By: Sourishree Ghosh, Research Analyst, GSDN

A new scramble for Africa is looming over the horizon. Africa remains a crucial source of critical minerals, gold, diamonds, Uranium and oil including critical inputs for alternative energies and advanced technologies.  The African Region is a vital region for global security. This region has been one of the regions for leveraging world power by the global powers. Russia’s growing footprint in the African continent has reflected upon its ambitions in the Global South. The US has been rapidly losing its soft power edge in Africa, while on the other hand, the popularity of Russia and China is growing.  Some call it a cold war type of competition in the continent. Russia has become the preferred security partner for a number of African nations while China’s investments have been largely focused on the minerals key to the global energy transition. In the latest developments, the US troops will be exiting Niger by September 15, 2024 wherein the Pentagon had previously enjoyed a long-standing security partnership. This also portrays a stark backlash against the Western military presence in the Sahel region.  

The US-South Africa ties have also been coming under tensions after the latter brought Israel to the ICJ over its Gaza war. The ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict and South Africa’s stance over the issue also demonstrates its changing relations with the West. Russia has gone in to fill in the advanced air defence systems. Washington’s leverage in the African continent has declined considerably. The US policy in Africa has been one of counterterrorism solely which has also overlooked the stability and development factors in its diplomatic engagement with Africa. In the last two decades, China has become the largest trading partner of all African nations and has replaced the US. The decline of US influence in the African continent has been one of the major reasons for the rise of China and Russia. In this article, we will explore the factors that are affecting Africa’s stance towards Russia and China and the limits of their relations in the long term.

Explaining Africa’s Tilt Towards China

Africa is crucial for China to secure its inputs for its manufacturing sector such as copper, cobalt, oil resources, crude oil and access to the African markets. The Chinese investments are mainly for greater political and security returns from the continent. Chinese sense of urgency of development in the African continent is of much greater importance than that of the western nations as China’s largest source of crude imports is Africa (mainly Republic of Congo and South Sudan) after West Asia. China’s BRI in Africa is towards a realisation of its dream of a Sino-centric world order. Africa has the largest number of countries that have friendly relations with China and this is a potential asset for China for its support in international institutions. Moreover, Africa is also described by the Chinese strategists as a possible and potential “exterior line” which China can use to deter the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy. So, Beijing’s investments in the African ports would come handy for naval deployments in the event of a war with the US.

China has its own PMCs for securing access to the critical minerals.  There is a common ideological linkage between the CCP and the rulers of states like Ethiopia. China has also expanded its defence attaches in Africa and the defence sales which experienced 55% growth between 2012 and 2017. The China-Angola relations have been strengthened during the country’s 30-year-old civil war. During this crucial period, the West was distracted by its “war on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. China is Africa’s largest trading partner and biggest source of foreign direct investment. Their ties date back to history when the African nations gave recognition to the PRC over Taiwan. China since the mid-1990s has officially heralded the policy of non-interference in the African governmental affairs and provision of loans with no strings attached. It has also been argued that many African nations have seen China’s no-strings attached approach more attractive than loans from US based financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.

China’s BRI has been influencing African domestic affairs and foreign policy making as well. Some 150 countries among whom many of them are in Africa have signed on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. For example, in Kenya, the Standard Gauge Railway has been hailed as one of the biggest and most successful infrastructure projects till date. Kenya had also borrowed some $5 billion from China for building railways for connecting the port city of Mombasa to Nairobi and Nairobi to Naivasha. These are a part of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. These include key telecommunication projects, global infrastructure and trade for connectivity from Kenya to Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan. However, these projects are also opening up the scope of corruption and massive debt. The railway project cuts through the Nairobi National Park which has raised environmental and sustainability concerns. Ethiopia and Zambia have green flagged massive Chinese built infrastructure.    

China’s commercial diplomacy is unmatched as Beijing forges for expansion of trade and diversification of investment in various sectors, signing of investment deals on fire quest official visits to the resource rich regions of the country (like Angola), unparalleled ability to provide low-cost financing and source of cheap labour for the infrastructure projects. These diplomatic and commercial endeavours of China have made Africa tilt towards China in its foreign policy. China’s security interests lay in the region due to the killing of the Chinese peacekeepers in Mali and Sudan. China’s stance has been challenged in Sudan, a major oil exporter to China, where the ongoing conflict has spurred changes in the Chinese policy. Beijing has also increased its commitment to the UN and African Union peace missions and establishment of its first overseas military outpost in Djibouti. China has also pledged $100 million of military aid to the African Union as it supports the country’s capability initiatives in defence and counterterrorism, for example, China has supported counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. These also shows that the

Thus, trade, investments and loans of China have tilted the African nations towards China. These Chinese activities for bolstering economic growth of Africa are not just mere goodwill investments and might potentially be a stockpiling of international support for contentious political issues in the UN. This has been researched and proven by experts from Aid Data, research lab at College of William and Mary, who reported a link between Chinese assistance and the alignment of the recipient countries with Beijing’s voting in the UN and garnering active support for its One China Principle.  An instance is when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, published a long-awaited report which has condemned China’s repressive policies in the Xinjiang province against the Uighur minority. Muslim countries in the African continent remained silent on the issue and this also led to the failure of the adoption of the resolution at the UN. These also reflect upon China’s soft power and economic diplomacy in the Global South. This can be seen as a conflict between the choice to be on the side of the authoritarian governments on the human rights issues at multilateral forums.  However, such a support is also quasi-systematic as in another case, 25 African nations voted against a motion which condemned China’s national security law in June 2020. The bilateral trade between China and Africa reached $187 billion in 2020 despite China’s zero-Covid policy. Thes tight economic ties with China has led to dependence on China. China is today Africa’s biggest bilateral creditor, with countries such as Kenya owing China around 72% of its bilateral trade. The African countries have refused to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war as China has implicitly stated that it will scale back its overseas investment drive on default of the debt issued by Chinese banks. It also must be noted that the African nations are refraining from any kind of military and security alliance.  China has also adopted a long term and comprehensive strategy including investments in the civilian and government infrastructure with several African nations including Ethiopia, Zambia and Angola.

Explaining Africa’s Tilt Towards Russia

Africa is crucial for Russia on account of the latest discoveries of natural resources from the region of Senegal to Mozambique for Europe’s supply chain issues.  Russia has been relying on memory diplomacy to tap into the anti-colonial sentiments of the African nations and also employing the disinformation campaign for discrediting the pro-western forces to present itself as a better partner than the West. The tilt of the African nations towards Russia dates back to history when the Soviet policy aligned with the sympathetic socialist countries across Africa, examples include close relationship of Moscow with South Africa’s anti-apartheid African National Congress and sending aid in the civil wars in Angola and Congo. In Moscow’s formal diplomatic efforts, Moscow has also signed military cooperation agreements with around nineteen countries since 2014 which signifies cooperation on sensitive issues such as defence cooperation. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has also given a boost to Russia’s attempts at band wagoning Africa. It has extended diplomatic support to Ethiopia and Uganda, both countries who face criticism over human rights issues. Russia has backed the military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso. It has also forged closer ties with Egypt for influencing the Libyan conflict to secure its access to the North African and Mediterranean oil reserves. One of the most notable bonding of Russia and Africa is the BRICS group, and BRICS has played a crucial role in building diplomatic institutions alternative to the western led institutions. Kremlin has also launched the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, which has been a yearly event since then. The Russo-African Summit in Sochi, Russia in October 2019 reflects the fact that Russia has made significant inroads in the African continent. The Summit ended successfully with the signing of the 21 military agreements. In March 2022, only 28 African states condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which meant that almost half of the continent avoided making any stand against Russia directly. In the domain of security, The Russian economies have been struggling economically due to the slow post covid recovery and the global ripple effect of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. For example, Russian fossil fuel exports to Africa in 2023 had skyrocketed to fourteen times as compared to the pre-war period.

Russian paramilitaries and mercenaries are operating in Mali, Congo, the Central African Republic and other states. Russia has also heavily expanded its military footprint in Africa through its Afrika Korps. This has also enhanced Russia’s hard power and influence in the region. The African nations also want greater agency in the management of their foreign affairs as various African nations have rebuffed the Western pressure of picking sides in the conflict. This western pressure has been counterproductive which has paradoxically enough furthered their anti-western sentiments. Moreover, Russia has not joined the western sanctions regime against Russia in the light of the Russia-Ukraine war. This also explains the successful international support Russia has garnered from Africa.

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, the United States had deployed troops and military aid to West Africa in order to deter the spread of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and the result today is the failure of the West’s policy to counter regional as well as international terrorism. The United States had withdrawn 1000 military personnel from Niger and shuttered a $110 million air base while the extremist insurgency continues to seep into the South of the continent. Some analysts point out that the revamped US approach should be a combination of well-financed initiatives weaving together security, governance and development rather than a permanent military presence. The French and the European troops in Barkahne, Tabuka and Sabre have been ousted by the new military rulers of Bamako and Ouagadougou.

Wagner had played a crucial role in the region for securing Russia’s access to the lucrative access to the mining assets. As Russia’s private military, Wagner’s actions first began in Sudan (2017) and rapidly expanded to Madagascar (2018) and Mozambique (2019). In the Libyan civil war, the Wagner group played a crucial role in securing Russia’s access to Libyan oil. However, the interests of these private armies do not always necessarily align with the Kremlin as the recent attempted coup in Russia was staged by this private military group.  Through the infamous group, Russia has also been indulging itself in the countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso wherein the western diplomacy had failed considerably due to the failures of the international and local actors to address the regional instability in the continent. The relationship between Paris and Bamako had declined considerably post the military coups in Mali in 2021 and 2022. France and the United States have alleged that the governments they have been working with have been perceived as corrupt and partly responsible for the insecurity. The Flintlock Counter-terrorism exercise is mostly focused on urban terrorism and rescue of hostages which are not really aligned with the reality of terrorism in the Sahel region. The Biden Administration in a bid for revival has offered the Global Fragility Act, a 10-year plan for deterring the spread of terrorism in the coastal west African nations. France had to withdraw its forces from Mali in 2022, after a decade of failed anti-terror and stabilisation efforts. The Biden administration had also suspended the countries’ free trading rights to the US. The issues of widespread human rights abuses in the region have also led to laws which prohibit the U.S military assistance to the countries of concern. Russia had taken advantage of the prevailing instability and security vacuum in the continent. For example, Russia brokered an exemption to the UNSC embargo on the supply of arms to the Central African Republic in 2017, this move had broken through France’s strong political and military influence for decades and presented Russia as a new security interlocutor.

Africa’s discontentment with the slow progress of UN reforms has been one of the major reasons for its tilt towards Russia and China. There has been increasingly an anti-western sentiment due to the West’s lacklustre Covid-19 vaccine distribution that had been a major setback for Africa’s public health system. The African Union has also called for the “complete exclusion of mercenaries from the African continent” and the lack of reform in the multilateral institutions have been the sore point of the Africa-US relations. Moscow is increasingly tapping into this anti-western sentiment for bolstering influence in the continent in the midst of the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. This is happening also because of the African nations’ long-standing frustration over the lack of representation in the international multilateral bodies and institutions. Many analysts have pointed out that the Western nations should seek to build more equal partnership with Africa. Russia’s interest in the vast resources of the continent is important for Russia as some of these technologies at the centre include the push for a clean energy future. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has nevertheless created food security challenges for Africa. Russia’s ties with Africa are mainly focused on the weapons trade but the former is currently expanding its operational footprint which includes signing of new military bases such as the establishment of a naval port in Sudan. On a diplomatic front, Russia’s goal is that of a multipolar world order. At the United Nations, it has also lobbied the African allies for favourable vote on the Ukraine conflict. On the economic front based on the data from the Congressional Research Service, Russia is not as powerful as its counterparts namely China and the United States.

Limits

African leaders have presented a peace proposal plan for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which Putin has acknowledged that the plan could be a basis of peace. Africa had also sent a clear signal to Putin about the need for peace in the successful conclusion of the grain deal. The latest Russia-African Summit in 2023 has failed to deliver any concrete results. Firstly, out of the 49 African countries that sent delegations to St. Petersburg for the second Russia-Africa Summit in July, only 17 heads of state attended which is much lower than the number of leaders who attended the December 2022 US-Africa Summit. The West has claimed that the involvement of the Russian private military companies is driving the conflict, along with worsening human rights abuses and a growing militarization of the administration in Africa. There had been a recent allegation by the United States that Pretoria was supplying arms to Moscow has also been the cause of a diplomatic dilemma between US and Africa. Africa had also previously taken an initiative for a ten-point peace plan in the Russia-Ukraine conflict which has failed to make the cut diplomatically. We must also note that the attendance at the Russia-Africa Summit has also dropped significantly as compared to the previous one. Moreover, some analysts have also pointed out that the competition over Africa’s resources can also become a fault line between Beijing and Moscow. Africa’s support and neutrality over the Ukraine war has been fragmented in nature. The continent has been in a geopolitical divide.

In return for favourable Chinese deals, China has boosted the African oil and mining sector. Beijing’s complex relationship with the continent has also challenged its “non-interference” policy in the continent. Secondly, China’s debt trap diplomacy in the continent has come into view. Zambia was the first country to default on its Chinese debt during the pandemic. A recent Boston University study reported that the lending to Africa by China has dropped to its lowest level in two decades and Beijing is preferably moving towards smaller investments. Some of the African nations view the Chinese investment in a favourable light however some of the countries have criticised Beijing for ignoring the environmental standards which have violated local laws and indulged in various other forms of corruption. It also needs to be understood that many African nations attach low priority to environmental standards. The environment factor is being ranked the least important in the prevalent dangers in Africa. Thirdly, China’s peace brokering in the conflicts has its own limitations. Zambia has also experienced civil strife due to the influx of Chinese companies in the region. The Chinese non-interference principle is being tested given the shifting geopolitics in the region. Chinese investments in the region peaked around 2016 and since then the Chinese loans to the African governments declined significantly, falling from US$ 28.4 billion in 2016 to US$ 1.9 billion in 2020. This is because of changing priorities of China for its domestic reasons and due to the high defaults of the African nations to pay the debts back to China. The African nations have characterised the Chinese loans as a mutually beneficial cooperation between the developing countries and China’s policy of non-interference. China has also far surpassed the US as an economic player in the African continent.

Another limitation in the long run is that the US is reinventing and rethinking its Africa policy. The US has also been trying to regain its hold and influence over the continent as understood from its efforts such as the US strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa with focus on pandemic recovery and just energy transition, hosting of the US-Africa Summit pledging to providing the continent with US$ 55 billion in aid and investments in 2022-25. The security situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has been in the flux due to a deteriorating security situation and a looming humanitarian crisis. The instability in the continent is itself a great challenge for normal and stable ties for all the nations involved in the scramble. 

The Chinese approach in the African continent has its own limitations, for instance, during the Sudanese civil war, China had to deal with the representations of various groups that opposed the government for maintaining the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which is operated by the China National Petroleum Corporations. In the past, China has aggressively pursued its repayment of debts from Africa which has to some extent affected China as the champion of the developing nations. China’s conflict resolution stance in diplomacy in Africa remains unclear. Beijing did appoint a special envoy to the Horn of Africa however it has not been playing any significant role in the devastating civil war in the country despite its heavy investments in Ethiopia. The African Union has taken the diplomatic lead in this regard. African leaders are also aware that Africa has become aground for power rivalry and proxy wars in Africa. This has also made Africa view China as a positive development model. American businesses in Africa are slowing their engagement given the high risk and power infrastructure and this vacuum is being filled by the Chinese companies. With regard to China, there is a greater concern for transparency in its dealings as for example, in Kenya, the parliamentarians also pressed for public scrutiny of the US$ 5 billion loan agreement Kenya made with the EXIM bank of China for the Mombasa-Nairobi railway.

To conclude, major powers of the world are competing for influence and the great scramble for Africa is a reality in world affairs today. Besides Russia and China, the Gulf nations especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey have extensively invested in the ports, military bases, and agricultural sector besides their robust diplomatic ties with the continent.  For example, Qatar has the longest standing involvement in peacekeeping efforts in the Horn of Africa which has been playing the role of a peace broker between the Sudanese government and rebels in Darfur. In the war-torn conflicted area of Libya, the UAE along with Russia and Egypt supported the Khalifa Haftar forces. Moreover, the African Union has also been playing a significant role in the promotion of economic, political and social integration in the continent, despite facing institutional, political and financial challenges. Thus, the shifting sands of geopolitics in the African continent has made the African gamble a complicated and complex affair wherein many powers are involved. It can also be inferred that Africa has been finely balancing and treading its diplomacy and tight-rope walking in dealing with the external affairs while also dealing with its internal conflicting circumstances. Africa is indeed facing a geopolitical divide across the continent. To conclude, these factors would determine the future of African relations with China and Russia in Africa’s foreign policy making.

By: Seetal Patra, Research Analyst, GSDN

The concept of ‘moderates’ in the case of Middle East crisis is no more a practical lens to find a solution to this hot boil of regional and diplomatic tensions. Moderates are those who try and pursue to bring on peace, cannot be emphasized more with the ongoing Israel- Hamas crisis (geo-political and humanitarian). The moderate powers in the context of Aab world, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have been mostly unsuccessful this time around in bringing a truce to end the onslaught of the civilians.

To be sure, the Saudi–Jordanian–Egyptian axis has made enormous effort to achieve peace over the last decade, putting forward ideas such as the Arab Peace Initiative and the Middle East Road Map. While the Israelis have talked about being the only party that wants peace, they have made no similar efforts during this period. Instead, they have sought to weaken the idea of negotiated settlements, such as the Israeli separation wall and disengagement from Gaza. Howsoever hard the moderates might have tried in building a boundary of peace in this region, but they have always fallen short, when it comes to effective state building, and developing a system of checks and balances with true accountability and transparency on the cards for the political process.

The façade of resistance to reform is itself using the ascendence of political Islam as a convenient scare tactic, with a General saying in the halls of the elites, “You open up the system, and the Islamists come in.” The elite’s desire in preserving its privileges grew along with its privileges. Merit as a virtue and state loyalty were subordinated to self-aggrandizement. Religious parties coexist with Arab regimes to control the public arena and fill the vacuum left by repression by offering public services.

Muslim-based parties established a wide and solid base of support through their charitable giving and social activities. In any case, religious organizations had gained a considerable advantage over other civil society groups by the time certain Arab countries considered political reforms in the early 1990s. The political inertia that was intended to protect the status quo for the elites at first and then to “shield” society against radical ideologies instead had the opposite effect, with religious groups using Islam as a political tool becoming more prominent and the ruling elite being perceived by Arab public as less “moderate” and more unaccountable.  Consequently, the argument put forth by those advocating for pluralistic reform in the Arab world is different: “You don’t open up the system and the Islamists—and only the Islamists—come in and garner mass support.”

This unfortunate situation cannot be justified. In contrast to other regions, which have demonstrated the ability to overcome obstacles and progress, even those as severe as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab world continues to insist that its unique circumstances should spare it from engaging in a substantive reform process.

In the Arab world, a third option is desperately needed: a universally moderate political force that is equally committed to peace and reform, as well as to maintaining political and cultural diversity and peacefully achieving its goals. In today’s Arab politics, if not in the hearts and minds of many Arab citizens, such a discourse is mostly lacking. Throughout society and at all times, there must be a core conviction in and dedication to political and cultural diversity. No party can force its cultural beliefs on the rest of society; no party has a monopoly on power or the truth. Pluralism is impossible in any nation unless all sides agree that the state alone should be in charge of maintaining security and using force, and that no other party has the right to use violence to achieve its goals. This implies that non-state entities, like the numerous armed organizations in Iraq or Hamas or Hezbollah, must completely disarm and become part of their respective nations’ political processes.

A diverse range of ethnic and religious groups make up the Arab globe. These include Christians of all denominations; Jews; Muslims, including Sunnis and Shiites; and other schools of law; in addition to Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Chechens, and Berbers. This civil conversation has to aim towards a society that welcomes all of its members and sees variety as a strength. It should also unwaveringly affirm that women have equal rights and are full participants in society and progress. The best chance of bringing about this kind of genuine transformation and ending the impasse in government is through gradual implementation. However, gradual doesn’t have to mean slow or haphazard, one-off initiatives that don’t contribute to a reform process. Gradual needs to be taken seriously.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

In January and February 2024, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) witnessed a wave of mass protests, sit-ins, and strikes as residents demanded the restoration of the wheat subsidy previously granted to the region. The unrest was fueled by the Pakistani federal government’s unilateral decisions, which had long been a source of discontent. This wave of protests mirrored the events of 2022, where similar grievances were aired. Despite these fervent demands and the protests leading up to the budget unveiling, the federal government remained reluctant to provide the necessary funds for GB. Ultimately, the region’s inhabitants continue to face the same challenges, with their demands largely unmet.

In the fiscal year 2024-25, the budget allocation for Gilgit-Baltistan starkly underscores significant disparities when compared to other regions in Pakistan. Despite its strategic importance and unique challenges, Gilgit-Baltistan received noticeably lower funding across various sectors. With a population of approximately 1.25 million spread over 72,496 square kilometers, the region’s federal budget allocation includes a Federal Grant-in-aid of PKR 68,000 million, a wheat subsidy of PKR 15,872 million, and a repayment of principal and interest totaling PKR 165 million. Additionally, there is an allocation of PKR 74,500 million under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), which also includes funds for PoJK. These figures highlight the ongoing inequities in resource distribution that hinder the region’s development potential.

The National Finance Commission (NFC) award is crucial for the financial allocation and development of Pakistan’s regions. However, GB faces significant challenges due to its exclusion from the NFC framework. Without provincial status, GB is not eligible for a direct share of the NFC award, resulting in predetermined, top-down budgetary allocations. This approach undermines local legislation and hampers targeted development efforts. As a result, GB struggles with various development issues, including infrastructure, education, healthcare, and economic growth. The lack of a direct NFC share exacerbates these problems, making it difficult to meet local needs effectively. Addressing the NFC issue is essential for unlocking GB’s development potential and ensuring a fair distribution of resources, which would greatly enhance the region’s economic and social landscape. Former Chief Minister of GB, Hafiz Hafeez-Ur-Rehman, has emphasized the need for participation in the NFC, stating in strong words that GB deserves its share, not charity. 

The Gilgit-Baltistan Finance Act 2022, through the “Gilgit-Baltistan Revenue Authority Bill 2022,” has imposed new taxes on 135 items, significantly impacting the local population. Unlike other regions of Pakistan, the people of GB lack representation in the national legislature, making these new taxes particularly contentious. The taxes have led to a 15-20% increase in the cost of living, affecting essential items like food, fuel, and healthcare, thereby exacerbating the economic challenges faced by the region’s residents. Local businesses predict a potential 25% drop in sales and profitability due to reduced consumer spending as prices rise. This tax imposition is seen as unfair by the residents, given GB’s disputed status and its lack of political voice at the federal level. Furthermore, GB’s infrastructure and investment levels are already lower than other parts of Pakistan, making it harder for the region to absorb these new fiscal pressures. The additional financial burden limits the capacity of individuals and businesses to invest in local development projects, further stalling progress in key areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare​.

The Special Investment Facilitation Cell (SIFC) initiative in GB has sparked significant controversy and protests. While the government claims that this project aims to revitalize tourism by renovating 44 dilapidated government guest houses, critics argue that it serves as a strategy for resource acquisition rather than genuine development. Local residents and leaders strongly oppose the SIFC move, asserting that it undermines regional autonomy and disregards the rights and wishes of the local population. The leasing agreements have been labeled as illegal and unconstitutional, emphasizing the need for transparent consultation with local stakeholders. Moreover, concerns have arisen about potential land grabbing and environmental degradation. Forests and public lands are being leased for hotel construction, raising fears that GB’s natural resources are being sold off, endangering both the environment and the livelihoods of the local population. Leader of the Opposition in the GB Assembly, Muhammad Kazim Maisam, has demanded accountability from the government regarding the plunder of resources in GB. The role of the military in economic projects like the SIFC remains controversial, with doubts persisting about the extent and durability of military influence in civilian economic activities.

Development and protest often go hand in hand in GB. The region’s socio-political landscape is shaped by the interplay between government initiatives and public dissent. A prime example is the 2023–2024 Gilgit-Baltistan protests, sparked by a dramatic increase in wheat prices. Local residents, political parties, and civil society organizations expressed their dissatisfaction through demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches across various towns. This clash between economic stability through price adjustments and public discontent highlights the ongoing tension in GB. Awami Action Committee presented a comprehensive 15-point demand list, which included not only the restoration of the wheat subsidy but also the suspension of the Finance Act 2022, the withdrawal of various taxes, and ensuring GB’s share in the National Finance Commission (NFC) award. Additionally, they demanded land ownership rights for locals, the cancellation of mineral exploration leases granted to outsiders, and the allocation of 80 percent of the Diamer Basha Dam’s royalty to GB residents. The list also called for a reliable electricity supply, the end of 22-hour power outages, the establishment of medical and engineering colleges, and the restoration of traditional routes in GB.

The grassroots uprising in GB signifies a broader struggle for autonomy and dignity. As protests continue, the government faces a critical juncture to address economic, service, and human rights concerns. Balancing development initiatives with social justice and local empowerment remains a significant challenge. Economic crises and rising unemployment further fuel protests, with demands for basic necessities like wheat flour, pulses, and power supply. The struggle for economic stability and livelihoods often leads to public dissent and demonstrations. Resource allocation and accountability are also contentious issues. Decisions such as leasing tourism sites or adjusting wheat prices significantly impact people’s lives. When perceived as unfair or detrimental, these decisions trigger protests, highlighting the tension between development goals and public welfare. The dynamic between development policies, public needs, and dissent shapes GB’s socio-political landscape. Policymakers and activists must navigate the delicate balance between progress and citizens’ rights and aspirations.

In conclusion, the socio-political landscape of GB is marked by a persistent struggle for autonomy and equitable resource distribution. The mass protests for the restoration of the wheat subsidy, underscore the region’s ongoing discontent with federal policies. The disparities in budget allocation for GB in the fiscal year 2024-25, compared to other regions, highlight the challenges faced by this strategically important yet underfunded area. The exclusion from the NFC framework exacerbates these issues, hindering targeted development efforts and effective local governance. The imposition of new taxes through the Gilgit-Baltistan Finance Act 2022 has further strained the local economy, increased the cost of living and impacted business profitability. Controversial initiatives like the SIFC have sparked significant opposition, with residents and leaders decrying what they see as resource exploitation under the guise of development. The dynamic between development policies and public needs continues to shape GB’s socio-political environment, with ongoing protests reflecting the broader struggle for dignity and fair treatment.

By: Aidamol Joseph, Research Analyst, GSDN

Throughout their many decades together, relations between China and Philippines have generally been friendly and cordial. Nonetheless, intense problems in both nations have recently caused them to “cool off”, reaching a low point since their diplomatic relations were established in 9 June 1975. China’s determination to assert its disputed sovereignty over the entirely of the vast South China Sea has sparked increasing clashes with its neighbors in recent years, particularly the Philippines.

China and Taiwan border the South China Sea on the north, the Indo-Chinese peninsula (which includes Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) on the west, Indonesia and Brunei on the south, and the Philippines (also known as West Philippine Sea) on the east. It is connected to the East China Sea (both marginal seas of the Pacific Ocean) by the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait. In 2016, trade across the South China Sea was valued at over USD 3.37 trillion, making it an essential global commercial route. 60% of all trade travels via Asia, and one third of all shipping passes through the South China Sea, according to the Center for Strategic and international Studies (CSIS), which estimates that 80% of trade worldwide is carried by sea by volume and 70% by value.  Millions of people rely on this sea’s abundant fishing grounds for their food security and means of subsistence.

Tensions between the Philippines and China have escalated over the last two years, mainly over two disputed territories: Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. The former is about 120 nautical miles (222 km) west of the Philippine Island of Luzon and is considered a part of the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Spratly islands are a group of over 100 islands and reefs, and while the Philippines claims some parts, China lays claim to the entire archipelago. China calls the Scarborough Shoal ‘Huangyan Dao’ while the Philippino name for it is ‘Pantang Shoal’ or ‘Bajo de Masinloc’.

The root causes of the tensions lies in the contested claims over the South China Sea, with China asserting nearly all of the region. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, defying a favorable ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People’s Republic of China under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China in the South China Sea that the Philippines alleged to be in violation of the convention. China adopted a position of non-acceptance and non-participation in the proceedings. The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as Registry in this arbitration.

China lays claim to nearly all of the Soth China Sea, including the Paracel Islands. Its “nine dash line” claim encompasses up to 90% of the sea, leading to tensions as it has expanded islands and built military installations to reinforce control, especially in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The line comprises nine dashes which extends hundreds of miles south and east from its most southernly province of Hainan. In 1947, China issued a map detailing its claims, and insists history backs up its claims- Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly Island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation. These claims are mirrored by Taiwan. However, critics say China has not been specific about what exactly its claim includes, and that the nine dash line that appears on Chinese maps encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates.

However, in recent months, there has been a rapid increase in tensions between Beijing and Manila. The main focus of it is a dilapidated ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines intentionally left stranded to strengthen their claim to the shoal. Conflicts have arisen recently when Chinese Coast Guard ships have fired water cannons at Philippine resupply boats, forcing Philippino sailors to be injured and causing damage to the ships. The Philippine forces were trying to replenish the forces on board.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) took harmful measures against legitimate Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 23 March 2024, and the United States supports its ally, the Philippines. Resupply vessel suffered major damage that rendered it immobile, and Filipino service members were injured as a result of PRC ships’ frequent use of water cannons and careless blocking tactics. By its actions, the PRC stops regular staff rotations and denies basic supplies to Filipino service members stationed at Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has repeatedly interfered with Philippine vessels’ ability to exercise their right to freedom of travel at sea and to cut off supplies to this long-standing outpost; this event is just the most recent example of this.

The PRC’s activities exhibit a blatant disdain for international law and destabilize the region. The legally binding ruling of an international tribunal rendered in July 2016 states that Second Thomas Shoal is a low tide feature that is unquestionably within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and that the PRC has no legitimate maritime claims to the waters surrounding it. The United States urges on the PRC to comply by the ruling and stop its risky and destabilizing behavior. The 2016 arbitral decision is final and legally binding on the PRC and the Philippines, as stipulated under the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. The United States reiterates that any armed action against Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including Coast Guard aircraft, anywhere in the South China Sea is covered by Article IV of the 1951 U.S-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

The tensions of the region are echoing in other parts of the world also. Germany has volunteered to arbitrate the conflict if it comes to that. When meeting with Ferdinand Macros Jr, Germany’s Federal Minister for Foreign affairs Annalena Baerbock offered her assistance in reducing tensions between China and Philippines. They emphasized the importance of establishing a peaceful dispute resolution framework and encouraging communication. On January 05, 2024 the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea convened a trilateral Indo-Pacific dialogue. During the discussion, the three nations expressed worry about China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. A series of naval drills in the area have been conducted by China, the US and the Philippines as a result go the events. The US and Philippine Navy ended their cooperative exercises in the South China Sea in January 2024. The coordinated patrol was allegedly being shadowed by the Chinese ships. China launched a second military drill in the area shortly after January 04, 2024 and the Peoples Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command referred to it as a “routine” exercise.

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US President Joe Biden jointly released a “Joint Vision Statement” on April 12, 2024 outlining a series of economic and defense cooperation initiatives, while slamming China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.”

As hostilities in South China Sea worsen, India has promised to stand behind the Philippines. At a news conference in Manila, External Affairs Minister S. Jayashankar reiterated India’s commitment to supporting the Philippines in preserving freedom and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. He emphasized the need for closer cooperation between India and the Philippine to shape the emerging model in the changing world. India and Philippines formally established diplomatic relations on 26 November 1949. This milestone marks a transformative partnership between the two nations.

Witnessing the multiple clashes between the two countries, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 30 December 2023 released a statement on “Maintaining and Promoting Stability in the Maritime Sphere in the Southeast Asia. According to President Macros, the situation in the area has become “more dire”, and in order to keep the peace, the Philippines would need to work with its neighbors and allies. China is critical of the Philippines attempts and said that the Philippines should not become an “offbeat case” and that any separate “code” without China is unlikely to have recognition from ASEAN countries.

China says the Philippines ignored proposals it put forward to manage their dispute in the South China Sea. Philippines President Ferdinand Macros Jr said they did not reject the deal, but said it stood on a “questionable” premise. He added that China’s claims were not recognized by any country, certainly not by the Philippines.

Relations between China and the Philippines are heating up once more. Because it is the first island chain, the Philippines has a particularly important geostrategic location. Conflict in the area might arise if the Philippines erects a permanent building on the Shoal. This could therefore have an impact on the South China Sea’s regional stability in the absence of code of conduct. Owing to the region’s instability, a single calculation error could trigger a major chaos.

By: Lipun Kumar Sanbad

The question of Taiwan’s independence has long been a significant issue in international relations, particularly involving China, Taiwan, and other nations with interests in the region. Recently, China’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan has intensified, with Chinese leadership indicating their willingness to use force to stop Taiwan from declaring independence. This situation has substantial consequences for global politics, impacting regional stability, international alliances, and economic dynamics. This article examines the implications of China’s position on Taiwan’s independence, focusing on its effects on global politics and India.

Historical Context and Current Situation

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), has a complicated history with mainland China. After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on the mainland. Since then, Taiwan has functioned as a separate political entity, even though the PRC claims it under the “One China” policy. Despite Taiwan’s effective independence and strong democratic system, it is not widely recognized as a sovereign state due to diplomatic pressure from China.

Recently, the Chinese government has ramped up its rhetoric and military activities around Taiwan. President Xi Jinping has reaffirmed China’s commitment to reunification, stating that China will not rule out the use of force to achieve this goal. Military drills near Taiwan, increased incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and efforts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan demonstrate China’s escalating pressure.

China’s Motivations

Reclaiming Taiwan is viewed as essential for China’s national rejuvenation and territorial integrity. Taiwan’s strategic military and economic significance, due to its location and technological advancements, is crucial for China. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reasserting control over Taiwan bolsters its domestic authority and legitimacy. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), maintaining control over Taiwan is vital for its political legitimacy. The CCP perceives reunification as essential to restoring China’s national grandeur. Failing to prevent Taiwan’s independence could significantly weaken the CCP’s authority, both domestically and internationally.

Taiwan’s geographic location gives it substantial strategic importance. It lies within the first island chain, which serves as a strategic barrier to China’s access to the Pacific Ocean. Controlling Taiwan would enable China to extend its military reach into the Pacific and secure its maritime boundaries. Conversely, an independent Taiwan aligned with the United States or other Western powers would present a major security threat to China. Taiwan plays a critical role in high-tech industries, especially in semiconductor manufacturing. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is integral to the global supply chain for advanced electronics. Gaining control over Taiwan’s technological assets would grant China significant economic and technological benefits.

For China, preventing Taiwan’s independence is also about preserving national unity and sovereignty. The PRC views any move toward Taiwanese independence as a breach of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, a principle that is central to its national policy. China’s position on Taiwan also affects its diplomatic relationships globally. The “One China” policy is a fundamental condition for diplomatic relations with the PRC. If Taiwan were allowed to declare independence, it could embolden other separatist movements within China, thereby undermining the CCP’s control over its other regions.

Global Political Implications

China’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan raises significant concerns about regional security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. A military conflict over Taiwan could involve neighboring countries and major powers, leading to widespread instability.

U.S.-China Relations

The United States has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, balancing its commitment to Taiwan’s defense under the Taiwan Relations Act with its diplomatic recognition of the PRC. China’s forceful actions could force the U.S. to adopt a more definitive stance, potentially leading to direct military confrontation, with severe repercussions for global peace and security.

 Impact on Japan and South Korea

Japan and South Korea, key U.S. allies in the region, would be significantly impacted by any conflict over Taiwan. Both countries have strong economic ties with Taiwan and strategic interests in regional stability. They may increase their military readiness and cooperation with the U.S., further escalating tensions with China.

International Alliances and Diplomacy

China’s actions regarding Taiwan will likely influence international alliances and diplomatic relations, prompting countries to reassess their positions and alliances. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia and India, is likely to become more united in response to China’s assertiveness. The Quad could enhance its military and strategic cooperation, sending a clear message to China about the unified stance of these democratic nations. The European Union, traditionally less involved in Asia-Pacific security issues, might increase its engagement in response to the Taiwan situation. The EU has economic and political interests in maintaining regional stability, and China’s actions could prompt a stronger EU stance on Indo-Pacific security matters.

Economic Consequences

The economic implications of China’s stance on Taiwan are significant, affecting global trade, supply chains, and economic stability. Taiwan is a vital player in the global supply chain, particularly in the semiconductor industry. Any conflict or instability in Taiwan could disrupt the production and supply of semiconductors, affecting industries worldwide, from electronics to automotive manufacturing. If China uses force to stop Taiwan’s independence, it could face substantial economic sanctions from the international community, similar to those imposed on Russia after its actions in Ukraine. These sanctions would impact China’s economy and have broader effects on global trade and investment.

Implications for India

India, as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, has a vested interest in the Taiwan issue. China’s aggressive posture towards Taiwan has several implications for India’s geopolitical and strategic landscape. China’s actions are likely to push India closer to the U.S., both militarily and diplomatically. The two countries may enhance their defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and strategic alignment to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea could be threatened by China’s assertiveness. As a result, India may increase its focus on maritime security, expanding its naval capabilities and collaborations with like-minded countries to ensure freedom of navigation and regional stability.

The economic ramifications of the Taiwan situation also affect India, given its economic ties with both China and Taiwan. India’s technology and manufacturing sectors could face disruptions if the Taiwan conflict affects semiconductor production. This would necessitate India to diversify its supply chains and seek alternative sources for critical components. The situation could also present opportunities for India to enhance its economic collaboration with Taiwan, particularly in areas like technology, electronics, and renewable energy. Strengthening economic ties with Taiwan could provide India with a strategic edge and reduce its dependence on Chinese imports.

India’s diplomatic approach to the Taiwan issue will need to be carefully calibrated to balance its relations with China and its strategic interests. India will face diplomatic pressures from both China and its Western allies regarding the Taiwan issue. It will need to navigate these pressures strategically, maintaining a balanced stance that upholds its national interests without escalating tensions unnecessarily. India’s role in international forums like the United Nations, G20, and BRICS will be crucial in shaping the global response to China’s actions. India can leverage its position to advocate for peaceful resolution and uphold international norms and principles.

Conclusion

China’s readiness to forcefully stop Taiwan’s independence is a significant development with far-reaching implications for global politics. The potential for military conflict, shifts in international alliances, and economic disruptions underscores the gravity of the situation. For India, the Taiwan issue presents both challenges and opportunities, requiring strategic foresight and diplomatic acumen to navigate effectively. As the global community watches closely, the actions and responses of key players will shape the future of regional and global stability. Ensuring a balanced and peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue is paramount, and it will require concerted efforts from all stakeholders to achieve this goal.

By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Growing India and China competition which was brewing for last few years, the development of India Out Campaign and victory of Mohammed Muizzu in the Maldives Presidential election highlights increased China’s role and influence in the country. The way China is changing the South Asia’s geo-political order, China’s reach and means to undermine India position in the region has become a concern for the India. The recent political upheaval happened due to a social media post has created a rift in India-Maldives relationship and allow President Muizzu to get closer to China. With Maldives getting closer to China under President Muizzu leadership, in coming years the gap and difference between India and Maldives will widen and cause more challenge to India to keep order and stability in South Asia and secure its geopolitical and national interest in the region vis-à-vis the Chinese threat in South Asia.

India-Maldives relationship: An Overview

Considering the current bilateral relationship between India and Maldives, the beginning of the relationship was warming as India became the first nation to recognise Maldives after it gained its independence in 1965 and establish diplomatic relationship. Establishing a healthy bilateral relationship and a closest maritime ally on many occasion Maldives supported India on various multilateral for like the UN, Commonwealth, NAM and SAARC, India supported and assisted the island country financially, militarily and diplomatically over the years. India also executed various projects like the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital, Faculty of Engineering Technology, provided tsunami aid and gave credit-line to address foreign exchange crisis, water crisis and construct houses.

As the Indian investment and Maldives support to India were mutual, a downfall to India-Maldives relations began during former President Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018) as the island nation started to shift towards China. Such a development and growing resentment towards India in Maldives were exploited by opposition parties in October 2020 under ‘India Out’ campaign which continued and became visible in the 2023 Maldives Presidential elections with Muizzu using the campaign to its advantage, thereby causing a rift in the India-Maldives relationship. Mud-slinging on X (formerly Twitter) become a watershed moment in the India-Maldives bilateral relationship and developments in the last few months are a fall-out of Maldives closeness to China and the continued impact of India Out campaign.

The Chinese Factor and Implication on the India-Maldives relationship

Posts on the social media caused a rise of hyper-nationalism on both sides, which was already under stress due to Muizzu becoming President in November 2023 and his closeness and focus on China has alarmed the Indian Government. As damage control measures failed to address the situation, at the time when Indian started to compared Lakshadweep to Maldives as an alternative tourist destination and Maldives counter response further worsened the situation. Since the incident, the reality around the India-Maldives relationship isn’t on a good term, as Maldives has removed the Indian Army personnel from the country. The number of Indian tourists arriving to the island nation fell from first to fifth position within few weeks after an uproar on X.

With a gap in the India-Maldives relations, China emerged as beneficiary in the diplomatic stand-off. Xiang Yang Hong 03, a Chinese surveying ship vital for anti-submarine warfare capabilities docked briefly in Maldives. Such Chinese manoeuvre in the Indian Ocean region has cautioned India. In return Indian Coast Guard Ship Samundra Paheredar visited Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei in April 2024. Later, the Indian Navy concluded an operational deployment in the South China Sea when three naval ship destroyer Delhi, fleet tanker Shakti and anti-submarine corvette Kiltan made port call which started with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei on May 26, 2024.

The situation in India-Maldives relationship emerged due to Maldives President Muizzu calls to defend national security and interests and restrict any foreign power interference in country’s internal matters. Although, social media post and response has impacted the relations between India and Maldives,  incidents like scrapping of India-Maldives hydrography agreement reflects that the year ahead is bleak for India and Maldives. Once India occupied the top spot in foreign visitors visiting Maldives and currently it has witnessed a fall of 54% between March 2023-24 as only 8,322 Indian tourist visited Maldives. Witnessing such a fall in tourist and its impact on Maldives economy, Ibrahim Faisal, Tourism Minister of Maldives on May 06, 2024 called upon the Indian tourists to return.

With the Muizzu government working to break free from his country’s dependence on India, withdrawal of Indian hydrographic ships from Maldives, welcoming Chinese ship and joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative will compel India to further strengthen its Indian Ocean region strategy. As China presence has increased in Maldives, India can’t afford to ignore and should ensure they remain strong and steadfast in their ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and undermine new Chinese adventure in the Indian Ocean region. However, Maldives alignment with China can be seen as the Muizzu government’s means to address challenges emerged due to strained relationship with India, knowing such an alignment comes with an inherent risk.

The recent, outreach by the Maldives Tourism ministry illustrate nation is grappling with a debt of US$ 1.3 billion which today constitute 20% of nation’s total debt. On the other hand, India proposed reduction of its financial aid by 22% to Maldives for the financial year 2024-25 has worried the Muizzu government. Getting closer to China has caused criticism from opposition and public unrest towards the Maldives government, on the other hand, they’ve ensured relation with India didn’t deteriorate further and get into a Chinese debt trap and faced a financial crisis situation as witnessed in Sri Lanka in 2019.

As the challenge posed by distancing itself from India isn’t economic in nature, the statement made by Maldives Defence Minister Ghassan Maumoon on May 12, 2024 that the  inability of Maldives pilots to fly three Dornier aircrafts due to unspecified reason have become a concern for the Muizzu government, which were flew by Indian personnel till May 10, 2024. With Maldives grappling with economic and military problem, Maldives President Muizzu vision and inclination toward China has caused trouble for the country.

Conclusion

However, seeing Maldives President Mohammed Muizzu step to ask Indian army personnel from the country to stop any interference from any foreign power in their internal affairs should come as a sort of relief for the Indian government. As the Indian government approval of extending a budget support of US$ 50 million to Maldives has been hailed by Maldives Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer as a true gesture of goodwill which signifies and strengthens the longstanding friendship between India and Maldives during his visit to India in May this year.

The visit of the Maldives President Muizzu for the swearing-in ceremony of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his third consecutive term on June 04, 2024 has raised hopes of the return of normalcy in relations between India and Maldives.