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New World Order Post the Iran War 

By : by Ankit Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

New World Order : Source Internet

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and the broader international system has undergone profound transformations following decades of tension, proxy conflicts, and intermittent military confrontations involving Iran. While discussing the concept of a “new world order” in the context of Iran requires careful analysis of ongoing developments, the regional and global implications of Iran’s conflicts with various actors have already begun reshaping alliances, economic relationships, security architectures, and power balances that define international relations in the twenty-first century.  

Historical Background of Iranian Conflicts 

Iran’s confrontational relationship with the United States and its regional adversaries traces back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent 444-day hostage crisis fundamentally ruptured U.S.-Iran relations, creating animosity that has persisted for more than four decades. 

Throughout the 1980s, Iran fought a devastating war with Iraq that lasted from September 22, 1980 to August 20, 1988, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and massive economic destruction. This conflict established patterns of regional rivalry and demonstrated Iran’s willingness to endure enormous costs in pursuit of its strategic objectives. 

The United States designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 19, 1984, citing Iranian support for groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, and various militias throughout the Middle East. This designation has remained in place, shaping American policy toward Iran across multiple presidential administrations. 

Iran’s nuclear program has been a source of international concern since revelations in August 2002 about undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted extensive inspections and monitoring, while debates have raged about whether Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons capabilities or maintain exclusively peaceful nuclear energy programs. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, in Vienna, Austria, represented a major diplomatic achievement involving Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union (EU). This agreement placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. However, President Donald Trump announced American withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, reimposing sanctions and initiating a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. 

Tensions escalated dramatically following the U.S. drone strike that killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, near Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020. Iran retaliated with ballistic missile strikes against American forces at Al Asad Airbase in Iraq on January 8, 2020, marking one of the most dangerous moments in U.S.-Iran confrontation. 

Regional Power Dynamics and Proxy Conflicts 

Understanding the potential new world order following intensified Iran conflicts requires examining the complex web of regional rivalries and proxy wars that have characterized Middle Eastern politics. Iran has developed an “axis of resistance” comprising allied governments and non-state actors across multiple countries, creating what some analysts describe as a “Shia Crescent” extending from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. 

In Iraq, Iran has cultivated close relationships with Shia militias collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, which formed to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but have become powerful political and military actors. These groups maintain complex relationships with the Iraqi government while receiving support from Tehran. 

Hezbollah in Lebanon represents Iran’s most sophisticated and capable non-state partner. Established in the 1980s with Iranian assistance, Hezbollah has evolved into a powerful political party and military force with an estimated arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking anywhere in Israel.  

In Yemen, Iran has provided varying levels of support to the Houthi movement, which seized control of the capital Sanaa on September 21, 2014, and has fought against a Saudi-led coalition since March 26, 2015. The Houthis have launched numerous drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and have targeted international shipping in the Red Sea, demonstrating Iran’s ability to project influence across the Arabian Peninsula. 

Saudi Arabia views Iran as its primary regional rival, competing for influence across the Middle East along sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical lines. This rivalry has fueled conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain, creating a regional cold war that periodically threatens to escalate into direct confrontation. 

Israel considers Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for groups hostile to Israel as existential threats. Israeli military operations have targeted Iranian positions in Syria, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and reportedly conducted sabotage operations against Iranian nuclear facilities. The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, on November 27, 2020, near Tehran, attributed to Israel, demonstrated the covert dimension of this conflict. 

Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control 

A major military conflict involving Iran would have profound implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts and arms control frameworks globally. Iran’s nuclear program has been the subject of intense international scrutiny, negotiations, and confrontation for more than two decades. 

The collapse of the JCPOA following American withdrawal in May 2018 eliminated constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran subsequently began exceeding limits on uranium enrichment levels and stockpiles specified in the agreement. By 2023, Iran had enriched uranium to 60 percent purity, significantly closer to the 90 percent threshold typically required for weapons-grade material. 

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, either before or after a major conflict, the regional and global implications would be enormous. Saudi Arabia has indicated it would pursue its own nuclear weapons program if Iran acquired such capabilities. Turkish officials have made similar statements about Turkey’s right to nuclear weapons if regional neighbors possess them. 

A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states would fundamentally alter deterrence calculations, crisis stability, and the risk of catastrophic conflict. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force on March 5, 1970, and has been the cornerstone of global non-proliferation efforts, would face its most serious challenge. Widespread proliferation in the Middle East could trigger similar dynamics in other regions, including Northeast Asia and South Asia. 

Economic Consequences and Energy Markets 

Iran’s role in global energy markets means that major conflict involving the country would have immediate and far-reaching economic consequences. Iran possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves, with approximately 157 billion barrels of oil. 

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day pass, representing about 21 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption, is partially controlled by Iran. Iranian threats to close the strait during periods of high tension have caused oil price spikes and demonstrated Tehran’s potential leverage over global energy supplies. 

Economic sanctions imposed on Iran since the 1990s and intensified after 2018 have severely damaged the Iranian economy, causing currency devaluation, inflation exceeding 40 percent annually during peak periods, and reduced oil exports from more than 2.5 million barrels per day before sanctions to fewer than 500,000 barrels per day during maximum pressure periods. 

A post-conflict scenario could see either the intensification of Iran’s economic isolation if Tehran is decisively defeated, or potentially the lifting of sanctions and reintegration into global markets if diplomatic resolution accompanies military de-escalation. The economic reconstruction of Iran, should such a scenario emerge, would require hundreds of billions of dollars and create opportunities for countries and companies willing to invest. 

China has emerged as Iran’s largest trading partner, importing Iranian oil despite American sanctions and signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on March 27, 2021, covering economic cooperation, political coordination, and potentially military collaboration over a 25-year period. This relationship positions China to play a major role in any post-conflict reconstruction or normalization process. 

Realignment of Global Alliances 

The question of a new world order following the major Iran conflict necessarily involves examining how international alliances and partnerships might be reconfigured. The existing alliance structures, formed largely during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, have already shown signs of strain and transformation. 

The United States has maintained security partnerships with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, since the council’s establishment on May 25, 1981. These relationships have been anchored in American security guarantees, arms sales, and military presence in exchange for energy supplies and regional stability. 

However, confidence in American commitment to Gulf security has periodically wavered. The Obama administration’s pursuit of the JCPOA, perceived by Gulf states as insufficiently addressing Iranian regional activities, created tensions. The Trump administration’s limited response to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais on September 14, 2019, which temporarily removed approximately half of Saudi oil production, raised questions about American reliability. 

The Abraham Accords, announced on August 13, 2020, normalized relations between Israel and the UAE, followed by normalization between Israel and Bahrain on September 15, 2020, Morocco on December 10, 2020, and Sudan on October 23, 2020. These agreements represent a significant realignment in Middle Eastern politics, with Arab states prioritizing shared concerns about Iran over the Palestinian issue. 

Restructuring of International Institutions 

A new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran would likely involve either the reform or marginalization of existing international institutions. The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has been paralyzed on numerous Middle Eastern issues by divisions among permanent members holding veto power. 

Russia and China have repeatedly used their Security Council vetoes to block resolutions targeting Iran, Syria, or other allied states, while the United States, United Kingdom, and France have blocked resolutions critical of Israel or calling for actions against Saudi Arabia. This gridlock has undermined the UN’s credibility and effectiveness. 

The IAEA, established on July 29, 1957, has played a central role in monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and verifying compliance with agreements. The agency’s credibility and authority have been tested by disputes over access to Iranian facilities, interpretation of evidence, and politicization of its work by various parties. 

Technological and Cyber Dimensions 

A new world order following major conflict involving Iran would increasingly feature cyber warfare, drone technology, and artificial intelligence as central elements of military and strategic competition. Iran has developed significant cyber warfare capabilities, conducting attacks against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other adversaries. 

Iranian-supplied drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen and by Shia militias in Iraq have attacked Saudi oil facilities, American bases, and other targets throughout the region. The relatively low cost and increasing sophistication of drone technology democratizes military capabilities, allowing non-state actors and smaller countries to threaten larger adversaries. 

The proliferation of these technologies and tactics to non-state actors and other countries would be accelerated by major conflict, creating new security challenges globally. Cyber weapons, unlike nuclear weapons, cannot be easily contained through non-proliferation regimes, and drones are increasingly available through commercial markets. 

Conclusion 

The concept of a new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran encompasses multiple dimensions including regional power balances, alliance structures, nuclear proliferation dynamics, economic relationships, humanitarian consequences, and the effectiveness of international institutions. While the specific contours of such an order would depend on the nature, duration, and outcome of any conflict, several trends seem likely. 

The Middle East would likely see accelerated realignment of relationships, with traditional divisions between Arab and Israeli states giving way to coalitions based on shared threat perceptions regarding Iran. The role of external powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, would be reconfigured based on their actions during and after conflict. 

Nuclear proliferation risks would intensify, potentially triggering a cascade of additional countries seeking weapons capabilities. The credibility of non-proliferation frameworks would be severely tested, with uncertain prospects for restoration. 

Humanitarian costs would be enormous, creating refugee flows, displacement, casualties, and long-term trauma affecting millions of people across multiple countries. The international community’s capacity to respond would be severely challenged. 

Ultimately, the question of whether a genuine “new world order” emerges or simply a reshuffling of existing power dynamics depends on whether key actors learn from historical mistakes, prioritize diplomacy over military force, and construct inclusive frameworks addressing legitimate security concerns of all parties. The stakes are high enough that failure to achieve such outcomes could reshape the international system in dangerous and destabilizing ways for decades to come. 

Why Cuba matters to the United States? 

By : Dhritiman Banerjee, Research Analyst, GSDN

US-Cuba Flag: Source Internet

Introduction 

The Monroe Doctrine, one of the earliest pillars of American foreign policy envisaged the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of US influence. Cuba, a country in that region extremely close to the US coast of Florida is a prominent feature of the region and a country which has been influenced by the socialist ideals with support from the erstwhile USSR. This has perpetually raised concerns in Washington which views these developments as a threat to its own sovereignty. However, it should be noted that, while US-Cuba relations have been strained, policymakers in Washington have seen the Cuban region as a zone requiring US intervention with the Guantanamo naval base of the US navy located in Cuba. This article maps out the strategic importance of Cuba to the United States and why the US emphasizes on regime change in Cuba as a strategic goal. 

US-Cuba relations and the factors at play 

US-Cuba relations deteriorated rapidly after the Fidel Castro led Cuban Communist Revolution overthrew the US backed Batista regime. The new regime rapidly nationalized all American assets and industries in Cuba affecting American industries and trade between America and Cuba. The US responded by imposing a trade embargo on Cuba and suspending diplomatic relations. However, due to the proximity of the US Coast to Cuba, legal and illegal immigration from Cuba to the United States became a major issue and is now a prominent part of the US discourse on national security. American companies were also locked out of Cuban natural resources which led to major losses in business. Furthermore, support of the USSR to the Castro regime affected Cold War dynamics and posed a direct threat to the goals of the Monroe doctrine. Cuba’s proximity to strategically important waterways near the Gulf shipping route and the Panama and its erstwhile support of the USSR and current close relations with US adversaries like Russia and China pose an existential threat to the continental United States. This can be seen during the dynamics of the Cuban Missile Crisis where Soviet missiles in Cuba posed a direct nuclear threat to America. The events during the Cuban missile crisis highlights the importance of a friendly regime in Havana to Washington which views Cuba not as an insignificant small Caribbean nation but as a strategic chokepoint in the US sphere of influence which can be used by America’s enemies to directly attack the US mainland. 

Thus, Cuba remains one of the perennial foreign policy challenges of the United States. While the Obama administration attempted to thaw US-Cuba relations by restarting diplomatic relations between America and Cuba, relations did not improve and the Trump administration again adopted a hardline approach regarding Cuba. This is mainly due to the proximity of Cuba to the United States and Cuban cooperation with Russia and China. The US previous experience with Cuba makes it wary of Cuban relations with its adversaries as this poses a security dilemma for the United States. 

The American security dilemma regarding Cuba 

America is a country with a unique location with the Atlantic Ocean to the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West, it is largely immune to most military interventions as only large-scale naval invasions are possible directly on the United States which can mitigated by the vast US Navy. However, a potential adversary with a strong military presence in Cuba to strengthen Cuba’s security capabilities against US threats, circumvents this requirement and can directly pose a threat to the Continental United States. The lack of a friendly regime in Havana and its cooperation with Moscow and Beijing therefore poses a direct security challenge for Washington. This is a unique security dilemma faced by the US which sees Cuban cooperation with its adversaries as a threat to its own sovereignty.  

Therefore, while Cuban military and economic capabilities are vastly inferior compared to the United States, its geographic location allows it to become a major adversary of Washington by at once allowing Russian and Chinese military presence within its borders as well as continuing its historical stance of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America and oppose US backed regimes in the region. Therefore, America’s position with respect to Cuba can be compared to the Russian view of Ukraine as Nato expansion in Eastern Europe poses the same security dilemma to Moscow as Chinese and Russian presence in Cuba poses to Washington. Thus, it can be said that the tyranny of geography makes Cuba a major strategic adversary to the US as although their capabilities are asymmetric, Cuba’s geographical features augment its foreign policy position with respect to the US. Thus, it can be said that while the two sides are unequally matched, great power rivalry complicates this relationship which makes Washington cautious with respect to its position on Cuba. 

Conclusion 

This article notes that, Havana matters to Washington mainly because of its geographical proximity and its socialist regime as well as its cooperation with American adversaries. This makes regime change in Cuba a major strategic goal for the United States. However, since the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington has failed to achieve its foreign policy objective of regime change in Cuba. The presence of an adversarial regime in Havana poses a direct threat of the US vision of the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of American influence, a key goal of the Monroe doctrine. This also allows American adversaries including Russia and China to establish a presence in the US zone of influence to directly pose a challenge to American hegemony in the region and use Cuba’s strategic location to gain influence in Latin America, an event that would weaken American dominance over the Caribbean and Latin America and allow its adversaries to have influence on strategic waterways like the Panama Canal. This poses an existential threat for the United States because of which it seeks to assert control over Havana and establish a friendly regime in the country. But US historical strategic failures in Cuba and the recent policies of the Trump administration appear to indicate that tensions are expected to continue. 

China’s Infrastructure Development along the LAC: Warning Bells for India  

By : Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN

China’s Infrastructure Development along LAC : Source Internet

Introduction 

India has always looked at The Himalayas as an asset. A terrain which was arduous to navigate, providing the subcontinent with a natural barrier against colonial threats from Central Asia. The following geographical advantage seems to be under siege as China develops dual-use infrastructure to transform the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas. The seclusion of the region, which was considered a demerit, has been converted into an operational advantage. These developments have been formidable as China aims at expanding its strategic dominance.  

While the Border Roads Organization publishes yearly updates, with infrastructural advancements gradually progress in the region of Arunachal Pradesh, the question that lingers is the comparative advantage provided by these developments. China has developed roads covering more than 600km in Tibet in the last decade. The runways with the capacity of managing heavy-lift aircraft at Shigatze and Hotan, and a network of villages complement the objective of projecting a strategic dominance even further. 

Moreover, the confrontations as Doklam and Galwan have showcased Chinese intentions at pursuing its objective, even it takes making intimidating advances. India’s approach of investing into pluralistic alliances and pragmatically assessing its strategy to satisfy its national interests can be threatened if China gains geographic leverage. The following article delves into the bells that have rung, trying to assess the extent of the threat and carving India’s path of tackling these jeopardizing advances. 

Background  

It has been six years since the vehement Galwan clash happened, and India has lacked in its response to ensure a safety net in case of a recurrence. The policy recommendations look reactionary and symbolic in nature as India aims at investing in ISR, build infrastructure alongside the LAC, while banning Chinese applications and strict FDI approval screenings. A critical question that arises is whether we are even tackling the right problem?  

China’s buildup along the lines of LAC, have been considered as a measure of projecting its force and dominance in the region, and aid in any kind of aggressive advancements in the future. However, it also serves as a political purpose, where it is altering the baseline of the amount of presence considered normal in a disputed region, from both psychological and legal domains. If India approaches this issue from a strictly militaristic lens, it might tackle the threat of an aggressive Chinese advancement soon but still lose the border dispute. 

Urgency  

The urgency of this matter has intensified in the last three years, established from the two cases as follows: 

  • The troop disengagement at Depsang Plains and Demchok in 2024, have been followed by continued construction activities moderated by the Chinese leadership in other non-disengaged sectors like the Pangong – Tso sector. Beijing disengagements instead of reflecting its compatibility, showcases its tactical approach with the strategic build-up sustaining in the background. 
     
     
  • China’s multi-billion railway expansion into Tibet, which incorporates the successful completion of the first phase of the buildup the Sichuan – Tibet Railway and the Xinjiang -Tibet Railway, that run close to the LAC. These developments completely alter the current scenario as it facilitates PLA mobilization in delicate border regions. 

However, these developments are not immediate, but a process that has continued for a couple of decades now. It is critical to understand the Chinese strategy of Salami Slicing and then observe the gradual build-up in these regions.  

Sustenance before Strike – The Risk of Salami Slicing  

The most significant change in the military scenario alongside the Himalayas, Tibet, and the LAC is the PLA’s capacity and capability to endure, apart from its overwhelming arsenal. The Chinese expansion via the Salami Slicing way, has been following a consistent series of events, where the build infrastructure in the disputed territory, enhance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the region, gradually gulping it into the new status quo. 

The Case of the Depsang Bulge and Galwan valley  

The Depsang Bulge is a region which is controversial as it finds itself very close to the LAC. In late-2010s and 2020, China started crucial infrastructure buildup in the region. This was followed by a blockade of Indian access to five patrolling points in these Depsang plains. During the clash at the Galwan valley, Beijing had already gained leverage in these regions before the physical clash even began. Each of these steps were too minor for India to take a significant action, but detrimental in establishing influence in the region. 

Recent Developments  

China has created a network of all-weather roads, tunnels and forward supply posts encompassing the region of Tibet, which facilitates the expansion of PLA at LAC flashpoints within 3 days.  

Beijing has also expanded its accommodation capacity alongside the PLA, employing a strategy of Civil-Military Fusion using dual-use villages, with these settlements expanding to more than 600 in the last decade through the Xiaokang Border Village Programme.  

The villages of Mayjam and Pangda in Arunachal Pradesh documented by satellites, have shown reinforcements, communication towers, and infrastructure irregular with agricultural requirements. 

The Moldo-Garrison complex, which incorporates ammunition stores, helicopter landing paddocks, and pre-positioned fuel, portrays the region being prepared for sustaining combat operations, rather than patrolling.  

India, on the contrary, works along the lines of Ladakh, enhancing road connectivity, which was sanctioned more than a decade ago. It also portrays its disagreements regarding these build-ups, protesting these actions in the international arena. 

The gap in infrastructure and promptness is alarming for India, as it can turn out to be a significant factor in the honest assessment.  

The Two Front War 

These developments aren’t limited to LAC but are based on a pattern that has led to the creation of a nexus, afflicting the border dynamics for India. One major example for the following developments can be the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Karakoram Highway Expansion, which is gradually strengthening China and Pakistan’s military-economic relations. Moreover, PLA’s operations alongside the LAC, with Pakistan engaging the LOC has create a two-front scenario. 

The structure of India’s Military forces wasn’t built in a way to sustain a way alongside 4000+ kms of active frontier deployment. Moreover, China’s continuous investment and advancement along the LAC and assistanceprovided to Pakistan for deployment, has proved this possibility to gradually become a potential military strategy.  

Compounding both these threats creates a surveillance of asymmetry which increases the risk exponentially. China’s deployed infrastructure, include its SIGINT stations, and electronic warfare systems with the capability of high-altitude UAV operations near the Pangong Tso, provides Beijing access to view India’s deployments. China also has a leverage in electronic warfare, which gives it an advantage in the first few hours of an active conflict. 

Therefore, we come back to the question of whether we are preparing on the right front. An adversary that can see you better than how you see them, doesn’t require deception to surprise.  

Policy Recommendations and Suggestions 

Asking Appropriate Questions 

India uses the kilometers of road complete as a standard unit of benchmark used by the Border Roads Organization to highlight the border infrastructure progress. Change this metric to one that facilitates border connectivity. The question relevant to discourse is – How quickly can a brigade reach a contested space?  

The Ministry of Defence can publish an Index -LAC Connectivity Index, which compares China’s capability against India’s growing infrastructure sector by sector, and demonstrates India’s operational readiness. 

Create a Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell. 

There is no dedicated Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell to track Chinese construction along the Borders. While the Border Roads Organization, Defence Intelligence Agency, and National Technical Research Organization work in this domain, they function separately. There is no platform where the resources can be pooled, and a more coordinated approach can be taken. 

Build a Minilateral Narrative  

China has created more than just blocs and understandings. China has also created a narrative revolving around connectivity, shared prosperity and development. While India has worked along the same lines, it is reactionary in nature. India has created a security architecture with QUAD, CSC and IONS, while blocs like IMEC for economic strategy.  

India can use these groupings for information sharing through satellite imagery in times of conflict, a diplomatic support against civil military fusion strategy employed by China and boost its strategies of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR with the help of other partners to create a narrative of India’s intent at being the first responder and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean Region to gain credibility countering China’s influence built through the BRI. 

The Mountain Strike Corps 

New Delhi should rewrite the mandate of the Mountain Strike Corps. An offensive response formation can be used as a tool of deterrence with a framework that incorporates a forward deterrence posture, with pre-positioned and pre-delegated authority. 

Prepare for the Emerging Domains of Warfare 

China has been preparing for a multi-domain warfare possibility, and India needs to respond in a similar fashion.  

  • A theatre level command structure should be created for electronic and cyberwarfare. 
  • Include these areas of warfare in the Joint Military Doctrine and devise a well-structured plan for each of these domains. 
  • Joint exercises and training programmes should be held with QUAD countries to improve awareness and enhance preparation. 

Conclusion 

The alarm bells have been rung and the threat on India increases every day. What is crucial right now is to dive into the fundamentals and find the right questions to address. The Chinese Salami Slicing tactic has been in progress since the last two decades now. As the Chinese advancement gets more aggressive India needs to prepare to dissuade, deter and defend its territory. The concept and manifestation of warfare is diversifying, and India needs to take prompt action in each of those directions. 

INDIA’S GEOPOLITICAL STANDING IN SOUTH ASIA 

By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

India’s Stand In South Asia

South Asia occupies a position of immense strategic importance in global geopolitics. Home to nearly one-fourth of the world’s population, the region serves as a bridge between the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. At the heart of this region stands India, the largest country in South Asia in terms of geography, population, economic size, military capability, historical legacy and diplomatic influence. All these factors shape India’s geopolitical standing in South Asia. After becoming independent in 1947, India has sought to establish itself as a regional leader while balancing complex relationships with neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan. In recent decades, India’s rise as a major global power has further enhanced its influence in South Asia. However, challenges such as regional rivalries, border disputes, terrorism, political instability in neighbouring states, and increasing Chinese involvement have complicated India’s efforts to maintain regional primacy. 

Geographical Significance  

India’s geographical position is one of its most important strategic assets. Located at the center of South Asia, India shares land borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while maintainingmaritime proximity to Sri Lanka and Maldives. India’s location allows it to influence major trade routes across the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is one of the world’s busiest maritime regions, carrying a substantial portion of global energy supplies and commercial shipping. India’s long coastline of over 7,500 kilometers and its island territories, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, provide strategic advantages in monitoring maritime activities. The country’s central position enables it to act as a gateway between East and West Asia. This strategic location enhances India’s role in regional connectivity, trade corridors and maritime security. It also provides India with significant influence over the security of South Asia.  

Impact of Population 

India’s population plays a crucial role in shaping its geopolitical standing in South Asia. As the world’s most populous country, India possesses significant demographic advantages that enhance its economic strength, military capabilities, diplomatic influence, and regional leadership. At the same time, managing such a vast population presents challenges that affect its regional and global ambitions. A large population provides India with a vast labor force and consumer market. This advantage has contributed to India’s emergence as one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies. Population size provides a large pool for military recruitment. India maintains one of the world’s largest armed forces, enabling it to project power and maintain security across South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. India’s large population contributes to its cultural and diplomatic influence. The country’s diverse cultural traditions, educational institutions, entertainment industry, and technological expertise enhance its soft power across the region. India’s demographic weight also gives it greater representation and influence in international forums such as the United Nations, G20, and BRICS. This international influence reinforces its leadership position in South Asia. India’s huge domestic market attracts foreign investment and promotes regional economic integration. Neighboring countries often seek access to Indian markets for exports, trade, and employment opportunities. A young and growing population provides India with significant human capital. Advances in education, technology, innovation, and entrepreneurship have helped India become a major player in information technology, digital services, pharmaceuticals, and space research. At the same time, a large population places significant pressure on food supplies, water resources, energy demand, healthcare systems, and housing and infrastructure.  

Role of Rising Economy

Economic strength forms the foundation of India’s geopolitical standing. India is among the world’s largest economies and has become a major destination for foreign investment, technology development and manufacturing. India’s economic growth has enabled it to extend development assistance and investment to neighboring countries. Through grants, loans, infrastructure projects, and technical cooperation, India has strengthened ties with countries across South Asia. It has engaged in initiatives such as the Hydropower cooperation with Bhutan, Infrastructure and connectivity projects in Nepal, Development assistance to Afghanistan, Railway and energy cooperation with Bangladesh, Port and housing projects in Sri Lanka and infrastructure and capacity-building support for Maldives. Trade relationships also reinforce India’s regional influence. Bangladesh has emerged as one of India’s largest trading partners in South Asia, while Nepal and Bhutan remain highly dependent on economic exchanges with India. India’s growing digital economy, technological capabilities, and pharmaceutical industry further enhance its soft power and economic attractiveness. During the COVID-19 pandemic, India’s vaccine diplomacy demonstrated its ability to provide public goods to neighbouring countries and strengthen regional goodwill.  

Military Dominance 

India possesses one of the most powerful militaries in South Asia. Its armed forces rank among the largest in the world, supported by advanced conventional capabilities and a growing defense-industrial base. India’s military strength serves several geopolitical purposes such as protection of territorial integrity, deterrence against external threats, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and peacekeeping and regional stabilization. India is also a nuclear-armed state, which significantly enhances its strategic standing. The development of a credible nuclear deterrent has strengthened India’s position in comparison to Pakistan and contributed to regional strategic stability. The Indian Navy has become increasingly important in safeguarding sea lanes and countering maritime threats. Through naval exercises, coastal surveillance networks, and defense partnerships with other states, India has reinforced its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. India’s military interventions and assistance in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and humanitarian missions across the region demonstrate its capacity to dominate the regional security system. India is also involved in multiple military exercises taking place across the world by participating and competing in almost all the continents. This helps the armed forces to learn about their position in the world and exchange knowledge, technical and technological expertise while maintaining friendly relations with other participating states.  

Historical Legacy

India’s geopolitical importance in South Asia is rooted in history. For centuries, the Indian subcontinent was connected through shared cultural, religious, and economic networks. Ancient kingdoms, trade routes, and religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism spread across the region from the Indian heartland. During the Cold War, India played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. By advocating strategic autonomy and avoiding alignment with either superpower bloc, India gained respect among newly independent states. Following independence, India’s leaders envisioned the country as a stabilizing force in South Asia. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized regional cooperation and peaceful coexistence. India’s support for the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 demonstrated its willingness to shape regional developments when its strategic interests were involved. Over time, India emerged as the dominant regional actor due to its overwhelming demographic, economic, and military advantages. India’s historical prominence sometimes creates concerns among neighbouring countries about Indian dominance. Due to its size, economic power, and historical influence, some states fear excessive dependence on India. These concerns occasionally encourage smaller South Asian countries to seek alternative partnerships with external powers, particularly China. Consequently, India’s historical centrality can be both a source of influence and a diplomatic challenge. 

Diplomatic Influence

India’s diplomatic influence is one of the most important factors shaping its geopolitical standing in South Asia. India uses diplomacy to maintain regional stability, promote economic integration, counter external influences and strengthen its leadership role. Through diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, India seeks to foster political stability and maintain friendly governments. Its ‘Neighborhood First’ policy emphasizes close cooperation and mutual development, enhancing India’s leadership. India’s economic diplomacy strengthens its geopolitical position by creating interdependence with neighboring states. Through trade agreements, development assistance, infrastructure projects, and investment initiatives, India promotes regional connectivity. India’s diplomatic standing is strengthened by its soft power resources such as cultural ties, Bollywood and media influence, educational opportunities, religious and historical connections and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. India uses regional organizations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to advance cooperation on trade, security, and development. While SAARC has faced challenges due to India-Pakistan tensions, BIMSTEC has emerged as an important platform linking South and Southeast Asia and enhancing India’s regional influence.  

The Trade War inside your MacBook

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By: Upasna Mishra

MacBook: source Internet

There was a time, not so long ago, when buying a new MacBook felt like a genuine investment in the future. It was expensive, yes, but it was a known quantity—a premium for premium engineering. That calculus has shifted. Over the past eighteen months, Apple has quietly but decisively raised the floor on its entire Mac lineup, from the entry-level MacBook Air to the powerhouse Mac Studio. While the company points to inflation and component costs, a more unsettling truth lies beneath the surface. The price of a laptop is no longer just about silicon and aluminium; it is about geopolitical survival, and the cost of that survival is being passed directly from the boardroom to the consumer.

The connection between a sleek aluminium chassis and a rare earth mining operation in China’s Inner Mongolia might seem tenuous, but it is the most critical link in Apple’s manufacturing chain. Every MacBook, every iMac, and every Mac Pro relies on a constellation of rare earth elements to function. They are in the magnets that close the lid with a satisfying snap, in the vibration-dampening components that keep fans quiet, and crucially, in the speakers and display hinges that give the device its premium feel. For years, this was a non-issue. China, which controls roughly eighty percent of the global supply of these elements, sold them cheaply and reliably. It was the invisible hand of a globalised market that kept prices stable and profit margins fat. The trade war, however, has changed everything.

That era of benign neglect is over. The world has woken up to the realisation that a single nation holding a monopoly over the building blocks of modern technology is not a convenience but a vulnerability. As geopolitical tensions have escalated, Beijing has made it clear that it views these resources not as commodities but as leverage. Export restrictions, sudden supply squeezes, and production quotas have become the new normal. For Apple, a company that prides itself on manufacturing precision and inviolable timelines, this unpredictability is existential. A delay in the delivery of neodymium for a display unit or dysprosium for a power management system does not just delay a single machine; it disrupts an entire quarterly forecast. The trade war is not being fought on distant battlefields; it is being fought inside the very components of your computer.

Apple’s response has been decisive, but it is a strategy that carries a heavy price tag. The company has embarked on an ambitious and deeply expensive campaign to rewire its supply chain from the ground up. This involves more than simply signing new contracts; it requires building an entirely new industrial ecosystem outside of China. Apple has committed hundreds of millions of dollars to develop sources of rare earth materials in the United States, Australia, and Europe. It is also pioneering efforts to increase its use of recycled rare earth elements, a noble goal, but one that is currently more expensive and less efficient than virgin mining. The company is essentially building a parallel universe of supply, one that is guaranteed to be free of geopolitical interference, but also guaranteed to be more costly. In essence, Apple is constructing a fortress around its supply chain, and the bricks are expensive.

This strategic pivot is not a choice but a necessity. Apple is a company with an unparalleled reputation for controlling its own destiny. The thought of its most iconic products being held hostage by a foreign power is anathema to its corporate identity. Yet, the capital expenditure required to mine, process, and manufacture these materials outside of China is staggering. We are not simply paying for a new mine in Texas or a processing plant in Australia; we are paying for the decades of expertise and infrastructure that China has already invested in. Replicating that overnight is impossible, and doing it at all requires a premium that must ultimately be accounted for. The trade war has forced Apple to become a miner, a refiner, and a manufacturer all at once, roles it never sought but must now embrace. The cost of this vertical integration, while strategically sound, is monumental and inevitably finds its way into the final price of every device.

The consequences for the consumer are already visible on the price tags of the latest Mac line-up. The base model MacBook Air, once a gateway device, now commands a price that feels uncomfortably close to the professional tier of a few years ago. The Mac mini, a beloved entry-level machine for students and creative professionals, has seen its starting price creep steadily upward. Even the more specialised machines, like the Mac Studio and the Mac Pro, have witnessed significant hikes that cannot be explained away by mere chip upgrades or improved displays. These are not arbitrary adjustments; they are a reflection of the new economic reality. The cost of a magnet is no longer just the cost of the metal; it is the cost of the geopolitical insurance required to secure it. Every time you open your wallet for a new laptop, you are contributing to a war chest designed to free Apple from the grip of a foreign adversary.

There is a broader economic lesson here that extends far beyond Cupertino. For decades, the Western world benefited from the “China price”—the artificially low cost of goods produced under a different set of environmental, labour, and political rules. We built our economy on the assumption that cheap manufacturing would last forever. We are now unlearning that assumption in real-time, and the tuition fees are being paid at the checkout. The move toward resilient supply chains is a positive development for long-term national security, but it is a direct contradiction to the consumer capitalism that has defined the last thirty years. The trade war has exposed the fragility of our prosperity and is forcing us to confront an uncomfortable truth: security has a price, and that price is now being itemised on every receipt for a new computer.

This is a dilemma that Apple cannot market its way out of. The sleek product videos, the environmental pledges, and the promises of revolutionary power are all true, but they are accessories to the central fact that the laptop has become a geopolitical artefact. When you buy a new Mac, you are not just buying a machine; you are buying into a complex system of de-risking, of reshoring, of strategic independence. And that independence, as history has shown time and again, is never cheap. The company’s marketing machine can spin a narrative of innovation and sustainability, but it cannot mask the fundamental truth that the era of frictionless globalisation is over.

Ultimately, the rising cost of a laptop is a taste of the future. As the world fragments into competing economic blocs, the seamless, frictionless globalisation we took for granted is giving way to a more expensive, more fractured reality. We will pay more for our electronics, not because the technology is necessarily better, but because the peace that allowed for its cheap production has been broken. The aluminium shell of the new MacBook is a fortress, designed to protect the delicate components within. But the price we pay to enter that fortress is a reflection of the walls we are building around the global economy itself. The trade war inside your MacBook is real, and it is only just beginning. What we are witnessing is not a temporary price correction but a permanent restructuring of the global technological order, and the consumer is bearing the heaviest burden.

General Dhiraj Seth: Fine Officer in the Command of the World’s Finest Army

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retired), Editor, GSDN

General Dhiraj Seth: source Internet

Anyone who has interacted with General Dhiraj Seth, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, ADC right from his days as a cadet of the 69 NDA course in the Foxtrot Squadron of National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla in the 1980s, to the announcement of the General Officer being appointed as the 31st Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of the Indian Army on June 18, 2026, was certain that the General Officer would be the Indian Army Chief one day.

As General Dhiraj Seth, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, ADC assumes the command of the 1.2 million strong Indian Army as its 31st COAS today, it is an appropriate reflection of the brilliant career that General Dhiraj Seth has had over the last 40 years in the olive greens that spans important command, staff and instructional appointments.

Commissioned on December 20, 1986 in 2 Lancers, an elite regiment of the Armoured Corps of the Indian Army, the General Officer went on to command Skinners Horse, another distinguished armoured regiment. 

The COAS has topped every course that he has done in the Indian Army, notably being the Young Officers Course where he was awarded the Silver Centurion, the Instructor Course, the Junior Command Course and the Defence Services Staff College Course where he bagged the Scudder Medal, the French Staff & Command Course in Paris and the Anti-Terrorist Course in the US Pacific Command, Hawaii.

The Army Chief has commanded an Armoured Brigade, the Uniform Force deployed in counter-insurgency operations, and a Strike Corps, apart from being the General Officer Commanding, Delhi Area during which he commanded the Republic Day Parade.

General Dhiraj Seth has the distinction of having commanded two commands of the Indian Army – the South Western Command and the Southern Command, moving on to becoming the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, before assuming the command of the Indian Army as its 31st COAS today.

In the interview to the Global Strategic & Defence News, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Ashok Mehta, AVSM, VSM (Retired), who was the Squadron Commander in 2 Lancers when the then Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) Dhiraj Seth joined the regiment in December 1986 after commissioning, as Operation Brasstacks was ongoing, vividly recalls the evening when 2/Lt (later General) Dhiraj Seth reported to him being his first Squadron Commander.

Lt Gen Ashok Mehta states that he was impressed by the demeanour and soldierly bearing of 2/Lt (later General) Dhiraj Seth and the initial training to him in the regiment was under the guidance and supervision of Lt Gen Ashok Mehta, in which 2/Lt (later General) Dhiraj Seth excelled and earned a place of pride amongst the troops and officers of 2 Lancers. Lt Gen Ashok Mehta recounts that way back, he was sanguine that 2/Lt (later General) Dhiraj Seth would rise to the very top in the Indian Army.

Another Indian Army Veteran, Lt Gen PS Mehta, AVSM, VSM (Retired) of the Skinners Horse, while speaking to the Global Strategic & Defence News, fondly recounted the decades-long personal, social and professional association with General & Mrs Dhiraj Seth, the First Couple of the Indian Army, adding that the couple are par-excellence known for their humbleness and humility.

Lt Gen PS Mehta (Retired) remembered the COAS being his student in the coveted Higher Command Course in the Army War College, Mhow, recollecting Colonel (later General) Dhiraj Seth as a soft-spoken, well-mannered and exceptionally brilliant officer whose taking over as the COAS is an apt recognition of his brilliant career and the wonderful persona he espouses immensely well.

General Dhiraj Seth’s elevation as the 31st COAS of the Indian Army comes at a critical time when the regional geopolitical turbulence in South Asia is increasing and the next two years would see greater impetus to the ongoing transformations in the Indian Army to make it more technology-driven, networked and self-reliant force.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24

General Upendra Dwivedi: The Chief who led the Indian Army to Victory

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retired), Editor, GSDN

General Upendra Dwivedi: source Internet

On May 07, 2025 at 1.05 am as India attacked Pakistan in what would become the 88-hour war which was codenamed “Operation Sindoor”, General Upendra Dwivedi, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Indian Army was sanguine that the Indian Army would emerge victorious in the tasks assigned to the world’s finest army that he was commanding as its Chief.

It is the dream of every officer who serves in any nation’s army to become its chief and to emerge victorious in any war that the officer fights for his/her nation. And General Upendra Dwivedi achieved both!

Commissioned on December 15, 1984 in the Jammu & Kashmir Rifles known as JAK RIF, a distinguished regiment of the Infantry of the Indian Army, General Upendra Dwivedi assumed the command of the Indian Army as its 30th COAS on June 30, 2024 and led the Indian Army to victory, as yet again India defeated Pakistan in the hard-hitting swift and short war “Operation Sindoor”, the fifth military conflict between India and Pakistan since 1947.

As the tenure of General Upendra Dwivedi as the Indian Army’s 30th COAS comes to an end today, the Chief would be remembered for the yeoman service rendered to India while commanding the world’s finest army.

General Upendra Dwivedi’s tenure highlights included the rapid progress of the Indian Army for modernisation, operational preparedness, technology adoption and defence indigenisation, taking the organisation towards becoming a technology-driven and future-ready force.

Last year, the Army Chief spelt-out the five pillars of the army transformation which included – technology absorption, structural reforms, human resource development, greater jointness amongst the three Services and outcome-oriented military effectiveness.

With the aim of greater operational preparedness and creating a more agile and multi-domain force, General Upendra Dwivedi ordered the raising of Rudra all-arms brigades, Bhairav light commando battalions, Shaktibaan artillery regiments and Divyastra batteries.

General Upendra Dwivedi in his two-year long tenure as the COAS ensured large-scale integration of drones in the world’s second biggest standing army, while also focussing on counter-drone capabilities, the results of which were evident during Operation Sindoor as the Indian Army successfully thwarted the drones sent across in huge numbers by Pakistan.

Brigadier Naveen Singh, Vr.C, VSM (Retired), who was the Gentlemen Cadet under the COAS when he was posted as Instructor in the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, eventually getting commissioned in JAK RIF, in an interview with the Global Strategic & Defence News, recounted fondly the decades-long association with General Upendra Dwivedi, describing him as well-read, humble and with honesty of purpose.

Brigadier Naveen Singh (Retired) further went on to add that while serving under the Army Chief when he was the Colonel Q of a formation in which the Brigadier was then commanding an Assam Rifles Battalion and then again when the Chief was Director General Infantry and the Brigadier was commanding an Infantry Brigade, the professionalism as well as the humane touch that General Upendra Dwivedi exhibited while interacting with Brigadier Naveen Singh (Retired), left him mesmerised by the clarity in thought process that the Army Chief exhibited.

Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Mukul Kulkarni (Retired), while speaking to the Global Strategic & Defence News, spoke with pride of being the Second-in-Command of the COAS when he was commanding 18 JAK RIF, adding that the Chief was the first commissioned officer of 18 JAK RIF to command the battalion, further describing the COAS as an extremely hardworking, rational and immensely professional, who always led from the front.

Lt Col Mukul Kulkarni (Retd) recounted an interesting incident when the battalion under the command of Colonel (later General) Upendra Dwivedi, came second in the Battle Physical Efficiency Test Competition conducted in the Infantry Brigade, that the battalion was part of, due to not performing well in the monkey-rope test.  Consequently, Colonel (later General) Upendra Dwivedi, ensured that every personnel of the battalion before proceeding on leave would pass the monkey-rope test and would personally stand to watch it happen. As a result, 18 JAK RIF won the next year’s Battle Physical Efficiency Test Competition of the Infantry Brigade!

After a distinguished service of nearly 42 years, General Upendra Dwivedi’s tenure as the Indian Army’s 30th COAS will be remembered for the leadership during Operation Sindoor, technology-driven military transformation, the expansion of drone warfare capabilities, strengthening the Tri-Services jointness and structural reforms for multidomain operations.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

Historic Passing Out Parade of Agniveers in the Indian Army: BEG Khadki Shines yet Again

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retired), Editor, GSDN

Passing Out Parade in BEG Khadki: source Author

In a historic and grand passing out ceremony marked by immaculate military precision and patriotic fervour, 2,038 Agniveers of the Bombay Engineer Group and Centre, Khadki, successfully passed out and joined Engineer Regiments of the Bombay Sappers of the Corps of Engineers of the Indian Army, on June 27, 2026. 

This is the highest number of Agniveers that have passed out on any single day amongst all the Regimental Centres of the Indian Army, thus creating a new record in India. These figures are the second highest in the world after Nigeria.

Marching during the Passing Out Parade: source Author

The Passing Out Parade was conducted at the Parade Ground of the Bombay Sappers, where Army Day Parade 2025 was held with military grandeur & decorum. Commandant, BEG & Centre reviewed the parade & complimented the Agniveers on their exemplary turnout, discipline and outstanding standards of drill.

Addressing the newly inducted soldiers, the Commandant reminded them that, as Bombay Sappers, they inherit a proud legacy spanning more than 206 years, a legacy distinguished by courage, professionalism, innovation and unwavering service to the nation. He exhorted them to uphold these traditions with integrity and dedication while embracing emerging technologies that are redefining the nature of modern warfare.

Marching: source Author

The ceremony was made even more memorable by the presence of nearly 8,000 family members, whose enthusiastic participation reflected the pride and aspirations associated with the occasion. In recognition of the unwavering support and sacrifices of the parents, Gaurav Padaks were presented to parents as a token of gratitude from IA.

These trained techno-soldiers will be deployed to various frontline and field formations of the Indian Army, where they will enhance the operational preparedness of formations by providing vital engineering support, build critical border infrastructure and assist in peacetime disaster relief operations.

Agniveer with proud parents: source Author

Apt is the saying for this historic occasion stated by the US General Norman Schwarzkopf “The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war” as the 2,038 Agniveers head to their respective Engineer Regiments in the service of India.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

Why Spratly Islands matter to China

By: Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Spratly Islands: source Internet

The Spratly Islands are a scattered collection of reefs, shoals, atolls, and small islands located in the South China Sea. It has become one of the most contested territories in contemporary international politics. At first glance, these remote and largely uninhabited islands may seem insignificant. However, below the surface lies a complex mix of history, national identity, economic interests, strategic competition and geopolitical rivalry. Many countries like China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have claimed all or parts of the Spratly Islands. Among these claimants China has emerged as the most assertive actor, investing heavily in infrastructure, military facilities and the artificial island construction to strengthen its presence in the region. Instead, their importance comes from the combination of strategic location, historical claims, valuable resources, and security concerns control over important maritime lanes, access to lucrative natural resources and much more general desires to become a dominant global force. China considers the islands to be an essential component of its maritime security strategy and a fundamental part of its own territory. However, some nations view China’s moves as an attempt to control the South China Sea and change of the balance of power in that region. 

Tensions surrounding the Spratly Islands have escalated in the recent years. What was once a relatively unnoticed territorial conflict it has become a major international problem due to the creation of artificial islands, the deployment of military equipment and frequent confrontations between the Chinese and Philippine boats. The region’s strategic importance has been further enhanced by the participation of outside countries like the United States and Japan. 

This article explores why the Spratly Islands matter so much to China. It examines the historical background of the dispute, the economic and the energy resources associated with the islands , their military and strategic importance and the broader implications for regional security and the international politics. 

Understanding the Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands are spread across a vast area of the South China Sea, covering approximately 409,000 square kilometres. Most of the features are small reefs, rocks and waves , many of which are submerged during high tide. Despite their limited land area the islands occupy a strategically important position between Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. 

The islands have not received much attention in the past. Because of its dangerous barrier reefs due to these traders and navigators frequently avoided the area while the fishermen occasionally came to fish and gather the turtle items.

Many countries started claiming sovereignty over the islands after Japan surrendered and renounced its territorial claims in the year 1951. Based on various historical and geographical justifications. Countries like China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines all claimed the ownership. Over time, however, the dispute intensified as countries realized the region’s growing strategic and the economic value. 

The Spratly Islands are special because their significance comes from their extensive oceanic zones and resources rather than their land size. Ownership of islands became associated with rights over nearby waterways and seafloor resources as international law developed especially with the passage of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, even small islands gained significant strategic importance. 

Historical Claims and China’s Perspective

China’s historical claim to the Spratly Islands is one of the primary reasons why they are important. Chinese officials often claim that the islands have been used for centuries by the Chinese sailors and fisherman. China claims that maps and historical documents show Chinese control over the South China Sea and its island groups, including the Spratly Islands.

The Nine-Dash Line a U-shaped border that covers the majority of the South China Sea is frequently used to represent China’s viewpoint. China claims that this line represents China’s historical rights in that region. China’s territorial claims are based on the Nine-Dash Line despite the fact that its exact legal meaning is still under debate. 

The problem for China goes past  the geography and resources. As it is directly connected to their national pride and sovereignty. Chinese authorities often cite historical instances in which foreign powers captured Chinese territory and enforced unfair treaties on China.

 As a result, China’s national identity is deeply tied to undoing these historical grievances. Today, the Spratly Islands are a potent symbol of modern Chinese sovereignty, where any diplomatic compromise would be viewed domestically as a sign of weakness.

Economic Significance

For China, the Spratly Islands are very important economically. Their proximity to some of the most significant maritime trade routes in the globe is one of the factor.

An important route for international trade is the South China Sea. Each year, A significant portion of global trade connects the East Asia with Europe, Africa and the Middle East via these seas. Uninterrupted access to these marine routes is crucial for China the largest trade nation in the world.

Greater influence over the Spratly Islands would strengthen China’s position along some of the world’s most important maritime routes.  A larger presence in the area improves China’s capacity to monitor and possibly safeguard the marine trade which is crucial for its economy, even though China does not openly aim to limit the shipping for commercial purposes. 

Beyond shipping, the South China Sea holds some of the world’s most lucrative fishing grounds. These waters sustain millions of livelihoods across Asia. For China, which operates the world’s largest fishing fleet, securing dominant access to these fisheries is a matter of long-term food security. China would be better able to protect the resources and fishing rights for its people if it gained control over the Spratly Islands. 

Energy Security and Natural Resources

Energy security is another major reason why the Spratly Islands matter to China. 

There are substantial natural gas and oil deposits in the South China Sea according to various estimations. According to some estimates the larger region has about 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. According to other estimates, the waters around the Spratly Islands may hold huge quantities of natural gas and billions of barrels of accessible oil.

The possibility for significant energy resources has drawn a lot of attention from the claiming governments, despite the fact that overlapping sovereignty claims have frozen major exploration efforts. This untapped potential is highly attractive to China. Despite being a top global energy producer, China’s rapid economic growth forces it to rely heavily on foreign oil and gas imports. 

Therefore, the Spratly Islands are seen by Chinese authorities as a potential source of strategic energy resources that could foster sustained economic growth. 

Military and Strategic Importance

The Spratly Islands are important to China for military reasons, which might be the main factor.

The islands are strategically located in the middle of the South China Sea. A country can monitor marine trade, carry out surveillance activities and project military might over a wide area by controlling these features.

Recognizing these advantages China has steadily expanded its presence in the Spratly Islands over the past decade. China started increasing land reclamation efforts in the 2014 transforming the underwater features and reefs into the man-made islands. Also on one of these reclaimed features, China had built a functional airstrip by March 2015. 

Airfields, ports, radar systems, communication centres and other military infrastructure are now located on these man-made islands. Chinese planes and navy boats may operate further from the mainland and establish a more permanent presence in the area thanks to these structures.

By making it more difficult for opposing forces to operate freely in the South China Sea the military analysts believe that these installations enhance China’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Additionally, the islands serve Chinese coast guard ships and navy missions logistically.

China believes that by establishing defensive positions that safeguard China’s southern maritime accesses, these initiatives enhance national security.

The Exclusive Economic Zone Factor

The Spratly Islands are becoming much more important because of the idea of the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Coastal states can claim an Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). States in this area have unique rights regarding the discovery and the use of natural resources.

By increasing a nation’s access to nearby waterways and bottom resources island control might affect maritime claims. Because of this, owning even small islands can have significant strategic and financial advantages.

Control over the Spratly Islands may provide China more access to natural resources like fisheries and hydrocarbons, and also strengthen its claims to bigger marine areas. This explains China’s strong emphasis on preserving and growing its influence in that region. 

China’s Artificial Island Strategy

One of the most controversial aspects of China’s South China Sea policy has been its artificial island construction program.

 China started large-scale land reclamation work on a number of Spratly Islands reefs and atolls in the early 2010s. Larger land masses that could support both military and civilian infrastructure were created using sand and building materials.

These initiatives have created large complexes with runways, ports, barracks, radar stations and defense systems from previously hidden or hardly developed features.

China claims that these installations aid in national defense, scientific research, disaster relief, and maritime safety. However, some believe that the projects main goals are to strengthen Chinese territorial claims and increase military power.

Regardless of China’s official civilian framing, these outposts have fundamentally altered the strategic landscape, giving China a permanent militarized launchpad deep inside contested waters. 

Regional and International Reactions

China’s activities in the Spratly Islands have generated strong reactions from neighbouring countries.

Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all have conflicting claims to the portions of the South China Sea. Many of these nations see China’s moves as an attempt to undermine their own territorial claims and change the status quo.

The Philippines has been very outspoken in criticizing Chinese actions. Manila started UNCLOS arbitration procedures in January 2013. On July 12, 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration found that China’s broad maritime claims had no legal foundation under the treaty, which was mostly in favor of the Philippines.

China refused to acknowledge the tribunal’s jurisdiction and rejected the ruling, calling it as illegitimate. 

The dispute has also attracted the attention of external powers. The United States has repeatedly emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation and has conducted naval operations in the region to challenge what it considers excessive maritime claims. 

Japan has likewise increased security cooperation with Southeast Asian states by providing maritime equipment and support to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam.

Implications for China’s Regional Ambitions

The Spratly Islands are closely connected to China’s broader ambition of becoming the leading power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Control over these islands enhances China’s ability to influence regional security dynamics, protect maritime trade routes, secure energy resources and project military power. The islands also serve as symbols of China’s determination to defend what it considers its historical rights and territorial sovereignty.

At the same time, China’s actions have contributed to concerns among the neighbouring countries encouraging closer security cooperation between Southeast Asian states and external powers such as the United States and Japan.

As a result, the Spratly Islands have become a focal point in the broader competition for influence in Asia. 

Conclusion

The Spratly Islands matter to China for multiple interconnected reasons. They have always been associated with Chinese national identity and sovereignty claims. They are economically close to important shipping lanes and rich fishing areas. From a strategic standpoint they offer access to potentially important natural gas and oil resources. Militarily, they offer platforms for observation, force projection and defense operations in the South China Sea.

China’s significant spending in military facilities, artificial islands and maritime surveillance show how important the area is to China. But these actions have also heightened tensions with major powers, especially the United States and escalated disagreements with neighbouring countries.

 In my view, the Spratly Islands issue is unlikely to be resolved in the near future because too many political, economic, and security interests are involved. China sees the islands as essential for its national security and regional influence, while other claiming states view Chinese actions as a threat to their sovereignty. As competition between China and the United States continues to grow, the Spratly Islands will remain one of the most important geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region. 

From Hormuz to Handala: Points to Ruminate for the Indian Armed Forces

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By: Brigadier KGK Nair, SM (Retired)

Iran War: source Internet

I am certain that the lessons learnt from the U.S.–Iranian conflict will be more than just a few slides and a casual discussion in Ops rooms and War Colleges. In fact, if we do not consign this latest conflict to mere academic discussions, and instead use this treasure trove of others’ mistakes and even brilliance to pivot our own doctrines and strategies, we will do ourselves a big favour! Purely from this perspective, the recent Russo-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, and U.S.–Iran conflicts are a Godsend for a military thinker. For my part, here are the critical strategic points worth dissecting and actively incorporating from the U.S.–Iranian tango.

  1. DATA-CENTRIC WARFARE: EVOLVING BEYOND KINETIC JOINTNESS. The U.S.–Iran conflict delivers a vital realization for Indian military planners: physical decentralisation is useless without digital and data resilience. While Operation Sindoor masterfully validated India’s kinetic jointness and integrated strike capabilities, the global battlefield has shifted toward multi-domain digital sabotage. Iran’s capacity to sustain a coherent military response after systemic decapitation was entirely dependent on its transition from a vulnerable network-centric model to an air-gapped, data-centric framework. By deploying a highly decentralized cyber offensive capability like Handala, they proved that localized units can function independently. Building upon the tactical successes of Operation Sindoor, the Indian Armed Forces must aggressively reform their digital doctrines. India must move away from vulnerable centralised command servers toward an AI-driven, distributed command infrastructure. By ensuring that local theater commands possess isolated, autonomous data redundancies, India can guarantee that even if a superpower’s electronic warfare or cyber attacks blind New Delhi, local field commanders retain full operational data to execute retaliatory responses.
  • ASYMMETRIC CYBER POWER: DCA AS AN OFFENSIVE DETERRENT. We must urgently evolve our Defence Cyber Agency (DCA) from a purely defensive, reactive posture into an active, asymmetric deterrent. Handala’s devastating operations against U.S. critical infrastructure, military personnel, and global corporate networks (like the Stryker Corporation wipe-out) demonstrate that cyber tools can inflict strategic-level economic and operational paralysis. An offensive cyber doctrine allows a nation to impose unacceptable, asymmetrical costs on a technologically superior adversary at a fraction of the cost of conventional kinetic warfare. The DCA must be empowered to map, infiltrate, and hold at risk an adversary’s critical information infrastructure long before a physical bullet is fired.
  • SOFTWARE SUPPLY-CHAIN INTEGRITY: ZERO-TRUST PARADIGMS. Handala’s ability to factory-reset over 200,000 devices globally via compromised Microsoft Intune credentials underscores that our cyber defence must aggressively enforce a Zero-Trust Architecture across all defence and civilian networks. The conflict exposes the reality that a military network is only as secure as the commercial software and identity mechanisms it relies on. The Indian Armed Forces must systematically purge any reliance on global commercial cloud administration tools for mission-critical networks. We must mandate an entirely sovereign, strictly audited code-base for military supply chains, shifting the defence focus from malware detection to hunting for compromised insider credentials and hidden supply-chain backdoors. Knowing that there are legacy systems to which we are tethered as an organization, the time to do this is now! We need to wean ourselves away from centralized and off-the-shelf (OTS) systems immediately if we want to maintain any semblance of a robust, functional framework on which we can ride during conflicts.
  • RESILIENT SPACE ARCHITECTURES: LEVERAGING LEO & D2D MESH NETWORKS. Beyond the digital domain, this conflict exposes the structural fragilities of modern space and communication architectures. The ease with which satellite downlinks and GPS signals were degraded over the Gulf highlights that fixed, heavy satellite ground terminals are a critical single point of failure when facing high-tier Electronic Warfare (EW). The Indian Armed Forces must pivot toward resilient, low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite clusters equipped with Direct-to-Device (D2D) communication protocols. Our tactical field radios, unmanned systems, and mobile command nodes must be capable of establishing ad-hoc networks directly with overhead indigenous space assets, bypassing the need for vulnerable terrestrial ground infrastructure.
  • KINETIC SURVIVABILITY: ACCELERATING THE INTEGRATED ROCKET FORCE (IRF). Iran’s survival underscores a critical kinetic lesson: traditional air power is highly vulnerable to early, systemic decapitation strikes on static infrastructure like runways, fuel lines, and maintenance hubs. We ourselves inflicted heavy damage on Pakistani infrastructure during Operation Sindoor and proved how vulnerable these assets are! India must rapidly institutionalize its planned Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) as an independent, highly mobile, and decentralized deterrent. Operating separately from traditional Air Force infrastructure, a land-mobile IRF utilizes heavy camouflage, decoy arrays, and highly dispersed launch nodes. By shielding our civilian critical infrastructure alongside this independent, survivable rocket architecture, India will ensure that its capacity to launch deep precision stand-off strikes remains fully functional under the heaviest multi-domain pressure.
  • MARITIME DENIAL: ACCELERATING THE ANDAMANS STRATEGIC NAVAL HUB. The maritime dimension of the Gulf conflict proves that controlling critical chokepoints does not require a massive blue-water navy; it requires a dense network of asymmetric denial tools. Iran successfully challenged superior naval forces through the saturation deployment of low-cost loitering munitions, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and smart sea mines. For the Indian Navy, the lesson is clear for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly the Malacca Strait and the Nine Degree Channel. While building aircraft carriers adds to power projection, our immediate defensive doctrine must prioritize sea-denial. This underscores the absolute urgency of transforming the Andaman and Nicobar Islands into a premier strategic naval hub. We must rapidly accelerate the militarization and infrastructural development of this tri-service outpost into an impregnable, permanent Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) bastion. By stationing long-range mobile missile batteries, runway-independent drone fleets, and underwater drone swarms across the island chain, India can effectively slam the door on any adversarial naval entry into the IOR, rendering the chokepoints logistically suicidal for foreign forces.
  • CONTESTED AIR DOMAINS: THE DEMISE OF AIR SUPERIORITY. The conflict has demonstrated the virtual impossibility of achieving absolute air superiority against an adversary equipped with layered, mobile, and integrated air defence systems (IADS) combined with swarms of low-cost drones. Heavy, expensive fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft are increasingly forced into stand-off roles due to the high risks of attrition. The Indian Air Force must adjust its doctrine from seeking total “air superiority” to executing localized air denial. We must mass-produce indigenously developed loitering munitions, counter-UAS (unmanned aerial systems), and highly mobile surface-to-air missile systems (like Akash and Kusha) that can move seamlessly with ground forces, rendering our airspace too costly for an invading superpower to contest.
  • CULTIVATING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: NEUTRALIZING NORTH-EAST VULNERABILITIES. While we fortify our kinetic and digital assets, we must recognize that a nation’s military doctrine cannot succeed in a diplomatic vacuum. The modern conflict landscape shows that hostile superpowers look to squeeze an adversary’s geopolitical fault lines. For India, our most sensitive vulnerability remains the North-East, a risk now magnified by the increasing, coordinated collaboration between Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan across diplomatic, economic, and political fronts. This emerging axis aims to create a strategic squeeze around the Siliguri Corridor and isolate our eastern flank. To systematically dismantle this axis, India must discard passive diplomacy and aggressively “cultivate” a neutral, if not actively pro-India, regional outlook through a calculated, multi-tiered framework:
  • Asymmetric Economic Tethering: We must make our neighbors’ economic survival fundamentally dependent on Indian baseline infrastructure. This means expanding cross-border electricity grids, oil pipelines, and digital payment systems into Nepal and Bangladesh. When Dhaka’s industrial power grids and Kathmandu’s energy exports are physically integrated with India, the structural cost of their political elite taking an anti-India stance becomes economically ruinous.
    • Monopolizing Security and Defense Cooperation: India must position itself as the default security provider in the immediate neighborhood. We must expand our defense lines of credit, mandate that their military officer corps undergo mandatory training at our institutions (like the NDA and IMA), and bundle our defense exports with lifecycle support. By deeply embedding Indian military systems and doctrines within the armed forces of Bangladesh and Nepal, we organically crowd out Pakistani intelligence networks and Chinese defense hardware.
    • Aggressive Cultural and Digital Statecraft: We must counter hostile narrative warfare by actively projecting India’s soft power. This requires a dedicated state policy to fund regional satellite channels, university scholarships, and tech incubators across Dhaka, Kathmandu, and Colombo. We must ensure that the younger, tech-savvy demographics in these nations view India as their primary economic and cultural anchor,  neutralizing the ideological infiltration sponsored by Islamabad and its external handlers. By binding our neighbours into this matrix of mutual dependency, we break Pakistan’s proxy manoeuvres in the region and transform our immediate neighbourhood from a historical vulnerability into a resilient geopolitical buffer zone.
  • LAND ASSAULT DETERRENCE: THE ‘FRICTION STRATEGY’ AND HUMAN ATTRITION. Perhaps the most profound lesson is how Iran successfully prevented a full-scale U.S. ground invasion: they made the cost of a land assault unacceptably high in terms of human casualties. Superpowers and technologically advanced nations—including the United States and potentially China—have an incredibly low tolerance for body bags and prolonged human attrition. Iran achieved this through its Decentralized Mosaic Defence Doctrine, training its population and local militias to fight a protracted, asymmetric insurgency using a dense network of underground tunnels, hidden mountain fortifications, and pre-delegated authority to fight even if central command is eliminated. For India’s borders along the Northern and Western fronts, our doctrine must explicitly shift toward a “Friction Strategy.” We must signal to any adversary that a land assault will not result in a swift, clean, digitized victory. By leveraging the rugged terrain of the Himalayas, embedding highly trained, decentralized scout and special forces teams with local border populations, and creating vast, hardened underground defense networks, India can guarantee an invader faces a bloody, grinding war of attrition. By ensuring that any territorial gain by an adversary is met with immediate, heavy human casualties through decentralized guerrilla tactics and autonomous sniper/drone cells, we turn our geography into an unsustainable meat-grinder, breaking the political will of even the most powerful nation.
  1. CONCLUSION: THE IMPERATIVE FOR DOCTRINAL TRANSITION. The strategic landscape of 2026 has made one reality undeniably clear: the traditional, linear ways of warfighting are dead. While Operation Sindoor brilliantly demonstrated our capability to achieve crushing joint-service success in a localized, kinetic theatre, the U.S.–Iran conflict reminds us that a technologically advanced adversary will rarely fight on terms of our choosing. They will instead strike at our central command structures, blind our space assets, disrupt our software supply chains, and exploit our regional borders through proxy diplomatic alliances. The Indian Armed Forces cannot afford to treat these global upheavals as remote case studies. The lessons from Hormuz to Handala demand that we transition from a reactive defence posture to an active, resilient, and multi-domain deterrent strategy. We must rapidly build an air-gapped, data-centric command network, empower the Defence Cyber Agency with offensive teeth, accelerate the standalone Integrated Rocket Force, and slam the door on foreign navies by heavily fortifying the Andaman and Nicobar hub. Concurrently, our military objectives must be matched by a fierce, deliberate economic and security cultivation of our immediate neighbours to permanently secure our North-Eastern flank. If we choose to innovate now, we secure India’s position as an unassailable global power. If we relegate these lessons to mere academic debates within our War Colleges, we invite strategic surprise. The choice is ours, and the time to act is now.
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