By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

The ceasefire that followed the recent Iran-Israel conflict has offered the Middle East a much-needed pause after weeks of escalating military confrontation. The fighting, which witnessed missile exchanges, airstrikes, cyber operations, and direct attacks on strategic military installations, marked one of the most dangerous phases in the long-standing rivalry between the two regional powers. Unlike previous proxy confrontations fought through allied militant groups, the recent conflict involved direct military engagement, raising fears of a broader regional war that could have drawn in the United States, Gulf Arab states and other global powers. The ceasefire has temporarily reduced the intensity of hostilities; history demonstrates that ceasefires in the Middle East are often fragile, influenced by military calculations, domestic politics, ideological rivalries, and external intervention. While the current agreement has prevented further immediate escalation, it has not resolved the fundamental disputes that led to the conflict. The durability of the ceasefire depends upon several interrelated factors such as the strategic objectives of Iran and Israel, the involvement of the United States, the role of regional actors, domestic political pressures, the activities of proxy militias, economic considerations and the effectiveness of international diplomacy.  

What Is the Conflict?  

The Iran-Israel rivalry has evolved over four decades. Before the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran maintained close diplomatic and military ties with Israel. The establishment of the Islamic Republic transformed Iran into one of Israel’s strongest regional adversaries. Iran rejected Israel’s legitimacy and positioned itself as the principal supporter of anti-Israel resistance movements such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Meanwhile, Israel has viewed Iran’s expanding regional influence and nuclear programme as existential security threats. Over the years, both countries have engaged in covert operations, cyber warfare, assassinations of military officials and nuclear scientists, and attacks on each other’s strategic assets. The latest conflict represented a dangerous departure from the shadow war. Direct missile and drone attacks demonstrated both countries’ willingness to openly challenge one another. The intervention of the United States in support of Israel and diplomatic efforts by regional and international actors eventually led to a ceasefire before the conflict escalated into a prolonged regional war.  

The Ceasefire

Both Iran and Israel suffered considerable military and economic costs during the conflict. Israel faced repeated missile attacks that strained its missile defence systems and disrupted civilian life. Iran experienced significant damage to military infrastructure and faced increasing international pressure. Neither side appeared prepared for a prolonged war involving sustained military operations. Accepting a ceasefire allowed both governments to regroup while claiming strategic success before their domestic audiences. The United States played a central role in preventing wider escalation. US has consistently supported Israel’s security while simultaneously seeking to avoid another major military conflict in the Middle East that could divert resources from strategic competition with China and Russia. American diplomatic engagement reportedly encouragedrestraint from both sides. Regional allies also feared that continued fighting would threaten energy infrastructure and maritime trade. There were economic aspects to it. War is expensive. Iran continues to face sanctions, inflation, and economic hardship. Israel also experienced significant financial costs associated with mobilization, missile interception, infrastructure damage, and disruptions to tourism and investment. Both governments therefore had economic incentives to pause military operations. One important reason the ceasefire could survive is mutual deterrence. Both Iran and Israel demonstrated that they possess the capability to inflict substantial damage upon each other. Israel retains qualitative military superiority, advanced intelligence capabilities, and sophisticated air defence systems. Iran has expanded its missile arsenal, drone technology, and regional proxy network. Because both countries understand the destructive consequences of renewed war, deterrence may encourage continued restraint. International diplomacy remains actively engaged in preserving the ceasefire. Countries including Qatar, Oman, Turkey and European powers have maintained communication channels between opposing parties. Although Iran and Israel lack direct diplomatic relations, intermediaries continue to facilitate indirect dialogue. These diplomatic mechanisms reduce the risk of misunderstandings that could unintentionally trigger renewed conflict. The Middle East has experienced years of instability. From Syria and Iraq to Yemen and Gaza. Most regional governments now prioritize economic development, infrastructure investment, tourism, and foreign investment. Countries across the Gulf increasingly seek stability rather than confrontation. Their preference for de-escalation creates additional pressure on Iran and Israel to avoid another large-scale conflict. Neither Iran nor Israel achieved decisive strategic victory during the conflict. Israel weakened certain Iranian capabilities but did not eliminate Iran’s military potential or nuclear expertise. Iran demonstrated its ability to strike Israeli territory but failed to significantly alter Israel’s strategic position. Since further military operations may not fundamentally change the strategic balance, both sides may prefer maintaining the ceasefire. 

Challenges To the Ceasefire

Numerous risks continue to threaten the agreement. Iran’s nuclear programme remains perhaps the greatest long-term source of tension. Israel insists that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons capability. Iran maintainsthat its nuclear programme serves peaceful civilian purposes while asserting its sovereign right to uranium enrichment. If intelligence suggests significant progress toward weaponization, or if negotiations collapse, Israel could again consider military action. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the ceasefire is that numerous armed non-state actors remain active throughout the region. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Various Iraqi militia groups, Houthi forces in Yemen and Palestinian militant organizations. Even if Iran and Israel avoid direct confrontation, actions by these groups could provoke retaliation and rapidly escalate into wider conflict. Proxy warfare has historically allowed regional powers to compete while avoiding full-scale conventional war. Political leaders often face domestic pressures that influence foreign policy. Israeli governments frequently prioritize national security and may adopt tougher military responses following attacks. Iranian leaders must also satisfy influential political, military, and ideological constituencies that oppose compromise with Israel. Changes in leadership or internal political crises could therefore weaken support for the ceasefire. Miscalculation is another problem. Military confrontations frequently result from accidents rather than deliberate policy such as misidentified missile launches, drone incursions, border incidents, intelligence failures and cyber-attacks attributed to the opposing side. Given the absence of direct communication between Iran and Israel, even small incidents could escalate rapidly. Unlike conventional territorial disputes, the Iran-Israel conflict contains strong ideological dimensions. Iran portrays itself as a leader of resistance against Israel and Western influence in the Middle East. Israel views Iran’s regional ambitions and support for militant organizations as existential threats. These ideological narratives make lasting reconciliation extremely difficult.  

Role of External Powers

The United States remains the most influential external actor. US provides Israel with military assistance, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic backing. At the same time, successive American administrations have sought to prevent regional wars that threaten global stability. Future US policy will significantly influence whether deterrence remains effective. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other Gulf countries increasingly prioritise regional economic transformation. Large development projects, foreign investment, and economic diversification require stability. Consequently, Gulf states have strong incentives to encourage continued ceasefire arrangements and mediation efforts. Russia and China have expanded their diplomatic influence in the Middle East. China has strengthened economic ties with both Iran and Gulf states while presenting itself as a potential mediator. Russia maintains strategic relationships with Iran but also coordinates with Israel on regional security issues. Although neither power possesses the same influence as the United States, both can contribute to diplomatic efforts that discourage renewed conflict.  

Economic Significance

The ceasefire carries major economic consequences beyond the Middle East. The Middle East remains central to global oil production. Conflict involving Iran raises concerns about shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime chokepoint. Even temporary disruptions can increase oil prices and contribute to global inflation. A durable ceasefire would stabilize energy markets and reduce uncertainty for consumers and investors. Regional instability threatens shipping routes connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. Insurance premiums rise during periods of conflict, increasing transportation costs, and disrupting global supply chains. Continued peace therefore benefits international commerce. Both Iran and Israel require economic stability. Iran seeks sanctions relief, investment, and inflation control. Israel aims to restore tourism, technology investment, and economic confidence. These domestic priorities encourage both governments to avoid renewed warfare.  

The coming months will be critical. If diplomatic engagement continues and both sides exercise restraint, the ceasefire may evolve into a more stable framework for managing competition. If not, the Middle East could once again witness a cycle of escalation with consequences extending far beyond the region. Ultimately, whether the ceasefire holds will depend less on the agreement itself than on the willingness of Iran, Israel, regional states, and global powers to transform a temporary cessation of hostilities into a broader process of conflict management. While cautious optimism is justified in the short term, lasting peace will require sustained diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and political compromise.  

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

China-Bangladesh Relations : Source Internet

Introduction 

India and Bangladesh have shared close ties for several decades because of their common history, geography and economic links. In recent years however, Bangladesh’s growing engagement with China has attracted increasing attention in India. While Dhaka describes these ties as part of its development strategy, they have also raised important strategic questions for New Delhi.  

China’s involvement in Bangladesh now extends beyond trade and investment to infrastructure, defence cooperation, technology, and connectivity projects. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China in June 2026 further strengthened bilateral ties through agreements on infrastructure, industrial investment, the proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC), the Teesta River project, and broader economic cooperation. 

These developments have drawn close attention to New Delhi. While Bangladesh maintains that its cooperation with China is based on economic interests rather than alignment against any country, India’s strategic community remains concerned about China’s expanding influence near its eastern borders, growing defence cooperation with Dhaka, and increased presence in the Bay of Bengal. 

This article examines the evolution of China-Bangladesh relations and analyses why China’s expanding role in Bangladesh is increasingly viewed as a strategic challenge for India’s security and regional interests. 

Historical Background 

China-Bangladesh relations have changed considerably over the past few decades. Immediately after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, political relations remained limited due to the Cold War dynamics and China’s close ties with Pakistan. Over the years, both countries gradually expanded their diplomatic and economic relations. 

One major change came during the early 2000s when China became Bangladesh’s largest trading partner replacing India. Bangladesh’s rapidly growing textile industry increasingly depended on Chinese raw materials, machinery, and industrial products. Economic cooperation soon expanded beyond trade into infrastructure development, manufacturing, and energy projects. 

Another important development came in 2016 when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh. During the visit, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a Strategic Cooperative Partnership, opening the door for greater Chinese investments in transport, ports, industrial zones, and energy infrastructure. Bangladesh also became the first South Asian country to formally join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting Dhaka’s interest in attracting large-scale infrastructure financing. 

Despite strengthening ties with Beijing, Bangladesh under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina largely maintained a careful balance between India and China. While China became Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and defence supplier, Dhaka continued close political and security cooperation with New Delhi. 

The political changes that followed the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024 introduced new dynamics into regional politics. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus adopted a more China-friendly foreign policy, while the election of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in 2026 further accelerated high-level engagement with Beijing. Rahman’s first major state visit to China signaled Bangladesh’s willingness to diversify its strategic partnerships while pursuing greater economic opportunities. 

Although Bangladeshi leaders continue to emphasize that their foreign policy is based on national interest rather than alignment with any power, the growing frequency of high-level exchanges with China has naturally generated strategic debate within India. 

Growing Economic Partnership 

Economic ties are now the most important aspect of relationships. China is now Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and one of its most important sources of foreign investment. Chinese companies are actively involved in sectors such as transport, manufacturing, telecommunications, renewable energy, power generation, and industrial development. 

During Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to Beijing in June 2026, Bangladesh secured fresh Chinese commitments for infrastructure financing and industrial investment. Several memoranda of understanding were signed covering industrial zones, renewable energy, electric vehicles, logistics, and manufacturing. Reports also suggested that Dhaka sought nearly US$6 billion in Chinese financial support for various development projects. 

One of the most notable agreements involved the China-Bangladesh Mongla Port Economic Zone, which will be developed with the participation of the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. The project replaced an earlier proposal involving an Indian developer that had failed to progress within the agreed timeframe. The agreement highlighted China’s growing role in Bangladesh’s port infrastructure and industrial development. 

Chinese companies have also invested in roads, bridges, railways, power plants, and special economic zones across Bangladesh. Industrial parks supported by Chinese financing aim to increase Bangladesh’s manufacturing capacity while attracting foreign investment and creating employment opportunities. 

For Bangladesh, Chinese investment offers access to large-scale capital, technology, and infrastructure development at a time when the country seeks to sustain rapid economic growth. Chinese financing is often accompanied by relatively quick implementation compared to some traditional development partners. 

China also benefits from these investments because Bangladesh occupies an important location between South Asia and Southeast Asia. Strong economic relations with Dhaka complement China’s wider objective of improving connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative while expanding access to the Bay of Bengal. 

However, China’s expanding economic presence has also generated debate regarding long-term strategic dependence, debt sustainability, and the geopolitical implications of major infrastructure investments. 

Infrastructure, Connectivity and the Belt and Road Initiative 

Infrastructure projects have become an important part of China-Bangladesh relations. China views improved connectivity as essential for expanding regional trade while simultaneously increasing its strategic access to the Indian Ocean. 

One of the most closely watched proposals is the revival of the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC). During Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s June 2026 visit to China, Chinese officials proposed extending the existing China-Myanmar Economic Corridor westward into Bangladesh. The proposed route would connect China’s Yunnan Province with Bangladeshi ports through Myanmar. 

Although Bangladesh has not formally approved the proposal and has stated that further examination is required, the initiative has attracted significant attention in New Delhi. Indian officials have acknowledged that they are closely monitoring developments while assessing their strategic implications. 

If this project is completed in the future, it could improve regional connectivity and give China easier access to the Bay of Bengal. This is one reason why Indian analysts are watching the proposal carefully. 

Such connectivity could strengthen China’s commercial presence while also increasing its long-term strategic influence in the region. 

The security situation in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State, remains one of the largest obstacles to the corridor’s implementation. Continued instability has delayed several Chinese infrastructure projects, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, highlighting the practical challenges associated with regional connectivity initiatives. 

Another important area of cooperation involves the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. China has agreed to provide technical assistance and feasibility studies for the project while repeatedly emphasizing that the initiative is not directed against any third country. Nevertheless, because the Teesta River originates in India and remains central to long-standing water-sharing negotiations between India and Bangladesh, Chinese involvement has generated considerable strategic discussion in New Delhi. 

China’s role in Bangladesh is no longer limited to trade and investment. Its involvement now includes ports, transport networks, industrial zones, and river management projects. This shows how broad the relationship has become over the past decade. It increasingly reflects Beijing’s broader geopolitical objective of expanding connectivity, strengthening regional influence, and integrating South Asia into its wider economic network 

Defence and Security Cooperation 

Defence cooperation has also grown over the last two decades. China has become Bangladesh’s largest supplier of military equipment, accounting for a significant share of the country’s defence imports. Chinese-made fighter aircraft, tanks, naval vessels, missile systems, air defence platforms and surveillance equipment now form an important part of Bangladesh’s military inventory. 

An important development took place in December 2016, when Bangladesh inducted two Chinese-built Type 035G Ming-class submarines into its navy. The acquisition marked Bangladesh’s entry into submarine operations and highlighted the growing depth of defence ties between the two countries. Since then, cooperation has expanded through military training, technical assistance, and defence exchanges. 

Recent reports indicate that Bangladesh is also considering the acquisition of 24 Chinese J-10CE multirole fighter aircraft along with advanced drone technology. Although no final agreement has been announced, these discussions demonstrate the increasing level of trust between Beijing and Dhaka in defence matters. 

China’s involvement goes beyond supplying military equipment. Chinese military institutions have also increased training opportunities for Bangladeshi officers, while cooperation has expanded in areas such as maintenance, logistics and military education. As Bangladesh continues to modernize its armed forces under the “Forces Goal 2030” programme, China remains one of its most important defence partners. 

In my view, both countries benefit from this cooperation. Bangladesh receives relatively affordable military equipment, while China strengthens its long-term presence in South Asia.  

Why It Raises Concerns for India 

India’s concerns regarding China-Bangladesh relations extend far beyond normal diplomatic engagement. The issue is not whether Bangladesh should maintain relations with China, but whether China’s growing strategic presence could alter the regional balance of powe 

One of the biggest concerns is the Siliguri Corridor, commonly known as the Chicken’s Neck. This narrow strip of land, measuring roughly 20–22 kilometres at its narrowest point, connects mainland India with its eight northeastern states. Any increase in Chinese infrastructure or military presence near Bangladesh’s northern districts naturally attracts the attention of Indian security planners. 

The proposed Chinese involvement in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project has therefore generated considerable debate. While China describes the project as technical cooperation aimed at river management, several Indian analysts argue that the presence of Chinese state-owned companies close to India’s sensitive eastern frontier could create long-term strategic implications. 

Another area of concern is the development of Mongla Port and the continued Chinese interest in Chattogram Port. These projects are frequently discussed within the broader context of China’s String of Pearls strategy, under which Beijing has invested in ports and maritime infrastructure across the Indian Ocean. Although China insists these investments are commercial, Indian strategic analysts remain cautious about their possible futuremilitary utility. 

At present there is no evidence that these ports will be used for military purposes, but many Indian analysts believe their future strategic value cannot be ignored.  

Reports regarding possible Chinese interest in the Lalmonirhat airbase, located near India’s border, have further intensified security discussions. Even though no formal military agreement has been announced, any Chinese role in upgrading infrastructure close to India’s eastern frontier would inevitably attract close monitoring from New Delhi. 

The proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC) also carries strategic significance. If eventually completed, it would provide China with improved overland access to the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh. Such connectivity would reduce Beijing’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes, while simultaneously increasing Chinese logistical access to the Indian Ocean. 

Taken together, these developments explain why India increasingly views China-Bangladesh relations through both economic and security lenses. 

India’s Strategic Response 

India has largely responded by strengthening its own relationship with Bangladesh instead of directly opposing China’s growing presence.  

The Ministry of External Affairs has repeatedly stated that India is closely monitoring developments in Bangladesh and will take appropriate measures whenever necessary. At the same time, New Delhi has emphasizedthat its relationship with Bangladesh remains based on mutual trust, shared interests and long-term cooperation. 

Rather than asking Bangladesh to choose between India and China, New Delhi has continued to strengthen bilateral cooperation in connectivity, trade, energy, border management and cultural exchanges. The reopening of tourist visas for Bangladeshi citizens and continued operation of projects such as the Bangladesh–India Friendship Pipeline demonstrate India’s effort to preserve positive relations despite occasional political differences. 

India has also accelerated infrastructure development in its eastern region while strengthening military preparedness near the Siliguri Corridor. Enhanced border infrastructure, improved logistics and closer coordination among security agencies reflect New Delhi’s determination to safeguard its strategic interests. 

India also needs to address unresolved bilateral issues, particularly water sharing. The long-pending Teesta Water Sharing Agreement remains one of the most sensitive aspects of India-Bangladesh relations. Many analysts argue that timely progress on this issue would reduce opportunities for external powers to expand their influence. 

Ultimately, India’s strategy appears to focus on remaining Bangladesh’s most reliable long-term partner while avoiding unnecessary escalation with either Dhaka or Beijing. 

Future Outlook 

China-Bangladesh relations are expected to continue expanding over the coming years. Bangladesh requires substantial investment to sustain economic growth, improve infrastructure and modernise its industrial base. China has the financial resources and technical expertise to support many of Bangladesh’s development goals.  

However, geography ensures that Bangladesh cannot ignore India. The two countries share a border of more than 4,000 kilometers, dozens of transboundary rivers, extensive trade links, and deep historical and cultural connections. Border management, water sharing, migration, and regional security require constant cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka regardless of their relations with other countries. 

In my opinion, Bangladesh is unlikely to choose either India or China completely. It is more likely to continue balancing its relations with both countries because each offers different advantages. While China provides investment and infrastructure, India remains Bangladesh’s closest neighbour with deep historical, cultural and economic ties.  

Conclusion 

In recent years, China-Bangladesh relations have entered a new phase with growing cooperation in trade, infrastructure, defence and connectivity. High-level political exchanges, growing Chinese investments and discussions surrounding projects such as the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor, the Mongla Port Economic Zone and the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project demonstrateBeijing’s increasing strategic interest in Bangladesh. 

For India, these developments represent more than ordinary diplomatic engagement. Chinese involvement near the Bay of Bengal, expanding defence cooperation, investments close to the Siliguri Corridor, and growing influence in Bangladesh’s infrastructure sector collectively raise important strategic questions. While none of these developments individually threatens India’s security, together they indicate a gradual shift in the regional geopolitical landscape. 

At the same time, it would be inaccurate to view Bangladesh as choosing China over India. Bangladesh continues to maintain strong economic, cultural and geographical ties with India, while repeatedly emphasizing that its cooperation with China is not directed against any third country. As several analysts have noted, Bangladesh’s long-term interests are best served by maintaining productive relations with both Asian powers. 

In my view, India’s response should focus less on viewing every Chinese investment as a strategic setback and more on strengthening its own partnership with Bangladesh through timely project implementation, enhanced connectivity, economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement. Geography ensures that India and Bangladesh will remain indispensable partners regardless of changing regional dynamics. 

To conclude, China-Bangladesh relations are likely to continue expanding in the coming years. This does not necessarily mean that India is losing its influence, but it does mean that regional competition is becoming more complex. In my opinion, India should focus on strengthening its own partnership with Bangladesh by delivering projects on time, increasing economic cooperation and maintaining regular diplomatic dialogue. As a student of diplomacy, I believe strong regional relationships are built not only through strategic competition but also through trust and consistent engagement.  

By : Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

For almost fifty years, Bangladesh has been India’s closest ally in South Asia. The relationship started in 1971 when, with help from India, Bangladesh won independence from Pakistan. However, since the expulsion of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 after the large democratic protests by students led to her exodus to India, the friendship has weakened considerably. Since then, Bangladesh has increasingly drifted towards China very noticeably in terms of foreign policy. 

This diplomatic challenge to India is much larger than a mere political challenge, it cuts into one of India’s most sensitive regions, or national interests, the Siliguri Corridor. Most importantly, this presents an interesting dilemma for India in terms of determining how much of a hold or control India actually has over their own backyard. This paper provides an overview of the China-Bangladesh relationship in theoretical terms, as well as providing an explanation of why this relationship should be of concern to India. 

A Change in Direction 

In the past, every new Bangladeshi leader visited India first after taking office. This showed the close relationship between the two countries. Muhammad Yunus, who led Bangladesh’s interim government after Hasina left, broke this tradition. His first foreign visit was to Beijing in March 2025 to mark fifty years of diplomatic ties between China and Bangladesh. During the visit, China offered Bangladesh US$ 2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants. This indicated that Dhaka no longer saw India as its primary partner. This change did not happen overnight. Even before 2024, Bangladesh was gradually developing ties with China. By the end of 2023, about seven hundred Chinese companies were already operating in the country. After Hasina’s departure, this process sped up and became more transparent. Many ordinary Bangladeshis were also dissatisfied with India due to unresolved water disputes, border issues, and a sense that India had aligned too closely with only one political party. 

Growing Economic Ties 

China’s economic role in Bangladesh has grown significantly. Total Chinese investment reached nearly US$ 42 billion by the 2024-25 financial year. Trade between the two countries has also increased rapidly. From August 2024 to August 2025, Bangladesh’s imports from China rose from US$ 1.54 billion to US$ 1.92 billion. During the same period, its exports to China grew from US$ 90.4 million to US$ 130 million. Since Bangladesh joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2016, China has helped build twelve roads, twenty-one bridges, and twenty-seven power plants in the country. 

One notable example is Mongla Port, Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport. China is now investing US$ 400 million to upgrade this port. Just a year earlier, India had secured rights to operate a terminal there, which was seen as a victory for India at the time. This shift at Mongla highlights how quickly India’s earlier advantages are being overtaken by Chinese influence.  

Water sharing is another contentious issue. China has offered to fund the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. However, Hasina previously declined this offer in favor of collaboration with India. On October 19, 2025, a large protest at Chittagong University called for the immediate start of this Chinese-backed project. This unrest occurs as the India-Bangladesh Ganga Water Sharing Treaty is set to expire in 2026, creating more uncertainty in their relationship. 

Military and Strategic Worries 

India’s security experts aren’t worried about trade; they are worried about the deepening defence ties between China and Bangladesh. Reports say China has helped Bangladesh resurrect Lalmonirhat airbase, an old airfield located just twelve to fifteen kilometers from the Indian border and about one hundred and thirty-five kilometers away from the Siliguri Corridor. Bangladesh says this is a civilian airport, but Indian officials worry it could be used for surveillance or a quick military strike if tensions ever flare. Bangladesh has also reportedly been negotiating to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets, which Indian analysts believe is part of a larger Chinese plan to build defence links around the borders of India. 

The Siliguri Corridor Problem 

This is important to consider due to geography. The Siliguri Corridor or the “Chicken’s Neck of India” is a narrow piece of land in the state of West Bengal which connects India’s mainland to the country’s eight north eastern states. It measures about twenty to twenty-five kilometers across certain areas. It is situated near the borders of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Chumbi Valley of China. The significance of this corridor lies in the fact that in case of its closure, India will lose its only connection by land with an area populated with over forty million people. That is why increased presence of Chinese interests in northern Bangladesh, located right next to this corridor, raises many concerns for India in New Delhi. However, one must acknowledge that Bangladesh itself is also vulnerable from the point of view of land corridors. 

Political Undercurrents 

China has also made relations with other political entities in Bangladesh aside from the country’s administration. An example of such political group is the Jamaat-e-Islami party, which is known for its close relationship with Pakistan and distant relationship with India. In September 2024, China’s envoy in Dhaka conducted a meeting with the head of this party, marking the first time that a diplomat from a foreign state has done so in over a decade. Other meetings also took place between Chinese officials and the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami in the months following this event. 

A New Government, A Cautious Reset 

The first general elections were held in Bangladesh following the departure of Hasina on February 12, 2026. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), headed by Tarique Rahman, got a huge majority securing two hundred and nine out of the total three hundred seats. The second largest party, Jamaat-e-Islami secured seventy-seven seats which largely came from constituencies bordering India. Rahman was sworn-in as the new Prime Minister of Bangladesh on February 17, 2026, after having been in exile in London for seventeen years. Unlike previous leaders of the BNP, Rahman during the campaign did not indulge in anti-Indian rhetoric. Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, is believed to have been the first world leader to congratulate him following the electoral victory and India extended a state invitation to Rahman as well as relaxing the visa regime in good faith. 

However, India is being cautious. Leaders of Bangladesh continue to pay visits to Beijing even after the change in the regime, and in one such visit both sides entered into an agreement aimed at intensifying their cooperation. This shows that closeness with China has now become a permanent feature of the foreign policy of Bangladesh rather than a temporary one of the interim phase. 

The Way Forward for India 

From the recent period of two years, the lessons are unambiguous. Relying solely on the goodwill of one leader or party in one’s neighborhood is not the way India should go. India losing its ground at Mongla port and on sharing water issues is an example of how progress can be rapidly reversed when one’s ties have not been established more generally, not only with one leader but with the politicians of the whole country. India will have to continue working on its trust with the Bangladeshi people, and not only with the government, by sorting out issues of visas, trade and water sharing that blame them for years. 

On the other hand, India should be vigilant about security threats along the Siliguri Corridor and together with the new government, should continue to intensify the border security cooperation. Another reason to be uncertain about the future is that Jamaat-e-Islami, which will be the principal opposition party, has a strong presence in the border regions. China’s deepening presence in Bangladesh is not going to vanish altogether, and India should not expect that Dhaka will be forced to decisively pick either side. In fact, Bangladesh is simply attempting to maintain good relations with many powers simultaneously, which is something that a smaller country between two giants would naturally do. Nevertheless, the developments of recent two years have sent a very strong signal to India. Only diplomacy that is patient and enduring, and not relying on old assumptions of goodwill, will determine how this crucial relationship will unfold in the future. 

By : Soumya Dutta, Research Analyst, GSDN

The contemporary geopolitical landscape has been marked by growing tensions among the United States, China and Russia, with the interactions increasingly influencing the contours of the global order. The second Trump administration arrived on January 2025, with the US President pursing a more transactional foreign policy, one which has been highlighted by its aggressive economic measures and disruption of established alliances. These developments have taken shape alongside the often described “no-limits” partnership between the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has deepened in lieu of their long and historical relationship, their cycles of cooperation and the shifting balance of power.  

Trump has started his second term, with the hopes of ‘un-uniting’ Beijing and Moscow and preventing the formation of a consolidated axis between the two major powers. But a combination of economic sanctions and geopolitical crises has ended up reinforcing the strategic coordination between the two. This includes but is not limited to increased trade volume with a rise of 23 per cent between the months of January and May 2026 and in energy exports that has rapidly climbed since the outbreak of the Ukraine war along with the proposal of new infrastructure projects such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to further deepen bilateral integration. This however should not be interpreted as an unconditional alignment, as China has continued to be cautious about an overdependence on Russian energy and it reflects a broader priority of avoiding reliance on any single partner. Most importantly, Beijing remains far more integrated with the global economy and continues to safeguard its ties with major markets while avoiding any costly secondary sanctions. Russia for its part is also approaching the limits of what this partnership can deliver and remains wary of the asymmetry: its economy becoming increasingly reliant on a single major buyer with the leverage to set terms. Therefore, the interaction shaping their engagement cannot be clearly defined through clear choices or stable alignments, but as part of a great power interaction, that is at once interdependent, with coordination where their interests converge and through hedging where they diverge, thereby creating a more fragile and strained international order.  

A Broken Triangle 

The origin of this triangular configuration can be better understood by tracing the longer history of how these powers have positioned themselves against one another over successive decades. Beginning with Nixon, in the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970s that has been the result of a deepening ideological and territorial dispute, Washington found an opportunity to exploit the rift by isolating Moscow while enhancing its own strategic ties. This strategy worked as Beijing found itself economically isolated with limited diplomatic reach and was seeking greater strategic autonomy from Soviet influence. This allowed the US to maintain a relatively better position with both powers, with a greater diplomatic leverage rather than being constrained by a unified bloc. 

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and a post-Cold War in unipolar order reduced the need for triangular balancing, as the shift in strategic conditions meant that the US was less likely to confront similar tensions that could constrain its choices. These conditions however no longer exist and under Trump there is an attempt to replicate this logic in reverse, by warming up to Moscow and trying to isolate Beijing. This perception has been echoed in the US policy cycles including the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has long argued that the US should avoid Russia becoming a long-term junior partner to China. In a strategy dubbed the “reverse Nixon”,Trump’s approach has been to ease Western sanctions on Russia and reassure the concerns that are there on NATO expansion to encourage Moscow to distance itself from China. Analysts however argue that Trump’s concessions on issue like Ukraine would not be a strong incentive for Moscow to burn a long-time relationship with China, for an administration that could leave office by 2028.  

Conversely, China and Russia are not formal allies, but their partnerships are grounded in economic interdependence and converging interests in limiting the US influence. Moreover, Russia and China are part of multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS+, and both have across successive US administrations from Obama to Biden have deepened their cooperation in energy, finance, trade and technology. The assumption therefore that Kremlin can be easily incentivized to decouple from Beijing might be naive. For Moscow, the successive rounds of sanctions have shown the uncertainty that any potential reintegration into the SWIFT system, even if the access is given can be withdrawn at any time. 

For Beijing and Moscow thus, the partnership has continued to deepen, and has been enhanced by Putin’s May 2026 visit, which coincided with the 25^th anniversary of the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Moreover, with around 40 bilateral agreements covering trade and logistics to nuclear energy, both countries have also advocated for a ‘multipolar world and a new type of international relations. The timing itself was strategic as the Putin-Xi talks came less than a week after Trump’s own summit in Beijing. What the two summits, read together revealed is a structural reality, that the strategy of ‘reverse Nixon’ has not weakened the axis to the extent it targeted. At the same time, the present US policy has been characterized as being transactional and assertive, with economic pressures, selective engagement and readiness to revisit established alignments. The result has been not only the failure to pull either of the rival powers closer but also the creation of conditions that continue to strain the broader international environment. 

A Decentralised World 

The escalating great power tension has the ability to push the world closer to a potential instability. This was highlighted by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, when they set the Doomsday Clock at 89 seconds to midnight as 2025 opened, the closest it has ever been to a symbolic catastrophe, a result of the compounding risks from arms control, disruptive technologies such as AI and nuclear threats. Moreover, the New START treaty has expired, without a successor that could act as a nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia. Thereby, the last mechanism by which the two powers can exchange data on nuclear deployments, conduct inspections and maintain a level of strategic transparency has been removed, increasing the chances of a miscalculation in times of a crisis. 

For the Global South, these consequences have been severe, especially through the disruptions caused by the US-China trade war, whose long terms effects deeply affect the economy of those developing countries that have integrated themselves into the supply chains of both the powers. Countries especially in South and Southeast Asia that has benefited from the “China + 1” strategy such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia are now also encountering policy contradiction as US trade policies shift their focus from “Made in China” to “Made by China” and try to stop rerouting of Chinese goods through third countries. As a result, these developing economies find themselves caught in the same trade pressures they were trying to avoid. 

Beyond trade, the shift in the security landscape has been equally consequential with military alliances by the US being treated as of cost-sharing nature rather than permanent strategic commitments. The approach has placed growing pressure on allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific to raise their defence spending significantly, thereby straining alliance partnerships and the reliability of US security guarantees. Moreover when the frequency of cross border crises are rising from pandemics, supply chain disruptions to climate shocks, the US decision to withdraw from 66 international organizations, including several entities within the UN system, has also raised serious concern about the weakening of the multilateral order. 

These developments have direct effects on the rules-based order itself. The fragile nature of the international order has created space for middle powers such as Brazil, India, Indonesia to expand their strategic autonomy, by diversifying their economic and security partnerships and engaging in issue-based coalitions as global governance becomes more decentralized. However, this middle power activism is not uniform, and their motivations or objectives also differ and therefore they should not be treated as a cohesive bloc with shared interests. But it does reflect a growing tendency among states to pursue issue specific cooperation, whether in minilateral groupings or through selective engagements in multilateral forums where their interests converge. 

Their success, however, will ultimately depend not only on the degree of trust and common purpose they share, but their efforts which will also play an important role in sustaining international cooperation in the backdrop of a more contested global order. 

What Lies Ahead? 

Moving forward, a number of trajectories can present itself on how future developments will unfold. The first one is a managed coexistence, where the three powers will continue to compete with occasional instances of cooperation as the international order fragments into overlapping blocs. However ongoing tensions such as from Ukraine to the Taiwan Strait also means that the leadership in these countries must be able absorb the pressures without gravitating towards confrontation. 

Second, would be a genuine diplomatic breakthrough where through successful dialogue a conclusion of the pressing issues and settlement of differences can take place. This trajectory cannot be ruled out as the transactional nature of the world order means that there is still room for agreements. But at the same time, these issues, such as a successor to replace the New START treaty, would require a sustained level of diplomatic investment to bring about any meaningful result. 

The third trajectory, which cannot be ignored, is a gradual escalation on multiple fronts ranging from nuclear signaling to economic shocks creating instability, that can result in a confrontation among the major powers. 

Therefore, it is ultimately not a breakdown of order that we have, but rather a transformation into a looser more fragmented system. As major powers increasingly interpret or bypass rules based on their immediate interests, the system begins to function less as a shared framework and more as a tool of competition. In such a setting, stability will not come from the strength of the rules, but instead the willingness by the states to exercise restraint. It is this shift, from that of a rule bound to one of a negotiated uncertainty that defines the present moment. 

By : Simar Kaur, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction  

The complex South Asian geopolitics sees the changing equation between Bangladesh and Türkiye as one of the important variables that could affect the prevailing power equilibrium in the region. The emerging relationship based on the intersection of economic and defence cooperation and political coordination on some global issues has seen a major development over the past few years. Up until July 2026, it seems that the path that this bilateral equation takes is now from being one of merely exchanging good intentions to becoming one of strategic collaboration. In terms of India, whose “Neighborhood First” policy includes Bangladesh as an integral part of it, there is the possibility that this growing closeness between Dhaka and Ankara might prove to be a diplomatic hurdle. 

The Geopolitical Context: From Distant Acquaintance to Strategic Powers  

Conventionally, Bangladesh and Türkiye had been enjoying friendly, yet rather subdued ties based upon their common Islamic majority and past links that go back to the assistance provided by the Turks during the 1971 Liberation War. But the situation has changed dramatically since 2020 because of active diplomatic expansion by Türkiye, headed by its President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the desire of Bangladesh to develop varied foreign ties outside its immediate neighborhood. The change of the paradigm became obvious after the political changes occurred in Dhaka in August 2024. This approach is underlined by the concept of “Asia Anew” that has been developed by Türkiye as an overarching strategy for this interaction. It is important to understand that Bangladesh has become not just a country receiving development assistance but also the key link through which Turkey can gain access to markets in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 2025, there was a rapid escalation of activities. 

Economic and Defence Convergence: Tangible Pillars of Partnership  

One of the essential pillars of the developing partnership is defence cooperation, which has created the biggest concerns among regional analysts. Türkiye has established itself as a leading defence equipment provider to Bangladesh, leaving behind its traditional partners. Starting from 2022, Bangladesh has made purchases of various military hardware from Turkey, ranging from armored vehicles to unmanned aerial vehicles and naval patrol boats. Talks in early 2026 on the possibility of purchasing Turkish corvettes and long-range artillery systems demonstrate further development in the area. Technology transfer and joint production initiatives offered by Turkish defence corporations, such as Baykar and Aselsan, present an attractive option for Bangladesh to expand its sources of defence hardware. Economically, the tie-up has been cemented through substantial investments made by the Turks in the Bangladeshi infrastructure and readymade garments industries. Turkish construction firms have won tenders to construct bridges and build power plants. The Turkish brands in the retail and textile sector have begun importing from Bangladeshi factories. The ratification of a Preferential Trade Agreement in March 2026 has brought down the duties on certain export products. On the cultural front, the Turkish Maarif Foundation runs some schools in the major Bangladeshi cities of Dhaka and Chittagong. 

Diplomatic Alignment and the “Ankara Effect”  

Besides economics and security, there is another aspect of the diplomatic partnership between Dhaka and Ankara that makes India’s strategic environment even more complicated. Turkey has been actively supporting Bangladesh in its Rohingya refugee crisis and providing humanitarian and political assistance in international organizations. On the other hand, Bangladesh has demonstrated readiness to support the diplomatic positions of Turkey concerning issues connected with the Muslim world at international institutions such as the OIC and the UN. The alignment also exists in maritime security, with Turkiye’s presence in the Indian Ocean and its strategic base in Somalia providing an existing basis for maritime cooperation in the form of patrols of the Bay of Bengal. This cooperation, however, is still in its early stages, indicating that Dhaka wishes to diversify its security cooperation that has long depended solely on India. Turkey’s plan to open a consulate in the city of Chittagong, which was announced in October 2025, shows the importance Turkey attaches to its ties with Bangladesh’s economic and maritime capital.  

Implication for India: Strategic Challenges and Diplomatic Pressure  

For India, however, there are many layers of challenges associated with rising relations between Türkiye and Bangladesh. First and foremost, it marks the dilution of India’s traditionally enjoyed predominance in both economic and security terms in relation to Bangladesh. India has always been the largest trading partner of Bangladesh within South Asia, although now it seems that Bangladesh has actively sought out new ties. Secondly, the defence-deal factor becomes especially sensitive for India, since it has always played an important role in Bangladesh’s military buildup. Thirdly, there might also be an opportunity in this partnership for Bangladesh to gain greater leverage in the international sphere. In previous negotiations involving bilateral issues like sharing river water and border management, India has used its economic and security links to tilt the balance. With a Bangladesh that has alternative relationships, it would likely have to mount stiffer resistance when negotiating over unresolved matters. Lastly, in the event of tensions in the region, having a powerful Turkey present in the region would create a variable for the Indian Navy to consider in its maritime partnership with Bangladesh. It is crucial to place these developments in context. Bangladesh has India as an indispensable neighbor, and it is unlikely that the economic and geographic considerations of the region will be overtaken by that of a distant relationship. The official relationship that exists between India and Bangladesh, in spite of the current problems, still has deep institutional ties, particularly when it comes to infrastructural development and energy trade. 

Conclusion  

The emerging alliance of Bangladesh and Türkiye provides a great example of how power dynamics in the world continue to be restructured, where middle powers carve out their own spheres of influence. It marks the diplomatic success of the country, increasing its sovereignty and room for manoeuvre. For Türkiye, it is a way to establish itself in the Indo-Pacific region. For India, it means that it should approach this relationship with great caution and reconsider its engagement strategy with Bangladesh. Neglecting all signs of Dhaka’s increased strategic independence might cause serious miscalculations. A better approach on the part of New Delhi would consist of improving its value proposition to Bangladesh by increasing connectivity, collaborating in water management and responding to its economic needs. In the end, India’s long-term strength remains its geography and culture, but these can only prove useful in the case of proper statecraft. 

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly following recent breakthroughs in generative AI, has transformed governance and state capacity across the world. While AI enhances efficiency and automation, its integration into surveillance infrastructures raises serious concerns about privacy, autonomy, and civil liberties. In authoritarian contexts, AI does not merely support governance—it expands the state’s ability to monitor, predict, and regulate behavior. The deployment of AI-enabled surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region represents one of the most advanced and controversial examples of this transformation. Home to approximately 11–12 million Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority with deep historical and cultural ties to Central Asia, Xinjiang has long been central to China’s security discourse. Following episodes of unrest, particularly the 2009 Ürümqi riots, Beijing intensified securitization policies in the region, framing them as counter-terrorism and anti-separatism efforts. 

What distinguishes Xinjiang is the scale and technological sophistication of its surveillance regime. AI-driven systems—including facial recognition networks, biometric data collection, and predictive policing tools such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)—have been used to aggregate data from checkpoints, smartphones, and financial records to identify individuals deemed “suspicious.” Surveillance technology firms such as Hikvision have been linked to this expanding infrastructure. In authoritarian systems where legitimacy rests on stability rather than electoral consent, surveillance becomes a preventive instrument aimed at deterring mobilization and regulating minority populations. In Xinjiang, digital monitoring has reportedly intersected with restrictions on religious practices, language use, and transnational communication, fueling international criticism and debates over human rights. This  article argues that AI in Xinjiang functions not merely as a security tool, but as a mechanism of algorithmic governance that reshapes state–society relations and raises critical questions about the future trajectory of digital authoritarianism. 

Historical Consolidation and Cultural Reconfiguration: China’s Expanding Control over Xinjiang

The consolidation of Chinese control over the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region must be understood within a long historical arc of imperial expansion, internal colonization, and contemporary technological governance. The Qing dynasty formally incorporated the region in 1884, designating it “Xinjiang,” meaning “newly returned frontier.” This nomenclature itself reflects a state-centric territorial claim and continues to inform official narratives; contemporary government platforms emphasize that Xinjiang has “never been East Turkestan,” directly countering separatist discourse. Following the fall of the Qing and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing institutionalized administrative control while promoting demographic restructuring. Large-scale migration of Han Chinese—initially through state-led settlement programs and later through economic incentives—gradually altered the ethnic balance of the region. Scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin describe this as a strategy of internal colonization, echoing earlier imperial “divide and rule” practices. While earlier decades relied on physical coercion and ideological campaigns under Mao Zedong, the 1990s onward witnessed indirect migration policies and economic integration efforts that masked deeper assimilationist objectives.

In the twenty-first century, control has expanded from demographic engineering to cultural and digital governance. Uyghur identity—rooted in Islam, Turkic linguistic heritage, Central Asian traditions, and a rich poetic culture—has increasingly come under regulatory scrutiny. Influential literary figures such as Abdurehim Ötkür, often regarded as the father of modern Uyghur poetry, symbolize a tradition where literature and communal memory are central to identity formation. Reports by journalists including Lily Kuo have highlighted restrictions on Uyghur intellectuals, poets, and educators, signaling a broader cultural contraction. Since 2017, state policies have reportedly included re-education campaigns, mosque demolitions or renovations aligned with “Sinicization,” and curriculum reforms privileging Mandarin over Uyghur language instruction. Recent updates (2023–2025) indicate a strategic shift: while mass detention facilities appear reduced in visibility, digital monitoring, data-driven governance, and heritage “repackaging” for tourism continue. Beijing simultaneously promotes Xinjiang as a hub within the Belt and Road Initiative, projecting stability and development. Thus, historical patterns of territorial consolidation have evolved into technologically mediated assimilation, where demographic change, cultural regulation, and algorithmic surveillance operate together to redefine state–society relations in Xinjiang.

From Imperial Censorship to Revolutionary Surveillance

Surveillance and censorship in China long predate the contemporary leadership of Xi Jinping. During the Qin and Han dynasties, political orthodoxy and loyalty to the ruler were central pillars of governance. Criticizing imperial authority was prohibited, and censorship mechanisms were institutionalized through the office of the Censorate. Censor officials monitored bureaucratic conduct, judicial proceedings, and public works, reporting directly to the emperor. Although framed as anti-corruption oversight, these institutions reinforced centralized authority and ideological conformity.

During the Qing dynasty, intelligence practices became more formalized. The spy manual Jianshu, authored by Zhu Fengjia, reflected an awareness of covert operations and counter-rebellion strategies. Surveillance thus evolved from bureaucratic oversight to proactive intelligence gathering. Under Mao Zedong, espionage networks initially used against Japanese forces were retained and repurposed domestically. Maoist campaigns institutionalized mass mobilization and neighborhood monitoring, embedding surveillance within everyday social life. What distinguishes contemporary China is not the existence of surveillance, but its technological scale and sophistication.

Digital Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Xinjiang

Modern surveillance intensified significantly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, particularly after the 2009 Ürümqi riots. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe Xinjiang as one of the most securitized regions globally. The state implemented grid-style policing, recruiting thousands of officers and introducing the “one policeman per village” model. Chen Quanguo’s tenure as regional party secretary after 2016 marked a dramatic escalation in security infrastructure.

Digital surveillance now complements physical policing. Biometric data collection, facial recognition systems, mandatory smartphone applications, and predictive platforms such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) enable real-time monitoring. Leibold characterizes this system as “ethnic sorting,” where individuals are categorized according to perceived ontological worth. Surveillance is framed as governance or “social management,” shifting its language from coercion to administrative normalcy.

Recent developments (2023–2025) indicate a transition from overt mass detention to normalized digital monitoring. International scrutiny led to sanctions on several Chinese technology firms, yet Beijing continues to promote AI governance domestically and export surveillance technologies abroad. Simultaneously, the state highlights economic development and tourism in Xinjiang, presenting stability as proof of policy success.

Continuities of Ethnic Management and Cultural Regulation

The securitization of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region reflects broader and historically embedded patterns of ethnic management and demographic engineering. Han migration policies—traced by scholars such as Nicolas Becquelin—illustrate long-standing strategies to recalibrate the region’s demographic balance and bind it more closely to the Chinese mainland. State-led development initiatives, expansion of railway networks, and consolidation of cotton and energy industries have strengthened economic integration while reinforcing dependence on central authority. Xinjiang’s cotton sector, for instance, remains central to China’s textile supply chain, yet it has also been the focus of international scrutiny and import restrictions imposed by the United States and parts of Europe over allegations of forced labor—claims Beijing firmly denies.

Cultural governance operates in parallel with these economic and demographic strategies. Policies promoting Mandarin-language instruction in place of Uyghur-medium education, restructuring mosque architecture under “Sinicization” guidelines, and regulating Islamic practices indicate that governance extends beyond security into the domain of identity formation. David Tobin argues that narratives portraying Uyghurs as security risks cultivate mutual insecurities between Han and Uyghur communities, thereby legitimizing expanded state control. Since 2023, China has further formalized AI governance regulations emphasizing “security” and “controllability,” embedding digital monitoring within broader administrative reforms. Although reports suggest that some re-education facilities have become less visible, digital surveillance infrastructures—facial recognition systems, biometric databases, and grid-style management—remain operational. Simultaneously, Beijing has promoted tourism campaigns showcasing Xinjiang’s cultural heritage, signaling a strategic shift from overt coercion to managed representation.

Taken together, current developments reinforce the argument that China’s approach represents continuity rather than rupture. Surveillance has evolved from imperial oversight and Maoist mass campaigns into technologically sophisticated digital governance under Xi Jinping. The integration of AI, economic modernization, and cultural regulation demonstrates a layered strategy: territorial consolidation is pursued not only through security apparatuses, but through demographic restructuring, economic dependency, and symbolic reconfiguration of minority identity. Contemporary policy in Xinjiang thus exemplifies how historical modes of control have been recalibrated for the digital age, blending modernization with centralized authority in ways that redefine state–society relations.

Algorithmic Governance and the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) represents the operational core of digital surveillance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Designed as a data-driven policing system, IJOP aggregates information from CCTV networks, biometric databases, smartphone monitoring applications, and police checkpoints. According to investigations by Human Rights Watch, the platform compiles behavioral data and flags individuals for investigation or detention based on algorithmic risk indicators. Leaked documents—often referred to as the “Karakax List”—revealed that individuals were reportedly detained for non-violent behaviors such as foreign contacts, religious observance, or possession of certain digital materials. Authorities maintain that the system enables “precision” counter-terrorism and prevents extremism; however, critics argue that predictive policing in this context expands suspicion to everyday life.

Screenshots of IJOP databases reportedly display detailed identity fields including name, ethnicity, gender, ID numbers, and behavioral flags. Scholars such as Adrian Zenz and James Leibold describe this as a shift from reactive law enforcement to algorithmic pre-emption—where risk is inferred rather than proven. This mirrors global debates following the 9/11 surveillance expansions in the United States exposed by Edward Snowden, yet the Xinjiang case differs in scale, ethnic targeting, and integration with mass political campaigns such as “Strike Hard.” Since 2023, although Beijing claims vocational centers have been phased out, reports indicate that digital monitoring remains deeply embedded, supported by AI governance regulations emphasizing national security. International sanctions against firms linked to surveillance supply chains coexist with China’s continued export of “smart city” technologies abroad, suggesting Xinjiang functions both as a domestic security project and a model of digital authoritarian governance.

Lived Experiences, Cultural Suppression, and Political Implications

Interviews conducted with Chinese and Uyghur respondents reveal the human dimension of algorithmic control. One interviewee described surveillance cameras “popping up” in the early 2000s, characterizing them as tools for cultural destruction and family separation. Another, a Uyghur living abroad, emphasized the symbolic politics of naming—rejecting “Xinjiang” in favor of “East Turkestan”—highlighting how territorial language itself becomes a site of contestation. A scholar interviewed linked AI surveillance directly to safeguarding the “One China” principle, arguing that digital monitoring enables authorities to track religious practice, separatist sentiment, and social networks with unprecedented efficiency.

Reports of restrictions on protest (more than three people gathering), alleged forced labor, and suppression of Islamic practices reinforce claims that surveillance extends beyond security into identity regulation. While Beijing frames these measures as counter-extremism and poverty alleviation, critics argue that algorithmic sorting, mass DNA collection, and “virtual fences” transform citizenship into a condition of continuous evaluation. Recent tourism campaigns and state media portrayals of stability contrast sharply with diaspora testimonies and ongoing international scrutiny.

Critically, the Xinjiang model illustrates how AI amplifies long-standing state objectives: territorial integrity, ideological conformity, and cultural assimilation. Surveillance here is not incidental but systemic—merging predictive analytics, biometric governance, and political campaigns into a comprehensive architecture of control. The case raises broader questions about the global diffusion of AI-enabled policing and whether technological modernization, absent robust accountability, risks normalizing permanent states of exception under the banner of security.

Global Contestation, Sanctions, and Competing Narratives (2023–2026)

The international response to developments in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has intensified over the past few years, transforming the issue from a human rights debate into a focal point of geopolitical contestation. In 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released an assessment stating that serious human rights violations in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity. Although Beijing rejected the findings as politically motivated, the report institutionalized global scrutiny within multilateral frameworks. Parallelly, the United States enacted and implemented the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, presuming goods produced in Xinjiang to be linked to forced labor unless proven otherwise. This legislation significantly impacted global supply chains, particularly in textiles and solar panel components, given Xinjiang’s centrality to cotton and polysilicon production. The European Union and several G7 countries have also imposed targeted sanctions on Chinese officials and entities allegedly linked to surveillance and detention systems.

Technology firms associated with surveillance infrastructure—most notably Hikvision and Huawei—have faced export restrictions and blacklisting measures. These actions underscore the growing recognition that Xinjiang is not merely a regional security matter but a test case for the global governance of AI. At the same time, China has deepened partnerships with countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, exporting “smart city” technologies that integrate facial recognition, biometric data systems, and predictive policing software. Critics argue that this diffusion risks normalizing algorithmic authoritarian practices beyond China’s borders, while Beijing frames such exports as neutral tools for modernization and crime prevention.

Domestically, official narratives emphasize stability, economic growth, and poverty alleviation in Xinjiang. State media highlights increased tourism, infrastructure development, and employment statistics as evidence of policy success. Beijing maintains that vocational training centers have been dismantled and that counter-terrorism efforts were necessary responses to violent incidents in the 2000s and early 2010s. However, diaspora testimonies, investigative journalism, and leaked documents such as the “Karakax List” continue to challenge these claims, arguing that digital monitoring, biometric databases, and algorithmic risk scoring remain embedded within everyday governance.

From a critical perspective, the Xinjiang case demonstrates three core dynamics. First, AI-enabled surveillance transforms suspicion into a predictive category, where algorithmic flagging substitutes individualized judicial process. Second, ethnic identity becomes datafied—reduced to quantifiable markers within systems such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). Third, international fragmentation over human rights norms enables competing narratives: liberal democracies frame Xinjiang as a site of systemic repression, while China presents it as a successful model of stability-oriented governance.

Thus, the contemporary debate is not solely about Xinjiang; it concerns the future of digital governance globally. As AI becomes central to administrative capacity worldwide, the Xinjiang model raises urgent normative questions: Can predictive policing coexist with due process? Does algorithmic efficiency erode minority rights when embedded in securitized frameworks? And will economic interdependence dilute accountability mechanisms? The trajectory of international responses between 2023 and 2026 suggests that Xinjiang has evolved into a defining case in the politics of algorithmic authoritarianism—where technology, sovereignty, and human rights intersect in unprecedented ways.

Conclusion

The case of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region demonstrates that artificial intelligence, when embedded within an authoritarian political framework, becomes more than a governance tool—it becomes an architecture of control. From the historical consolidation of Xinjiang to the deployment of predictive platforms such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), China’s approach reflects continuity in ethnic management, now recalibrated through algorithmic governance. Surveillance in Xinjiang is not episodic or reactive; it is systemic, preventive, and data-driven—integrating biometric collection, facial recognition, grid policing, and digital profiling into everyday administration.

Critically, the Xinjiang model reveals how AI transforms suspicion into quantifiable risk and identity into data. Under the language of counter-terrorism, stability, and modernization, algorithmic systems restructure state–society relations by normalizing constant monitoring and pre-emptive intervention. International sanctions, multilateral reports, and supply chain restrictions underscore global unease, yet competing narratives persist between human rights advocacy and sovereignty-based security claims. Ultimately, Xinjiang stands as a defining case of algorithmic authoritarianism—illustrating how technological sophistication can reinforce centralized authority and raise urgent questions about accountability, minority rights, and the global future of AI-enabled governance.

By : Ritika Biswas, Research Analyst, GSDN

“The Quad Is Dead, Long Live the Quad” “Did Trump Kill the Quad?” “The US Built the Quad, But Now It’s Letting It Fail”. Throughout 2025, headlines across the United States and international media were saturated with titles like these, fueling a growing sentiment that the Quad was falling apart. These reports suggested that the partnership, once seen as a key part of security in the Indo-Pacific, was losing strength because the administration of the United States of America under President Donald Trump seemed to be pulling back from its leadership role. Although these news articles do not claim that the Quad’s strategy or its goals were dead, they pointed to a shift in how the partnership functions, showing that the regional stability remains active. 

But What Is the Quad? 

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a team of four democracies: Australia, India, Japan and the United States of America acting as a strong partner against China’s growing power and to help keep the Indo-Pacific region free and open for everyone. The Quad traces its origins to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the United States, India, Japan and Australia worked together to provide emergency help, even though they didn’t have a formal group set up for it. The success of that cooperation led the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, Shinzo Abe, to propose a more structured Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007. However, the group stopped meeting in 2008, largely because Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd withdrew, being unwilling to go against Beijing at the height of the Sino-Australian economic boom. The Quad was restored in 2017 during the Trump administration, driven by shared anxieties over China’s bold behavior over territory in the South China Sea, the building of military bases on man-made islands and the fast growth of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. 

 Since its revival in 2017 under the first Trump administration and its subsequent major summit-level partnership under President Joe Biden, the Quad has been seen as a key part of maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific.  The Biden era transformed the Quad from a consultative forum into a summit-level coalition, with leaders holding their first virtual meeting in March 2021, followed by face-to-face meetings at the White House in September 2021, in Tokyo in May 2022, in Hiroshima in May 2023, and in Wilmington, Delaware, in September 2024. Under President Biden, the Quad began working on a long list of goals, spanning maritime security, vaccine distribution, climate change, technology standards, infrastructure financing and cybersecurity. Critics felt the group was taking too much, but supporters believed this wide-ranging plan showed an affirmative vision for the region. Despite this ambitious agenda, the momentum slowed. Now, in the middle of 2026, leaders in cities like New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra are all asking the same worried questions: Is the Quad finished, or is it just taking a break? 

The second Trump administration began with what appeared to be a strong signal of continuity in the Quad. On January 21, 2025, the Quad foreign ministers met in Washington under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, promising to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open. This indicated that the Quad had strong support from both U.S. political parties. However, these hopes did not last long. President Trump’s “America First” policy focused on making direct, one-on-one deals rather than working with a group of partners. Washington soon imposed high tariffs of up to 50 percent on Indian products and criticized India for buying cheap oil from Russia. These actions hurt the trust that the four countries had spent years cultivating. 

India was supposed to host the Quad Leaders’ Summit in 2025. Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally invited President Trump to New Delhi in June 2025. Yet 2025 came and went without any leaders’ meeting. Trump reportedly canceled his trip because of the trade disagreements. Because India was also unhappy about the new taxes and the criticism regarding Russia, it did not push for the meeting to be rescheduled. By September 26, 2025, it became clear that the summit would not take place at all that year. As a result, the Quad’s most important event – the annual leaders’ meeting – did not happen in 2025.  

Is the Quad Really Dead? 

Even when news articles and media headlines in 2025 painted a dark picture, they never actually claimed that the Quad’s main goals were dead. While they focused on the fact that the leaders were not meeting and the partnership seemed to be “dying” in the public eye, they were really describing a shift in style. These reports highlighted that while the “public face” of the Quad- the grand summits and media spectacle were gone, the core mission was not. In reality, the Quad has not been entirely inactive. In fact, behind that silence, the Quad’s actual work has continued. Exercise Malabar, the yearly naval drill featuring all four countries, was held in Guam from October 28 to November 8, 2025, and was one of the largest in recent years. A workshop on disaster response was held in Honolulu and the third Quad Counterterrorism Working Group met in December 2025. Foreign ministers met in Washington in July 2025 and again in New Delhi on May 26, 2026. These meetings proved that the partnership remains very active. In short, the Quad has not stopped working; it has simply lost its “voice” at the top level. 

On February 7, 2026, the United States and India made a big breakthrough by announcing a new trade plan. As part of this deal, the U.S. agreed to lower the tariffs on Indian products from 25 percent down to 18 percent. This was a partial fix for the high taxes that had been put in place because India was buying oil from Russia. This agreement helped fix the relationship between the two countries, which is the foundation needed for the Quad to work. It was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Quad revival. 

On May 26, 2026, the Quad foreign ministers met in New Delhi. Many observers characterized it as a damage control exercise and an attempt to rescue the grouping’s relevance. The meeting led to several major results. First, the four ministers announced a plan called the Quad Critical Minerals Framework. This plan aims to strengthen supply lines, so countries do not have to rely on just one nation – a clear reference to China’s near-monopoly on the processing of important minerals. Second, they started the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC). It enhanced real-time maritime domain awareness across the region. Finally, they moved forward with the Ports of the Future Partnership, especially promising to work with Fiji to build and improve its ports. 

Will India Be Replaced in the Quad? 

Yet even as the New Delhi meeting produced these deliverables, a more uncomfortable question was being whispered in the strategic cycle: Was India still the right member, or could it simply be replaced? 

The question gained real attention in 2025 with the quiet rise of a new group called the “Squad,” which includes the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines.  Unlike India, the Philippines is an official U.S. military ally, has no complicated ties to Russia and has been on the front lines of direct standoffs with China in the South China Sea. The “Squad” has already conducted naval exercises. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out bluntly that India is seen as a weak link in the Quad. They argue that India is not a formal ally, is hesitant to join freedom of navigation patrols and is often pulled in many different directions at once. 

However, the Squad and Quad have different goals. The Squad is narrowly focused on hard maritime security in the South China Sea. The Quad has a wider vision for the whole Indo-Pacific region, which requires India’s massive size, its key position in the Indian Ocean and its large population and economy. Replacing India would not save the Quad; it would simply create a different grouping entirely. The real question is not whether India can be replaced, but whether India and the United States can rebuild enough trust to make the Quad worth keeping. 

Is the Australia Summit a last chance for the Quad? 

The clearest sign that the Quad is not finished is what is now planned for later in 2026. Australia is the leader of the group this year and is expected to host a Quad Leaders’ Summit that never happened in India in 2025. All four countries’ defence and foreign ministers continue to talk through regular channels, and the militaries are working together even more closely than before. The question now is not whether the Quad is working. Clearly it is, but whether President Trump will attend a leaders’ meeting and bring back the political importance that the group has been missing for over a year. If he does, the Quad gets a genuine second wind. If he does not, the gap between the group’s hard work on the ground and its lack of political attention will become impossible to ignore. 

In the end, while the Quad might not be in the news as much as it used to be, it is still doing important work behind the scenes. The idea of “Long live the Quad” means that even when things get difficult, the group’s mission to keep the region stable and safe continues to be a vital part of world politics. 

By : Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed the United States and Israel as its principal strategic adversaries. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between Tehran and Washington have remained hostile, while tensions between Iran and Israel have steadily increased due to disagreements over Iran’s nuclear programme, regional influence and support for armed groups across the Middle East. Although the possibility of a direct war between Iran, the United States, and Israel appeared remote for many years, Iranian leaders consistently prepared for such a scenario. Rather than attempting to match the military capabilities of its adversaries, Iran developed a strategy focused on deterrence, asymmetric warfare, missile technology, regional partnerships, and economic leverage. 

The conflict that intensified during 2025 and expanded further in 2026 demonstrated that Iran had spent decades preparing for a confrontation with militarily superior opponents. Despite facing two technologically advanced powers equipped with modern air forces, intelligence networks, precision-guided weapons, and substantial military resources, Iran managed to sustain its resistance and continue military operations. In my opinion, this was not simply the result of chance. It reflected years of planning that focused on strengthening Iran’s military capabilities, regional influence and ability to withstand prolonged conflict.  

Iran’s preparations were shaped by several historical experiences. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 convinced Iranian leaders that the country needed self-reliant defence capabilities. Later, economic sanctions, regional conflicts, the killing of General Qasem Soleimani on January 03, 2020, and increasing Israeli concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities reinforced Tehran’s belief that future military confrontation was possible. Consequently, Iran invested heavily in missile forces, drone technology, underground military infrastructure, and relationships with regional partners that collectively became known as the “Axis of Resistance.” 

This article examines how Iran prepared for its war with the United States and Israel. It explores the historical foundations of Iranian strategy, the development of missile and drone capabilities, the strengthening of internal security institutions, the role of regional proxy networks, and the importance of economic pressure points such as the Strait of Hormuz. 

Historical Background and Strategic Thinking 

Iran’s approach to national security has been heavily influenced by its modern history. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War left a profound impact on Iranian military thinking. During the conflict, Iran faced extensive missile attacks, chemical weapons, and international isolation. The experience convinced Iranian leaders that dependence on foreign suppliers was dangerous and that the country needed indigenous military capabilities. 

Following the war, Iran began investing heavily in missile development and defence industries. Over time, sanctions and diplomatic isolation further encouraged self-sufficiency. Tehran concluded that it could not compete directly with the conventional military power of the United States. Instead, it adopted an asymmetric warfare strategy designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of stronger opponents. 

Iranian leaders often argue that major wars are forced upon Iran rather than started by it. This belief has influenced the country’s defence planning for decades. This concept became central to Iranian strategic doctrine. According to this thinking, Iran must prepare not only to defend its territory but also to ensure that any adversary pays a heavy price for military action. 

The United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 08, 2018 further reinforced these perceptions. The return of economic sanctions, combined with increasing tensions in the Gulf region, convinced many Iranian officials that military confrontation could eventually occur. The assassination of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 deepened these concerns and accelerated efforts to improve deterrence capabilities. 

By the mid-2020s, Iranian strategic planning increasingly focused on surviving a potential war, preserving state institutions, maintaining retaliatory capabilities, and ensuring that adversaries could not achieve rapid victory. 

Building the Largest Missile Arsenal in the Middle East 

One of the most important parts of Iran’s military strategy was the expansion of its missile programme. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East. Over the years, Tehran invested heavily in ballistic and cruise missiles to strengthen its deterrence capabilities. 

Missiles such as the Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr-1, Sejjil, and Khorramshahr provide Iran with the ability to strike targets across the Middle East, including Israel and United States military bases. Iran also improved the accuracy and survivability of these weapons by constructing underground missile bases and mobile launch systems. 

In addition, Iran gained valuable combat experience through missile operations in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and against United States forces in Iraq between 2017 and 2020. These operations gave Iranian forces practical experience and helped improve how missiles would be used during a larger conflict.  

The Rise of Drone Warfare 

Alongside missiles, unmanned aerial systems became a crucial component of Iran’s military strategy. Recognizing its limitations in modern combat aircraft, Iran invested heavily in drone technology as a cost-effective alternative. 

Systems such as the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 became internationally known due to their operational use in several conflicts. These drones provided Iran with the ability to conduct long-range strikes while imposing significant costs on adversaries. 

Iran’s investment in drones provided several military advantages. Drones were cheaper to produce than advanced fighter aircraft, could be manufactured in large numbers, and could overwhelm air-defence systems through saturation attacks. They also provided valuable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 

The effectiveness of Iranian drone technology became particularly evident during the September 14, 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities. The operation temporarily disrupted a significant portion of global oil production and demonstrated the strategic impact that relatively inexpensive weapons could achieve. 

By the mid-2020s, drones had become one of the main tools in Iran’s overall military strategy 

Strengthening Internal Security and Political Stability 

Iran’s preparations extended beyond military capabilities. Iranian leaders believed that any future war would likely involve attempts to destabilize the regime from within. As a result, significant attention was devoted to internal security and political resilience. 

Following periods of domestic unrest and external pressure, Iranian authorities strengthened security institutions and increased coordination among intelligence agencies. Border regions received additional attention, while measures were introduced to counter foreign influence and potential sabotage operations. 

The government also enhanced wartime decision-making structures. Reports indicated that the Supreme National Security Council received expanded responsibilities, while new defence coordination mechanisms were introduced to improve crisis management. 

Iranian leaders believed that future wars would involve not only military attacks but also political pressure, cyber operations and economic sanctions.  

The Axis of Resistance and Regional Influence 

Another important part of Iran’s preparation was the development of the Axis of Resistance, a network of state and non-state groups that oppose American and Israeli influence in the Middle East. Over the years, Iran strengthened its ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Palestinian armed groups. 

These partnerships gave Iran strategic depth by creating multiple fronts that could deter or complicate military action against it. Following the October 07, 2023 Hamas attack and the subsequent regional escalation, the importance of these alliances became even more evident. Iran continued to strengthen coordination among its regional partners, viewing them as an essential part of its overall deterrence strategy and regional influence. 

Protecting the Nuclear Programme and Strategic Infrastructure 

Iran’s nuclear programme has remained a major source of tension with the United States and Israel. Anticipating that nuclear sites would be among the first targets in any conflict, Tehran invested heavily in protecting strategic infrastructure. Facilities such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were reinforced with underground tunnels, hardened structures, and additional fortifications to improve their survivability against air and missile strikes. 

Iran also strengthened the protection of missile bases, command centres, and drone production facilities by dispersing and hardening them across different locations. These measures were intended to preserve critical military capabilities and ensure continuity of operations during a prolonged conflict. 

Preparing for Economic Warfare 

Iranian leaders understood that any major conflict would involve significant economic consequences. Therefore, economic warfare became an important component of Iranian strategic planning. 

One of Iran’s most powerful tools in this regard is the Strait of Hormuz. Located between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, the strait serves as one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. A substantial portion of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports passes through these waters each day. 

For decades, Iranian officials have periodically warned that the Strait of Hormuz could be disrupted if Iran faced existential threats. While such actions would also impose costs on Iran itself, Tehran viewed the ability to threaten global energy flows as an important deterrent. 

Military exercises conducted in the Persian Gulf often demonstrated Iran’s capability to operate in and around the strait. Naval units practiced asymmetric tactics involving fast attack craft, anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and drone systems. 

The idea behind these preparations was relatively simple. If Iran could not match American military power directly, it could still impose substantial economic costs on its adversaries and the wider international community. 

Many analysts argued that any prolonged disruption of the Strait of Hormuz would affect global energy markets, increase oil prices, and create economic uncertainty far beyond the Middle East. By maintaining this capability, Iran sought to ensure that military action against it would carry consequences extending well beyond the battlefield. 

Military Exercises and Readiness 

Military exercises played an important role in Iran’s preparations. Throughout the years leading up to the conflict, Iranian armed forces regularly conducted large-scale drills designed to test operational readiness and demonstrate capabilities. 

These exercises involved the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regular armed forces, naval units, missile forces, and air defence systems. Scenarios often simulated attacks on foreign military bases, protection of strategic infrastructure, defence of coastal regions, and disruption of maritime traffic. 

These exercises had several purposes.They allowed military commanders to identify weaknesses, improve coordination, and test new technologies under realistic conditions. They also sent political signals to foreign governments regarding Iran’s willingness and ability to defend its interests. 

Joint exercises with partners such as Russia further demonstrated Iran’s efforts to strengthen international military relationships. Although these exercises did not create formal military alliances comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they provided opportunities for cooperation and knowledge-sharing. 

Iran’s preparations were not limited to conventional military exercises. Iran also invested heavily in cyber capabilities, intelligence collection, electronic warfare, and information operations. These tools provided additionalmeans of influencing events without relying solely on traditional military force. 

By the time conflict intensified, Iran had spent years developing a multidimensional approach to warfare that integrated conventional, unconventional, economic, and informational instruments of power. 

Wartime Performance and Strategic Resilience 

When conflict eventually erupted, Iran faced immense challenges. The United States and Israel possessed overwhelming advantages in air power, intelligence capabilities, and technological sophistication. Iranian military infrastructure suffered significant damage, while several senior commanders and officials were killed. 

Despite these setbacks, Iran demonstrated a degree of resilience that surprised many observers. Although significant damage was inflicted on military infrastructure, the state continued to function and retained the capacity to respond militarily, which was one of Tehran’s primary objectives from the outset. 

Iran also retained the ability to threaten regional infrastructure, military bases, and maritime routes. These capabilities prevented its adversaries from achieving a quick and decisive victory. 

One of the main reasons Iran managed to continue fighting was the preparation it had carried out over several decades. Underground facilities, dispersed military assets, established command structures, and extensive missile inventories allowed Iran to continue operating under difficult conditions. 

Equally important was Iran’s ability to frame the conflict as a struggle for national survival. Government narratives emphasized sovereignty, resistance, and defence against foreign aggression. This messaging helped strengthen domestic cohesion during a period of extraordinary pressure. 

Although Iran suffered substantial military and economic losses, its preparations enabled it to avoid complete strategic defeat. In this sense, Tehran achieved one of its primary wartime objectives: survival. 

Implications for Regional Security 

Iran’s preparations and performance during the conflict carry important implications for regional and international security. 

The conflict also highlighted several broader lessons for regional security. One lesson was the growing importance of missiles and drones in modern warfare. Another was the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, where any disruption could affect global energy markets. The war also demonstrated how regional allies and non-state actors can shape conflicts beyond national borders. Finally, it showed that resilience and long-term preparation are now as important as conventional military strength.  

Conclusion 

Iran’s preparation for a possible war with the United States and Israel developed gradually over several decades rather than through one single policy. Instead, it reflected decades of strategic planning shaped by historical experiences, regional competition, economic pressures, and security concerns. 

Iran invested heavily in missile technology, drone warfare, underground infrastructure, and regional partnerships. It strengthened internal security institutions, developed economic pressure tools centered on the Strait of Hormuz, and expanded its ability to conduct asymmetric warfare. These measures were designed not to match the military power of the United States and Israel directly, but to ensure that any conflict would be costly, prolonged, and uncertain. 

The conflict demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of Iran’s approach. While Tehran remained at a conventional military disadvantage, its preparations enabled it to preserve key capabilities, maintain resistance, and avoid political collapse. The ability to survive sustained military pressure and continue retaliatory operations reflected years of deliberate preparation. 

In my opinion, the biggest lesson from this conflict is that military strength alone does not determine the outcome of modern wars. Resilience, adaptability, economic leverage, regional partnerships, and technological innovation have become equally important. Iran understood this reality and structured its preparations accordingly. 

As tensions continue to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, Iran’s experience will likely influence military planning across the region. Regardless of whether Iran’s strategy is viewed as defensive or expansionist, its long-term military preparations clearly influenced the course of the conflict. The war demonstrated that even when facing stronger adversaries, a state that has prepared patiently and strategically can remain a significant actor in regional and international affairs. 

By : by Bhavika Bhartiya, Research Analyst, GSDN

A nation that has been discussed repeatedly during negotiations in the Middle East is Iran. They have created a vast infrastructure of Allied Militias across the region including Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Gaza. Collectively, these groups are referred to as the “Axis of Resistance” by various media organizations. At first glance, it may appear as though Iran has a very dominant position within the Middle East; however, recent developments indicate that Iran’s grip on the area is not complete nor as strong as it once seemed. This paper focuses on understanding how Iran established its influence within the Middle East so that we can analysewhether Iran truly has control over the region today. 

How Did Iran Build its Influence? 

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has been trying to increase its influence throughout the Middle East and develop its power by exporting its ideology to as many other Muslim nations as possible to reduce the amount of influence the United States and Israel have in the region. To do this, the Iranian regime has created and supported armed proxy groups throughout the region that can advance Iranian interests and fight on Iran’s behalf without engaging in conventional warfare. The largest proxy organization supported by Iran is Hezbollah, a Lebanese organization formed in 1982, which has grown into an extremely powerful military organization with an estimated 150,000 rockets/missiles and thousands of trained fighters.  

The Iranian regime has been able to establish relationships with Shia militia groups in Iraq post-2003, when the US-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein and created a power vacuum that Iran quickly filled. Many of these groups have been formed and managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of the Iranian military that manages and funds proxy groups globally. Iran reportedly spends $1-2 billion annually supporting these groups. 

Iran’s Reach: From Lebanon to Yemen 

 Iran has a considerable amount of influence in Yemen-through the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) who seized control of Yemen’s capital (Sanaa) and started a civil war there in 2014. Iran began to supply the Houthis with weaponry and military training, and because of Iranian assistance and training over time the Houthis demonstrated their growing capabilities by launching missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia and subsequentlyachieving long-range accuracy against Israeli targets.  

After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Houthis began to attack vessels in the Red Sea (a vital global shipping lane) disrupting international trade and forcing ships to reroute around Africa with the potential to cripple the global economy. Additionally, after January 2024, the US and UK conducted a series of air strikes against the Houthis, which included an air campaign (Operation Rough Rider) that comprised approximately 1,100 strike missions conducted in 2025. However, despite these operations the Houthis continued their conflict demonstrating how heavily Iran has invested in developing this militant group over many years. 

Recent Setbacks for Iran 

The years between late 2023 and 2025, were a significant period of decline for Iran, and thus Iran’s strength in the region suffered greatly from this period. Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria at the time, was ousted from power in December 2024, which would be the biggest blow to Iran to date. Syria was considered one of Iran’s most important allies and was the main route for Iran to send arms and fighters to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Once Assad was no longer in power, the new Syrian government would not allow Iranian citizens to enter Syria and would not permit shipments of Iranian weapons to be sent into Syria. A leader of the Syrian opposition said that the fall of Assad would delay Iran’s regional plans by over 40 years. 

In addition to losing its major ally and dispensing with the ability to send arms and fighters to its main ally in the region, Hezbollah, Iran also suffered a significant loss in Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel in 2024. In September 2024, Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader for many years, which was a huge loss for the organization. By April 2025, Hezbollah would have given up 190 of its 265 military positions in southern Lebanon to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which was a significant retreat for an organization that had been viewed as one of the most powerful non-state armed forces in the world. 

Iran Itself Came Under Attack 

One of the most shocking things was the fact that attacks on Iran were really something that one wouldn’t be able to guess. In July 2024, for example, Israel assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. This was humiliating to Iran. Showed clearly that even the capital of Iran was not safe from being attacked. In June 2025, Israel attacked Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile facilities with air strikes that were fired from outside of Iran. After this, in April and October of 2024, Iran launched large scale missile and drone attacks against Israel; however, the majority of these were intercepted and did not do nearly as much damage to Israel as had been anticipated. This demonstrated that although Iran has considerable military strength, it also has many weaknesses. 

So, Is the Middle East in Iran’s Grip? 

There are a lot of things to consider when it comes to Iran’s influence in the Middle East, so it may not be easy to answer whether Iran has total control of the region. From one perspective, Iran has accomplished something extraordinary: despite being a heavily financially sanctioned country, it was able to build and maintain influence outside of its own borders across numerous countries with very low investments in proxy organizations. No other country has accomplished over time anything like the construction and maintenance of an entire country’s influence spread across five countries/territories. Iran has continued to have active allies in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and it has attempted to rebuild its influence in areas where it has had difficulty or lost its ability to continue its support for its proxy organizations. 

From the other side, recent events during 2024 and 2025, demonstrate that Iranian control over the Middle East is not absolute. Syria was lost as a supporting ally and supply route, Hezbollah was weakened, Hamas was devastated in Gaza as an indirect result of an Israeli attack on Iranian territory, and in July 2025, Iranian military support in the form of a large shipment of approximately 750 tons of deadly weapons to Houthi forces was intercepted demonstrating the pressure there are on Iran’s logistical supply chains as well. 

Conclusion 

The last several decades, Iran has undoubtedly demonstrated its importance as a major actor in the Middle East. By using a strategy of supporting allied militias, Iran has been able to project its power into regions far outside its borders. Many recent events have revealed the limitations of this influence. Iran’s network is being challenged on multiple fronts simultaneously, and the setbacks of 2024 and 2025 have been profoundly significant; whereas the Middle East cannot yet be said to be completely under Iran’s control, Iran has ensured that no matter what happens next in the region, it will remain an essential and unavoidable player.