with India’s broader strategy of reducing dependence on China-dominated supply chains, particularly in electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, global disruptions—exacerbated by the Ukraine conflict and export restrictions by multiple countries—have intensified competition over mineral access, with over 200 export restrictions recorded globally since 2018. Russia’s pivot towards Asian markets, including India, thus reflects both necessity and opportunity. Furthermore, India’s policy push through initiatives like the Critical Minerals Mission (2025) and Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes enhances its attractiveness for Russian investment in downstream processing and value addition. If effectively operationalised, this cooperation could move the bilateral partnership beyond hydrocarbons towards a future-oriented geoeconomic axis, embedding resilience, technological collaboration, and strategic autonomy into India–Russia relations.

These developments indicate a gradual shift from resource-centric engagement to diversified industrial cooperation, though the scale of investment remains modest relative to potential. Another crucial dimension shaping India–Russia economic relations is the evolving connectivity and logistics architecture, which is central to sustaining long-term trade and investment flows. The operationalisation of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a 7,200-km multimodal network linking India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia—has emerged as a strategic alternative to traditional routes like the Suez Canal. Recent pilot shipments have demonstrated that the INSTC can reduce transit time by 30–40 percent and lower freight costs by nearly 20 percent, significantly enhancing trade efficiency. Parallelly, the Vladivostok–Chennai maritime corridor, first proposed in 2019, has gained renewed momentum post-2022, offering a direct sea route that cuts shipping time from over 40 days to approximately 24 days. In 2025, both countries also intensified cooperation on the Eastern Maritime Corridor, integrating port infrastructure and boosting energy transportation. Furthermore, Russia’s interest in expanding the Northern Sea Route (NSR), coupled with discussions on joint shipbuilding and ice-class vessel development with India, highlights the Arctic’s growing relevance in bilateral cooperation. These developments are not merely logistical but deeply strategic, as they enable both nations to bypass chokepoints and mitigate geopolitical risks associated with Western-controlled trade routes. However, challenges such as infrastructural gaps in Iran, regulatory inconsistencies, and limited private sector participation continue to constrain full operational efficiency. Strengthening these corridors through coordinated investments and policy harmonisation will be essential to unlocking the next phase of India–Russia economic integration.

Financial Integration and the Rise of Alternative Investment Channels

A defining feature of post-2022 economic engagement is the deepening of financial integration. Russian banks such as Sberbank and VTB have expanded their presence in India, facilitating trade settlements and investment flows. The introduction of Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs) has enabled Russian firms to channel surplus rupees into Indian government securities and financial markets.

Portfolio investments have emerged as a significant avenue, exceeding US$2 billion in 2024. Russian investors increasingly view India as a “safe harbour,” driven by its economic stability and growth prospects. The launch of a mutual fund linked to the Nifty 50 index further institutionalizes financial connectivity, allowing Russian retail investors exposure to India’s top companies. In the startup ecosystem, Russian-origin funds such as RTP Global and Sistema Asia Capital have invested in sectors ranging from fintech to food delivery. While some of these entities have distanced themselves from Russia post-Ukraine conflict, their continued engagement underscores India’s attractiveness as an innovation hub. This financial convergence reflects a broader reorientation of Russian capital towards the Global South, with India emerging as a central node in this transition.

Persistent Bottlenecks: Structural and Institutional Constraints

Despite progress, several structural challenges hinder the full realization of investment potential. The absence of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) since 2017 leaves investors without robust legal protection, increasing uncertainty. Although negotiations resumed in 2024, a final agreement remains elusive. Currency-related challenges persist within the rupee–ruble framework. Dependence on third-country exchange rates, restrictions on rupee repatriation, and forex volatility complicate transactions. Additionally, India’s cautious regulatory approach—reflected in Russia’s high-risk rating by export credit agencies—limits deeper financial integration. Infrastructure and logistical gaps further constrain trade expansion. While corridors like INSTC offer promise, their operational efficiency remains inconsistent. Moreover, Indian private sector reluctance to engage with Russia, driven by sanctions risk and market unfamiliarity, continues to impede diversification. Addressing these bottlenecks requires coordinated policy reforms, enhanced institutional frameworks, and greater private sector participation.

Conclusion

The evolution of India–Russia economic relations in the post-2022 era reflects a complex interplay of geopolitics, economic pragmatism, and strategic necessity. While sanctions have disrupted traditional pathways, they have also catalyzed innovation in financial mechanisms, logistics, and investment strategies. India’s emergence as a key destination for Russian capital underscores its growing importance in the Global South. For Russia, India offers not only a large and dynamic market but also a gateway to alternative economic networks beyond the West. For India, engagement with Russia ensures energy security, technological collaboration, and strategic autonomy.

However, the sustainability of this partnership will depend on addressing structural imbalances, diversifying trade, and strengthening institutional frameworks. Moving forward, the focus must shift from transactional engagement to long-term strategic integration, encompassing emerging sectors such as critical minerals, digital economy, and green energy. In an increasingly fragmented global order, the India–Russia partnership stands as a testament to adaptive resilience. Its future trajectory will not merely shape bilateral ties but also influence the contours of a multipolar economic system in the decades to come.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The contemporary international system stands at a critical inflection point, where the very actors that once designed and upheld global rules are increasingly bypassing, bending, or outright violating them. Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization—long regarded as pillars of a rules-based international order—are facing an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness. What was once a system characterized by predictability, multilateral cooperation, and institutionalized norms is now giving way to a fragmented and volatile geopolitical landscape defined by strategic competition, unilateralism, and transactional decision-making.

This shift is not merely structural but deeply systemic. The post-Cold War optimism that economic interdependence and shared values would foster enduring cooperation has eroded under the weight of emerging realities. Major powers increasingly prioritize national interests over collective commitments, as evidenced by the weaponization of trade through tariffs, the expansion of sanctions regimes, and the growing use of technology controls as instruments of geopolitical leverage. The paralysis of global institutions in addressing major conflicts and economic disruptions further underscores the limitations of existing governance frameworks.

Compounding this transformation is the convergence of multiple global crises. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed stark inequalities in global health governance, while subsequent disruptions in supply chains, energy markets, and financial systems revealed the vulnerabilities of an interconnected world. Simultaneously, intensifying geopolitical rivalries—from tensions in the Indo-Pacific to conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East—have heightened uncertainty and accelerated the shift toward strategic autonomy. The increasing securitization of economic policy, coupled with the rise of digital platforms and non-state actors as influential stakeholders, has blurred the traditional boundaries between economics, security, and governance.

In this evolving context, the distinction between cooperation and competition is becoming increasingly obsolete. States now operate in a complex environment where they may simultaneously collaborate, compete, and contest with the same actors across different domains. This emerging reality reflects a transition from a values-based order to one driven by “shared value,” where pragmatic interests, rather than ideological alignment, determine the contours of engagement.

This article argues that the ongoing transformation of the global order is characterized by the erosion of rule-based systems, the rise of transactional geopolitics, and the growing agency of middle powers navigating a fragmented landscape. It contends that while this shift introduces uncertainty and instability, it also creates opportunities for reimagining global governance through more inclusive, flexible, and adaptive frameworks. Ultimately, the challenge for the international community lies not in restoring the past order, but in constructing a new equilibrium that balances power, equity, and cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Rise of Transactional Geopolitics and “Shared Value” Partnerships

One of the defining features of this emerging order is the transition from values-based alliances to interest-driven, transactional partnerships. Countries increasingly collaborate not because of shared ideologies but due to converging strategic or economic interests. For instance, despite ongoing tensions between the United States and China in areas like technology and security, both continue to engage on climate negotiations and global financial stability mechanisms. Similarly, India’s simultaneous engagement with Western powers through frameworks like the Quad, while maintaining strategic ties with Russia for defense and energy, exemplifies this duality.

Recent developments in 2025–26 further underscore this trend: global supply chain disruptions caused by geopolitical conflicts have forced unlikely partnerships in critical minerals and semiconductor production. The European Union’s outreach to countries in Africa and Latin America for rare earths, and Japan’s investments in Southeast Asia to counter Chinese dominance, demonstrate how “shared value” is replacing “shared values” as the glue of cooperation. However, such arrangements remain inherently fragile, as they lack the deeper ideological cohesion that sustained alliances during the Cold War.

Fragmentation of Multilateralism and the Crisis of Global Governance

The weakening of multilateral institutions is perhaps the most visible symptom of this geopolitical transition. The United Nations Security Council continues to face criticism for its inability to respond effectively to major conflicts, including the prolonged war in Ukraine and the intensifying crises in the Middle East. The absence of structural reforms—particularly the underrepresentation of Africa and the Global South—has further eroded its legitimacy.

Simultaneously, the WTO faces an existential crisis. Data from recent international trade reports indicate that over 3,000 trade-restrictive measures were implemented globally in 2025 alone, compared to fewer than 100 annually two decades ago. The increasing use of unilateral sanctions and export controls, especially in technology sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, has fragmented global trade governance. The rise of plurilateral agreements, such as Indo-Pacific economic frameworks and regional trade blocs, signals a move away from universal rules toward selective, interest-based arrangements. This fragmentation risks creating a “patchwork order,” where overlapping rules generate uncertainty and disproportionately disadvantage smaller economies.

Climate Inequity and the Geopolitics of Climate Finance

Another critical dimension reinforcing the crisis of the global order is the intensification of climate geopolitics and unequal climate finance flows. Despite repeated commitments under frameworks like the Paris Agreement, developed countries have consistently fallen short of their pledge to mobilize $100 billion annually for developing nations—a target only partially met and often through loans rather than grants. According to recent estimates by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, developing economies require over $2 trillion annually by 2030 to meet climate mitigation and adaptation goals. Yet, in 2025, climate finance flows remained heavily skewed, with nearly 70% directed toward mitigation projects in middle-income countries, leaving least developed countries severely underfunded. The growing use of carbon border taxes, particularly the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), has further complicated global trade dynamics by imposing additional costs on exports from developing economies. At the same time, extreme climate events—ranging from devastating floods in South Asia in 2024 to prolonged droughts in Africa—have exposed the vulnerability of countries with minimal adaptive capacity. These developments highlight a widening gap between climate commitments and actual delivery, reinforcing perceptions of inequity in the global system. As climate change increasingly intersects with trade, finance, and security, it is becoming a central axis of geopolitical contestation. Without a fundamental restructuring of climate finance mechanisms and more equitable burden-sharing, the credibility of global governance frameworks will continue to erode, further weakening already fragile international cooperation.

Middle Powers and the “New Delhi Moment”

Amid the decline of traditional power structures, middle powers are emerging as crucial actors shaping the new geopolitical landscape. Countries like India, Brazil, and Turkey are asserting greater strategic autonomy, leveraging their positions to influence global debates on trade, climate, and security. The idea of a “New Delhi Moment,” discussed prominently at global forums, reflects the potential for such states to redefine cooperation frameworks outside the shadow of superpower rivalry.

Recent initiatives reinforce this shift. India’s leadership during the G20 presidency emphasized inclusive development and digital public infrastructure, while Brazil’s renewed activism in climate diplomacy highlights the Global South’s growing agency. Furthermore, coalitions such as BRICS expansion in 2024–25 demonstrate how emerging economies are creating parallel platforms to challenge Western-dominated institutions. However, the effectiveness of these coalitions depends on their ability to move beyond rhetoric and deliver tangible outcomes, particularly in areas like climate finance and development assistance.

Sovereignty, Power Politics, and the Erosion of Trust

The resurgence of sovereignty as a central principle reflects both empowerment and risk. While countries increasingly assert their right to independent decision-making, this has also led to heightened tensions and reduced trust in international cooperation. Instances of alleged political interference, economic coercion, and strategic pressure—whether through sanctions, tariffs, or digital surveillance—have intensified in recent years.

For example, disputes over technology governance, including restrictions on semiconductor exports and concerns over data sovereignty, illustrate how economic tools are being weaponized. Similarly, geopolitical tensions in regions like the South China Sea and Eastern Europe highlight the limits of international law when confronted with power politics. This environment creates a paradox: while sovereignty is championed as a safeguard of national interest, its aggressive assertion often undermines collective stability.

The Economic Dimension: Uncertainty, Supply Chains, and Development Challenges

From a business perspective, the erosion of predictable rules has profound implications. Global corporations increasingly face regulatory fragmentation, geopolitical risks, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The shift toward “de-risking” and “friend-shoring” strategies—accelerated by the COVID-19 aftermath and geopolitical tensions—has reconfigured global production networks.

Recent data indicates that multinational companies are diversifying manufacturing bases away from China toward countries like Vietnam, India, and Mexico. However, this transition comes with increased costs and inefficiencies. Moreover, developing countries risk being marginalized if they cannot integrate into these new supply chains. The decline of multilateral trade frameworks also threatens economic growth, with estimates suggesting that the collapse of global trade norms could reduce GDP in emerging economies by up to 5%.

At the same time, climate finance and development funding remain inadequate. Despite commitments made at global climate summits, actual disbursements to vulnerable nations fall significantly short, exacerbating inequalities and undermining trust in global governance.

A further dimension underscoring the fragility of the current geopolitical order is the resurgence of conflict economies and the securitization of energy and food systems. The ongoing repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine War continue to disrupt global grain and fertilizer supplies, with Ukraine and Russia together accounting for nearly 30% of global wheat exports before the war. In 2024–25, renewed disruptions in Black Sea shipping routes led to spikes in global food prices, disproportionately affecting countries in Africa and West Asia. Simultaneously, energy markets have been reshaped by geopolitical tensions, with Europe reducing dependence on Russian gas while increasing imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States and Qatar. This transition, while strategic, has increased energy costs and exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains. Furthermore, the weaponization of energy—seen in production cuts by oil-producing nations and strategic reserves management—has amplified volatility in global markets. According to recent estimates, over 345 million people worldwide faced acute food insecurity in 2025, nearly double pre-pandemic levels. The convergence of conflict, climate change, and economic instability has thus created a “polycrisis,” where shocks in one domain rapidly cascade into others. These trends not only exacerbate inequalities between developed and developing nations but also challenge the effectiveness of global governance mechanisms in ensuring stability. Without coordinated international responses to secure food and energy systems, such disruptions risk becoming a permanent feature of the global order.

Techno-Politics and the Weaponization of Innovation

A critical yet often underexplored dimension of this shifting geopolitical order is the growing intersection between technology governance, economic security, and strategic competition. The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductor technologies has transformed them into instruments of geopolitical leverage. In 2025, the United States expanded export controls on advanced chips and AI technologies targeting China, while simultaneously investing over $50 billion under industrial policy frameworks such as domestic semiconductor initiatives. In response, China accelerated its self-reliance strategy, increasing R&D spending to over 2.6% of GDP and tightening control over critical mineral exports like gallium and germanium—essential for global electronics supply chains. Meanwhile, the European Union introduced its Digital Markets Act and AI regulatory frameworks, aiming to set global standards while reducing dependence on external technological ecosystems. These developments have effectively fragmented the digital economy into competing regulatory and technological blocs. Additionally, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure—including financial networks and energy grids in 2024–25—have highlighted the vulnerability of interconnected systems in the absence of universally accepted norms. The result is an emerging “techno-polar” world order, where innovation is increasingly securitized and access to technology is weaponized. This trend not only deepens strategic mistrust among major powers but also creates significant barriers for developing countries, which risk exclusion from next-generation technological ecosystems. Without coordinated global governance mechanisms, the technological divide could become as consequential as traditional economic inequalities, reshaping power hierarchies in the decades to come.

Conclusion

The transformation of the global order is neither entirely negative nor wholly inevitable; it is, rather, a moment of profound transition that demands both critical reflection and strategic imagination. While the erosion of rule-based systems has undoubtedly introduced volatility and distrust, it has also exposed the inadequacies of outdated institutions and created space for necessary reform. The real challenge before the international community is not to nostalgically restore a past order that no longer reflects contemporary realities, but to construct a more adaptive, inclusive, and representative framework of global governance.

Reform must go beyond rhetoric. Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization must evolve to accommodate the voices and aspirations of the Global South, particularly regions like Africa that remain structurally underrepresented. At the same time, governance mechanisms must expand to address emerging domains—digital technologies, artificial intelligence, climate finance, and supply chain resilience—where the absence of coherent rules risks deepening fragmentation. Re-centering development, equity, and sustainability within global discourse is no longer optional; it is essential for restoring legitimacy and ensuring long-term stability.

Ultimately, the future of geopolitics will be defined by whether states can transcend zero-sum calculations and embrace the reality of deep interdependence. In a world where cooperation and competition coexist, leadership will be measured not by dominance, but by the ability to forge trust amid uncertainty and consensus amid divergence. If the current era is marked by rule-makers becoming rule-breakers, the next must be defined by rule-shapers—actors willing to rebuild norms that are fair, flexible, and forward-looking. The stakes are not merely institutional or strategic; they are civilizational. The choices made today will determine whether the emerging world order descends into prolonged fragmentation or evolves into a more just and resilient system capable of addressing the shared challenges of humanity.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The prospect of a ceasefire in the Middle East, particularly amid the intensifying confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, remains both urgent and uncertain. As the conflict enters a prolonged and increasingly complex phase, diplomatic signals, military developments, and geopolitical calculations collectively suggest that while pathways to de-escalation exist, they are fragile, contested, and contingent on a convergence of interests that has yet to fully materialize. 

At the heart of the current crisis lies a dangerous cycle of escalation. The war has expanded beyond direct hostilities between principal actors to encompass regional proxies, critical infrastructure, and vital global trade routes. The effective disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, has amplified by the global consequences of the conflict. Energy markets have reacted sharply, with rising fuel prices underscoring how regional instability can rapidly translate into worldwide economic strain. This interdependence has heightened international urgency for a ceasefire, not only as a humanitarian imperative but as an economic necessity. 

Despite the intensity of the conflict, there are emerging, albeit tentative, indications of diplomatic movement. The circulation of peace proposals, including multi-point frameworks aimed at curbing nuclear ambitions and restoring freedom of navigation, reflects a recognition among global powers that a purely military resolution is neither sustainable nor desirable. However, these proposals are constrained by deep mistrust. Public rhetoric from key actors continues to emphasize strength and resolve, often overshadowing quieter, back-channel communications that hint at a willingness to negotiate. This duality public defiance paired with private opennessillustrates the complexity of achieving a ceasefire in a highly polarized environment. 

One of the principal obstacles to a ceasefire is asymmetry in stated objectives. For some actors, the goal is immediate de-escalation and stabilization, while for others, it extends to broader strategic outcomes such as dismantling military capabilities, securing long-term deterrence, or redefining regional power balances. This divergence complicates negotiations, as a ceasefire is not merely a pause in hostilities but a reflection of underlying political compromises. Without alignment on what a ceasefire is meant to achieve, even temporary agreements risk collapsing under the weight of unmet expectations. 

The role of external actors further complicates the situation. European nations, alongside other global stakeholders, have begun to articulate frameworks aimed at ensuring maritime security and preventing further escalation. These efforts signal a shift toward multilateral crisis management, recognizing that the consequences of the conflict extend far beyond the immediate region. Proposals to establish international coalitions focused on safeguarding energy flows and facilitating negotiations represent a pragmatic approach to de-escalation. However, the effectiveness of such coalitions depends on inclusivity and credibility. Excluding key stakeholders risks undermining legitimacy, while over-inclusion may dilute strategic coherence. 

Regional dynamics also play a critical role in shaping the prospects for a ceasefire. Countries across the Middle East, many of which have direct economic and security stakes in the conflict, are navigating a delicate balance between alignment and neutrality. Their involvement in mediation efforts reflects both self-interest and a broader desire to prevent the conflict from spiraling into a wider regional war. At the same time, the participation of non-regional powers introduces additional layers of strategic competition, as global rivalries intersect with local conflicts. 

Humanitarian considerations add another dimension to the urgency of a ceasefire. The conflict has already resulted in significant civilian casualties, displacement, and infrastructure destruction. In parallel, ongoing tensions in Gaza and the West Bank highlight the interconnected nature of Middle Eastern conflicts, where developments in one arena can influence dynamics in another. Efforts to secure humanitarian corridors, facilitate aid delivery, and protect civilian populations are often seen as precursors to broader ceasefire agreements. These measures, while limited in scope, can build confidence and create momentum for more comprehensive negotiations. 

Economic pressures are also shaping the trajectory of the conflict. The disruption of energy supplies, combined with broader market instability, has created incentives for de-escalation. Governments facing domestic economic challenges may be more inclined to pursue diplomatic solutions, particularly as the costs of prolonged conflict become increasingly apparent. However, economic considerations alone are unlikely to override strategic and ideological priorities, especially in contexts where national security narratives dominate political discourse. 

Another critical factor influencing the likelihood of a ceasefire is the internal political landscape of the involved states. Leadership decisions are often shaped by domestic considerations, including public opinion, political legitimacy, and institutional constraints. In some cases, adopting a hardline stance may be politically advantageous, even if it complicates diplomatic efforts. Conversely, the pursuit of negotiations may be framed as a sign of weakness, limiting leaders’ willingness to engage openly in peace processes. Understanding these internal dynamics is essential for assessing the feasibility of a ceasefire. 

The role of international organizations and multilateral frameworks cannot be overlooked. United Nations-led initiatives, as well as resolutions aimed at conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, provide institutional pathways for peacebuilding. The establishment of transitional governance structures, stabilization forces, and reconstruction mechanisms in conflict-affected areas demonstrates the potential for coordinated international action. However, the success of these initiatives depends on sustained political will and cooperation among major powers, which has often been lacking in recent years. 

In assessing whether a ceasefire is on the horizon, it is important to distinguish between short-term pauses and long-term resolutions. Temporary ceasefires, often driven by immediate pressures such as humanitarian concerns or tactical recalibrations, are more achievable but inherently unstable. They can provide critical relief and create opportunities for dialogue, but without addressing underlying grievances, they risk becoming merely interluded in a continuing cycle of conflict. A durable ceasefire, by contrast, requires a comprehensive approach that integrates security arrangements, political negotiations, and economic reconstruction. 

Confidence-building measures could play a pivotal role in bridging the gap between these two forms of ceasefire. Initiatives such as prisoner exchanges, phased withdrawals, and joint monitoring mechanisms can help reduce tensions and build trust among conflicting parties. Additionally, third-party mediation, particularly by actors perceived as neutral or balanced, can facilitate communication and reduce the risk of miscalculation. The involvement of countries with established diplomatic channels to both sides may be particularly valuable in this regard. 

Looking ahead, several scenarios are possible. One scenario involves a gradual de-escalation driven by a combination of diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and strategic recalibration. In this case, a ceasefire could emerge as part of a broader negotiated settlement, potentially linked to issues such as nuclear oversight, regional security arrangements, and economic cooperation. Another scenario involves continued escalation, with intermittent pauses that fail to translate into lasting peace. This outcome would likely exacerbate humanitarian suffering and increase the risk of a wider regional conflict. 

A third, more complex scenario involves a hybrid approach, where limited ceasefires coexist with ongoing low-intensity conflict. This pattern, which has been observed in other regions, reflects the difficulty of achieving comprehensive peace in deeply entrenched conflicts. While not ideal, such an arrangement may provide a degree of stability and create space for incremental progress. 

Eventually, the question of whether a ceasefire is on the horizon depends on the interplay of multiple factors the willingness of key actors to compromise, the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives, the impact of economic pressures, and the broader geopolitical context. While there are reasons for cautious optimism, particularly considering ongoing diplomatic efforts, significant challenges remain. 

The path to a ceasefire in the Middle East is neither linear nor guaranteed. It requires not only the cessation of hostilities but also reimagining regional relationships and security frameworks. Achieving this will demand sustained engagement, strategic patience, and recognition that peace is not a singular event but a continuous process. As the conflict continues to evolve, the international community faces a critical test of its ability to navigate complexity, balance competing interests, and prioritize long-term stability over short-term gains. Therefore, the horizon of a ceasefire is visible but distant, shaped by both the urgency of the present and the uncertainties of the future. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Need for Multi-Domain Deterrence

India’s security environment is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by the rapid evolution of military technologies and the emergence of complex, hybrid threats. Traditional warfare, once defined by territorial control and conventional force deployment, is now being reshaped by cyber operations, space-based assets, artificial intelligence, and precision-guided systems. In this changing landscape, deterrence can no longer rely solely on numerical strength or legacy platforms; instead, it must evolve into a multi-domain construct that integrates capabilities across land, air, sea, cyber, and space.

The concept of multi-domain deterrence (MDD) emphasizes synergy—where different military domains operate in coordination to create a cumulative strategic effect. For India, this shift is particularly critical given the challenge posed by technologically advanced adversaries like China, whose military modernization has been both rapid and comprehensive. China’s ability to combine conventional forces with cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space capabilities gives it a decisive edge in shaping the battlefield. Therefore, India must move beyond fragmented responses and adopt a synchronized, multi-domain strategy that ensures faster decision-making, real-time intelligence sharing, and precision strike capabilities.

However, adopting MDD is not merely a doctrinal shift—it requires a rethinking of how India conceptualizes power. It demands integration across services, the breaking down of silos, and the creation of a unified command structure capable of executing complex operations. Without such transformation, India risks remaining reactive rather than proactive in its deterrence posture.Recent global conflicts have powerfully demonstrated that the future of warfare lies in the seamless fusion of multiple domains, reinforcing the urgency of India’s transition toward multi-domain deterrence. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war has highlighted the decisive role of drones, satellite intelligence, cyber operations, and precision-guided munitions in shaping battlefield outcomes, often compensating for asymmetries in conventional force strength. Similarly, the Israel–Hamas conflict (2023–present) has underscored the importance of integrated air defence systems, real-time intelligence fusion, and rapid response mechanisms in countering both state and non-state threats. These conflicts reveal that dominance is no longer achieved solely through territorial control but through information superiority, speed of decision-making, and technological integration. For India, these lessons are particularly relevant in the context of its contested borders and evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s advancements in hypersonic weapons, cyber warfare, and space militarisation further intensify the need for India to accelerate its own transformation. Additionally, the increasing militarisation of emerging domains such as outer space and cyberspace indicates that future conflicts may begin long before traditional military engagement occurs. Consequently, India must prioritise not just capability accumulation but capability integration, ensuring that its forces can operate cohesively across domains in real time. These contemporary developments make it evident that multi-domain deterrence is not a theoretical construct but an operational necessity, critical to maintaining strategic stability and preventing conflict in an increasingly volatile global order.

Hard Choices and Systemic Vulnerabilities in India’s Defence Preparedness

A central theme emerging is the presence of hard strategic choices that India must confront. One approach involves aggressively investing in emerging technologies and building entirely new capabilities. While this may offer long-term advantages, it carries significant risks—particularly if such investments fail to mature in time or create gaps in current operational readiness. The second approach is more conservative: integrating new technologies into existing systems to enhance their effectiveness. Though less risky, this strategy may not significantly alter the balance of power.Recent policy and budgetary trends further highlight both the progress and persistent gaps in India’s defence preparedness. The Union Budget 2025–26 has continued to prioritise capital outlay for defence modernization, with a growing share allocated to domestic procurement under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. This reflects a strategic push to reduce import dependency, which historically accounted for a significant portion of India’s defence acquisitions. However, despite these efforts, challenges remain in terms of absorptive capacity and timely fund utilisation, often leading to under-execution of allocated budgets. On the innovation front, initiatives such as the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) programme and the expansion of defence corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are encouraging start-ups and MSMEs to contribute to next-generation military technologies, including unmanned systems, AI-based solutions, and advanced materials. At the same time, global supply chain disruptions and geopolitical uncertainties—exacerbated by ongoing conflicts and great power competition—have exposed vulnerabilities in India’s reliance on foreign components and critical technologies. Furthermore, the increasing role of private sector giants and strategic partnerships in defence production marks a shift toward a more diversified industrial base, yet coordination challenges with public sector undertakings persist. These developments indicate that while India is moving in the right direction, bridging the gap between policy intent and execution remains crucial. Strengthening institutional mechanisms, improving procurement efficiency, and ensuring synergy between stakeholders will be key to transforming India’s defence preparedness into a truly resilient and future-ready system.

India’s dilemma lies in balancing these competing priorities. The country continues to rely heavily on legacy platforms, many of which are ill-suited to modern warfare. At the same time, its defence-industrial base lacks the scale and efficiency needed to rapidly produce advanced technologies. This creates a dual vulnerability—technological lag and industrial insufficiency—which adversaries could exploit. Moreover, India’s procurement processes remain slow and bureaucratic, often leading to delays in capability acquisition. The lack of coordination between the armed forces, research institutions, and industry further exacerbates the problem. The issue is not merely technological competence but the absence of a structured system capable of delivering at speed and scale. To address these vulnerabilities, India must adopt a pragmatic approach—one that combines incremental improvements with targeted investments in disruptive technologies. This includes strengthening domestic manufacturing, encouraging innovation, and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. Without such reforms, India’s deterrence strategy will remain constrained by systemic inefficiencies.

Building Enabling Layers: The Backbone of Effective Deterrence

Another is the importance of “enabling layers” in shaping India’s multi-domain capabilities. These layers—Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and advanced communication networks—form the foundation upon which effective deterrence is built. Unlike visible military assets such as tanks or fighter jets, enabling systems operate behind the scenes, ensuring coordination, situational awareness, and rapid response.Recent developments underscore how rapidly the character of enabling layers is evolving in India’s strategic framework. The growing deployment of space-based surveillance assets, such as improved satellite constellations for real-time tracking and communication, has significantly enhanced India’s situational awareness along contested borders. Parallelly, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning into intelligence processing is reducing decision-making time, enabling predictive threat analysis rather than reactive responses. India’s increasing focus on network-centric warfare, reflected in systems like integrated air command and control networks and battlefield management systems, is gradually linking sensors, shooters, and decision-makers into a unified digital grid. This transformation is particularly crucial in light of recent border tensions and evolving grey-zone tactics, where information dominance often determines strategic advantage without full-scale conflict. Additionally, the rapid expansion of drone and counter-drone capabilities, especially after lessons drawn from global conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war, has pushed India to invest in swarm drone technologies and electronic warfare systems capable of neutralising unmanned threats. The emphasis on secure and resilient communication networks—including quantum communication research and anti-jamming technologies—further reflects an understanding that future wars will be fought as much through data integrity as through firepower. Collectively, these advancements highlight that enabling layers are no longer supportive elements but decisive instruments of deterrence, capable of shaping outcomes even before conventional forces are deployed.

For India, strengthening these layers is critical. A robust ISR system, for instance, allows for continuous monitoring of adversary movements, enabling preemptive action when necessary. Similarly, advanced C2 systems ensure that information flows seamlessly across different units and services, reducing response time and improving operational efficiency. In a multi-domain environment, where decisions must be made in seconds, such capabilities can prove decisive. The editorial also underscores the need for affordable and scalable ISR platforms, particularly in large numbers. This is essential because, in a prolonged conflict, the ability to sustain surveillance and reconnaissance operations becomes as important as initial deployment. Additionally, integrating cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into these enabling layers can provide India with a strategic edge, allowing it to disrupt adversary systems while protecting its own.

Another crucial aspect is the development of a layered C4ISR architecture (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). This integrated system not only enhances India’s operational capabilities but also limits the effectiveness of adversary actions. By creating redundancy and resilience within these layers, India can ensure continuity of operations even in contested environments.

Reforming the Defence-Industrial Base and Strategic Way Forward

The success of India’s multi-domain deterrence strategy ultimately hinges on the strength of its defence-industrial base. India’s industrial ecosystem is not yet structured to deliver the speed, scale, and innovation required for modern warfare. Addressing this gap requires comprehensive reforms that go beyond incremental changes.

First, India must prioritize industrial capacity building by fostering greater collaboration between the public and private sectors. Private industry, with its efficiency and technological dynamism, can play a crucial role in accelerating production and innovation. Providing long-term contracts, ensuring policy stability, and reducing regulatory barriers can incentivize private participation and drive growth in the defence sector.Recent developments in India’s defence architecture reinforce the urgency of transitioning toward a fully integrated multi-domain deterrence framework. The Government of India’s declaration of 2025 as the “Year of Defence Reforms” signals a decisive policy push toward jointness, technological modernization, and institutional restructuring. Central to this effort is the long-awaited implementation of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), which aim to unify the Army, Navy, and Air Force under single operational commanders for specific threat theatres. This restructuring is expected to eliminate inter-service silos and significantly enhance operational efficiency in multi-domain warfare scenarios. Complementing this, the June 2025 reform empowering the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to issue binding joint operational directives marks a watershed moment in India’s military evolution, effectively transforming “jointness” from a conceptual aspiration into an actionable command structure. Simultaneously, India is investing in advanced technological ecosystems, including artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, cyber warfare, and space-based capabilities, which are increasingly central to modern deterrence strategies. Initiatives such as integrated battlefield surveillance systems and network-centric warfare platforms are enhancing India’s C4ISR capabilities, enabling faster and more precise decision-making on the battlefield. Moreover, the emphasis on indigenous defence production under the broader vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat reflects a strategic shift toward self-reliance, aiming to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers while building resilient supply chains. Taken together, these reforms indicate that India is not merely adapting to changing warfare dynamics but actively reshaping its military doctrine to align with the demands of 21st-century conflict—where integration, speed, and technological superiority are the ultimate determinants of deterrence credibility.

Second, procurement reforms are essential. The current system must evolve to become more flexible, transparent, and outcome-oriented. This includes focusing on capability development rather than platform acquisition, streamlining decision-making processes, and aligning procurement with strategic objectives. Importantly, the system must be able to adapt quickly to changing technological and operational requirements.

Third, India must invest in critical enabling capabilities through targeted budget allocations. This includes funding for advanced research, development of indigenous technologies, and creation of infrastructure to support multi-domain operations. Learning from China’s example, India should also build sufficient stockpiles and production capacity to sustain operations during prolonged conflicts. Finally, doctrinal and institutional reforms are necessary to ensure effective implementation. The integration of the armed forces through theatre commands, combined with technological integration, can enhance coordination and operational effectiveness. Equally important is the need for a clear strategic vision that aligns military, industrial, and political objectives.

Conclusion

India’s strategic trajectory today is defined not by incremental adaptation but by the necessity for transformational change. The shift toward multi-domain deterrence encapsulates a broader reimagining of how power is generated, integrated, and projected in the 21st century. It demands that India move beyond legacy frameworks and embrace a future where deterrence is built on speed, synergy, and technological superiority rather than sheer scale alone. This transition, however, is as much about mindset as it is about material capability—requiring political will, institutional cohesion, and a culture of innovation that permeates both the military and the defence-industrial ecosystem. Crucially, India must recognize that deterrence in the modern era is not static but dynamic. It is continuously shaped by emerging technologies, evolving doctrines, and shifting geopolitical realities. As adversaries invest heavily in artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and space militarization, India cannot afford a reactive posture. Instead, it must anticipate, adapt, and lead—leveraging its growing technological base, expanding industrial capacity, and strategic partnerships to build a resilient and future-ready force. Ultimately, the success of India’s multi-domain deterrence strategy will lie in its ability to integrate diverse capabilities into a coherent whole, where every domain reinforces the other. This is not merely about preparing for war but about preventing it—by presenting a posture so credible and cohesive that adversaries are dissuaded from aggression. In doing so, India will not only safeguard its national interests but also emerge as a stabilizing force in an increasingly fragmented and contested global order.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Northeast India, a region defined by its ecological richness and hydrological complexity, is emerging as a critical frontier in India’s geopolitical and economic strategy. Comprising eight states and interconnected by a dense network of rivers, the region serves as a natural bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. At the centre of this network lies the Brahmaputra River—a transboundary lifeline that sustains agriculture, hydropower, and livelihoods while shaping regional connectivity.

In recent years, India’s evolving Indo-Pacific vision and the Act East Policy have brought renewed focus to the Northeast as a strategic gateway. Legislative backing through the National Waterways Act 2016 has enabled the expansion of inland water transport (IWT) networks, positioning rivers as engines of economic integration. However, this transformation is occurring amid geopolitical shifts, including instability in Myanmar and recalibrating relations with Bangladesh.

Recent infrastructure push further reinforces this shift. The Government of India has earmarked approximately ₹5,000 crore for developing waterways in the Northeast, alongside plans for dozens of community jetties to boost local connectivity and trade ecosystems. In 2026, multiple inland waterway projects were inaugurated along the Brahmaputra, signaling a transition from policy intent to implementation. Simultaneously, strategic infrastructure such as the Kumar Bhaskar Varma Setu and the proposed Brahmaputra underwater tunnel highlight an integrated approach combining riverine and land connectivity. These developments collectively indicate that Northeast India is no longer peripheral but central to India’s Indo-Pacific vision. Revitalising its river systems is thus not merely developmental—it is geopolitical, economic, and strategic in equal measure.

River Systems as Strategic and Economic Arteries

The river systems of Northeast India have historically functioned as vital channels of trade and connectivity. Colonial-era networks linking Assam to Kolkata via river routes demonstrate the region’s long-standing integration into global commerce. Today, these waterways are being reimagined as cost-effective and sustainable transport corridors.

Recent policy initiatives have accelerated this transformation. National Waterway 2 (Brahmaputra) and National Waterway 16 (Barak) are witnessing increased cargo movement, supported by investments in terminals, vessels, and logistics infrastructure. The government is actively constructing modern river terminals, introducing mechanised cargo handling systems, and deploying new inland vessels to improve efficiency.An equally transformative dimension of revitalising Northeast India’s river systems lies in their potential to catalyse regional value chains and integrate local economies into global production networks. Beyond their traditional role as transport corridors, rivers such as the Brahmaputra River and Barak can serve as logistical backbones for emerging sectors including agro-processing, bamboo-based industries, fisheries, and eco-tourism. Recent policy emphasis on multimodal logistics parks, riverine cold storage systems, and last-mile connectivity infrastructure reflects a shift toward creating an ecosystem rather than isolated transport routes. For instance, integrating inland waterways with rail corridors and border trade points can enable seamless movement of goods from Northeast India to markets in Southeast Asia, particularly under frameworks aligned with India’s Act East Policy. Furthermore, the development of river ports as economic clusters—equipped with warehousing, customs clearance, and digital tracking systems—can attract private investment and generate employment in a region historically constrained by limited industrialisation. This approach also aligns with global trends toward sustainable logistics, as inland water transport offers a lower carbon footprint compared to road and rail alternatives. However, realising this vision will require addressing critical gaps in skill development, institutional coordination, and financing mechanisms. Encouraging public-private partnerships, fostering entrepreneurship, and integrating local communities into value chains will be essential for ensuring inclusive growth. In this sense, river revitalisation is not merely about enhancing connectivity but about reimagining Northeast India as a dynamic economic corridor—one that bridges local potential with regional and global opportunities while reinforcing its strategic relevance in the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, new projects launched in 2026 aim to transform the Brahmaputra into a major logistics and tourism corridor, reflecting a dual-use strategy that integrates economic growth with regional development. The development of additional waterways—such as Dhansiri and Kopili—under the National Waterways framework further expands the network, creating a multi-nodal river transport system.

However, despite these advancements, challenges remain. Infrastructure gaps, seasonal navigability issues, and limited private sector participation constrain the full utilisation of these waterways. Addressing these bottlenecks will require sustained investment, technological innovation, and policy coordination. If successfully implemented, river systems can significantly reduce logistics costs, enhance trade competitiveness, and position Northeast India as a key economic corridor linking South Asia with Southeast Asia.

Transboundary Rivers and the Geopolitics of Water Diplomacy

Northeast India’s rivers are inherently transboundary, flowing across multiple countries and shaping regional geopolitics. The Brahmaputra basin, shared by China, India, and Bangladesh, exemplifies the strategic complexities of water governance. Issues such as upstream dam construction, data sharing, and seasonal flow variations are increasingly intertwined with broader geopolitical competition.A critical yet often underemphasised dimension of transboundary river governance is the growing impact of climate change on water security and regional stability. The Himalayan river systems, including the Brahmaputra River, are highly sensitive to glacial melt, erratic precipitation patterns, and extreme weather events, all of which are intensifying due to global warming. These environmental shifts are altering river flow regimes, increasing the frequency of floods in downstream regions such as Assam and Bangladesh, while also raising concerns about long-term water availability during dry seasons. Such variability complicates existing diplomatic arrangements, as traditional water-sharing frameworks are often based on historical flow data that may no longer be reliable. Moreover, climate-induced stress can exacerbate geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions where trust deficits already exist. In this context, integrating climate resilience into water diplomacy becomes imperative. This includes enhancing joint data-sharing mechanisms, investing in early warning systems, and developing adaptive river basin management strategies. By framing rivers not merely as resources to be divided but as shared ecosystems to be managed collectively, India can promote a more cooperative and forward-looking approach to regional water governance.

Recent developments highlight these concerns. India has unveiled a massive multi-billion-dollar hydropower and transmission plan to harness the Brahmaputra basin’s potential, partly in response to China’s upstream dam-building activities. This reflects the growing securitisation of water resources, where infrastructure development is linked to both energy security and strategic positioning. At the same time, unresolved issues such as the Teesta River water-sharing dispute continue to affect India–Bangladesh relations. Effective water diplomacy is therefore essential not only for resource management but also for maintaining regional stability. India has begun to adopt a more proactive approach, leveraging bilateral river agreements and transit frameworks to enhance connectivity and cooperation. However, long-term success will depend on institutionalising these mechanisms, ensuring transparency, and building trust among stakeholders. In an era of climate change and increasing water stress, cooperative river governance will be critical for preventing conflict and unlocking the full strategic potential of Northeast India’s waterways.

Connectivity Corridors and Strategic Alternatives to the Siliguri Corridor 

The strategic vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor has long constrained Northeast India’s connectivity. River-based and multimodal projects are now being developed to reduce this dependence and create alternative routes to the sea. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is central to this strategy. By linking Mizoram to Myanmar’s Sittwe port, it provides a direct maritime route that bypasses the Siliguri Corridor, significantly enhancing logistical resilience. The project is expected to become fully operational by 2027, further strengthening India’s Act East ambitions.Beyond economic and logistical considerations, the development of alternative connectivity corridors in Northeast India carries significant national security implications. The heavy reliance on the Siliguri Corridor—a narrow stretch connecting the region to mainland India—has long been viewed as a strategic vulnerability, particularly in the context of evolving regional security dynamics. River-based and multimodal connectivity projects, such as those linked to the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, offer not only economic benefits but also critical redundancy in times of crisis. By creating multiple access routes to the Northeast, India can enhance its military mobility, ensure uninterrupted supply chains, and reduce the risks associated with potential disruptions along a single corridor. Additionally, improved connectivity to ports such as Sittwe strengthens India’s strategic outreach into the Bay of Bengal, aligning with its broader Indo-Pacific vision. However, the security dimension also necessitates robust border management, infrastructure protection, and coordination among defence and civilian agencies. Integrating these considerations into connectivity planning will be essential for ensuring that infrastructure development contributes not only to economic growth but also to long-term strategic resilience and national security preparedness.

Recent expansions include integrating river systems such as the Brahmaputra and Barak into a broader multimodal network, enhancing connectivity between Northeast India and Southeast Asia. Additionally, infrastructure projects like the proposed Brahmaputra underwater tunnel and new bridges aim to drastically reduce travel time and improve access to border regions. However, geopolitical uncertainties—particularly in Myanmar—pose significant challenges. India’s engagement with multiple stakeholders reflects the complexities of implementing infrastructure projects in politically volatile environments. Despite these challenges, the development of alternative corridors remains essential for ensuring economic integration and strategic autonomy. By diversifying connectivity routes, India can mitigate risks and enhance the resilience of its northeastern region.

From Vision to Reality: Bridging Policy Ambitions and Infrastructure Gaps in Northeast India

India’s policy approach toward Northeast connectivity has evolved from the Look East Policy to the more action-oriented Act East Policy. This shift reflects a growing recognition of the region’s strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific framework.An important factor that will determine the long-term success of Northeast India’s river revitalisation efforts is the role of institutional governance and inter-agency coordination. While multiple ministries—including shipping, water resources, environment, and external affairs—are involved in river development and connectivity projects, the absence of a unified institutional framework often leads to fragmented implementation and delays. Establishing a dedicated river basin authority or a Northeast-focused inland waterways coordination body could streamline decision-making, ensure policy coherence, and accelerate project execution. Additionally, aligning central initiatives with state-level priorities is essential, given the diverse socio-political and ecological contexts across the region. Strengthening institutional capacity at the local level—through training, technical expertise, and digital monitoring systems—can further enhance efficiency and accountability. International best practices, such as integrated river basin management models, offer useful lessons for India in balancing development with environmental sustainability. By prioritising governance reforms alongside infrastructure investments, India can ensure that its ambitious plans for river revitalisation are not only implemented effectively but also sustained over the long term, thereby reinforcing the Northeast’s role as a strategic and economic gateway to the Indo-Pacific.

Significant investments have been made in infrastructure, including dredging, port development, and multimodal connectivity projects. The government has committed substantial financial resources toward inland waterways, alongside ongoing projects nearing completion across Assam and neighbouring states. Innovative initiatives—such as developing inland water transport on smaller rivers and lakes in states like Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya—highlight efforts to expand connectivity beyond major waterways. These projects aim to integrate remote regions into the broader economic network, promoting inclusive and balanced development. However, challenges persist. Delays in key projects, limited coordination among agencies, and environmental concerns—such as riverbank erosion and flooding—continue to hinder progress. Recent large-scale anti-erosion and river management projects underscore the urgency of addressing these structural issues.

Moving forward, a comprehensive strategy is needed to align infrastructure development with environmental sustainability and geopolitical objectives. This includes leveraging digital technologies, enhancing public-private partnerships, and strengthening institutional capacity. Only through such an integrated approach can Northeast India realise its full potential as a strategic gateway to the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion 

Northeast India’s river systems represent a convergence of geography, economy, and geopolitics. From the Brahmaputra’s vast basin to emerging connectivity corridors, these waterways hold the key to transforming the region into a hub of trade and strategic influence. Recent developments—from large-scale investments and infrastructure projects to renewed policy focus—indicate that India is actively repositioning the Northeast within its Indo-Pacific strategy. The expansion of inland waterways, operationalisation of multimodal projects, and integration of river systems into regional supply chains reflect a comprehensive and forward-looking approach. However, the path ahead is not without challenges. Geopolitical uncertainties, environmental vulnerabilities, and infrastructural gaps must be addressed through sustained policy efforts and regional cooperation. Strengthening ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar, while diversifying connectivity options, will be critical for ensuring long-term resilience. Ultimately, the revitalisation of Northeast India’s rivers is about more than connectivity—it is about redefining India’s strategic geography. If effectively harnessed, these waterways can transform the Northeast from a peripheral region into a central node of Indo-Pacific engagement, shaping the future of regional trade, diplomacy, and security in the 21st century.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean Region is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by intensifying great power competition, evolving maritime threats, and shifting alliance structures. At the heart of this transformation lies the growing convergence between India and Australia—two resident powers whose interests increasingly align in preserving a stable, open, and rules-based maritime order. As global attention shifts toward the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean is no longer a secondary theatre but a central arena of strategic contestation.

Recent geopolitical signals reinforce this shift. The 2026 testimony by U.S. officials emphasizing India’s role as a net security provider, coupled with the relative under-prioritisation of the IOR in United States defence strategy, suggests an emerging redistribution of security responsibilities. This evolving “division of labour” places India and Australia in a pivotal position to shape regional stability. At the same time, China’s expanding footprint—particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative—has intensified strategic anxieties across littoral states.

Against this backdrop, institutionalising India–Australia cooperation is no longer optional; it is a strategic necessity. Beyond ad hoc engagements and symbolic partnerships, both countries must develop durable frameworks that can address shared concerns—ranging from maritime security and supply chain resilience to infrastructure governance and regional capacity-building. The future balance of power in the Indian Ocean may well depend on how effectively Canberra and New Delhi translate convergence into coordinated action.A broader conceptual lens to understand the deepening India–Australia engagement is through the evolution of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, where small, flexible groupings are increasingly complementing traditional multilateral institutions. Platforms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue illustrate how issue-based coalitions can respond more effectively to emerging challenges, ranging from maritime security to supply chain resilience and critical technologies. Within this framework, India–Australia cooperation represents a crucial bilateral pillar that underpins wider regional arrangements. Recent Quad initiatives—including collaboration on critical minerals, undersea cable protection, and humanitarian assistance—highlight a shift toward functional and outcome-oriented cooperation. At the same time, both countries are navigating a complex strategic environment shaped by the relative decline of consensus-based multilateralism and the rise of competitive geopolitics. The limitations of larger regional organisations, such as SAARC and even ASEAN-led mechanisms, have further reinforced the appeal of minilateral approaches that allow like-minded states to act decisively without being constrained by divergent interests. For India and Australia, embedding their bilateral partnership within this evolving architecture enhances both strategic flexibility and collective capacity. It also enables them to shape regional norms and standards in ways that reflect shared values of openness, sovereignty, and rules-based order. Consequently, institutionalising their cooperation is not merely about bilateral alignment but about positioning themselves as central actors in a broader networked security architecture that defines the future of the Indo-Pacific.

China’s Expanding Maritime Footprint and Strategic Implications

Over the past two decades, China has systematically expanded its presence across the Indian Ocean, transforming its role from a distant economic actor to an embedded strategic player. Through large-scale investments in ports, energy corridors, and transport infrastructure, Beijing has established a network of strategic nodes that extend from Southeast Asia to East Africa. These projects, often financed through concessional loans, have created long-term dependencies among host nations.

The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port remains emblematic of this dynamic, where financial distress led to a 99-year lease agreement with China. Similar patterns are visible across the region, raising concerns about debt sustainability, sovereignty, and strategic vulnerability. Beyond economics, China’s increasing naval deployments, surveillance vessel port calls, and dual-use infrastructure projects signal a gradual militarisation of its presence in the Indian Ocean. Recent developments further highlight this trajectory. Reports of Chinese research vessels operating in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean littorals, alongside expanding logistical facilities in eastern Africa, suggest a long-term strategy aimed at securing sea lanes and projecting power. For regional actors, this raises critical questions about freedom of navigation, control over chokepoints, and the potential erosion of a rules-based order.

India’s Strategic Response and the Turn Toward Partnerships

For India, China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean represents a direct challenge to its traditional sphere of influence and maritime security calculus. Historically, New Delhi has viewed the region as its primary strategic domain—a perception now being tested by external encroachment and evolving regional dynamics. India’s response has been multifaceted. It has accelerated connectivity and development projects across neighbouring countries, undertaken over 100 infrastructure initiatives, and strengthened maritime cooperation through capacity-building and defence partnerships. Initiatives in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives reflect India’s effort maintain its relevance and counterbalance Chinese influence. However, structural limitations persist. India’s project delivery timelines, financial constraints, and the politicisation of its engagement in neighbouring countries often undermine its effectiveness. Recognising these challenges, India has increasingly turned toward like-minded partners, including Japan, the United States, and Australia, to enhance its strategic reach and implementation capacity. Recent agreements, such as expanded energy cooperation with Sri Lanka and connectivity projects linking India’s northeast to Bangladesh, demonstrate a shift toward collaborative frameworks. These partnerships not only amplify India’s capabilities but also reduce the risk of unilateral exposure in a highly competitive strategic environment.

Australia’s Strategic Stakes in the Indian Ocean

As a resident power with significant economic and security interests in the Indian Ocean, Australia’s engagement with the region has intensified in recent years. The Indian Ocean serves as a critical artery for Australia’s trade and energy flows, with over half of its seaborne exports transiting through these waters.

Australia’s vulnerability to maritime disruptions is particularly acute. Any blockade or coercion affecting key chokepoints—such as the Strait of Malacca—would have immediate and severe implications for its economy and national security. This reality has driven Canberra to re-evaluate its strategic priorities, placing greater emphasis on the Northeast Indian Ocean Region. An increasingly significant yet underappreciated dimension of Australia’s engagement in the Indian Ocean Region is the growing centrality of critical minerals and supply chain security, which directly intersects with its partnership with India. As global economies transition toward clean energy and advanced technologies, the demand for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements has surged dramatically. Australia, as one of the world’s leading producers of these resources, occupies a pivotal position in emerging supply chains. Simultaneously, India’s expanding manufacturing base and ambitions in renewable energy, electric mobility, and semiconductor development make it a key consumer and processing hub. Recent bilateral initiatives, including agreements on critical minerals cooperation and resilient supply chains, reflect a shared recognition of this strategic convergence. Moreover, disruptions caused by the COVID-19 and ongoing geopolitical tensions have exposed the vulnerabilities of overconcentrated supply chains, particularly those linked to China. This has prompted both countries to prioritise diversification and resilience as core strategic objectives. By institutionalising cooperation in this domain—through joint investments, technology sharing, and coordinated policy frameworks—India and Australia can reduce dependency risks while enhancing economic security. Furthermore, integrating critical minerals into the broader India–Australia strategic partnership elevates their cooperation beyond traditional defence and maritime concerns, positioning it at the forefront of 21st-century geoeconomic competition. In this sense, supply chain collaboration is not merely an economic necessity but a strategic imperative that reinforces their shared vision of a stable, secure, and resilient Indian Ocean Region.

Policy documents such as Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy underscore this shift, identifying India as a “top-tier partner” and highlighting the Indian Ocean as a primary area of military interest. At the same time, uncertainties surrounding U.S. commitment to the region—evident in its limited military presence and evolving strategic focus—have prompted Australia to diversify its security partnerships.

The AUKUS framework, while significant, is largely oriented toward the Pacific theatre. This creates a strategic gap in the Indian Ocean, one that can be effectively addressed through deeper engagement with India. By aligning their strategic priorities, both countries can mitigate vulnerabilities and enhance regional stability.

Toward Institutionalised Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

Despite growing convergence, India–Australia cooperation in the Indian Ocean remains under-institutionalised. Existing mechanisms—such as joint naval exercises, dialogue platforms, and cooperation within the Indian Ocean Rim Association—provide a foundation but lack the depth and coordination required to address emerging challenges.

Institutionalisation requires moving beyond episodic collaboration toward structured frameworks with clearly defined objectives, resource commitments, and implementation mechanisms. This could include joint maritime domain awareness systems, coordinated infrastructure investments in third countries, and integrated supply chain resilience initiatives. A critical next step in institutionalising India–Australia cooperation lies in operationalising a joint framework for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and coordinated security architecture across the Indian Ocean Region. Both India and Australia possess complementary capabilities—India with its extensive network of coastal radar systems and information fusion centres, and Australia with advanced surveillance technologies and strong linkages with Pacific and Southeast Asian partners. Integrating these capabilities through real-time data sharing, joint monitoring mechanisms, and coordinated patrols could significantly enhance situational awareness across critical sea lanes. Such cooperation would not only improve responses to traditional threats like piracy, trafficking, and illegal fishing but also address emerging challenges such as grey-zone activities and strategic encroachment by extra-regional powers. Recent initiatives, including India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), provide a strong foundation for this collaboration, but their potential remains underutilised without deeper Australian integration. Additionally, expanding trilateral or minilateral formats involving key littoral states—such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and France (given its territories in the Indian Ocean)—could further strengthen this architecture. However, the success of such initiatives will depend on building trust, ensuring interoperability, and aligning strategic priorities across partners. Institutionalising MDA cooperation would thus represent a tangible and actionable step toward transforming India–Australia relations from a declaratory partnership into a functional security provider framework, capable of shaping outcomes in one of the world’s most strategically contested maritime spaces.

Recent developments offer a conducive environment for such efforts. The growing relevance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, increased frequency of India–Australia bilateral exercises like AUSINDEX, and shared concerns over critical minerals and technology supply chains provide avenues for deeper collaboration. However, challenges remain. Differences in strategic culture, capacity asymmetries, and bureaucratic inertia can hinder progress. Additionally, both countries must navigate their respective relationships with other major powers, particularly the United States, without undermining their bilateral partnership. Ultimately, the success of institutionalisation will depend on political will, sustained engagement, and the ability to align long-term strategic objectives. A joint India–Australia roadmap for the Indian Ocean—backed by concrete commitments—could serve as a transformative step in this direction.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean Region is emerging as a decisive arena in the evolving global order, where economic flows, strategic competition, and geopolitical alignments intersect. In this dynamic environment, the partnership between India and Australia holds the potential to shape the region’s future trajectory. The imperative is clear: ad hoc cooperation is no longer sufficient. Institutionalised frameworks are essential to ensure continuity, coherence, and strategic impact. By working together as resident powers, India and Australia can uphold a favourable balance of power, deter coercion, and contribute to a stable and inclusive regional order. Yet, this partnership must be grounded in pragmatism and foresight. It must address not only traditional security concerns but also emerging challenges such as supply chain resilience, climate security, and technological governance. The coming years will test whether India and Australia can translate strategic convergence into sustained collaboration.

Looking ahead, the sustainability of India–Australia cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region will depend significantly on their ability to integrate non-traditional security domains into their strategic framework. Issues such as climate change, maritime environmental degradation, and disaster resilience are becoming increasingly central to regional stability, particularly for vulnerable littoral states. The Indian Ocean is witnessing rising sea levels, intensifying cyclones, and ecological stress on critical marine ecosystems, all of which have direct implications for economic security and human livelihoods. Both India and Australia possess considerable expertise in disaster response, climate adaptation, and sustainable resource management, creating a strong foundation for collaborative leadership in these areas. Expanding joint initiatives in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), blue economy projects, and climate-resilient infrastructure can enhance their credibility as responsible regional stakeholders. Furthermore, such cooperation offers a less contentious avenue for engagement with smaller Indian Ocean states, allowing India and Australia to build trust and goodwill without triggering geopolitical anxieties. Recent Quad-led initiatives on climate resilience and infrastructure sustainability further reinforce the importance of embedding environmental considerations into strategic planning. By aligning their security objectives with developmental and environmental priorities, India and Australia can contribute to a more holistic and inclusive vision of regional order—one that goes beyond power balancing to address the underlying drivers of instability in the Indian Ocean Region.
If successful, their partnership could serve as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific stability—demonstrating how middle powers, through coordination and commitment, can navigate great power competition and shape a more balanced and resilient regional order.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress