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February 16, 2026
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Why Spain matters in Global Geopolitics?

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By: Ankit Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

Spain: source WorldAtlas.com

The geopolitical history of Spain has had a progression of selective steps, beginning with the central place in the first world empire, to its long-term isolation, and finally to the modern-day renaissance that has placed the country in an influential role in the European arena. The 1492 expedition of Christopher Columbus in effect gave Spain a monopoly to the new lands discovered in the Americas. The scale of the modern Spain relevance is established on the basis of the Treaty of Tordesillas signed on 7 June 1494, dividing the non-European territories between Spain and Portugal. This way, Spain was able to gain control of most part of the American continent, thus creating the foundation of a large transcontinental empire. The Spanish Empire later became the first real global polity enforcing its control over lands in North and South America, the archipelago of the Philippines, parts of Africa and Europe, such as the Dutch Republic and a number of Italian states. The Spanish military conquests in Europe as well as its economy and the Real de a Ocho, the first currency to circulate in the world were all funded and fueled by the presence of silver and gold deposits in Bolivian Potosí and Mexican mines.

But the heights of the Spanish hegemony faded away with the emergence of the rule of competing forces taking the form of the gradual decline of its territorial possessions, power as well as the hegemony. This phenomenon is captured in an African maxim, El que mucho abarca, poco aprieta, which means ‘’Has so much to hold, but little to squeeze’’ and is a useful summary of the overstretched imperialism of Spain. During the centuries, the Spanish Crown ruled a vast American empire concurrently, fought continental wars against France, Protestant Dutch and England as well as against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. This dispersion of resources, ambition and attention eventually led to its downfall as it exemplifies the real world example of geopolitical power when diluted to an undesirable extent loses its effectiveness. 

The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) that ended the war of the Spanish Succession was a turning point in geopolitics of Europe. Spain in its turn had to hand over territorial property to Italy and the Netherlands, even more important to deliver the bases of naval strategic location Gibraltar and Menorca to the United Kingdom. This moved the balance of power in the Mediterranean theatre permanently. Another pivotal that can be considered the watershed moment in history is the attack of Spain by Napoleon, which caused a significant economic and social disaster on the territory of the country. Internal political instability that was rooted in the nineteenth century included civil wars, a stagnant economy and constant economic decline.

 Spain did not industrialise in a similar way to Britain, France, and Germany hence hindering its status as a supplier of power in European matters. Spain adopted a policy of neutrality in the World War I, which can be explained by relatively weak military position of the country, antagonized by the constant struggles in Morocco, as well as its domestic political unsteadiness which did not allow active involvement in the war. The civil war in Spain (1936–1939) turned to be a proxy war as a foreshadowing of the beginning of the Second World War. Although Spain proclaimed its neutrality in World War 2, it changed sides and openly supported the Axis powers adopting a non-belligerent stance.

The cold war period also made Spain very diplomatically isolated; the state was not a participant in the United Nations, the Marshall plan, and the establishment of NATO and thus lost the perceived importance in international scene The Pact of Madrid (1953) institutionalised the sale of the land by Spain to establish the U.S. military bases in return on key economic and military aid, and the isolation of Spain came to an end, and the Franco rule was cemented. The peaceful shift to democracy in Spain after the death of Franco in 1975 tied the concept of geopolitical relevance in Spain fundamentally.

 The Indispensable Pivot: Spain and the World Geopolitics.

 Spain rarely appears in the vast list of world geopolitics as much as the United States, China, and Russia do. The most common argument presented by geopolitical experts explains the relative marginalisation by the absence of nuclear armaments and permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council.

However, Spain is a geopolitical key actor not because of its raw, military or economic power, but its strategic location, which can never be replicated, its critical connections with various continents and peoples, and the bargaining power it can exercise in the major institutions which create the twenty-first century brought its importance. Spain is on the crossroad of the most crucial geopolitical routes of the world since it is the gateway linking Europe and Africa to facing the core of the European Union and NATO. As a result, Spain has become an essential partner, a key node, and a frontline state that is facing numerous international issues, including security and defense, migration and energy.

The Geographic Pivot: Continents and Oceans Intersection

 The most basic asset of Spain is the geography; it is not a geographical position but an intersection of sea and land networks. Alongside its enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, located on the North African coast, Spain shares control of the Strait of Gibraltar a key marine chokepoint in the world. In excess of over 100, 000 ships per annum pass through this narrow route, handling around 25 per cent of the world shipping. The security and control in this strait are one of the most vital issues in the whole international economy since the instability of this Gulf would have a cascading effect which would far outshine the effects seen in Suez Canal or the Red Sea. Spain is also a country with a major Atlantic and Mediterranean coast, the second one in the entirety, the other country is France. This two-sided positioning offers Spain as an excellent hub in maritime security in Europe. The geographical importance of this area is strategic because it is a military and geopolitical factor. The Navigable docking station Rota, is a Spanish-American station; one of the most vital naval bases in Europe. It is the hub of the U.S Navy 6th fleet and houses four of the Aegis armed destroyers that comprise the backbone of the NATO ballistic missile defense network over the European continent. With the assistance of Moron Air Base, the base gives Spain a strong structural power within the NATO alliance.

The European Leader: A Big Four Leader in Brussels. Spain has been transformed into a core participant of the European project since it joined the then European Economic Community in 1986 as a peripheral state. Since the exit of the United Kingdom, Spain is now considered one of the so-called Big Four in the European Union, along with Germany, France, and Italy. Being the fourth-largest economy in the Euro zone, the economic health and the decisions of the policies made by Spain, have a direct effect on the stability of the common currency.

Spain has a very delicate external border of the EU as the country has to cope with one of the most fluid migration paths; the western African, through the Canary Islands, and the western Mediterranean routes. This gives Spain a huge bargaining power in Brussels. The EU cannot do without cooperation with Spain that handles the whole migration policy with asylum issues and that has often used the position to the country’s advantage to obtain funding and political goodwill.

Spain is also turning out to be an important gas energy hub in Europe with the largest regasification capacity of liquefied natural gas (LNG) which has a value of about one-third of the total liquid natural gas capacity in the EU countries.

The Atlantic Bridge: The Hispanidad Vector of Latin America

The deep, unmatched and multidimensional relation with Latin America is the geopolitical resource peculiar to Spain. Spain occupies the key location of the Hispanosphere, a linguistic bloc with more than 580 million speakers of Spanish language and, thus, it is ranked as the second-most spoken native language in the world. The common language, combined with a deep culture and historical relationship, provides Spain with a rich amount of soft power and intrinsic sympathy, which facilitate a diplomatic and business interaction in the world arena.

 In case of the European Union, Spain is the representative which interacts with Latin America on default terms. It is the leading advocate of strengthening the EU-Latin American relations, facilitates the trade agreements like the EU Mercosur one and directs the development help. In the process of dealing with the region, Madrid has often been consulted first when Brussels tries to do so. The Spanish corporations have powerful influence on the Latin American continent. Large companies like banking, Telefonos and energy workforce (Santander, Telefonos, and Repsol) have made the region a base of their international business. This enhanced integration economically ensures Spain an investment interest and a strong economic bargaining in not only the stability of the region but also, which also forms a significant political influence in the region.

The North African Frontier: A Complex and Critical Relationship

 The relationships of Spain with its southern neighbors, in the Maghreb, most especially between Spain and Morocco, Spain and Algeria are probably the most complex, unstable and sensitive in terms of geopolitics. The relations with Morocco contain the main issues of migration and the territorial conflicts. The fact that Spain has been relying on Morocco to control the migration flows gives it substantial bargaining power which has been used to achieve political compromises through what has come to be known as the opening taps.

The Spanish strategic shift of recent days in support of the scenario of Moroccan autonomy, shifting its traditional stance of neutrality is seen as a geopolitical gangland act that may intervene the Spanish in convincing Morocco to join it in managing migration and permit them to resolve a diplomatic crisis. Along with mending relations with Morocco, Spain also broke the ties with Algeria, the other power of the region and the main rival of Morocco. Another example of what a high-risk balancing act would require Spain to carry out is the Algeria that is the source of much of its natural gas needs, balancing between its interests in energy security and the inter-regional competition of the two most significant southern neighbors. This Spanish policy is a southern one that makes Spain indispensable. This is referred as soft power and economic specialization.

 The Spanish position in the world arena is characterized not only by the high level of soft power, but also by the high level of professional economy in the world. The nation is always in the list of top ten contributors of world soft power. This popularity can be minded by global popularity of its language, its globally renowned tourism sector, one of the most frequented destinations on planet Earth, its distinguished football clubs (Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) and its cultural exports in the form of film, cuisine and even arts. In addition to the tourist industry, Spain leads the quiet world on a number of major sectors with the renewable energy sector being one of them, giving particular focus to wind and solar energy.

 Conclusion: The Indispensable ‘Pivotal Power’

The significance of Spain does not involve the urge to control but rather centrality. It happens to be the geographical hinge and as the institutional screw serving as part of the EU the consistent and consistent policy of the south, the cultural and economic pivot between Europe and Latin America, what cronies the military pivot of the whole NATO coalition. It is true that other power may be greater, but Spain roots and its tactics are more deeply implanted in the very problems and possibilities of our era. Disregarding Spain is tantamount to disregarding one of the geopolitical pinpoints of the world.                                                                                           

The Environment as a Global Security Issue: An International Relations Perspective

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The Environment as a Global Security Issue: Source Internet

The Environment in Contemporary International Relations

Over the last few decades, concern over the international implications of large-scale environmental problems has begun to command the attention of policymakers. The landmark 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm discussed the right to a healthy and productive environment, including adequate food, safer water, and clean air. However, some progress has been made, notably in improving air and water quality in industrialized nations. But enormous problems remain to be solved and environmental deterioration in developing countries continues at an alarming rate, exacerbated by rapid urbanization, resource dependency, climate vulnerability, and limited institutional capacity to manage environmental risks effectively.

In the contemporary period, climate-induced disasters such as the 2022 floods in Pakistan, prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, and recurring wildfires in the United States, Canada, and Southern Europe have demonstrated how environmental degradation directly undermines economic stability, governance capacity, and human security. Is it possible to talk about the rise of a new global (dis)order founded on the challenges posed by environmental issus ? Recent geopolitical developments suggest that environmental stress is increasingly reshaping international politics, as seen in disputes over water-sharing arrangements such as the Nile River Basin, growing climate-related migration pressures in the Sahel and Central America, and the securitization of energy transitions amid global competition for critical minerals like lithium and rare earths.

Through the review of the state of the art on the subject, this article argues the growing importance of the environment, and natural resources in particular, in international relations; and aims to raise awareness among International Relations scholars to the potential positive impact of the development of the discipline in integration with global environmental change studies.. The increasing prominence of climate change within forums such as the UN Security Council debates, G20 summits, and COP negotiations further reinforces the argument that environmental issues are no longer peripheral but central to the contemporary global security agenda.

The Environment as a Multidimensional Issue and a Global Security Risk

Globalization, population growth, economic and social development, natural resource exploitation and scarcity, climate change, and rapid urbanization constitute the principal external drivers shaping the contemporary international system. In the Anthropocene—an era defined by humanity’s decisive impact on planetary systems—environmental sustainability has emerged not merely as a developmental concern but as a core global security imperative.

From an International Relations perspective, environmental risks are multidimensional because they simultaneously affect economic stability, political order, social cohesion, and state sovereignty. Climate change functions as a threat multiplier, intensifying existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as an isolated cause of conflict. Recent global examples illustrate this dynamic clearly: prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, climate-induced floods in Pakistan, and rising sea levels threatening small island states such as the Maldives and Tuvalu have undermined livelihoods, strained state capacity, and increased dependence on international assistance—thereby raising risks of instability and conflict.

Different IR theories offer distinct interpretations of this phenomenon.

  • Realism views environmental scarcity—particularly of water, energy, and food—as a potential source of interstate rivalry and strategic competition, evident in disputes such as the Nile River Basin tensions and Arctic resource competition.
  • Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the necessity of multilateral cooperation and global governance mechanisms, as reflected in frameworks like the Paris Climate Agreement, UNFCCC, and global climate finance regimes, which seek collective responses to transboundary environmental threats.
  • Constructivist approaches highlight the evolving norms around environmental responsibility, sustainability, and climate justice, visible in the growing recognition of climate security within UN Security Council debates.
  • Human security theory shifts the focus from states to individuals, underscoring how environmental degradation directly threatens food security, health, and displacement, particularly in the Global South.

Taken together, these perspectives demonstrate that environmental issues transcend traditional security boundaries. In an interconnected world, environmental degradation in one region produces political, economic, and security repercussions far beyond national borders, making environmental sustainability a central pillar of contemporary global security thinking. This reality compels states and international institutions to rethink sovereignty, prioritize preventive cooperation, and integrate environmental considerations into strategic planning, diplomacy, and conflict prevention frameworks at both regional and global levels.

Environmental Threats to Security

Environmental issues increasingly intersect with both security and economic stability, two foundational concerns of the modern state. Since the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change, environmental degradation has been progressively reframed as a security concern rather than a purely developmental or scientific issue. This securitization has been reinforced through repeated discussions in G20 summits, World Economic Forum meetings, and high-level climate diplomacy, underscoring the recognition that environmental stress can destabilize states and regions.

Contemporary global developments validate this shift.


Climate-induced disasters such as the 2022 floods in Pakistan, prolonged droughts in the Horn of Africa, and wildfires across Southern Europe, Canada, and Australia have exposed how environmental shocks undermine economic productivity, strain governance structures, and intensify humanitarian crises. These events illustrate what the UN has termed climate change as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating existing political, social, and economic vulnerabilities.

Historically, the roots of this crisis can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution, which established resource-intensive growth patterns based on fossil fuels, large-scale water use, and rapid urbanization. While this model accelerated economic development, it also entrenched unsustainable consumption patterns. Climate change has further aggravated these pressures, particularly in resource-dependent economies.

Water insecurity represents one of the most acute manifestations of environmental threats to security. Over the past six decades, global water consumption has grown at more than twice the rate of population growth, with climate change intensifying variability in rainfall and freshwater availability.
Current examples include the Nile River Basin tensions, where Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam has heightened diplomatic friction with Egypt and Sudan, and the Indus Basin, where climate stress compounds already sensitive India–Pakistan relations. As Homer-Dixon argues, “environmental scarcity can contribute to violent conflict by increasing economic deprivation and weakening institutions”.

From a Realist perspective, such resource scarcity increases the likelihood of competition and strategic rivalry among states. In contrast, Liberal Institutionalists emphasize the role of international cooperation and regimes, arguing, as Robert Keohane notes, that “international institutions matter because they facilitate cooperation under conditions of interdependence”. Environmental regimes thus become essential tools for managing shared vulnerabilities in an anarchic international system.

Why Global Environmental Issues “Belong” to International Relations

The environment is arguably the most global, transboundary, and multidimensional issue confronting the international system today. Its impacts transcend borders, link domestic politics with global outcomes, and challenge traditional notions of sovereignty—making it a central concern for International Relations as a discipline.

International Relations, by design, examines diplomatic relations, strategic interactions, cross-border flows, and global governance mechanisms, positioning it uniquely to analyze environmental challenges. As Hedley Bull observed, “order in world politics is maintained not only by power, but by shared interests and common rules”. Environmental protection increasingly constitutes one such shared interest.

Globalization has intensified the interaction between domestic and international spheres. Environmental degradation within a state—whether deforestation, pollution, or climate vulnerability—now produces global consequences through migration, supply-chain disruptions, and security spillovers. Recent climate-driven migration from the Sahel, Central America, and South Asia demonstrates how environmental stress can influence border politics, regional stability, and international humanitarian regimes.

From a Constructivist perspective, environmental security reflects evolving global norms and identities. The growing discourse on climate justice, sustainability, and global citizenship shows how ideas shape state behavior. As Alexander Wendt famously argued, “anarchy is what states make of it”—and environmental cooperation illustrates how shared perceptions of risk can transform state interactions.

Despite this relevance, International Relations as a discipline still faces challenges, particularly in parts of the Global South where institutional capacity and academic resources remain limited. Strengthening IR scholarship on environmental issues is therefore critical not only for theoretical development but also for informing policy-making and public awareness in an interconnected world.

India’s Stand

As a responsible emerging power and a leading voice of the Global South, India has increasingly positioned itself as a constructive yet assertive actor in global environmental governance. This role is reflected in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and its sustained commitment to reducing the emissions intensity of GDP while safeguarding developmental priorities. India’s climate diplomacy is rooted in the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), consistently emphasizing historical emissions and equity in burden-sharing.

From a Human Security perspective, India frames climate change as a threat to livelihoods, food security, water availability, and public health rather than merely an environmental or technical challenge. This approach is particularly relevant for a country with high climate vulnerability, as demonstrated by increasing heatwaves, erratic monsoons, glacial retreat in the Himalayas, and coastal risks in states such as Odisha and Gujarat. These domestic realities shape India’s emphasis on adaptation and resilience-building alongside mitigation efforts.

India’s leadership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA) exemplifies how environmental cooperation is deployed as an instrument of South–South diplomacy. By promoting affordable renewable energy solutions for developing countries, India seeks to reshape global energy transitions in a more inclusive manner. This aligns with Liberal Institutionalism, which, as Robert Keohane argues, recognizes that “international institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs”. The ISA serves precisely this function by institutionalizing collaboration among climate-vulnerable states.

From a Constructivist standpoint, India’s climate diplomacy also reflects norm entrepreneurship. By foregrounding equity, climate justice, and sustainable development, India contributes to reshaping global narratives around environmental responsibility. As Alexander Wendt famously observed, “identities and interests are socially constructed”—a process evident in India’s efforts to redefine climate leadership beyond emission reduction metrics alone.

Furthermore, India’s climate engagement increasingly functions as an instrument of soft power. As Joseph Nye notes, “power in the modern world increasingly rests on the ability to shape preferences”. Through renewable energy leadership, climate finance advocacy, and multilateral engagement, India seeks to enhance its normative influence without compromising economic growth.

In sum, India’s environmental strategy reflects a pragmatic synthesis of national interest, ethical responsibility, and strategic diplomacy. By integrating development concerns with global environmental commitments, India exemplifies how emerging powers can contribute meaningfully to shaping a more equitable and cooperative global environmental order.

Conclusion

The environmental challenges examined in this article underscore the necessity of adopting a holistic understanding of environmental insecurity—one that accounts for its structural causes, socio-political contexts, and far-reaching consequences. Climate change, resource scarcity, and ecological degradation are no longer peripheral concerns; they now constitute central determinants of economic stability, political order, and human security. As Barry Buzan aptly argues, “security is about survival, but survival is not only military”—a recognition that environmental threats fundamentally reshape the meaning of security in the contemporary international system.

International Relations, as a multidisciplinary field, possesses the analytical tools required to interpret and respond to these challenges. By integrating insights from security studies, political economy, and global governance, the discipline enables a shift from reactive crisis management toward preventive and cooperative global strategies. The increasing incorporation of climate security into UN Security Council debates, G20 agendas, and COP negotiations demonstrates how environmental concerns are steadily redefining international norms and institutional priorities.

While environmental stress can intensify competition and conflict—particularly in fragile regions—it simultaneously creates unprecedented opportunities for cooperation. Transnational initiatives such as the Paris Climate Agreement, global climate finance mechanisms, and renewable energy alliances illustrate how shared ecological vulnerability can foster multilateral engagement. As Hedley Bull observed, “international order is sustained by common interests and shared rules”—and environmental preservation has emerged as one of the most compelling common interests of the twenty-first century.

Ultimately, the global environmental crisis calls for a transformation not only in policy frameworks but also in collective political imagination. Preserving the planet demands a reconceptualization of sovereignty, responsibility, and development—anchored in global solidarity and long-term sustainability. By embracing this challenge, International Relations can contribute to shaping a new global order—one defined not by domination or rivalry, but by cooperation, resilience, and the shared imperative to safeguard humanity’s common environmental future.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

India-EU Trade Agreement: Implications for the Indian Defence Manufacturing 

By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

India-EU: Source Internet

The India–European Union Free Trade Agreement (FTA), often described by policymakers on both sides as the “mother of all deals,” marks a decisive shift in the trajectory of India–EU relations. While public discussion has largely focused on its commercial dimensions of tariff reductions on automobiles, wines, textiles, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, the agreement’s true strategic significance lies elsewhere. Embedded within the FTA is an unprecedented security and defence framework that elevates defence cooperation from a peripheral concern to a central pillar of the partnership. For India’s defence manufacturing ecosystem, this development represents not merely an incremental gain, but a potentially transformative opportunity. 

Trade agreements traditionally revolve around market access, customs schedules, and regulatory harmonisation. The India–EU FTA departs from this template by explicitly recognisingdefence as a strategic sector in a volatile global order. By institutionalising defence and security cooperation alongside economic integration, the agreement reflects a broader convergence of geopolitical interests between two democratic actors navigating an era of intensifying great-power competition, supply-chain disruptions, and strategic uncertainty. 

At the heart of this shift is the India–EU Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), signed by India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. This framework elevates defence cooperation to an institutionalised, long-term engagement rather than a series of ad hoc procurement decisions. Notably, India becomes only the third Asian country after Japan and South Korea to conclude such a partnership with the European Union, underscoring New Delhi’s growing strategic weight in European thinking. 

The inclusion of defence within the broader FTA signals a recognition that economic resilience and security preparedness are increasingly intertwined. In a world marked by armed conflict in Europe, instability in the Indo-Pacific, and disruptions to global supply chains, defence manufacturing has emerged as both an economic and strategic asset. For India, this marks a once-in-a-generation opening to integrate its defence industry into advanced global value chains. 

India and the European Union arrive at this agreement from distinct historical and strategic contexts, yet their needs increasingly converge. Over the past decade, India has pursued an ambitious defence indigenisation agenda under the banner of Aatmanirbhar Bharat. Import bans, production-linked incentives, streamlined procurement processes, and a strong emphasis on defence exports have reshaped what was once a heavily import-dependent ecosystem. 

Today, Indian firms manufacture a wide spectrum of defence equipment, ranging from artillery systems and armoured vehicles to missiles, drones, radars, electronic warfare systems, and ammunition. Defence exports have risen sharply, credibility has improved, and the sector’s ambitions have expanded beyond domestic self-sufficiency toward global competitiveness. Yet critical gaps remain. India still lacks the scale, sustained foreign investment, advanced technology absorption, and assured access to large, stable markets necessary to transition from an emerging supplier to a major defence manufacturing hub. 

Europe, meanwhile, confronts a different set of pressures. The war in Ukraine has severely depleted European defence stockpiles and exposed structural weaknesses in production capacity and supply chains. At the same time, growing uncertainty over long-term US security guarantees exacerbated by domestic political volatility in Washington has sharpened European calls for strategic autonomy. As a result, European governments are increasing defence spending at an unprecedented pace while seeking to diversify suppliers and rebuild industrial resilience. 

This convergence of Indian capacity and European demand creates a natural alignment. As Rajnath Singh noted following the FTA’s announcement, India’s defence industry can play a “meaningful role” in the EU’s ReArm Europe initiative, particularly as Europe seeks to de-risk dependencies and diversify its industrial base. 

Historically, India–EU defence ties have followed a familiar pattern Europe sold advanced platforms and systems; India bought them. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have long been among India’s most important defence suppliers. While this relationship brought access to advanced capabilities, it also reinforced dependency and limited domestic value addition. 

That dynamic is now beginning to shift. In recent years, Indian ammunition, explosives, and select defence components have found European buyers as stockpiles ran low. The new FTA seeks to institutionalise this transition, moving the relationship from transactional procurement to industrial partnership. 

Indian and European leaders have repeatedly emphasised the need for defence industries on both sides to “synergise” their efforts. Such collaboration aligns India’s pursuit of self-reliance with Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy, creating a framework where co-development, co-production, and supply-chain integration replace one-sided sales. 

What distinguishes this moment from previous declarations of intent is the institutional machinery being put in place. The proposed India–EU Defence Industry Forum will bring together companies from both sides to identify concrete opportunities in manufacturing, innovation, and technology. Crucially, governments are envisaged as facilitators rather than gatekeepers, enabling industry-led collaboration. 

Supply-chain integration is another central pillar of the partnership. By linking Indian manufacturers to European defence ecosystems, the agreement aims to build trusted, resilient production networks capable of meeting long-term security requirements. Indian participation in European defence programmes further deepens this integration, offering access to advanced standards, certification regimes, and collaborative R&D frameworks. 

On the European side, Kaja Kallas has described the Security and Defence Partnership as a milestone that opens the door to deeper cooperation, both bilaterally and in multilateral forums. The framework institutionalises annual security and defence dialogues, expands cooperation in maritime security, cyber defence, counterterrorism, and space security, and establishescontinuity and oversight mechanisms essential for sustained engagement. 

Timing is a critical factor in the agreement’s significance. Europe is rebuilding its defence posture at speed. It requires production capacity, cost efficiency, and reliable partners beyond the traditional transatlantic axis. India offers all three, along with political alignment and strategic autonomy of its own. 

The scale of India’s defence manufacturing growth underscores this readiness. Domestic defence production reached approximately ₹1.50–1.51 lakh crore in FY 2024–25, representingnearly 90 per cent growth since 2019–20. Defence exports have climbed to around ₹24,000–25,000 crore, up from less than ₹1,000 crore a decade ago. Government targets of ₹3 lakh crore in production and ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029 now appear achievable rather than aspirational. 

What India lacks is the next growth engine to sustain this trajectory. The European Union, with its large and stable market, advanced technological base, and expanding defence budgets, can provide that engine. 

Access to European markets, joint development programmes, co-production arrangements, and defence-related foreign direct investment would allow Indian firms to move up the value chain from component suppliers to system integrators and platform exporters. For Europe, India offers manufacturing depth, resilience, and a trusted partner as it modernises its armed forces. 

One of the least discussed but potentially most consequential aspects of the partnership lies in defence financing. The Security and Defence Partnership may allow India to access the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, including a €150 billion loan facility designed to support European defence requirements. 

If realised, this access would embed Indian industry even more deeply into Europe’s defence ecosystem, providing long-term financial support for capacity expansion and technological upgrading. For India, this aligns directly with the objectives of Aatmanirbhar Bharat, while for Europe it enhances industrial resilience without over-reliance on domestic capacity alone. 

The EU’s ReArm Europe initiative, which aims to mobilise up to €800 billion in defence spending by 2030, further strengthens the case for partnership. With €150 billion earmarked for joint procurement and an overarching goal of reducing dependence on US suppliers, the initiative creates strong incentives for collaboration with reliable external partners. 

India’s defence industry is well positioned to integrate into this framework. Liberalised FDI norms allowing up to 74 per cent foreign ownership in defence manufacturing enhance India’s attractiveness as a co-development and production hub. Indian firms already maintain partnerships with European counterparts, laying the groundwork for deeper collaboration. 

India–EU defence collaboration is no longer theoretical. India has inducted 36 Rafale fighter jets from France, with additional orders under negotiation that include significant domestic manufacturing. The partnership between SAFRAN, DRDO, and HAL to co-develop a high-thrust engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft represents a shift from licensed production to genuine co-development. 

India is also close to finalising submarine manufacturing cooperation with Germany, producing C-295MW transport aircraft with Spain, and procuring advanced naval systems from Italy. Public and private sector firms including HAL, Bharat Electronics, Bharat Dynamics, Larsen & Toubro, Tata Advanced Systems, Mahindra Defence, Garden Reach Shipbuilders, and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders are well positioned to scale these engagements. 

Europe’s extensive military support to Ukraine has created an immediate need to replenish ammunition, missiles, and other systems. Indian manufacturers already produce a wide range of such equipment and export to multiple countries, including European states. The Security and Defence Partnership formalises and expands this pathway, transforming episodic purchases into structured cooperation. 

India’s competitive advantage lies not only in cost efficiency but also in demonstrated operational capability. Indigenous platforms and systems showcased during recent military operations have reinforced confidence in Indian manufacturing standards. At the same time, India has been careful to avoid direct involvement in ongoing conflicts, underscoring the need for careful political coordination even as industrial cooperation expands. 

Despite its promise, the partnership is not without challenges. Closer defence ties with the EU inevitably draw India closer to NATO-aligned strategic frameworks, potentially complicating relations with Russia a long-standing defence partner. Europe’s security threat perception is shaped heavily by Moscow, and pressure on India to further distance itself from Russian defencecooperation is likely to grow. 

Managing this balance will test India’s diplomatic agility and commitment to strategic autonomy. Another critical prerequisite for deeper cooperation is the conclusion of an India–EU Security of Information Agreement, without which sensitive technology sharing will remain constrained. Prioritising this agreement will be essential to unlock the partnership’s full potential. 

Beyond defence, the FTA promises significant economic gains across sectors. Implementation is expected from FY 2027, with more pronounced effects from FY 2028 onward. Labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, footwear, marine products, and gems and jewellery gain zero-tariff access to the EU market, enhancing India’s competitiveness against regional rivals. 

Pharmaceuticals, medical devices, chemicals, electronics manufacturing, and IT services also stand to benefit from tariff reductions, regulatory cooperation, and improved mobility frameworks. In defence and aerospace, tariff elimination on aircraft and spacecraft imports, coupled with the Defence Industry Forum and programme participation, signals a long-term structural shift. Investor confidence has already responded positively, with defence stocks rising following the SDP announcement as an early indicator of market expectations. 

The India–EU Security and Defence Partnership, embedded within the broader Free Trade Agreement and the Joint India–EU Comprehensive Strategic Agenda 2030, represents a qualitative leap in bilateral relations. By aligning strategic imperatives with industrial opportunity, it strengthens India’s defence manufacturing ecosystem while advancing Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. 

Although geopolitical balancing particularly regarding Russia will remain a delicate and ongoing challenge, the overall trajectory of the partnership is unmistakably positive. If implemented with consistency and political will, it has the potential to fundamentally reshape defence cooperation, accelerate technological advancement, and generate durable economic and strategic dividends for both India and the European Union. In this trade agreement, defence is not a peripheral add-on; it is the quiet prize and potentially its most consequential outcome. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World: India’s Multilateral Balancing through BRICS and the Quad

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

India Between QUAD and BRICS: Source Internet

1. From Non-Alignment to Strategic Autonomy: India’s Post–Cold War Foreign Policy Reorientation

Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked a decisive turning point in India’s foreign policy orientation. During the bipolar era, India’s commitment to non-alignment was rooted in the desire to preserve strategic independence amid superpower rivalry. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a rapidly globalizing, multipolar international system compelled India to recalibrate its external engagements. Economic liberalization in the early 1990s further accelerated this shift, pushing India to engage more proactively with global institutions, regional groupings, and emerging power centers.

In this evolving geopolitical landscape, India transitioned from the rigid framework of non-alignment to a more flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy, which emphasizes issue-based partnerships, diversified alignments, and pragmatic engagement without formal alliances. Strategic autonomy allows India to pursue its national interests while maintaining freedom of choice across security, economic, and diplomatic domains. This approach has become particularly significant as global power diffuses beyond traditional Western dominance, with China’s rise and renewed great-power competition reshaping international politics.

Within this context, India’s engagement with multilateral frameworks such as BRICS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a deliberate balancing strategy. While BRICS enables India to cooperate with emerging economies and shape alternative global governance mechanisms, the Quad strengthens India’s position in the Indo-Pacific by enhancing strategic coordination with like-minded democracies. Together, these platforms illustrate how India navigates a multipolar world by leveraging multilateralism to safeguard autonomy, enhance economic resilience, and assert its growing global role.

2. Strategic Autonomy through Multilateral Balancing in a Multipolar World

India’s contemporary foreign policy marks a decisive departure from Cold War–era non-alignment. Rather than maintaining equidistance from rival power blocs, India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy emphasizes multi-alignment—engaging selectively with competing powers while avoiding binding alliances. This approach enables India to preserve strategic flexibility in an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system.

India’s continued defense cooperation with Russia, expanding strategic partnership with the United States, deepening economic engagement with the European Union, and leadership within the Global South collectively illustrate this shift. India’s calibrated response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict exemplifies strategic autonomy in practice. Despite sustained Western pressure, New Delhi refrained from explicit condemnation of Russia, maintained energy and defense ties, and simultaneously deepened cooperation with the US and Europe, underscoring India’s commitment to independent decision-making amid geopolitical polarization.

India’s participation in BRICS reflects its commitment to reforming global governance and amplifying the voice of emerging economies. The grouping provides a platform for South–South cooperation and serves as an alternative to Western-dominated financial institutions. The New Development Bank (NDB) remains BRICS’ most tangible institutional achievement, supporting infrastructure and sustainable development projects in India without political conditionalities.

The 2024 expansion of BRICS to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE has enhanced the bloc’s geopolitical and economic relevance. India’s support for expansion—combined with its emphasis on consensus-based governance—reflects its effort to broaden Global South representation while preventing institutional dominance by any single power. India has also used BRICS platforms to promote local currency trade, supply-chain resilience, and digital public infrastructure, projecting its Digital Public Goods model (UPI, Aadhaar, DigiLocker) as a scalable and inclusive development framework.

Parallel to its engagement with BRICS, India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a strategic response to growing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, particularly after the Galwan Valley crisis of 2020. While remaining cautious of formal military alliances, India views the Quad as a flexible mechanism that enhances deterrence, regional stability, and strategic coordination without undermining autonomy.

Initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) have strengthened India’s surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean, while Quad-led cooperation in semiconductors, clean energy, vaccines, and disaster resilience reinforces India’s regional leadership without overt militarization.

India’s simultaneous engagement with BRICS and the Quad reflects a strategy of multilateral hedging rather than policy contradiction. While BRICS facilitates dialogue with China within a multilateral framework, the Quad enhances India’s leverage in counterbalancing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Continued engagement with China through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), despite unresolved border tensions, demonstrates India’s preference for institutionalized interaction, while growing defense interoperability with Quad partners strengthens its strategic bargaining position.

India’s multilateral balancing strategy has significantly elevated its global profile, most notably during its G20 Presidency in 2023, where it positioned itself as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. At the same time, sustaining strategic autonomy presents challenges, including internal divergences within BRICS, the risk of over-securitization of the Quad, and intensifying great-power competition. Nevertheless, India’s ability to engage across ideological and geopolitical divides highlights the adaptability of its foreign policy. Strategic autonomy, anchored in selective and pragmatic multilateralism, remains central to India’s aspiration to emerge as a leading power in a multipolar international order.

3. BRICS as a Pillar of India’s Economic and Diplomatic Multilateralism

BRICS, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, represents one of the most influential coalitions of emerging economies in the contemporary international system. Initially conceptualized as “BRIC” by economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 to highlight the growth potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the grouping transitioned from a financial concept into a formal diplomatic platform with the first meeting of BRIC foreign ministers in 2006. The inclusion of South Africa in 2010 expanded the forum’s geographical and political representation, giving rise to BRICS as a voice of the Global South.

Beyond its demographic and economic weight—accounting for approximately 41% of the world’s population, nearly 24% of global GDP, and around 16% of global trade—BRICS has evolved into an institutional mechanism aimed at reforming global governance structures traditionally dominated by Western powers. The grouping seeks to promote a more inclusive and representative international economic order, particularly in institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO.

A major institutional achievement of BRICS is the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014, which provides development finance for infrastructure and sustainable development projects without the stringent political conditionalities often associated with Western-led financial institutions. India has been a major beneficiary of NDB funding, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy, transport infrastructure, and urban development, reinforcing the economic dimension of its multilateral engagement.

India’s chairmanship of BRICS in 2021 further underscored its commitment to shaping the agenda of emerging economies. During its tenure, India emphasized themes such as BRICS@15: Intra-BRICS Cooperation for Continuity, Consolidation and Consensus, focusing on supply chain resilience, digital public infrastructure, counter-terrorism, and reform of multilateral institutions. India’s promotion of digital public goods—such as UPI and Aadhaar—as scalable development models reflects how BRICS serves as a platform for norm diffusion and soft power projection.

Recent developments have further enhanced BRICS’ strategic relevance. The 2024 expansion of BRICS to include countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia has significantly increased the bloc’s geopolitical reach, energy influence, and financial clout. India’s support for expansion, while advocating consensus-based decision-making, demonstrates its attempt to balance inclusivity with concerns over excessive Chinese influence within the grouping.

In the context of global economic uncertainty, sanctions politics, and supply chain disruptions, BRICS has increasingly focused on local currency trade, financial cooperation, and discussions around reducing dependence on the US dollar. While India remains cautious about full-scale de-dollarization, its participation in these discussions aligns with its broader goal of strategic autonomy and diversified economic partnerships.

Thus, BRICS functions not merely as an economic grouping but as a strategic multilateral platform through which India amplifies its voice, strengthens South–South cooperation, and contributes to shaping a multipolar world order. By engaging actively within BRICS, India reinforces its position as a leading emerging power while maintaining flexibility in navigating great-power competition.

4. India’s Strategic Leverage within BRICS: Reforming Global Governance amid Divergent Interests

BRICS exercises growing influence in global development and governance, particularly among low- and middle-income countries, by offering an alternative framework to Western-dominated institutions. Its primary objective lies in fostering cooperation among major emerging economies while advocating reforms in global financial and political structures that inadequately represent developing nations. Over time, BRICS has evolved from a consultative forum into a more coordinated platform addressing shared challenges across economic, political, and social domains.

One of BRICS’ central objectives is to enhance economic cooperation and development financing, reflected in the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB). As of 2024, the NDB has approved over USD 35 billion in projects, with India among the largest recipients. BRICS also advocates reform of the IMF and World Bank, strengthens financial resilience through the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), and extends influence across Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

India’s strategic objectives within BRICS align with its doctrine of strategic autonomy. It promotes development-centric multilateralism, digital public infrastructure, and consensus-based governance while cautiously managing China’s dominance. India’s engagement with Russia within BRICS reinforces long-standing strategic ties, while institutional dialogue provides space to manage tensions with China post-Galwan.

Despite achievements, BRICS faces structural constraints due to divergent national interests, limited cohesion in trade and technology governance, and unequal gains from global agreements. These challenges constrain India’s policy space and highlight the need for deeper coordination and issue-based cooperation within the grouping.

5. The Quad and India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Selective Alignment without Alliance Commitments

India’s evolving stance on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) reflects a strategically calibrated transition rather than a departure from its long-standing commitment to autonomy. Initially hesitant, India viewed the Quad as a consultative mechanism. However, ongoing tensions with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Beijing’s assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific prompted reassessment.

Today, India perceives the Quad as a flexible, values-based framework to advance a stable, rules-based regional order. Quad cooperation in maritime domain awareness, critical technologies, supply chains, and humanitarian assistance has expanded significantly. Exercises such as Malabar 2024 signal operational coordination without formal alliance obligations.

India’s Indo-Pacific vision—anchored in SAGAR and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative—positions it as a net security provider rather than a hegemon. Enhanced naval deployments, logistics agreements, and joint patrols underscore India’s growing maritime role while preserving strategic autonomy.

6. Multilateral Hedging through BRICS and the Quad: India as a Bridge between Global Orders

India’s engagement within the Quad reflects a conscious effort to contest dominant social knowledge structures shaping the Indo-Pacific order. Rather than fully endorsing a Western-led liberal international order, India promotes pluralism, inclusivity, and strategic autonomy in regional governance. Its reluctance to formalize or institutionalize the Quad stems from concerns over strategic polarization, the risk of alliance entrapment vis-à-vis China, and the imperative of preserving ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific architecture. By advocating flexible, issue-based cooperation—such as maritime domain awareness, disaster relief, and technology partnerships—India seeks to shape regional norms without reinforcing bloc politics.

Simultaneously, India’s leadership within BRICS underscores its commitment to reshaping global governance beyond the Indo-Pacific. Institutions such as the New Development Bank, initiatives on local currency trade, and the 2024 BRICS expansion illustrate India’s role in amplifying Global South representation and contesting Western financial dominance. Collectively, India’s engagement across both platforms positions it as a normative bridge between established and emerging global orders, balancing reformist ambitions with strategic restraint.

Conclusion

India’s engagement with BRICS and the Quad reflects a deliberate strategy of multilateral hedging aimed at preserving strategic autonomy in a rapidly evolving multipolar order. Rather than pursuing rigid alignments, India leverages these platforms to balance great-power competition, advance Global South interests, and shape regional and global norms. Through BRICS, India challenges existing financial and governance hierarchies, while its participation in the Quad strengthens a rules-based Indo-Pacific without formal alliance commitments. This calibrated approach highlights India’s growing confidence as a bridge between competing global orders, positioning it as a pivotal actor in shaping an inclusive, pluralistic international system.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

Why ASEAN Works and SAARC Falters: A Comparative Study of Regional Cooperation in Asia.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

SAARC VS ASEAN: Source Internet

Introduction

Regionalism in Asia presents a paradox of uneven outcomes. While ASEAN has evolved into a resilient platform for cooperation, SAARC remains institutionally stagnant. This article compares their origins, structures, and political contexts to explain how institutional design, power asymmetry, and conflict management shape the success or failure of regional cooperation.

 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka on 8 December 1985, was conceived as a regional mechanism to promote economic growth, social development, and collective self-reliance among its eight member states. Despite its broad mandate and institutional framework, SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by structural constraints—most notably unanimity-based decision-making and the exclusion of bilateral disputes—which have paralysed summit-level engagement. Enduring geopolitical tensions, particularly between India and Pakistan, have stalled regional cooperation, resulting in minimal intra-regional trade and weak policy coordination. Although recent sectoral initiatives, anniversary statements, and calls for revival—especially from Bangladesh and smaller member states—suggest limited residual relevance, the growing shift toward sub-regional arrangements such as BIMSTEC and BBIN reflects SAARC’s declining centrality in South Asian regionalism in the absence of political consensus and institutional reform.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok with the signing of the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, later expanding to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999), forming the ten-member bloc it is today. ASEAN’s Charter, launched in 2008 in Jakarta, transformed the organization into a legal entity and set the foundation for an “EU-style community” aiming at deeper regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective engagement in global affairs. Since then, ASEAN has pursued ambitious goals in trade liberalization, political cooperation, and social development. In recent years, the bloc has taken significant steps in strengthening its regional role: at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur (October 2025), leaders welcomed Timor-Leste as the bloc’s 11th member and endorsed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord to de-escalate the Cambodia-Thailand border crisis, demonstrating ASEAN’s capacity to mediate regional disputes. ASEAN also articulated a five-year strategic plan (2026-2030) to accelerate economic integration, enhance digital infrastructure, and promote sustainable development amid shifting geopolitical currents. Concurrently, ASEAN initiatives have advanced cooperation on education transformation, higher education resilience, and environment protection, while the bloc continues grappling with complex challenges such as implementing its peace plan in Myanmar and navigating the strategic interests of external powers in the Indo-Pacific. These developments reflect ASEAN’s evolving role as a central platform for multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, even as it contends with structural challenges and external geopolitical pressures. 

Formation and Conceptual Foundations of SAARC

The idea of South Asian regional cooperation predates the establishment of SAARC by several decades, evident in early initiatives such as the Asian Relations Conference (1947), the Baguio Conference (1950), and the Colombo Powers Conference (1954). These efforts reflected post-colonial aspirations for solidarity, economic cooperation, and collective self-reliance among newly independent states. However, they failed to evolve into formal institutions due to deep political mistrust, unresolved bilateral disputes, and the constraining influence of Cold War alignments. A decisive shift occurred in 1979 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which destabilized South Asia and heightened awareness of the region’s vulnerability to external powers. This security shock accelerated efforts toward regional institutionalization, culminating in the establishment of SAARC in 1985. Significantly, SAARC was designed as a non-political and non-security-oriented forum, deliberately excluding bilateral disputes from its agenda—an institutional compromise shaped by prevailing mutual suspicions among member states.

India–Pakistan Divergences and Institutional Design

India and Pakistan’s initial skepticism played a central role in shaping SAARC’s institutional architecture. India’s reservations stemmed from its regional primacy as the largest political and economic actor in South Asia. New Delhi feared that a multilateral framework might enable smaller neighbours to internationalize bilateral disputes, particularly Kashmir, form balancing coalitions against India, and constrain its strategic autonomy. Consequently, India insisted on principles of sovereign equality, non-interference, and the exclusion of security matters from SAARC’s mandate. Pakistan, in contrast, viewed SAARC through the prism of strategic rivalry and economic asymmetry. It feared that regional cooperation would consolidate India’s economic dominance, marginalize Pakistan diplomatically, and allow India to bypass core political disputes while projecting regional leadership. This mutual distrust resulted in a deliberately weak institutional structure, consensus-based decision-making, and an avoidance of contentious political issues—features that have continued to limit SAARC’s effectiveness.

Institutionalization, Expansion, and Contested Regional Identity

Despite these constraints, SAARC’s formal establishment was made possible through diplomatic leadership by Bangladesh. Between 1979 and 1980, consultations among South Asian UN representatives in New York led Bangladesh to draft a working paper that provided the basis for intergovernmental discussions. These efforts culminated in the first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on 7–8 December 1985, symbolizing cautious collective commitment to regional cooperation. SAARC’s expansion with Afghanistan’s accession further exposed conceptual ambiguities regarding South Asian identity. Afghanistan’s application in 2005 generated intense debate, as it occupies a geopolitical crossroads between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. While the requirement to hold democratic elections prior to accession reflected SAARC’s normative aspirations, Afghanistan’s inclusion in 2007 also underscored the organization’s limited capacity to manage internal instability. The presence of numerous observer states—including China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union—highlighted SAARC’s strategic importance, even as meaningful regional integration remained elusive.

Contemporary Relevance and Persistent Stagnation

The structural weaknesses embedded at SAARC’s inception are clearly reflected in contemporary developments. The cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad following the 2016 Uri terrorist attack marked a critical rupture, as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan jointly boycotted the meeting, leading to institutional paralysis. Since then, no SAARC summit has been convened, with India increasingly prioritizing alternative regional and sub-regional frameworks such as BIMSTEC and broader Indo-Pacific partnerships. Although the COVID-19 SAARC Emergency Fund initiative in 2020 briefly revived engagement, disagreements over leadership and management revealed enduring trust deficits, particularly between India and Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan’s political transformation after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has further complicated SAARC’s revival. Despite encompassing 21% of the world’s population and over 5% of global GDP, SAARC continues to function largely as a declaratory forum rather than an operational regional organization, constrained by unresolved security dilemmas, contested regional identity, and entrenched power asymmetries.

Origins and Formation of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) evolved from earlier attempts at regional cooperation, most notably the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established on 31 July 1961 by Thailand, the Philippines, and the Federation of Malaya. While ASA reflected early regionalist aspirations, its limited membership and weak institutional base constrained its effectiveness. A more comprehensive and enduring framework emerged on 8 August 1967 with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The Declaration articulated ASEAN’s core objectives: accelerating economic growth, promoting social progress and cultural development, fostering regional peace and stability, encouraging mutual assistance in training and research, enhancing cooperation in agriculture and industry, and maintaining constructive relations with international organizations. From its inception, ASEAN was envisioned as a pragmatic and flexible institution grounded in cooperation rather than formal supranationalism.

Cold War Context and Early Consolidation

ASEAN’s creation was strongly shaped by Cold War dynamics, particularly the desire of Southeast Asian states to contain the spread of communism and insulate the region from great-power rivalries. This shared security concern provided early cohesion among member states, which was further strengthened in the mid-1970s following major geopolitical shifts, including the fall of Saigon, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). ASEAN’s first summit, held in Bali in 1976, marked a significant step toward institutional consolidation with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. These agreements formalized principles of non-interference, peaceful dispute resolution, and regional solidarity, laying the normative foundation for ASEAN’s long-term stability and cooperation.

Post–Cold War Expansion and Functional Cooperation

The end of the Cold War enabled ASEAN to exercise greater regional political autonomy and expand its functional scope. During the 1990s, ASEAN emerged as a key regional actor in trade liberalization and security dialogue, positioning itself as a central platform for regional multilateralism. The signing of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995 further underscored ASEAN’s collective commitment to regional peace and security. Beyond strategic considerations, ASEAN’s cohesion has been reinforced by shared historical and cultural linkages, as Southeast Asia has long functioned as a crossroads between East Asia and South Asia, influenced by Islamic, Persian, and later European interactions. This combination of strategic pragmatism and cultural interconnectedness has enabled ASEAN to deepen cooperation while accommodating political diversity among its members.

Contemporary Dynamics and Institutional Adaptability

Today, ASEAN comprises ten member states with a total area of over 4.5 million square kilometres and an estimated population of approximately 668 million. Symbolically, the ten stalks of rice in the ASEAN flag represent unity and shared prosperity among its members. ASEAN has also made tangible progress in people-to-people connectivity, particularly through the institutionalization of visa-free travel, which has significantly increased intra-ASEAN tourism—by 2010, nearly half of all tourists within ASEAN originated from member states themselves. At the same time, ASEAN has faced unprecedented challenges, notably Myanmar’s political crisis since 2017, which has tested the organization’s principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making. ASEAN’s evolving response to Myanmar reflects a gradual but significant shift in its institutional character, highlighting its capacity for adaptation while striving to preserve unity and regional credibility.

Why ASEAN Worked Where SAARC Stalled: A Comparative Transition

From the perspective of new regionalism, ASEAN’s relative success can be attributed to its ability to evolve beyond narrow state-centric cooperation toward a multidimensional regional project encompassing economic integration, political dialogue, and societal connectivity. New regionalism emphasizes openness, flexibility, and functional diversification, all of which are evident in ASEAN’s post–Cold War evolution—from trade liberalization and people-to-people mobility to crisis coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, SAARC has remained trapped within a traditional, state-centric framework, heavily constrained by sovereignty concerns and elite-level mistrust. Its limited engagement beyond formal diplomacy and weak societal embeddedness have prevented the emergence of a shared South Asian regional identity, reinforcing institutional stagnation.

Institutionalist explanations further illuminate the divergence. ASEAN developed durable norms and practices—often described as the “ASEAN Way”—that, despite being informal and consensus-based, are reinforced through frequent summits, dense networks of ministerial meetings, and institutional continuity. These mechanisms have enabled ASEAN to adapt incrementally to crises, as seen in its collective response to Myanmar’s post-2021 political turmoil and its coordination under frameworks such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework. SAARC, by contrast, suffers from weak institutional density, infrequent high-level engagement, and an absence of enforcement or dispute-resolution mechanisms. Its consensus rule, combined with low institutionalization, amplifies veto power and renders the organization highly susceptible to political shocks, as demonstrated by its paralysis since the 2016 Uri crisis.

From a realist perspective, power asymmetry and threat perception are central to explaining SAARC’s stagnation. South Asia is characterized by a clear regional hegemon—India—whose economic and military dominance generates persistent fears of marginalization among smaller states and balancing behavior from Pakistan. This asymmetry has prevented the development of trust-based cooperation and encouraged zero-sum calculations, particularly in the security domain. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, the absence of a single overwhelming regional power has allowed ASEAN to function as a collective balancing platform amid intensifying US–China rivalry. ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, through forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, reflects its ability to manage external power competition without internal paralysis.

Taken together, these theoretical perspectives highlight that ASEAN’s effectiveness lies not in the absence of conflict but in its capacity to institutionalize cooperation amid diversity and tension. SAARC’s failure, conversely, reflects the limitations of depoliticized regionalism in a conflict-prone environment. Without mechanisms to manage power asymmetry, address security externalities, or foster functional interdependence, SAARC has remained a fragile and reactive institution. This theoretical contrast reinforces why ASEAN has emerged as a resilient model of regionalism, while SAARC continues to struggle with relevance in an increasingly interconnected and competitive regional order.

SAARC and ASEAN: Divergent Outcomes of Regionalism in Asia

South Asia today faces multiple overlapping challenges, including refugee and migration crises, unresolved territorial disputes, ethnic and cultural tensions, weak infrastructure connectivity, and fragile political trust among states. These challenges have directly constrained the effectiveness of SAARC, whose foundational objective of fostering regional cooperation remains unfulfilled. Persistent mutual suspicion—particularly between India and Pakistan—has prevented SAARC from evolving beyond a symbolic forum. In contrast, Southeast Asia’s regional mechanism, ASEAN, despite having a smaller population and territorial size, has successfully fostered a relatively stable regional order, deepened economic interdependence, and institutionalized cooperation in trade, connectivity, and security dialogue. This contrast has led many scholars to characterize the experience succinctly: SAARC has stagnated, while ASEAN has consolidated.

Conflict Management and Institutional Adaptability: ASEAN’s Advantage

Conflicts are not unique to South Asia; they are inherent to all regional systems. What distinguishes ASEAN is not the absence of conflict but its ability to manage tensions without institutional breakdown. During its first decade, ASEAN prioritized regional stability amid communist insurgencies and Cold War turbulence, reinforcing unity through shared threat perception. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the Bali Summit, marked a turning point by formally incorporating security concerns, dispute settlement mechanisms, and norms of peaceful coexistence. In recent years, ASEAN has demonstrated institutional adaptability, particularly in response to Myanmar’s political crisis following the 2021 military coup. By excluding Myanmar’s junta from high-level summits and adopting the Five-Point Consensus, ASEAN signaled a willingness to reinterpret its non-interference principle to preserve regional credibility—something SAARC has been unable to do in comparable crises.

Economic Integration and Trade Performance: ASEAN’s Structural Depth

ASEAN’s political stability enabled sustained economic integration. From the late 1970s onward, ASEAN leveraged institutional continuity to expand trade and investment cooperation. Its cumulative GDP growth between 1976 and 1982—averaging nearly 15% annually—laid the foundation for deeper economic frameworks such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Today, intra-ASEAN trade accounts for nearly 50% of total exports, supported by integrated supply chains and manufacturing networks. ASEAN’s central role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020, further reinforces its position as the hub of Asia-Pacific economic architecture. By contrast, SAARC’s economic instruments—SAPTA (1993) and SAFTA (2004)—have delivered limited outcomes, with intra-regional trade stagnating at around 7%, reflecting weak industrial complementarities and poor trade facilitation.

SAARC’s Structural Constraints and Persistent Underperformance

SAARC’s failure to generate meaningful regional integration is deeply rooted in its origins and structural design. Indo–Pakistan rivalry, extreme power asymmetry favoring India, and the colonial legacy of contested borders have repeatedly undermined trust. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC deliberately excluded security issues from its mandate, leaving no institutional mechanism to manage conflicts when they inevitably arise. Recent examples reinforce this weakness: the cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit after the 2016 Uri attack, the paralysis following India–Pakistan tensions, and Afghanistan’s political uncertainty after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Even economically, SAARC remains one of the least connected regions globally; World Bank studies highlight excessive documentation, delays, and logistical barriers—such as the requirement of over 50 signatures and multiple days for cross-border cargo movement between India and Bangladesh. Large-scale regional projects like the TAPI gas pipeline remain stalled due to security and political distrust, illustrating the region’s inability to convert economic interdependence into cooperation.

Comparative Assessment: Why ASEAN Succeeds and SAARC Struggles

The contrast between ASEAN and SAARC highlights three critical differences. First, ASEAN evolved as a problem-managing organization, while SAARC remains a problem-avoiding forum. Second, ASEAN’s relatively balanced power structure enabled collective leadership, whereas SAARC’s India-centric asymmetry fostered fears of hegemony and counter-balancing behavior. Third, ASEAN successfully integrated economic incentives with political dialogue, creating a virtuous cycle of stability and growth. South Asia, despite housing nearly a quarter of the global population, remains dependent on extra-regional trade partners, with nearly 60% of SAARC trade occurring outside Asia. This dependence, combined with weak industrial diversification and low foreign direct investment, further marginalizes SAARC in global economic governance.

Pathways for Revitalizing SAARC in a Changing Regional Order

For SAARC to regain relevance, incremental and pragmatic reforms are essential. Strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms, expanding cross-border energy cooperation, simplifying trade procedures, and enhancing people-to-people connectivity are necessary first steps. In a region increasingly shaped by Chinese infrastructure investment and geopolitical competition, SAARC could serve as a collective platform to negotiate sustainable development terms, protect labor mobility interests, and assert South Asia’s shared cultural and historical identity. Ultimately, SAARC’s survival depends on allowing regionalism to evolve organically—supported not only by state elites but also by societal engagement—so that South Asia’s immense human and material potential can be translated into lasting regional cooperation.

Conclusion

The divergent trajectories of ASEAN and SAARC underscore that regional cooperation depends not merely on shared geography but on adaptive institutions, balanced power relations, and conflict-management mechanisms. ASEAN’s pragmatic regionalism contrasts sharply with SAARC’s structural rigidity, offering important lessons for revitalizing South Asian cooperation in an increasingly interconnected regional order.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

India’s Defence Budget 2026: An Analysis 

By: Sonalika Singh , Consulting Editor , GSDN

India’s Defence Budget : Source Internet

The Union Budget 2026–27 has accorded an unprecedented priority to national defence, allocating a historic ₹7.85 lakh crore (approximately US$93.5 billion) to the Ministry of Defence(MoD). This represents a 15.19 per cent increase over the previous year’s Budget Estimates (BE) of ₹6.81 lakh crore and accounts for nearly 14.67 per cent of total Union expenditure, the largest share commanded by any ministry. Since 2014, when defence allocations stood at roughly ₹2.29 lakh crore, India’s defence outlay has more than tripled, reflecting the Modi government’s sustained emphasis on military preparedness and strategic autonomy. 

Yet the significance of this year’s budget extends beyond headline figures. The 2026–27 allocation is framed by the political leadership as a “post–Operation Sindoor” consolidation push. Operation Sindoor, described by the government as a historic military success, appears to have validated specific tactical investments particularly in airpower and precision-strike capabilities. At the same time, it exposed enduring structural weaknesses, including gaps in long-term force readiness, slow procurement cycles, and the persistent drag of manpower-heavy expenditure. 

This budget must therefore be understood not merely as an accounting exercise but as a strategic document offering insight into India’s evolving threat perceptions and preparedness in an increasingly volatile neighbourhood. The notion of “collusive threats” from China and Pakistan has moved from theoretical planning to operational reality, demanding rapid capability accretion across multiple domains. Against this backdrop, a critical analysis of the defence budget reveals persistent tension between ambitious modernisation goals and unresolved structural constraints. 

At an aggregate level, India’s defence expenditure remains anchored at approximately 2 per cent of GDP. While this marks a recovery from earlier declines, it continues to fall short of the 2.5–3 per cent benchmark repeatedly recommended by the Standing Committee on Defence and several Defence Secretary–led expert committees. In the aftermath of a major military operation, the inability or unwillingness to cross this threshold raises questions about the depth of India’s fiscal commitment to long-term military transformation. 

The internal composition of the defence budget further highlights enduring challenges. Pay and allowances account for around 26.4 per cent of total allocations, while defence pensions consume another 21.84 per cent, amounting to ₹1.71 lakh crore. Combined, these heads absorb nearly half of overall defence spending, significantly constraining fiscal space for modernisation. Civil organisations under the MoD receive 3.64 per cent, leaving capital and operational expenditure to compete within a tightly bounded envelope. 

Although capital expenditure has grown substantially, the broader structure continues to reflect a manpower-intensive force model inherited from earlier decades. Without deeper reformsparticularly in pension liabilities, the budgetary system risks perpetuating a cycle in which modernisation gains remain incremental rather than transformational. 

The most consequential feature of the 2026–27 defence budget is the sharp rise in capital expenditure, which stands at ₹2,19,306.47 crore with an increase of 21.83 per cent over the previous year’s BE of ₹1,80,000 crore. Capital spending now accounts for roughly 27.95 per cent of the total defence allocation, underscoring the government’s intent to prioritise capability development over mere force sustenance. 

A granular examination of capital outlay reveals a deliberate tilt towards technology-intensive force multipliers rather than platform-heavy expansion. The largest share continues to be allocated to “Other Equipment,” which has risen from ₹63,099.03 crore in the 2025–26 BE to ₹82,217.82 crore in 2026–27, an increase of over 30 per cent. This head covers a wide spectrum of assets, including electronic warfare systems, radars, drones, loitering munitions, and digitisation tools critical for network-centric warfare. 

Spending on aircraft and aeroengines has also witnessed a significant increase, rising to ₹63,733.94 crore from ₹48,614.06 crore in the previous BE an increase of nearly 31 per cent. Although the 2025–26 revised estimates had temporarily pushed spending beyond ₹72,000 crore, the 2026–27 BE establishes a high and stable baseline for sustained airpower modernisation. This allocation is crucial for maintaining operational readiness following Operation Sindoor and for advancing long-pending acquisition programmes such as the 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA). 

Naval modernisation, while steady, appears comparatively restrained. The Navy has allocated ₹25,023.63 crore for fleet modernisation, marginally higher than the ₹24,390.95 crore in the previous BE. While modest in absolute terms, this funding remains strategically significant given India’s expanding maritime responsibilities and the growing presence of adversarial naval assets in the Indian Ocean Region. 

Research and Development (R&D) has received ₹17,250.25 crore under the capital head, up from ₹14,923.82 crore in the 2025–26 BE. In addition, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been allocated a total budget of ₹29,100 crore, with ₹17,200 crore earmarked for capital expenditure. This sustained increase reinforces the government’s emphasis on indigenous technology development under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. 

The allocation patterns in the 2026–27 budget reflect direct lessons drawn from recent operational experience. The sharp increase in aircraft and aero-engine funding signals recognition of the decisive role played by air superiority, electronic warfare, and standoff-strike capabilities during Operation Sindoor. Investments in airborne early warning systems, beyond-visual-range missiles, and advanced electronic warfare suites aim to preserve escalation of dominance in future contingencies. 

Similarly, the emphasis on “Other Equipment” underscores the military’s shift towards digitisation and enhanced situational awareness. Drones, battlefield sensors, and integrated command-and-control systems are increasingly central to operations across high-altitude, desert, and maritime environments. For the Army, these investments are particularly relevant in addressing challenges along the northern borders, where terrain and logistics impose severe operational constraints. 

Maritime deterrence remains another key concern. Although the Navy’s capital allocation has risen only marginally, it supports critical long-term projects such as Project 75(I), which aims to induct six advanced submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion systems. In an environment marked by China’s expanding naval footprint and growing undersea activity in the Indian Ocean, these capabilities are essential for maintaining credible deterrence. 

A defining feature of the 2026–27 budget is its attempt to energise India’s defence industrial ecosystem, particularly through enhanced participation by domestic firms. Approximately 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget around ₹1.64 lakh crore has been earmarked for procurement from Indian companies, including private sector entities. This reflects a sustained policy commitment to indigenisation and reduced import dependence. 

The imminent signing of the ₹70,000 crore-plus Project 75(I) submarine contract with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems exemplifies this approach. While the project involves foreign collaboration, it mandates indigenous content levels starting at 45 per cent and rising to 60 per cent over time. Indian shipyards such as Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited stand to benefit, along with hundreds of MSMEs integrated into global supply chains for sensors, spares, and sub-systems. 

In aerospace, customs-duty exemptions on raw materials for aircraft Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) represent a strategically significant reform. As the Indian Air Force’s fleet expands particularly with the induction of new fighter platforms domestic MRO capacity becomes critical for reducing downtime during crises. Collaborations such as Safran’s proposed MRO facility for M88 engines in Hyderabad signal growing confidence in India’s aerospace ecosystem. 

Emerging technologies also feature prominently. The induction of weaponised unmanned interceptor craft developed by private firms under the iDEX framework highlights the growing role of start-ups in addressing niche operational requirements, particularly in coastal and maritime security. 

Despite the scale of India’s defence budget, comparative analysis underscores the severity of its strategic challenge. China’s estimated defence spending of approximately US$374 billionnearly four times India’s translates into significantly greater acquisition power, particularly in advanced technologies such as hypersonic weapons, space systems, and artificial intelligence. Pakistan, while far behind in absolute terms, continues to offset asymmetries through targeted acquisitions, including Turkish drones and Chinese aircraft. 

India’s challenge, therefore, is not merely to outspend individual adversaries but to balance resources across two geographically distinct theatres. This reality stretches procurement priorities thin and places a premium on efficient allocation, technological leverage, and rapid decision-making. 

Six years after its introduction, the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 presents a mixed record. While it has successfully prioritised domestic procurement and reduced outright imports, it has also revealed significant inefficiencies. 

The prolonged gestation of Project 75(I) illustrates these shortcomings. Conceived over two decades ago, the project took nearly six years under DAP 2020 to reach the contract-signing stage. In an era characterised by rapid technological change, procurement cycles spanning 15–20 years risk delivering platforms that are operationally dated upon induction. 

Moreover, the emphasis on negative import lists has occasionally resulted in capability gaps, where foreign options are excluded before indigenous alternatives are fully mature. While programmes such as the Light Combat Helicopter and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft are strategically vital, over-reliance on future indigenous deliveries carries near-term operational risks. 

Export promotion remains another weak link. Although domestic manufacturing capacity has expanded, explicit budgetary support for defence exports remains opaque. To emulate countries such as Turkey whose drone exports have reshaped regional power balances India must provide stronger incentives for private-sector R&D and faster certification pathways. 

A critical imbalance persists in the allocation of resources between public sector undertakings and private industry. Investment in Defence Public Sector Undertakings remains at ₹1,494 crore, while combined assistance for prototype development under “Make” procedures for the Army and Air Force stands at just ₹1,707.81 crore. This disparity limits the private sector’s ability to undertake long-term, high-risk R&D. 

For India’s defence industrial ecosystem to mature, private firms must be treated as strategic partners rather than peripheral vendors. This entails sharing R&D risk, offering stable long-term contracts, and rewarding innovation and speed rather than procedural compliance. Rationalising revenue expenditure particularly pensions would further free fiscal space for technology-driven solutions where private industry excels. 

The Union Budget 2026–27 represents a calibrated effort to consolidate military gains following Operation Sindoor while addressing select capability gaps in airpower, maritime deterrence, and battlefield digitisation. The sharp rise in capital expenditure and the emphasis on indigenous procurement signal a clear strategic intent to modernise India’s armed forces. 

However, the budget stops short of the structural transformation required to fully align India’s military posture with its strategic ambitions. Persistent manpower costs, slow procurement cycles, and limited private sector incentivisation continue to constrain modernisation outcomes. With defence spending hovering around 2 per cent of GDP, India risks pursuing a “more with less” approach in an era where adversaries are rapidly scaling technological capabilities. 

Ultimately, state-funded capital expenditure alone cannot deliver the military transformation India seeks. Without decisive reforms to pension liabilities, procurement processes, and private-sector participation, India may continue to punch below its weight in the global hard-power equation, despite impressive headline numbers. Yet the trajectory is not without a promise. The steady rise in capital allocations, growing confidence in indigenous platforms, and the gradual opening of the defence ecosystem to private industry indicate that the foundations for long-term transformation are being laid. If complemented by sustained fiscal commitment, procurement reform, and deeper public–private collaboration, India is well positioned to translate its economic strength and technological ambition into credible, multidomain military power in the decade ahead. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs.

India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement: Opportunities, Challenges, and Strategic Implications

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

India-EFTA Trade Pact: Source Internet

European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and India: Strategic Economic Partnership

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an intergovernmental organisation established by the Stockholm Convention in 1960 with the purpose of promoting free trade and economic integration among its member states. EFTA originally included seven countries but now consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. This bloc operates as a trade partnership distinct from the European Union (EU), facilitating liberalised trade policies, removing tariffs, and fostering closer economic cooperation with global partners through free trade agreements (FTAs). 

India’s engagement with EFTA has culminated in a major milestone: the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) between India and the four EFTA countries was signed on 10 March 2024 after long negotiations and subsequently entered into force on 1 October 2025. This marks India’s first comprehensive trade pact with four developed European economies outside the EU framework. In the fiscal year 2022-23, EFTA ranked as India’s fifth-largest trading partner, trailing the EU, the United States, the UK, and China, with two-way trade valued at USD 18.65 billion and India recording a trade deficit of USD 14.8 billion; Switzerland stands out as India’s largest partner within the bloc, followed by Norway. Exports to EFTA dominated in machinery and pharmaceuticals, while Indian exports were led by organic chemicals.

The TEPA is designed not only to reduce tariffs on goods such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, watches, and processed foods but also to liberalise trade in services, expand investment flows and deepen economic cooperation. Over a 15-year period, the EFTA members have pledged about USD 100 billion in investments into India, with an aim to generate one million direct jobs, making it one of the most ambitious investment commitments in any Indian trade deal to date. By creating easier market access, streamlined customs procedures, and mutual recognition in professional and services domains, this partnership supports India’s broader goals of enhancing global supply chain integration and strengthening industrial competitiveness. 

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 under the Stockholm Convention, with the objective of promoting free trade and economic cooperation among its member states. India–EFTA relations have steadily deepened over the decades, culminating in a major breakthrough on 10 March 2024, when India and the four EFTA countries signed the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) in New Delhi, marking India’s first comprehensive trade pact with this European bloc. This growing engagement is reflected in trade figures as well—during FY 2022–23, bilateral trade between India and EFTA stood at USD 18.65 billion, underscoring the expanding economic interdependence and strategic relevance of the partnership.

In recent news, the TEPA implementation has been widely highlighted for its potential to boost bilateral trade, attract large-scale investments, and generate employment, with officials from both sides marking the agreement as pivotal in enhancing economic relations between India and European economies outside the EU framework. 

TEPA as a Strategic Reset in India–EFTA Economic Relations

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) represents a strategic reset after a decade-long pause in negotiations, which had stalled in 2013 due to differences over market access and investment commitments. Changing global geopolitics—particularly supply-chain disruptions, heightened trade uncertainty, and a shared interest in reducing over-dependence on China—created fresh momentum for the deal. Finalised in March 2024, TEPA consists of 14 comprehensive chapters covering market access for goods, rules of origin, trade facilitation, services, investment promotion, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and sustainable development, making it one of India’s most wide-ranging trade agreements with developed economies.

A standout feature of TEPA is its investment-centric architecture. EFTA has committed to facilitating USD 100 billion in foreign direct investment into India over a 15-year period, explicitly linked to direct job creation, while excluding volatile portfolio flows. This makes TEPA unique among India’s trade agreements, as it legally ties investment to employment outcomes. The agreement also reinforces strong IPR protections, aligned with the WTO’s TRIPS framework, addressing long-standing concerns of EFTA members—particularly Switzerland—while maintaining India’s regulatory flexibility in public interest areas such as healthcare and access to medicines.

On market access, TEPA demonstrates a calibrated balance. EFTA has offered tariff concessions on 92.2% of tariff lines, covering 99.6% of India’s exports, including full access for 100% of non-agricultural products and concessions on Processed Agricultural Products (PAPs). India, in return, has liberalised 82.7% of its tariff lines, covering 95.3% of EFTA exports, while safeguarding sensitive sectors such as dairy, soy, coal, and select agricultural goods. The agreement also advances services liberalisation, with enhanced access across Mode 1 (digital delivery), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of professionals), alongside provisions for Mutual Recognition Agreements in professions like nursing, architecture, and chartered accountancy. Recent policy discussions have highlighted TEPA’s role as a gateway for Indian firms into wider European markets, with Switzerland emerging as a strategic base due to its strong services linkages with the EU—positioning TEPA as both a trade pact and a long-term geo-economic partnership.

EFTA Services Offer: Source Internet

Why the India–EFTA TEPA Is a Strategic and Economic Game-Changer?

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) is significant primarily because of its investment-driven design, with EFTA countries committing to USD 100 billion in Foreign Direct Investment over 15 years, directly linked to job creation. This scale of assured FDI is unprecedented in India’s trade agreements and is expected to accelerate development in infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, clean energy, and high-end technology sectors. Beyond capital inflows, TEPA promotes technology transfer, R&D collaboration, and vocational skill development, which aligns closely with India’s long-term growth needs and its demographic dividend. Recent official statements following the agreement’s operationalisation have highlighted TEPA as a “model trade pact” that combines market access with tangible developmental outcomes rather than purely tariff reductions.

From a domestic policy perspective, TEPA strongly reinforces flagship initiatives such as “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat.” By incentivising local manufacturing and encouraging EFTA firms to establish production bases in India, the agreement supports import substitution while embedding India deeper into global value chains. Simultaneously, TEPA is expected to boost India’s services exports, particularly in IT, business services, professional services, and digital delivery, aided by commitments on Mode 1, Mode 3, and Mode 4 access. Indian consumers also stand to gain through greater access to high-quality Swiss and Nordic products—such as watches, chocolates, processed foods, and precision instruments—at more competitive prices as customs duties are gradually phased out over a decade. Recent trade commentary has emphasised that this balance between consumer welfare and domestic industry protection makes TEPA politically and economically sustainable.

Service Exports: Source Internet

At a broader strategic level, the India–EFTA deal carries geopolitical and systemic significance. It strengthens India’s economic footprint in Europe outside the EU framework, diversifies trade partnerships, and reduces dependence on a narrow set of trading partners amid global uncertainty. TEPA also sets a precedent for future trade negotiations with the UK and the European Union, offering a blueprint for integrating market access, investment commitments, intellectual property protection, sustainability, and government procurement into a single framework. With its emphasis on TRIPS-aligned IPR standards, environmental stewardship, and rules-based trade, recent policy analyses describe TEPA as positioning India not just as a market, but as a credible rule-shaper and  champion of free trade and economic cooperation in the evolving global trade order.

India’s Bilateral Engagements with EFTA Nations: Strategic Depth Beyond Trade

India’s relations with individual EFTA member states predate the TEPA framework and reflect long-standing diplomatic, economic, and strategic convergence. India–Norway ties, established in 1947, have evolved from traditional diplomacy into forward-looking cooperation in sustainability, maritime governance, and polar research. The launch of the India–Norway Task Force on Blue Economy in 2020 marked a significant shift toward ocean-based sustainable development, renewable energy, and fisheries management. Scientific collaboration remains a cornerstone, highlighted by HIMADRI, India’s Arctic research station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, which has gained renewed relevance amid global climate governance debates and Arctic geopolitics. In the context of TEPA, Norway’s support for India’s inclusion in key export control regimes and its emphasis on green growth align closely with India’s strategic and environmental priorities.

India–Switzerland relations form the economic backbone of India’s engagement with EFTA. Since the Treaty of Friendship in 1948, Switzerland has emerged as India’s largest trading partner within EFTA and a critical source of high-value investment, technology, and precision manufacturing expertise. The presence of over 300 Swiss companies in India, alongside major Indian IT firms operating in Switzerland, reflects a mature and mutually embedded economic relationship. Recent developments surrounding the India–EFTA TEPA (signed in 2024) have further elevated Switzerland’s role as a gateway for Indian firms into wider European markets, particularly in services, pharmaceuticals, innovation, and R&D. Ongoing dialogues on intellectual property protection, skill mobility, and investment-linked job creation underscore both opportunity and friction, making Switzerland central to the agreement’s success.

India’s engagement with Iceland and Liechtenstein, though smaller in scale, carries disproportionate strategic value. India–Iceland relations, established in 1972, have intensified since the mid-2000s, with Iceland becoming the first Nordic country to support India’s permanent UNSC membership—a politically significant gesture. Recent MoUs on renewable energy, geothermal technology, green hydrogen, and decarbonisation reflect convergence on climate action and clean energy transitions, areas where Iceland holds niche expertise. Meanwhile, India–Liechtenstein ties, formalised in 1993, are largely investment-driven, with FDI inflows—though modest—reflecting Liechtenstein’s role as a financial and investment hub. Under TEPA, these smaller EFTA economies gain strategic relevance as innovation partners and niche investors, reinforcing India’s broader objective of diversified, high-quality economic engagement with Europe beyond the EU framework.

Critical Challenges and Structural Constraints of the India–EFTA Trade Agreement

 Despite its potential benefits, the India-EFTA trade agreement faces several key challenges that warrant attention. Firstly, India’s selective exclusion of sectors like agriculture and dairy from significant tariff reductions may limit the advantages for EFTA exporters, particularly regarding India’s substantial imports of gold, mainly from Switzerland. Moreover, the agreement includes a provision allowing India to adjust duty concessions if the committed investments of USD 100 million fail to materialize, introducing a layer of accountability. Concerns also arise regarding data exclusivity provisions proposed by EFTA nations, which could hinder access to critical clinical trial data for generic drug manufacturers. Addressing the vast income disparities between India and EFTA countries is essential for ensuring equitable opportunities and fostering mutual growth. Additionally, streamlining non-tariff barriers such as differing product standards and technical regulations is crucial to prevent hurdles for exporters and ensure compliance with market requirements. Lastly, domestic opposition from Indian sectors facing EFTA competition underscores the importance of engaging stakeholders to address potential job losses and concerns about unfair competition. 

Conclusion

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement represents far more than a conventional free trade arrangement; it is a strategic experiment in aligning trade liberalisation with investment-led development, employment generation, and technological advancement. By combining deep market access with a legally anchored USD 100 billion investment commitment, TEPA signals a shift in India’s trade diplomacy—from tariff-centric negotiations to outcome-oriented economic partnerships. It strengthens India’s integration into high-value European supply chains, enhances services exports, and positions the country as a credible destination for long-term, quality capital in a period of global economic fragmentation.

However, the agreement’s long-term success will hinge on effective implementation and careful management of structural asymmetries. Persistent concerns over data exclusivity, non-tariff barriers, income disparities, and domestic sectoral resistance highlight the need for continuous stakeholder engagement, regulatory coordination, and policy flexibility. India’s ability to safeguard public interest—particularly in healthcare and agriculture—while remaining an attractive investment destination will be central to sustaining political and economic consensus around TEPA.

Ultimately, TEPA serves as a benchmark for India’s future engagements with advanced economies, including ongoing negotiations with the UK and the EU. If implemented with institutional coherence and strategic foresight, the agreement could redefine India’s role from a rule-taker to a rule-shaper in the global trade order, reinforcing its image as a champion of free trade, sustainable development, and equitable economic cooperation. In this sense, the India–EFTA partnership is not merely about trade expansion—it is a test case for India’s evolving global economic strategy in the 21st century.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a Research Analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on International and Regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in Talent Acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

Rethinking Modernity: From Eurocentrism to a Polycentric Global Perspective

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Rethinking Modernity :Source Internet

Introduction

Modernity has long been treated as a singular historical experience rooted in Europe, often presented as a universal template for political, economic, and social development. This Eurocentric framing, however, obscures the complex, global processes through which modernity emerged and evolved. As colonial encounters, global trade, and transnational exchanges shaped both European and non-European societies, modernity became a multidimensional and contested phenomenon rather than a linear European achievement. In an era marked by globalization, geopolitical fragmentation, and shifting power centers, reassessing modernity beyond Western narratives has become essential. This article critically examines modernity as a historically produced yet globally diffused process, tracing its intellectual foundations, institutional expressions, and inherent contradictions. By engaging with debates on Eurocentric, Westcentric, and polycentric modernities—and situating them within contemporary geopolitical developments—it seeks to highlight modernity as an evolving, plural, and deeply political project shaped by power, interaction, and historical context.

Rethinking Modernity Beyond the Eurocentric Paradigm

The idea of modernity has historically been closely linked to Europe and the West, often interpreted through a Eurocentric lens that presents European experience as a universal model. However, modernity is a multidimensional concept, and a non-biased, non-Eurocentric approach is essential to compare diverse global modernities fairly. Developing a world sociology of modernity enables recognition of multiple historical trajectories shaped by culture, colonial experience, and political context. Conventionally, modernity is perceived as a transformative era originating in Europe and North America, marked by the industrial and democratic revolutions. These developments, reinforced by colonial expansion, access to global resources, and transoceanic trade, positioned Europe as the perceived driver of world history. Contemporary debates on decolonization, reparations, and global inequality—particularly in Africa and the Caribbean—underscore how Europe’s modern ascent was inseparable from colonial exploitation. To understand modernity today, globalization—initiated by colonial encounters after the discovery of the Americas—must be seen as a foundational process shaping modern political and economic structures, a reality exposed by supply-chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war.

European modernity claimed global significance from its inception. The discovery of the Americas triggered European philosophical reflections on humanity, exemplified by John Locke’s concept of the “State of Nature.” Enlightenment thought elevated freedom and reason as universal principles of knowledge and governance. The American and French Revolutions institutionalized liberal democracy through ideas of individual rights and popular sovereignty, while Alexis de Tocqueville viewed universal suffrage as the future of political history. Economic modernity was articulated through Adam Smith’s advocacy of market self-regulation and later critiqued by Marx and Engels, who anticipated economic globalization in The Communist Manifesto. These ideas shaped global political and economic institutions such as constitutional governance, market capitalism, and international financial regimes, which continue to structure the contemporary international order.

Modernity rests on faith in human freedom and rationality, enabling self-determination, mastery over nature, and rational social organization. These principles were institutionalized in documents such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1793), which universalized individual and collective rights. Yet recent geopolitical developments reveal growing tensions within this model. Democratic backsliding in the United States and Europe, the rise of right-wing populism in France and Italy, and challenges to judicial independence in Hungary and Poland reflect internal crises within liberal modernity itself. Simultaneously, China’s state-led developmental model, Russia’s rejection of Western liberal norms amid the Ukraine war, and debates on “post-liberal” or “civilizational” democracy in the Global South increasingly contest Western claims to universality. Global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change negotiations, and widening economic inequality have further exposed contradictions between democratic freedoms and market capitalism. As citizens question whether liberal democracy and capitalism can deliver social justice, stability, and security, the future trajectory of modernity appears increasingly plural, fragmented, and shaped by non-Western political and social alternatives.

From Promise to Paradox: The Limits of Modernity

Modernity rests on the belief in progress, human values, and humanity’s capacity for self-understanding. Yet from the beginning, thinkers questioned whether modern ideals could be translated into stable political and economic institutions. Immanuel Kant doubted the feasibility of a world republic, advocating instead an international federation of states. Karl Marx critiqued capitalism for generating class inequality and alienation, contradicting modernity’s promise of freedom and equality.

By the twentieth century, Western societies increasingly diverged from non-Western paths, challenging the idea of a singular modern trajectory. Max Weber’s concept of rationalization influenced modernization theory and later debates on multiple modernities, though these often ignored Weber’s pessimism about modernity’s long-term consequences. Critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued that the dominance of instrumental reason leads to commodification, mass culture, and the erosion of creativity and autonomy.

Contemporary geopolitical developments reinforce these concerns. The rise of digital surveillance in China, algorithmic governance in Western democracies, and the growing power of tech monopolies reflect rational efficiency turning into control. Democratic backsliding in Hungary, India, and parts of Latin America, alongside the Russia–Ukraine war and Gaza conflict, exposes the fragility of liberal norms. These crises suggest that modernity’s rational foundations increasingly coexist with exclusion, coercion, and systemic inequality.

From Eurocentric Dominance to Polycentric Modernity

This framework presents modernity as an evolving and contested process rather than a single, linear European achievement. The Eurocentric view of modernity conceptualizes modernity as an intellectual and moral awakening from immaturity to reason, rooted primarily in eighteenth-century Europe. Influenced by Enlightenment thinkers, this perspective highlights internal European developments such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution as decisive turning points. However, by focusing almost exclusively on intra-European dynamics, it downplays the role of non-European societies, colonial encounters, and global exchanges that materially enabled Europe’s transformation. Contemporary critiques point out that Europe’s industrial and political advances were deeply intertwined with colonial exploitation, resource extraction, and transoceanic trade networks.

The global perspective on modernity challenges this inward-looking approach by situating modernity within world history. It traces the origins of modernity to fifteenth-century events such as Portuguese maritime expansion and Spain’s “discovery” of the Americas, which integrated previously separate regions into a single global system. From this view, modernity emerged through planetary interactions rather than isolated European progress. Current globalization debates—such as supply chain interdependence exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic—reinforce this argument by demonstrating how economic and social transformations are inseparable from global connectivity.

The first phase, Eurocentric modernity, emerged between the late fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, primarily in northwestern Europe. The Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and early scientific revolutions fostered new ways of thinking about knowledge, authority, and governance. While Europe remained the central driver of change during this period, its rise was supported by overseas expansion and colonial encounters. Present-day discussions on reparations and decolonization echo this historical imbalance by questioning the moral foundations of Europe’s early modern dominance.

The second phase, Westcentric modernity, crystallized around 1900 as European powers extended their influence worldwide through imperialism. Western institutions such as the nation-state, capitalism, and liberal democracy were exported—often forcibly—to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Current geopolitical tensions, including debates over Western interventionism and the decline of US-led liberal order, reflect growing resistance to this imposed model of modernity.

The third phase, polycentric modernity, marks a shift toward multiple centers of modern development. Emerging powers like China and India pursue distinct modern paths that combine technological advancement with indigenous political and cultural frameworks. China’s state-led capitalism and India’s democratic yet civilizational discourse illustrate how modernity today is plural, contested, and no longer Western-exclusive. Together, these phases reveal modernity as a dynamic, globally produced process shaped by power, interaction, and diversity.

Limitations of Modernity in a Fragmented Global Order

Modernity, rooted in Enlightenment ideals of reason, progress, and individual freedom, has undeniably reshaped societies, yet its limitations have become increasingly visible in the contemporary global landscape. Modernization does not imply the wholesale realization of Enlightenment values. Even liberal democratic states continue to grapple with persistent inequalities related to race, gender, and class. Movements such as Black Lives Matter in the United States and global debates on gender pay gaps highlight how formal equality has not translated into substantive social justice.

A central critique of modernity concerns its relationship with repression. While modernization promises emancipation, modern institutions have often enabled new forms of control. The expansion of digital surveillance technologies, exemplified by mass data monitoring and AI-driven governance in China, and security-led restrictions on civil liberties in democracies following terrorism or pandemics, reveal how modern systems can suppress dissent under the guise of stability and progress.

Moreover, modernity does not guarantee progress. Rapid industrialization and globalization have produced uneven outcomes, with economic growth coexisting alongside rising inequality. The widening wealth gap within and between states—visible in debates over global vaccine inequality during COVID-19 or economic distress in the Global South amid rising inflation—illustrates the uneven distribution of modern benefits. Simultaneously, modernization has disrupted traditional cultures and identities, generating social alienation and political backlash, as seen in the rise of populist and nationalist movements across Europe and parts of Asia.

Technological advances further complicate modernity’s legacy. Innovations such as nuclear weapons, autonomous warfare, and biotechnology pose existential risks, evident in renewed nuclear anxieties following the Russia–Ukraine war. Finally, modernization remains deeply context-specific, shaped by cultural, historical, and geopolitical factors. The coexistence of diverse development paths—from Western liberal democracies to hybrid authoritarian-capitalist models—underscores that modernity is neither uniform nor universally progressive.

Europe and the Emergence of Modernity: From Eurocentric Origins to Multiple Pathways

Modernity has long been associated with Europe, yet it is neither exclusive to the continent nor uniform in its expression. European modernity emerged through distinctive historical conditions, particularly between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but its underlying principles—rationality, reflexivity, and institutional transformation—can arise in diverse societies. Jürgen Habermas conceptualizes modernity as a tension between instrumental rationality, focused on efficiency and control, and communicative rationality, grounded in dialogue and consensus. Importantly, he rejects claims that modernity has exhausted itself, instead viewing it as an unfinished project.

This perspective aligns with S.N. Eisenstadt’s theory of multiple modernities, which challenges the idea of a single European model. Rather, modernity adapts to different civilizational contexts, shaped by local histories and cultural frameworks. The period between 1750 and 1850—often described as the Sattelzeit—marked a decisive transformation in Europe, characterized by industrialization, new political concepts, and a break from traditional temporal understandings. These changes produced what Strydom terms a European “meta-cognitive order,” shaping how societies understood progress, knowledge, and governance.

Peter Wagner further argues that modernity is defined by societies’ continuous efforts to address core problems of social and political order. However, his framework underplays how different modernities interact globally and how European dominance in the nineteenth century influenced shared institutional models. Moreover, Wagner pays limited attention to the moral and political reorientations brought about by modernity—shifts that are essential for evaluating competing modern trajectories.

Contemporary geopolitics underscores these debates. The coexistence of liberal democracies in Europe, state-led capitalist models in China, and hybrid systems in the Global South reflects multiple modernities in practice. The European Union’s emphasis on communicative rationality contrasts with more instrumental governance approaches elsewhere, illustrating that modernity continues to evolve through interaction rather than convergence.

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Conclusion

Modernity, far from being a fixed or exclusively European condition, emerges as a dynamic and contested process shaped by historical encounters, ideological struggles, and global power relations. While European experiences played a formative role in defining early modern institutions and ideas, the universalization of this model has increasingly been challenged by alternative developmental trajectories and contemporary geopolitical realities. The rise of multiple modernities—visible in the coexistence of liberal democracies, state-led capitalist systems, and hybrid political orders—underscores that modernity is neither uniform nor inevitably progressive. Persistent inequalities, technological domination, democratic backsliding, and global crises reveal the limits of Enlightenment promises when detached from social justice and moral accountability. As the global order shifts toward polycentricity, the future of modernity will depend on how societies reconcile freedom with equality, rationality with ethics, and progress with inclusivity. Rethinking modernity beyond Eurocentrism thus allows not only a more accurate historical understanding but also a more plural and responsive vision of global modern life.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

The Dance of Globalization, COVID-19, and the Nation-State: Adapting to a Shifting World Order 

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Counsulting Editor, GSDN

Globalization: Source Internet

Introduction

In the heady days of the 1990s, as globalization took its initial steps, scholars were both hopeful and wary of this emerging trend. They foresaw globalization’s viral qualities – its swiftness, ability to transcend borders, and transformative power. At the time, many believed globalization would bring about positive change, fostering economic growth, cultural exchange, and global cooperation. However, they did not anticipate that such interconnectedness could also become so dangerous, infectious, and difficult to control. Fast forward to today, and we find ourselves amid a global pandemic, COVID-19, the most globalized scourge in the human history. This pandemic has disrupted the world in unprecedented ways, exposing vulnerabilities in supply chains, healthcare systems, and governance structures, and its impact on globalization and the nation-state system has been profound. While some argue for a pause on globalization, seeing COVID-19 as a cautionary signal, others contend that globalization is irreversible and will continue to shape economies, societies, and international relations. Understanding this complex interplay requires examining the multifaceted interactions between global integration, state sovereignty, public health, and technological cooperation, as well as the social and political implications that have emerged during this crisis.

The Viral Nature of Globalization

Globalization has long exhibited a viral character, enabling the rapid movement of ideas, technology, capital, and people across borders. Early proponents viewed this interconnectedness as a force for economic growth, innovation, and global cooperation. However, the COVID-19 pandemic starkly exposed the vulnerabilities embedded within this system. What once symbolized efficiency and integration became a conduit for crisis, as global mobility accelerated the spread of the virus and disrupted tightly knit international networks.

Recent examples underscore this fragility. The global semiconductor shortage (2020–2022) revealed how overreliance on a few production hubs—particularly in East Asia—could paralyze industries worldwide, from automobiles to consumer electronics. Similarly, vaccine supply chain disruptions and “vaccine nationalism” during COVID-19 highlighted the tension between global interdependence and national self-interest, as wealthy states secured doses while developing countries faced severe shortages. The Ever Given blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 further demonstrated how a single chokepoint in global trade could disrupt nearly 12 percent of world commerce within days.

These developments have fueled criticism that globalization prioritizes efficiency and profit over resilience and public welfare. Consequently, calls for reshoring, diversification of supply chains, and strategic autonomy have intensified. Yet, rather than signaling the end of globalization, these crises point to the need for a more balanced and resilient form of global integration—one that tempers speed with safeguards and cooperation with preparedness.

The Irreversibility of Globalization

Despite renewed debates triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, globalization remains fundamentally irreversible. Its foundations were laid in the post–Cold War era, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global embrace of market-oriented reforms, and the growing dominance of financial capitalism. Over the decades, globalization has become embedded in production systems, technological innovation, and political influence, making reversal both impractical and costly.

Recent developments reinforce this reality. Even amid geopolitical tensions, global trade volumes rebounded strongly in 2021–22, demonstrating the resilience of international economic interdependence. China’s continued expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the United States’ leadership in shaping digital trade, semiconductor alliances, and climate technology partnerships, and Russia’s efforts to redirect its energy exports toward Asian and Global South markets following the Ukraine war all reflect sustained global engagement rather than retreat. Moreover, the rapid growth of digital globalization—through cross-border data flows, remote work, fintech, and e-commerce platforms—has intensified interdependence beyond physical borders.

Calls to “pause” globalization overlook these structural realities. Much like the Industrial Revolution or the digital age, globalization has reshaped economic and social life in irreversible ways. What is unfolding is not de-globalization, but recalibrated globalization—one that seeks diversification, strategic autonomy, and resilience without dismantling the interconnected global order that now defines contemporary international relations.

The Revival of the Nation-State

Although globalization remains irreversible, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a notable—though temporary—revival of the nation-state. Governments across the world reasserted authority by imposing lockdowns, sealing borders, regulating movement, and expanding executive powers in the name of public health. Citizens, in turn, turned to the state for protection, healthcare provision, and economic relief, reaffirming the centrality of national governments in times of crisis.

Recent examples illustrate this resurgence. In India, the invocation of the Disaster Management Act centralized decision-making and reinforced federal authority. The European Union’s initial border closures and export restrictions on medical equipment revealed a reversion to national priorities over supranational coordination. Similarly, the United States’ use of the Defense Production Act to boost domestic production of ventilators and vaccines reflected renewed emphasis on national capacity and self-reliance.

However, this revival has clear limits. Global finance, production networks, and labor markets remain deeply interconnected. Efforts to seal borders or reshore industries have exposed the high economic costs of isolation, including inflation, labor shortages, and supply bottlenecks. Moreover, the pandemic fostered greater civic awareness, with citizens increasingly demanding accountability, welfare provision, and competent governance. This renewed state–citizen engagement may have lasting implications, reshaping governance expectations in the post-pandemic era. Yet, the nation-state’s resurgence does not signal the decline of globalization; rather, it highlights the need for stronger states capable of managing global interdependence without retreating from it.

Science, Technology, and Globalization

The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully demonstrated the deep interdependence between science, technology, and globalization. Modern scientific innovation, particularly in public health and medicine, is inherently transnational, relying on shared knowledge, cross-border funding, and globally distributed expertise. The rapid identification and sequencing of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in China in January 2020, followed by its immediate sharing on global scientific databases, enabled researchers worldwide to begin vaccine development within days—an unprecedented scientific response made possible only through global collaboration.

Vaccine development provides the clearest example. The Pfizer–BioNTech vaccine emerged from cooperation between an American pharmaceutical giant and a German biotech firm, while Oxford–AstraZeneca combined British research, Swedish-British manufacturing, and global clinical trials across Brazil, South Africa, and India. Similarly, India’s Serum Institute, the world’s largest vaccine producer, became central to global supply through the COVAX initiative, supplying doses to low- and middle-income countries. The pandemic also highlighted tensions between nationalism and global science. The Trump administration’s reported attempt to secure exclusive access to a German vaccine developer, alongside widespread vaccine nationalism, revealed how national interests can clash with collective global needs. Yet, multinational clinical trials, shared epidemiological modeling, and coordinated WHO-led research efforts reaffirmed the indispensability of global scientific cooperation.

Overall, COVID-19 has reaffirmed that scientific progress cannot be fully confined within national borders. The rapid development of vaccines, global clinical trials, and shared epidemiological data demonstrated that breakthroughs rely on transnational collaboration, collective expertise, and integrated research networks. While political pressures and nationalist agendas may encourage countries to pursue strategic autonomy in areas such as vaccine production or medical technology, the pandemic has shown that no nation can respond effectively to global health crises in isolation. Moving forward, the globalized framework of scientific research and pharmaceutical innovation is likely to endure, emphasizing shared knowledge, coordinated efforts, and international cooperation.

Xenophobia and Vulnerable Groups

While globalization has expanded economic opportunities and cross-cultural exchange, it has neither eliminated xenophobia nor reduced the structural marginalization of vulnerable groups. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed and, in many cases, intensified these fault lines. Political leaders and populist movements in several countries instrumentalized the crisis to reinforce exclusionary narratives. In the United States, references to COVID-19 as the “China virus” by President Trump contributed to a sharp rise in anti-Asian hate crimes, while Brazil’s leadership downplayed the pandemic, disproportionately endangering indigenous and low-income communities.

In Europe, migrants and refugees faced heightened border restrictions and limited access to healthcare, reinforcing their precarious status. In India, the pandemic was accompanied by Islamophobic narratives following the Tablighi Jamaat incident, alongside widespread neglect of migrant workers, millions of whom were forced into hazardous journeys during sudden lockdowns. Globally, women, informal workers, and ethnic minorities bore the brunt of job losses, health risks, and social exclusion.

These developments underscore that globalization, without adequate social safeguards, can exacerbate inequality and prejudice during crises. Addressing these challenges requires not a retreat from globalization, but the construction of a more inclusive global order—one that prioritizes social protection, human rights, and equitable access to healthcare in times of global emergency.

The Future of the Nation-State System

As the world transitions into the post-pandemic phase, it has become increasingly clear that while globalization remains an enduring and irreversible reality, the traditional nation-state system must undergo significant adaptation. Originally designed for an era in which borders, sovereignty, and territorial control were more clearly demarcated, the existing system is ill-equipped to manage complex transnational challenges such as pandemics, climate change, cyber insecurity, financial volatility, and large-scale migration. The COVID-19 crisis starkly exposed the limitations of unilateral state action, demonstrating that even the most powerful states lacked the capacity to respond effectively in isolation.

Rather than signaling the decline of the nation-state, these developments point toward its transformation. States will continue to function as a central political and administrative actors, particularly in areas of welfare provision, public health, and crisis management. However, their effectiveness will increasingly depend on their ability to cooperate within multilateral frameworks and coordinate policies with regional and global institutions. The mixed performance of organizations such as the World Health Organization during the pandemic has not diminished their relevance but has instead intensified calls for institutional reform, greater transparency, and enhanced enforcement capabilities within global governance structures.

Simultaneously, the pandemic has reshaped the social contract between states and citizens. Public expectations regarding state responsibility, accountability, and preparedness have risen sharply, with greater emphasis on social protection, inclusive policymaking, and evidence-based governance. This shift has reinforced the idea that state legitimacy in the post-pandemic world will be measured not solely by economic growth or military strength, but by resilience and responsiveness to systemic risks.

These evolving dynamics suggest the emergence of a hybrid international order in which sovereignty is exercised through cooperation rather than isolation. The ability of states to reconcile national interests with collective global responsibilities—while maintaining democratic legitimacy—will play a decisive role in shaping the future trajectory of international politics and governance in an increasingly interconnected world. Success in this hybrid order will depend on effective multilateral institutions, transparent policy coordination, and the capacity to address transnational challenges such as pandemics, climate change, cyber threats, and global inequality, ensuring that both national resilience and global stability are mutually reinforced.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the intricate dance between globalization, the nation-state, and the COVID-19 pandemic reflects the evolving landscape of our world. While COVID-19 has disrupted the status quo and prompted a temporary revival of the nation-state, the irrevocable forces of globalization persist. Science and technology remain inherently global endeavors, and sustained international cooperation continues to be indispensable in addressing shared challenges. At the same time, the persistence of xenophobia, inequality, and uneven access to resources underscores the urgent need for a more inclusive and just global order.

Looking ahead, the post-pandemic world is unlikely to witness a binary choice between globalization and sovereignty. Instead, it will require a recalibration of global integration that prioritizes resilience, equity, and collective security. Nation-states must strengthen domestic capacities while actively engaging in multilateral frameworks capable of managing transnational risks. Ultimately, the ability to harmonize global interdependence with effective and accountable state governance will determine how societies respond to future crises, shaping both global stability and human well-being in the decades to come.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

Regionalism In South Asia: Evaluating SAARC’s Performance, Limitations and Future Relevance

By: Khushbu AhlawatConsulting Editor, GSDN

SAARC: Source Internet

INTRODUCTION 

Regionalism in South Asia represents the shared endeavour of nations to manage common challenges, strengthen economic development, and promote political stability through cooperation. Amidst diverse cultures, historical rivalries, and developmental disparities, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985, has emerged as the primary institutional framework embodying this regional aspiration. By bringing together eight member states—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan—SAARC seeks to harmonize policies, facilitate socio-economic integration, and promote people-to-people exchanges, creating a platform where collaboration can transcend bilateral tensions.

In the context of globalization, where interdependence spans trade, security, and technology, regional organizations serve as vital instruments for coordinated action and collective bargaining. Headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal, SAARC’s observer status at the United Nations and engagement with extra-regional actors such as China, Japan, the European Union, and the United States underscores its international relevance. Despite challenges, SAARC reflects both the promise and complexity of South Asian regionalism, making it central to the region’s pursuit of peace, prosperity, and integration.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF SAARC IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 

Since its establishment in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has progressively evolved as a platform for fostering regional cooperation, dialogue, and collaboration among its member states. Some key achievements are as follows:

  • Deepening Cooperative Frameworks
    Since its establishment in 1985, SAARC has aimed to strengthen cooperation among South Asian states to improve living standards, promote socio-economic development, and foster regional engagement. Functional cooperation has translated into practical initiatives such as the South Asian University, SAARC International College, the SAARC Development Fund, SAARC Food Bank, and agreements on judicial cooperation and counter-terrorism. Sector-specific programs, including the SAARC telemedicine network, SAARC Writers and Literature Foundation, and South Asia Foundation, have promoted cultural and people-to-people connectivity. Post-2020, SAARC has remained relevant through issue-based collaboration, particularly in disaster management, climate resilience, and public health. The SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund, virtual leaders’ meetings, and ongoing initiatives in food security, environmental protection, and women’s empowerment underscore the organization’s role in incremental, sector-driven regional cooperation despite persistent political constraints.
  •  Advancing Trade and Economic Integration
    Economic cooperation is a core objective of SAARC, aimed at enhancing regional growth and integration. The transition from SAPTA to the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) marked a significant step toward reducing tariffs and promoting intra-regional trade through phased tariff liberalization. However, implementation has remained uneven due to political tensions, extensive sensitive lists, and non-tariff barriers. Despite these constraints, member states continue limited engagement through SAFTA concessions, trade facilitation measures, and development projects supported by the SAARC Development Fund. The importance of regional economic coordination was also evident during supply-chain disruptions in the COVID-19 period. Critically, intra-SAARC trade accounts for only about 5–6% of the region’s total trade, compared to over 25% in ASEAN, highlighting the gap between SAARC’s economic potential and its actual performance.
  • Cooperation with Observer Countries
    SAARC’s engagement with observer countries and international organizations reflects its recognition of South Asia’s developmental constraints in areas such as capital availability, technology, infrastructure, and human resources. Observer states—including the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, Iran, and the European Union—have expressed interest in supporting the region through development assistance, technical cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. To institutionalize such engagement, SAARC has concluded agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with several multilateral organizations, notably UNDP, ITU, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNDCP, and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, covering sectors such as development planning, telecommunications, trade facilitation, drug control, and education.

In recent years, cooperation with observers has been most visible in issue-based and technical domains rather than through SAARC-led political initiatives. Japan and the European Union have supported regional connectivity, disaster management, and development projects, while China’s observer engagement has focused on infrastructure financing and development assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, collaboration with UN agencies, particularly WHO and UNICEF, played a key role in public health coordination and humanitarian support across SAARC states. Critically, while observer engagement has enhanced resources and technical expertise, much of this cooperation remains project-based and fragmented, often bypassing SAARC as an institution in favour of bilateral arrangements. This underscores both the utility and the institutional limitations of SAARC in leveraging extra-regional partnerships for sustained regional integration.

  • Enhancing People-to-People Contacts
    SAARC recognizes that fostering people-to-people relations is a crucial goal of regional cooperation, complementing formal diplomatic and economic initiatives. Despite structural and political constraints, the organization has undertaken several initiatives to promote social and cultural connectivity across South Asia, including South Asian Festivals, the Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians, SAARC Law, cooperation with NGOs, the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organised Tourism, and the SAARC Documentation Centre. Civil society, including academics, writers, journalists, and retired officials, plays a vital role in establishing communication networks and supporting Track II diplomacy, especially between India and Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral described this process as “New Regionalism,” reflecting its regional significance. Recent developments, such as virtual cultural exchanges during COVID-19, the SAARC University Network, and online regional research collaborations, have strengthened youth and academic linkages. 
  • Financial Cooperation and Regional Integration

SAARC has prioritized financial cooperation as a key component of regional integration, institutionalized through regular SAARC Finance Ministers Meetings, held in member states including Pakistan, India, the Maldives, and Bhutan. Early initiatives, such as the formation of the Inter-Governmental Expert Group on Financial Matters and the SAARC Expert Group on the Development of Capital Markets, aimed to chart a phased roadmap toward a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). Member countries have exchanged concept papers and explored mechanisms for harmonizing financial regulations, promoting investment, and facilitating regional capital flows. While progress was modest in the first two decades, recent years have seen renewed emphasis on regional financial coordination. Notably, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) has expanded its focus to include infrastructure, energy, and social sector projects, while discussions on regional payment systems, disaster risk financing, and SME financing mechanisms have gained momentum.

  • Regional Security Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism

SAARC has recognized terrorism and transnational crime as major regional threats, formalized through the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987) and its Additional Protocol (2005) under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. However, practical cooperation has been limited, with member states often prioritizing bilateral initiatives over multilateral engagement. The SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) in Colombo illustrate institutional mechanisms for monitoring and intelligence sharing, though their impact has been modest.

In recent years, regional security concerns—such as cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and rising radicalization in the region—have underscored the need for stronger collaboration. Joint exercises, intelligence-sharing platforms, and discussions on cyber-security and counter-radicalization, including efforts coordinated with the UN and observer states like China and the EU, represent emerging areas of engagement. 

  • Integrated Program of Action: Multi-Sectoral Cooperation

The Integrated Program of Action (IPA) is SAARC’s key mechanism for coordinating multi-sectoral cooperation across 12 areas, including agriculture, education, health, environment, rural development, tourism, science and technology, and women in development. Each sector is overseen by a Technical Committee, with progress reported to the Standing Committee. IPA has facilitated structured collaboration, capacity-building, and policy harmonization among member states. Recent initiatives include regional disaster management programs, climate resilience projects, telemedicine networks, and cross-border educational collaborations through the SAARC University Network, which were particularly useful during COVID-19.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF SAARC IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

  • Challenges of Political Rivalries and Trust Deficit

SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by historical inter-state disputes, mistrust, and security concerns, particularly between India and Pakistan. Colonial legacies, territorial conflicts, and communal tensions have created enduring suspicion, impeding multilateral cooperation. The 19th SAARC Summit in 2016 was indefinitely postponed due to deteriorating India-Pakistan relations, highlighting the fragility of consensus-driven decision-making. Political differences, cultural divergences, and the “clash of civilizations” narrative, as noted by Samuel Huntington, exacerbate these divisions. Smaller member states, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan, have often expressed fear of Indian dominance, resulting in reluctance to fully engage in SAARC initiatives, while India has increasingly invested in alternative platforms like BIMSTEC, marginalizing Pakistan and weakening SAARC’s cohesion.

  • Economic and Structural Constraints

SAARC’s economic integration has been limited despite initiatives like SAFTA (2006). Intra-regional trade remains below 6% of total trade, reflecting poor financial coordination, asymmetry between India and smaller members, and lack of complementary economic structures. Most member states export similar goods, while China and other external powers exploit South Asia’s markets through competitive pricing, infrastructure investment, and bulk production, reducing SAARC’s economic leverage. Divergent political systems, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and inconsistent commitment to regional projects further undermine financial cooperation. Recent economic crises, such as Pakistan’s FATF grey listing and Afghanistan’s humanitarian challenges post-Taliban takeover, have heightened regional instability, limiting SAARC’s capacity to respond effectively.

  • Institutional and Operational Limitations

SAARC’s structural framework imposes additional constraints. The charter prohibits discussion of bilateral disputes, while the requirement for unanimity slows decision-making. Different governance systems—from India’s democracy to Nepal’s monarchy and Sri Lanka’s presidential system—complicate policy harmonization. Initiatives like STOMD, SDOMD, IPA, and regional development funds demonstrate potential, yet implementation has been largely project-based and fragmented. The lack of visionary leadership, limited cost-benefit analysis, and bureaucratic inertia impede SAARC’s ability to address emerging challenges, including terrorism, cross-border migration, climate risks, and water disputes. While SAARC remains a symbolic platform for dialogue, these political, economic, and structural shortcomings continue to restrict its effectiveness in achieving meaningful regional integration.

NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN SAARC

  • Political Reforms

SAARC’s political effectiveness is constrained by mutual mistrust, bilateral disputes, and India’s perceived dominance. To rebuild trust, member states—particularly India—need to adopt a cooperative, equitable approach rather than a hegemonic stance. Proposals such as Conflict Coordination Groups (CCGs) to address bilateral disputes, the inclusion of international concerns like peace, security, and technological cooperation in summit discussions, and mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution could strengthen political collaboration. India’s proactive role during COVID-19, including coordinating virtual SAARC meetings and providing vaccines to all member states, including Pakistan, highlights the potential of political leadership to restore confidence and demonstrate SAARC’s relevance. A joint UN Peacekeeping Force proposal in response to the Afghanistan crisis reflects how SAARC could coordinate on regional security challenges if political will exists.

  • Economic Reforms

Regional economic integration remains weak due to trade imbalances, low intra-SAARC trade, and inadequate infrastructure. Reforms should focus on establishing common standards, investment regimes, and free trade zones, along with improved road, rail, and air connectivity to facilitate cross-border commerce. Joint ventures in services, education, and technology can enhance people-to-people collaboration while promoting economic interdependence. India’s COVID-19 humanitarian outreach—including vaccine and aid support to member countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal—can serve as a springboard for restoring regional trade, market activity, and interdependence, moving toward a self-reliant “Atmanirbhar SAARC.” Sub-regional cooperation, such as Bangladesh–India–Nepal economic corridors, could provide practical models for broader integration.

  • Social and Institutional Reforms

Social reforms should strengthen civil society and cultural exchanges to build a shared South Asian identity. Greater interaction among academics, writers, media, and historians can reduce historical misconceptions and foster trust. Institutional reforms are also critical: the SAARC Secretariat requires expansion, increased funding, and greater autonomy to prepare position papers and manage IPA initiatives. Proposals such as establishing a SAARC Parliament or Assembly, increasing the frequency of ministerial and summit-level meetings, and improved coordination with NGOs could significantly enhance operational efficiency and decision-making capacity. Recent initiatives like the SAARC University Network and digital youth forums demonstrate the potential of technology-enabled institutional reforms to support regional integration.

ENHANCING INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SAARC FUNCTIONING

Improving India‑Pakistan relations is critical for revitalizing SAARC, as bilateral tensions have repeatedly stalled multilateral cooperation and impeded regional summits.  It emphasizes the importance of regular SAARC meetings as mandated by the Charter, including virtual summits, which were used effectively during the COVID‑19 pandemic to coordinate responses and sustain dialogue. India’s leadership in convening these virtual sessions and providing vaccines to all member states demonstrated the potential of collaborative engagement even amid strained ties. However, recent developments underscore the fragility of bilateral relations; the 2025 India‑Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam attack and subsequent military exchanges, suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, and diplomatic downgrades have heightened mistrust, reopening old fault lines and disrupting initiatives for cooperation. Despite this, there are glimmers of dialogue: Pakistan has at times signaled willingness for talks, and any sustained confidence‑building measures—such as trade facilitation, cultural diplomacy, and people‑to‑people exchanges—could lay groundwork for broader engagement.

Multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provide alternative avenues for structured interaction, potentially easing tensions and building mutual confidence that could translate back to SAARC. Cultural diplomacy, including sports and arts exchanges, remains an underutilized but valuable tool for reducing political tension and fostering grassroots goodwill. While complex geopolitical dynamics and security concerns persist, sustained diplomatic efforts, confidence‑building measures, and inclusive dialogue between India and Pakistan are essential for SAARC to function as an effective regional cooperation mechanism. 

CONCLUSION

Nelson Mandela’s observation—“If you want to make peace with your adversary, you have to cooperate with your opponent, then he joins you as a partner”—aptly underscores SAARC’s potential as a platform for regional cooperation, even among historically contentious nations. Despite persistent political tensions, economic disparities, and institutional limitations, SAARC’s continued existence reflects the shared commitment of South Asian leaders to dialogue, coordination, and incremental collaboration. Revitalizing the organization requires enhanced political will, stronger leadership, effective branding, and active engagement at all levels, including people-to-people, economic, and security initiatives. While SAARC may face periodic setbacks, it remains more than an intergovernmental body—it embodies a vision of regional peace, integration, and collective prosperity, serving as a vital framework for addressing shared challenges and fostering cooperation in South Asia.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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