By : Soumya Dutta

On May 19^th 2026, India enhanced its Arctic engagement at the Third India-Nordic Summit at Oslo, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Nordic counterparts reaffirming their commitment to science, sustainabilityand strategic partnerships. With the Arctic ice melting, the previously inaccessible shipping and trade routes are becoming accessible, and the region also holds immense economic value for its oil, gas and other critical minerals, which has further resulted to its growing geopolitical importance. Moreover, climate change in the Arctic can directly influence India through monsoon disruptions affecting food and water security and rising sea-levels threaten over 1300 of its island territories. The summit therefore reinforced India’s Arctic policy, by strengthening cooperation in polar research, climate and environmental issues and further elevating the relationship through the signing of a Green Technology and Innovation Strategic Partnership. 

India’s involvement in the Arctic however dates to 1920 when it signed the Svalbard Treaty as a part of the British dominion. In 2007 the first Indian scientific expedition reached the Arctic and in the following year the Himadri Research Station was established at Ny-Ålesund in Svalbard, Norway. This not only served India’s scientific utilities but became a strategic asset allowing a year-round research engagement in the region and has also helped in its transition, from a peripheral scientific presence to becoming a stakeholder in the Arctic governance. Established in 1966, the Arctic Council has emerged as the highest-level platform on discussions of the Arctic region and India was granted an observer status in 2013. Even without voting powers, the status however ensures India’s presence in key decision shaping processes in a globally significant region and collaboration with the Arctic states on issues of climate change, sustainable development and environmental protection.  

A signification portion of the Himalayan region also lies within India and because of its ice reserves, it has been referred to as the “Third Pole”. The Himalayas are of immense strategic importance as they influence water security, climate patterns and agricultural productivity by regulating river flows and monsoon rainfall, which sustain millions of people. Despite being geographically distant, the developments in the Arctic such as the melting ice, rising temperatures and shared patterns have highlighted the interconnected nature of the environmental changes in the Himalayas. Consequently, India has increasingly come to view the Arctic, the Antarcticand the Himalayan region as part of its broader polar programme, which reinforces the scientific and the strategic importance of having a sustained presence when it comes to the Arctic. 

In 2014, India deployed its first multi-sensor moored observatory, to provide real time subsea monitoring at Kongsfjorden and in 2016, an atmospheric laboratory was set up at Gruvebadet, one kilometer south of Ny-Ålesund. The momentum has been carried on by the release of the “India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development” in 2022. Based on the six pillars of scientific research, environmental protection, economic development, connectivity, cooperation and national capacity building, the policy laid down a multi-dimensional approach when it comes to the region and aims to create a more coherent framework that would secure India’s environmental, economic and strategic interests. At one level, the policy can be realized as an extension of India’s broader foreign policy approach rooted in multi-alignment and cooperative engagement through partnership with the Arctic states and adherence to a rules-based governance. However, by simultaneously, linking the policy to energy and resource security, shipping routes and drawing on its advances of space-based technologies such as satellite remote sensing and Earth observation, the policy has advanced a vision that situates the Arctic affairs within India’s broader national priorities, especially at a time when competition in regard to access and governance in the region among major powers continues to grow. 

Who Owns the Arctic? 

One of the first issues that emerges, when Arctic politics is considered is the concept of ‘global commons. The status of the region has been debated as many insist that it should not be exclusively controlled by a few states but instead must be seen as belonging to the international community, similar to the idea of the high seas, the region of Antarctica and outer space. The proponents of this idea argue that the Arctic must be governed through collective responsibility and managed in a way so that there is open access, as otherwise the focus becomes limited to narrow national interest and an exclusive influence by the Arctic Council countries. Moreover,issues of climate change have global consequences and a shared approach to preserve the region’s sensitive biodiversity also requires inclusive global governance. 

Those who argue against this state that the Arctic cannot be treated as a ‘global commons’ as most of the region falls under the sovereign jurisdiction of the eight Arctic states. Instead, it can be more accurately described as a “Quasi-Global Common”, particularly as these Arctic coastal states have clearly defined Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial rights under the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). Only the central Arctic Ocean beyond this EEZs form part of the high seas that can be truly considered as ‘global commons.  Moreover, the governance in the region is Ied by institutions such as the Arctic Council and the non-Arctic countries are given only observer status and therefore have limited influence when it comes to the region. Also, by extending the ‘global commons’ framework to the entire Arctic region it will end up ignoring the existing state sovereignty of the member countries and external powers may also justify greater involvement in the Arctic, particularly in relation to its resources and as new shipping routes emerge, thereby challenging the jurisdictional arrangements when it comes to the region. Moreover, unlike the Antarctic Treaty, there exists no equivalent comprehensive agreement when it comes to the Arctic. 

The Arctic as a Theatre of Great Power Rivalry 

The governance architecture of the Arctic region is sustained by the Arctic Council, as established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996. However, among the Council members, a loose grouping has emerged consisting of five Arctic littoral states, which include the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway to signal unity among the Arctic coastal powers and also to engage in issue specific cooperation, which will directly affect the interests of the coastal states. Since 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly disrupted the working of the Council and the remaining seven members also boycotted and refused participation. This continued till Russia’s chairmanship in the Council ended in 2023 and was succeeded by Norway.  

The present Danish Chairship is being seen as a possible ‘reset’, but even then, its effectiveness has been diminished as the Council must navigate the complex internal political dynamics and other emerging constraints. It has also undermined the idea of “Arctic Exceptionalism” that science and cooperation will separate it from global political conflicts. The shifting dynamics has also been reinforced by Russia, as it has moved closer to China, which it increasingly views as an Arctic partner. With the longest Arctic coastline and a fleet of 40 ice breaker vessels, Russia continues to consolidate its capabilities and operational presence in the region. 

As part of this wider great-power competition, the self-governing Arctic island and part of Denmark, Greenland has also become a region of consternation under the Trump administration, especially with its strategic location. Home to the critical US led Pituffik Space Base used for missile warning and aerospace monitoring purposes, it has become an important element of the North American defence against potential Russianoperations through the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK). Combined with rare earth minerals, the US has considered a range of options including military force to acquire Greenland. This resulted in considerable anxiety in countries such as Canada, as a potential US acquisition of Greenland can alter the balance of control over the contested Northwest Passage resulting in an American claim of jurisdiction through both Alaska and Greenland. France and Canada therefore responded to these developments by opening consulates in Greenland, while Denmark undertook ‘Operation Arctic Endurance’ to strengthen Europe’s strategic determination.  

The entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO has further bolstered its defence capabilities in the Arctic, especially as Russia increases its military buildup and China aims to deepen its strategic footprint in the region. An observer in the Arctic Council, China has positioned itself as an important stakeholder by identifying as a “Near-Arctic State’ and extending its Belt and Road Initiative in the region, through the emerging Arctic shipping corridors called the ‘Polar Silk Road’. The Sino-Russian cooperation has also emerged as a defining feature in the Arctic, through cooperation on energy projects such as LNG, shipping routes and military drills such as a joint military operation in the Bering Sea, near the coast of Alaska that featured naval exercise and bomber patrols. 

This growing contestation over shipping routes, resources and militarization has come to increasingly shape Arctic geopolitics. Russia continues to expand its strategic capabilities and influence in the region, by militarizing its northern coast, securing its key shipping corridors such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and heavily investing in infrastructure development, through which it aims to secure what it views as its sovereign frontier. The US remains security focused and aims to deter the Sino-Russian axis through operational readiness and through coordination with its Arctic allies. On the other hand, China’s strategy to the Arctic has been influenced by its aim to secure resources, to enhance its global status as a leading polar power and to develop alternative trade routes, through strategic partnerships as it lack a territorial presence in the Arctic itself. What therefore emerges in the Arctic is a competitive landscape where states position themselves both strategically and through commercial activities using territorial claims and expanding presence, driven by powers both within and beyond the region.  

India’s Expanding Arctic Footprint 

India is not merely a passive observer of these polar affairs and has increasingly created its own distinct position in the Arctic landscape. 

The Nordic Partnership: India’s engagement with the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Finland) have been largely based on shared democratic values, research driven partnership and deepening trade ties. Realizing the growing importance of countries like India in Arctic affairs, they had also extended their support for admission as an observer in the Arctic Council. In recent years the India-Nordic Summits in 2018 and 2022, focused on Arctic cooperation through polar research, climate change and environmental protection. This trajectory has been continued through the third Summit in Oslo, where they advanced a forward-looking strategic partnership in green technology, innovation, trade and investment, blue economy, STEM collaboration and defence. 

Norway has been the leading partner of India’s Arctic affairs, with its physical and strategic presence maintained through the Himadri research station and collaboration with the Norwegian Polar Institute. Through space collaboration with Sweden’s Esrange Space Centre, India also aims to strengthen its Arctic ground station capabilities and improve monsoon prediction and agriculture management. The inaugural India-Finland Arctic Dialogue at Rovaniemi, Finland in January 2026, has deepened cooperation on Arctic matters and India also aligns closely with polar priorities and environmental diplomacy in the region. 

The Russian Dimension: Amid Western sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, Moscow has increasingly turned towards diversifying its partnerships, with its long-standing bilateral ties with India, extending into cooperation in the Arctic as well. Both countries have agreed at the 23^rd India-Russia Annual Summit, to develop the Northern Sea Route to reduce the transit passage of energy and goods, while also enhancing connectivity through the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor.   Under the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics (RELOS), there is now an increased opportunity for India to gain strategic maritime presence in the Arctic, through shared military access of ports and bases. Moreover, through projects such as joint polar ship building, Russia has clearly established itself as the “gateway to the Arctic” and today serve as a crucial partner to India’s Arctic ambitions. 

The China Factor: A fellow observer of India in the Arctic Council, China’s Arctic strategy has been of commercial expansion, infrastructure development and narrative construction. By normalizing its presence in the Arctic, China wants to integrate itself into the broader economic and security architecture of the region. Moreover, the Northern Sea Route (NSG) offers a more attractive alternative that can overcome the “Malacca Dilemma” that China faces. For New Delhi, in contrast its strategy has been deepening its own scientific capabilities, strengthening its partnerships and positioning itself as a responsible stakeholder in Arctic governance. 

What Lies Ahead 

Moving forward, the Arctic is likely to be more fragmented, where scientific and environmental cooperation will coexist with strategic rivalry, regarding shipping routes and resource access. At the same time, climate change is remaking the Arctic’s physical geography, and these changes are moving faster than what its political geography can adapt to. The consensus-based governance structure that has been developed anchored in the Arctic Council, is also getting challenged by the escalating East-West geopolitical tensions. This may end up creating gaps for more transactional and interest-driven forms of engagement in the region. 

For New Delhi, it has already established a network of partnerships, articulated a comprehensive policy, and maintained a careful balance across competing geopolitics alignments. However, in the coming period its ambitions must be enhanced with investments, establishment of research infrastructure and long-term continuity in the region anchored in sustainability. There is also a need for greater coherence in managing parallel engagements with it Nordic partners and Russia, which may at time end up reflecting divergent strategic expectations. Therefore, these developments reflect that the High North is no longer a distant frontier, but one which increasingly sits at the intersection of India’s core national priorities. 

By : by Ankit Raj, Research Analyst, GSDN

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and the broader international system has undergone profound transformations following decades of tension, proxy conflicts, and intermittent military confrontations involving Iran. While discussing the concept of a “new world order” in the context of Iran requires careful analysis of ongoing developments, the regional and global implications of Iran’s conflicts with various actors have already begun reshaping alliances, economic relationships, security architectures, and power balances that define international relations in the twenty-first century.  

Historical Background of Iranian Conflicts 

Iran’s confrontational relationship with the United States and its regional adversaries traces back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent 444-day hostage crisis fundamentally ruptured U.S.-Iran relations, creating animosity that has persisted for more than four decades. 

Throughout the 1980s, Iran fought a devastating war with Iraq that lasted from September 22, 1980 to August 20, 1988, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and massive economic destruction. This conflict established patterns of regional rivalry and demonstrated Iran’s willingness to endure enormous costs in pursuit of its strategic objectives. 

The United States designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 19, 1984, citing Iranian support for groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, and various militias throughout the Middle East. This designation has remained in place, shaping American policy toward Iran across multiple presidential administrations. 

Iran’s nuclear program has been a source of international concern since revelations in August 2002 about undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted extensive inspections and monitoring, while debates have raged about whether Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons capabilities or maintain exclusively peaceful nuclear energy programs. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, in Vienna, Austria, represented a major diplomatic achievement involving Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union (EU). This agreement placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. However, President Donald Trump announced American withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, reimposing sanctions and initiating a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. 

Tensions escalated dramatically following the U.S. drone strike that killed Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, near Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020. Iran retaliated with ballistic missile strikes against American forces at Al Asad Airbase in Iraq on January 8, 2020, marking one of the most dangerous moments in U.S.-Iran confrontation. 

Regional Power Dynamics and Proxy Conflicts 

Understanding the potential new world order following intensified Iran conflicts requires examining the complex web of regional rivalries and proxy wars that have characterized Middle Eastern politics. Iran has developed an “axis of resistance” comprising allied governments and non-state actors across multiple countries, creating what some analysts describe as a “Shia Crescent” extending from Tehran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. 

In Iraq, Iran has cultivated close relationships with Shia militias collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, which formed to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but have become powerful political and military actors. These groups maintain complex relationships with the Iraqi government while receiving support from Tehran. 

Hezbollah in Lebanon represents Iran’s most sophisticated and capable non-state partner. Established in the 1980s with Iranian assistance, Hezbollah has evolved into a powerful political party and military force with an estimated arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking anywhere in Israel.  

In Yemen, Iran has provided varying levels of support to the Houthi movement, which seized control of the capital Sanaa on September 21, 2014, and has fought against a Saudi-led coalition since March 26, 2015. The Houthis have launched numerous drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and have targeted international shipping in the Red Sea, demonstrating Iran’s ability to project influence across the Arabian Peninsula. 

Saudi Arabia views Iran as its primary regional rival, competing for influence across the Middle East along sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical lines. This rivalry has fueled conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain, creating a regional cold war that periodically threatens to escalate into direct confrontation. 

Israel considers Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for groups hostile to Israel as existential threats. Israeli military operations have targeted Iranian positions in Syria, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and reportedly conducted sabotage operations against Iranian nuclear facilities. The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, on November 27, 2020, near Tehran, attributed to Israel, demonstrated the covert dimension of this conflict. 

Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control 

A major military conflict involving Iran would have profound implications for nuclear non-proliferation efforts and arms control frameworks globally. Iran’s nuclear program has been the subject of intense international scrutiny, negotiations, and confrontation for more than two decades. 

The collapse of the JCPOA following American withdrawal in May 2018 eliminated constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran subsequently began exceeding limits on uranium enrichment levels and stockpiles specified in the agreement. By 2023, Iran had enriched uranium to 60 percent purity, significantly closer to the 90 percent threshold typically required for weapons-grade material. 

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, either before or after a major conflict, the regional and global implications would be enormous. Saudi Arabia has indicated it would pursue its own nuclear weapons program if Iran acquired such capabilities. Turkish officials have made similar statements about Turkey’s right to nuclear weapons if regional neighbors possess them. 

A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states would fundamentally alter deterrence calculations, crisis stability, and the risk of catastrophic conflict. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force on March 5, 1970, and has been the cornerstone of global non-proliferation efforts, would face its most serious challenge. Widespread proliferation in the Middle East could trigger similar dynamics in other regions, including Northeast Asia and South Asia. 

Economic Consequences and Energy Markets 

Iran’s role in global energy markets means that major conflict involving the country would have immediate and far-reaching economic consequences. Iran possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest proven crude oil reserves, with approximately 157 billion barrels of oil. 

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day pass, representing about 21 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption, is partially controlled by Iran. Iranian threats to close the strait during periods of high tension have caused oil price spikes and demonstrated Tehran’s potential leverage over global energy supplies. 

Economic sanctions imposed on Iran since the 1990s and intensified after 2018 have severely damaged the Iranian economy, causing currency devaluation, inflation exceeding 40 percent annually during peak periods, and reduced oil exports from more than 2.5 million barrels per day before sanctions to fewer than 500,000 barrels per day during maximum pressure periods. 

A post-conflict scenario could see either the intensification of Iran’s economic isolation if Tehran is decisively defeated, or potentially the lifting of sanctions and reintegration into global markets if diplomatic resolution accompanies military de-escalation. The economic reconstruction of Iran, should such a scenario emerge, would require hundreds of billions of dollars and create opportunities for countries and companies willing to invest. 

China has emerged as Iran’s largest trading partner, importing Iranian oil despite American sanctions and signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on March 27, 2021, covering economic cooperation, political coordination, and potentially military collaboration over a 25-year period. This relationship positions China to play a major role in any post-conflict reconstruction or normalization process. 

Realignment of Global Alliances 

The question of a new world order following the major Iran conflict necessarily involves examining how international alliances and partnerships might be reconfigured. The existing alliance structures, formed largely during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, have already shown signs of strain and transformation. 

The United States has maintained security partnerships with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, since the council’s establishment on May 25, 1981. These relationships have been anchored in American security guarantees, arms sales, and military presence in exchange for energy supplies and regional stability. 

However, confidence in American commitment to Gulf security has periodically wavered. The Obama administration’s pursuit of the JCPOA, perceived by Gulf states as insufficiently addressing Iranian regional activities, created tensions. The Trump administration’s limited response to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais on September 14, 2019, which temporarily removed approximately half of Saudi oil production, raised questions about American reliability. 

The Abraham Accords, announced on August 13, 2020, normalized relations between Israel and the UAE, followed by normalization between Israel and Bahrain on September 15, 2020, Morocco on December 10, 2020, and Sudan on October 23, 2020. These agreements represent a significant realignment in Middle Eastern politics, with Arab states prioritizing shared concerns about Iran over the Palestinian issue. 

Restructuring of International Institutions 

A new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran would likely involve either the reform or marginalization of existing international institutions. The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has been paralyzed on numerous Middle Eastern issues by divisions among permanent members holding veto power. 

Russia and China have repeatedly used their Security Council vetoes to block resolutions targeting Iran, Syria, or other allied states, while the United States, United Kingdom, and France have blocked resolutions critical of Israel or calling for actions against Saudi Arabia. This gridlock has undermined the UN’s credibility and effectiveness. 

The IAEA, established on July 29, 1957, has played a central role in monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and verifying compliance with agreements. The agency’s credibility and authority have been tested by disputes over access to Iranian facilities, interpretation of evidence, and politicization of its work by various parties. 

Technological and Cyber Dimensions 

A new world order following major conflict involving Iran would increasingly feature cyber warfare, drone technology, and artificial intelligence as central elements of military and strategic competition. Iran has developed significant cyber warfare capabilities, conducting attacks against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other adversaries. 

Iranian-supplied drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen and by Shia militias in Iraq have attacked Saudi oil facilities, American bases, and other targets throughout the region. The relatively low cost and increasing sophistication of drone technology democratizes military capabilities, allowing non-state actors and smaller countries to threaten larger adversaries. 

The proliferation of these technologies and tactics to non-state actors and other countries would be accelerated by major conflict, creating new security challenges globally. Cyber weapons, unlike nuclear weapons, cannot be easily contained through non-proliferation regimes, and drones are increasingly available through commercial markets. 

Conclusion 

The concept of a new world order emerging from major conflict involving Iran encompasses multiple dimensions including regional power balances, alliance structures, nuclear proliferation dynamics, economic relationships, humanitarian consequences, and the effectiveness of international institutions. While the specific contours of such an order would depend on the nature, duration, and outcome of any conflict, several trends seem likely. 

The Middle East would likely see accelerated realignment of relationships, with traditional divisions between Arab and Israeli states giving way to coalitions based on shared threat perceptions regarding Iran. The role of external powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, would be reconfigured based on their actions during and after conflict. 

Nuclear proliferation risks would intensify, potentially triggering a cascade of additional countries seeking weapons capabilities. The credibility of non-proliferation frameworks would be severely tested, with uncertain prospects for restoration. 

Humanitarian costs would be enormous, creating refugee flows, displacement, casualties, and long-term trauma affecting millions of people across multiple countries. The international community’s capacity to respond would be severely challenged. 

Ultimately, the question of whether a genuine “new world order” emerges or simply a reshuffling of existing power dynamics depends on whether key actors learn from historical mistakes, prioritize diplomacy over military force, and construct inclusive frameworks addressing legitimate security concerns of all parties. The stakes are high enough that failure to achieve such outcomes could reshape the international system in dangerous and destabilizing ways for decades to come. 

By : Dhritiman Banerjee, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

The Monroe Doctrine, one of the earliest pillars of American foreign policy envisaged the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of US influence. Cuba, a country in that region extremely close to the US coast of Florida is a prominent feature of the region and a country which has been influenced by the socialist ideals with support from the erstwhile USSR. This has perpetually raised concerns in Washington which views these developments as a threat to its own sovereignty. However, it should be noted that, while US-Cuba relations have been strained, policymakers in Washington have seen the Cuban region as a zone requiring US intervention with the Guantanamo naval base of the US navy located in Cuba. This article maps out the strategic importance of Cuba to the United States and why the US emphasizes on regime change in Cuba as a strategic goal. 

US-Cuba relations and the factors at play 

US-Cuba relations deteriorated rapidly after the Fidel Castro led Cuban Communist Revolution overthrew the US backed Batista regime. The new regime rapidly nationalized all American assets and industries in Cuba affecting American industries and trade between America and Cuba. The US responded by imposing a trade embargo on Cuba and suspending diplomatic relations. However, due to the proximity of the US Coast to Cuba, legal and illegal immigration from Cuba to the United States became a major issue and is now a prominent part of the US discourse on national security. American companies were also locked out of Cuban natural resources which led to major losses in business. Furthermore, support of the USSR to the Castro regime affected Cold War dynamics and posed a direct threat to the goals of the Monroe doctrine. Cuba’s proximity to strategically important waterways near the Gulf shipping route and the Panama and its erstwhile support of the USSR and current close relations with US adversaries like Russia and China pose an existential threat to the continental United States. This can be seen during the dynamics of the Cuban Missile Crisis where Soviet missiles in Cuba posed a direct nuclear threat to America. The events during the Cuban missile crisis highlights the importance of a friendly regime in Havana to Washington which views Cuba not as an insignificant small Caribbean nation but as a strategic chokepoint in the US sphere of influence which can be used by America’s enemies to directly attack the US mainland. 

Thus, Cuba remains one of the perennial foreign policy challenges of the United States. While the Obama administration attempted to thaw US-Cuba relations by restarting diplomatic relations between America and Cuba, relations did not improve and the Trump administration again adopted a hardline approach regarding Cuba. This is mainly due to the proximity of Cuba to the United States and Cuban cooperation with Russia and China. The US previous experience with Cuba makes it wary of Cuban relations with its adversaries as this poses a security dilemma for the United States. 

The American security dilemma regarding Cuba 

America is a country with a unique location with the Atlantic Ocean to the East and the Pacific Ocean to the West, it is largely immune to most military interventions as only large-scale naval invasions are possible directly on the United States which can mitigated by the vast US Navy. However, a potential adversary with a strong military presence in Cuba to strengthen Cuba’s security capabilities against US threats, circumvents this requirement and can directly pose a threat to the Continental United States. The lack of a friendly regime in Havana and its cooperation with Moscow and Beijing therefore poses a direct security challenge for Washington. This is a unique security dilemma faced by the US which sees Cuban cooperation with its adversaries as a threat to its own sovereignty.  

Therefore, while Cuban military and economic capabilities are vastly inferior compared to the United States, its geographic location allows it to become a major adversary of Washington by at once allowing Russian and Chinese military presence within its borders as well as continuing its historical stance of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America and oppose US backed regimes in the region. Therefore, America’s position with respect to Cuba can be compared to the Russian view of Ukraine as Nato expansion in Eastern Europe poses the same security dilemma to Moscow as Chinese and Russian presence in Cuba poses to Washington. Thus, it can be said that the tyranny of geography makes Cuba a major strategic adversary to the US as although their capabilities are asymmetric, Cuba’s geographical features augment its foreign policy position with respect to the US. Thus, it can be said that while the two sides are unequally matched, great power rivalry complicates this relationship which makes Washington cautious with respect to its position on Cuba. 

Conclusion 

This article notes that, Havana matters to Washington mainly because of its geographical proximity and its socialist regime as well as its cooperation with American adversaries. This makes regime change in Cuba a major strategic goal for the United States. However, since the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington has failed to achieve its foreign policy objective of regime change in Cuba. The presence of an adversarial regime in Havana poses a direct threat of the US vision of the Western Hemisphere as a distinct zone of American influence, a key goal of the Monroe doctrine. This also allows American adversaries including Russia and China to establish a presence in the US zone of influence to directly pose a challenge to American hegemony in the region and use Cuba’s strategic location to gain influence in Latin America, an event that would weaken American dominance over the Caribbean and Latin America and allow its adversaries to have influence on strategic waterways like the Panama Canal. This poses an existential threat for the United States because of which it seeks to assert control over Havana and establish a friendly regime in the country. But US historical strategic failures in Cuba and the recent policies of the Trump administration appear to indicate that tensions are expected to continue. 

By : Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction 

India has always looked at The Himalayas as an asset. A terrain which was arduous to navigate, providing the subcontinent with a natural barrier against colonial threats from Central Asia. The following geographical advantage seems to be under siege as China develops dual-use infrastructure to transform the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas. The seclusion of the region, which was considered a demerit, has been converted into an operational advantage. These developments have been formidable as China aims at expanding its strategic dominance.  

While the Border Roads Organization publishes yearly updates, with infrastructural advancements gradually progress in the region of Arunachal Pradesh, the question that lingers is the comparative advantage provided by these developments. China has developed roads covering more than 600km in Tibet in the last decade. The runways with the capacity of managing heavy-lift aircraft at Shigatze and Hotan, and a network of villages complement the objective of projecting a strategic dominance even further. 

Moreover, the confrontations as Doklam and Galwan have showcased Chinese intentions at pursuing its objective, even it takes making intimidating advances. India’s approach of investing into pluralistic alliances and pragmatically assessing its strategy to satisfy its national interests can be threatened if China gains geographic leverage. The following article delves into the bells that have rung, trying to assess the extent of the threat and carving India’s path of tackling these jeopardizing advances. 

Background  

It has been six years since the vehement Galwan clash happened, and India has lacked in its response to ensure a safety net in case of a recurrence. The policy recommendations look reactionary and symbolic in nature as India aims at investing in ISR, build infrastructure alongside the LAC, while banning Chinese applications and strict FDI approval screenings. A critical question that arises is whether we are even tackling the right problem?  

China’s buildup along the lines of LAC, have been considered as a measure of projecting its force and dominance in the region, and aid in any kind of aggressive advancements in the future. However, it also serves as a political purpose, where it is altering the baseline of the amount of presence considered normal in a disputed region, from both psychological and legal domains. If India approaches this issue from a strictly militaristic lens, it might tackle the threat of an aggressive Chinese advancement soon but still lose the border dispute. 

Urgency  

The urgency of this matter has intensified in the last three years, established from the two cases as follows: 

• The troop disengagement at Depsang Plains and Demchok in 2024, have been followed by continued construction activities moderated by the Chinese leadership in other non-disengaged sectors like the Pangong – Tso sector. Beijing disengagements instead of reflecting its compatibility, showcases its tactical approach with the strategic build-up sustaining in the background. 
   
   

• China’s multi-billion railway expansion into Tibet, which incorporates the successful completion of the first phase of the buildup the Sichuan – Tibet Railway and the Xinjiang -Tibet Railway, that run close to the LAC. These developments completely alter the current scenario as it facilitates PLA mobilization in delicate border regions. 

However, these developments are not immediate, but a process that has continued for a couple of decades now. It is critical to understand the Chinese strategy of Salami Slicing and then observe the gradual build-up in these regions.  

Sustenance before Strike – The Risk of Salami Slicing  

The most significant change in the military scenario alongside the Himalayas, Tibet, and the LAC is the PLA’s capacity and capability to endure, apart from its overwhelming arsenal. The Chinese expansion via the Salami Slicing way, has been following a consistent series of events, where the build infrastructure in the disputed territory, enhance Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the region, gradually gulping it into the new status quo. 

The Case of the Depsang Bulge and Galwan valley  

The Depsang Bulge is a region which is controversial as it finds itself very close to the LAC. In late-2010s and 2020, China started crucial infrastructure buildup in the region. This was followed by a blockade of Indian access to five patrolling points in these Depsang plains. During the clash at the Galwan valley, Beijing had already gained leverage in these regions before the physical clash even began. Each of these steps were too minor for India to take a significant action, but detrimental in establishing influence in the region. 

Recent Developments  

China has created a network of all-weather roads, tunnels and forward supply posts encompassing the region of Tibet, which facilitates the expansion of PLA at LAC flashpoints within 3 days.  

Beijing has also expanded its accommodation capacity alongside the PLA, employing a strategy of Civil-Military Fusion using dual-use villages, with these settlements expanding to more than 600 in the last decade through the Xiaokang Border Village Programme.  

The villages of Mayjam and Pangda in Arunachal Pradesh documented by satellites, have shown reinforcements, communication towers, and infrastructure irregular with agricultural requirements. 

The Moldo-Garrison complex, which incorporates ammunition stores, helicopter landing paddocks, and pre-positioned fuel, portrays the region being prepared for sustaining combat operations, rather than patrolling.  

India, on the contrary, works along the lines of Ladakh, enhancing road connectivity, which was sanctioned more than a decade ago. It also portrays its disagreements regarding these build-ups, protesting these actions in the international arena. 

The gap in infrastructure and promptness is alarming for India, as it can turn out to be a significant factor in the honest assessment.  

The Two Front War 

These developments aren’t limited to LAC but are based on a pattern that has led to the creation of a nexus, afflicting the border dynamics for India. One major example for the following developments can be the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Karakoram Highway Expansion, which is gradually strengthening China and Pakistan’s military-economic relations. Moreover, PLA’s operations alongside the LAC, with Pakistan engaging the LOC has create a two-front scenario. 

The structure of India’s Military forces wasn’t built in a way to sustain a way alongside 4000+ kms of active frontier deployment. Moreover, China’s continuous investment and advancement along the LAC and assistanceprovided to Pakistan for deployment, has proved this possibility to gradually become a potential military strategy.  

Compounding both these threats creates a surveillance of asymmetry which increases the risk exponentially. China’s deployed infrastructure, include its SIGINT stations, and electronic warfare systems with the capability of high-altitude UAV operations near the Pangong Tso, provides Beijing access to view India’s deployments. China also has a leverage in electronic warfare, which gives it an advantage in the first few hours of an active conflict. 

Therefore, we come back to the question of whether we are preparing on the right front. An adversary that can see you better than how you see them, doesn’t require deception to surprise.  

Policy Recommendations and Suggestions 

Asking Appropriate Questions 

India uses the kilometers of road complete as a standard unit of benchmark used by the Border Roads Organization to highlight the border infrastructure progress. Change this metric to one that facilitates border connectivity. The question relevant to discourse is – How quickly can a brigade reach a contested space?  

The Ministry of Defence can publish an Index -LAC Connectivity Index, which compares China’s capability against India’s growing infrastructure sector by sector, and demonstrates India’s operational readiness. 

Create a Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell. 

There is no dedicated Border Infrastructure Intelligence Cell to track Chinese construction along the Borders. While the Border Roads Organization, Defence Intelligence Agency, and National Technical Research Organization work in this domain, they function separately. There is no platform where the resources can be pooled, and a more coordinated approach can be taken. 

Build a Minilateral Narrative  

China has created more than just blocs and understandings. China has also created a narrative revolving around connectivity, shared prosperity and development. While India has worked along the same lines, it is reactionary in nature. India has created a security architecture with QUAD, CSC and IONS, while blocs like IMEC for economic strategy.  

India can use these groupings for information sharing through satellite imagery in times of conflict, a diplomatic support against civil military fusion strategy employed by China and boost its strategies of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR with the help of other partners to create a narrative of India’s intent at being the first responder and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean Region to gain credibility countering China’s influence built through the BRI. 

The Mountain Strike Corps 

New Delhi should rewrite the mandate of the Mountain Strike Corps. An offensive response formation can be used as a tool of deterrence with a framework that incorporates a forward deterrence posture, with pre-positioned and pre-delegated authority. 

Prepare for the Emerging Domains of Warfare 

China has been preparing for a multi-domain warfare possibility, and India needs to respond in a similar fashion.  

• A theatre level command structure should be created for electronic and cyberwarfare. 

• Include these areas of warfare in the Joint Military Doctrine and devise a well-structured plan for each of these domains. 

• Joint exercises and training programmes should be held with QUAD countries to improve awareness and enhance preparation. 

Conclusion 

The alarm bells have been rung and the threat on India increases every day. What is crucial right now is to dive into the fundamentals and find the right questions to address. The Chinese Salami Slicing tactic has been in progress since the last two decades now. As the Chinese advancement gets more aggressive India needs to prepare to dissuade, deter and defend its territory. The concept and manifestation of warfare is diversifying, and India needs to take prompt action in each of those directions. 

By : Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

South Asia occupies a position of immense strategic importance in global geopolitics. Home to nearly one-fourth of the world’s population, the region serves as a bridge between the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. At the heart of this region stands India, the largest country in South Asia in terms of geography, population, economic size, military capability, historical legacy and diplomatic influence. All these factors shape India’s geopolitical standing in South Asia. After becoming independent in 1947, India has sought to establish itself as a regional leader while balancing complex relationships with neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan. In recent decades, India’s rise as a major global power has further enhanced its influence in South Asia. However, challenges such as regional rivalries, border disputes, terrorism, political instability in neighbouring states, and increasing Chinese involvement have complicated India’s efforts to maintain regional primacy. 

Geographical Significance  

India’s geographical position is one of its most important strategic assets. Located at the center of South Asia, India shares land borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while maintainingmaritime proximity to Sri Lanka and Maldives. India’s location allows it to influence major trade routes across the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is one of the world’s busiest maritime regions, carrying a substantial portion of global energy supplies and commercial shipping. India’s long coastline of over 7,500 kilometers and its island territories, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, provide strategic advantages in monitoring maritime activities. The country’s central position enables it to act as a gateway between East and West Asia. This strategic location enhances India’s role in regional connectivity, trade corridors and maritime security. It also provides India with significant influence over the security of South Asia.  

Impact of Population 

India’s population plays a crucial role in shaping its geopolitical standing in South Asia. As the world’s most populous country, India possesses significant demographic advantages that enhance its economic strength, military capabilities, diplomatic influence, and regional leadership. At the same time, managing such a vast population presents challenges that affect its regional and global ambitions. A large population provides India with a vast labor force and consumer market. This advantage has contributed to India’s emergence as one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies. Population size provides a large pool for military recruitment. India maintains one of the world’s largest armed forces, enabling it to project power and maintain security across South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. India’s large population contributes to its cultural and diplomatic influence. The country’s diverse cultural traditions, educational institutions, entertainment industry, and technological expertise enhance its soft power across the region. India’s demographic weight also gives it greater representation and influence in international forums such as the United Nations, G20, and BRICS. This international influence reinforces its leadership position in South Asia. India’s huge domestic market attracts foreign investment and promotes regional economic integration. Neighboring countries often seek access to Indian markets for exports, trade, and employment opportunities. A young and growing population provides India with significant human capital. Advances in education, technology, innovation, and entrepreneurship have helped India become a major player in information technology, digital services, pharmaceuticals, and space research. At the same time, a large population places significant pressure on food supplies, water resources, energy demand, healthcare systems, and housing and infrastructure.  

Role of Rising Economy

Economic strength forms the foundation of India’s geopolitical standing. India is among the world’s largest economies and has become a major destination for foreign investment, technology development and manufacturing. India’s economic growth has enabled it to extend development assistance and investment to neighboring countries. Through grants, loans, infrastructure projects, and technical cooperation, India has strengthened ties with countries across South Asia. It has engaged in initiatives such as the Hydropower cooperation with Bhutan, Infrastructure and connectivity projects in Nepal, Development assistance to Afghanistan, Railway and energy cooperation with Bangladesh, Port and housing projects in Sri Lanka and infrastructure and capacity-building support for Maldives. Trade relationships also reinforce India’s regional influence. Bangladesh has emerged as one of India’s largest trading partners in South Asia, while Nepal and Bhutan remain highly dependent on economic exchanges with India. India’s growing digital economy, technological capabilities, and pharmaceutical industry further enhance its soft power and economic attractiveness. During the COVID-19 pandemic, India’s vaccine diplomacy demonstrated its ability to provide public goods to neighbouring countries and strengthen regional goodwill.  

Military Dominance 

India possesses one of the most powerful militaries in South Asia. Its armed forces rank among the largest in the world, supported by advanced conventional capabilities and a growing defense-industrial base. India’s military strength serves several geopolitical purposes such as protection of territorial integrity, deterrence against external threats, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and peacekeeping and regional stabilization. India is also a nuclear-armed state, which significantly enhances its strategic standing. The development of a credible nuclear deterrent has strengthened India’s position in comparison to Pakistan and contributed to regional strategic stability. The Indian Navy has become increasingly important in safeguarding sea lanes and countering maritime threats. Through naval exercises, coastal surveillance networks, and defense partnerships with other states, India has reinforced its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. India’s military interventions and assistance in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and humanitarian missions across the region demonstrate its capacity to dominate the regional security system. India is also involved in multiple military exercises taking place across the world by participating and competing in almost all the continents. This helps the armed forces to learn about their position in the world and exchange knowledge, technical and technological expertise while maintaining friendly relations with other participating states.  

Historical Legacy

India’s geopolitical importance in South Asia is rooted in history. For centuries, the Indian subcontinent was connected through shared cultural, religious, and economic networks. Ancient kingdoms, trade routes, and religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism spread across the region from the Indian heartland. During the Cold War, India played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. By advocating strategic autonomy and avoiding alignment with either superpower bloc, India gained respect among newly independent states. Following independence, India’s leaders envisioned the country as a stabilizing force in South Asia. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized regional cooperation and peaceful coexistence. India’s support for the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 demonstrated its willingness to shape regional developments when its strategic interests were involved. Over time, India emerged as the dominant regional actor due to its overwhelming demographic, economic, and military advantages. India’s historical prominence sometimes creates concerns among neighbouring countries about Indian dominance. Due to its size, economic power, and historical influence, some states fear excessive dependence on India. These concerns occasionally encourage smaller South Asian countries to seek alternative partnerships with external powers, particularly China. Consequently, India’s historical centrality can be both a source of influence and a diplomatic challenge. 

Diplomatic Influence

India’s diplomatic influence is one of the most important factors shaping its geopolitical standing in South Asia. India uses diplomacy to maintain regional stability, promote economic integration, counter external influences and strengthen its leadership role. Through diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, India seeks to foster political stability and maintain friendly governments. Its ‘Neighborhood First’ policy emphasizes close cooperation and mutual development, enhancing India’s leadership. India’s economic diplomacy strengthens its geopolitical position by creating interdependence with neighboring states. Through trade agreements, development assistance, infrastructure projects, and investment initiatives, India promotes regional connectivity. India’s diplomatic standing is strengthened by its soft power resources such as cultural ties, Bollywood and media influence, educational opportunities, religious and historical connections and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. India uses regional organizations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to advance cooperation on trade, security, and development. While SAARC has faced challenges due to India-Pakistan tensions, BIMSTEC has emerged as an important platform linking South and Southeast Asia and enhancing India’s regional influence.  

By: Andey Vivaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Spratly Islands are a scattered collection of reefs, shoals, atolls, and small islands located in the South China Sea. It has become one of the most contested territories in contemporary international politics. At first glance, these remote and largely uninhabited islands may seem insignificant. However, below the surface lies a complex mix of history, national identity, economic interests, strategic competition and geopolitical rivalry. Many countries like China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have claimed all or parts of the Spratly Islands. Among these claimants China has emerged as the most assertive actor, investing heavily in infrastructure, military facilities and the artificial island construction to strengthen its presence in the region. Instead, their importance comes from the combination of strategic location, historical claims, valuable resources, and security concerns control over important maritime lanes, access to lucrative natural resources and much more general desires to become a dominant global force. China considers the islands to be an essential component of its maritime security strategy and a fundamental part of its own territory. However, some nations view China’s moves as an attempt to control the South China Sea and change of the balance of power in that region. 

Tensions surrounding the Spratly Islands have escalated in the recent years. What was once a relatively unnoticed territorial conflict it has become a major international problem due to the creation of artificial islands, the deployment of military equipment and frequent confrontations between the Chinese and Philippine boats. The region’s strategic importance has been further enhanced by the participation of outside countries like the United States and Japan. 

This article explores why the Spratly Islands matter so much to China. It examines the historical background of the dispute, the economic and the energy resources associated with the islands , their military and strategic importance and the broader implications for regional security and the international politics. 

Understanding the Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands are spread across a vast area of the South China Sea, covering approximately 409,000 square kilometres. Most of the features are small reefs, rocks and waves , many of which are submerged during high tide. Despite their limited land area the islands occupy a strategically important position between Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. 

The islands have not received much attention in the past. Because of its dangerous barrier reefs due to these traders and navigators frequently avoided the area while the fishermen occasionally came to fish and gather the turtle items.

Many countries started claiming sovereignty over the islands after Japan surrendered and renounced its territorial claims in the year 1951. Based on various historical and geographical justifications. Countries like China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines all claimed the ownership. Over time, however, the dispute intensified as countries realized the region’s growing strategic and the economic value. 

The Spratly Islands are special because their significance comes from their extensive oceanic zones and resources rather than their land size. Ownership of islands became associated with rights over nearby waterways and seafloor resources as international law developed especially with the passage of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, even small islands gained significant strategic importance. 

Historical Claims and China’s Perspective

China’s historical claim to the Spratly Islands is one of the primary reasons why they are important. Chinese officials often claim that the islands have been used for centuries by the Chinese sailors and fisherman. China claims that maps and historical documents show Chinese control over the South China Sea and its island groups, including the Spratly Islands.

The Nine-Dash Line a U-shaped border that covers the majority of the South China Sea is frequently used to represent China’s viewpoint. China claims that this line represents China’s historical rights in that region. China’s territorial claims are based on the Nine-Dash Line despite the fact that its exact legal meaning is still under debate. 

The problem for China goes past  the geography and resources. As it is directly connected to their national pride and sovereignty. Chinese authorities often cite historical instances in which foreign powers captured Chinese territory and enforced unfair treaties on China.

 As a result, China’s national identity is deeply tied to undoing these historical grievances. Today, the Spratly Islands are a potent symbol of modern Chinese sovereignty, where any diplomatic compromise would be viewed domestically as a sign of weakness.

Economic Significance

For China, the Spratly Islands are very important economically. Their proximity to some of the most significant maritime trade routes in the globe is one of the factor.

An important route for international trade is the South China Sea. Each year, A significant portion of global trade connects the East Asia with Europe, Africa and the Middle East via these seas. Uninterrupted access to these marine routes is crucial for China the largest trade nation in the world.

Greater influence over the Spratly Islands would strengthen China’s position along some of the world’s most important maritime routes.  A larger presence in the area improves China’s capacity to monitor and possibly safeguard the marine trade which is crucial for its economy, even though China does not openly aim to limit the shipping for commercial purposes. 

Beyond shipping, the South China Sea holds some of the world’s most lucrative fishing grounds. These waters sustain millions of livelihoods across Asia. For China, which operates the world’s largest fishing fleet, securing dominant access to these fisheries is a matter of long-term food security. China would be better able to protect the resources and fishing rights for its people if it gained control over the Spratly Islands. 

Energy Security and Natural Resources

Energy security is another major reason why the Spratly Islands matter to China. 

There are substantial natural gas and oil deposits in the South China Sea according to various estimations. According to some estimates the larger region has about 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. According to other estimates, the waters around the Spratly Islands may hold huge quantities of natural gas and billions of barrels of accessible oil.

The possibility for significant energy resources has drawn a lot of attention from the claiming governments, despite the fact that overlapping sovereignty claims have frozen major exploration efforts. This untapped potential is highly attractive to China. Despite being a top global energy producer, China’s rapid economic growth forces it to rely heavily on foreign oil and gas imports. 

Therefore, the Spratly Islands are seen by Chinese authorities as a potential source of strategic energy resources that could foster sustained economic growth. 

Military and Strategic Importance

The Spratly Islands are important to China for military reasons, which might be the main factor.

The islands are strategically located in the middle of the South China Sea. A country can monitor marine trade, carry out surveillance activities and project military might over a wide area by controlling these features.

Recognizing these advantages China has steadily expanded its presence in the Spratly Islands over the past decade. China started increasing land reclamation efforts in the 2014 transforming the underwater features and reefs into the man-made islands. Also on one of these reclaimed features, China had built a functional airstrip by March 2015. 

Airfields, ports, radar systems, communication centres and other military infrastructure are now located on these man-made islands. Chinese planes and navy boats may operate further from the mainland and establish a more permanent presence in the area thanks to these structures.

By making it more difficult for opposing forces to operate freely in the South China Sea the military analysts believe that these installations enhance China’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Additionally, the islands serve Chinese coast guard ships and navy missions logistically.

China believes that by establishing defensive positions that safeguard China’s southern maritime accesses, these initiatives enhance national security.

The Exclusive Economic Zone Factor

The Spratly Islands are becoming much more important because of the idea of the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Coastal states can claim an Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). States in this area have unique rights regarding the discovery and the use of natural resources.

By increasing a nation’s access to nearby waterways and bottom resources island control might affect maritime claims. Because of this, owning even small islands can have significant strategic and financial advantages.

Control over the Spratly Islands may provide China more access to natural resources like fisheries and hydrocarbons, and also strengthen its claims to bigger marine areas. This explains China’s strong emphasis on preserving and growing its influence in that region. 

China’s Artificial Island Strategy

One of the most controversial aspects of China’s South China Sea policy has been its artificial island construction program.

 China started large-scale land reclamation work on a number of Spratly Islands reefs and atolls in the early 2010s. Larger land masses that could support both military and civilian infrastructure were created using sand and building materials.

These initiatives have created large complexes with runways, ports, barracks, radar stations and defense systems from previously hidden or hardly developed features.

China claims that these installations aid in national defense, scientific research, disaster relief, and maritime safety. However, some believe that the projects main goals are to strengthen Chinese territorial claims and increase military power.

Regardless of China’s official civilian framing, these outposts have fundamentally altered the strategic landscape, giving China a permanent militarized launchpad deep inside contested waters. 

Regional and International Reactions

China’s activities in the Spratly Islands have generated strong reactions from neighbouring countries.

Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all have conflicting claims to the portions of the South China Sea. Many of these nations see China’s moves as an attempt to undermine their own territorial claims and change the status quo.

The Philippines has been very outspoken in criticizing Chinese actions. Manila started UNCLOS arbitration procedures in January 2013. On July 12, 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration found that China’s broad maritime claims had no legal foundation under the treaty, which was mostly in favor of the Philippines.

China refused to acknowledge the tribunal’s jurisdiction and rejected the ruling, calling it as illegitimate. 

The dispute has also attracted the attention of external powers. The United States has repeatedly emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation and has conducted naval operations in the region to challenge what it considers excessive maritime claims. 

Japan has likewise increased security cooperation with Southeast Asian states by providing maritime equipment and support to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam.

Implications for China’s Regional Ambitions

The Spratly Islands are closely connected to China’s broader ambition of becoming the leading power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Control over these islands enhances China’s ability to influence regional security dynamics, protect maritime trade routes, secure energy resources and project military power. The islands also serve as symbols of China’s determination to defend what it considers its historical rights and territorial sovereignty.

At the same time, China’s actions have contributed to concerns among the neighbouring countries encouraging closer security cooperation between Southeast Asian states and external powers such as the United States and Japan.

As a result, the Spratly Islands have become a focal point in the broader competition for influence in Asia. 

Conclusion

The Spratly Islands matter to China for multiple interconnected reasons. They have always been associated with Chinese national identity and sovereignty claims. They are economically close to important shipping lanes and rich fishing areas. From a strategic standpoint they offer access to potentially important natural gas and oil resources. Militarily, they offer platforms for observation, force projection and defense operations in the South China Sea.

China’s significant spending in military facilities, artificial islands and maritime surveillance show how important the area is to China. But these actions have also heightened tensions with major powers, especially the United States and escalated disagreements with neighbouring countries.

 In my view, the Spratly Islands issue is unlikely to be resolved in the near future because too many political, economic, and security interests are involved. China sees the islands as essential for its national security and regional influence, while other claiming states view Chinese actions as a threat to their sovereignty. As competition between China and the United States continues to grow, the Spratly Islands will remain one of the most important geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region.