By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Eastern Mediterranean is no longer just a peripheral zone of Middle Eastern diplomacy; it has become a strategic epicenter of global energy, security, and geopolitical rivalry. In this rapidly evolving theater, the partnership between Cyprus and Israel has emerged as one of the most critical and complex bilateral relationships. Driven by shared energy ambitions, maritime security interests, and balancing against Turkish assertiveness, the two states have built a robust alliance. Yet beneath the surface, this alliance is being tested by maritime boundary disputes, diverging foreign policy alignments, and the lingering uncertainty of regional diplomacy.

The Cyprus–Israel relationship oscillates between deep strategic cooperation and geopolitical friction. While both nations benefit from collaboration on natural gas development and trilateral security cooperation with Greece, recent developments such as Israel’s rapprochement with Turkiye, unresolved Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) disputes, and diverging stances on regional conflicts have exposed latent vulnerabilities in their alignment. This article dissects the relationship with granular detail, focusing on the interplay of energy, security, diplomacy, and regional pressure.

Historical Underpinnings: From Distance to Alliance

Cyprus and Israel had historically distant relations for much of the 20th century. Cyprus, despite being geographically close, generally aligned itself with the Arab bloc on issues such as Palestinian statehood and maintained a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. This reflected both ideological concerns and practical diplomatic strategy, as Cyprus sought to maintain balanced ties with the Arab world, crucial for economic and political support. Meanwhile, Israel was closely aligned with Turkiye, particularly after the 1950s, which limited its incentive to engage with Cyprus, a country embroiled in the Cyprus problem, a complex geopolitical conflict that resulted in the division of the island after Turkiye’s military intervention in 1974.

The turning point came after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli naval forces raided a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza, resulting in ten civilian deaths and a breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations. This pushed Israel to seek new strategic allies in the region, namely Cyprus and Greece, who shared concerns over Turkish maritime assertiveness.

Thus began a rapid normalization and expansion of ties, evolving into strategic cooperation encompassing energy, defense, intelligence sharing, and regional diplomacy.

Energy Diplomacy and EEZ Disputes

The discovery of major natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean was a key catalyst in strengthening Cyprus–Israel ties. Israel discovered the Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) gas fields, while Cyprus found the Aphrodite field (2011) in Block 12 of its declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

To coordinate exploration and exploitation, Israel and Cyprus signed an EEZ delimitation agreement in 2010, consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, Turkiye does not recognize UNCLOS or the Republic of Cyprus and has aggressively challenged the legitimacy of these EEZs.

A critical issue is the Aphrodite Yishai gas reservoir, which crosses the maritime boundary between Cyprus and Israel. Israel has argued that a portion of the field lies within its EEZ and that Israeli companies should be entitled to a share of revenues. The disagreement has stalled the development of Aphrodite, with negotiations ongoing since 2011.

Despite multiple rounds of talks, no unitization agreement has been finalized. This remains a lingering technical commercial dispute that has geopolitical overtones, as any mismanagement could sour the broader alliance.

The EastMed Gas Project: Promise and Politics

In 2016, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece proposed the EastMed Gas Pipeline, a €6 billion project to transport gas from the Levant Basin to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. The pipeline is designed to carry 10–12 billion cubic meters of gas annually to reduce EU dependence on Russian energy. While symbolically significant, the project has faced technical, financial, and political hurdles:

• The depth and complexity of the seabed route make construction expensive and logistically challenging.
• Turkiye has objected vehemently, claiming the pipeline infringes on its claimed continental shelf, particularly after its 2019 maritime delimitation deal with Libya.
• The U.S. withdrew support in 2022, calling the project “financially unviable” and pushing for electrification alternatives like the EuroAsia Interconnector.

Israel’s enthusiasm for EastMed has cooled recently. Talks with Turkiye about exporting gas via existing pipelines to Europe have raised fears in Cyprus that Israel could pivot away from the Greek Cypriot route in favor of economic expedience and Turkish normalization. This adds a strategic ambiguity to the Israel–Cyprus relationship.

Trilateral Security Cooperation with Greece

The trilateral partnership between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece has become one of the most active diplomatic formats in the region. Since its first summit in 2016, it has expanded to include annual high-level meetings, joint military drills, and infrastructure projects:

Key defense collaborations include:

• “Noble Dina” Naval Exercises: Annual drills involving anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and maritime interdiction scenarios.
• “INIOCHOS” Air Exercises: Coordinated by Greece, these involve multi-domain training and are often used for testing Israel’s F-35s and Cyprus’s air defense capacity.
• EuroAsia Interconnector: A 1,208 km undersea cable project aiming to link the three countries’ power grids, expected to be operational by 2028.

These initiatives are motivated by a shared perception of Turkish assertiveness as destabilizing. However, analyst Z. Tziarras likes to note that this is a “quasi alliance,” strategically useful but lacking treaty obligations or military guarantees, meaning cooperation remains conditional on current leadership preferences and external shocks.

Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement and Cypriot Unease

In recent years, Israel has worked to repair ties with Turkiye, culminating in the exchange of ambassadors in 2022 and increased energy dialogue. While these moves are welcomed by many international actors, they trigger anxiety in Nicosia. Turkiye has offered Israel the possibility of using its existing pipeline infrastructure to export gas to Europe cheaper and faster than the EastMed pipeline. For Cyprus, this poses a dual threat:

• Economic: It undermines the commercial value of Cyprus’s own energy strategy.
• Political: It risks marginalizing Cyprus in regional energy diplomacy.

Recent meetings between Israeli and Turkish energy ministers have signaled growing momentum for cooperation, though no formal agreement has been signed as of mid 2025. Still, Cyprus views these developments with strategic caution, concerned that its once exclusive partnership with Israel may become a regional triangle where Ankara reasserts influence.

Divergence on Palestine and the UN

Despite being a strategic partner to Israel, Cyprus maintains diplomatic symmetry with Arab states and has long supported Palestinian statehood. It was one of the first European states to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988 and often votes in favor of UN resolutions critical of Israeli actions, particularly those concerning settlement expansion and military operations in Gaza. Cyprus has historically sought to position itself as a bridge between Europe, the Arab world, and Israel. While this position has been largely respected by Israel, it can at times create diplomatic frictions, especially during periods of intense regional violence or sensitive UN resolutions.

Both states, however, have demonstrated an ability to compartmentalize differences, keeping strategic cooperation separate from their ideological divergences on the Palestinian issue.

External Actors and Regional Balancing

The Cyprus–Israel axis does not operate in isolation. It intersects with a wider constellation of regional powers and international institutions:

• European Union: Strongly supports Cyprus’s EEZ rights and opposes Turkish drilling. The EU has backed infrastructure like the EuroAsia Interconnector.
• United States: A close Israeli ally, the U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Cyprus in 2020, signaling support for its regional role. However, its withdrawal from East Med support indicates a preference for de-escalation over entrenchment.
• Egypt: A key player in the EMGF, it shares energy goals with Cyprus and Israel and maintains its own large gas infrastructure.
• Russia: Historically supported Cyprus diplomatically, but its regional role has been weakened by the war in Ukraine.
• Lebanon: Shares a maritime boundary dispute with Israel. Recent U.S.-brokered agreements on maritime boundaries have opened the door to future EMGF expansion, potentially including Lebanon in broader frameworks.

This growing web of energy diplomacy and overlapping claims underscores the need for structured, rules-based conflict management in the region.

Conclusion

As Cyprus and Israel continue to navigate the choppy waters of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics, their relationship stands as a test case for modern alliance building in contested regions. The strategic rationale remains solid: shared energy corridors, joint security interests, and a common stance against unilateral regional dominance, particularly by Turkiye. However, as the geopolitical chessboard shifts, the durability of this alliance depends on adaptability, trust, and mutual clarity of intent.

For Cyprus, the challenge lies in ensuring that its sovereignty and maritime claims are not sidelined in Israel’s broader regional recalibrations, especially if ties with Ankara deepen. For Israel, maintaining credibility as a dependable partner while pursuing diversified energy and diplomatic options will require a delicate balance of pragmatism and principle.

Ultimately, Cyprus–Israel tensions are not a sign of a failing alliance but of one grappling with the realities of multipolar diplomacy. If managed wisely, this relationship can serve as a cornerstone for regional energy stability, maritime order, and strategic cooperation in one of the world’s most volatile maritime zones.

About the Author

Drishti Gupta is a postgraduate in International Relations with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Delhi University. She brings a strong foundation in global affairs, diplomatic studies, and strategic policy analysis. Drishti has held multiple research positions with reputed organisations such as Global Strategic & Defence News, The Geostrata, and Defence Research and Studies India, where she has contributed to key research projects on cybersecurity, foreign policy, and India’s evolving defence posture. Her academic and professional journey is marked by a deep interest in international diplomacy, global governance, and national security. She has completed certified programs on Global Diplomacy (University of London), Power and Foreign Policy, and Political Economy of Institutions, alongside the McKinsey Forward Program for professional development.

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By: Aditi Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The rivalry between Greece and Turkey that has its roots in centuries-old conflicts and is marked by frequent crises that have influenced not only the geopolitical environment of the southeast European continent but also that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the larger regional security framework. Greece and Turkey have had a Cold War-style, protracted struggle for at least the past 40 years disrupted by shorter or longer détente pauses. Another way to characterise this situation is as a relationship of manageable tension.

Due to the bilateral relationship’s tumultuous past, competing nationalist narratives are frequently discussed in public. Both nations are regarded as each other’s “founding fathers,” according to their respective occupations before attaining independence that is Greece in 1829 and Turkey in 1923. On both sides, elite thought, public opinion, and national security doctrines are still influenced by these intersecting historical traumas.

The stakes are raised by the fact that both nations are strategically located to control important oil routes, maritime lanes and migrant corridors connecting three continents. The Greece-Turkey relationship is essential to peace and security in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean because of the unresolved maritime boundary disputes such as Cyprus’s partition, migratory pressures and a history of military brinkmanship.

Historical Background

From the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the fascinating coexistence of the progenitors of modern Greeks and Turks inside the Ottoman Empire the history of current-day Greeks and Turks is a case of entangled history.  The Greek-Turkish hostility has its origins in the Ottoman era when Greece was ruled by the Ottoman Empire till the Greek War of Independence in the 1800s.

There was even discussion to establish an Ottoman-Greek state during the last decade of the nineteenth century despite the existence of the Kingdom of Greece which was pursuing expansion. Just ten years after the terrible Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 a similar idea resurfaced in the 1930s that was of a Greek–Turkish confederation. Later, Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923 that put an end to hostilities and it attempted to settle territorial disputes while also redrawing country borders and requiring population transfers. However, there were several issues that remained unresolved particularly the ones that pertained to minority rights and Aegean Sea islands.

Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952 because of the Cold War with the goal of promoting collaboration against shared external threats. Both countries constantly pursued different strategic priorities rather than reducing their rivalry. The mistrust was also heightened by Cyprus – related divisions after the island gained independence in 1960 and after the Turkish military intervened on July 20, 1974. Further, there have been frequent crises in the Aegean and continuous disputes over air and maritime space and the bilateral relationship alternated between cautious détente and outright hostility on occasion.

Cyprus Conflict

At the geostrategic intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is Cyprus. It was therefore historically considered an important strategic area for numerous empires and civilisations. Cyprus fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1571. Large numbers of settlers from all across the Empire were brought in by the Ottomans to create a Turkish presence in the local populace.

In exchange for helping the Ottoman Empire defend its eastern provinces from Russian threats, Britain assumed administrative authority of the island in 1878. The emerging Turkish Republic officially ceded its claim of Cyprus to Britain in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The island was officially proclaimed a crown colony by Britain in 1925, two years later.

When the island obtained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, certain Greek Cypriot elites started to demand that it be merged with the Kingdom of Greece before the end of the 19th century. Calls to merge the island with Greece grew among Greek Cypriot elites. Pro-enosis Greek nationalism played a major role in the bloody riots against the British government in 1931. The Greek Cypriots resumed their political involvement following World War II.

On July 15, 1974, a Greek-sponsored coup was carried out as a result of intercommunal violence and desires for enosis or unity with Greece. On July 20, 1974 Turkey responded by launching a military incursion that gave them control of the island’s northern part. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which is solely recognised by Turkey was proclaimed on November 15, 1983 as a result of the ensuing de facto division. Although decades of reunification negotiations have not produced a meaningful settlement, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping personnel have been maintaining a buffer zone since 1974.

In the wake of the Turkish invasion, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim established a new mission of good works. Serious talks about many humanitarian challenges took place during the next 10 months. The main political issues like territory, refugees and the structure of the government however, remained unresolved.

Migration and Refugee Crisis

Migration has become a geopolitical and humanitarian issue. Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers fled Turkey for Greek islands during the 2015 refugee crisis that placed a burden on resources and sparking disagreements over border control. When Turkish officials urged thousands of migrants to approach the Greek land border at Evros in March 2020 tensions reached a height and the Greek security forces responded with. The EU mediated aid packages and border assistance out of concern for its own stability but the underlying friction still exists.

Aegean Sea Dispute

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Greece and Turkey have been at odds over the Aegean islands. Both countries current borders were set by international treaties following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Many Aegean islands however, had no clear status which resulted in continuous ownership and control disputes. Due to competing claims to the region’s borders, Athens and Ankara have been at conflict over maritime matters in the Aegean Sea since the 1970s.

Historical hostility, the demilitarisation of Eastern Aegean islands, disagreements over the boundaries of national seas and the Continental Shelf and regular airspace breaches are the main causes of this protracted Aegean Sea problem. Tensions between the two countries have increased because of the incidents and military posture brought on by these divisive topics. The discovery of substantial natural gas reserves in the area and the 44-refugee crisis affecting Europe are two of the many reasons that have contributed to the recent escalation of tensions between the two nations. Natural gas has increased the stakes with Turkey claiming that because of their closeness to the gas resources islands like Kastellorizo should be under its jurisdiction.

While Turkey opposes the application of UNCLOS in the Aegean and claims concerns over its own coastal security, Greece on the other hand rests its claims on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which it is a signatory. Any Greek attempt to expand its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is viewed as a casus belli by Turkey. The discovery of new energy deposits in the area has intensified rivalry for access and rights to profitable hydrocarbons that makes these disputes more pressing. Frequent diplomatic and military conflicts are fuelled by such disagreements.

Recent Developments

Greece’s strategy to become the EU’s safeguards against Turkey was altered when it realised that closer ties between the EU and Turkey increased the likelihood that it could settle its bilateral issues with Turkey and the Cyprus issue in accordance with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. However, during the height of EU-Turkey relations historic potential were lost.

Prospects for resolving the Cyprus issue were scuttled in April 2004 when Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan. Furthermore, in December 2004 the Greek government did not exert pressure on Turkey to refer the unresolved maritime zone delimitation problems to the Hague’s International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Due to several structural and conceptual issues Greek-Turkish relations have become more tense after two decades of relative peace and lost chances to resolve their differences. The strategic decisions made by both nations were certain to have an impact on the future of their relations because Turkey’s EU membership was no longer a means of resolving bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey. The importance of interaction mechanisms which Greece had deemed crucial to advancing its concept of bilateral cooperation was diminished in Turkey as a result of Turkey’s move away from West institutions and pursuit of strategic autonomy. The nature of bilateral relations was unavoidably altered by this.

When Turkey sent the research vessel Oruc Reis along with warships and a Greek naval mobilisation to perform seismic investigations in disputed seas off the coast of Kastellorizo island on May 20, 2020 tensions significantly increased. Therefore, naval brinkmanship and diplomatic standoffs took place in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Concerned by these events and in solidarity with its member Greece, the EU urged for moderation and threatened sanctions on Turkey. To maintain balance the US called for talks while highlighting NATO unity. In October 2020, more EU sanctions were put in place because to Turkey’s ongoing drilling operations.

Despite multiple standoffs diplomatic channels have remained open. In January 2021 Greece and Turkey resumed exploratory talks after a five-year hiatus while United Nations-facilitated meetings in Geneva sought to revive Cyprus negotiations. NATO facilitated military de-confliction mechanisms by establishing a hotline. Despite these dialogues there were no fundamental breakthroughs were achieved by 2025 which left tensions unresolved but controlled.

Amongst various external powers, one important stakeholder has been the EU which has pushed Turkey with economic penalties and offered Greece diplomatic support. While energy interests and migrant cooperation complicate the EU’s balancing act France increased its naval presence to demonstrate support for Greece. The United States maintains strategic interests that underscore the importance of bilateral stability for NATO’s southern flank and serve as a check on the situation in times of crisis by maintaining military installations in both Greece and Turkey. through communication with Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. By applying its energy expertise Russia seeks to expand its influence and presence in the Mediterranean, further complicating an already complex web of rivalries and alliances.

Economic Interdependence and Strategic Realities

Throughout the 20th century, most peripheral economies have been influenced by the pursuit of economic growth. The years following 1949 established a somewhat stable climate in Greece that facilitated quick development. Growth rates during what became known as the Golden Age were roughly 6.5 percent in the 1950s and 7.4 percent from 1961 to 1979. A lot of this was dependent on fiscal and monetary restraint. However, when that equilibrium was thrown off in the 1970s especially during the oil crisis, inflation increased and foreign inflows decreased, which ultimately had a significant negative impact on employment and economy. As part of the EU’s Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) frameworks the country began to move towards privatisation and market reforms in the 1990s as a result of mounting domestic demands as well as pressure from the EU.

The economic trajectory of Turkey was rather more lopsided. Populist cycles continued and the nation had financial crises in 1994 and 2001. More domestic borrowing was made possible by financial liberalisation but it also increased interest rates and produced fiscal deficits that exposed more serious structural problems.

The 1999 reconciliation did however, inject some fresh vitality. In the early 2000s, trade and investment increased particularly in sectors like building and tourism. Both sides’ business communities appeared optimistic.

All of it, however was unable to keep politics out. Cyprus and Aegean tensions continued to resurface. Additionally, the political resolve to forge closer commercial links declined along with Turkey’s EU process. Large-scale initiatives like the EastMed pipeline might be beneficial but only if political trust is established beforehand.

Pathways to Resolution

The key to long-term de-escalation is diplomatic interaction which can be aided by impartial third parties. Although the UN and NATO offer platforms for communication, political will is necessary for them to be effective. Long-term fixes can be provided by impartial dispute resolution and confidence-building measures. Cooperation needs to be encouraged by economic collaboration, particularly in the areas of energy and regional infrastructure. The best chances for regional stability are supported by international law-based arbitration.

The ongoing disputes between Greece and Turkey over national identity, resources and sovereignty continue to pose a severe danger to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Euro-Atlantic region. Frequent crises indicate the potential for escalation, while initiatives to promote trust and regional diplomatic engagement suggest a path ahead. A successful resolution requires the political might of both Athens and Ankara, as well as the continuous support of international institutions and third-party mediators.

About the Author

Aditi Sharma has recently completed her Master’s in Geopolitics and International Relations, from Manipal Academy of Higher Education, building a strong academic foundation in global affairs. She has previously interned at the Vivekananda International Foundation and is passionate about International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Journalism. Her core interests lie in Indian National Security, Defence, Counterterrorism, and West Asian Studies. She is committed to continuous learning and aims to contribute meaningfully to public and academic discourse.

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By: Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

The Trump 2.0 Presidency, most in India thought, would be an easy one for India. After all, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the United States President Donald Trump called each other ‘good friends’ and seemed to share a great personal equation. Modi was also among the first of the world leaders who visited Washington DC soon after Trump took charge in January this year. Modi’s February visit to the United States seemed to then indicate that both leaders were picking up from where they had last left. But since then something seems to have gone amiss in this relationship with Trump’s almost daily tirades against India. It would be fair to say that at this point the India-US relationship seems to be at its lowest in the last two decades or more.

The recent announcement where the United States has slapped India with a 50 percent tariff, the highest among all countries so far, will ensure that the India-US relationship goes into a sharp nose-dive. Brazil is the only other country today facing tariffs as high as India’s. New Delhi responded sharply to this latest onslaught by Trump and pointed out that the tariffs are “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable” and said its imports of Russian oil is based on its objective of securing the energy needs of its nation of 1.4 billion people. But the damage to the relationship is now a done deal.

If one was to try and make sense of how it has all come to this, it would be fair to state that Trump seems irked with India. And there are many theories as to what has upset the US President. Many believe that not giving Trump credit for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan during Op Sindoor has upset him. India has been quite clear that no third country was involved in the ceasefire between India and Pakistan following four days of conflict in May this year. It is important to point out here that it was actually the US President who first announced the ceasefire in a post on social media and claimed credit for it. He has since then taken credit for it almost 28 times. Pakistan was quick to thank him and also went on to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. India diplomatically maintained that no third country was involved in this. Many have since argued that India should try and play up to Trump’s ego and maybe give him the headlines and attention he craves. But that is hard for India to do given the domestic sensitivities when it comes to Pakistan; and Pakistan-sponsored cross border terrorism.

Now Trump has decided to ‘weaponize’ tariffs against India and much of the world. And if that was not enough, Trump has now dragged Russia into the row by pointing out how India’s purchase of Russian oil has in a way funded the Ukraine war.

In his latest move, Trump has raised by 25 per cent the tariffs on India as a punishment over its purchases of cheap Russian oil, which today account for one-third of its imported oil. So in effect India today faces 50 per cent tariffs, one of the highest the US has imposed on any country so far.

“They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine,” he said in a post to his Truth Social network recently. He also accused India of selling Russian oil “on the Open Market for big profits”. In a previous social media post, he went on to refer to both Russia and India as ‘dead economies”.

These almost daily comments have of course upset many in India and there has been a fierce debate on how to deal with Trump and his constant and rather insulting remarks. Some have suggested that perhaps India can assuage his ego a little and give in to his demands to soften his stance. But the majority opinion in India seems to be clear that India must push back and Trump’s behaviour should not be tolerated.

After showing considerable restrain, India’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement 4 August that was clearly a push back against Trump and his various allegations. It was rather strongly worded and for once minced no words about the hypocrisy being displayed by both the US and the European Union with regards to Russia. “India has been targeted by the United States and the European Union for importing oil from Russia after the commencement of the Ukraine conflict. In fact, India began importing from Russia because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the outbreak of the conflict. The United States at that time actively encouraged such imports by India for strengthening global energy markets stability,” said the statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

The MEA statement also pointed out that, “In this background, the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable. Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security.”

In the end, what we are now looking at is a bilateral relationship that has hit its lowest. India has decided to stand up and push back at Trump, who is going overboard with his penalties in the form of tariffs. This will push India to seek conciliation with China even as the US moves closer to Pakistan. The coming weeks will now tell whether the India-US relationship is likely to worsen or start repairing.

About the Author

Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9

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By: Sonalika Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

“Make America Great Again” (MAGA), first coined by Donald Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, has evolved into a potent political movement grounded in nativist nationalism and populism. Its core message asserts that America has lost its former prosperity and global status due to issues like immigration, globalization, and a perceived cultural decline. Since then, MAGA has left a lasting imprint on Republican politics, public discourse, and international right-wing strategies.

But in 2025, with Trump back in the White House and brandishing slogans reminiscent of MAGA’s origins, the question arises: Is MAGA really happening? To answer, we must examine its electoral strength, ideological unity, institutional influence, ideological potency, and cultural reach. This article delves into MAGA’s current reality from its increasingly visible power to internal rifts, its blueprint for change, and the fragile coalition that sustains it. Only then can we evaluate whether MAGA is a transformative movement reshaping American politics or a personalized brand vulnerable to fractures and contingent upon one man’s influence.

MAGA is more than campaign sloganeering it represents a deeply embedded worldview. According to Britannica, it blends nativist resentment of immigration and globalization with a nostalgic idealism about America’s past.  Among Republicans, about half to 60% identify as MAGA-aligned, making it the dominant faction within the party. However, MAGA remains a minority on the national scale, with non-Republican Americans less likely to identify with it.

Beyond politics, MAGA has spawned a parallel economic ecosystem conservative-aligned businesses intentionally cater to its base. Prominent examples include Public Square (a conservative Yelp alternative) and GrabAGun, an online firearms retailer backed by Trump Jr. These ventures are not merely symbolic they’ve raised over US$ 179 million in IPO proceeds and generated meaningful revenue, indicating economic momentum beyond mere rhetoric.

MAGA-like ideologies are crossing borders. Terms such as “Make Europe Great Again” and conservative summits in London reflect a global resonance. While Trump’s foreign populism remains parochial, its theme’s identity, skepticism of globalization resonates among right-wing groups in Europe, Latin America, and beyond.

In July 2025, MAGA’s coherence was jolted by the controversy surrounding the Jeffrey Epstein files. Trump received intense pressure from MAGA influencers like Steve Bannon, Dan Bongino, and Nikki Haley to release grand-jury testimony against liberal elites.  When the DOJ disclosed no such “client list,” many within MAGA perceived it as a cover-up.

This generated rare internal backlash at Turning Point USA’s summit, young MAGA leaders booed the administration’s approach and warned that disillusionment could erode support by up to 10%. Axios labeled it a crisis of faith within the base. Although Trump eventually dismissed the controversy and loyalists rallied back, the episode revealed friction MAGA’s predictive influence no longer guarantees command over its audience.

Internal MAGA tensions also arose over foreign and economic policy. Hardline MAGA members criticized Trump’s continued military aid to Ukraine and measured stance on Iran, suggesting he’s drifting from his “America First”. Meanwhile, the signature tax-cut initiative nicknamed the “Big, Beautiful Bill” (BBB) faced criticism conservatives celebrated it, but populists argued it betrayed working-class interests and spiked inequality.  This economic divergence underscores the tension between Trump’s plutocratic policies and his working-class supporters.

The MAGA movement now straddles Donald Trump’s personal brand and a deeper ideological current. Trump remains indispensable his actions set movement direction, but MAGA influencers are increasingly vocal in policing deviations. Figures like Bannon and Carlson have publicly reprimanded Trump when they perceive he strays.

Analysts warn this relationship is fraught Trump seeks control, while true believers expect ideological fidelity. That friction tends to emerge over issues like transparency, executive overreach, and foreign alliances and they could intensify if Trump bends to institutional or donor pressures.

Project 2025 is the institutional architecture designed to convert MAGA sentiment into lasting power. Spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation and Trump-aligned officials, it consists of four components a detailed policy manual, a personnel database, training programs, and a “day-one” playbook.  Its 900-page plan, Mandate for Leadership 2025, seeks to “deconstruct the administrative state” and accelerate conservative governance.

If enacted, Project 2025 would drastically reshape governance replacing civil servants with loyalists, subsuming independent agencies under the White House, curtailing federal equality and environmental enforcement, and bolstering executive authority.  Critics liken it to a template for democratic erosion, with warnings about removing checks and balances and repositioning agencies as political tools.

Despite distancing statements during the 2024 campaign, Trump’s second term has adopted many of the plan’s recommendations. Brookings notes that almost two-thirds of Trump’s early executive actions match Project 2025’s proposals on deregulation, immigration, environmental rollback, and social issues.  The Guardian concurs that Trump is using Project 2025 as a century-long governance blueprint.

Public opinion reflects serious concerns. A Navigator poll found most Americans fear that Project 2025 would grant unprecedented presidential power, roll back constitutional rights, and dismantle checks and balances. Legal scholars warn it amounts to democratic backsliding a rewiring of governance toward authoritarian control.

MAGA faithful view Project 2025 as a mechanism to institutionalize their agenda, ensuring permanence beyond electoral cycles. For opponents, it’s a warning sign revealing how ideology can morph into systemic overhaul.

Key MAGA influencers Steve Bannon, JD Vance, Elon Musk, Vivek Ramaswamy are already positioning themselves for future leadership roles.  Whether they build successor movements or serve under a future Trump term will shape MAGA’s evolution.

MAGA’s base is an uneasy fusion of rural lower-middle-class populists and billionaire-aligned elites, united by shared suspicion of the liberal establishment.  This coalition thrives on policy friction populists want tariffs, protectionism, and cultural conservatism, while elites back deregulation and business-focused governance. Historical parallels to past populist-authoritarian alliances suggest fissures are inevitable.

Young conservatives, especially those aligned with Turning Point USA, continue to champion MAGA ideals rank-and-file maintenance of “America First” rhetoric remains strong. Internationally, MAGA themes appear in conservative movements globally, though adaptations vary.

MAGA’s durability depends on managing internal tensions loyalty vs ideology, Trump vs institutions, populism vs plutocracy. If Trump maintains his authoritarian populist posture, MAGA may persist even grow. Absent Trump, ideological opponents or establishment Republicans might fracture the movement. The Epstein backlash hints at these fragilities, underscoring the continual risk of fragmentation.

So, is MAGA really happening? The evidence suggests yes, but not in a simple or monolithic way.

On one hand, MAGA remains a powerful force. Politically, it shapes Republican primaries and executive decisions. Economically, its parallel ecosystem including IPO-backed conservative platforms continues to expand. Globally, its rhetoric and themes resonate with right-wing movements abroad.

Yet internal tensions pose serious challenges. The Epstein files controversies, economic policy splits, and foreign policy misalignments reveal unseen cracks. Trump’s discomfort with ideological purists and his alliances with mega-capitalists create persistent friction.

Project 2025 exemplifies MAGA’s ambition an institutionalized, authoritarian-flavored blueprint capable of transforming governance. But mishandling ideological divisions or ceding control to non-populist elites could splinter the movement.

MAGA’s future hinges on alignment between leadership, ideology, and institutional structure. If Trump or his ideological heirs remain leaders, and Project 2025 continues driving implementation, MAGA is more than a moment it’s a political transformation underway. But if ideological coherence falters or Trump’s media grip diminishes, MAGA risks splintering into rival factions. In a polarized America, MAGA is undoubtably happening but whether it endures or implodes remains undecided.  

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as a UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations in the governance and policy sector. Over the years, she has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics, along with a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a commitment to insightful inquiry and meaningful contribution in the field of public affairs.

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

On July 30, 2025 as the 47^th US President announced tariffs on India along with penalties for purchasing Russian arms & oil, the Indian media and social media was agog with the effects of these tariffs in the coming times with heating debates and discussions noticeable in all forms of the electronic & digital media. On August 06, 2025 the tariffs on India were increased to 50%.

I am no economist and can’t comment on the effect the tariffs will have on India but what hit me the most were Donald Trump’s words on July 30, 2025 that India is a “dead economy”. Calling the most populous nation in the world with 1.46 billion population and the world’s fourth largest economy with the GDP of US$ 4.1 trillion, was an outright insult to each of the 1.46 billion Indian citizens.

Of the three super-powers ie the USA, Russia and China, India has normal relations with Russia and tensions with the USA and China. Donald Trump’s stance on India since he was inaugurated as the 47^th US President on January 20, 2025, has certainly not been pro-India. Whether it was him praising Pakistan during his inauguration speech and not mentioning India at all in the entire 30 minutes speech, or him taking credit 32 times for effecting the India-Pakistan ceasefire after the 88-hour conflict between the two nations in May 2025, a claim outrightly rejected by India or his words calling India a dead economy, none of Donald Trump’s actions inspire strong India-US relations any more, that existed in the last one decade.

Donald Trump’s rhetorical remarks on India are not an aberration but the climax of the anti-India stance that the USA has for decades. The US 7^th Fleet steaming towards the Bay of Bengal as the 1971 India-Pakistan War raged on and the US refusal to give India supercomputers in the 1980s are two of many such examples.

For decades, the USA has allowed Khalistani & Jihadi terrorists to use the American soil to wage a war on India. It is surprising that the Indian mainstream & social media didn’t see it coming in the last one decade and were agog with singing peans and praises for the USA and Donald Trump.

As India stands at a critical juncture in international geopolitics with tensions with two of the three superpowers, and seven out of the eight India’s neighbours not on friendly terms with India, sole exception being Bhutan, and with the two-front war to be waged by the China & Pakistan combine any time after 2030, it is now time for the Great Indian Leap!

The national animal of India is the Bengal Tiger (Panthera tigris). Tigers are famous for their leaps which can be up to 16 metres vertically and in the forward distance up to 25 metres, a remarkable achievement considering the fact that the length of an average tiger is 9 to 10 feet. And with this gigantic leap, the tiger catches its target.

India’s target for the next five years till 2030 is to increase her economic and military might despite the grave geopolitical situation that exists today in South Asia and with the growing uncertainty in global geopolitics, for the two-front war by China & Pakistan likely any time after 2030, which will be in all seven domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, space and water. India’s economic and military growth in the next five years has to be prodigious.

And for this to happen, India has to be poised for the Great Indian Leap.

Factors for the Great Indian Leap

India has made outstanding progress since her Independence in 1947. From being called a snake charmers nation in the 1950s, today India is the nation with an economy that outstrips the current economic growth of many developed nations. For a nation whom the British leader Winston Churchill had stated on March 06, 1947 that “Indian leaders will be men of straw”, Indians have proved him wrong and India’s strong progress in economic, diplomatic and military fields is attributed to the strong Indian leadership from 1947 till date.

However, the current regional and global uncertainties that exist today with the two-front war on the horizon to happen any time after five years, it is the period 2025-2030 that needs extra vigour and vitality that needs to outstrip the pace of progress India has made in the last 78 years since independence.

Everything is possible. Two examples of China, prove the impossibility theory incorrect.

One, in 2007, China had no high-speed rail network, also called bullet trains. In 2017, China achieved the maximum high-speed rail length for any nation in the world. As on date, China has 45,000 kilometres of high-speed rail network which connects all major Chinese cities.

Two, in 2015, no Chinese university ranked in the top 500 universities in the world. China launched World Class 2.0 programme with the aim of having atleast two Chinese universities in the top 500 of the world by 2030. The target was achieved well before time in 2023.

The Great Indian Leap in the next five years has to incorporate the following factors:

Accountability & Responsibility:   For every infrastructure big or small, for any central or state schemes, new or old, accountability and responsibility should be fixed. Non-performers should be removed and those be given the tasks which are lagging behind schedule. It is a pity that Gurugram, nick-named as the Millennium City, which contributes maximum tax to the state of Haryana, during each year’s monsoon is in a pitiable state. The inconvenience caused to residents and the loss of business is of enormous proportions during the three-month period from July-September when monsoon hits north India. Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, the Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force on May 29, 2025 expressed dismay at the delay in the delivery of fighter jets stating that “timeline is a big issue”. With the two-front war on the horizon, such delays are unacceptable and accountability and responsibility needs to be enforced in the strictest manner possible.

Role of Indian mainstream & social media:   The Indian mainstream & social media needs to highlight issues requiring attention, rather than only bring forth communal & religious issues and deep state & conspiracy theories, which are fast losing their charm and effect. It is time to face the real issues & challenges that are staring at the nation. The media be it electronic or social, plays a very important part in shaping narratives and has great viewership and following. Their role as the Fourth Estate has to be in national interest and not only focussed on Television Rating Points which garner more advertising revenue, and electoral advantages. Money and political advantage should take a back-seat for these media outlets for the next five years and the national interest should be the sole criteria for the challenges that India will face after 2030. USA and the West have become developed nations as they being democracies, have encouraged questioning. Russia & China have become developed nations as they have a single political party system, and hence questioning is discouraged. India is a democracy, hence questioning by the press will speed up the progress rate.

Political Unity:   On issues of national security, economic growth and military prowess, the political parties of India need to be united, irrespective of the political party’s ideology. The challenge in front of India needs the political parties to express solidarity on critical issues, irrespective of the outcome of elections at any level – national, state or municipal. The next five years have to be treated as a war effort as the two-front war clouds have started darkening. On March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.

Framing of the National Security Strategy:   India needs to formulate the National Security Strategy (NSS) within the next two months and put it in public domain. The NSS framed should spell out clearly what are the external and internal threats of India. This would greatly help in the whole-of-the-nation to deal with the adversarial situation that is just five years away.  After all, fighting a war isn’t the sole responsibility of a nation’s military only. Every ministry, organisation and individual have to contribute in war preparedness according to its capacity and capability. The future war to be waged by China & Pakistan will have to be met by enhanced technological, economic and of course military power, for which the NSS has to clearly spell out the path ahead so that all public and private sectors contribute with total clarity. A famous Chinese proverb says “The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second-best time is now”.

Finally, US President Donald Trump’s Tariff war on India and his remark of the Indian economy being dead should be the transfiguration of the Great Indian Leap. Jane Goodall’s quote “What you do makes a difference, and you have to decide what kind of difference you want to make” has deep significance for 1.46 billion Indian citizens and all public and private sector organisations that the next five years have to see a transformational India that is prepared for the two-front war that will happen any time after 2030.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

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By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

The recent Iran-Russia growing strategic partnership has shifted the attention towards the Middle East and elevated the concerns for nuclear security. This bilateral military-technology trade partnership increases the military capabilities in each country’s respective area of influence such as Ukraine in Europe and Israel in the Middle East. This strategic partnership has big implications not only in the Middle-East or Eastern Europe but many other countries. The relationship between Iran and Russia has made U.S. put economic and political sanctions on both countries. This can push both countries to come even closer and rely on each other and potentially have a big impact on global nuclear regime.

Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership

The two countries have been engaged in unprecedented rapprochement since the start of the war in Ukraine. The peak of military co-operation between the two countries came in 2022, when Iran supplied drones to Russia to be used in the Russia-Ukraine war. On January 17, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian signed an historic 20-year strategic agreement. This new “strategic partnership” between Russia and Iran was finally signed in the Kremlin just three days before the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president.

The treaty spans forty-seven articles, covering almost all major areas, including trade, energy, security, nuclear issue, port visits and joint officer training. They pledged not to allow their territory to be used in any military action against the other, or help anyone to attack the other, and would cooperate to counter outside military threats. The agreement, however, does not directly or explicitly talk about a “mutual defence clause”. The text also includes exchanges “in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy” including “the construction of nuclear energy facilities,” according to information released by the Kremlin.

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, exacerbated by the air strikes conducted by the United States (US) on Iranian nuclear sites, has significantly escalated tensions in the Middle East. Russia has condemned both Israel and the US for ‘violating international law and the United Nations Charter’. But all that condemnation was only on paper that yielded no efforts from Russia to stop the crisis. This muted reaction showed the reality of Iran-Russia strategic partnership for all the rhetoric of anti-Western solidarity. This silence is all the more striking given that Iran is one of the few countries actively supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, supplying drones, arms, and military equipment but Russia not helping Iran militarily in return.

Despite all the agreement between Iran-Russia, Russia has not supplied any arms to Iran. The Kremlin has limited itself to a formal condemnation while leaving the Islamic Republic to deal with what initially appeared to be an existential crisis that has now been temporarily paused through a ceasefire. Vladimir Putin said that Iran had not asked for help since the beginning of Israel’s air campaign. The Russian president added that the comprehensive partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran has no articles related to the military sphere.

Impact on Global Nuclear Regime

Global focus has been shifted to the Middle East, allowing the Kremlin to intensify its attacks on Ukraine, hoping for military gains there, and if the Iranian regime overcomes this crisis, it will emerge more dependent on Russia for its survival. A collapse of the Islamic Republic or a potential Iranian nuclear breakout could destabilize the broader region, erode Moscow’s strategic foothold, and expose the limitations of its capacity to shape regional power dynamics and secure its southern periphery.

The United States of America has always been against the idea of Iran becoming a nuclear state. Due to which, Trump always opted for the “Maximum Pressure” by putting more economical sections on Iran and the supporting nation Russia. This Maximum Pressure has the potential to push Tehran and Moscow Even Closer. This can increase Iran’s keenness towards making nuclear weapon or at least increase the chance of Iran asking for technological help from Russia for the development of nuclear weapon technology Nuclear Weapon Technology.

Russia recognizes that the war’s outcome has the potential to reshape its global stature, fundamentally alter the dynamics of the “Iran question” in which Moscow has long claimed a central role or as a moderator and impact global strategic stability and non-proliferation efforts. Although, Russia’s role in the Iran-Isreal crisis is constrained by its deep involvement in Ukraine crisis and the U.S. is criticised by many nations for funding the genocide in Gaza and the West-Bank. These conflicting pressures presents both risks and opportunities, with risks currently outweighing potential gains. Simultaneously, due to international sanctions, Russia grew increasingly reliant on longtime Iranian rivals for the oil-price coordination and investments in civil nuclear program and Missile development. 

Due to the ongoing crisis and global focus shifting to the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation regime has been affected. Some states may grow more interested in nuclear weapons such as Iran and South Koria. If Iran makes a nuclear weapon, the bordering countries in the Middle-East may also be forced to build deeper underground, more secretive facilities that are less vulnerable to conventional attacks. Similarly, South-Koria has repeatedly asked the U.S. to help them with North-Koria which is a nuclear country. But not getting significant response from U.S. has made them believe that America’s Nuclear Umbrella is reliable. The U.S. is losing its influence in many countries. For example, they already have strategic pacts with North Korea and close ally Belarus, as well as a partnership agreement with China. The concern about national defence and security could make them choose nuclear option.

The progress of Iran’s civil nuclear program may also be at stake due to the U.S. sanctions for limiting Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, the progress of Western sanctions on Iran and Russia have complicated Russian efforts to receive payment from Iran for work on the Bushehr plant. Russia reduced half billion dollars in debt from Iran in 2023. Yet work on new reactors at Bushehr 2 has been slow. By early 2025 only 17% of the project was completed. Isolated from the West and facing China’s investment hesitance, Tehran has little option but to rely on Russian technology. This close relationship strengthens Russia’s grip globally over civilian nuclear energy.

Iran has signed multiple treaties in the past as well with several other major nations Iran and Russia’s partnership allows the opportunity to challenge the United States and the West. Countries includes China, North Korea, Venezuela, Cube, and Belarus share similar objectives to decrease American hegemony and to create a multipolar world. China and India also seek a multipolar world but do not suffer from the same political and economic isolation levied against the Russians and Iranians.

China’s support for Iran’s nuclear ambition has been constant, which now, extends to investment in infrastructural projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, proposing a massive investment of $400 billion over the next 25 years. North Korea has signed a pact with Iran, enhancing its missile technology. Venezuela, on the other hand does not have much to offer, but has still signed the strategic pact as a tool of mutual defiance against US. Belarus, a staunch Russian ally, has consistently shown its support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear purposes.

For Europe, the Israeli–Iranian conflict has exposed its geopolitical marginalization. Efforts to align closely with the US and Israel have brought strategic risks, while excluding Europe from the decisions shaping key developments in the region. Europe faces new challenges in its relations with both Iran and Russia, arising from the war in Ukraine and the dynamics of nuclear diplomacy.

Future prospects

Nuclear talks between Iran or Russia and the United States could lead to one of these scenarios. If Iran or Russia agrees with U.S., it will likely result in a ceasefire in Ukraine and the genocide of Palestinian civilians will continue. This will reduce the U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, might give some economic relieve for both countries. Moscow’s reliance on military cooperation and alternative economic partnerships with countries like Iran, China and North Koria could diminish. This could increase the west influence and decrease the Russia’s influence in the Middle-East. This also erase all the chances of Iran acquiring Weapon of Mass Destruction and it will could also impact the Iran’s civilian nuclear program.

On the other hand, an agreement could take place between Iran and Russia, whether through tighter Western sanctions on Russia or increased pressure on Iran. In this case, America will try to put more sanctions on both nations. Russia will most likely try to bolster its ties with countries like China and North Koria and simultaneously increase control in the Middle-East. The economic and Military cooperation between Iran and Russia can speed up Iranian weapon program and grow arm supply in many countries. This can potentially end the genocide in Gaza and West-Bank, although nothing can be said about Russia-Ukraine war. This could potentially drive Tehran and Moscow into even closer strategic alignment.

Conclusion

The Iran-Russia 20-year agreement is important not just from a bilateral context but has wide raging geopolitical ramifications. The evolving alignment between Tehran and Moscow will likely continue to operate on a spectrum between transactional cooperation and strategic coordination, advancing in selective areas of mutual benefit while avoiding the risks of overcommitment. Systemic pressures have created conditions that are pushing Tehran and Moscow toward deeper cooperation, and that will continue to shape the intensity and trajectory of the partnership in the future.

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

The India–Canada reset in relations represents one of the most consequential diplomatic recalibrations undertaken by New Delhi in recent years, striking a balance between pragmatism and cautious optimism. For decades, India and Canada have shared a robust partnership grounded in democratic ideals, parliamentary systems, economic complementarities, and deep-rooted people-to-people connections that have flourished across generations. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, bilateral engagement has historically rested on a framework that combines trade, education, scientific collaboration, and cultural exchanges. However, the crisis triggered by the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in mid-2023 tested these pillars in unprecedented ways, causing a protracted freeze in high-level dialogue and a sharp deterioration of trust. New Delhi consistently rejected Canada’s “credible allegations” as unsubstantiated and politically motivated, emphasising in multiple official statements that India remained committed to addressing security concerns through lawful channels rather than what it described as public grandstanding.

Despite the turbulence, by early 2025, a combination of domestic political shifts in Ottawa and strategic compulsions in both capitals created conditions ripe for rapprochement. The arrival of Mark Carney as Canada’s new Governor of the Bank of Canada provided the first real opportunity to reset ties after nearly two years of strained relations. Carney’s pragmatic approach stood in stark contrast to the Trudeau era, with his administration signalling its readiness to compartmentalise individual legal proceedings from the broader strategic partnership. According to MEA press releases, India welcomed this shift, describing it as an “opportunity to restore momentum to a relationship of substantial promise.”

One of the first visible outcomes of the reset was the decision to fully restore diplomatic staffing at both High Commissions in New Delhi and Ottawa, which had been operating at reduced capacity since late 2023. Consular services, including visa processing for students, tourists, and business travellers, resumed within weeks of the Carney-Modi meeting on the sidelines of the 2025 G7 summit in Alberta. This development was particularly significant for the Indian diaspora in Canada, which at over 1.8 million strong represents one of the largest and most influential immigrant communities in the country. As noted in the MEA Annual Report 2024–25, restoring normal consular operations was a priority to minimize disruptions for families and businesses affected by the standoff. Beyond immediate normalisation, India and Canada have outlined an ambitious roadmap for future engagement that spans economic, technological, and security cooperation.

On trade, both sides agreed to revive negotiations toward the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and an interim Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA), with a stated goal of concluding at least the interim pact within a year. According to the Government of Canada, CEPA could unlock preferential access for Canadian exporters in sectors ranging from pulses, potash, and forestry products to advanced manufacturing and services. At the same time, Indian companies would benefit from reduced tariffs on textiles, pharmaceuticals, and IT services. The India–Canada CEO Forum, reconstituted after a hiatus, has been tasked with developing a roadmap to scale bilateral trade beyond USD 15 billion by 2030, focusing on key sectors and potential trade barriers.

The MEA has also emphasised that the new chapter in ties will involve closer cooperation on climate action, critical minerals, and the deployment of clean technology. India is looking to Canada as a partner in its National Green Hydrogen Mission, which aims to transform the country into a global hub for green hydrogen production and export. Canada, endowed with abundant reserves of lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, is eager to position itself as a reliable supplier to India’s booming battery and electric vehicle sectors. The two countries are also exploring joint ventures in grid modernisation and carbon capture, utilisation, and storage, areas where Canadian expertise aligns with India’s ambitious decarbonization targets under its updated Nationally Determined Contributions.

Security collaboration, which had nearly collapsed following the Nijjar crisis, is cautiously resuming through structured institutional mechanisms. As reported in The Hindu, the MEA and Canada’s Global Affairs have agreed to expand the annual Strategic Dialogue to include working groups on counter-terrorism financing, radicalisation prevention, and cybersecurity. A new track-1.5 dialogue involving senior security officials and think tanks is planned for early 2026 to deepen understanding of transnational extremism and strengthen legal cooperation. Canadian authorities, while maintaining that due process will continue in the Nijjar investigation, have signalled their readiness to clamp down on organisations that incite violence or promote secessionist propaganda. Indian diplomats have described this as an essential confidence-building step to insulate strategic engagement from domestic political pressures.

One area identified by the MEA as ripe for future collaboration is defence industrial cooperation. India has expressed interest in sourcing advanced simulation technologies, Arctic weather gear, and specialised aircraft components developed by Canadian firms. Canadian aerospace companies, in turn, are exploring opportunities in India’s rapidly expanding civil aviation market and defence modernisation programs. While no major defence deals have yet been finalised, the potential for collaboration in this area is significant, and both sides are expected to convene a dedicated Defence and Security Cooperation Working Group later in 2025, paving the way for a promising future.

People-to-people ties remain a robust foundation and a source of both opportunity and challenge. According to Statistics Canada, Indian immigrants are now Canada’s largest source of new permanent residents and students. In the wake of the reset, provincial governments, such as Ontario and British Columbia, are collaborating with the Indian High Commission to establish smoother pathways for academic mobility and professional accreditation, particularly in critical sectors like healthcare and engineering. The MEA has also emphasized the importance of safeguarding Indian students from fraudulent immigration consultants and ensuring that unscrupulous agents do not exploit labour mobility agreements. Looking ahead, the India–Canada reset is significant as it is poised to become a test case for how democratic countries can navigate disagreements while advancing shared interests in a multipolar world. Both nations are deeply committed to reforming global governance institutions to reflect contemporary realities better. India’s G20 presidency and Canada’s engagement in the G7 have provided platforms to align positions on inclusive digital transformation, sustainable finance, and resilient supply chains. The MEA has indicated that India expects Canada to be an important partner in championing reforms of the World Trade Organisation, democratisation of climate finance, and more representative frameworks for technology governance.

Perhaps most tellingly, senior Indian officials have consistently framed the reset not as a return to status quo ante but as an opportunity to define a more mature, resilient partnership built on clarity of red lines and mutual respect. As stated in the MEA briefing, “India remains committed to engaging constructively with Canada based on sovereign equality, non-interference, and shared values.” This commitment will likely be tested as the Nijjar investigation continues and as both societies grapple with the challenge of managing diaspora politics without undermining national security. Nevertheless, the Carney-Modi dialogue has already produced measurable dividends—complete restoration of diplomatic channels, resumption of trade negotiations, incremental intelligence cooperation, and a roadmap for expanding clean energy and innovation partnerships. Over the next decade, India and Canada have the potential to redefine their engagement through sustained high-level exchanges, deeper business integration, and a clearer understanding of each other’s domestic constraints. If this reset is grounded in consistent policy and mutual accountability, it could become a model for other democracies seeking to reconcile their strategic ambitions with the realities of complex, pluralistic societies.

 It is essential to examine the future of India-Canada relations through the lens of strategic, cultural, and economic dimensions, with a significant emphasis on defence cooperation. Despite recent tensions and diplomatic standoffs that have periodically strained bilateral ties, the underlying imperatives driving mutual engagement suggest that both countries have strong incentives to recalibrate and deepen their relationship. The socio-political landscapes of both nations are evolving, shaped by internal pressures, diaspora dynamics, and global strategic realignments. While current diplomatic frictions—particularly over politically sensitive issues involving diaspora activism and allegations of interference—have impeded progress, these appear to be temporary setbacks in a broader context marked by potential for long-term collaboration. The future relationship will likely be shaped not only by government-to-government negotiations, but also by deeper, multifaceted linkages in trade, people-to-people contact, cultural exchanges, technological cooperation, and, increasingly, defence partnerships. In terms of defence and strategic affairs, a convergence of interests is emerging.

India’s growing emphasis on self-reliance in defence manufacturing (Atmanirbhar Bharat) aligns well with Canada’s advanced technological capabilities and innovation ecosystem. As global threats become more transnational—ranging from cyber warfare to climate-related security risks—there is scope for increased collaboration in intelligence sharing, maritime security, cybersecurity frameworks, and peacekeeping operations. Canada’s status as a NATO member and its increasing participation in Indo-Pacific dialogues position it as a valuable partner in India’s Act East policy and broader regional strategic outlook. Although Canada has traditionally maintained a restrained defence posture in the Indo-Pacific, pressures from allies such as the United States, Australia, and Japan may compel it to take a more proactive role, one where India could emerge as a critical strategic interlocutor. The future could witness joint training exercises, strategic dialogues, and the establishment of formal defence mechanisms, especially as both countries seek to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and uphold the rules-based international order.

Cultural ties will continue to serve as a resilient foundation of bilateral relations, mainly due to the significant Indian diaspora in Canada, which is one of the largest globally. This community not only contributes to the economic and political fabric of Canada but also acts as a bridge for cultural understanding, educational exchanges, and soft power diplomacy. Over time, cultural diplomacy is likely to assume a more formalised role, with expanded programs in language, cinema, art, and education. India’s soft power—manifested through Bollywood, yoga, cuisine, and festivals—resonates strongly within Canada’s multicultural ethos. Universities and academic institutions from both countries have the potential to become platforms for shared innovation and global research, particularly in fields such as clean energy, artificial intelligence, and public health. These cultural and educational ties may help to soften political differences, fostering greater understanding and reducing the friction caused by conflicting domestic narratives. Economically, both countries have strong incentives to revitalise trade and investment ties. While a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has remained elusive for years, the urgency of diversifying global trade relationships in a post-pandemic world may revive negotiations. Canada’s vast reserves of critical minerals and clean energy resources are of particular interest to India’s burgeoning technological and manufacturing sectors.

Meanwhile, India’s massive consumer base and digital economy offer Canadian firms access to one of the fastest-growing markets in the world. Strategic investments in sectors such as agriculture, information technology, and green energy could be mutually beneficial, supported by regulatory harmonisation and visa facilitation. The evolution of this economic partnership will depend mainly on political will and the ability to compartmentalise differences on sensitive issues while advancing mutually beneficial areas of cooperation.

Furthermore, multilateralism could become a key area of cooperation, particularly in the context of global governance reforms, climate change, and global health resilience. Both countries, as democratic nations with pluralistic values, have overlapping interests in preserving an open international system. Canada’s advocacy for human rights and inclusive governance, when expressed with diplomatic sensitivity, can find resonance with India’s constitutional values, albeit with recognition of its unique socio-political context. In terms of climate cooperation, Canada’s experience with carbon pricing and sustainable infrastructure could complement India’s ambitious renewable energy goals. Engagement in forums such as the G20, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations provides further avenues for alignment on global challenges, particularly as both nations increasingly recognise the importance of South-South cooperation and equitable development.

However, the relationship will not be without its challenges. Political rhetoric, fuelled by domestic electoral considerations in both countries, can hinder diplomatic progress. Diaspora politics, especially when it intersects with separatist movements or perceived interference in domestic affairs, will continue to be a recurring flashpoint. However, the maturity of the relationship will be tested not by the absence of conflict but by the capacity to manage disagreement through institutional mechanisms, dialogue, and mutual respect. Canada’s evolving understanding of India’s strategic sensitivities and India’s appreciation of the complexities of liberal democracies will be crucial in navigating contentious issues. Over time, both nations may develop a more pragmatic approach—one that allows for disagreements without derailing cooperation in other domains.

While India-Canada relations are presently navigating a complex phase, the long-term forecast remains cautiously optimistic. Defence cooperation stands poised to become a new pillar, supported by shared concerns over regional stability and global security. Cultural linkages and diaspora relations will continue to serve as a deep connective tissue, offering resilience even during diplomatic downturns. Economic complementarities and multilateral engagements offer rich opportunities for constructive collaboration. The future relationship will not be linear nor devoid of challenges, but it will likely be defined by increasing interdependence, strategic dialogue, and a maturing understanding of each other’s priorities. As both nations seek to assert themselves in an increasingly multipolar world, their relationship—if anchored in pragmatism and mutual respect—could evolve into a comprehensive partnership that contributes meaningfully to global peace, prosperity, and democratic resilience.

By: Dr. Bawa Singh

Civilian casualties have been rising, with someone dying every 12 minutes in conflict zones on account of humanitarian crisis. Whereas on the other hand, the military expenditure is growing exponentially of the major powers.  As of today, the countries engaged in conflicts, disputes, wars and on account of this background, million people are suffering a major humanitarian crisis. Since 2024 onwards, the world has been facing its gravest humanitarian crisis. An estimated 186.5 million people across 72 countries, direly needed humanitarian aid. Yet, the donors have provided only US$ 22.58 billion out of the US$ 49 billion needed i.e., leaving a shortfall to the amount of $26.42 billion resulting in vulnerabilities of food insecurity, collapsed health systems, and seriously devastated livelihoods.

The above-mentioned figures revealed stark paradoxes as the so-called major powers cannot mobilize required resources needed to avert a mass humanitarian crisis. On the one hand, millions are not able to manage their basic needs and on the other hand, military unproductive expenditure is growing exponentially.  In 2024, it is reported that global military spending surged to a record US$ 2.718 trillion, which roughly comes to the amount of 2.5 percent of world GDP. The humanitarian assistance declined from US$ 37.5 billion in 2023 to US$ 33.9 billion. Major donor countries cut their aid programmes up to 40 percent even as they expanded their defense budgets to counter perceived threats. How the world is paradoxical with stark misalignment? Major economic powers arming for war instead of providing humanitarian aid to protect vulnerable people in conflict/war zones. Currently, million people have been facing humanitarian crisis resulting in deaths, displacements, refugees, lack of basic necessities like food, health, education etc.

The US and Russia are wielding outsized strategic influence over both conflict escalations and relief operations in the conflicting zones. When their bilateral tensions grow, sanctions used to choke off aid funding, airspace restrictions take place resulting in restrictions on medical and food deliveries, and resolutions are blocked for safe corridors. If a thaw takes place in the US–Russia relations, consequence would be positive resulting in unlock of frozen assets, coordinate targeted relief for life-saving goods, and establish de-confliction corridors. It used to amplify humanitarian relief in the conflicting zones.

For example, the humanitarian lifeline proved vulnerable to political shifts in early 2025. It  became even more critical,  when the US’s Executive Order 14169 imposed a 90-day pause on nearly all foreign assistance. In view of this, the UN warned that the suspension could cause up to 350,000 excess deaths.  More than 32 million women would be deprived of reproductive health services along with 12.8 million displaced people of basic healthcare. About 10 million refugees could not avail emergency aid. This reflected how strategic disagreements directly result into life-and-death outcomes for the conflict zone entrapped people.

If Washington and Moscow can rebuild trust by defusing their bilateral and other geopolitical tensions, then the multilateral bodies would gain vital resources and political backing. For example, a shared US-Russia framework for ceasefire could empower the UN to establish safe corridors in Yemen and Ethiopia. While their joint funding commitments, could close the current US$ 26 billion aid shortfall that impacted seriously millions with malnutrition and preventable disease.

Beyond their direct assistance, cooperative US–Russia diplomacy can strengthen the Security Council’s capacity to adopt binding resolutions for humanitarian relief access. In 2016, adhoc US–Russia geopolitical understandings, had enabled the cross-border convoys into besieged Syrian territories. Today, similar collaboration is required to handle the grave humanitarian crisis. It could unlock frozen assets in billions for reconstruction, provide access of humanitarian aid in conflict-eroded health systems, drinking water, sanitation, and shelter projects across Gaza, the Sahel etc.

Ultimately, it is argued that genuine détente between Washington and Moscow is direly needed. Such cooperation would be helpful in liberating the financial, logistical, and diplomatic resources from perpetual crisis management. The liberated sources can be redirected toward accessibility of humanitarian aid. Even a considerable amount of their combined military budgets reallocated towards humanitarian aid. These two powers could reduce the current funding shortfall. It could prevent million deaths, and restore hope for better life battered by conflict. Therefore, détente is direly needed between the US and Russia, which could become an urgent humanitarian lifeline.

About the Author

Dr. Bawa Singh has been teaching in the Department of South and Central Asian Studies at the School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. His research expertise includes the geopolitics of South and Central Asia, Indian foreign policy, regional cooperation, maritime security, and global health diplomacy.

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