By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

The exploration of outer space has been one of humanity’s greatest achievements, and the United States has played a leading role in this field throughout. The US has contributed significantly to this endeavor since the mid-twentieth century. It has consistently demonstrated scientific excellence, technological innovation, and strategic vision in space exploration. Its space prowess is not just a reflection of technological capability but also of its economic strength, military interests, scientific ambitions, and global influence. The United States’ achievements in space have transformed modern life through innovations in communication, navigation, weather forecasting and national security with the help of technologically advanced satellites and cameras. The emergence of private American space companies such as SpaceX have also helped the nation reach heights in this industry. 

From the early days of the Cold War to the modern era of commercial spaceflight and deep-space exploration, the United States has consistently expanded its capabilities and influence in outer space. The launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 in 1957 marked the beginning of the Space Age and triggered the Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union. In response, the United States established National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958 to coordinate civilian space activities. The early years witnessed intense competition between the two superpowers. Although the Soviet Union achieved several firsts, including the first human in space through Yuri Gagarin, the United States ultimately secured the most significant symbolic victory. In 1969, the Apollo 11 Moon Landing successfully placed astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin on the Moon. Armstrong’s famous words, “one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind,” marked a defining moment in human history. This achievement established the United States as a global leader in space exploration. After the Moon landings, the United States shifted its focus from short-term achievements to long-term space operations. The introduction of the Space Shuttle in 1981 represented a major innovation. The shuttle enabled repeated access to space, deployment of satellites, scientific experiments, and the construction of orbital infrastructure. Following the Cold War, space exploration has increasingly become a platform for international cooperation. The United States played a central role in creating and operating the International Space Station (ISS), one of the largest collaborative scientific projects in history. The ISS enabled long-duration human presence in space and advanced research in medicine, engineering, and biology. This era demonstrated the United States’ ability to combine leadership with international partnership. 

Apart from Apollo 11 and the ISS, the United States has made some of the most significant contributions to the advancement of space science, technology, and exploration. Through NASA, the United States has conducted numerous scientific missions that have transformed our understanding of the cosmos. The Hubble Space Telescope provided detailed images of distant galaxies, nebulae, and planets, helping scientists estimate the age of the universe and study black holes. More recently, the James Webb Space Telescope has enabled observation of some of the earliest galaxies formed after the Big Bang. American robotic missions have also explored Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and other celestial bodies, providing invaluable scientific data about the solar system. The United States pioneered the development and deployment of advanced satellite systems. These satellites have transformed communication, weather forecasting, navigation, disaster management, and environmental monitoring. The Global Positioning System, developed by the United States, is one of the most widely used technologies in the world. GPS supports transportation, aviation, maritime navigation, emergency services, agriculture, and countless smartphone applications. One of the most significant developments in recent decades has been the rise of America’s private space industry. Unlike many countries where space activities remain largely government-driven, the United States has fostered a dynamic ecosystem of private companies working alongside NASA. Among these companies, SpaceX has emerged as a transformative force. Founded by Elon Musk, SpaceX revolutionized space transportation through reusable rocket technology. Its Falcon 9 significantly reduced launch costs and increased access to space. SpaceX also developed the Crew Dragon, which restored America’s independent capability to send astronauts into orbit. Furthermore, the company’s ambitious Starship project aims to enable large-scale lunar and Martian exploration. Other major companies such as Blue Origin, founded by Jeff Bezos, and United Launch Alliance contribute significantly to American launch capabilities. This public-private partnership model has become a defining feature of US space leadership. Space is increasingly recognized as a critical domain for national security. The United States possesses the world’s most sophisticated network of military satellites, supporting communications, intelligence gathering, navigation, and missile warning systems. The United States Space Force, established in 2019, reflects the growing importance of space in defence planning. Its mission includes protecting American space assets and ensuring freedom of operation in the space domain. The execution of Osama bin Laden in 2011 by the US Special Forces was possible because of the American satellites as they found out about his precise location. As other nations develop anti-satellite weapons and advanced space capabilities, the strategic significance of American space power continues to grow. Maintaining superiority in space is increasingly viewed as essential for preserving national security and technological leadership. The United States has led the exploration of Mars through a series of successful robotic missions. Rovers such as Spirit, Opportunity, Curiosity, and Perseverance have analysed Martian geology, searched for evidence of ancient water, and investigated the planet’s potential to support life. These missions have significantly expanded scientific knowledge and laid the groundwork for future human missions to Mars. The United States derives substantial economic benefits from its leadership in space. The space sector generates billions of dollars annually and supports thousands of high-skilled jobs in engineering, manufacturing, research, and information technology. The commercialization of space has opened new opportunities in satellite internet services, space tourism, resource extraction, and in-orbit manufacturing. Projects such as SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation demonstrate how space technologies can address terrestrial challenges by providing internet connectivity to remote regions. Consequently, space has become not only a scientific frontier but also an increasingly important economic sector that contributes to American competitiveness and innovation.  

Today, United States is the undisputed leader in global space exploration, maintaining its dominance in metrics such as launch frequency, total mass delivered to orbit, satellite constellation size, technological innovation, and economic output. With the US space economy reaching US$240.1 billion in 2024 and projected to grow at an 8.4% compound annual growth rate through 2032, America’s space prowess represents not just scientific achievement but a formidable economic and strategic asset. The United States is now preparing for a return to the Moon through the Artemis Program. Artemis seeks to establish a sustainable human presence on the Moon and use it as a steppingstone for future missions to Mars. The program includes advanced spacecraft, lunar habitats, and international partnerships. Unlike the Apollo missions, which were primarily motivated by geopolitical competition, Artemis emphasizes long-term exploration, scientific discovery, and international cooperation. Success in this program could position the United States at the forefront of a new era of lunar development. Advances in artificial intelligence, robotics, propulsion systems, and reusable launch vehicles are expected to further expand exploration capabilities. Private companies are likely to play an even larger role in future space activities. Space tourism, commercial lunar missions, asteroid mining, and in-space manufacturing may transform the economics of exploration. The United States, with its entrepreneurial culture and technological expertise, is well-positioned to lead these developments. Emerging technologies such as nuclear propulsion and advanced life-support systems could make deep-space missions more feasible. If current trends continue, the United States will remain a central actor in shaping humanity’s expansion beyond Earth.  

Despite its impressive achievements, the United States faces several challenges in maintaining its space leadership. International competition is intensifying. Countries such as China have made rapid advances in human spaceflight, lunar exploration, and space infrastructure. China’s ambitious plans for lunar bases and Mars missions represent a significant challenge to American dominance. The increasing congestion of Earth’s orbit raises concerns about space debris. Thousands of inactive satellites and fragments pose risks to operational spacecraft and future missions. Addressing this issue requires technological innovation and international cooperation. Budgetary constraints and political changes can affect long-term planning. Large-scale projects often require decades of sustained funding and bipartisan support. Fluctuations in priorities may delay critical missions. Cybersecurity threats and potential militarization of space can also create new vulnerabilities. Protecting satellites and communication networks has become an essential aspect of modern space strategy.  

The United States has established unparalleled space prowess through a combination of scientific innovation, technological excellence, strategic investment, and entrepreneurial dynamism. From the Apollo Moon landings to advanced space telescopes, from military satellite networks to reusable rockets, American achievements have transformed both space exploration and life on Earth. NASA’s pioneering missions, the rise of commercial space enterprises, and ambitious initiatives such as Artemis demonstrate that the United States continues to push the boundaries of human capability. While challenges from international competitors, space debris, and security concerns persist, America retains significant advantages in research, infrastructure, talent, and private-sector innovation. As humanity enters a new era of exploration focused on the Moon, Mars, and beyond, the United States is likely to remain at the forefront of global space activities. Its space prowess is not merely a symbol of national power, but a driving force behind scientific progress, economic growth, and humanity’s quest to explore the cosmos. 

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

In global politics, the Middle East is a very important place. It is a region of rich in energy resources the foundation of many major civilizations and religions also it is a vital crossroads that links Europe, Asia and Africa. However, the region has come to be associated with violence, instability, and political rivalry despite its historical significance and huge potential. Over the past century the Middle East has been often changed by wars, revolutions, occupations, insurgencies and humanitarian disasters etc . As a result, the topic of how long the Middle East will not see peace remains central to debates among the policymakers, scholars and the common people 

Many disputes like the Historical disputes, geographical disputes, ideological divides, religious splits, foreign interventions and opposing the national interests all contribute to the solution for this. The Oslo Accords, the Camp David Accords and the Abraham Accords are only a few of the several peace attempts that have already been started however neither of them have completely addressed the fundamental causes of war. Recent incidents involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah and the US have further complicated to the situation in the area. However, some observers argue that economic cooperation and new diplomatic chances could eventually lead to the establishment of conditions for a sustainable peace 

This article examines the historical roots of conflict in the Middle East and the challenges that continue to prevent peace and the possibilities for a more stable future.  By examining these factors, we can better understand why peace remains difficult to achieve and what steps may help to create a more peaceful region in the future. 

The Historical Foundations of Conflict 

The early 20th century is the period in which the present-day instability in the Middle East began. While negotiating agreements that went against the claims of Arab independence, Britain supported Arab revolutions against the Ottoman Empire during World War I and the Sykes-Picot Agreement which Britain and France signed on May 16, 1916, that divided a large portion of the Ottoman Arab territory into zones of control in secret. A year later November 02, 1917, the Balfour Declaration expressed British support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  

The future of the region was significantly influenced by these decisions. Rather than true choice and new states developed under European influence after the collapse of ottoman empire and the Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920. To establish governments with different populations with conflicting identities and interests. Artificial boundaries frequently disregarded the ethnic, tribaland religious reality. 

Arab nationalism became stronger during the 1930s and 1940s. Tension between the Jewish and Arab communities grew along with an increase in Jewish migration to Palestine. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations agreed with a partition proposal in response to the Holocaust and growing worldwide demand for a Jewish homeland. The first Arab-Israeli War began on May 14, 1948, when Israel declared its independence. 

 After the centuries of oppression, freedom signified self-determination and the national survival to Israelis. Hundreds and thousands of Palestinians were uprooted from their homes during what they called the “Nakba,” or calamity. Middle Eastern politics are still shaped by the fallout from these incidents.  

Arab Nationalism, Regional Wars, and the Rise of New Rivalries 

Arab nationalism gained its importance in the 1950s and 1960s under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Arab nations encouraged regional unification and aimed for further independence from the Western influence. The strategic significance of the area and the willingness of other countries to get involved in its matters was made clear by Suez Crisis, which started on October 29, 1956. 

The Six-Day War, which started on June 5, 1967, was another important event. Geopolitical issues in the region were drastically changed after Israel took control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Arab resentment with Israel grew as a result of the conflict, which has also increased in the Palestinian displacement. 

The 1970s was marked by both conflict and diplomatic efforts. Egypt and Syria began the Yom Kippur War on October 6, 1973, to reclaim the territories they had lost in 1967.The war demonstrated that Arab states were still willing to challenge the existing regional order. even if the Israel eventually maintained its military advantage. The oil shortage brought out by the war further demonstrated the importance of Middle Eastern countries energy resources on a worldwide scale. 

When Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, this marked a significant turning point. The first Arab country to officially recognize Israel was Egypt. However, agreement’s larger impact on peace in the region was limited since it did not address the Palestinian question. 

The Iran Revolution on February 11, 1979, was another significant event. Middle Eastern politics took on a new ideological dimension with the fall of the Shah and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran presented itself as a challenger to both the regional rivals, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia and the Western support. Conflicts today are still influenced by this rivalry.  

Proxy Wars and Foreign Intervention 

Throughout the 1980s and onward proxy wars became more prevalent in the Middle East. Between September 22, 1980, and August 20, 1988, the Iran-Iraq War resulted in significant damage and fatalities. The rise of Hezbollah and the civil war in Lebanon complicated regional politics. 

Middle Eastern events have always been heavily influenced by foreign powers. Political, economic and military interventions have been made by the US, Russia and European nations. Some initiatives increased local disputes while others sought to maintain stability.  

The Gulf War that followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 02, 1990, further demonstrated the region’s strategic significance. Later regional politics were once again altered by the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003. Power vacuums brought about by Saddam Hussein’s overthrow fueled sectarian strife and the emergence of extremist groups. Unintended repercussions were frequently the result of these initiatives. 

Many led to new types of instability rather than bringing about long-lasting peace thereby undermining confidence among regional players. 

The Arab Spring and the Failure of Political Transformation 

One of the most significant political events in the contemporary Middle Eastern history is the Arab Spring which was started in late 2010. Local people called for increased accountability from their authorities, economic opportunity, and political reform. 

The result was uneven despite the overthrow of several dictators. Yemen developed one of the worst humanitarian crises in history, Syria went through a catastrophic civil war and Libya collapsed under instability. The Arab Spring highlighted the area’s state structures weakness and showing the general anger of people everywhere. 

Skepticism about the likelihood of enduring peace was strengthened by the failure to implement stable governmental reforms. Political tensions became worse that many administrations put their safety and survival of the regime ahead of democratic development.  

The Israel-Palestine Conflict and Contemporary Challenges 

The Israeli-Palestinian war is the problem that has impacted Middle Eastern peace most significantly. Fundamental differences on limits, settlements, refugees, military arrangements, and Jerusalem’s status continue after the decades of negotiations. 

By creating a structure for the upcoming talks, the Oslo Accords, which came into effect on September 13, 1993, encouraged confidence. However, the peace effort was harmed by the killing of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and political events that followed on. 

After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the conflict was rapidly escalated. Significant destruction resulted from the subsequent bloodshed, especially in the Gaza. The conflict was growing and that split regional; the global views and the humanitarian crises were worsening significantly. 

Defeating Hamas, according to some analysts, might eventually open doors for new diplomatic efforts. Supporters of this viewpoint to efforts aimed at improving relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel plans for Palestinian economic development and the possibility of further regional collaboration. Some maintain concerns, believing that military wins themselves are insufficient to resolve the fundamental issues that drive conflict. 

The Era of “No War, No Peace” 

Middle East countries may have entered what many analysts refer to as a “no war, no peace” age based on recent events. Although there are periodic ceasefires and diplomatic efforts in the region, the underlying causes of instability are rarely addressed. 

This fact is made clear by the ongoing conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States. Tensions in the area have escalated due to military posturing, retaliation, and direct strikes. However, nobody has won a clear victory despite numerous escalations. 

Rather, the region seems to be caught in a vicious cycle of intensification, moderation, and fresh conflict. The instability has now been symbolized by the Strait of Hormuz. The disruptions there had major worldwide consequences because it is one of the major energy chokepoints in the world. 

Another example is Lebanon. Conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah still pose a threat to wider stability in the region, despite the occasional ceasefire deal. Syria continues to exist in a situation of prolonged instability, split between rival governments and the foreign forces. 

In my opinion, the current situation shows that the Middle East is no longer facing isolated conflicts. Instead, different crises have become interconnected, making the regional stability much harder to achieve. If major actors continue to view security through military competition rather than cooperation, the cycle of conflict is likely to continue.  

Religion, Identity, and the Search for Meaning 

Middle Eastern politics are still strongly influenced by religion. Jerusalem is considered one of the world’s most disputed cities because it is so important to Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 

Religious stories often affect national identities and political attitudes. The Abraham Accords, which was signed on September 15, 2020, was an attempt to highlight the common religious and historical connections across numerous cultures. 

However, religious differences can also be used for political ends. For example, conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran are influenced by the Sunni-Shia division. Security concerns and territorial disputes are sometimes linked with religious symbolism. 

While religion is often blamed for conflict in the Middle East, it is important to recognize that political interests frequently play an equally significant role. Religious identities are sometimes used by leaders to mobilize support, but the underlying issues often involve power, territory, and security.  

Can peace still be achieved? 

There are many reasons for cautious optimism despite many challenges. The Abraham Accords proved that Israel and several Arab nations could work together. New alliances have been sparked by similar security concerns, technology cooperation, and economic integration. 

Prior to the conflict on October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia’s growing ties with Israel showed that more peace might take place under appropriate circumstances. Long-term stability can also be supported by the economic initiatives that are meant to enhance Palestinian living conditions. 

But diplomatic negotiations alone will not bring about permanent peace. It requires addressing historical grievances, encouraging inclusive governance, minimizing outside intervention, and providing common people with economic opportunity. 

Military force cannot be used to impose peace. Neither can ceasefires be the only way to achieve it. Trust, cooperation and a willingness to confront the issues are essential for long-lasting peace. 

Conclusion 

In my view, the Middle East has remained trapped in cycles of conflict because of historical grievances, geopolitical rivalries, and unresolved territorial disputes that continue to influence present-day politics. Although many peace initiatives have been attempted, most have addressed the symptoms of conflict rather than its root causes. This has made it difficult to transform temporary ceasefires into a long-lasting peace.  

Recent developments suggest that many governments in the region are focusing more on survival and security than on long-term peacebuilding. Peace is still threatened by shaky ceasefires, proxy wars, and geopoliticalrivalry. However, it would be insufficient to say that peace is unattainable. 

The Middle East’s history shows both the capacity for transformation and the lasting impact of the conflict. Diplomatic development can be achieved even in challenging situations as shown by the various agreements like the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords. Prospects might result from enhanced diplomatic involvement, economic growth, and regional cooperation. In my opinion long lasting peace will only become possible when regional leaders are willing to address the deeper political and social issues that have fueled conflict for the generation  

When will the Middle East not see peace? The ability of international and regional actors to address the root causes of the instability and move beyond the short-term crisis management will help to determine the outcome. Peace will remain elusive until it occurs. However, there will always be a hope for a more stable and peaceful Middle East region if communication, diplomacy, and collaboration are possible. 

By : Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

Discussions of wars usually revolve around weapons, soldiers, and technology. However, geography, which is the actual physical environment of any given country and the location of that country on the Earth’s surface, is often overlooked as a consideration in terms of a war outcome. An example is the conflict between Iran, on one side, and the United States & Israel, on the other side, which became more so in terms of confrontation in 2025, illustrated that Geography can provide a country significant advantages in warfare regardless of whether or not they are being confronted by combat superiority. The geography of Iran which includes mountains along its borders and a small seaward boundary and large expanse of land and its geographic location in the Middle East made it possible for Iran to create significant military challenges for the U.S. & Israeli forces during this conflict, thus holding their positions from both countries. This article will illustrate how geography played an essential role in helping Iran maintain its ground during these conflicts. 

Iran’s Location: Sitting at the Centre of Everything 

Iran is positioned at an important area in the globe. It shares borders with Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey. To the south Iran has a long coastline along the Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf) and to the north it has a coastline along the Caspian Sea. Iran’s central location makes it very difficult for Iran to be cut off from other countries (surrounded by its enemies). 

During this period of conflict, the most critical geographic position Iran held was that of the Strait of Hormuz – a very narrow body of water through which at least 20% of the world’s oil flows daily. Because Iran shares a border with the Strait of Hormuz, it had the capability to threaten oil ships traveling through the Strait. This caused the price of oil to increase around the world and put considerable tension on any country that relied on foreign oil from the Gulf. As a result, both the US and Israel had to carefully consider how far either country could push Iran, knowing that Iran could disrupt global energy supplies simply because of its geographic position. 

The Mountains: Iran’s Protective Shield 

Iran’s two biggest mountain ranges served as its primary defence during the war. The Zagros Mountains form the western and southwestern borders with Iraq while the Alborz Mountains run in the north of Iran. These mountains are very large and steep, making it difficult to pass through them. 

If the U.S. were to have sent ground troop into Iran from Iraq, they would have had to navigate through the Zagros mountain passes. Moving heavy military equipment and vehicles through narrow roads would be slow, risky, and expensive. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have extensive knowledge about these mountains and have been preparing for years how to defend this area of their country. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, Iran successfully resisted a well-armed Iraqi invasion partially due to these same mountains. 

The mountains also offer protection to Iran’s nuclear facilities. For example, Iran’s Fordow enrichment site is located near the city of Qom inside a mountain at least 80m below ground. With some of the most powerful weapons the U.S. possesses, it would be very difficult for them to eliminate the Fordow facility with one strike, which gives Iran additional time to relocate any operational equipment or personnel to ensure they can continue developing their nuclear programme. 

Iran’s Strategic Depth 

Iran is a huge country around 1.6 million kilometres and, therefore, it has what some military experts refer to as “strategic depth.” This is important because the more area that you have to withstand damage, the longer it will take for an adversary to actually defeat your country. This is in stark contrast to Israel, which is one of the smallest countries in the world and most of its cities, airports and military infrastructure are crammed into a small strip of land along the coastline. Therefore, Israel is much more vulnerable to missile and/or drone attacks because there is virtually no strategic depth.  

Iran has taken advantage of its size. Instead of deploying all its missiles and weapons in one location, it has deployed them over a vast area of the country (from the north-east corner of Khorasan Province to the south-west corner of Khuzestan Province). To achieve this, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) has built underground tunnel systems in the mountains near cities such as Tabriz and Isfahan where missiles are stored and launched. While US and Israeli aircraft could potentially destroy some of these sites with missiles or other munitions, they would not be able to destroy all of them at once because they are located across such a vast area. 

Partners Support in Tough Land: Stretching Iran Further 

Iran did not engage in combat alone but had long established ties to militant groups in neighbouring countries, namely Hezbollah of Lebanon and the Houthi movement in Yemen as well as militias in Iraq and Syria. Collectively, these entities have been denoted by the “Axis of Resistance.” Each of these organizations have been geographically positioned in areas that present challenges to Americans and Israelis wishing to strike them.  

For example, Hezbollah fires rockets from rural areas in southern Lebanon, forcing Israel to split its attention between both the Lebanese front and the Iranian front. Similarly, the Houthis launch both rockets and drones from among the most difficult areas available on the Arabian Peninsula, providing them with both physical barriers as well as geographic distance from their targets. The US Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to shoot down these relatively inexpensive Houthi drones with interceptor missiles. The cost of a Houthi drone is about $20,000 to $30,000 while an interceptor missile costs the US about $2 million. The US will continue to spend huge amounts of money, and the difference in costs was clearly a benefit to Iran due to the distance and hiding place of the Houthis in the mountains. 

The North: A Strong and Protected Side 

Iran’s northern border with the Caspian Sea also helped it during the conflict. The Caspian is a landlocked sea, which states that the powerful US Navy could not sail into it. Russia, which also borders the Caspian, had a broadly affability toward Iran. This meant the US and Israel, both could not attack Iran from the north, and they could not fly over Russian airspace to reach Iran more easily. All their aircraft had to approach from the south and southwest, which were exactly the directions where Iran had built its strongest air defences and radar systems. 

The northern border of Iran with the Caspian Sea also assisted Iran throughout the course of the war. Being that the Caspian Sea is a landlocked body of water, there was no way that the U.S. Navy could enter the Caspian Sea. Additionally, because of Russia’s relative friendliness towards Iran, neither U.S. nor Israeli forces could fly over Russian airspace enroute to attacking. Thus, having to use the southern/southwestern air routes provided lower air flow and had to approach at a much more stable and predictable altitude than would have been the case had they been able to operate from their respective bases from within Iranian territory. 

Messages forwarding under the soil 

War today involves much more than simply missiles and aircraft. Communication plays an equally important role in conducting warfare. Iran had been constructing a comprehensive underground fibre optic cable network throughout its entire territory and has sufficient underground military commander sites that they are hard to destroy via air attack. In fact, many of Iran’s civilian communications were able to be disrupted due to US cyber-attacks, but the military commander’s ground networks remained functional due to Iran’s mountainous terrain and large land mass. Once again, the geography of Iran’s large mountainous and land mass allowed it to be protected from the destructiveness of any technology by itself. 

Conclusion 

The conflict between Iran and the alliance between the United States and Israel demonstrated a critical lesson to all people that geographic territory continues to have major importance within modern warfare. Iran’s location along the Persian Gulf, as well as its mountain ranges, large size, unsatisfactory occupation of other countries by Iranian allied militias over considerable distances, and its security along its northern border provided Iran with an advantage that could not be easily disrupted by missiles and bombs. Further, while Iran was able to cause significant damage (the destruction of several major cities, damage to the Iranian economy and destruction to some of its military installations), Iran never lost. Geography plays a significant role in this equation. As a result, both sides of the conflict were forced into negotiations to reach a ceasefire, not because there was equal balance of power between Iran and the United States or Israel with respect to technology and resources, but because geography benefited the Iranian side of the conflict. 

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

Since the start of the new millennium, the People’s Republic of China has gone from having a fledgling military-based space program to being among the most extensive and advanced national space programs in existence. As of June 2026, China finds itself a peer space power to the United States and in leading positions on several key issues, such as lunar exploration, the operation of space stations, and satellite navigation technology. In this paper, we will examine China’s evolution as a space power, including its history, structure, achievements, goals, and impact on the issue of international space governance.  

Historical Evolution and Institutional Framework  

China’s ventures into outer space started during the Cold War era, out of security considerations. The launch of the Dong Fang Hong 1 satellite on April 24, 1970, was the first step towards becoming a member of space powers. For thirty years, however, China’s space program remained scattered and primitive. But everything changed on November 20, 1999, when the Shenzhou 1 space vehicle was launched, and China confirmed the viability of its human spaceflight program. The establishment of the CNSA, or China National Space Administration, in 1993 was a move towards creating a civilian face for this project, although the true backbone of the program continues to be the PLA or the People’s Liberation Army, specifically its Strategic Support Force, which is now called the PLA Aerospace Force since 2024. The Chinese space policy is expressed in a series of five-year plans and through official space white papers. The 2021 document entitled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective” made a connection between space exploration and national rejuvenation, scientific research, and economic expansion. The latest five-year plan, for 2026 to 2030, announced in March 2026, focuses on the use of AI-based autonomy, orbit servicing, and establishing a manned presence on the moon by 2032. While Western space exploration is characterized by heavy dependence on PPPs, Chinese efforts in this area are more government oriented. In particular, the prime contractor in China’s space program is CASC. However, a budding commercial space industry, exemplified by such companies as Galactic Energy and iSpace, has started to launch small satellites and supply missions to outer space. 

Major Strategic Assets and Achievements 

Four cornerstones underpin China’s space power, including human spaceflight, lunar and deep space exploration, satellite navigation, and space science.  

Tiangong space station is the Chinese permanently manned LEO station. Its construction started with Tianhe core module’s launch on April 29, 2021. As of November 2022, the three-module (Tianhe, Wentian, and Mengtian) station formed a T-shaped structure. As of June 2026, Tiangong station operates normally with a crew of three taikonauts; rotation crews replace each other every six months. For instance, the latest Shenzhou 19 mission launched on April 15, 2026, transported seven taikonauts for a long-term rotation mission, including two payload specialists. Over 30 international experiments performed aboard Tiangong space station include experiments from countries like Switzerland, Poland, and Kenya; it reflects China’s alternative to the International Space Station (ISS) set to shut down operations post-2030. China has announced its intention to expand Tiangong into a six-module station by 2028, along with launching a co-orbiting Xuntian space telescope comparable to the Hubble Space Telescope. Secondly, China has witnessed an unprecedented level of success in its lunar program. The Chang’e series includes orbiters (Chang’e 1 & 2) and landers & rovers. On January 3, 2019, Chang’e 4 created history with its soft landing on the far side of the Moon. Chang’e 5 brought back 1.731 kg of lunar samples on December 16, 2020. However, the most impressive mission was Chang’e 6, which succeeded in its mission of landing at the lunar south pole on May 28, 2024, and bringing back 2.1 kg of materials from the Shackleton Crater in the permanently shadowed area on June 25, 2024. Chang’e 7, launched on March 12, 2026, is working on hopping probes to search for water ice in lunar caves. Besides, the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), which is a collaboration of China and Russia and is expanding now to include Venezuela, Pakistan, and South Africa as partners, is being constructed. The ILRS has already sent its first basic module, which consists of a robotic lander-orbiter, on April 2, 2026. China is planning to make its taikonauts land on the Moon by 2032, before NASA’s Artemis III (expected to be launched in late 2027). Thirdly, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) was launched on July 31, 2020. With BDS-3 being made up of thirty satellites, the system has provided navigation services across the world at accuracies of 1.2 meters for civilian users and 0.2 meters for military users. As of June 2026, BDS has been adopted by over 1.5 billion receivers in China alone. Moreover, BDS-3 is required in Chinese commercial maritime navigation, aviation navigation, and autonomous driving systems. Competing directly with GPS (USA), GLONASS (Russia), and Galileo (Europe), BDS offers services that can be used in any of these areas mentioned above. The fourth improvement in the country is that there have been increased investments in space science research. The Insight satellite, which was launched on June 15, 2017, is used for researching black holes. Another satellite that was launched in China is called Kuafu-1, which has been renamed ASO-S. It was launched on October 9, 2022, and is used for investigating solar flares. The Einstein Probe satellite was launched on January 9, 2024, and is used to detect X-ray transients resulting from tidal disruptions. 

Economic and Technological Drivers 

China’s space budget is estimated at US$ 15 billion for 2026, second only to the United States’ $ 32 billion (NASA’s allocation excluding defence space spending). However, China’s purchasing power parity advantage means it can achieve comparable or greater physical output. In 2025 alone, China conducted sixty-eight orbital launches, surpassing the United States’ fifty-two. The workhorse Long March 5B and the partially reusable Long March 9 (first test flight on August 18, 2025) have reduced launch costs to proximately US5,000perkilogramtoLEO, com’edtoSpaceX’sUS 2,700 for Falcon 9 but significantly less than European Arianespace’s US$ 12,000. China has also developed the world’s first methane-liquid oxygen engine, the Tianque-12, which powered the Zhuque-2 rocket to orbit on July 12, 2023. In terms of the economy, revenues from satellite services (communication, Earth Observation, navigation) amounted to US$ 48 billion in 2025 and provided employment to over 300,000 people. In addition, “space-for-civilian” applications have been widely encouraged by the Chinese government, ranging from heat-resistant ceramics, composite materials, and bearings that contribute to the manufacture of fast trains and medical imaging technology. However, civilian-to-space technology developed by private entities, including advanced silicon carbide chips and 3D-printed rocket engines, has been integrated into military satellites.  

Military Use and Dual-Use Nature 

It is not possible to discuss China’s space power without looking at its military implications. For the PLA, space is a means to fight wars. It uses such terms as “integrated space-earth operations,” which include surveillance, targeting, and communications. China operates the Jianbing (Sentry) series of reconnaissance satellites, with the Jianbing-12, launched on November 21, 2025, having a resolution of 0.1 meters. The Shijian-17 (Practice-17) satellite, launched on November 3, 2016, has shown rendezvous and proximity operations, including the inspection of another satellite operated by China, but Western analysts, according to the United States Space Command, based on the report published on September 8, 2021, highlighted the possibility of approaching foreign geostationary satellites. China maintains that it only developed one type of anti-satellite weapon, with the only test conducted on January 11, 2007, when the Fengyun-1C weather satellite was destroyed in the kinetic-ascent test. However, ground-based lasers and electronic warfare weapons, which can blind or jam satellites, are in use. According to the United States Department of Defence report to Congress dated May 15, 2026, “China possesses the world’s most diverse and growing inventory of counterspace weapons.” However, China is also actively involved in international confidence-building initiatives. For example, China has been part of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) since 1980 and co-sponsored the “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” draft treaty in 2014. Moreover, China hosted its third “Belt and Road Space Information Corridor” forum on April 24, 2026, in Beijing. Thirty space ministers attended the forum, where data exchange to deal with disasters was encouraged.  

Comparative Position and Future Trajectory 

In terms of execution speed and consistency, China beats others in the field of space exploration. While the U.S. leads in deep space nuclear propulsion and commercial reusable programs, they are hindered by uncertainty regarding Congress’ willingness to fund them. Russia has stalled, with their last space mission (Luna-25) failing on August 19, 2023. Europe lacks autonomous space exploration due to Ariane 6 delays and the retiring Ariane 5. India has successfully landed their Chandrayaan-3 probe on the Moon on August 23, 2023, yet their annual budget amounts to mere US$ 2.5 billion. China continues a steady line; in 2030, they have a plan to achieve Mars sample return (Tianwen-3, October 2028, July 2031), a Jupiter orbiter (Tianwen-4, September 2029), and a crewed lunar base. One such weakness includes China’s dependence on foreign parts when it comes to some radiation-hardened electronics and scientific instruments. The U.S.’s Wolf Amendment, introduced back in 2011, stipulates that NASA cannot collaborate in a two-way capacity with CNSA, leaving China no other option but to come up with local versions. Ironically, this has helped China become more self-reliant, developing products like 100-megawatt Hall-effect thrusters and X-ray telescopes. 

Challenges and Risks 

These are three challenges facing China in its space ascendancy. Orbital Debris. China is behind the largest event of debris created from an anti-satellite missile test conducted in 2007, which left over 3,000 pieces of space junk. Although there have been changes in other areas, the upper stages of the Long March rocket still do not passivate. In March 2024, the breakup of a Long March 4C upper stage led to the creation of more than 150 pieces of space debris. Brain Drain: top-level space scientists from China continue to migrate to America and Europe for the sake of conducting independent research despite repatriation incentives in the field. Geopolitical Retaliation: the signing of the Artemis Accords by countries including Australia, Japan, and NATO (thirty-two countries total up to June 2026) is a geopolitical response to the ILRS.  

Conclusion 

China is not an emerging space power; it is a fully formed superpower in space. From the Tiangong station to the South Pole of the moon, from BeiDou navigation satellites to its Mars rovers, China has carefully assembled an end-to-end system. The approach is patient, secret, but increasingly willing to cooperate with non-Western states. On the other hand, the Western model of space power is more commercial, transparent, but potentially politically unstable. On June 2, 2026, the world is closer to having a multipolar space power structure than it has been at any point since the Apollo Program era. Whether the result of this multipolarity will be a new space race or sustainable cooperation will hinge on diplomatic developments over the coming five years. 

By : Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

In May of this year, the foreign ministers of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue alliance) met in Delhi. The meeting was closely observed as many analysts debate the future of the Quad under Trump 2.0. The Quad Leaders’ Summit, which was due in 2025, has yet to materialize. Further, United States President Donald Trump’s visit to China in May also made it clear that the US is not seeking any confrontation with China. Trump appeared conciliatory in Beijing which brings us to the question as to what is the future of an alliance that was supposed to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. That was never the official status of the grouping but rather the much-understood pact among the four.  

In Delhi, the foreign ministers of India, Japan and Australia and the US Secretary of State met and in their press statements later, they announced several areas in which the grouping intends to focus. A decision was taken to launch a new initiative to boost port infrastructure in the Pacific Islands. The first project under this initiative will be to build a port in Fiji. The group members also agreed to expand the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative through the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region in Gurugram. India is set to host the second QUAD-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, which was launched in 2025 at Guam. Further, new initiatives on maritime surveillance, energy security, and critical minerals were announced that showed the grouping’s shift toward strategic cooperation. But there was no clarity when the next Quad Leaders’ Summit would take place.  

The origins of the Quad go back to 2004, when the four countries coordinated humanitarian assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2007, a more formal dialogue began but then it never really took off. In 2017, the Quad saw a revival and a more focused approach on the four nations coming together to create a counterbalance to China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. There was a buzz that the Quad was going to be an Asian NATO, but again it’s an idea that never really went further.  

There was a real fear that the grouping might fall apart when the US changed from a Republican President to a Democrat one. The transition from Trump 1.0 to Joe Biden had many speculate on how that change would affect the Quad. But the Biden administration strengthened the Quad. His administration participated in not only the first in-person summit in 2021 but also in five more summits, including two virtual ones. The Biden administration also pledged to have the Quad play a “defining role in the region” which in effect meant keeping China in check in the Indo-Pacific.  

However, what has impacted the Quad the most has been the tenure of Trump 2.0. The US President has unleashed his own vision of global affairs and priority areas. There is also a very distinct sense that the US, under Trump 2.0, does not want to compete with China. During his China visit in May, the focus was on building a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”. Trade was top of the agenda despite the ongoing tensions in the Middle East. China remains a major market for the US, but red tape and regulations act as major obstacles. But during the visit, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping told US business leaders that China’s “doors will open wider” and that American firms would have “broader prospects” in the Chinese market, according to news site Xinhua.  

The real question then is that if the US is seeking a closer relationship with China under Trump 2.0, as was displayed by both sides during Trump’s visit, where does it leave the Quad? One can safely say that at this point of time the significance of the Quad has been diminished. The no-commitment by the US to hold a Quad Leaders’ Summit and the movement of the US to co-operate and not compete with China, are clear indications that the Quad will have to operate on low priority now.  

For India, this is bad news. The India-US story has been riddled with tensions under Trump 2.0, and the highlights have been tariffs and insults. Quad, for India, was a grouping where India was a major player and the US was betting on it to counter the rise of an ambitious China. However, the script seems to have undergone a change in Washington, DC. And the Quad members have no choice but to play with the new script. While it would be incorrect to write off the Quad, it would be equally incorrect to overstate its importance today.  

By : Prof (Dr.) M. L Meena and Ravi Dass Bishnoi

There is a distinction, rarely made in mainstream commentary but essential to understanding the present, especially geopolitical moment, between possessing power and being able to exercise it purposefully. The political sociologist Michael Mann spent much of his career separating what he called despotic power, the state’s capacity to act unilaterally and coercively, from structural power, which is the state’s ability to penetrate civil society and implement its decisions across territory. The most dangerous political condition, Mann argued, is not a weakness. It is the combination of high despotic capacity with declining infrastructural reach, a state that can threaten everything and deliver very little.  

The United States currently spends one trillion dollars annually on its military, a record figure, with the Trump administration now proposing to raise that to $1.5 trillion for 2027, a 44 percent increase that the White House itself describes as approaching the historic levels of the build-up before the Second World War. And yet: since early March, Iranian forces have declared the Strait of Hormuz closed and carried out over a dozen attacks on ships attempting transit, while Washington’s ultimatums expired, its deadlines passed, and oil prices rose nearly 50 percent over March alone, one of the steepest monthly rallies on record. The despotic capacity is staggering. The infrastructural reach means the ability to translate that capacity into a durable, stable outcome is visibly deteriorating. This is not a military failure in the conventional sense. It is a structural one, and the distinction matters enormously for how we think about what comes next. 

The political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman identified the conceptual skeleton of this problem several years ago, though the world has taken considerably longer to feel its full weight. Their theory of weaponized interdependence describes how states can leverage asymmetrical positions within global economic networks to coerce other actors and how the very structures that liberals believed would foster peace can be repurposed for coercive ends. The insight was sharp, but it was written primarily from the perspective of great powers the United States using its dominance over global financial clearing systems and semiconductor supply chains to punish rivals. What today has demonstrated, with brutal clarity, is that the logic runs in every direction simultaneously. Iran does not control SWIFT. It does not manufacture semiconductors. It cannot project conventional military force beyond its immediate region. What it does control is 33 kilometres of water through which one-fifth of global oil passes. As one recent analysis put it, conflict in international relations increasingly takes the form of war by any means other than war, in which state and non-state actors use civilian infrastructure, logistics networks, and economic dependencies as levers of coercive power. The Houthis grasped the same geography. A militia with no navy, no air force, and no industrial base understood that the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, the narrow passage between Yemen and Djibouti, was not merely a waterway. It was a structural vulnerability in the global economy, waiting to be exploited by anyone with the will to do so and nothing left to lose. 

This is where the popular concept of the polycrisis, associated most prominently with the economic historian Adam Tooze, requires both acknowledgement and serious qualification. Tooze’s formulation that we are living through interconnected crises whose combined impact exceeds the sum of their parts, is descriptively accurate as far as it goes. But a recent critical reading argues that the concept replaces structural explanations with a profusion of empirical data, perceiving events from the implicit standpoint of the managerial state and implying a political programme based on stabilizing existing social relations rather than transforming them. That critique carries weight. Calling everything a polycrisis risks producing a sophisticated vocabulary for helplessness, a way of naming the problem that simultaneously forecloses the question of who built the systems that are now failing, and in whose interest those systems were constructed. The crises of the current geopolitical scenario are not falling from the sky. They have architects. They have beneficiaries. And they have geography.  

That geography is the part of this debate that receives the least analytical attention, and it is precisely where the most consequential dynamics are unfolding. The global economy has been constructed, over several decades, around a small number of physical chokepoints whose disruption produces cascading effects entirely disproportionate to the military significance of the actors controlling them. The Strait of Hormuz. The Bab-el-Mandeb. The Taiwan Strait, through which over 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors transit. The South China Sea, over which roughly a third of global maritime trade passes annually. The Lombok and Malacca straits are the underwater cable corridors of the Indo-Pacific. These are not abstract strategic concepts. They are specific coordinates on a map, and the states and non-state actors positioned nearest to them wield leverage that bears no relationship to their GDP or their defence budgets. The liberal international order was not designed with this geography in mind. It was designed in 1944 and 1945 by people whose principal concern was avoiding another European war, and whose conception of global economic governance reflected the industrial and maritime realities of that moment. The world has since reorganized itself around different latitudes and different chokepoints, while institutional architecture has remained largely unchanged. 

The United States–China competition illuminates this mismatch with clarity. The conventional framing, a rising power challenging a dominant one, is too tidy to be useful. What is unfolding is a contest over who gets to design the next layer of global infrastructure: not the physical infrastructure of the 20th century, canals and railways and oil pipelines, but the computational infrastructure of the 21st century. Semiconductor fabrication. Artificial intelligence training architecture. Undersea data cables. Cloud computing topology. Rare-earth processing supply chains concentrated in southern China and the lithium triangle of South America. The concentration of nearly 90 percent of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan creates a high dependence that shapes not just commercial calculations but sovereign strategic decisions across the entire world. Washington’s chip export restrictions are, at one level, a trade measure. At another level, they are an attempt to freeze the architecture of computational power in a configuration favorable to the United States before China can build around it. Beijing understands this, which is why its response has been a national mobilization that treats cost as essentially secondary, because the alternative is to allow a rival to control the infrastructure through which future military systems, economic productivity, and political influence will all flow. Neither side is miscalculating. Both are responding to the same structural reality with the tools at their disposal. What neither side has adequately reckoned with is that this competition, conducted without institutional guardrails, is actively destroying the interdependence that made both countries rich.  

There is a new intellectual debate emerging at the edges of this conversation that deserves to be brought to the centre. It concerns not just who holds power, but who designs the systems through which power moves, and whether, in a world of AI-accelerated decision-making, that distinction between the architects of order and the inhabitants of order is becoming the fundamental political question of the century. The Cold War had a stabilizing logic built into its technology. Verifying a missile signature took time. Assessing intelligence took time. Negotiating a backdown took time. Those hours and days were not inefficiencies; they were the margin of error within which human judgment could intervene before miscalculation became catastrophe. AI-integrated targeting systems, autonomous cyber operations, and algorithmic early-warning networks are progressively eliminating that margin. But the deeper issue is more unsettling still: as AI systems take on more of the work of intelligence assessment and strategic recommendation, the question of whose values, whose threat models, and whose historical assumptions are encoded into those systems becomes a geopolitical question of the first order. An AI trained predominantly on American strategic doctrine will not assess a Chinese naval movement the same way an AI trained on Chinese strategic doctrine will assess an American one. The crisis that results may have no human author, in any meaningful sense. That is a new kind of danger, and the existing vocabulary of deterrence theory is not equipped to address it. 

Beneath all of this, the part of the world that has the least representation in the institutions making these decisions bears the greatest cost of their dysfunction. Over 72,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since October 2023, among them more than 21,000 children, with nearly 90 percent of the strip’s water and sanitation infrastructure destroyed or damaged. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of energy and food price surges flowing directly from the Hormuz conflict, the IMF’s Spring Meetings this April produced recommendations that civil society groups across the Global South described as entrenching a cycle of debt distress and austerity rather than addressing the structural crisis. Official Development Assistance was cut by almost 25 percent, the steepest drop in recent history, while Washington proposed a defence budget of $1.5 trillion. The arithmetic of these choices is not accidental. It reflects a global order in which the costs of geopolitical competition are socialised downward and outward, onto the populations with the least institutional voice, while the benefits of the systems being competed over remain concentrated at the top.  

The question worth sitting with is not whether the international order is in crisis. It visibly is. The more important question is whether the frameworks we are using to understand that crisis are adequate to its depth. Calling it a polycrisis names the complexity without explaining the causation. Calling it a new Cold War imports a bipolar clarity that does not exist. Calling it multipolarity implies an orderly distribution of influence that the evidence does not support. What we are witnessing is something older and more uncomfortable: a confrontation between the world as it was institutionally designed and the world as it has physically and technologically become. The institutions were built for a particular geography of power. That geography has shifted. The institutions do not have any.