By :  Pratyush Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

For years, Iran has lived with the possibility of a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States. While such a conflict was once largely seen as a possibility, growing tensions in the Middle East have made it a much more serious strategic concern. Iran has therefore spent years preparing for the possibility that it could be forced to fight on more than one front at the same time. 

But how does a country prepare to face two militarily superior adversaries? Iran’s answer has not been to compete with them weapon for weapon. Instead, it has built a strategy around missiles, drones, asymmetric warfare, regional partnerships, and the ability to absorb an initial strike while retaining the capacity to retaliate. 

This article attempts to examine how Iran prepared for the possibility of a two-front war with the United States and Israel, the strategic thinking behind these preparations, and the extent to which they have helped Iran withstand and respond to such a conflict. 

Introduction: Preparing for and Fighting a Two-Front War 

Iran is no longer preparing for a possible war with the United States and Israel it is already fighting one. The conflict that began on February 28, 2026, after the United States and Israel launched major strikes against Iran, has turned into a wider and much more serious confrontation. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks against Israel and U.S. military positions in the region, while the fighting has also affected the wider Gulf. 

For Iran, this is the kind of situation it has been preparing for over many years. Tehran has always understood that it would face a major disadvantage in a direct conventional war with the United States and Israel. Both countries have stronger air forces, advanced intelligence and surveillance systems, and far greater military resources. Instead of trying to match them directly, Iran has built its military around missiles, drones, air defence, underground facilities, naval forces and other forms of asymmetric warfare. 

The importance of these preparations can now be seen during the ongoing war. Iran has used its missile and drone capabilities to strike targets far beyond its borders, while its military infrastructure and underground facilities are designed to help it continue operating even after heavy attacks. Its ability to produce weapons domestically has also become important as the war continues, and access to foreign supplies remains limited. 

The Strait of Hormuz has become another major part of the conflict. Iran has used its position around the waterway as a source of pressure against the United States and its regional partners. The fighting and restrictions around the strait have also affected international shipping and global energy supplies, showing how a conflict centered on Iran can quickly create consequences far beyond the Middle East. 

Iran is also not fighting only from its own territory. Its long-standing relationships with armed groups and partners across the region have created additional pressure points for the United States and Israel. This regional reach has become an important part of Iran’s wider strategy, allowing the conflict to extend beyond a simple Iran-versus-US-and-Israel battlefield. 

What makes the current war important, therefore, is that it provides a real test of the military strategy Iran has spent years developing. The missiles, drones, protected facilities, naval capabilities, and regional networks that were built as tools of deterrence are now being used under actual wartime conditions. The conflict is showing both the strengths of this strategy, and the serious challenges Iran faces when confronting two technologically superior military powers at the same time. 

Iran’s Military Preparation: Building for a Long War 

Iran has spent many years preparing for the kind of war it is facing today. It knew that it could not compete with the United States and Israel in terms of fighter jets, advanced technology or overall military power. So instead of trying to build the same kind of military, Iran focused on weapons and strategies that could help it survive a long conflict and continue attacking its opponents. 

Missiles and Drones: Iran’s Main Weapons 

Missiles have always been one of the most important parts of Iran’s military strategy. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran has the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. Its missiles include short-, medium- and longer-range systems that can reach targets across much of the region. 

Iran has also built a large drone programme. Drones are relatively cheaper than fighter aircraft and can be used for surveillance as well as attacks. This gives Iran another way to strike targets without having to depend on its ageing air force. 

This focus on missiles and drones is partly because Iran knows that its air force cannot compete directly with the United States or Israel. Instead, it has invested in weapons that can be launched from the ground and used against targets at long distances. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has assessed that Iran’s missile forces can reach targets at distances of up to around 2,000 kilometers. 

Underground Facilities: Protecting What Matters 

Iran has also spent years building underground military facilities. This is important because one of the biggest advantages of the US and Israel is their ability to carry out powerful air strikes. 

By placing missile launchers, weapons and other important equipment underground or in protected locations, Iran makes it harder for an enemy to destroy everything in a single attack. These facilities do not make Iran completely safe from air strikes, but they can help some of its military forces survive the first wave of attacks. 

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has previously described Iran as having a large network of underground military facilities, including sites connected to its missile programme. 

Building Weapons at Home 

Another important part of Iran’s preparation has been producing more weapons inside the country. Years of sanctions have made it difficult for Iran to buy many advanced weapons from foreign countries. As a result, Iran has tried to develop its own missiles, drones and other military equipment. 

This has become especially useful during a long conflict because Iran cannot simply depend on new weapons arriving from abroad. If it can continue producing missiles and drones at home, it has a better chance of replacing some of the weapons it uses. 

SIPRI estimated that Iran spent about $7.4 billion on its military in 2025. SIPRI also reported that planned funding for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization, which is involved in ballistic missile production, increased by 44% in Iran’s 2025 budget. Funding for Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, which produces aircraft and drones, increased by 50%. 

These figures show that Iran has continued investing in its missile and drone programmes even while dealing with economic pressure and sanctions. 

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Geographical Advantage 

Iran also has an important advantage that does not come from weapons it comes from geography. The Strait of Hormuz lies between Iran and Oman and connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. It is one of the most important oil routes in the world. 

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, around 20.7 million barrels of oil per day passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024. That was about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption. 

This gives Iran a powerful source of pressure during a war. Any serious disruption in the Strait can affect oil supplies, shipping, and prices far beyond the Middle East. In the current conflict, the importance of the Strait has become even clearer as shipping through the area has been heavily disrupted. 

Preparing to Keep Fighting 

All these preparations point to the same basic idea. Iran does not need to be stronger than the United States or Israel to make a war difficult for them. It needs to make sure that it can survive the first attacks, continue launching weapons, and keep the conflict going. 

Missiles and drones give Iran the ability to strike at long distances. Underground facilities help protect important military assets. Domestic production helps it continue making weapons despite sanctions. And its position around the Strait of Hormuz gives it another way to put pressure on the global economy. 

The current war is now testing whether these preparations can actually work under real battlefield conditions. Iran built many of these capabilities over decades. The question now is how well they can help the country continue fighting against two much stronger military powers. 

Iran’s Two-Front Strategy: Fighting on Multiple Fronts 

Iran is fighting a difficult war because it is dealing with two much stronger military powers at the same time. Israel is attacking targets inside Iran, while the United States is also involved in the conflict. Instead of putting all its strength into one type of attack, Iran is trying to create problems for both countries in different ways. 

Keeping Pressure on Israel 

Missiles and drones are at the centre of Iran’s attacks on Israel. Iran’s air force is much weaker than Israel’s, so it cannot depend on fighter aircraft to fight at the same level. Missiles give Iran a way to attack from a distance without sending its aircraft deep into Israeli airspace. 

Iran has one of the largest missile programmes in the region. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says that Iran has the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, including missiles with ranges of up to about 2,000 kilometers. This gives Iran the ability to reach Israel and other targets across the region. 

Drones add another layer to this strategy. They are generally cheaper than missiles and fighter aircraft and can be used in large numbers. Even when many of them are intercepted, they can force Israel to use its air-defence systems and expensive interceptor missiles. 

So, for Iran, the purpose is not only to hit a target. It is also to keep Israel under pressure and make it spend resources on defence. 

Making Things Difficult for the US 

Iran is also trying to put pressure on American forces in the region. The United States has military bases and troops across the Middle East, which gives Iran several possible targets and pressure points. 

Iran does not have to destroy these bases to create an effect. Even the threat of repeated attacks can force the US to increase security around its bases, move military equipment, and use more defensive weapons. 

The cost of defending against Iranian attacks can also become significant. Reuters reported in August 2026 that the US had used almost all of its long-range ATACMS and PrSM missiles during the conflict, along with large numbers of Patriot and THAAD interceptors. 

This shows one of the less obvious parts of Iran’s strategy. Iran is not only trying to damage its opponents; it is also trying to make them use up valuable military resources. 

Bringing Pressure from Outside Iran 

Iran’s influence in the region gives it another tool. For years, Tehran has maintained relationships with armed groups in countries such as Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. These groups have their own military capabilities and have been part of Iran’s wider regional strategy. 

This means that the conflict does not necessarily stay inside Iran or between Iran and Israel. Pressure can appear in different parts of the Middle East. For the US and Israel, this makes the situation harder to manage because they must watch several areas at the same time. 

However, this strategy also has risks for Iran. The more conflict spreads, the more difficult it becomes for Tehran to control what happens. Regional groups have their own interests and decisions, so Iran cannot always control every action taken in its name. 

Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters 

Iran also has an important advantage that comes from its location. The Strait of Hormuz, which lies between Iran and Oman, is one of the world’s most important routes for oil shipments. 

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, around 20.7 million barrels of oil per day moved through the Strait in 2024. That was roughly one-fifth of the world’s petroleum consumption. 

This makes the Strait extremely important during the war. If shipping through the area is seriously disrupted, the effects can be felt far outside the Middle East. Oil prices, shipping costs and energy supplies can all be affected. 

For Iran, the Strait therefore becomes more than just a military location. It gives Tehran a way to create economic pressure on countries that may not even be directly involved in fighting. 

A Strategy Based on Pressure, Not Direct Superiority 

Iran knows that it cannot win a traditional military competition against the United States and Israel. Its approach is different. It is trying to use the weapons and advantages it does have to make the conflict harder and more expensive for its opponents. 

Missiles and drones allow Iran to attack from a distance. Its regional connections create pressure in different parts of the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz gives it an important economic advantage. Together, these tools allow Iran to fight a much stronger opponent without having to match its military power directly. 

The biggest question now is how long Iran can maintain this strategy. The war is using large amounts of weapons and resources on all sides, while Iran is also dealing with damage to its military infrastructure. Its ability to replace weapons, protect its remaining forces and continue putting pressure on both the US and Israel will be an important test of the strategy it has built over many years. 

By : Soumya Dutta, Research Analyst, GSDN

On July 20-21, 2026, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) helicopter and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) crossed into the Taiwan Strait median line, a significant boundary for escalation control between China and Taiwan and stayed for roughly 9.5 hours inside the Taiwan’s restricted R9 zone east of the line. It has not been the first publicly reported case of the PLA using its air assets and testing Taiwan’s response thresholds but they typically consisted of fighter jets that stayed for a few minutes and headed back, however using a helicopter that hover at a lower altitude and for such extended period sets a dangerous precedent. Combined with a reconnaissance UAV, it points to a more coordinated use of troops for a possible cross-Strait action. 

These operations by China has been generally understood as strategic signaling, but these expanded efforts point towards a more ‘operational conditioning’, whereby these external actors are normalizing their presence in what Taiwan claims as its sovereign domain, rehearsing access corridors and incrementally changing the baseline for acceptable airspace behavior. These actions are far more consequential than what coercive messaging would have done, precisely as no codified law is being violated. The Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) along with the median line do not carry any international legal status, so what is under attack is not a statute but the acceptable measures of restraint, whose erosion as Taipei fears may very well lead to a reunification as Beijing claims under its ‘One China’ policy. 

Therefore, the legal distinction regarding the routine PLA operations around Taiwan is crucial to understanding the significance of these incursions. The clearest legal boundary for Taiwan is its 12 nautical-mile territorial airspace, where an entry by Chinese military aircraft would be considered a substantial violation of Taiwan’s sovereignty. This framework is grounded in international agreements, most notably the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which established the principle of state sovereignty over national airspace. Most PLA aircrafts, however, remain outside this boundary and within the ADIZ, which acts an early-warning and identification buffer along with the median line, which is an informal military demarcation established during the Cold War with US support to reduce the risk of military incidents, but neither China nor Taiwan has formally agreed to it. With room to manoeuvre, Beijing has gradually expanded the frequency and duration of its operations, normalizing a more persistent PLA military presence around Taiwan. 

A Long-Arc of Taiwan Strait Crisis 

These patterns that continued for over a decade have been marked by a few trigger points, most notably the 2022 visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi which was perceived as a breach of the narrative, that Taiwan is an inalienable province of China, culminating into the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. This prompted China to launch large-fire military exercises, conduct drone and maritime assault operations, thereby effectively rehearsing a blockade of the island. Similar Chinese military response has followed Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with US Speaker Kevin McCarthy in 2023 and then Vice President Lai Ching-te’s layover in US, with Beijing conducting increasingly extensive exercises around the island. This pattern has thus continued through the Joint Sword series and Justice Mission-2025, which increasingly focus on encirclement, blockade, strikes on critical infrastructure and establishing anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to constrain the ability of external actors to intervene directly. 

Against this backdrop Taiwan Strait has remained a geopolitical flashpoint, with its narrow corridor placed at the centre of tensions between Taiwan and mainland China. The current phase of heightened tensions can be understood as a continuation of a recurring pattern of crises in the strait, dating back to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-55. It began, when Beijing shelled the Taiwan-controlled offshore island of Kinmen and Matsu, bringing China and the United States close to direct military confrontation. Soon after, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis followed in 1958, when China again bombarded the island, prompting US military intervention and raising fears of a wider conflict, including the possible use of nuclear weapons. The Third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, nearly four decades later saw Beijing conduct missile tests and military manoeuvres around Taiwan in an attempt to pressure Taipei ahead of its first presidential election. This escalation then prompted Washington to deploy two aircraft carrier groups to the region. 

With each episode leaving behind a precedent that Beijing has turned into a new operational normal, this baseline has been reinforced by China’s equipping of all its five theatre commands with the J-20 fifth generation fighter jets and undertaking joint military exercises and normalizing a persistent air presence. What makes the recent development interesting, is also the deliberate shift in strategy, after the detected Chinese fighter sorties dropped to a three year low in the first half of 2026 to 1334 a result of the Trump-Xi Summit in Beijing earlier this year and perhaps since Beijing has already established the behavioral thresholds, which it can now maintain with lower operational costs and also reduce the international attention spikes arising from observers. 

What Beijing Gains Now and Later 

The question therefore arises on this apparent resurgence and what does China hope to achieve? In this context, these developments are not a renewed aggression but a validation of the precedent it has gained while slowly redefining the strait status quo. Moreover, Beijing aims to achieve certain short term as well as long term goals through this. Firstly, repeated ADIZ incursions result in a cumulative strain on Taiwan’s air defence system and erode its response efficiency and threshold. Secondly, this enables the PLA to rehearse its blockade and access-denial tactics in a peacetime setting. Third exceptional actions now tend to appear routine. In the longer term, rather than avoiding escalation Beijing is learning to author it. This has been a sequence however not unique to Taiwan, but visible in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, administered by Japan. The aim of unification then carriers a more consequential effect than coercion itself. 

A Red Line or not? 

The response of the stakeholders therefore becomes important on how they interpret these developments. China has repeatedly asserted its territorial integrity and emphasized its commitments on achieving the ‘One China’ principle while blaming countries like the US for breaching its pledge to maintain ‘unofficial only’ relations with Taiwan, as highlighted by Pelosi’s visit and even releasing white papers on reunification. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has described China’s actions as a violation of the “rules based international order” and “international norms,” even condemning similar airspace intrusions in regions like Japan while updating its engagement rules and declaring that any Chinese aircraft that enters its sovereign airspace of 12 nautical miles of the coasts, in contrast to median line (25 miles) will invite a military response.  

These developments also coincide with the so-called Davidson Window which anticipates China’s militarily actions against Taiwan by 2027. However, Beijing has not articulated a specific public deadline for achieving reunification. Instead, the CPC has consistently framed it as part of its broader ambition of “national rejuvenation”, associated with the 2049 centenary of the PRC. What matters more is however the method, as Beijing is not preparing for a single decisive moment but incrementally redefining what counts as acceptable behavior in contested airspace, one uncontested incursion at a time. As key actors from Washington to Tokyo and Manila observe these developments, India too must pay closer attention to the implications of such incremental normalization for airspace management and crisis stability in contested theatres, particularly along its sensitive frontiers. The deeper risk therefore lies not simply in misreading Beijing’s signals, but in misjudging the baseline itself failing to notice when yesterday’s exception has quietly become today’s norm. 

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The boundary dispute between China and India is one of the longest unresolved territorial disagreements in the world. Stretching across nearly 2,100 miles of the Himalayan frontier, the disputed boundary has shaped the relationship between the two most populous nations on earth for more than seven decades. The disagreement produced one full-scale war in 1962, a deadly military clash in the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, and several years of tense troop mobilization along the Line of Actual Control, commonly referred to as the LAC. At the same time, the two countries have also periodically negotiated disengagement agreements, resumed high-level political contact, and expanded trade to record levels. This apparent contradiction, tension along the frontier on one hand and deepening economic interdependence on the other, raises an important question. Can China and India ever truly resolve their border disputes, or are they destined to manage an uneasy and indefinite coexistence along a contested frontier? This article examines the historical origins of the dispute, the key flashpoints that have defined it, the diplomatic efforts undertaken so far, and the structural obstacles and opportunities that will determine whether a final settlement is achievable. 

Historical Roots of the Boundary Dispute 

The India-China boundary was never formally demarcated during the colonial period, leaving behind a legacy of competing claims once both countries emerged as modern nation states. The eastern sector of the boundary, covering the present-day Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, is largely defined by the McMahon Line, a boundary drawn during the Simla Convention of 1914 between British India and Tibet. China has consistently refused to recognise the McMahon Line, arguing that Tibet did not possess the sovereign authority to conclude such an agreement independently. The western sector, covering the Aksai Chin plateau, presents a different set of complications. Aksai Chin is administered by China as part of its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but India claims it as part of the union territory of Ladakh. The middle sector, running through the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, is comparatively less contentious but still lacks a mutually agreed boundary alignment. Because no treaty ever formally demarcated the frontier across its entire length, both countries have relied on the concept of the Line of Actual Control, an operational ceasefire line rather than a legally settled international boundary, to manage day-to-day military presence. 

The 1962 War and Its Enduring Legacy 

Tensions between the two newly independent Asian giants escalated through the 1950s as China consolidated control over Tibet and built a strategic road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to Tibet, a project India only discovered after its completion. Diplomatic protests failed to resolve the disagreement, and on October 20, 1962, Chinese forces launched a coordinated offensive across both the eastern and western sectors of the disputed boundary. The war lasted approximately one month and ended in a decisive military setback for India. China declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962, and withdrew its forces to positions behind what later came to be recognized as the Line of Actual Control. The war left a deep imprint on Indian strategic thinking and created a residue of mistrust that continues to influence bilateral relations today. It also hardened each side’s territorial claims, making any subsequent settlement politically difficult, since conceding territory after a military defeat carries a heavy domestic political cost for Indian leaders, while China has shown little inclination to revisit an outcome it regards as settled in its favor. 

Key Friction Points Along the Frontier 

Beyond the broad sectoral disagreements, several specific locations have repeatedly triggered military standoffs. The Doklam plateau, a tri-junction area claimed by both China and Bhutan, became the site of a seventy-three-day standoff between Indian and Chinese troops beginning in June 2017, after India intervened to stop Chinese road construction that New Delhi viewed as a threat to a strategically vital corridor connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. The Depsang Plains and the Demchok sector in eastern Ladakh remained points of friction for years after the 2020 crisis, with Chinese patrols restricting Indian access to traditional patrolling points. Pangong Tso, a glacial lake straddling the Line of Actual Control, was the site of physical clashes between soldiers in 2020 before both sides withdrew heavy equipment from its northern and southern banks. More recently, in January 2026, China revived its historical claim over the Shaksgam Valley, a region in the Jammu and Kashmir union territory that India considers its sovereign territory but which has been under Chinese control since Pakistan ceded it under a bilateral agreement signed in 1963. India has consistently rejected the 1963 cession as illegal and void, and the renewed Chinese assertion added a fresh layer of complexity to an already crowded set of territorial disagreements. 

The Galwan Valley Clash and the 2020 Standoff 

The most crisis in the bilateral relationship since 1962 began in early May 2020, when Indian and Chinese troops clashed at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. The confrontation escalated dramatically on June 15, 2020, when a violent hand-to-hand clash in the Galwan Valley resulted in the deaths of twenty Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties, later acknowledged by Beijing to be four soldiers. It was the first fatal clash on the border in forty-five years and triggered a massive mobilization of troops, artillery, and air assets by both sides along the frontier. The crisis fundamentally altered the trajectory of the relationship. India suspended several bilateral initiatives, banned numerous Chinese mobile applications on security grounds, and tightened scrutiny of Chinese investment proposals. Both governments authorized their military commanders to hold a series of corps commander level talks, beginning shortly after the clash and continuing years afterward, aimed at achieving disengagement at multiple friction points. Progress was slow and uneven, with disengagement completed at some locations, such as the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso in February 2021 and at Gogra-Hot Springs in September 2022, while other points, particularly Depsang and Demchok, remained unresolved for an extended period. 

The Long Road to Disengagement and Diplomatic Reset 

A significant breakthrough came in October 2024, when India and China finally reached a disengagement agreement covering the Depsang and Demchok sectors, the last two remaining friction points from the 2020 standoff. The agreement restored patrolling arrangements that existed prior to the crisis, allowing troops from both sides to patrol up to previously agreed patrolling points. Days after this agreement was finalized, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held bilateral talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23, 2024, marking the first formal meeting between the two leaders in five years. The two leaders agreed to direct their special representatives, a mechanism led on the Indian side by the National Security Advisor, to resume dialogue aimed at achieving a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Momentum continued to build through 2025. In August 2025, Modi travelled to the Chinese city of Tianjin to attend the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional grouping that includes both countries, where he held extensive talks with Xi Jinping. During the 2025 round of the Special Representatives dialogue, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi agreed to establish an expert group tasked with exploring the possibility of achieving what has been described as an early harvest, meaning a limited but concrete agreement on boundary delimitation in less complicated sectors of the frontier, even while the broader dispute remains unresolved. 

This diplomatic momentum was carried into 2026. On May 27, 2026, India and China held the thirty-fifth round of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, an institutional platform commonly known by the abbreviation WMCC that brings together diplomats from both countries to discuss border management issues, in Beijing. The talks were described by the Ministry of External Affairs as constructive and forward-looking, and it marked the first high-level diplomatic engagement specifically on the border situation since July 2025. Both sides used the meeting to review progress on maintaining peace and tranquility along the frontier and agreed to undertake substantive preparations for the next round of the Special Representatives dialogue, which both governments continue to describe as the principal political mechanism for resolving the boundary question. India also used the occasion to press for an early meeting of the Expert Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers, reflecting an additional area of cooperation tied to the management of rivers that originate in Tibet and flow into Indian territory. 

Economic Interdependence as a Stabilizing Factor 

Even as troops faced the frontier, trade between the two countries continued to expand, illustrating the complex and at times contradictory nature of the relationship. According to figures cited by the Chinese ambassador to India, bilateral trade between the two countries reached a record high of US$ 155.6 billion in 2025, an increase of more than twelve percent over the previous year. China remains among India’s largest trading partners, supplying critical inputs such as electrical machinery, bulk pharmaceutical ingredients, and industrial components that Indian manufacturing depends upon heavily. At the same time, the trade relationship remains heavily skewed in China’s favor. India’s trade deficit with China reached approximately US$ 99.21 billion in the 2024-2025 financial year, the largest trade deficit India runs with any single country, and this imbalance has widened almost every year for the past two decades. This economic interdependence cuts both ways when it comes to prospects for resolving the border dispute. On one hand, the scale of trade gives both governments a strong incentive to prevent military tensions from spiraling into a broader conflict that would disrupt commerce worth over US$ 100 billion annually. On the other hand, the size and persistence of India’s trade deficit have become a political irritant, with Indian policymakers arguing that genuine normalization of ties cannot occur while the border remains militarized and the economic relationship remains so lopsided. 

Structural Obstacles That Persist 

Despite the recent diplomatic thaw, several structural obstacles continue to make a comprehensive and final settlement of the border dispute extremely difficult to achieve. The first obstacle is the sheer scale of the territorial claims involved. China claims approximately 35,000 square miles of territory that India administers, primarily in Arunachal Pradesh, which Chinese officials often refer to as South Tibet. India, in turn, claims sovereignty over Aksai Chin, an area of roughly 15,000 square miles currently under Chinese administration. Neither side has shown any indication that it is prepared to formally cede its claims over these regions, making a full and final settlement covering the entire boundary a distant prospect. The second obstacle is domestic political sensitivity. Any Indian government that appears to concede territory, even in a limited technical sense such as adjusting the alignment of the Line of Actual Control, risks fierce opposition criticism and accusations of weakness, particularly given the legacy of the 1962 war. Chinese leadership similarly faces internal pressure to avoid appearing to make concessions on territorial sovereignty, a politically sensitive issue tied closely to nationalist sentiment. The third obstacle is the absence of a mutually agreed common understanding of where the Line of Actual Control actually runs. Unlike a demarcated international boundary, the LAC exists largely as a set of overlapping perceptions, and the two militaries frequently disagree over the precise location of patrolling points, creating recurring opportunities for friction even in the absence of any deliberate provocation. The fourth obstacle is the broader strategic competition between the two countries, which extends well beyond the border itself into contested spheres of influence across South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and multilateral institutions, making the boundary dispute difficult to isolate from wider geopolitical rivalry. 

The Role of External Factors 

The India-China boundary dispute cannot be understood in isolation from the broader regional and global context. China’s close strategic and military partnership with Pakistan, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a large-scale infrastructure initiative connecting Xinjiang to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, runs through territory in Gilgit-Baltistan that India claims as its own, adding a trilateral dimension to what is nominally a bilateral dispute. India’s deepening security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia through groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is viewed with suspicion in Beijing, which sees these arrangements as part of a broader strategy of containment. China’s construction of dual-use infrastructure, including villages and military facilities in disputed border areas, has similarly alarmed Indian security planners, who have responded with their own infrastructure build-up, including projects such as the Sela Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh designed to improve troop mobility and logistics along the frontier. These external dynamics mean that even a technical resolution of specific friction points along the LAC is unlikely to fully de-link the border dispute from the wider strategic rivalry between the two Asian powers. 

Possible Pathways Toward Resolution 

Notwithstanding these obstacles, several pathways could allow China and India to manage, and eventually substantially resolve, their border disagreements over time. The most realistic near-term pathway is incremental progress through confidence building measures rather than a single comprehensive settlement. This approach, sometimes described by officials as pursuing an early harvest, involves resolving less contentious and more clearly defined sections of the boundary first, such as portions of the middle sector, while leaving the more politically fraught eastern and western sectors for later negotiation. A second pathway involves strengthening existing institutional mechanisms, including the Special Representatives dialogue and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, to build sustained mutual trust through regular, predictable engagement rather than crisis-driven negotiation. A third pathway involves expanding economic and people-to-people ties as a means of creating broader constituencies within both countries that have a vested interest in stability, even if this does not directly resolve territorial claims. A fourth pathway, which remains more distant, involves formal boundary delimitation and demarcation across the entire frontier, potentially modelled on agreements China has previously reached with other neighbors, such as its 2004 boundary settlement with Russia, though the scale, historical baggage, and strategic stakes involved in the India-China case make such a comprehensive settlement considerably more difficult to achieve in the near term. Ultimately, most independent analysts and former diplomats suggest that a full and final resolution remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, and that the more realistic and achievable goal for both governments is to manage the dispute responsibly, preventing it from triggering renewed military conflict, while allowing the broader relationship to develop in parallel. 

Conclusion 

The question of whether China and India can ever resolve their border disputes does not have a simple answer. The historical depth of the disagreement, the scale of the territorial claims involved, the absence of a mutually agreed boundary line, and the weight of domestic political sensitivities on both sides make a comprehensive final settlement extremely difficult to achieve soon. At the same time, the events of the past two years, including the October 2024 disengagement agreement, the resumption of leader-level dialogue at Kazan and Tianjin, and the continued institutional engagement through mechanisms such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination in 2026, demonstrate that both countries retain a strong shared interest in preventing their disagreements from escalating into open conflict. Rising trade, now exceeding US$ 155 billion annually, further reinforces the incentive for stability. The most plausible trajectory for the coming years is therefore neither a dramatic breakthrough nor a return to open confrontation, but a continued process of careful, incremental management, punctuated by periodic disengagement agreements and confidence building measures, that gradually narrows the scope of active disagreement even as the underlying territorial claims remain formally unresolved. Whether this process eventually culminates in a full and final settlement of the boundary or simply produces a durable and peaceful modus vivendi along a still-contested frontier, will depend on the political will of leaders in both New Delhi and Beijing over the coming decades. 

By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala , Research Analyst , GSDN

India and Japan share one of the most important strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Although the two countries have different histories, cultures, and geographical locations, they are connected by shared democratic values, mutual trust, and a common vision for peace, stability, and economic prosperity. Over the last three decades, their relationship has expanded from limited economic cooperation into a comprehensive partnership covering trade, infrastructure, defence, technology, energy, education, and regional security. Today, Japan is one of India’s most trusted development partners, while India has emerged as a key strategic partner for Japan in Asia. 

The importance of this partnership has increased because of the changing global politics. China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, disruptions in global supply chains after the COVID-19 pandemic, and rapid technological competition have encouraged both countries to work more closely. India and Japan support a rules-based international order where international law is respected, sea routes remain open, and disputes are settled peacefully. Recent meetings between the leaders of the two countries in 2025 and 2026 have further strengthened cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, defence technology, and economic security. 

Historical Evolution 

The relationship between India and Japan has deep cultural roots. Their earliest connection came through Buddhism, which spread from India to Japan through East Asia more than a thousand years ago. Buddhism greatly influenced Japanese religion, philosophy, art, and architecture, creating a lasting cultural bond between the two countries. Modern diplomatic relations began in 1952 after Japan regained its sovereignty following the Second World War. India was among the first countries to establish peaceful diplomatic relations with Japan by signing a separate peace treaty. During the Cold War, however, relations remained limited because India followed a policy of non-alignment while Japan remained closely allied with the United States. The situation changed after India’s economic reforms in 1991. As India opened its economy, Japan recognized the country’s growing economic potential and increased investments in manufacturing and infrastructure. In 2000, both countries established a ‘Global Partnership’. This was upgraded to a ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 2006 and further elevated to a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 2014. These developments reflected the growing political trust and expanding cooperation between the two nations. 

Economic Cooperation 

Economic cooperation remains the strongest pillar of India–Japan relations. Japan is one of India’s largest investors and one of the biggest providers of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japanese companies such as Suzuki, Toyota, Honda, Sony, Panasonic, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi have made major investments in India’s automobile, electronics, manufacturing, and technology sectors. Among these companies, Maruti Suzuki has played a particularly significant role in transforming India’s automobile industry. Japanese investment has not only created employment opportunities but has also introduced advanced technology, modern management practices, and high manufacturing standards. Japan has also contributed significantly to India’s infrastructure development. Through low-interest loans and technical assistance, it has supported landmark projects such as the Delhi Metro, the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Dedicated Freight Corridors, and metro rail projects in several Indian cities. These projects have improved connectivity, strengthened industrial growth, and boosted India’s economic development. The Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor, commonly known as the Bullet Train project, remains one of the biggest symbols of India–Japan cooperation. Built using Japan’s famous Shinkansen technology, the project reflects the high level of trust between the two countries. Although construction has faced delays because of land acquisition and administrative challenges, both governments reaffirmed during their meetings in 2025 and 2026 that the project remains a priority. Economic cooperation has recently expanded into emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, quantum technology, digital infrastructure, and critical minerals. Both countries are working together to build resilient supply chains and reduce dependence on a small number of countries for advanced technologies. During the 2026 India–Japan Annual Summit, new initiatives were announced to strengthen cooperation in these sectors, reflecting the importance of technology in future economic growth. India’s large market, skilled workforce and rapidly growing manufacturing sector complement Japan’s advanced technology, financial strength and industrial expertise. This combination has made the economic partnership stronger than ever and has laid the foundation for broader strategic cooperation. 

Defence and Security Cooperation 

Over the past decade, defence and security cooperation has become one of the most significant aspects of India–Japan relations. The changing geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific has brought the two countries closer than ever before. Both India and Japan are concerned about the growing security challenges in the region, including China’s increasing military presence, tensions in the East and South China Seas, cyber threats, and the need to protect important sea lanes through which a large portion of global trade passes. India and Japan support a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific where international law is respected and disputes are resolved peacefully. Their shared commitment to a rules-based international order has strengthened strategic trust and encouraged closer military cooperation. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises involving their navies, armies, and air forces. The Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) has become an important platform for improving coordination between their naval forces. Japan is also a permanent participant in the Malabar Naval Exercise, along with India, the United States and Australia. These exercises enhance interoperability, improve maritime security, and prepare the participating countries for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Another major milestone was the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which allows the armed forces of both countries to use each other’s military facilities for logistics, fuel, maintenance, and supplies during joint exercises and humanitarian missions. In recent years, defence cooperation has expanded further to include cyber security, space security, maritime domain awareness, intelligence sharing, and defence technology. During the 2026 India–Japan Annual Summit, both governments agreed to strengthen cooperation in defence innovation and emerging technologies, reflecting the increasing strategic importance of the partnership. 

Challenges 

Despite remarkable progress, some challenges continue to affect the relationship. Bilateral trade remains below its true potential, and Japanese companies sometimes face delays related to land acquisition, regulatory procedures, and project implementation in India. Differences in language, work culture, and business practices can also slow commercial cooperation. Another challenge is managing relations with China. While India and Japan share concerns regarding China’s growing strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific, both countries also maintain important economic ties with Beijing. Therefore, they must carefully balance strategic competition with economic engagement while avoiding unnecessary tensions. 

Despite these challenges, the future of India–Japan relations appear extremely promising. India’s rapidly growing economy, expanding manufacturing sector, young workforce, and digital transformation complement Japan’s advanced technology, financial resources, and industrial expertise. Both governments have identified cooperation in defence production, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, clean energy, critical minerals, cybersecurity, and resilient supply chains as priorities for the coming decade. The recent developments of 2025 and 2026 clearly demonstrate this commitment. New agreements on economic security, emerging technologies, defence innovation, and supply-chain resilience show that both countries are preparing together for future global challenges. Japan has also continued to support India’s aspiration for permanent membership of a reformed United Nations Security Council, highlighting the growing political trust between the two nations. India–Japan relations have evolved into one of the strongest and most comprehensive strategic partnerships in Asia. Built on shared democratic values, mutual trust and common strategic interests, the partnership now extends far beyond trade and investment. Japan has played a vital role in India’s economic development through infrastructure financing, technology transfer, and industrial investment, while India has become an indispensable strategic partner for Japan in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Although certain challenges remain, they are outweighed by the vast opportunities for cooperation. The expanding collaboration in defence, advanced technologies, clean energy, infrastructure, and regional diplomacy demonstrate that the partnership is becoming deeper and more future-oriented. As global politics continues to evolve, India and Japan are expected to work even more closely in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Their growing partnership is not only beneficial for the two countries but also contributes significantly to regional security, sustainable development, and a more balanced and rules-based international order.