On January 3, 2026, the United States of America conducted a military operation in Venezuela, reigniting debates far beyond the American continents, reaching the Taiwan Strait. Operation Absolute Resolve — that resulted in the detention of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro along with his wife. Capturing him was the outcome of a long-term information gathering, planning and preparation that includes special operations forces in the ground. However, the US is no stranger to conducting such operations. 150 aircraft conducted these large-scale strikes on several targets in Venezuelan capital city, Caracas. Following the operation, the US President Donald Trump announced that, “We’re going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition”, signalling its active role in managing Venezuela’s political shift.
In September 2025, tensions between Trump and Maduro deteriorated when the US forces targeted vessels off the coast of Venezuela, leaving more than 100 people dead. However, that was not the only incident. From then on, the US carried out numerous strikes on vessels that it believed were carrying drugs into the country. The US administration accused Venezuela of being involved in drug smuggling, which Maduro’s government had clearly denied. According to AP news media report, “Maduro faces federal charges in the Southern District of New York dating back to March 2020: narco-terrorism conspiracy, conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, and weapons offenses related to machineguns and destructive devices.” Notably, Maduro stated in a past interview that “the US wants to force a government change in Venezuela and gain access to its vast oil reserves” and the drug-smuggling narrative is just a pretext for intervention. Venezuela was ready to negotiate with the US on combating drug-trafficking, but the US administration had already made up its mind about how to handle the situation.
While the US interpreted launching its operation against Nicolás Maduro as necessary for the US security and regional stability, its strategic implications have been perceived differently worldwide. Uruguay and Chile voiced their concern. Brazil’s President Lula criticized the US intervention, posting on social media that “attacking countries, in flagrant violation of international law, is the first step toward a world of violence, chaos, and instability.” However, it immediately recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s new leader. Cuba characterized it as a “criminal assault.” Moreover, American civil society has been polarized, with people supporting the strike while others criticizing its own government. China and Russia, both the countries were critical of the US operation and shocked by the scale of the strikes.
Both Russia and China were among the largest foreign partners leveraging Venezuela’s oil sector. This growing dependence had raised concerns in Washington. Beyond the notion of “seeking greater leverage over its oil,” the US was also concerned about the deepening presence of China, Russia, and other outside powers in Venezuelan soil. Now, with the US strikes, however, the strategic equation has shifted.
Venezuela’s ambassador to the UN, Samuel Moncada stated that, “If the kidnapping of a head of state, the bombing of a sovereign country, and the open threat of further armed actions are tolerated or downplayed, the message sent to the world is devastating: namely, that the law is optional and that force is the true arbiter of international relations.” He also said that “other countries cannot afford to look the other way” and “accepting that logic would mean opening the door to a profoundly unstable world.”
The question now circulating among policy circles is whether this demonstration of the US power and influence has unintentionally created a strategic opening for China to re-think its policies toward Taiwan.
But are the situations in Venezuela and Taiwan truly comparable?
According to experts, the two situations are fundamentally incomparable. To begin with, Venezuela is a sovereign state. It faces internal political crisis, economic breakdown, and struggle for leadership, leaving it exposed to external pressure. These internal challenges have not only weakened state institutions but also limit Caracas’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty. As a result, external actors have found a fertile ground to intervene under the justification of security or stability concerns.
On the other hand, Taiwan’s situation is different, not to mention being far more complex. Although it is governed independently as the Republic of China (ROC), with its own democratic institutions, military, and effective control over its territory, but does not hold widespread diplomatic recognition needed to be considered as a separate state. China does not evaluate Taiwan through the same lens that many international commentators have used in the Venezuelan case. China sees Taiwan as an inseparable part of Chinese territory; hence, it is more like an internal matter and that cannot be compared to Venezuela. This framing places the issue of Taiwan within the realm of its sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than an external intervention. Because of this, Beijing views any external involvement in Taiwan as an interference in its domestic affairs, rather than a similar to regime change or security operations conducted abroad.
What would happen if China attempted a similar move against Taiwan?
China has officially condemned the US operation. However, on Chinese social media, narratives has been spreading on recovering Taiwan. Users went on to suggest using the same process as the US to recover Taiwan. Somewhat unexpectedly, the US operation on Venezuela has turned into a model of intervention. Moreover, some statements made by certain Chinese military experts indicate that segments of the security establishment view military options against Taiwan as increasingly achievable under specific conditions. One such Chinese military affairs expert, Fu Qianshao, commented that “Taiwan must consider whether it could evade a similar operation by the Chinese military”, adding that the short distance between Taiwan and China would give Taiwanese forces less response time than Venezuela had. Nevertheless, these views coexist with significant caution within China’s leadership. China does not require a US operation against a foreign state as a precedent to act on a territory that it considers as its own. The political, economic, and escalation risks of such an operation remain a crucial point to Beijing’s strategic decision-making. Taiwan is well within China’s military reach, but capability is not the same as the cost.Taiwan has a modern military, a politically mobilized population, and strong domestic legitimacy rooted in democratic governance with the aim to strengthening resilience and deterrence. Only last year, Chiu Chui-cheng, the cabinet-ranked head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, warned that “if Taiwan were to be taken over by China by force, it will trigger a domino effect, undermine the regional balance of power, and directly threaten the security and prosperity of the United States.” In a way, Taiwan is counting on support from the current US administration.
Hypothetically, if China were ever to attempt a similar operation against Taiwan, the consequences would be severe and largely predictable. Immediately after such an operation, it would trigger a regional and international response, including swift diplomatic backlash from many Western nations, as well as neighbouring states like India, Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners. There is intentional ambiguity surrounding the US policy in such a situation, making its actions difficult to predict. Nonetheless, Beijing would face almost certain economic retaliation in the form of sanctions. This is particularly evident given the risks of export controls, disruptions to trade and financial markets, especially in light of Taiwan’s central role in global semiconductor supply chains. Any escalation in the Taiwan or the wide surrounding maritime passages would severely disrupt global trade and financial markets to a large extent. While the US operation in Venezuela disrupted energy markets, a similar operation in Taiwan would not only disrupt semiconductor supply chains but potentially disturb trade and finance, as well as technology markets worldwide.
Hypothetically or not, the international community would certainly react, at the very least. But the US and China apparently do not hold the same kind of international weight and reputation, nor do any two countries. Both are undoubtedly global powers with different forms and levels of influence. The US has the most capable military power, with a global network of alliances, multiple overseas bases, and the ability to project force frequently across regions. Over the past two decades, it has used military operations repeatedly beyond its borders and removed leaders. Yet, it has rarely faced sanctions and has largely retained its status with significant international legitimacy. In contrast, China’s influence is mostly economic, driven by its role as a major trading partner for many countries.
Viewed through this angle, the US operation in Venezuela does not dramatically “open a pathway” for China to attack on Taiwan. There is no doubt that it has sharpened debates and rhetorical comparisons. However, rather than serving as a model or blueprint, the operation explicitly emphasizes how power projection is interpreted differently depending on context, legitimacy, and consequences. For China, Taiwan remains governed by its own strategic realm, not by precedents set elsewhere. The real takeaway is that such actions do not invite replication, but potentially send worldwide signals about the balance of power and how international law is, perhaps selectively overlooked in practice by dominant states.
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About the Author
Trishnakhi Parashar is an enthusiastic and dedicated learner with a Master’s degree in International Relations/Politics from Sikkim Central University. Her academic journey is further enriched by a certification in Human Rights and Duties, a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management from Tezpur University, and a Diploma in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Indian Institute of Governance and Leadership.
Having begun her career at Tech Mahindra, Trishnakhi transitioned into the research field to pursue her deep-rooted passion for international affairs. She is currently interning at Global Strategic and Defence News, where she continues to refine her analytical skills. Her core interests include international relations, terrorism, diplomacy, and geopolitics—fields she explores with rigor and critical insight. Trishnakhi is committed to meticulous research and driven by a determination to contribute meaningfully to global discourse. With a vision to carve out her own niche, she aspires to leave a lasting impact on contemporary international issues.
Women, War, and Separatist Politics: Source Internet
Introduction
Armed conflicts and separatist movements have historically been narrated through masculinized frameworks of power, strategy, and territorial control. Yet, as Cynthia Enloe reminds us, “the personal is international,” underscoring how global political processes are deeply embedded in gendered hierarchies. Women in conflict zones are not merely collateral victims of war; they are simultaneously targets, survivors, combatants, and peacebuilders within structures shaped predominantly by male political decision-making. Contemporary conflicts—from the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza to protracted ethnic tensions in South Asia—demonstrate that war is experienced in profoundly gendered ways. According to recent UN assessments (2024–2025), women and children constitute a significant majority of displaced populations globally, with acute shortages of reproductive healthcare, menstrual hygiene products, and livelihood access intensifying their vulnerability. These realities compel a rethinking of separatism and armed resistance not as gender-neutral phenomena, but as deeply gendered political processes that reshape women’s identities, agency, and political consciousness.
This article interrogates how separatist conflicts both constrain and catalyze women’s political roles, asking whether spaces within ethno-nationalist movements inadvertently create conditions for feminist assertion or merely reproduce patriarchal control under militant structures. It comparatively examines three contexts: the plight of Palestinian women in Gaza amid protracted occupation and renewed cycles of violence; the Sri Lankan separatist movement, particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), where women were mobilized as fighters within a rigid ideological framework; and the Meitei–Kuki conflict in Manipur, where women have emerged as protest leaders, community defenders, and, at times, symbols of ethnic nationalism. While these cases differ in geography and political trajectory, they converge in revealing how women navigate the dual burden of communal allegiance and gender subordination. As bell hooks argued, “Feminism is a struggle to end sexist oppression,” yet in conflict zones this struggle is often subsumed within larger nationalist imperatives. By analyzing women as victims, perpetrators, negotiators, and agents of resistance, this article situates gender not at the margins but at the core of separatist politics, highlighting how war simultaneously entrenches patriarchy and opens contested spaces for feminist rearticulation in fragile societies.
Fighting, Femininity, and the Frontlines: Rethinking Resistance Through a Gendered Lens
Conflict and resistance are rarely gender-neutral phenomena; rather, they are embedded within deeply entrenched social hierarchies that define who is expected to fight, who is expected to suffer, and whose violence is considered legitimate. Before engaging specific case studies, it is essential to interrogate why a gender-sensitive lens is indispensable in analyzing conflict. This inquiry must move beyond empathy or romanticized portrayals of women as symbolic victims and instead critically examine the structural conditions that shape their participation, marginalization, and representation. As Cynthia Enloe asserts in Bananas, Beaches and Bases, understanding militarism requires asking where women are—economically, socially, and politically—and how their labor and bodies sustain systems of conflict. Her call to adopt a holistic lens challenges the persistent assumption that war is primarily a masculine enterprise, relegating women to passive or secondary roles.
Contemporary conflicts reinforce the urgency of this analytical shift. In Gaza (2024–2025), women not only bear the brunt of displacement and humanitarian collapse but also emerge as journalists, medics, and grassroots organizers documenting and resisting violence. In Ukraine, women constitute a significant and growing segment of the armed forces, reshaping traditional perceptions of combat roles. Similarly, in Sudan’s ongoing civil war, women’s groups have mobilized peace campaigns despite being disproportionately targeted by gender-based violence. These examples demonstrate that women’s participation in war cannot be reduced to narratives of victimhood or emotional reaction.
Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, in Mothers, Monsters, Whores, critique how female combatants are framed through narrow archetypes—either as grieving mothers seeking revenge, irrational “monsters,” or hypersexualized deviants. Such representations deny women political agency and obscure their ideological commitments. Violence, strategy, and militaristic decision-making are conventionally coded as masculine traits, reinforcing patriarchal assumptions about bravery, rationality, and leadership. Consequently, when women take up arms or assert authority within resistance movements, their actions are often stigmatized rather than analyzed as expressions of political consciousness.
These gendered constructions influence not only societal perceptions but also operational realities in “fight or flight” scenarios. The expectation that men fight and women endure perpetuates unequal burdens and obscures the complex motivations driving women’s engagement in conflict—whether as combatants, supporters, negotiators, or dissenters. By deconstructing these assumptions, a gendered analysis does not merely add women into existing frameworks; it challenges the foundational premises of how resistance, legitimacy, and power are defined in conflict zones worldwide.
Gaza and the Gendered Burden of War: Survival, Agency, and Silenced Voices
The ongoing war in Gaza since October 7, 2023, offers a stark illustration of how conflict is profoundly gendered in both its violence and its expectations. Women are symbolically framed as those to be “protected”—a trope embedded in the chivalric logic of “women and children first”—yet in practice they constitute a disproportionate share of casualties and displaced populations. UN Women and humanitarian agencies have repeatedly warned that thousands of women have been killed, injured, or rendered homeless, while millions face acute food insecurity and collapsing healthcare systems. As one humanitarian worker observed in 2024, “There is no safe place for women in Gaza.” The contradiction between symbolic protection and lived vulnerability exposes the fragility of patriarchal narratives in wartime.
Beyond victimhood, Palestinian women occupy multiple, often invisible roles: frontline medics, journalists, community organizers, and heads of households in the absence of male relatives. Reports from 2024–2025 highlight severe shortages of menstrual products, prenatal care, and safe childbirth facilities, with hundreds of women giving birth daily under bombardment and displacement. As a displaced Gazan woman told a relief agency, “Our periods have become a nightmare.” Simultaneously, women’s organizations continue advocacy and documentation efforts, asserting political voice amid devastation. Gaza thus reveals not only the suffering of women in war but also their resilience and contested agency within deeply gendered structures of conflict.
From Victims to Combatants: Women, Militancy, and the Politics of Armed Agency
The question of why women take up arms disrupts the deeply embedded assumption that war is an exclusively masculine enterprise. Feminist scholarship has long argued that women are not merely passive victims of violence but political actors capable of choice, strategy, and ideological commitment. As Cynthia Enloe famously asks, “Where are the women?”—a question that compels analysts to look beyond battlefields dominated by male imagery and toward the complex motivations that draw women into armed struggle. Similarly, Laura Sjoberg contends that women’s political violence is often dismissed as emotional deviation rather than recognized as “a conscious engagement with power.” Understanding female militancy, therefore, requires moving beyond sensationalism toward structural analysis.
Contemporary global conflicts reaffirm this urgency. In Ukraine, women now serve in combat and command roles within the armed forces, challenging entrenched gender hierarchies in military institutions. In Kurdish regions of Syria, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) have become internationally recognized symbols of female armed resistance against ISIS. Meanwhile, in Myanmar’s post-2021 resistance movement, women constitute a visible segment of People’s Defence Forces, often citing state repression and lack of alternatives as catalysts for participation. These examples echo Jennifer Eggert’s framework, which highlights three critical factors influencing women’s militarization: the intensity of military pressure, shortages of male manpower, and the absence of effective external mediation.
The Sri Lankan civil war offers a striking historical case. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) institutionalized female combat units, at times comprising nearly half of its cadre. While propaganda framed participation as emancipation—promising escape from domestic confinement and the creation of a gender-equal Tamil Eelam—numerous testimonies reveal patterns of forced recruitment, especially of adolescent girls. Memoirs and human rights reports document abductions, coercion, and the irreversible nature of enlistment. One former recruit recalled that joining felt like “a one-way door—entry but not exit,” capturing the tension between agency and compulsion.
The romanticization of female fighters—portrayed as heroic, disciplined, and ideologically pure—often obscured the brutality of war and the manipulation embedded within militant structures. As global conflicts continue to evolve, the phenomenon of women taking up arms must be examined not as anomaly or spectacle, but as a politically conditioned outcome of militarization, survival, and contested promises of liberation.
Torchbearers in Turmoil: Gendered Violence and Women’s Resistance in Manipur
The ethnic violence that engulfed Manipur in May 2023 exposed not only deep-rooted communal fractures between the Meitei and Kuki communities but also the profoundly gendered nature of conflict. The viral video of two Kuki women being stripped, paraded, and sexually assaulted in Thoubal district shocked the nation, prompting widespread outrage and renewed scrutiny of state accountability. As one survivor recounted in testimony reported by national media, the mob treated them “as if we were not human.” The brutality underscored a recurring truth in conflict zones: women’s bodies become symbolic battlegrounds upon which notions of honor, revenge, and community dominance are violently inscribed.
Yet, the Manipuri context also reveals a complex and layered story of women’s political engagement. Historically, women in Manipur have not remained confined to passive victimhood. The Meira Paibis—literally “women torchbearers”—emerged in the 1980s as a grassroots civil society movement confronting militarization, substance abuse, and human rights violations. Their activism gained global attention in 2004 when elderly Manipuri women staged a nude protest against the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), declaring, “Indian Army, rape us too,” in a searing indictment of custodial violence. In the current crisis (2023–2025), Meira Paibis have resumed night patrols, organized relief for displaced families, and pressured authorities for justice, even as the conflict remains unresolved and sporadic violence continues.
Recent reports indicate ongoing displacement, internet shutdowns, and fragmented peace initiatives, reflecting the fragile security situation in 2025. Within this volatile landscape, women occupy contradictory roles—simultaneously survivors of targeted sexual violence and agents of community mobilization. The Manipuri case therefore challenges simplistic binaries of victim and protector, revealing how gendered violence can provoke both trauma and organized resistance. In the shadow of state inertia and communal polarization, Manipuri women continue to negotiate survival, dignity, and political voice in a deeply fractured society.
From Armed Virgins to Silenced Survivors: Femininity, Militancy, and Aftermath in Sri Lanka
The transformation of Tamil women within the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) raises a critical question: where does femininity go in times of war? Traditionally, femininity in Sri Lankan Tamil society was associated with modesty, restraint, domesticity, and social conformity. Women were respected yet confined—expected to embody silence and poise within patriarchal structures. However, the militarization of women during the Sri Lankan civil war fundamentally disrupted these gendered expectations. As Erin Alexander notes in Women of War, the LTTE’s inclusion of women redefined the Tamil woman from a “nurturing wife” to what was termed the “Armed Virgin”—a disciplined, androgynous, weapon-bearing nationalist figure.
The symbolic cutting of long hair upon recruitment was not merely aesthetic; it marked ideological rebirth and the blurring of gender lines. As Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity suggests, gender is not innate but enacted through repeated practices. The female LTTE cadre, clad in camouflage and carrying AK-47s, performed a new gendered identity that challenged the binary of passive femininity versus aggressive masculinity. One former cadre, Tamilini, reflected that women’s participation in war transformed perceptions of shyness and dependence, replacing them with confidence and authority. Yet, as feminist scholars caution, participation in militarism does not automatically dismantle patriarchy; it often reconfigures it.
Globally, similar patterns persist. In post-ISIS Iraq and Syria, former female fighters struggle with reintegration and stigma. In Colombia, ex-FARC women have reported marginalization despite peace accords promising gender inclusion. Sri Lanka mirrors this trajectory. Today, more than a decade after the war ended in 2009, reports from human rights groups in 2024–2025 indicate that former female LTTE cadres continue to face surveillance, economic precarity, and social ostracization. Many conceal their pasts to avoid discrimination. A former fighter told The Washington Post, “I feel I could have been a leader, but now I must ask for money to leave the house,” capturing the painful regression from militant agency to enforced dependency.
Thus, the promise of emancipation through armed struggle proved paradoxical. The women who once embodied revolutionary heroism now navigate PTSD, unemployment, and patriarchal reintegration. Their journey underscores a sobering reality: while war can temporarily unsettle gender hierarchies, post-conflict societies often restore traditional norms, leaving female combatants suspended between empowerment and exclusion.
This paradox is not confined to Sri Lanka but resonates across contemporary post-conflict societies, where the demobilization of women often coincides with their political marginalization. In Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power, women who once served in security forces or civil administration were systematically erased from public life, forced into invisibility despite years of institutional participation. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, women who engaged in community defense and resistance during the civil war now confront trauma, displacement, and limited reintegration support amid fragile peace negotiations. Similarly, in Colombia—despite the gender-sensitive provisions of the 2016 peace accord—female ex-combatants of the FARC continue to report economic insecurity and stigmatization, with many excluded from meaningful political participation. Even in Ukraine, where women’s combat roles have expanded since 2022, analysts warn that post-war reconstruction may reassert traditional gender norms unless institutional safeguards are embedded early. These global patterns reinforce a central argument of this study: separatist and insurgent movements may temporarily destabilize patriarchal hierarchies by enabling women’s militarized visibility, but without sustained structural transformation, post-conflict societies frequently re-domesticate women into conventional roles. The trajectory from fighter to marginalized civilian thus exposes the unfinished and deeply contested project of gender justice within nationalist and separatist struggles worldwide.
Conclusion: Women and the Architecture of Sustainable Peace
Post-conflict reconstruction, viewed through a feminist theoretical lens, is not merely a technical process of rebuilding institutions and infrastructure; it is a transformative political project that determines whose voices shape the future of a society. Women in post-conflict settings occupy a paradoxical position—simultaneously bearing the disproportionate burdens of war and emerging as indispensable agents of recovery, reconciliation, and reform. Their experiences of trauma, displacement, economic dispossession, and gender-based violence are not isolated hardships but structural consequences of militarized and patriarchal systems. Addressing these layered vulnerabilities is therefore central to preventing conflict relapse and ensuring durable peace.
Meaningful reconstruction requires more than symbolic inclusion. It demands psychosocial support, access to education and healthcare, economic opportunities, land and property rights, and genuine political participation. Women’s leadership in peacebuilding processes enhances social trust, strengthens community cohesion, and integrates gender-responsive priorities into governance frameworks. International mandates such as UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 have institutionalized the recognition that gender equality is inseparable from international peace and security, reinforcing the obligation of states and non-state actors to combat conflict-related sexual violence and expand women’s decision-making roles.
Ultimately, sustainable peace is contingent upon inclusive governance and gender-just reconstruction. Empowering women through economic agency, legal reform, and institutional representation transforms post-conflict societies from fragile ceasefires into resilient political communities. Recognizing women not only as survivors but as architects of peace is essential for achieving equitable development, restorative justice, and long-term stability.
Aid diplomacy has emerged as a central instrument of contemporary statecraft, enabling states to project influence, cultivate goodwill, and secure strategic interests. In South Asia, India’s engagement with its eastern neighbours—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—illustrates a calibrated blend of developmental partnership and geopolitical strategy. Rooted in deep historical, cultural, and economic linkages, India’s neighbourhood policy increasingly relies on development cooperation to promote regional stability and shared prosperity.
India’s aid diplomacy in the eastern sub-region is shaped by three interrelated imperatives. First, the stagnation of SAARC and persistent India–Pakistan tensions have shifted New Delhi’s focus from broad regionalism to sub-regional frameworks such as BBIN (Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal). These arrangements prioritize functional cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and economic integration. Second, China’s expanding footprint through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has intensified geopolitical competition, compelling India to offer an alternative development model emphasizing demand-driven assistance, capacity-building, and relatively fewer political conditionalities. Third, development cooperation serves India’s security interests by addressing transnational challenges including migration, energy insecurity, border instability, and climate vulnerabilities. While India projects itself as a development partner rather than a traditional donor, its aid diplomacy remains closely aligned with strategic concerns. Balancing geopolitical competition with genuine partnership constitutes the core challenge of India’s eastern engagement.
Patterns of Aid Allocation and Geostrategic Drivers
Between 2003 and 2023, India allocated approximately ₹57,884 crore in grants and assistance to Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Bhutan received the largest share—nearly 75 percent—reflecting the depth of bilateral trust and institutionalized cooperation, particularly in hydropower development. Bangladesh received a comparatively smaller grant share but benefited from growing Lines of Credit and infrastructure investments, especially after 2013, when China expanded its economic footprint.
Bhutan’s dominant allocation underscores India’s long-standing strategic partnership. The India–Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement (1972, renewed in 2016) institutionalized free trade and transit access. Hydropower cooperation—covering projects such as Chukha, Tala, Mangdechhu, and Punatsangchhu—anchors the economic relationship. Electricity exports to India constitute a major portion of Bhutan’s revenue, embedding deep economic interdependence.
In Nepal, aid allocations fluctuated alongside geopolitical developments. Following China’s increased engagement under BRI and President Xi Jinping’s 2019 visit to Kathmandu, India expanded assistance to reaffirm its role as Nepal’s primary development partner. Infrastructure, post-earthquake reconstruction, and cross-border transmission lines became focal points.
Myanmar’s aid trajectory corresponds closely with political transitions and border security concerns. Democratic reforms after 2011 saw expanded Indian cooperation, particularly in connectivity and border development. Following renewed instability after 2021, India adopted a pragmatic approach—maintaining development engagement to preserve border stability and safeguard strategic projects.
Overall, India’s aid allocation patterns reveal strategic responsiveness. Assistance increases during periods of heightened Chinese involvement or political instability, demonstrating that development cooperation functions as an instrument of geopolitical calibration.
BBIN and Sub-Regional Reorientation
The paralysis of SAARC since 2014 prompted India to pivot toward sub-regionalism. BBIN emerged as a pragmatic alternative, allowing functional cooperation in connectivity, transport, and energy without broader political deadlocks. A core objective is integrating India’s North Eastern Region (NER) with neighbouring economies. Historically isolated yet strategically vital, the NER connects India to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and China. Aid-funded infrastructure projects aim to transform the region into a gateway linking South Asia with Southeast Asia under the Act East Policy.
India–Bangladesh connectivity has advanced significantly. Restoration of pre-1965 rail links, operationalization of the Akhaura–Agartala railway, inland water transit routes, and the Maitri Setu bridge have reduced logistical barriers. Access to Chattogram and Mongla ports enables northeastern states to access sea routes, lowering transportation costs. The BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement, operational among Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, facilitates cargo movement despite Bhutan’s pending ratification.
With Myanmar, projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway seek to link the NER with Southeast Asia. India has also funded border development initiatives in Chin State and the Naga Self-Administered Zone to manage insurgency risks and migration flows.
In Bhutan, hydropower cooperation, customs modernization, and proposed rail connectivity reinforce deep economic integration. India’s support for BIMSTEC complements BBIN by embedding sub-regionalism within a broader Bay of Bengal framework. Sub-regionalism thus functions as both developmental strategy and geopolitical instrument—enabling India to consolidate influence while counterbalancing external actors.
Energy Diplomacy and Regional Grid Integration
Energy cooperation represents one of the most consequential pillars of India’s eastern diplomacy. Cross-border power trade has evolved into a mechanism of structural interdependence linking Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and India within an emerging regional electricity market.
India–Bangladesh energy ties expanded following the 2013 Power Purchase Agreement. Bangladesh now imports over 1,000 MW from India through multiple interconnections. The Maitree Super Thermal Power Project at Rampal further institutionalized cooperation. Significantly, Bangladesh began importing Nepali hydropower via India’s grid—marking South Asia’s first trilateral electricity trade arrangement and a milestone for BBIN energy integration.
Nepal and Bhutan possess vast hydropower potential—approximately 40 GW and 23 GW respectively. India has invested heavily in transmission lines such as the Muzaffarpur–Dhalkebar corridor, enabling Nepal to export surplus monsoon electricity. By 2024–2025, Nepal increasingly utilized the Indian Energy Exchange for cross-border trade, generating valuable foreign exchange earnings. Bhutan’s hydropower cooperation remains the bedrock of bilateral relations. However, cost overruns and rising debt have sparked debates in Bhutan regarding economic dependence and financing models. India’s gradual shift from grant-based assistance to loan financing has introduced new sensitivities.
From India’s perspective, hydropower imports diversify renewable energy sources, support decarbonization goals, and reduce the need for politically contentious dams in its Northeast. Acting as a transmission hub enhances India’s centrality within the regional energy architecture. Nevertheless, climate change, glacial melt, and basin-level ecological concerns complicate hydropower geopolitics. Long-term sustainability will require equitable financial models and transparent water governance mechanisms.
Economic Integration and Digital Statecraft
India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion. In Nepal, India supported constitutional transitions and continues engagement amid coalition volatility. High-level exchanges in 2023–2025, cooperation on parliamentary training, and assistance in infrastructure and energy projects reflect India’s preference for institutional continuity despite frequent government changes in Kathmandu. In Bhutan, India assisted the 2008 democratic transition and continues institutional capacity-building, including digital governance cooperation and parliamentary exchanges following Bhutan’s 2023–2024 electoral cycle. Myanmar presents a complex case: after the 2021 military coup, India adopted a calibrated approach—advocating restoration of democracy while maintaining engagement to secure border stability, manage refugee inflows into Manipur and Mizoram, and protect connectivity projects such as the Kaladan corridor. Additionally, India has participated in ASEAN-led consultations on Myanmar and provided humanitarian assistance to affected populations, reflecting its dual-track policy of democratic advocacy and strategic engagement.
In Bangladesh, India emphasized constitutional continuity following the January 2024 general elections, reiterating support for democratic processes while deepening cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and security coordination. The operationalization of cross-border railway links, expansion of power trade exceeding 1,000 MW, and collaboration on coastal shipping agreements underline the interlinkage between governance stability and economic integration. Counterterrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing remain central, particularly given concerns over extremism and cross-border insurgent networks. India has also expanded election management training and capacity-building programs for officials from neighbouring countries under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) framework, alongside digital public goods cooperation such as the rollout of UPI-based payment connectivity and digital identity partnerships. Across the region, New Delhi increasingly links governance assistance with digital public infrastructure, e-governance platforms, and institutional modernization. India’s democratisation strategy thus reflects pragmatic liberalism—supporting representative institutions and governance reforms while simultaneously safeguarding strategic interests, border security, and regional stability in a fluid geopolitical environment.
Energy Geopolitics in the Bay of Bengal
The Bay of Bengal constitutes a critical maritime energy frontier. UNCLOS rulings in 2012 and 2014 resolved maritime delimitation disputes among Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India, reducing conflict risk and enabling offshore exploration. Bangladesh, confronting declining domestic gas reserves and rising LNG import costs after the global energy shocks triggered by the Ukraine conflict, has accelerated offshore bidding rounds and revised its Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) to attract foreign investment in deep-water blocks. India, under its Open Acreage Licensing Policy (OALP), has expanded exploration activities along its eastern offshore basin, encouraging greater participation by domestic and international energy firms. Meanwhile, China’s operationalization of the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines linking the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan province has added a strategic dimension, reducing Beijing’s dependence on the Malacca Strait while strengthening its presence in the eastern Indian Ocean.
India’s response integrates maritime diplomacy, energy cooperation, and security initiatives under its SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine. Cooperation with Bangladesh includes the operationalization of the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, expanded cross-border electricity trade, and growing coordination on LNG supply and coastal shipping. India has also intensified naval exercises, coordinated patrols, and maritime domain awareness sharing with Bangladesh and Myanmar to safeguard offshore energy assets and sea lanes of communication. Through BIMSTEC, India promotes regional frameworks for coastal shipping, grid interconnectivity, and blue economy collaboration. Although territorial disputes have largely subsided, the Bay of Bengal continues to function as a theatre of economic rivalry and strategic balancing, where energy security, maritime governance, and great-power competition remain deeply intertwined.
Democratisation and Political Stability
India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion.
India’s support for democratisation in its eastern neighbourhood reflects a blend of normative commitment and pragmatic security considerations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that stable democracies are less likely to engage in conflict; however, India’s approach prioritizes stability over ideological promotion. In Nepal, India supported constitutional transitions and continues engagement amid coalition volatility. High-level exchanges in 2023–2025, cooperation on parliamentary training, and assistance in infrastructure and energy projects reflect India’s preference for institutional continuity despite frequent government changes in Kathmandu. In Bhutan, India assisted the 2008 democratic transition and continues institutional capacity-building, including digital governance cooperation and parliamentary exchanges following Bhutan’s 2023–2024 electoral cycle. Myanmar presents a complex case: after the 2021 military coup, India adopted a calibrated approach—advocating restoration of democracy while maintaining engagement to secure border stability, manage refugee inflows into Manipur and Mizoram, and protect connectivity projects such as the Kaladan corridor.
In Bangladesh, India emphasized constitutional continuity following the January 2024 general elections, reiterating support for democratic processes while deepening cooperation in connectivity, energy trade, and security coordination. Counterterrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing remain central, particularly given concerns over extremism and cross-border insurgent networks. India has also expanded election management training and capacity-building programs for officials from neighbouring countries under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) framework. Across the region, New Delhi increasingly links governance assistance with digital public infrastructure, e-governance platforms, and institutional modernization. India’s democratisation strategy thus reflects pragmatic liberalism—supporting representative institutions and governance reforms while simultaneously safeguarding strategic interests, border security, and regional stability in a fluid geopolitical environment.
Conclusion
India’s aid diplomacy in its eastern neighbourhood represents a nuanced strategy that integrates development cooperation with geopolitical pragmatism. Through infrastructure development, energy integration, digital financial systems, and sub-regional frameworks such as BBIN and BIMSTEC, India has repositioned itself as a central stabilizing actor in eastern South Asia. Aid allocation patterns demonstrate strategic responsiveness, particularly amid China’s expanding regional presence. Cross-border power trade and grid connectivity underscore India’s ambition to act as the energy hub of the sub-region. Meanwhile, economic integration through trade liberalization and Digital Public Infrastructure reflects evolving forms of economic statecraft.
Yet challenges remain. Bureaucratic delays, debt sustainability concerns, perceptions of asymmetry, climate vulnerabilities, and intensifying geopolitical competition complicate India’s neighbourhood policy. Sustaining credibility will require balancing strategic leadership with sensitivity to sovereignty and equitable partnership. As regional geopolitics grow increasingly complex in 2024–2025, India’s eastern aid diplomacy underscores a broader transformation: from traditional donor–recipient hierarchies toward structured interdependence. The long-term success of this model will depend on transparent governance, inclusive development, and India’s ability to harmonize strategic interests with the aspirations of its neighbours.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
As South Asia grapples with rising energy demand, climate commitments, and the need for regional cooperation, cross-border renewable energy partnerships are emerging as a crucial pillar of sustainable growth. India and Bhutan, long bound by cooperation in various fields and levels, are now extending their collaboration into the bright new domain of solar energy, marking a subtle but significant shift in the region’s clean energy landscape.
In lines with the national vision of ‘Neighbourhood First’, the India Power Corporation Limited (IPCL) has recently highlighted that it has formed a strategic collaboration with Bhutan’s Green Energy Power Private Limited to create a 70 MW solar power project in the neighbouring country’s Paro district. The project is part of the West Bengal-based power utility’s goal to install 1.5 GW of solar capacity in Bhutan over the next five years, according to a press statement.
Bhutan’s power consumption is predicted to get more than double in the next two years, led by initiatives like the Gelephu Mindfulness City, the rise of energy-intensive businesses like ferrosilicon, and increased demand from digital infrastructure and crypto-mining operations, according to the report. And while hydropower continues to dominate Bhutan’s energy mix, the government aims to reach 25,000 MW of installed power capacity by 2034, including 5,000 MW from solar energy.
According to IPCL, the Tenchuka location in Paro was chosen after a preliminary review of technical criteria. The project location is claimed to have approximately 200 acres of south-facing terrain with good solar irradiation and is located about 3.5 kilometers from the Jamjee 220/33 kV substation, thereby opening the doors to seamless power evacuation. Indeed, this project is not just a capacity addition, but rather reflective of India’s commitment to cross-border energy cooperation. This is in line with the country’s bigger goal of becoming a 1.5 GW solar player by 2030.
According to Tandi Dorji, founder of Green Energy Power Private Limited, this will be Bhutan’s first independent power producer (IPP) project. Bhutan is attracting increased attention from Indian powerhouses. Recently, Tata Power and Druk Green Power Corporation (DGPC) have joined hands and are progressing towards creating about 5,000 MW of clean energy projects, while Adani Power has inked an MoU with DGPC to explore hydropower potentials of up to 5,000 MW. Likewise, Reliance Power, in collaboration with Druk Holdings and Investments, is creating a 500 MW solar project and planning additional hydropower capacity.
IPCL, founded in 1919, is an integrated power company with interests in electricity distribution, smart metering, renewable energy, and thermal generating. The corporation has reported that renewable energy currently accounts for more than 70% of its portfolio.
This recent collaboration represents more than a single solar installation, as it reflects a gradual broadening of India–Bhutan energy cooperation in response to evolving demand patterns and climate priorities. As Bhutan looks to diversify its energy mix beyond hydropower and India advances its neighbourhood-first approach through renewable energy partnerships, such initiatives underline the strategic role of cross-border solar projects in shaping a resilient and sustainable regional energy architecture.
The geopolitical history of Spain has had a progression of selective steps, beginning with the central place in the first world empire, to its long-term isolation, and finally to the modern-day renaissance that has placed the country in an influential role in the European arena. The 1492 expedition of Christopher Columbus in effect gave Spain a monopoly to the new lands discovered in the Americas. The scale of the modern Spain relevance is established on the basis of the Treaty of Tordesillas signed on 7 June 1494, dividing the non-European territories between Spain and Portugal. This way, Spain was able to gain control of most part of the American continent, thus creating the foundation of a large transcontinental empire. The Spanish Empire later became the first real global polity enforcing its control over lands in North and South America, the archipelago of the Philippines, parts of Africa and Europe, such as the Dutch Republic and a number of Italian states. The Spanish military conquests in Europe as well as its economy and the Real de a Ocho, the first currency to circulate in the world were all funded and fueled by the presence of silver and gold deposits in Bolivian Potosí and Mexican mines.
But the heights of the Spanish hegemony faded away with the emergence of the rule of competing forces taking the form of the gradual decline of its territorial possessions, power as well as the hegemony. This phenomenon is captured in an African maxim, El que mucho abarca, poco aprieta, which means ‘’Has so much to hold, but little to squeeze’’ and is a useful summary of the overstretched imperialism of Spain. During the centuries, the Spanish Crown ruled a vast American empire concurrently, fought continental wars against France, Protestant Dutch and England as well as against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. This dispersion of resources, ambition and attention eventually led to its downfall as it exemplifies the real world example of geopolitical power when diluted to an undesirable extent loses its effectiveness.
The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) that ended the war of the Spanish Succession was a turning point in geopolitics of Europe. Spain in its turn had to hand over territorial property to Italy and the Netherlands, even more important to deliver the bases of naval strategic location Gibraltar and Menorca to the United Kingdom. This moved the balance of power in the Mediterranean theatre permanently. Another pivotal that can be considered the watershed moment in history is the attack of Spain by Napoleon, which caused a significant economic and social disaster on the territory of the country. Internal political instability that was rooted in the nineteenth century included civil wars, a stagnant economy and constant economic decline.
Spain did not industrialise in a similar way to Britain, France, and Germany hence hindering its status as a supplier of power in European matters. Spain adopted a policy of neutrality in the World War I, which can be explained by relatively weak military position of the country, antagonized by the constant struggles in Morocco, as well as its domestic political unsteadiness which did not allow active involvement in the war. The civil war in Spain (1936–1939) turned to be a proxy war as a foreshadowing of the beginning of the Second World War. Although Spain proclaimed its neutrality in World War 2, it changed sides and openly supported the Axis powers adopting a non-belligerent stance.
The cold war period also made Spain very diplomatically isolated; the state was not a participant in the United Nations, the Marshall plan, and the establishment of NATO and thus lost the perceived importance in international scene The Pact of Madrid (1953) institutionalised the sale of the land by Spain to establish the U.S. military bases in return on key economic and military aid, and the isolation of Spain came to an end, and the Franco rule was cemented. The peaceful shift to democracy in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975 tied the concept of geopolitical relevance in Spain fundamentally.
The Indispensable Pivot: Spain and the World Geopolitics.
Spain rarely appears in the vast list of world geopolitics as much as the United States, China, and Russia do. The most common argument presented by geopolitical experts explains the relative marginalisation by the absence of nuclear armaments and permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council.
However, Spain is a geopolitical key actor not because of its raw, military or economic power, but its strategic location, which can never be replicated, its critical connections with various continents and peoples, and the bargaining power it can exercise in the major institutions which create the twenty-first century brought its importance. Spain is on the crossroad of the most crucial geopolitical routes of the world since it is the gateway linking Europe and Africa to facing the core of the European Union and NATO. As a result, Spain has become an essential partner, a key node, and a frontline state that is facing numerous international issues, including security and defense, migration and energy.
The Geographic Pivot: Continents and Oceans Intersection
The most basic asset of Spain is the geography; it is not a geographical position but an intersection of sea and land networks. Alongside its enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, located on the North African coast, Spain shares control of the Strait of Gibraltar a key marine chokepoint in the world. In excess of over 100, 000 ships per annum pass through this narrow route, handling around 25 per cent of the world shipping. The security and control in this strait are one of the most vital issues in the whole international economy since the instability of this Gulf would have a cascading effect which would far outshine the effects seen in Suez Canal or the Red Sea. Spain is also a country with a major Atlantic and Mediterranean coast, the second one in the entirety, the other country is France. This two-sided positioning offers Spain as an excellent hub in maritime security in Europe. The geographical importance of this area is strategic because it is a military and geopolitical factor. The Navigable docking station Rota, is a Spanish-American station; one of the most vital naval bases in Europe. It is the hub of the U.S Navy 6th fleet and houses four of the Aegis armed destroyers that comprise the backbone of the NATO ballistic missile defense network over the European continent. With the assistance of Moron Air Base, the base gives Spain a strong structural power within the NATO alliance.
The European Leader: A Big Four Leader in Brussels. Spain has been transformed into a core participant of the European project since it joined the then European Economic Community in 1986 as a peripheral state. Since the exit of the United Kingdom, Spain is now considered one of the so-called Big Four in the European Union, along with Germany, France, and Italy. Being the fourth-largest economy in the Euro zone, the economic health and the decisions of the policies made by Spain, have a direct effect on the stability of the common currency.
Spain has a very delicate external border of the EU as the country has to cope with one of the most fluid migration paths; the western African, through the Canary Islands, and the western Mediterranean routes. This gives Spain a huge bargaining power in Brussels. The EU cannot do without cooperation with Spain that handles the whole migration policy with asylum issues and that has often used the position to the country’s advantage to obtain funding and political goodwill.
Spain is also turning out to be an important gas energy hub in Europe with the largest regasification capacity of liquefied natural gas (LNG) which has a value of about one-third of the total liquid natural gas capacity in the EU countries.
The Atlantic Bridge: TheHispanidad Vector of Latin America
The deep, unmatched and multidimensional relation with Latin America is the geopolitical resource peculiar to Spain. Spain occupies the key location of the Hispanosphere, a linguistic bloc with more than 580 million speakers of Spanish language and, thus, it is ranked as the second-most spoken native language in the world. The common language, combined with a deep culture and historical relationship, provides Spain with a rich amount of soft power and intrinsic sympathy, which facilitate a diplomatic and business interaction in the world arena.
In case of the European Union, Spain is the representative which interacts with Latin America on default terms. It is the leading advocate of strengthening the EU-Latin American relations, facilitates the trade agreements like the EU Mercosur one and directs the development help. In the process of dealing with the region, Madrid has often been consulted first when Brussels tries to do so. The Spanish corporations have powerful influence on the Latin American continent. Large companies like banking, Telefonos and energy workforce (Santander, Telefonos, and Repsol) have made the region a base of their international business. This enhanced integration economically ensures Spain an investment interest and a strong economic bargaining in not only the stability of the region but also, which also forms a significant political influence in the region.
The North African Frontier: A Complex and Critical Relationship
The relationships of Spain with its southern neighbors, in the Maghreb, most especially between Spain and Morocco, Spain and Algeria are probably the most complex, unstable and sensitive in terms of geopolitics. The relations with Morocco contain the main issues of migration and the territorial conflicts. The fact that Spain has been relying on Morocco to control the migration flows gives it substantial bargaining power which has been used to achieve political compromises through what has come to be known as the opening taps.
The Spanish strategic shift of recent days in support of the scenario of Moroccan autonomy, shifting its traditional stance of neutrality is seen as a geopolitical gangland act that may intervene the Spanish in convincing Morocco to join it in managing migration and permit them to resolve a diplomatic crisis. Along with mending relations with Morocco, Spain also broke the ties with Algeria, the other power of the region and the main rival of Morocco. Another example of what a high-risk balancing act would require Spain to carry out is the Algeria that is the source of much of its natural gas needs, balancing between its interests in energy security and the inter-regional competition of the two most significant southern neighbors. This Spanish policy is a southern one that makes Spain indispensable. This is referred as soft power and economic specialization.
The Spanish position in the world arena is characterized not only by the high level of soft power, but also by the high level of professional economy in the world. The nation is always in the list of top ten contributors of world soft power. This popularity can be minded by global popularity of its language, its globally renowned tourism sector, one of the most frequented destinations on planet Earth, its distinguished football clubs (Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) and its cultural exports in the form of film, cuisine and even arts. In addition to the tourist industry, Spain leads the quiet world on a number of major sectors with the renewable energy sector being one of them, giving particular focus to wind and solar energy.
Conclusion: The Indispensable ‘Pivotal Power’
The significance of Spain does not involve the urge to control but rather centrality. It happens to be the geographical hinge and as the institutional screw serving as part of the EU the consistent and consistent policy of the south, the cultural and economic pivot between Europe and Latin America, what cronies the military pivot of the whole NATO coalition. It is true that other power may be greater, but Spain roots and its tactics are more deeply implanted in the very problems and possibilities of our era. Disregarding Spain is tantamount to disregarding one of the geopolitical pinpoints of the world.
The Environment as a Global Security Issue: Source Internet
The Environment in Contemporary International Relations
Over the last few decades, concern over the international implications of large-scale environmental problems has begun to command the attention of policymakers. The landmark 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm discussed the right to a healthy and productive environment, including adequate food, safer water, and clean air. However, some progress has been made, notably in improving air and water quality in industrialized nations. But enormous problems remain to be solved and environmental deterioration in developing countries continues at an alarming rate, exacerbated by rapid urbanization, resource dependency, climate vulnerability, and limited institutional capacity to manage environmental risks effectively.
In the contemporary period, climate-induced disasters such as the 2022 floods in Pakistan, prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, and recurring wildfires in the United States, Canada, and Southern Europe have demonstrated how environmental degradation directly undermines economic stability, governance capacity, and human security. Is it possible to talk about the rise of a new global (dis)order founded on the challenges posed by environmental issus ? Recent geopolitical developments suggest that environmental stress is increasingly reshaping international politics, as seen in disputes over water-sharing arrangements such as the Nile River Basin, growing climate-related migration pressures in the Sahel and Central America, and the securitization of energy transitions amid global competition for critical minerals like lithium and rare earths.
Through the review of the state of the art on the subject, this article argues the growing importance of the environment, and natural resources in particular, in international relations; and aims to raise awareness among International Relations scholars to the potential positive impact of the development of the discipline in integration with global environmental change studies.. The increasing prominence of climate change within forums such as the UN Security Council debates, G20 summits, and COP negotiations further reinforces the argument that environmental issues are no longer peripheral but central to the contemporary global security agenda.
The Environment as a Multidimensional Issue and a Global Security Risk
Globalization, population growth, economic and social development, natural resource exploitation and scarcity, climate change, and rapid urbanization constitute the principal external drivers shaping the contemporary international system.In the Anthropocene—an era defined by humanity’s decisive impact on planetary systems—environmental sustainability has emerged not merely as a developmental concern but as a core global security imperative.
From an International Relations perspective, environmental risks are multidimensional because they simultaneously affect economic stability, political order, social cohesion, and state sovereignty. Climate change functions as a threat multiplier, intensifying existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as an isolated cause of conflict. Recent global examples illustrate this dynamic clearly: prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, climate-induced floods in Pakistan, and rising sea levels threatening small island states such as the Maldives and Tuvalu have undermined livelihoods, strained state capacity, and increased dependence on international assistance—thereby raising risks of instability and conflict.
Different IR theories offer distinct interpretations of this phenomenon.
Realism views environmental scarcity—particularly of water, energy, and food—as a potential source of interstate rivalry and strategic competition, evident in disputes such as the Nile River Basin tensions and Arctic resource competition.
Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the necessity of multilateral cooperation and global governance mechanisms, as reflected in frameworks like the Paris Climate Agreement, UNFCCC, and global climate finance regimes, which seek collective responses to transboundary environmental threats.
Constructivist approaches highlight the evolving norms around environmental responsibility, sustainability, and climate justice, visible in the growing recognition of climate security within UN Security Council debates.
Human security theory shifts the focus from states to individuals, underscoring how environmental degradation directly threatens food security, health, and displacement, particularly in the Global South.
Taken together, these perspectives demonstrate that environmental issues transcend traditional security boundaries. In an interconnected world, environmental degradation in one region produces political, economic, and security repercussions far beyond national borders, making environmental sustainability a central pillar of contemporary global security thinking. This reality compels states and international institutions to rethink sovereignty, prioritize preventive cooperation, and integrate environmental considerations into strategic planning, diplomacy, and conflict prevention frameworks at both regional and global levels.
Environmental Threats to Security
Environmental issues increasingly intersect with both security and economic stability, two foundational concerns of the modern state. Since the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change, environmental degradation has been progressively reframed as a security concern rather than a purely developmental or scientific issue. This securitization has been reinforced through repeated discussions in G20 summits, World Economic Forum meetings, and high-level climate diplomacy, underscoring the recognition that environmental stress can destabilize states and regions.
Contemporary global developments validate this shift.
Climate-induced disasters such as the 2022 floods in Pakistan, prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, and wildfires across Southern Europe, Canada, and Australia have exposed how environmental shocks undermine economic productivity, strain governance structures, and intensify humanitarian crises. These events illustrate what the UN has termed climate change as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating existing political, social, and economic vulnerabilities.
Historically, the roots of this crisis can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution, which established resource-intensive growth patterns based on fossil fuels, large-scale water use, and rapid urbanization. While this model accelerated economic development, it also entrenched unsustainable consumption patterns. Climate change has further aggravated these pressures, particularly in resource-dependent economies.
Water insecurity represents one of the most acute manifestations of environmental threats to security. Over the past six decades, global water consumption has grown at more than twice the rate of population growth, with climate change intensifying variability in rainfall and freshwater availability. Current examples include the Nile River Basin tensions, where Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam has heightened diplomatic friction with Egypt and Sudan, and the Indus Basin, where climate stress compounds already sensitive India–Pakistan relations. As Homer-Dixon argues, “environmental scarcity can contribute to violent conflict by increasing economic deprivation and weakening institutions”.
From a Realist perspective, such resource scarcity increases the likelihood of competition and strategic rivalry among states. In contrast, Liberal Institutionalists emphasize the role of international cooperation and regimes, arguing, as Robert Keohane notes, that “international institutions matter because they facilitate cooperation under conditions of interdependence”. Environmental regimes thus become essential tools for managing shared vulnerabilities in an anarchic international system.
Why Global Environmental Issues “Belong” to International Relations
The environment is arguably the most global, transboundary, and multidimensional issue confronting the international system today. Its impacts transcend borders, link domestic politics with global outcomes, and challenge traditional notions of sovereignty—making it a central concern for International Relations as a discipline.
International Relations, by design, examines diplomatic relations, strategic interactions, cross-border flows, and global governance mechanisms, positioning it uniquely to analyze environmental challenges. As Hedley Bull observed, “order in world politics is maintained not only by power, but by shared interests and common rules”. Environmental protection increasingly constitutes one such shared interest.
Globalization has intensified the interaction between domestic and international spheres. Environmental degradation within a state—whether deforestation, pollution, or climate vulnerability—now produces global consequences through migration, supply-chain disruptions, and security spillovers. Recent climate-driven migration from the Sahel, Central America, and South Asia demonstrates how environmental stress can influence border politics, regional stability, and international humanitarian regimes.
From a Constructivist perspective, environmental security reflects evolving global norms and identities. The growing discourse on climate justice, sustainability, and global citizenship shows how ideas shape state behavior. As Alexander Wendt famously argued, “anarchy is what states make of it”—and environmental cooperation illustrates how shared perceptions of risk can transform state interactions.
Despite this relevance, International Relations as a discipline still faces challenges, particularly in parts of the Global South where institutional capacity and academic resources remain limited. Strengthening IR scholarship on environmental issues is therefore critical not only for theoretical development but also for informing policy-making and public awareness in an interconnected world.
India’s Stand
As a responsible emerging power and a leading voice of the Global South, India has increasingly positioned itself as a constructive yet assertive actor in global environmental governance. This role is reflected in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and its sustained commitment to reducing the emissions intensity of GDP while safeguarding developmental priorities. India’s climate diplomacy is rooted in the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), consistently emphasizing historical emissions and equity in burden-sharing.
From a Human Security perspective, India frames climate change as a threat to livelihoods, food security, water availability, and public health rather than merely an environmental or technical challenge. This approach is particularly relevant for a country with high climate vulnerability, as demonstrated by increasing heatwaves, erratic monsoons, glacial retreat in the Himalayas, and coastal risks in states such as Odisha and Gujarat. These domestic realities shape India’s emphasis on adaptation and resilience-building alongside mitigation efforts.
India’s leadership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA) exemplifies how environmental cooperation is deployed as an instrument of South–South diplomacy. By promoting affordable renewable energy solutions for developing countries, India seeks to reshape global energy transitions in a more inclusive manner. This aligns with Liberal Institutionalism, which, as Robert Keohane argues, recognizes that “international institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs”. The ISA serves precisely this function by institutionalizing collaboration among climate-vulnerable states.
From a Constructivist standpoint, India’s climate diplomacy also reflects norm entrepreneurship. By foregrounding equity, climate justice, and sustainable development, India contributes to reshaping global narratives around environmental responsibility. As Alexander Wendt famously observed, “identities and interests are socially constructed”—a process evident in India’s efforts to redefine climate leadership beyond emission reduction metrics alone.
Furthermore, India’s climate engagement increasingly functions as an instrument of soft power. As Joseph Nye notes, “power in the modern world increasingly rests on the ability to shape preferences”. Through renewable energy leadership, climate finance advocacy, and multilateral engagement, India seeks to enhance its normative influence without compromising economic growth.
In sum, India’s environmental strategy reflects a pragmatic synthesis of national interest, ethical responsibility, and strategic diplomacy. By integrating development concerns with global environmental commitments, India exemplifies how emerging powers can contribute meaningfully to shaping a more equitable and cooperative global environmental order.
Conclusion
The environmental challenges examined in this article underscore the necessity of adopting a holistic understanding of environmental insecurity—one that accounts for its structural causes, socio-political contexts, and far-reaching consequences. Climate change, resource scarcity, and ecological degradation are no longer peripheral concerns; they now constitute central determinants of economic stability, political order, and human security. As Barry Buzan aptly argues, “security is about survival, but survival is not only military”—a recognition that environmental threats fundamentally reshape the meaning of security in the contemporary international system.
International Relations, as a multidisciplinary field, possesses the analytical tools required to interpret and respond to these challenges. By integrating insights from security studies, political economy, and global governance, the discipline enables a shift from reactive crisis management toward preventive and cooperative global strategies. The increasing incorporation of climate security into UN Security Council debates, G20 agendas, and COP negotiations demonstrates how environmental concerns are steadily redefining international norms and institutional priorities.
While environmental stress can intensify competition and conflict—particularly in fragile regions—it simultaneously creates unprecedented opportunities for cooperation. Transnational initiatives such as the Paris Climate Agreement, global climate finance mechanisms, and renewable energy alliances illustrate how shared ecological vulnerability can foster multilateral engagement. As Hedley Bull observed, “international order is sustained by common interests and shared rules”—and environmental preservation has emerged as one of the most compelling common interests of the twenty-first century.
Ultimately, the global environmental crisis calls for a transformation not only in policy frameworks but also in collective political imagination. Preserving the planet demands a reconceptualization of sovereignty, responsibility, and development—anchored in global solidarity and long-term sustainability. By embracing this challenge, International Relations can contribute to shaping a new global order—one defined not by domination or rivalry, but by cooperation, resilience, and the shared imperative to safeguard humanity’s common environmental future.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
The India–European Union Free Trade Agreement (FTA), often described by policymakers on both sides as the “mother of all deals,” marks a decisive shift in the trajectory of India–EU relations. While public discussion has largely focused on its commercial dimensions of tariff reductions on automobiles, wines, textiles, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, the agreement’s true strategic significance lies elsewhere. Embedded within the FTA is an unprecedented security and defence framework that elevates defence cooperation from a peripheral concern to a central pillar of the partnership. For India’s defence manufacturing ecosystem, this development represents not merely an incremental gain, but a potentially transformative opportunity.
Trade agreements traditionally revolve around market access, customs schedules, and regulatory harmonisation. The India–EU FTA departs from this template by explicitly recognisingdefence as a strategic sector in a volatile global order. By institutionalising defence and security cooperation alongside economic integration, the agreement reflects a broader convergence of geopolitical interests between two democratic actors navigating an era of intensifying great-power competition, supply-chain disruptions, and strategic uncertainty.
At the heart of this shift is the India–EU Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), signed by India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. This framework elevates defence cooperation to an institutionalised, long-term engagement rather than a series of ad hoc procurement decisions. Notably, India becomes only the third Asian country after Japan and South Korea to conclude such a partnership with the European Union, underscoring New Delhi’s growing strategic weight in European thinking.
The inclusion of defence within the broader FTA signals a recognition that economic resilience and security preparedness are increasingly intertwined. In a world marked by armed conflict in Europe, instability in the Indo-Pacific, and disruptions to global supply chains, defence manufacturing has emerged as both an economic and strategic asset. For India, this marks a once-in-a-generation opening to integrate its defence industry into advanced global value chains.
India and the European Union arrive at this agreement from distinct historical and strategic contexts, yet their needs increasingly converge. Over the past decade, India has pursued an ambitious defence indigenisation agenda under the banner of Aatmanirbhar Bharat. Import bans, production-linked incentives, streamlined procurement processes, and a strong emphasis on defence exports have reshaped what was once a heavily import-dependent ecosystem.
Today, Indian firms manufacture a wide spectrum of defence equipment, ranging from artillery systems and armoured vehicles to missiles, drones, radars, electronic warfare systems, and ammunition. Defence exports have risen sharply, credibility has improved, and the sector’s ambitions have expanded beyond domestic self-sufficiency toward global competitiveness. Yet critical gaps remain. India still lacks the scale, sustained foreign investment, advanced technology absorption, and assured access to large, stable markets necessary to transition from an emerging supplier to a major defence manufacturing hub.
Europe, meanwhile, confronts a different set of pressures. The war in Ukraine has severely depleted European defence stockpiles and exposed structural weaknesses in production capacity and supply chains. At the same time, growing uncertainty over long-term US security guarantees exacerbated by domestic political volatility in Washington has sharpened European calls for strategic autonomy. As a result, European governments are increasing defence spending at an unprecedented pace while seeking to diversify suppliers and rebuild industrial resilience.
This convergence of Indian capacity and European demand creates a natural alignment. As Rajnath Singh noted following the FTA’s announcement, India’s defence industry can play a “meaningful role” in the EU’s ReArm Europe initiative, particularly as Europe seeks to de-risk dependencies and diversify its industrial base.
Historically, India–EU defence ties have followed a familiar pattern Europe sold advanced platforms and systems; India bought them. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have long been among India’s most important defence suppliers. While this relationship brought access to advanced capabilities, it also reinforced dependency and limited domestic value addition.
That dynamic is now beginning to shift. In recent years, Indian ammunition, explosives, and select defence components have found European buyers as stockpiles ran low. The new FTA seeks to institutionalise this transition, moving the relationship from transactional procurement to industrial partnership.
Indian and European leaders have repeatedly emphasised the need for defence industries on both sides to “synergise” their efforts. Such collaboration aligns India’s pursuit of self-reliance with Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy, creating a framework where co-development, co-production, and supply-chain integration replace one-sided sales.
What distinguishes this moment from previous declarations of intent is the institutional machinery being put in place. The proposed India–EU Defence Industry Forum will bring together companies from both sides to identify concrete opportunities in manufacturing, innovation, and technology. Crucially, governments are envisaged as facilitators rather than gatekeepers, enabling industry-led collaboration.
Supply-chain integration is another central pillar of the partnership. By linking Indian manufacturers to European defence ecosystems, the agreement aims to build trusted, resilient production networks capable of meeting long-term security requirements. Indian participation in European defence programmes further deepens this integration, offering access to advanced standards, certification regimes, and collaborative R&D frameworks.
On the European side, Kaja Kallas has described the Security and Defence Partnership as a milestone that opens the door to deeper cooperation, both bilaterally and in multilateral forums. The framework institutionalises annual security and defence dialogues, expands cooperation in maritime security, cyber defence, counterterrorism, and space security, and establishescontinuity and oversight mechanisms essential for sustained engagement.
Timing is a critical factor in the agreement’s significance. Europe is rebuilding its defence posture at speed. It requires production capacity, cost efficiency, and reliable partners beyond the traditional transatlantic axis. India offers all three, along with political alignment and strategic autonomy of its own.
The scale of India’s defence manufacturing growth underscores this readiness. Domestic defence production reached approximately ₹1.50–1.51 lakh crore in FY 2024–25, representingnearly 90 per cent growth since 2019–20. Defence exports have climbed to around ₹24,000–25,000 crore, up from less than ₹1,000 crore a decade ago. Government targets of ₹3 lakh crore in production and ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029 now appear achievable rather than aspirational.
What India lacks is the next growth engine to sustain this trajectory. The European Union, with its large and stable market, advanced technological base, and expanding defence budgets, can provide that engine.
Access to European markets, joint development programmes, co-production arrangements, and defence-related foreign direct investment would allow Indian firms to move up the value chain from component suppliers to system integrators and platform exporters. For Europe, India offers manufacturing depth, resilience, and a trusted partner as it modernises its armed forces.
One of the least discussed but potentially most consequential aspects of the partnership lies in defence financing. The Security and Defence Partnership may allow India to access the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, including a €150 billion loan facility designed to support European defence requirements.
If realised, this access would embed Indian industry even more deeply into Europe’s defence ecosystem, providing long-term financial support for capacity expansion and technological upgrading. For India, this aligns directly with the objectives of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, while for Europe it enhances industrial resilience without over-reliance on domestic capacity alone.
The EU’s ReArm Europe initiative, which aims to mobilise up to €800 billion in defence spending by 2030, further strengthens the case for partnership. With €150 billion earmarked for joint procurement and an overarching goal of reducing dependence on US suppliers, the initiative creates strong incentives for collaboration with reliable external partners.
India’s defence industry is well positioned to integrate into this framework. Liberalised FDI norms allowing up to 74 per cent foreign ownership in defence manufacturing enhance India’s attractiveness as a co-development and production hub. Indian firms already maintain partnerships with European counterparts, laying the groundwork for deeper collaboration.
India–EU defence collaboration is no longer theoretical. India has inducted 36 Rafale fighter jets from France, with additional orders under negotiation that include significant domestic manufacturing. The partnership between SAFRAN, DRDO, and HAL to co-develop a high-thrust engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft represents a shift from licensed production to genuine co-development.
India is also close to finalising submarine manufacturing cooperation with Germany, producing C-295MW transport aircraft with Spain, and procuring advanced naval systems from Italy. Public and private sector firms including HAL, Bharat Electronics, Bharat Dynamics, Larsen & Toubro, Tata Advanced Systems, Mahindra Defence, Garden Reach Shipbuilders, and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders are well positioned to scale these engagements.
Europe’s extensive military support to Ukraine has created an immediate need to replenish ammunition, missiles, and other systems. Indian manufacturers already produce a wide range of such equipment and export to multiple countries, including European states. The Security and Defence Partnership formalises and expands this pathway, transforming episodic purchases into structured cooperation.
India’s competitive advantage lies not only in cost efficiency but also in demonstrated operational capability. Indigenous platforms and systems showcased during recent military operations have reinforced confidence in Indian manufacturing standards. At the same time, India has been careful to avoid direct involvement in ongoing conflicts, underscoring the need for careful political coordination even as industrial cooperation expands.
Despite its promise, the partnership is not without challenges. Closer defence ties with the EU inevitably draw India closer to NATO-aligned strategic frameworks, potentially complicating relations with Russia a long-standing defence partner. Europe’s security threat perception is shaped heavily by Moscow, and pressure on India to further distance itself from Russian defencecooperation is likely to grow.
Managing this balance will test India’s diplomatic agility and commitment to strategic autonomy. Another critical prerequisite for deeper cooperation is the conclusion of an India–EU Security of Information Agreement, without which sensitive technology sharing will remain constrained. Prioritising this agreement will be essential to unlock the partnership’s full potential.
Beyond defence, the FTA promises significant economic gains across sectors. Implementation is expected from FY 2027, with more pronounced effects from FY 2028 onward. Labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, footwear, marine products, and gems and jewellery gain zero-tariff access to the EU market, enhancing India’s competitiveness against regional rivals.
Pharmaceuticals, medical devices, chemicals, electronics manufacturing, and IT services also stand to benefit from tariff reductions, regulatory cooperation, and improved mobility frameworks. In defence and aerospace, tariff elimination on aircraft and spacecraft imports, coupled with the Defence Industry Forum and programme participation, signals a long-term structural shift. Investor confidence has already responded positively, with defence stocks rising following the SDP announcement as an early indicator of market expectations.
The India–EU Security and Defence Partnership, embedded within the broader Free Trade Agreement and the Joint India–EU Comprehensive Strategic Agenda 2030, represents a qualitative leap in bilateral relations. By aligning strategic imperatives with industrial opportunity, it strengthens India’s defence manufacturing ecosystem while advancing Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Although geopolitical balancing particularly regarding Russia will remain a delicate and ongoing challenge, the overall trajectory of the partnership is unmistakably positive. If implemented with consistency and political will, it has the potential to fundamentally reshape defence cooperation, accelerate technological advancement, and generate durable economic and strategic dividends for both India and the European Union. In this trade agreement, defence is not a peripheral add-on; it is the quiet prize and potentially its most consequential outcome.
About the Author
Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs.
1. From Non-Alignment to Strategic Autonomy: India’s Post–Cold War Foreign Policy Reorientation
Introduction
The end of the Cold War marked a decisive turning point in India’s foreign policy orientation. During the bipolar era, India’s commitment to non-alignment was rooted in the desire to preserve strategic independence amid superpower rivalry. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a rapidly globalizing, multipolar international system compelled India to recalibrate its external engagements. Economic liberalization in the early 1990s further accelerated this shift, pushing India to engage more proactively with global institutions, regional groupings, and emerging power centers.
In this evolving geopolitical landscape, India transitioned from the rigid framework of non-alignment to a more flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy, which emphasizes issue-based partnerships, diversified alignments, and pragmatic engagement without formal alliances. Strategic autonomy allows India to pursue its national interests while maintaining freedom of choice across security, economic, and diplomatic domains. This approach has become particularly significant as global power diffuses beyond traditional Western dominance, with China’s rise and renewed great-power competition reshaping international politics.
Within this context, India’s engagement with multilateral frameworks such as BRICS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a deliberate balancing strategy. While BRICS enables India to cooperate with emerging economies and shape alternative global governance mechanisms, the Quad strengthens India’s position in the Indo-Pacific by enhancing strategic coordination with like-minded democracies. Together, these platforms illustrate how India navigates a multipolar world by leveraging multilateralism to safeguard autonomy, enhance economic resilience, and assert its growing global role.
2. Strategic Autonomy through Multilateral Balancing in a Multipolar World
India’s contemporary foreign policy marks a decisive departure from Cold War–era non-alignment. Rather than maintaining equidistance from rival power blocs, India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy emphasizes multi-alignment—engaging selectively with competing powers while avoiding binding alliances. This approach enables India to preserve strategic flexibility in an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system.
India’s continued defense cooperation with Russia, expanding strategic partnership with the United States, deepening economic engagement with the European Union, and leadership within the Global South collectively illustrate this shift. India’s calibrated response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict exemplifies strategic autonomy in practice. Despite sustained Western pressure, New Delhi refrained from explicit condemnation of Russia, maintained energy and defense ties, and simultaneously deepened cooperation with the US and Europe, underscoring India’s commitment to independent decision-making amid geopolitical polarization.
India’s participation in BRICS reflects its commitment to reforming global governance and amplifying the voice of emerging economies. The grouping provides a platform for South–South cooperation and serves as an alternative to Western-dominated financial institutions. The New Development Bank (NDB) remains BRICS’ most tangible institutional achievement, supporting infrastructure and sustainable development projects in India without political conditionalities.
The 2024 expansion of BRICS to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE has enhanced the bloc’s geopolitical and economic relevance. India’s support for expansion—combined with its emphasis on consensus-based governance—reflects its effort to broaden Global South representation while preventing institutional dominance by any single power. India has also used BRICS platforms to promote local currency trade, supply-chain resilience, and digital public infrastructure, projecting its Digital Public Goods model (UPI, Aadhaar, DigiLocker) as a scalable and inclusive development framework.
Parallel to its engagement with BRICS, India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a strategic response to growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, particularly after the Galwan Valley crisis of 2020. While remaining cautious of formal military alliances, India views the Quad as a flexible mechanism that enhances deterrence, regional stability, and strategic coordination without undermining autonomy.
Initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) have strengthened India’s surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean, while Quad-led cooperation in semiconductors, clean energy, vaccines, and disaster resilience reinforces India’s regional leadership without overt militarization.
India’s simultaneous engagement with BRICS and the Quad reflects a strategy of multilateral hedging rather than policy contradiction. While BRICS facilitates dialogue with China within a multilateral framework, the Quad enhances India’s leverage in counterbalancing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Continued engagement with China through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), despite unresolved border tensions, demonstrates India’s preference for institutionalized interaction, while growing defense interoperability with Quad partners strengthens its strategic bargaining position.
India’s multilateral balancing strategy has significantly elevated its global profile, most notably during its G20 Presidency in 2023, where it positioned itself as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. At the same time, sustaining strategic autonomy presents challenges, including internal divergences within BRICS, the risk of over-securitization of the Quad, and intensifying great-power competition. Nevertheless, India’s ability to engage across ideological and geopolitical divides highlights the adaptability of its foreign policy. Strategic autonomy, anchored in selective and pragmatic multilateralism, remains central to India’s aspiration to emerge as a leading power in a multipolar international order.
3. BRICS as a Pillar of India’s Economic and Diplomatic Multilateralism
BRICS, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, represents one of the most influential coalitions of emerging economies in the contemporary international system. Initially conceptualized as “BRIC” by economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 to highlight the growth potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the grouping transitioned from a financial concept into a formal diplomatic platform with the first meeting of BRIC foreign ministers in 2006. The inclusion of South Africa in 2010 expanded the forum’s geographical and political representation, giving rise to BRICS as a voice of the Global South.
Beyond its demographic and economic weight—accounting for approximately 41% of the world’s population, nearly 24% of global GDP, and around 16% of global trade—BRICS has evolved into an institutional mechanism aimed at reforming global governance structures traditionally dominated by Western powers. The grouping seeks to promote a more inclusive and representative international economic order, particularly in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO.
A major institutional achievement of BRICS is the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014, which provides development finance for infrastructure and sustainable development projects without the stringent political conditionalities often associated with Western-led financial institutions. India has been a major beneficiary of NDB funding, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy, transport infrastructure, and urban development, reinforcing the economic dimension of its multilateral engagement.
India’s chairmanship of BRICS in 2021 further underscored its commitment to shaping the agenda of emerging economies. During its tenure, India emphasized themes such as BRICS@15: Intra-BRICS Cooperation for Continuity, Consolidation and Consensus, focusing on supply chain resilience, digital public infrastructure, counter-terrorism, and reform of multilateral institutions. India’s promotion of digital public goods—such as UPI and Aadhaar—as scalable development models reflects how BRICS serves as a platform for norm diffusion and soft power projection.
Recent developments have further enhanced BRICS’ strategic relevance. The 2024 expansion of BRICS to include countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia has significantly increased the bloc’s geopolitical reach, energy influence, and financial clout. India’s support for expansion, while advocating consensus-based decision-making, demonstrates its attempt to balance inclusivity with concerns over excessive Chinese influence within the grouping.
In the context of global economic uncertainty, sanctions politics, and supply chain disruptions, BRICS has increasingly focused on local currency trade, financial cooperation, and discussions around reducing dependence on the US dollar. While India remains cautious about full-scale de-dollarization, its participation in these discussions aligns with its broader goal of strategic autonomy and diversified economic partnerships.
Thus, BRICS functions not merely as an economic grouping but as a strategic multilateral platform through which India amplifies its voice, strengthens South–South cooperation, and contributes to shaping a multipolar world order. By engaging actively within BRICS, India reinforces its position as a leading emerging power while maintaining flexibility in navigating great-power competition.
4. India’s Strategic Leverage within BRICS: Reforming Global Governance amid Divergent Interests
BRICS exercises growing influence in global development and governance, particularly among low- and middle-income countries, by offering an alternative framework to Western-dominated institutions. Its primary objective lies in fostering cooperation among major emerging economies while advocating reforms in global financial and political structures that inadequately represent developing nations. Over time, BRICS has evolved from a consultative forum into a more coordinated platform addressing shared challenges across economic, political, and social domains.
One of BRICS’ central objectives is to enhance economic cooperation and development financing, reflected in the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB). As of 2024, the NDB has approved over USD 35 billion in projects, with India among the largest recipients. BRICS also advocates reform of the IMF and World Bank, strengthens financial resilience through the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), and extends influence across Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
India’s strategic objectives within BRICS align with its doctrine of strategic autonomy. It promotes development-centric multilateralism, digital public infrastructure, and consensus-based governance while cautiously managing China’s dominance. India’s engagement with Russia within BRICS reinforces long-standing strategic ties, while institutional dialogue provides space to manage tensions with China post-Galwan.
Despite achievements, BRICS faces structural constraints due to divergent national interests, limited cohesion in trade and technology governance, and unequal gains from global agreements. These challenges constrain India’s policy space and highlight the need for deeper coordination and issue-based cooperation within the grouping.
5. The Quad and India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Selective Alignment without Alliance Commitments
India’s evolving stance on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a strategically calibrated transition rather than a departure from its long-standing commitment to autonomy. Initially hesitant, India viewed the Quad as a consultative mechanism. However, ongoing tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Beijing’s assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific prompted reassessment.
Today, India perceives the Quad as a flexible, values-based framework to advance a stable, rules-based regional order. Quad cooperation in maritime domain awareness, critical technologies, supply chains, and humanitarian assistance has expanded significantly. Exercises such as Malabar 2024 signal operational coordination without formal alliance obligations.
India’s Indo-Pacific vision—anchored in SAGAR and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative—positions it as a net security provider rather than a hegemon. Enhanced naval deployments, logistics agreements, and joint patrols underscore India’s growing maritime role while preserving strategic autonomy.
6. Multilateral Hedging through BRICS and the Quad: India as a Bridge between Global Orders
India’s engagement within the Quad reflects a conscious effort to contest dominant social knowledge structures shaping the Indo-Pacific order. Rather than fully endorsing a Western-led liberal international order, India promotes pluralism, inclusivity, and strategic autonomy in regional governance. Its reluctance to formalize or institutionalize the Quad stems from concerns over strategic polarization, the risk of alliance entrapment vis-à-vis China, and the imperative of preserving ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific architecture. By advocating flexible, issue-based cooperation—such as maritime domain awareness, disaster relief, and technology partnerships—India seeks to shape regional norms without reinforcing bloc politics.
Simultaneously, India’s leadership within BRICS underscores its commitment to reshaping global governance beyond the Indo-Pacific. Institutions such as the New Development Bank, initiatives on local currency trade, and the 2024 BRICS expansion illustrate India’s role in amplifying Global South representation and contesting Western financial dominance. Collectively, India’s engagement across both platforms positions it as a normative bridge between established and emerging global orders, balancing reformist ambitions with strategic restraint.
Conclusion
India’s engagement with BRICS and the Quad reflects a deliberate strategy of multilateral hedging aimed at preserving strategic autonomy in a rapidly evolving multipolar order. Rather than pursuing rigid alignments, India leverages these platforms to balance great-power competition, advance Global South interests, and shape regional and global norms. Through BRICS, India challenges existing financial and governance hierarchies, while its participation in the Quad strengthens a rules-based Indo-Pacific without formal alliance commitments. This calibrated approach highlights India’s growing confidence as a bridge between competing global orders, positioning it as a pivotal actor in shaping an inclusive, pluralistic international system.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
Regionalism in Asia presents a paradox of uneven outcomes. While ASEAN has evolved into a resilient platform for cooperation, SAARC remains institutionally stagnant. This article compares their origins, structures, and political contexts to explain how institutional design, power asymmetry, and conflict management shape the success or failure of regional cooperation.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka on 8 December 1985, was conceived as a regional mechanism to promote economic growth, social development, and collective self-reliance among its eight member states. Despite its broad mandate and institutional framework, SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by structural constraints—most notably unanimity-based decision-making and the exclusion of bilateral disputes—which have paralysed summit-level engagement. Enduring geopolitical tensions, particularly between India and Pakistan, have stalled regional cooperation, resulting in minimal intra-regional trade and weak policy coordination. Although recent sectoral initiatives, anniversary statements, and calls for revival—especially from Bangladesh and smaller member states—suggest limited residual relevance, the growing shift toward sub-regional arrangements such as BIMSTEC and BBIN reflects SAARC’s declining centrality in South Asian regionalism in the absence of political consensus and institutional reform.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok with the signing of the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, later expanding to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999), forming the ten-member bloc it is today. ASEAN’s Charter, launched in 2008 in Jakarta, transformed the organization into a legal entity and set the foundation for an “EU-style community” aiming at deeper regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective engagement in global affairs. Since then, ASEAN has pursued ambitious goals in trade liberalization, political cooperation, and social development. In recent years, the bloc has taken significant steps in strengthening its regional role: at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur (October 2025), leaders welcomed Timor-Leste as the bloc’s 11th member and endorsed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord to de-escalate the Cambodia-Thailand border crisis, demonstrating ASEAN’s capacity to mediate regional disputes. ASEAN also articulated a five-year strategic plan (2026-2030) to accelerate economic integration, enhance digital infrastructure, and promote sustainable development amid shifting geopolitical currents. Concurrently, ASEAN initiatives have advanced cooperation on education transformation, higher education resilience, and environment protection, while the bloc continues grappling with complex challenges such as implementing its peace plan in Myanmar and navigating the strategic interests of external powers in the Indo-Pacific. These developments reflect ASEAN’s evolving role as a central platform for multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, even as it contends with structural challenges and external geopolitical pressures.
Formation and Conceptual Foundations of SAARC
The idea of South Asian regional cooperation predates the establishment of SAARC by several decades, evident in early initiatives such as the Asian Relations Conference (1947), the Baguio Conference (1950), and the Colombo Powers Conference (1954). These efforts reflected post-colonial aspirations for solidarity, economic cooperation, and collective self-reliance among newly independent states. However, they failed to evolve into formal institutions due to deep political mistrust, unresolved bilateral disputes, and the constraining influence of Cold War alignments. A decisive shift occurred in 1979 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which destabilized South Asia and heightened awareness of the region’s vulnerability to external powers. This security shock accelerated efforts toward regional institutionalization, culminating in the establishment of SAARC in 1985. Significantly, SAARC was designed as a non-political and non-security-oriented forum, deliberately excluding bilateral disputes from its agenda—an institutional compromise shaped by prevailing mutual suspicions among member states.
India–Pakistan Divergences and Institutional Design
India and Pakistan’s initial skepticism played a central role in shaping SAARC’s institutional architecture. India’s reservations stemmed from its regional primacy as the largest political and economic actor in South Asia. New Delhi feared that a multilateral framework might enable smaller neighbours to internationalize bilateral disputes, particularly Kashmir, form balancing coalitions against India, and constrain its strategic autonomy. Consequently, India insisted on principles of sovereign equality, non-interference, and the exclusion of security matters from SAARC’s mandate. Pakistan, in contrast, viewed SAARC through the prism of strategic rivalry and economic asymmetry. It feared that regional cooperation would consolidate India’s economic dominance, marginalize Pakistan diplomatically, and allow India to bypass core political disputes while projecting regional leadership. This mutual distrust resulted in a deliberately weak institutional structure, consensus-based decision-making, and an avoidance of contentious political issues—features that have continued to limit SAARC’s effectiveness.
Institutionalization, Expansion, and Contested Regional Identity
Despite these constraints, SAARC’s formal establishment was made possible through diplomatic leadership by Bangladesh. Between 1979 and 1980, consultations among South Asian UN representatives in New York led Bangladesh to draft a working paper that provided the basis for intergovernmental discussions. These efforts culminated in the first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on 7–8 December 1985, symbolizing cautious collective commitment to regional cooperation. SAARC’s expansion with Afghanistan’s accession further exposed conceptual ambiguities regarding South Asian identity. Afghanistan’s application in 2005 generated intense debate, as it occupies a geopolitical crossroads between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. While the requirement to hold democratic elections prior to accession reflected SAARC’s normative aspirations, Afghanistan’s inclusion in 2007 also underscored the organization’s limited capacity to manage internal instability. The presence of numerous observer states—including China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union—highlighted SAARC’s strategic importance, even as meaningful regional integration remained elusive.
Contemporary Relevance and Persistent Stagnation
The structural weaknesses embedded at SAARC’s inception are clearly reflected in contemporary developments. The cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad following the 2016 Uri terrorist attack marked a critical rupture, as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan jointly boycotted the meeting, leading to institutional paralysis. Since then, no SAARC summit has been convened, with India increasingly prioritizing alternative regional and sub-regional frameworks such as BIMSTEC and broader Indo-Pacific partnerships. Although the COVID-19 SAARC Emergency Fund initiative in 2020 briefly revived engagement, disagreements over leadership and management revealed enduring trust deficits, particularly between India and Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan’s political transformation after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has further complicated SAARC’s revival. Despite encompassing 21% of the world’s population and over 5% of global GDP, SAARC continues to function largely as a declaratory forum rather than an operational regional organization, constrained by unresolved security dilemmas, contested regional identity, and entrenched power asymmetries.
Origins and Formation of ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) evolved from earlier attempts at regional cooperation, most notably the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established on 31 July 1961 by Thailand, the Philippines, and the Federation of Malaya. While ASA reflected early regionalist aspirations, its limited membership and weak institutional base constrained its effectiveness. A more comprehensive and enduring framework emerged on 8 August 1967 with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The Declaration articulated ASEAN’s core objectives: accelerating economic growth, promoting social progress and cultural development, fostering regional peace and stability, encouraging mutual assistance in training and research, enhancing cooperation in agriculture and industry, and maintaining constructive relations with international organizations. From its inception, ASEAN was envisioned as a pragmatic and flexible institution grounded in cooperation rather than formal supranationalism.
Cold War Context and Early Consolidation
ASEAN’s creation was strongly shaped by Cold War dynamics, particularly the desire of Southeast Asian states to contain the spread of communism and insulate the region from great-power rivalries. This shared security concern provided early cohesion among member states, which was further strengthened in the mid-1970s following major geopolitical shifts, including the fall of Saigon, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). ASEAN’s first summit, held in Bali in 1976, marked a significant step toward institutional consolidation with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. These agreements formalized principles of non-interference, peaceful dispute resolution, and regional solidarity, laying the normative foundation for ASEAN’s long-term stability and cooperation.
Post–Cold War Expansion and Functional Cooperation
The end of the Cold War enabled ASEAN to exercise greater regional political autonomy and expand its functional scope. During the 1990s, ASEAN emerged as a key regional actor in trade liberalization and security dialogue, positioning itself as a central platform for regional multilateralism. The signing of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995 further underscored ASEAN’s collective commitment to regional peace and security. Beyond strategic considerations, ASEAN’s cohesion has been reinforced by shared historical and cultural linkages, as Southeast Asia has long functioned as a crossroads between East Asia and South Asia, influenced by Islamic, Persian, and later European interactions. This combination of strategic pragmatism and cultural interconnectedness has enabled ASEAN to deepen cooperation while accommodating political diversity among its members.
Contemporary Dynamics and Institutional Adaptability
Today, ASEAN comprises ten member states with a total area of over 4.5 million square kilometres and an estimated population of approximately 668 million. Symbolically, the ten stalks of rice in the ASEAN flag represent unity and shared prosperity among its members. ASEAN has also made tangible progress in people-to-people connectivity, particularly through the institutionalization of visa-free travel, which has significantly increased intra-ASEAN tourism—by 2010, nearly half of all tourists within ASEAN originated from member states themselves. At the same time, ASEAN has faced unprecedented challenges, notably Myanmar’s political crisis since 2017, which has tested the organization’s principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making. ASEAN’s evolving response to Myanmar reflects a gradual but significant shift in its institutional character, highlighting its capacity for adaptation while striving to preserve unity and regional credibility.
Why ASEAN Worked Where SAARC Stalled: A Comparative Transition
From the perspective of new regionalism, ASEAN’s relative success can be attributed to its ability to evolve beyond narrow state-centric cooperation toward a multidimensional regional project encompassing economic integration, political dialogue, and societal connectivity. New regionalism emphasizes openness, flexibility, and functional diversification, all of which are evident in ASEAN’s post–Cold War evolution—from trade liberalization and people-to-people mobility to crisis coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, SAARC has remained trapped within a traditional, state-centric framework, heavily constrained by sovereignty concerns and elite-level mistrust. Its limited engagement beyond formal diplomacy and weak societal embeddedness have prevented the emergence of a shared South Asian regional identity, reinforcing institutional stagnation.
Institutionalist explanations further illuminate the divergence. ASEAN developed durable norms and practices—often described as the “ASEAN Way”—that, despite being informal and consensus-based, are reinforced through frequent summits, dense networks of ministerial meetings, and institutional continuity. These mechanisms have enabled ASEAN to adapt incrementally to crises, as seen in its collective response to Myanmar’s post-2021 political turmoil and its coordination under frameworks such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework. SAARC, by contrast, suffers from weak institutional density, infrequent high-level engagement, and an absence of enforcement or dispute-resolution mechanisms. Its consensus rule, combined with low institutionalization, amplifies veto power and renders the organization highly susceptible to political shocks, as demonstrated by its paralysis since the 2016 Uri crisis.
From a realist perspective, power asymmetry and threat perception are central to explaining SAARC’s stagnation. South Asia is characterized by a clear regional hegemon—India—whose economic and military dominance generates persistent fears of marginalization among smaller states and balancing behavior from Pakistan. This asymmetry has prevented the development of trust-based cooperation and encouraged zero-sum calculations, particularly in the security domain. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, the absence of a single overwhelming regional power has allowed ASEAN to function as a collective balancing platform amid intensifying US–China rivalry. ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, through forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, reflects its ability to manage external power competition without internal paralysis.
Taken together, these theoretical perspectives highlight that ASEAN’s effectiveness lies not in the absence of conflict but in its capacity to institutionalize cooperation amid diversity and tension. SAARC’s failure, conversely, reflects the limitations of depoliticized regionalism in a conflict-prone environment. Without mechanisms to manage power asymmetry, address security externalities, or foster functional interdependence, SAARC has remained a fragile and reactive institution. This theoretical contrast reinforces why ASEAN has emerged as a resilient model of regionalism, while SAARC continues to struggle with relevance in an increasingly interconnected and competitive regional order.
SAARC and ASEAN: Divergent Outcomes of Regionalism in Asia
South Asia today faces multiple overlapping challenges, including refugee and migration crises, unresolved territorial disputes, ethnic and cultural tensions, weak infrastructure connectivity, and fragile political trust among states. These challenges have directly constrained the effectiveness of SAARC, whose foundational objective of fostering regional cooperation remains unfulfilled. Persistent mutual suspicion—particularly between India and Pakistan—has prevented SAARC from evolving beyond a symbolic forum. In contrast, Southeast Asia’s regional mechanism, ASEAN, despite having a smaller population and territorial size, has successfully fostered a relatively stable regional order, deepened economic interdependence, and institutionalized cooperation in trade, connectivity, and security dialogue. This contrast has led many scholars to characterize the experience succinctly: SAARC has stagnated, while ASEAN has consolidated.
Conflict Management and Institutional Adaptability: ASEAN’s Advantage
Conflicts are not unique to South Asia; they are inherent to all regional systems. What distinguishes ASEAN is not the absence of conflict but its ability to manage tensions without institutional breakdown. During its first decade, ASEAN prioritized regional stability amid communist insurgencies and Cold War turbulence, reinforcing unity through shared threat perception. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the Bali Summit, marked a turning point by formally incorporating security concerns, dispute settlement mechanisms, and norms of peaceful coexistence. In recent years, ASEAN has demonstrated institutional adaptability, particularly in response to Myanmar’s political crisis following the 2021 military coup. By excluding Myanmar’s junta from high-level summits and adopting the Five-Point Consensus, ASEAN signaled a willingness to reinterpret its non-interference principle to preserve regional credibility—something SAARC has been unable to do in comparable crises.
Economic Integration and Trade Performance: ASEAN’s Structural Depth
ASEAN’s political stability enabled sustained economic integration. From the late 1970s onward, ASEAN leveraged institutional continuity to expand trade and investment cooperation. Its cumulative GDP growth between 1976 and 1982—averaging nearly 15% annually—laid the foundation for deeper economic frameworks such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Today, intra-ASEAN trade accounts for nearly 50% of total exports, supported by integrated supply chains and manufacturing networks. ASEAN’s central role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020, further reinforces its position as the hub of Asia-Pacific economic architecture. By contrast, SAARC’s economic instruments—SAPTA (1993) and SAFTA (2004)—have delivered limited outcomes, with intra-regional trade stagnating at around 7%, reflecting weak industrial complementarities and poor trade facilitation.
SAARC’s Structural Constraints and Persistent Underperformance
SAARC’s failure to generate meaningful regional integration is deeply rooted in its origins and structural design. Indo–Pakistan rivalry, extreme power asymmetry favoring India, and the colonial legacy of contested borders have repeatedly undermined trust. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC deliberately excluded security issues from its mandate, leaving no institutional mechanism to manage conflicts when they inevitably arise. Recent examples reinforce this weakness: the cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit after the 2016 Uri attack, the paralysis following India–Pakistan tensions, and Afghanistan’s political uncertainty after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Even economically, SAARC remains one of the least connected regions globally; World Bank studies highlight excessive documentation, delays, and logistical barriers—such as the requirement of over 50 signatures and multiple days for cross-border cargo movement between India and Bangladesh. Large-scale regional projects like the TAPI gas pipeline remain stalled due to security and political distrust, illustrating the region’s inability to convert economic interdependence into cooperation.
Comparative Assessment: Why ASEAN Succeeds and SAARC Struggles
The contrast between ASEAN and SAARC highlights three critical differences. First, ASEAN evolved as a problem-managing organization, while SAARC remains a problem-avoiding forum. Second, ASEAN’s relatively balanced power structure enabled collective leadership, whereas SAARC’s India-centric asymmetry fostered fears of hegemony and counter-balancing behavior. Third, ASEAN successfully integrated economic incentives with political dialogue, creating a virtuous cycle of stability and growth. South Asia, despite housing nearly a quarter of the global population, remains dependent on extra-regional trade partners, with nearly 60% of SAARC trade occurring outside Asia. This dependence, combined with weak industrial diversification and low foreign direct investment, further marginalizes SAARC in global economic governance.
Pathways for Revitalizing SAARC in a Changing Regional Order
For SAARC to regain relevance, incremental and pragmatic reforms are essential. Strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms, expanding cross-border energy cooperation, simplifying trade procedures, and enhancing people-to-people connectivity are necessary first steps. In a region increasingly shaped by Chinese infrastructure investment and geopolitical competition, SAARC could serve as a collective platform to negotiate sustainable development terms, protect labor mobility interests, and assert South Asia’s shared cultural and historical identity. Ultimately, SAARC’s survival depends on allowing regionalism to evolve organically—supported not only by state elites but also by societal engagement—so that South Asia’s immense human and material potential can be translated into lasting regional cooperation.
Conclusion
The divergent trajectories of ASEAN and SAARC underscore that regional cooperation depends not merely on shared geography but on adaptive institutions, balanced power relations, and conflict-management mechanisms. ASEAN’s pragmatic regionalism contrasts sharply with SAARC’s structural rigidity, offering important lessons for revitalizing South Asian cooperation in an increasingly interconnected regional order.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
The Union Budget 2026–27 has accorded an unprecedented priority to national defence, allocating a historic ₹7.85 lakh crore (approximately US$93.5 billion) to the Ministry of Defence(MoD). This represents a 15.19 per cent increase over the previous year’s Budget Estimates (BE) of ₹6.81 lakh crore and accounts for nearly 14.67 per cent of total Union expenditure, the largest share commanded by any ministry. Since 2014, when defence allocations stood at roughly ₹2.29 lakh crore, India’s defence outlay has more than tripled, reflecting the Modi government’s sustained emphasis on military preparedness and strategic autonomy.
Yet the significance of this year’s budget extends beyond headline figures. The 2026–27 allocation is framed by the political leadership as a “post–Operation Sindoor” consolidation push. Operation Sindoor, described by the government as a historic military success, appears to have validated specific tactical investments particularly in airpower and precision-strike capabilities. At the same time, it exposed enduring structural weaknesses, including gaps in long-term force readiness, slow procurement cycles, and the persistent drag of manpower-heavy expenditure.
This budget must therefore be understood not merely as an accounting exercise but as a strategic document offering insight into India’s evolving threat perceptions and preparedness in an increasingly volatile neighbourhood. The notion of “collusive threats” from China and Pakistan has moved from theoretical planning to operational reality, demanding rapid capability accretion across multiple domains. Against this backdrop, a critical analysis of the defence budget reveals persistent tension between ambitious modernisation goals and unresolved structural constraints.
At an aggregate level, India’s defence expenditure remains anchored at approximately 2 per cent of GDP. While this marks a recovery from earlier declines, it continues to fall short of the 2.5–3 per cent benchmark repeatedly recommended by the Standing Committee on Defence and several Defence Secretary–led expert committees. In the aftermath of a major military operation, the inability or unwillingness to cross this threshold raises questions about the depth of India’s fiscal commitment to long-term military transformation.
The internal composition of the defence budget further highlights enduring challenges. Pay and allowances account for around 26.4 per cent of total allocations, while defence pensions consume another 21.84 per cent, amounting to ₹1.71 lakh crore. Combined, these heads absorb nearly half of overall defence spending, significantly constraining fiscal space for modernisation. Civil organisations under the MoD receive 3.64 per cent, leaving capital and operational expenditure to compete within a tightly bounded envelope.
Although capital expenditure has grown substantially, the broader structure continues to reflect a manpower-intensive force model inherited from earlier decades. Without deeper reformsparticularly in pension liabilities, the budgetary system risks perpetuating a cycle in which modernisation gains remain incremental rather than transformational.
The most consequential feature of the 2026–27 defence budget is the sharp rise in capital expenditure, which stands at ₹2,19,306.47 crore with an increase of 21.83 per cent over the previous year’s BE of ₹1,80,000 crore. Capital spending now accounts for roughly 27.95 per cent of the total defence allocation, underscoring the government’s intent to prioritise capability development over mere force sustenance.
A granular examination of capital outlay reveals a deliberate tilt towards technology-intensive force multipliers rather than platform-heavy expansion. The largest share continues to be allocated to “Other Equipment,” which has risen from ₹63,099.03 crore in the 2025–26 BE to ₹82,217.82 crore in 2026–27, an increase of over 30 per cent. This head covers a wide spectrum of assets, including electronic warfare systems, radars, drones, loitering munitions, and digitisation tools critical for network-centric warfare.
Spending on aircraft and aeroengines has also witnessed a significant increase, rising to ₹63,733.94 crore from ₹48,614.06 crore in the previous BE an increase of nearly 31 per cent. Although the 2025–26 revised estimates had temporarily pushed spending beyond ₹72,000 crore, the 2026–27 BE establishes a high and stable baseline for sustained airpower modernisation. This allocation is crucial for maintaining operational readiness following Operation Sindoor and for advancing long-pending acquisition programmes such as the 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA).
Naval modernisation, while steady, appears comparatively restrained. The Navy has allocated ₹25,023.63 crore for fleet modernisation, marginally higher than the ₹24,390.95 crore in the previous BE. While modest in absolute terms, this funding remains strategically significant given India’s expanding maritime responsibilities and the growing presence of adversarial naval assets in the Indian Ocean Region.
Research and Development (R&D) has received ₹17,250.25 crore under the capital head, up from ₹14,923.82 crore in the 2025–26 BE. In addition, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been allocated a total budget of ₹29,100 crore, with ₹17,200 crore earmarked for capital expenditure. This sustained increase reinforces the government’s emphasis on indigenous technology development under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative.
The allocation patterns in the 2026–27 budget reflect direct lessons drawn from recent operational experience. The sharp increase in aircraft and aero-engine funding signals recognition of the decisive role played by air superiority, electronic warfare, and standoff-strike capabilities during Operation Sindoor. Investments in airborne early warning systems, beyond-visual-range missiles, and advanced electronic warfare suites aim to preserve escalation of dominance in future contingencies.
Similarly, the emphasis on “Other Equipment” underscores the military’s shift towards digitisation and enhanced situational awareness. Drones, battlefield sensors, and integrated command-and-control systems are increasingly central to operations across high-altitude, desert, and maritime environments. For the Army, these investments are particularly relevant in addressing challenges along the northern borders, where terrain and logistics impose severe operational constraints.
Maritime deterrence remains another key concern. Although the Navy’s capital allocation has risen only marginally, it supports critical long-term projects such as Project 75(I), which aims to induct six advanced submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion systems. In an environment marked by China’s expanding naval footprint and growing undersea activity in the Indian Ocean, these capabilities are essential for maintaining credible deterrence.
A defining feature of the 2026–27 budget is its attempt to energise India’s defence industrial ecosystem, particularly through enhanced participation by domestic firms. Approximately 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget around ₹1.64 lakh crore has been earmarked for procurement from Indian companies, including private sector entities. This reflects a sustained policy commitment to indigenisation and reduced import dependence.
The imminent signing of the ₹70,000 crore-plus Project 75(I) submarine contract with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems exemplifies this approach. While the project involves foreign collaboration, it mandates indigenous content levels starting at 45 per cent and rising to 60 per cent over time. Indian shipyards such as Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited stand to benefit, along with hundreds of MSMEs integrated into global supply chains for sensors, spares, and sub-systems.
In aerospace, customs-duty exemptions on raw materials for aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) represent a strategically significant reform. As the Indian Air Force’s fleet expands particularly with the induction of new fighter platforms domestic MRO capacity becomes critical for reducing downtime during crises. Collaborations such as Safran’s proposed MRO facility for M88 engines in Hyderabad signal growing confidence in India’s aerospace ecosystem.
Emerging technologies also feature prominently. The induction of weaponised unmanned interceptor craft developed by private firms under the iDEX framework highlights the growing role of start-ups in addressing niche operational requirements, particularly in coastal and maritime security.
Despite the scale of India’s defence budget, comparative analysis underscores the severity of its strategic challenge. China’s estimated defence spending of approximately US$374 billionnearly four times India’s translates into significantly greater acquisition power, particularly in advanced technologies such as hypersonic weapons, space systems, and artificial intelligence. Pakistan, while far behind in absolute terms, continues to offset asymmetries through targeted acquisitions, including Turkish drones and Chinese aircraft.
India’s challenge, therefore, is not merely to outspend individual adversaries but to balance resources across two geographically distinct theatres. This reality stretches procurement priorities thin and places a premium on efficient allocation, technological leverage, and rapid decision-making.
Six years after its introduction, the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 presents a mixed record. While it has successfully prioritised domestic procurement and reduced outright imports, it has also revealed significant inefficiencies.
The prolonged gestation of Project 75(I) illustrates these shortcomings. Conceived over two decades ago, the project took nearly six years under DAP 2020 to reach the contract-signing stage. In an era characterised by rapid technological change, procurement cycles spanning 15–20 years risk delivering platforms that are operationally dated upon induction.
Moreover, the emphasis on negative import lists has occasionally resulted in capability gaps, where foreign options are excluded before indigenous alternatives are fully mature. While programmes such as the Light Combat Helicopter and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft are strategically vital, over-reliance on future indigenous deliveries carries near-term operational risks.
Export promotion remains another weak link. Although domestic manufacturing capacity has expanded, explicit budgetary support for defence exports remains opaque. To emulate countries such as Turkey whose drone exports have reshaped regional power balances India must provide stronger incentives for private-sector R&D and faster certification pathways.
A critical imbalance persists in the allocation of resources between public sector undertakings and private industry. Investment in Defence Public Sector Undertakings remains at ₹1,494 crore, while combined assistance for prototype development under “Make” procedures for the Army and Air Force stands at just ₹1,707.81 crore. This disparity limits the private sector’s ability to undertake long-term, high-risk R&D.
For India’s defence industrial ecosystem to mature, private firms must be treated as strategic partners rather than peripheral vendors. This entails sharing R&D risk, offering stable long-term contracts, and rewarding innovation and speed rather than procedural compliance. Rationalising revenue expenditure particularly pensions would further free fiscal space for technology-driven solutions where private industry excels.
The Union Budget 2026–27 represents a calibrated effort to consolidate military gains following Operation Sindoor while addressing select capability gaps in airpower, maritime deterrence, and battlefield digitisation. The sharp rise in capital expenditure and the emphasis on indigenous procurement signal a clear strategic intent to modernise India’s armed forces.
However, the budget stops short of the structural transformation required to fully align India’s military posture with its strategic ambitions. Persistent manpower costs, slow procurement cycles, and limited private sector incentivisation continue to constrain modernisation outcomes. With defence spending hovering around 2 per cent of GDP, India risks pursuing a “more with less” approach in an era where adversaries are rapidly scaling technological capabilities.
Ultimately, state-funded capital expenditure alone cannot deliver the military transformation India seeks. Without decisive reforms to pension liabilities, procurement processes, and private-sector participation, India may continue to punch below its weight in the global hard-power equation, despite impressive headline numbers. Yet the trajectory is not without a promise. The steady rise in capital allocations, growing confidence in indigenous platforms, and the gradual opening of the defence ecosystem to private industry indicate that the foundations for long-term transformation are being laid. If complemented by sustained fiscal commitment, procurement reform, and deeper public–private collaboration, India is well positioned to translate its economic strength and technological ambition into credible, multidomain military power in the decade ahead.
About the Author
Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs.
