By : Shaurya Pandey, Research Analyst, GSDN

On June 18, 2026, United States President Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Iran at the Palace of Versailles, France, during the Group of Seven (G7) summit, marking a significant, if fragile, milestone in a conflict that had shaken the Middle East and rattled the global economy for nearly four months. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the document separately. The agreement, brokered with Pakistan’s assistance after weeks of difficult negotiations, declares an immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, reopens the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, and establishes a 60-day window for further negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security. Yet, as seasoned observers of the region have quickly noted, an MoU is not a final peace treaty. The harder work lies ahead, and the path from this preliminary agreement to a durable, comprehensive settlement remains treacherous. 

Background: A War That Changed the Middle East 

The roots of the current crisis stretch back through decades of hostility between Washington and Tehran, punctuated by failed diplomatic attempts and escalatory cycles. The most recent chapter began in earnest on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes on Iran, targeting its nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. The strikes resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as senior officials, including Ali Larijani, a key figure in prior diplomatic efforts. Iran responded by unleashing a series of counterstrikes against Israel, United States military bases in the region, and targets in Arab states. Most consequentially, Iran shut down the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which approximately 20 percent of the world’s oil passes, bringing global energy markets to the brink. 

Following intense international pressure and Pakistan’s mediation efforts, the United States and Iran agreed on a temporary ceasefire on April 7, 2026. Months of tortuous negotiations followed, mediated by Pakistan, with several near collapses before the June 15, 2026, preliminary agreement was announced. Iran had effectively weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, forcing an economic calculation on the United States and its allies that, ultimately, incentivized compromise. The price of United States crude oil fell more than 4.5 percent to US$ 80 per barrel upon news of the deal, reflecting the enormous economic stakes involved. 

What the MoU Contains 

The 14-point MoU is, by design, a framework rather than a resolution. It extends the ceasefire for 60 days, a period extendable by mutual consent, during which the two sides are expected to address the most contentious unresolved issues. The agreement formally reopens the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic and lifts dueling blockades that had throttled global trade. President Trump authorized what he described as a toll-free opening of the strait, declaring on June 20, 2026, that no fees would be charged for passage during or after the ceasefire window. The MoU also indicates that oil and some financial sanctions on Iran will be lifted, and that allies will submit plans for reconstruction assistance. According to Iranian state media, an estimated US$ 24 billion in frozen Iranian assets are to be released during the 60-day window, with half disbursed before final negotiations begin, though Washington disputed that characterization. 

Critically, Iran also reaffirmed its commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to abstain from producing nuclear weapons. Final negotiations during the 60-day window are expected to address uranium enrichment levels, the size and disposition of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, the fate of advanced centrifuges, and verification and monitoring arrangements. The Council on Foreign Relations noted that early reporting suggests Tehran will be permitted to continue enriching uranium at some level and will not be required to dismantle its network of proxy groups, both of which are significant concessions given the stated objectives with which the United States entered the war. 

The Nuclear Question: The Heart of the Matter 

No issue is more central to the long-term durability of this agreement than Iran’s nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented that Iran enriched uranium to near-weapons-grade levels, well beyond what is needed for civilian purposes, and by May 31, 2026, it reported Iran had amassed a record stockpile of military-grade enriched uranium. The Trump administration maintained throughout the conflict that preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons was its primary objective. President Trump repeatedly stated that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. 

The problem is that the MoU leaves the nuclear question almost entirely unresolved. As Al-Jazeera noted in its analysis, nothing substantive has been negotiated yet on the nuclear program. A wide gap already exists between the two sides’ interpretations of what even the preliminary agreement entails: United States Vice President JD Vance suggested nuclear inspectors would return to Iran to help destroy the highly enriched uranium stockpile, while Iranian officials insisted that nuclear negotiations would not even begin until after the initial MoU was formally signed. Experts such as Ali Vaez, Director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, have emphasized that the final agreement must address the location of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, verifiable disposal of that material, and the establishment of long-term restrictions and transparency measures on Iran’s nuclear program. 

There are no issues that can be resolved in 60 days. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which involved far more modest and narrowly defined nuclear concessions, took years to negotiate, involving teams of specialist technical experts and multiple rounds of talks involving Iran, the United States, and other major powers. The current framework is significantly broader in scope, yet the negotiating window is a fraction of the time. Analysts such as Ben Rhodes, who served as United States Deputy National Security Adviser under former President Barack Obama, observed that the deal effectively reopened a waterway that was open before the war began, while starting a nuclear negotiation far narrower than what the Trump administration had originally sought. 

The Israeli Dimension: A Spoiler in Waiting 

One of the most immediate threats to the deal’s viability is Israel’s continued military campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militant group. Iran had made an end to the Lebanon fighting a condition for any agreement with the United States. Yet Israel was not a direct party to the MoU negotiations and has made clear it does not consider itself bound by the agreement’s terms. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared on June 15, 2026, that Israeli forces would remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza without any time limit. Far-right Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir was even more explicit, writing that the agreement does not bind Israel. 

The strain this creates in the United States-Israel relationship has been palpable. Trump publicly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for ordering the bombing of Hezbollah targets in southern Beirut, and reportedly told The New York Times that Netanyahu is a very difficult person to deal with. Israeli opposition politicians have grown increasingly vocal in their criticism, with former Prime Minister Ehud Barak declaring that Iran emerged stronger and Israel weaker from the conflict, and that this represented Netanyahu’s strategic responsibility and failure. A poll conducted in April 2026 revealed that 80 percent of Israeli respondents favoured continuing the war against Hezbollah even if it created friction with the United States, illustrating the domestic political pressures Netanyahu faces. 

Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group explained that from Iran’s perspective, the MoU is a test for President Trump to see if he can rein in Prime Minister Netanyahu. Iran views Israel as the party that pushed the United States into this conflict in the first place and believes that if Netanyahu remains unhappy with any arrangement, he has the capability to relaunch the war after a few months. This assessment underscores a structural vulnerability in the deal: any sustained Israeli military action that Iran views as a violation of the ceasefire could provide Tehran with justification to close the Strait of Hormuz again, sending the entire diplomatic framework into collapse. 

Domestic Politics and the Durability Question 

The political dimensions of this deal are inseparable from its prospects for durability. In the United States, President Trump faces pressure from two directions simultaneously. On one hand, his administration needs to demonstrate tangible progress on reducing energy prices and ending an unpopular war ahead of mid-term congressional elections, where Republicans risk losing their majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. On the other hand, hawkish members of his own Republican Party are deeply skeptical of any arrangement that does not result in a complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program and destruction of its enriched uranium stockpile. Trump will also need to sell the deal to congressional skeptics who remember his own decision during his first term to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA in 2018. 

In Iran, the political landscape is also complex. The new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the assassinated Ali Khamenei, has significantly less consolidated authority than his father commanded. As Vaez noted in April 2026, Mojtaba is not supreme in the way his father was, and factionalism is built into the DNA of the Iranian political system. Iranian hardliners associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been hostile to negotiations from the outset. The IRGC’s Aerospace Force Commander publicly accused the United States of violating the ceasefire through its naval operations and threatened a decisive response. Iran’s new Supreme Leader himself declared in June 2026 that United States military bases in the Middle East were no longer safe, indicating a continuing hawkish faction within the Iranian system capable of undermining any deal. 

Regional Implications: Winners, Losers, and Bystanders 

The ripple effects of the United States-Iran conflict and the subsequent deal have reordered regional calculations in significant ways. Gulf Arab states, who had long depended on American security guarantees against Iran, are now re-evaluating their strategic positions. Iran’s demonstrated ability to bring the Strait of Hormuz to a standstill, effectively holding the global economy hostage, revealed that the United States’ conventional military superiority does not translate automatically into strategic dominance. Analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations observed that while nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have alternative maritime routes for their energy exports, countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain do not and will be compelled to accommodate Iranian demands on maritime transit arrangements or face economic dislocation. 

The G7 nations welcomed the agreement, with French President Emmanuel Macron indicating that discussions would focus on the long-term reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the broader diplomatic opportunity created by the framework. The G7 joint declaration called the deal a historic opportunity to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to tackle threats related to its regional and ballistic activities. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, whose country played an indispensable mediating role throughout the negotiations, announced the deal alongside Trump, reflecting Islamabad’s elevated diplomatic profile. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described the agreement as a critical step, while expressing hope that both parties would build on the momentum to reach a final resolution. 

Will the Deal Hold? An Assessment 

The question of whether the Iran-United States peace deal will hold can be approached at two levels: whether the initial 60-day MoU survives to produce a final agreement, and whether any final agreement, if reached, proves durable over time. At both levels, the outlook is uncertain but not hopeless. 

The 60-day window faces immediate structural challenges. Israel’s continuation of military operations in Lebanon threatens to provide Iran with a legitimate grievance to walk away, and Tehran has already demonstrated its willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to perceived violations. The freeze on nuclear negotiations, with the two sides unable to agree even on what the preliminary deal commits them to, is another alarming indicator. Vaez has noted that both Washington and Tehran are approaching the deal with very different narratives: the Americans speak of peace while the Iranians speak of victory, and so many essential issues have been deferred that the agreement is more of a political roadmap than a substantive settlement. 

And yet there are strong structural incentives for the deal to hold, at least in the short term. Both sides are exhausted. Iran has suffered enormous casualties, the death of its Supreme Leader, extensive damage to its military infrastructure, and the pounding of its civilian economy. The United States, for its part, is facing political pressure at home, rising oil prices, and the reputational costs of a war that did not achieve its maximalist objectivesof regime change. As Vaez put it bluntly, the reason either side has walked away from the table is that the alternatives to a deal range from unpalatable to outright ugly. The question is whether this shared interest in avoiding renewed conflict is sufficient to bridge the enormous substantive gaps that remain. 

Conclusion 

The United States-Iran MoU signed in June 2026 is a genuine and significant diplomatic achievement, but it is emphatically not a peace deal in any final or settled sense. It is a fragile truce between two adversaries who have not resolved the fundamental disagreements that drove them to war. The coming 60 days will be among the most consequential in modern Middle Eastern diplomacy. The international community faces a narrow window to transform an armistice into something more enduring. The obstacles are formidable: an unresolved nuclear program, a defiant Israeli government pursuing its own agenda in Lebanon, domestic hawks in both Washington and Tehran ready to torpedo any arrangement, and a history of broken commitments that makes trust between the two parties nearly non-existent. 

The words of Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group capture the moment well: for the first time in more than a decade, the world is seeing images of Iranian officials and American officials meeting face to face in the same room. That image alone, however, is not enough. Whether the Iran-United States peace deal holds will ultimately depend not on the symbolism of a signing ceremony in France, but on the painstaking, unglamorous work of technical negotiation, political compromise, and regional diplomacy that must now follow. The world, battered by months of conflict and soaring energy prices, can only hope that both sides have the wisdom and the will to see it through. 

By: Arsh Mishra, Research Analyst, GSDN

India-Pakistan relations can best be described as a bed of particularly painful thorns, historically more so for one side than the other. Ever since the colonial gift of a nation divided into two by mere lines on a map, the two States have engaged in all sorts of hostilities possible, particularly army-against-army wars starting in 1947-48 followed by 1965 and 1971. The 1971 war that birthed Bangladesh prompted Pakistan to finally realise that as far as conventional warfare was concerned, it would always be outdone by the Indian forces. Thus began a deliberate and extensive Pakistani pivot to a new age of warfare and conflict, all the aspects of which can be aptly included under the umbrella of asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric Warfare

In the simplest words, asymmetric warfare is described as conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies. While sounding very simple, this concept includes a myriad ways of waging conflict, some of which have been extensively employed by India’s hostile neighbour. Till today, with new conflicts around the world, and with the old ones evolving, asymmetric warfare and it scope continues to expand, making it one of the toughest challenges for State security and defence. In the current day and age, methods can range from age-old proxy warfare and guerilla tactics to the highly sophisticated realm of cyber and information warfare, and with seemingly futuristic concepts like weather weaponisation fast heading towards plausible operationalisation, it is in India’s best interests, nay a pressing necessity, to do all it can to stay ahead of the curve. Historical examples paint a less-than-conclusive picture of the success of asymmetric warfare. While the smaller belligerent party in the Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars secured victory, the same cannot be seen in more contemporary conflicts such as the post-October 7 Israeli war on Hamas and Hizb’allah, where the larger, more sophisticated party clearly has the upper hand. In the Indo-Pakistani context, the drawn nature of the conflict makes the analysis far more complex and the judgement of victory or defeat more uncertain. This article aims to qualitatively examine the effectiveness of Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare against India.

Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts

On September 22, 1965, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the immediate aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war and a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated ceasefire resolution, made a particularly fiery speech in the Council, which portrayed Pakistan as a victim of India’s “naked predatory unwarranted aggression”; a laughable notion at the very least considering Operation Gibraltar, the spark that lit the flame of war, was undertaken less than two months before this speech. Notable amongst all the usual rhetoric was one statement that has since defined Pakistan’s approach to its conflict with India, “We will wage a war for thousand years, a war of defence”. Furthermore, he threatened Pakistani withdrawal from the United Nations in the absence of a lasting settlement on the Kashmir issue; interestingly, the ultimatum has not been carried out till date despite the UN’s failure as per Pakistani perception.

After abject failure and utter humiliation in the 1971 war that created Bangladesh, Bhutto laid down the doctrine of ‘inflicting a thousand cuts’ upon India, to dismember it. Ironically, six years later, Bhutto himself was deposed and later executed by the new regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, who despite the clear difference in opinions, seemed to agree with waging low intensity and covert conflict against the Indian State, thus formalising and expanding on the doctrine of ‘Bleeding India with a Thousand Cuts’.

Since then, through cross border terrorism, separatist insurgencies and hybrid and information warfare, Pakistan has been waging a protracted war against India, a war that it aims to keep waging into the distant future. The significant pivot to a new type of warfare enabled Pakistan to achieve its objective of attempting to destabilise India and a nuisance to the neighbourhood, while foregoing the costs, both economic and otherwise, of engaging in direct conflict.

Terrorism and Separatist Insurgencies

After the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan sought to redirect the remaining Sunni mujahids into Kashmir to propagate acts of terror and insurgency. Thus, from the 1980s, the single greatest security threat to India till date began to take shape. Pakistan officially maintained the rising violence and armed struggle in Kashmir as the freedom movement of the Kashmiris who sought to secede from India. Reports of Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) admitting to the National Assembly that Pakistan did indeed sponsor acts of violence in Kashmir, and Gen Parvez Musharraf admitting to supporting and training Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, however, led the narrative of Pakistani non-involvement to an early grave.

Due to the terrorism being promulgated in Kashmir, the Indian Army and paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF) maintain a presence of close to 3.5 lakh troops, in addition to all the supporting logistics required to sustain this level of deployment. This comes at a significant economic and human cost to India, while the cost of carrying out terrorism to Pakistan is minimal and grossly incomparable to the Indian cost of countering it. Moreover, since 2000, more than 3000 security personnel have lost their lives in terror acts in Kashmir, in addition to a host of civilian lives and destruction of property and infrastructure. Even though estimates suggest more than 13000 terrorists have been neutralised in the same time frame, the value of human lives in India is far greater than in Pakistan, with the result being that every single life lost in India is felt with the same psychological and emotional solemnity.

In addition to Kashmir, Pakistan fuelled and continues to fuel separatist fires in Punjab through the Khalistan movement, extending support to organisations like the Babbar Khalsa Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force and the Khalistan Commando Force. The ISI, during the 1980s, set up a special cell to provide arms and ammunition to the Khalistani terrorists under Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Even though a strong Khalistani terror threat has long since diffused, the micro-involvement of Pakistan in Punjab even today through narrative building and cross-border drug smuggling, continues to present a problem for India significant enough to counter actively, something that has been a victim of recent neglect.

With Kashmir and Punjab being the main focus, Pakistan continues to attempt to infiltrate and sow discord in India through proxy assets in Nepal and Bangladesh, and with both new governments treading a wary and calculated approach to India’s influence in the region, there are opportunities for Pakistan to exploit, ones that must be shut down through Indian diplomatic and intelligence efforts sooner than later.

Inter Services Intelligence and Deep State

The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is responsible for handling Pakistan’s intelligence requirements, much akin to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB). However, unlike its Indian counterparts, the ISI is not just an intelligence agency, but also the chief puppeteer behind every single aspect of ruling Pakistan. In close conjunction with the Pakistani army, whose officers both serving and retired make up much of the ISI, the agency forms a potent Deep State apparatus that effectively controls Pakistani affairs. It is common knowledge, supported by a plethora of studies and evidence, that no real power rests with the Pakistani federal executive, and that they serve at the pleasure of the ISI and army. Pakistan’s extensive experience with coups d’etat is enough to underscore the veracity of this system. Owing to such absolute control, it is far easier for Pakistan to devote time, efforts and resources dedicated to destabilising India, instead of focussing on actual governance, and the indications that this indeed is the state of affairs is highlighted by the complete breakdown of normal life, whether economic or civil, in most parts of Pakistan.

It also enables Pakistan to circumvent lengthy bureaucratic procedures to achieve its military and terror objectives, which is in stark contrast to the red tape culture in Indian administration. It was a common source of ridicule for Indian troops stationed along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border to be mocked by Pakistani troops who often used to call out the lengthy chain of permissions required for India to fire a lone bullet towards Pakistan while they could spray Indian posts with a barrage any time they pleased. While this situation has vastly improved with Indian troops being granted more autonomy, India is still a long way from streamlining its bureaucratic procedures, while maintaining accountability and democratic control, unlike Pakistan which is, for all practical purposes, an autocratic State with a government that serves at the pleasure of its generals.

Furthermore, the extensive penetration of the Pakistani Deep State into the nation’s administration has enabled it to dictate the diplomatic narrative, and it is no surprise that on every major international platform, Pakistan continues to propagate its narrative of being a victim of terrorism, claims that are dismissed often, and rebutted aptly by the Indian diplomats. However, the persistence of such narratives, and their selective subscription by the international comity of nations at times, highlights the reactionary nature of Indian diplomatic efforts instead of active and aggressive diplomacy aimed at dispelling such narratives before they take root.

Information Warfare

With the evolving nature of warfare, Information Warfare has emerged as a key aspect of asymmetric conflicts. During and after Operation Sindoor, narratives from both sides persisted for a long time, and despite clear operational victory, India was not able to capitalise on the opportunity to engage in effective information warfare (IW). Despite heavy losses, the Pakistani public celebrates Pakistani triumph in Operation Banyan-al-Marsoos, with the narrative gaining traction in parts of India as well. The ISI and Director General Inter Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), the army’s public relations branch have been miles ahead of India in propagating IW, which India awoke to too late and still has not caught up to the levels required.

In the modern age, wars will increasingly be fought through non-kinetic means, and IW remains the most important aspect of the same. ISI has been able to infiltrate Indian media space and influence people’s perception through effective use of social media sock-puppet networks and covert funding and directions to fringe anti-State outfits. Therefore, while at the international and diplomatic level, India maintains an upper hand through factual rebuttals, at the human level, Pakistan has been able to create chaos, confusion, hysteria and doubt with respect to Indian efforts, at minimal human or economic cost.

Upon the subject of cyberspace infiltration and sophisticated cyber-attacks, Pakistan currently lacks the wherewithal to break through India’s security, but with China as a trusted ally, it can soon be expected to possess the capability to perpetrate such attacks in the near future.

The threat to India’s media and cyber space is a clear and present danger, more so than kinetic and conventional security concerns, and Pakistan has the advantage of an enormous head-start in this respect.

The Economy of Asymmetric Warfare

The Indian Budget 2026-27 allocated the Ministry of Defence $86.7 bn, close to 2% of the national GDP. This figure excludes the additional $18 bn allocated to the Ministry of Home Affairs for the paramilitary forces and intelligence apparatus under it. In contrast, Pakistan’s defence budget for the current financial year is $10.8 bn. While the amounts look seem disparate and project India’s superior position regarding security, the reality is not so stark. The ISI and Pakistani Army propagate their conflict through proxy terrorist outfits, most of which are registered as not-for-profit organisations and rely on private funding just as much as covert government funding. Therefore, the cost of the conflict is far lesser for Pakistan, with its primary focus on destabilising India, and far greater for India, with its security spending itself directed into diverse sub-verticals. By drawing out the conflict as lesser costs, Pakistan ensures Indian drainage of funds on maintain security and countering threats, such as infiltration and terror attacks, that Pakistan has abundant resources to churn out through its well-established terror sponsoring State machinery.

The Judgement

Henry Kissinger stated “the conventional army loses if it does not win, but the guerilla wins if he does not lose”. It is an unpolished view on the subject; the real success or failure of an asymmetric conflict depends on whether the original objective is achieved. While Pakistan continues to bleed India economically through defence spending and human costs of the lives lost due to terror attacks, it falls extremely short of its objective of dismembering India. India, even through a less-than-ideal and fractured approach to countering the Pakistani asymmetric threat, has been able to heal its wounds faster than Pakistan has been able to inflict the cuts. The single most important factor in this is the resilience of the Indian people, who unite in the face of adversity despite diversity. It has been seen that incidents like terror attacks bring Indians closer together in their demand and hope for an end to the problem once and for all, a mindset that allows the State machinery to respond effectively to the threats. Thus, while India bleeds, it does not sustain injury for stretches of time long enough for Pakistan to fracture the integrity of the nation. In this sense, Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare, while potent, has failed in its objective.

The Way Forward

Contemporary Pakistan is begetting the rotten fruits of years of neglect towards its citizens, and the Deep State today is surrounded by threats from all sides, literally and figuratively. The Taliban is a major nuisance, the Balochistan Liberation Army has declared control over 85% of the province, there are whispers of the demand for secession in Sindh and there are mass uprisings in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-Occupied-Jammu and Kashmir. The time is opportune for India to forego its reactionary approach and aim at completely neutralising the Pakistani threat at a time when the rogue state is already crippled. Doing so does not require kinetic or conventional force, but a pragmatic and aggressive approach towards controlling the narrative at the highest diplomatic level and the grassroots at the same time. Economic pressure, dissent and diplomatic isolation pursued with focussed vigour will make sure Pakistan never again features as a security threat, all three of which can be achieved by a mastery of Information Warfare.

India does not need a thousand cuts for Pakistan, three well directed slashes will sever its ambitions of dismembering India once and for all, and the war of a thousand years shall have ended in less than a hundred.

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

On June 16, 2026, the United States announced that the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) would once again be known as the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). According to the official statement, the change was made to restore the command’s historic identity while leaving its mission area of responsibility and operational commitments unchanged. At first glance, the decision appears to be little more than an administrative adjustment. Yet in international politics, symbols and terminology often carry meanings that extend far beyond bureaucratic decisions. 

The renaming has attracted considerable attention because the addition of the word “Indo” in 2018 was itself viewed as a major strategic signal. It reflected Washington’s recognition of the growing interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and acknowledged India’s increasing importance in the regional security architecture. Consequently, the removal of the term “Indo” has generated debate among policymakers, analysts and strategic observers regarding whether the United States is subtly redefining its priorities in Asia. 

The restoration of the USPACOM designation raises an important question: does this change indicate a shift in American strategic priorities, or is it merely an attempt to revive a historic military identity? In my view, the decision is largely symbolic at present. Nevertheless, it deserves attention because strategic terminology often shapes perceptions among allies and competitors and can influence how a country’s intentions are interpreted.  

 The Evolution of USPACOM and the 2018 Transformation 

The United States Pacific Command has a long and distinguished history. Established on January 1, 1947, by President Harry S. Truman, it became the oldest and largest of the United States unified combatant commands. Throughout the Cold War and the post-Cold War period the command played a central role in maintaining American military presence across the Pacific region. 

USPACOM was involved in the major military and humanitarian operations including support during the Korean War, the Vietnam War and numerous disaster-relief missions throughout Asia and the Pacific. Over the decades the command has become a cornerstone of the United States security architecture in the region. 

The script shifted dramatically on May 30, 2018. Standing at Pearl Harbor, then-Defence Secretary James Mattis didn’t just rename a command he formally fused two oceans into a single interconnected strategic theatre  

In my view, the significance of the 2018 renaming went far beyond geography, as it reflected Washington’s growing recognition that developments in the Indian and Pacific Oceans could no longer be viewed separately. Economic flows, maritime trade routes, energy supplies, and security challenges linked the two oceans more closely than ever before.  

The inclusion of the term “Indo” was not merely a geographical adjustment. It also reflected growing recognition of India’s strategic importance within the regional security architecture. India’s growing economic power, expanding naval capabilities, and strategic location along key sea lines of communication made it a crucial partner in maintaining regional stability.  

The Rise of the Indo-Pacific Concept 

The term “Indo-Pacific” emerged as one of the defining strategic concepts of the 21st century. Unlike the older “Asia-Pacific” framework that focused primarily on East Asia and the Pacific Ocean, the Indo-Pacific concept recognised that developments in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean are increasingly interconnected. 

There are several factors that contributed to this shift are as: 

• First, the global trade patterns increasingly depended upon maritime routes connecting the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. The Indian Ocean became a vital artery for energy shipments and commercial activity. 

• Second, China’s growing economic and military influence expanded beyond East Asia into the Indian Ocean region. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, China increased its economic presence across South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 

• Third, countries such as India, Japan and Australia began promoting the Indo-Pacific framework as a meaning of encouraging greater regional cooperation and preserving a rule based international order. 

Washington saw the adoption of the Indo-Pacific terminology as a sign of support for a regional vision that prioritized freedom of navigation, openness, respect for sovereignty and resistance to force.  

India’s Central Role in the Indo-Pacific Strategy 

One of the most important implications of the 2018 renaming was the symbolic elevation of India within United States strategic thinking. 

Historically, American security planning in Asia focused heavily on East Asia particularly relations with Japan, South Korea and the other Pacific allies. The Indo-Pacific framework expanded this perspective by placing India closer to the centre of regional strategic calculations. 

India has a special geographic location. Situated in the center of the Indian Ocean, it is positioned on vital shipping lanes that carry a significant amount of the world’s energy and trade. It is an essential player in regional security matters due to its naval prowess and expanding its diplomatic influence 

The deepening strategic partnership between India and the United States over the past decade further reinforced this trend. Defence cooperation expanded through joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and defenceagreements. Both countries increasingly found common ground in promoting maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation. 

Consequently, the addition of “Indo” to the command’s title in 2018 was widely viewed as an acknowledgement of India’s growing strategic significance. 

From an Indian perspective, the inclusion of the term “Indo” carried considerable symbolic value. It signalled that India was no longer viewed merely as a South Asian power but as a key stakeholder in the wider regional balance of power. Although symbolism alone does not guarantee deeper cooperation, such recognition contributes to mutual confidence and strengthens political support for strategic partnerships. For this reason, the removal of the term in 2026 has attracted attention in India even though there has been no indication of any reduction in bilateral defence cooperation or diplomatic engagement.  

 The Quad and Strategic Alignment 

The Indo-Pacific concept also became closely associated with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) that brings together India, the United States, Japan and Australia. 

Although the Quad is not a military alliance, it serves as an important platform for strategic cooperation among four major democracies. The grouping focuses on issues ranging from maritime security and disaster response to emerging technologies and supply chain resilience. 

The Indo-Pacific framework provided much of the intellectual and strategic foundation for Quad cooperation. It promoted the idea that regional stability depended upon collaboration among like-minded states committed to maintaining a free, open, and inclusive regional order. 

For this reason, some observers have questioned whether the removal of “Indo” from the command name might indicate a reduced emphasis on the broader coalition-based approach that characterized previous Indo-Pacific strategies.  

However, there is currently little evidence that the United States intends to abandon the Quad or significantly reduce cooperation with India, Japan and Australia. The command area of responsibility remains unchanged, and official statements have repeatedly emphasized continued commitment to regional allies and partners. 

 What Does the 2026 Renaming Signal? 

The central debate surrounding the restoration of the USPACOM designation concerns strategic signaling. 

Supporters of the decision argue that the change is primarily historical and symbolic. The Pentagon has emphasized that the command operated under the USPACOM designation for more than seventy years and that restoring the original name honors a distinguished institutional legacy. 

This interpretation gains support from the fact that there have been no announced changes to troop deployments, military planning, command structures, or alliance commitments. The command’s area of responsibility continues to extend from the western coast of the United States to the western border of India. 

Moreover, the administration has presented the decision as part of a broader effort to restore traditional names and symbols across the United States military establishment. Viewed in this context, the renaming may reflect domestic political preferences and institutional continuity rather than a significant shift in foreign policy.  

Nevertheless, I believe it would be incorrect to dismiss the importance of terminology altogether. In international politics, names often shape perceptions, influence policy debates, and convey diplomatic messages. The decision to add “Indo” in 2018 was intended to signal evolving regional priorities and recognize the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific framework. Consequently, the removal of the term has prompted questions about whether those priorities are changing. 

Why Strategic Terminology Matters in International Relations 

Strategic terminology has always played an important role in international relations. Governments often use specific words, concepts, and frameworks to communicate their priorities, reassure allies, and send signals to competitors. The term “Indo-Pacific” itself is an example of how language can influence strategic thinking. Before the concept gained more importance, discussions about regional security were largely framed within the “Asia-Pacific” context. However as geopolitical and economic linkages between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean became more significant, policymakers increasingly adopted the Indo-Pacific framework to reflect these changing realities. 

The decision to include the word “Indo” in the command title in 2018 therefore carried considerable symbolic weight. It suggested that the Indian Ocean and India itself had become central components of the United States regional strategy. Consequently, the decision to remove the term in 2026 has generated debate despite the absence of operational changes. Critics argue that such terminology influences perceptions among allies and partners, while supporters contend that military capabilities and policies matter more than names. Regardless of which interpretation proves correct, the controversy demonstrates that language remains a powerful instrument of statecraft. In modern geopolitics, even minor changes in official terminology can attract significant international attention and scrutiny. 

 China and the Strategic Context 

Any discussion of the Indo-Pacific framework inevitably involves China. 

The rise of China has been one of the most significant developments in international politics during the past several decades. China’s growing military capabilities, expanding economic influence and increasing maritime presence have reshaped strategic calculations throughout Asia. 

Many analysts viewed the Indo-Pacific concept as a response to these changes. While not explicitly directed against China the framework promoted cooperation among countries concerned about preserving a balance of power and maintaining freedom of navigation. 

The 2018 renaming therefore carried strategic significance because it signaled Washington’s intention to engage more actively across both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 

The 2026 decision to restore the USPACOM designation has consequently generated debate regarding whether the United States is altering its approach towards China. Some analysts suggest that Washington may be seeking a different strategic narrative while others believe the change reflects domestic political considerations rather than any substantive policy adjustment. 

It is therefore understandable why some analysts have linked the renaming decision to the broader competition between the United States and China. However, without accompanying policy changes, it would be premature to interpret the restoration of USPACOM as evidence of a fundamental strategic shift.  

At present the available evidence does not support the conclusion that the United States has fundamentally changed its approach towards China. Military commitments, alliance structures, and regional engagement remain largely intact. 

 Symbolism versus Substance 

One of the most important lessons of international politics is that symbolism and substance are often interconnected. 

Substantively, little has changed. The command continues to oversee the same geographic area. Its personnel, missions, and operational responsibilities remain unchanged. Official statements have repeatedly stressed continuity rather than transformation. 

Symbolically, however, the change is significant. The term “Indo-Pacific” became one of the defining strategic concepts of contemporary international relations. It reflected an understanding that the security and prosperity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans are deeply interconnected. 

Removing the term does not erase these realities. Yet it does alter the language through which Washington communicates its strategic priorities. 

For allies and partners, perceptions matter. Countries often interpret terminology as an indicator of future policy directions. Even if no immediate operational changes occur, the renaming encourages speculation regardingthe future trajectory of United States strategy. 

 Conclusion 

The decision to rename the United States Indo-Pacific Command as the United States Pacific Command once again has generated considerable debate because it touches upon larger questions about American strategy in Asia. On the surface, the change appears administrative and symbolic. The command’s mission, personnel, alliances, and area of responsibility remain unchanged. 

However, the significance of the decision lies in the political and strategic messages it may convey. The addition of “Indo” in 2018 represented recognition of the growing strategic importance of India, the Indian Oceanand the broader Indo-Pacific concept. Its removal in 2026 raises questions regarding whether Washington is redefining the way it frames its regional priorities. 

Based on the available evidence, I believe that renaming reflects symbolism more than substance. While the decision has generated debate among strategic observers, there is little indication that Washington intends to reduce its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region or its partnerships with countries such as India, Japan and Australia. Nevertheless, because strategic language often carries political meaning, the move will continue to be closely watched by both allies and competitors.  

Ultimately, the true significance of the decision will be determined not by the name of the command but by future American actions. If the United States continues to strengthen partnerships with India, support the Quad and maintain its regional commitments, the renaming will likely be remembered as a symbolic gesture. If policy priorities evolve in a different direction, historians may view it as an early indication of a broader strategic recalibration. For now, the decision serves as a reminder that in international relations, even a change of name can carry strategic meaning. 

By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

Artificial Intelligence refers to computer systems capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence, including learning, reasoning, decision-making, and pattern recognition. In military affairs, AI is often described as a force multiplier because it can improve the speed, accuracy, and effectiveness of military operations. China’s military leadership believes that future wars will be characterized by ‘intelligence warfare’,where AI-driven systems will dominate the battlefield. This concept goes beyond the earlier notion of information warfare and focuses on the use of machine learning, big data analytics, autonomous systems, and advanced computing to achieve superiority in combat. The Chinese government’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017) identified AI as a national priority and emphasized its military applications. Since then, China has invested heavily in AI research and development, encouraging collaboration between technology companies, universities, and defence institutions. China’s rapid advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) are transforming not only its economy and society but also its military capabilities. Over the last decade, the Chinese government has identified AI as a strategic technology that can revolutionize warfare and enhance national security. Through substantial investments, military-civil fusion policies, and technological innovation, China is integrating AI into a wide range of weapon systems and military operations. The country’s objectiveis to build a ‘world-class military’ by the middle of the 21st century and to gain a competitive advantage in future conflicts. AI has become central to the modernization efforts of the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), influencing everything from autonomous weapons and intelligence gathering to cyber warfare and command systems.  

AI Strategy and MCF- 

One of the key features of China’s AI development is the policy of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF). Under this strategy, civilian technological innovations are integrated into military modernization efforts. Leading Chinese technology firms such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei, and SenseTime contribute to AI development that can potentially support defence applications. Military-Civil Fusion enables the PLA to access cutting-edgetechnologies developed in the commercial sector, including machine learning algorithms, computer vision, natural language processing, robotics, autonomous navigation systems and big data analytics. This approach reduces development costs and accelerates the deployment of advanced military technologies.  

AI and Weapon Systems- 

One of the most significant applications of AI in China’s military is the development of autonomous weapon systems. These systems can operate with minimal human intervention and make decisions based on data gathered from sensors and battlefield environments. China has become a major producer of military drones and is increasingly incorporating AI into their operations. AI-powered drones can identify targets automatically, navigate complex environments, coordinate with other drones, conduct surveillance missions, and carry out precision strikes. Chinese defence companies have demonstrated drone swarms capable of operating collectively using AI algorithms. Swarm technology allows hundreds of drones to communicate and cooperate, overwhelming enemy defences through coordinated attacks. Unlike traditional drones controlled by remote operators, AI-enabled drones can continue missions even when communication links are disrupted, making them more resilient in contested environments. China is also developing AI-enhanced loitering munitions, often referred to as ‘kamikaze drones. These weapons can search for targets independently and strike them once identified. AI improves target recognition and mission effectiveness while reducing the need for constant human control. AI is playing an increasingly important role in improving China’s missile capabilities. Modern missile systems require rapid identification and tracking of targets. AI algorithms help process sensor data from satellites, radar systems, and reconnaissance platforms to improve target acquisition. China has invested heavily in hypersonic missile technology. Hypersonic weapons travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 and present significant challenges for missile defence systems. AI contributes to real-time navigation, flight-path optimization, target tracking, and evasion of defensive systems. By processing large amounts of data during flight, AI allows hypersonic weapons to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and improve their effectiveness. Modern warfare increasingly depends on the ability to process information rapidly and make timely decisions. China is integrating AI into command and control (C2) systems to improve battlefield management. AI systems analyze vast quantities of information from multiple sources, including satellites, radar systems, intelligence reports, drones, and communication systems. These systems can identify threats, recommend courses of action, and support commanders in making faster decisions. AI enhances situational awareness by combining data from different sensors into a comprehensive operational picture. This enables military leaders to respond quickly to emerging threats and coordinate forces efficiently. Chinese military strategists believe that decision superiority will be a critical factor in future wars, and AI provides a means of achieving this advantage.  

Impact of AI on Navy- 

China’s naval modernization program increasingly incorporates AI technologies. The PLA Navy is developing unmanned surface vessels (USVs) capable of performing reconnaissance, surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and detection. AI enables these vessels to navigate independently, avoid obstacles, and coordinate with other naval assets. AI-powered underwater drones can conduct long-duration missions with limited human intervention. These systems support intelligence gathering, ocean surveillance, submarine tracking, and my countermeasures. Such capabilities are particularly important in strategically significant regions such as the South China Sea.  

Impact of AI on Airforce- 

China is actively integrating AI into its air force operations. AI assists pilots by processing sensor information, identifying threats, managing electronic warfare systems, and supporting tactical decisions. Future Chinese fighter aircraft may incorporate AI copilots capable of handling routine tasks and assisting in combat situations. China is exploring concepts like ‘loyal wingman’ drones. These AI-powered unmanned aircraft operatealongside manned fighters, extending combat capabilities while reducing risks to pilots. Their roles may include decoy operations and air-to-ground attacks. 

Impact of AI on Cyber Warfare- 

Cyber warfare represents another area where China is employing AI extensively. AI can identify network vulnerabilities, detect security weaknesses, automate cyberattacks, and adapt malware to changing defences. AI-driven cyber tools increase the speed and scale of offensive operations. At the same time, AI strengthens defensive capabilities. The combination of offensive and defensive cyber-AI enhances China’s overall cyber warfare posture. Electronic warfare also involves disrupting enemy communications, sensors, and command systems. China uses AI to analyse electromagnetic signals, jam enemy systems more effectively and adapt electronic attacks in real time. Machine learning algorithms can rapidly process large volumes of signal intelligence and identify opportunities for disruption that human operators might miss.  

Challenges- 

Despite significant progress, China faces several challenges in integrating AI into weapon systems. AI systems can suffer from data quality problems, algorithmic errors, vulnerability to deception, and reliability issues in complex environments. Battlefield conditions are often unpredictable, making autonomous decision-making difficult. The growing use of autonomous weapons raises important ethical questions. Concerns include accountability for AI decisions, civilian casualties, compliance with international humanitarian law, and risk of accidental escalation. Many countries are debating whether fully autonomous lethal weapons should be regulated or restricted. AI systems may themselves become targets of cyberattacks. Adversaries could attempt to manipulate data inputs, hack autonomous systems, disrupt communication networks, and exploit software vulnerabilities. Protecting AI-enabled weapon systems is therefore a major challenge.  

China’s use of AI in weapon systems has significant implications for global security. AI may alter the military balance in the Indo-Pacific region by enhancing China’s operational capabilities. Neighboring countries and major powers are closely monitoring these developments. AI accelerates military competition among leading powers. The United States, China, and other nations are investing heavily in AI-driven military technologies, creating a new technological arms race. The increasing autonomy of weapon systems could shorten decision-making times during crises. While this may improve military effectiveness, it also raises the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. AI is also transforming the nature of warfare itself. Future conflicts may involve extensive use of autonomous systems, cyber operations, and machine-driven decision-making, reducing reliance on traditional military platforms.  

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction  

It is not futuristic speculation that has given rise to the notion of creating a bridge between the Russian Far East and North America through the Bering Strait; the idea of building it dates back a century and has been brought up several times, each time being dismissed due to the difficulties of distance, climate, and finances. Nevertheless, in June 2026, a radical resurgence of the concept of bridging the Bering Strait took place with the name of “Putin-Trump Tunnel.” The reason for such a name was an official declaration of Kirill Dmitriev, Russian Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation. According to him, the project includes a railway tunnel that crosses underwater at about 86 km and cuts the cost of the construction from US$65 billion to less than US$8 billion with the help of modern boring technologies. This article critically assesses the viability of the Russia-Alaska tunnel considering its technological, financial, and geopolitical aspects, as well as the question of whether it will materialize soon. 

Historical Context and the New Proposal  

This concept of joining these two places together has existed for more than a hundred years already. This modern version of this idea was proposed in October 2025 by Kirill Dmitriev, who is the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). He described it as “a 112-kilometre link, symbolizing unity. It started getting a lot of attention during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2026. Dmitriev mentioned that he signed a design agreement with an engineering company. He hoped that the design process would finish no later than December 31, 2026, and the decision about building the bridge would depend on its economic feasibility. It should be noted that the modern project differs greatly from the earlier, too expensive for projects in using tunnel technology. Dmitriev mentioned that applying ideas of The Boring Company of Elon Musk could lower the price of the construction process from US$65 billion to as little as US$8 billion in under 8 years. It was reportedly discussed with the leading figures of the United States, such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and China could be involved too. 

Technical Feasibility and Logistical Hurdles  

Technically, construction of the tunnel under the Bering Strait is possible from the point of view of engineering. Specialists indicate that the underwater stretch of the tunnel is just about 1.5 times larger than that of the Channel Tunnel. Nevertheless, environmental conditions and logistics are extremely challenging. The major problems are not related to building the tunnel itself, but to a lack of auxiliary infrastructure. The closest Russian railroad is situated thousands of kilometers away from Chukotka through the zone of permafrost and mountains. In addition, Alaska is isolated from the railroad system of the United States. Transport of materials, fuel, and food for the building of the tunnel at the distant construction site in Chukotka, where there is an annual “northern supply”, is a highly challenging logistical task. There are no existing roads, cities, or energy systems in the region to support such a megaproject, which means that the transport approach to the construction of the tunnel should be built from scratch. Operating and maintaining the tunnel would be more costly than in the case of developed regions because of the Arctic climate. 

Economic Viability and the Question of Cargo Base  

The main obstacle standing in the way of implementation of the project is the absence of economic feasibility. The core issue here is which cargo can justify the investment in construction of such a massive tunnel. At present, the trade flow between Russia and the US is very low, and there is no apparent freight basis for the project to become commercially successful. As experts note, the project can be viable only as a part of a logisticschain that does not exist at present. Though the tunnel can serve as a shortcut between Asia and North America, the expenses of building the railroad over thousands of kilometers of wilderness tundra outweigh any time savings in comparison to sea routes, which at present handle more than eighty per cent of world trade volume. The claim of about three to five per cent of global sea trade passing through the tunnel seems rather doubtful. In addition, the shorter time it takes to deliver products through a land route is not sufficient due to the requirement of air or marine transportation of cargo up to the tunnel at each end point. According to one specialist, “‘ any saving of a few days compared with maritime travel is quickly wiped out by the staggering costs of laying thousands of kilometres of new track'”. 

Geopolitical Dimensions and Strategic Interests  

This tunnel idea is both a statement on geopolitics and a project of infrastructure development. Even Dmitriev referred to it as a “project that unites continents.” However, in the context of increasingly fragmented geopolitics, the tunnel is offered as a symbol of possible cooperation among Russia, the United States, and China. The geopolitical situation, however, is rather fragmented. It was met with skepticism by the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, who said he was “not happy with this” after Donald Trump mentioned it. Present-day geopolitical tensions, along with sanctions, make this kind of cooperation rather difficult. Besides, China being a possible participant in the project means that there is a complicated situation – although it could become one of the biggest beneficiaries of the new transcontinental land connection. Experts warn that “a key facility owned by one party and a main user being another is a definite time bomb”. 

Conclusion: Will It Fructify? 

Russia-Alaska tunnel project, as it currently exists in 2026, is an ambitious plan but also a highly uncertain one. With its emphasis on revolutionary technology that will dramatically lower construction costs, the new proposal has added a second wind to an idea that had existed for decades already. Completion of technical design by the end of 2026 may help gather some more data on its feasibility. However, there are many barriers to overcome that cannot be easily overcome with the help of technology. First, there is a tremendous logistical barrier connected with building and sustaining required infrastructure in the region, which is one of the most remote in the world. Second, there is no clear rationale or cargo base for it, and third, the serious geopolitical confrontation makes project cooperation highly unlikely. Thus, even though the project is a good example of what can be achieved with peace and investment, it does not seem likely to fructify in the medium term.  

By : Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

China is the foremost global manufacturer with factories producing everything from phones to steel, cities with thousands of occupants, and an economy that has expanded rapidly at an unprecedented rate in the modern age. To operate all of this, China needs a colossal amount of energy. In 2024, China used 163.8 exajoules of energy, more than all North America (including Canada, Mexico, the USA), the European Union and Japan together. This immense figure has important and inappropriate implications that China cannot provide itself with sufficient energy to meet its needs. While China considers national security as its priority above everything else, dependence on outside sources for energy, rather than being an economic concern, is also a strategic weakness that influences foreign policy, military strategy and its relationships with other countries. 

The Scale of the Problem 

In addition to being the biggest importer of crude oil, China is also the biggest importer of natural gas. In 2024, imports were about 74% of China’s total crude oil supply, while 42% came from domestic sources. In 2024, the cost of importing crude oil to China was worth $325 billion which is worth more than the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] of many individual countries. The average amount of crude oil imported to China was 11.65 million barrels daily in 2025, which is up by 5.7% from the previous year. To comprehend China’s energy dependency, one needs to first understand its scale.  

Coal paints a very different picture. China is effectively self-sufficient in coal (the largest coal producer in the world), however, coal imports into China have also increased dramatically in recent years. In 2023, China imported 474 million tons of coal, the largest coal importer and the largest coal producer in the world. The reasoning behind this is simple China’s industrial hunger is far greater than what could be met by the massive resources of coal located within its borders. Coal is responsible for more than half of the electricity produced in China and in 2024, the number of new coal-fired power plants built reached a high point for the last ten years, with 94.5 GW of new coal capacity being added. This situation, however, conflicts with China’s ambitions for complete green energy development worldwide. 

The Malacca Dilemma: A Chokepoint that Haunts Beijing 

The Malacca Dilemma is one of China’s major energy-related challenges described by Chinese military officials under the former President Hu Jintao in 2003. This concept was derived from a geographic feature known as the Strait of Malacca located between Malaysia and Indonesia. This waterway is the shortest maritime link connecting the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Furthermore, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports travel through this bottleneck, meaning that, in times of war the strait could be blocked, thereby cutting off all of China’s oil supplies within a matter of hours. 

This concern is not theoretical. The U.S. Navy is well positioned to enforce a blockade and has done so to various countries before. Thus, China has taken considerable measures over time to develop secondary routes for energy transport through the Strait of Malacca (which is considered to be on the verge of being closed) by pursuing a number of different actions related to its larger Belt and Road Initiative model. One such plan is the construction of a pipeline and road network along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which will transport energy from Gwadar Port in Pakistan directly to China’s western region of Xinjiang. Two other major overland options are the Myanmar-China oil pipelines that were finished in 2013 and 2015 respectively. They are not just economic infrastructure projects they are strategic insurance policies against the day when the sea lanes might be closed. 

Russia, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Oil 

China’s Foreign Policy is heavily influenced by its dependence on energy supplies that are generally hard to separate from overarching aspirations. China’s primary source of crude oil imports were Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Between these three countries, China imported over two million barrels of oil per day (about 20% of all imports) in 2024. After Western nations had imposed economic sanctions against Russia following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China became Russia’s most important customer for energy and purchased large quantities of discounted Russian oil. Both countries thus benefit through China’s acquisition of a stable, low-cost energy source from Russia while Russia has a way to avoid being harmed by Western sanctions. This energy relationship essentially renders China incapable of joining Western led sanctions against Russia regardless of its official position regarding the military conflict. 

Overall energy dependence constrains China’s economic and diplomatic options in the international arena in addition to being an economic issue. The same principle applies to China’s diplomatic engagement with Gulf States. Through a concerted effort, China has endeavoured to develop and maintain solid and ongoing relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchs while simultaneously solidifying relations with their main rival, Iran (the Gulf States). The ability to continue balancing these competing diplomatic relations depends on maintaining a stable flow of energy between China and both groups. 

The Renewable Revolution: Promise and Reality  

Despite that, China’s problems with dependency on oil will still not be solved by the renewable revolution. In fact, 86 percent of China’s total primary energy supply was derived from fossil fuels in 2024. This is principally a result of China’s large and extensive industrial base (i.e., steel mills, cement plants, chemical manufacturing, and heavy manufacturing). Industrial processes require both chemical feedstocks and heat (as well as electricity), both of which today are much more difficult to produce using solar panels and wind turbines than they are from fossil fuels. As a consequence, China will remain dependent upon fossil fuels until industrial processes can be largely or fully electrified or be powered by hydrogen feedstocks. 

Stockpiling as Strategy 

One indication of how seriously China considers its energy vulnerability is the rapid buildup of its oil reserve capacity. By late 2024, China had expanded its total oil storage capacity to more than 2 billion barrels and its total strategic and commercial reserves were estimated to be between 1.2 billion barrels and 1.3 billion barrels. In fact, Chinese state-owned oil companies Sinopec and CNOOC are working on building 11 new storage facilities in 2025 and 2026. Experts say that in 2025 China is stockpiling approximately 1 to 1.2 million barrels of oil each day far more than is necessary to meet current needs providing both a buffer to cover supply interruptions and leverage in global energy markets. However, this also reflects Beijing’s concerns over its supply chain’s reliability amid an increasingly uncertain world. 

Conclusion 

China has an exceedingly high level of energy dependence, making energy dominance an incredible challenge for itself and other countries. With more total energy being produced than all three of the US, EU, and Japan combined, it should come as no surprise that China’s energy production is not sufficient to meet its needs and that it must constantly manage risk associated with its energy sources and global economies. China must ensure that it maintains stable supplier relationships and multiple alternative pipeline/port options in the Middle East, Central Asia, Russia, and Africa simultaneously to minimize the risk of geopolitical instability or supply disruption, while also maintaining existing coal power facilities in use today and diversifying its energy supply by developing renewables at an unprecedented rate. It has taken on significant amounts of reserve energy to protect against catastrophic events that may or may not occur in the future, but that cannot be ruled out. The way in which China handles the challenges related to energy dependence over the next few decades will impactthe development of global energy markets, international trade and geopolitical stability for the entire world. 

By : Prachi Kushwah, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

West Asia is one of the most important regions for India because of its significance in energy security, trade, investment, maritime connectivity, and the welfare of the Indian diaspora. The ongoing conflict in West Asia has emerged as a major geopolitical crisis with consequences extending far beyond the region. As a country that maintains strong relations with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and several other regional actors, India is directly affected by developments in the region. The conflict has generated uncertainty in energy markets, disrupted shipping routes, increased security concerns, and created challenges for global economic growth. For India, the impact is multidimensional and influences foreign policy, economic stability, strategic planning, and national security. The crisis also highlights the importance of balanced diplomacy and preparedness in an increasingly interconnected world. 

India’s Strategic Interests in West Asia 

India’s engagement with West Asia is based on long-standing historical, economic, and cultural ties. The region supplies a large share of India’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas requirements. It is also a major destination for Indian exports and a significant source of investment. Millions of Indians work in Gulf countries and contribute to India’s economy through remittances. In addition, India cooperates with regional countries on security, counterterrorism, maritime safety, and infrastructure development. These extensive interests make peace and stability in West Asia extremely important for India’s long-term development and strategic objectives. 

Impact on Energy Security 

Energy security is the area most immediately affected by conflict in West Asia. India imports a substantial portion of its energy requirements, and disruptions in the region often result in fluctuations in global oil and gas prices. Rising energy prices increase India’s import bill and place pressure on public finances. Higher fuel costs also contribute to inflation by raising transportation and production expenses across sectors. The Strait of Hormuz remains a critical maritime chokepoint through which a significant share of global oil trade passes. Any disruption in this route can create uncertainty in international markets. To reduce risks, India has sought to diversify energy suppliers, expand strategic petroleum reserves, and accelerate the transition toward renewable energy sources. However, continued instability in West Asia remains a significant concern for India’s energy security framework. 

Trade and Economic Consequences 

West Asia is an important trading partner for India. The conflict has affected trade by increasing transportation costs and creating uncertainty in shipping networks. Security concerns in the Red Sea and surrounding waters have forced some vessels to take longer routes, increasing transit times and freight charges. Such developments affect exporters and importers alike. Indian businesses may face higher costs for imported raw materials, while exporters may experience reduced competitiveness in international markets. Financial markets also react to geopolitical uncertainty, resulting in fluctuations in investor confidence and market performance. Although India’s economy has shown resilience, prolonged conflict could create additional economic pressures and affect global growth prospects. 

Impact on the Indian Diaspora 

One of India’s primary concerns during any crisis in West Asia is the safety and welfare of Indian citizens residing in the region. Millions of Indians work across Gulf countries in sectors such as healthcare, construction, information technology, education, hospitality, and retail. Escalating tensions can create concerns regarding employment, transportation, and personal security. Families in India often depend on remittances sent by relatives working abroad, making the economic well-being of expatriate communities particularly important. The Government of India has consistently prioritized the protection of overseas citizens through diplomatic engagement, emergency assistance mechanisms, and contingency planning. The conflict has reinforced the need for robust evacuation and support systems to address potential emergencies. 

Maritime Security Challenges 

Maritime security has become increasingly important because of the conflict’s impact on major shipping lanes. India’s trade depends heavily on sea routes connecting the Indian Ocean with Europe, Africa, and West Asia. Threats to commercial shipping, including attacks on vessels and disruptions to maritime traffic, increase transportation costs, and create logistical challenges. The Indian Navy has enhanced surveillance and operational readiness to safeguard sea lines of communication and ensure the security of commercial shipping. Strong maritime capabilities are essential for protecting India’s trade interests and maintaining uninterrupted access to global markets. 

Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Implications 

India has adopted a balanced diplomatic approach toward the conflict. It maintains strong bilateral relationships with multiple countries in the region and seeks to preserve these partnerships while promoting peace and stability. India’s foreign policy is guided by the principle of strategic autonomy, enabling it to engage constructively with all stakeholders. The conflict has tested India’s diplomatic skills, as it must carefully navigate competing interests while safeguarding national priorities. India has consistently emphasized dialogue, de-escalation, and peaceful resolution of disputes. This balanced approach has strengthened India’s credibility as a responsible and pragmatic international actor. 

Defence and Security Implications 

The conflict carries broader implications for India’s security environment. Regional instability can influence global strategic dynamics and create opportunities for extremist organizations to exploit uncertainty. India closely monitors developments in West Asia because security challenges often have transnational consequences. Lessons from contemporary conflicts also contribute to military planning and modernization efforts. The use of advanced technologies, drones, cyber capabilities, and precision weapons in modern warfare provides valuable insights for defence preparedness. The crisis further highlights the importance of strengthening domestic defence production and enhancing strategic self-reliance. 

Investment and Connectivity Projects 

West Asian countries have become important economic partners and investors in India. Sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the region have invested in infrastructure, renewable energy, logistics, technology, and real estate. Political instability may influence investment decisions by increasing uncertainty, but long-term economic cooperation remains strong because of mutual interests. The conflict may also affect connectivity initiatives linking India with West Asia and Europe. Successful implementation of such projects requires a stable and predictable regional environment. Consequently, regional peace is essential for realizing the full potential of future economic corridors and infrastructure networks. 

Humanitarian Dimensions 

The humanitarian consequences of war extend beyond geopolitical considerations. Armed conflict results in civilian casualties, displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and disruption of essential services. India has consistently supported humanitarian assistance efforts and emphasized the importance of protecting civilians. Humanitarian concerns influence international diplomacy and shape global responses to crises. India’s support for relief efforts reflects its broader commitment to human welfare and international cooperation. 

India’s Policy Response 

India’s response to the West Asia conflict has focused on protecting national interests while supporting diplomatic solutions. The government has monitored developments closely, engaged with regional partners, and taken steps to ensure the safety of Indian citizens. Efforts to strengthen energy security, diversify supply sources, enhance maritime surveillance, and maintain stable diplomatic relations form key components of India’s strategy. By pursuing a balanced and pragmatic approach, India seeks to minimize risks and maintain stability despite an uncertain regional environment. 

Conclusion 

The West Asia war has significant implications for India because of the country’s extensive economic, strategic, and people-to-people connections with the region. Energy security, trade, investment, maritime transportation, diaspora welfare, and foreign policy are all influenced by developments in West Asia. Rising oil prices, disruptions in shipping routes, and geopolitical uncertainty present substantial challenges. At the same time, the crisis underscores the importance of diversification, strategic autonomy, and diplomatic engagement. India’s balanced approach has enabled it to protect its interests while supporting peace and stability. As the situation evolves, India will continue to adapt its policies to address emerging challenges and safeguard its long-term national interests. 

By : Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The political question surrounding the Iran war is no longer limited to foreign policy. Since the U.S.-Israeli air campaign began on February 28, 2026, the conflict has become a test of presidential credibility, economic management, congressional authority, and party discipline. A ceasefire framework and interim memorandum of understanding were announced in mid-June 2026, but the domestic political damage may already have been done. For Republicans, the issue is not only whether the military campaign achieved its stated objectives. The larger question is whether the war has weakened the party’s ability to defend its narrow congressional majority in the November 2026 midterm elections. 

The war as a domestic political test 

Foreign conflicts often reshape midterm politics when they become linked to pocketbook issues, presidential competence, and public trust. That pattern is especially important in 2026 because the Trump administration tied the campaign against Iran to national security, oil-market stability, and deterrence. Once the conflict disrupted shipping lanes and pushed energy prices higher, the political frame shifted. Voters were no longer evaluating only military action; they were also evaluating inflation, gasoline prices, household costs, and the risk of escalation. 

That dynamic matters because midterm elections are usually a referendum on the party in power. If a war is seen as successful, limited, and decisive, it can produce a rally effect. If it looks open-ended, expensive, or strategically confused, it can depress approval and widen the opposition’s advantage. The Iran war has moved through both phases: initial force, sustained uncertainty, and then an uneasy ceasefire process that did not erase public concern. 

What the polling says 

The public record is unfavorable for Republicans. A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted from March 31 to April 02, 2026, found that 66% of Americans wanted the United States to end its involvement quickly, even if the administration did not fully achieve its objectives. In that same survey, 60% disapproved of the strikes on Iran, and only 27% preferred a prolonged campaign to secure the government’s goals. The same polling stream showed that gasoline had crossed US$ 4 per gallon, reinforcing the sense that the war was reaching into everyday economic life. 

Public opinion remained soft until June 2026. A Reuters/Ipsos poll reported on June 08, 2026, found Trump’s approval near a record low at 35%, with the war cited as a major factor in the decline. The same reporting noted that voters were still expecting higher fuel prices, which is politically damaging in an election cycle where inflation remains the dominant issue for many households. 

The coalition picture is more complicated than a simple partisan split. On June 12, 2026, Reuters reported that 54% of evangelicals opposed Trump’s military use in Iran and that his approval among evangelicals had fallen to 52%, down from 61% in August 2025. That matters because evangelical voters are one of the most reliable Republican constituencies. Any fracture there increases the risk of depressed turnout or protest abstention in competitive districts. 

Why the war is politically dangerous for Republicans 

The first source of risk is economic spillover. The conflict strained global energy markets, and even when prices later eased, the initial shock had already translated into higher inflation expectations, transport costs, and consumer anxiety. Republicans usually benefit when voters focus on border security, crime, and cultural issues. They are far less comfortable when the dominant question is whether the party in power made life more expensive. The Iran war pushed the debate toward exactly that terrain. 

The second risk is strategic ambiguity. Trump initially framed the campaign as a short, overwhelming operation with clear objectives. As the conflict stretched on, that promise became harder to defend. On June 15, 2026, Reuters reported that the United States and Iran had signed a memorandum of understanding to halt the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but that agreement immediately generated criticism from Republicans who thought it conceded too much. A policy that can be attacked both as too aggressive and too conciliatory is a political liability. 

The third risk is internal party fragmentation. The Republican coalition is no longer uniformly interventionist. Some lawmakers and commentators support Trump’s use of force, while others in the America First camp are skeptical of foreign entanglements and wary of spending political capital on Middle East operations. Once a conflict generates public division inside the governing party, it becomes harder to sustain a unified campaign message. 

The fourth risk is institutional. On June 03, 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a war-powers resolution seeking to end continued military action in Iran without fresh congressional authorization, with several Republicans breaking ranks. On June 16, 2026, the Senate narrowly blocked a similar effort. These votes do not resolve the conflict by themselves, but they signal discomfort inside Congress. In midterm campaigns, such fissures often matter as much as formal policy outcomes because they shape perceptions of control and competence. 

Historical midterm logic 

Historical precedents also point toward risk for the president’s party. Brookings has noted that the president’s party has lost ground in 20 of the last 22 midterm House elections dating back to 1938. The main exceptions, in 2002 and 1998, reflected highly unusual circumstances: the post-September 11 security rally around President George W. Bush and the impeachment fight surrounding President Bill Clinton. In other words, only extraordinary national cohesion has reliably offset the normal midterm penalty. 

Brookings also emphasizes the link between presidential approval and midterm losses: the higher the president’s approval, the smaller the seat losses for the president’s party. That relationship matters because war usually helps incumbents only when it produces a strong rally effect and quick success. The Iran war did not do that. Instead, the conflict appears to have lowered approval rather than raised it, which is precisely the condition that tends to magnify midterm losses. 

House and Senate implications 

The House is the most likely point of vulnerability. Republicans entered 2026 with only a narrow margin, meaning even modest shifts in turnout or persuasion can alter control. A national environment defined by high prices, fatigue with the war, and doubts about the administration’s messaging could be enough to flip several swing districts. The June 03, 2026, House war-powers vote suggests that some Republican incumbents already view the conflict as politically hazardous in competitive seats. 

The Senate is harder to predict because the map is smaller and more state specific. Still, the war may indirectly assist Democrats in states where moderate and independent voters are more sensitive to economic disruption and executive overreach. If the party becomes identified with prolonged military engagement, congressional candidates in suburban and swing-state contests may be forced to defend a policy they did not design but are expected to own. 

Republicans would normally expect a foreign-policy win to stabilize the coalition. In this case, the ceasefire framework may reduce the most immediate political damage, but it is unlikely to create a durable rally unless it also delivers lower energy prices, visible de-escalation, and a convincing narrative of strategic success. Without those follow-through effects, the issue may remain a source of voter doubt rather than a source of credit. 

What would blunt the damage 

Three developments could limit the electoral cost. First, if the ceasefire holds through the summer of 2026 and oil and gasoline prices continue to fall, the economy may reclaim center stage from foreign policy. Second, if the administration releases a coherent post-conflict rationale that appears credible to independents, some of the uncertainty could fade. Third, if Democratic candidates fail to convert anti-war sentiment into a broader affordability message, the war alone may not be sufficient to determine control of Congress. 

Even so, the available evidence suggests that Republicans are more exposed than helped. Polling shows that the war is unpopular, the economic effects are visible, and the party’s internal messaging is fractured. Midterm elections rarely reward a governing party that is defending a costly conflict with uncertain strategic payoff. 

Conclusion 

The Iran war is not automatically a guarantee of Republican defeat, but it is a serious electoral headwind. As of June 2026, the conflict has weakened Trump’s approval, intensified concerns about inflation and energy costs, and exposed divisions inside the Republican coalition. Historical midterm patterns work against the president’s party even in ordinary conditions, and the 2026 environment is not ordinary. Unless the ceasefire solidifies quickly and economic pressure eases, the war is likely to function less as a victory lap and more as a liability in the November 2026 midterm elections. That does not make it the sole determinant of the outcome, but it may well be one of the most consequential factors shaping whether Republicans keep control of Congress.