By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

“India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present” is a book written by Shivshankar Menon has propounded the whole narrative of the book along the historical lines of geopolitical transitions in a timeline manner, therefore by narrating the story of how India’s journey took the steps of diplomatic interest. With the stalwart news headlines asserting that with the opening of economic doors, China’s share in the world’s GDP rose from about two percent in 1990 to about 18 percent in 2022. The stupendous economic rise has made the country permanently revolving on the global pyramid of South Asia. With the converging victories of the Sino-Pak alliance, the internal instability of both countries has wider implications for the decisive future of the growing turbulence of China in South Asia. China’s strategic involvement with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and India has brought tables of debt devious trap in the security domains for the said countries.

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China will deepen relations with its neighbours in accordance with the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and partnership with its neighbours.” However, the geopolitical relations between the nations can only be fostered when pseudo-mutual benefits clear the vision.

In India’s Way, a book authored by S. Jaishankar has blamed “legacy issues” for the growing scuffle between India and China’s problems. The recent developments of China’s longstanding profile to barging into South Asia strategically and engulfing them to burgeon its autonomy in the South Asian region has compelled regional countries to revamp their foreign policies towards China. The proclamation of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” or “Third Era” in the historical narratives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) constitutes a dictum of ‘striving for achievement’. However, in the second era, the policy was ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ as proposed by Deng Xiaoping was a fiasco that turned into the futility of the Chinese policy of sticking to the dictum.

The persistence of deep suspicion of China’s geostrategic movement in the South Asian region is a result of fulfilling its geopolitical interest through tailoring massive infrastructure development and investment programs as a catalyst of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route. The clarity of the posing narrative that China is stepping into this area for mutual benefit is a completely blurred vision primarily to gain support via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route.

This article endeavours to navigate China’s prospects and the weight that South Asian countries can take to renunciate the pseudo phrase of ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping to weave the rest of the world as a better community to perform state action in interlinked global affairs.’

In long term potential intentions of China’s policy towards South Asia might result in “perpetual oscillation” in foreign policy of South Asian countries where it will be defined through the national interest of concerned states. The proclivities of decision-makers in international opportunities are always dynamic and not static, therefore, it is reflected in domestic capabilities in the international environment.

Evolution of Chinese discourse in South Asia

Broadly, it can be said that China’s discourse in South Asia can be classified into four different kinds of categorization. The multifaceted nature of Chinese discourse has imperatively four watersheds in summarization to understand the larger footprints. The first watershed was through travelogues which resulted in administrative details along with the study of geography, society, and cultural practices of South Asia. Further, in the second watershed, the expansion of Chinese mercantile networks in the Indian Ocean, moreover, by the sixteenth century the focus was shifted toward coastal regions of South Asia through maritime routes. In the third and fourth watersheds, the implication of the dearth of knowledge that was comprehended in South Asia was invisible, henceforth, became distorted. An accurate understanding of Chinese discourse in South Asia was visible only in the late nineteenth century when travellers from Quing China began visiting British India to mark the periodization and caveats on the past discourse to amend them and remove the notion of distorted histories.

In November 2012, President Xi Jinping first mentioned the notion of the ‘Chinese Dream’ to resurrect the Chinese nation by making the armed forces strong. In October 2013, President Xi Jinping asserted ‘The strategic goal of China’s diplomacy with neighbouring countries is to serve the realization of the two “centenary goals” and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ Therefore, it discernible that China’s goal of economic development and geopolitical considerations in its neighbourhood policy expression is to become a hegemon in the region.

In a white paper titled, ‘China’s policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’ where China made a brutal warning statement to small and medium-sized countries to not take sides among big countries. While Xi Jinping’s goal of community to common destiny is a fiasco to believe in since the instances of Sri Lanka in the recent timeline has made it a funeral to accept the fact that China’s interest since the beginning was never for the mutual benefit in the enhancing line of ‘strategic confidence based on socialism which President Xi addressed in 2018 conference.

In the recent past, the combination of Chinese discourse amalgamated with the Chinese Dream as a strategic confidence to spell out BRI as an alternative geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic framework for China to fuel up the long-standing aspiration of taking the domination of the area to its fullest.

Navigating the future aspiration of China’s dreadful mystery in investing South Asian region

Vulnerabilities residing in the South Asian region are inviting China to involve its money and power through the region in receiving experiences from each other’s footprints. The intensity of Chinese activism can manage the neighbourhood political risk to face the special challenges. While people presume only China’s factor for shaping South Asian dissonance, however, internal, external, and most importantly regional factors are the fundamentals to the same. Where the cases of building grand infrastructure to fuelling up the small countries to deceiving with its strategy, one has to keep in mind about Chinese economy taking a troubled position on the global stage. Recently, a report published by IMF stated, that GDP growth for Asia’s largest economy will slow down to 4.6% in 2024 from 5.4% in 2023, and fall further to 3.4% by 2028. On one side, China’s real estate slump and growth of 0.5% in exports which is as good as nothing.

Interpretation of Cold War 2.0 between China and the US

The global and regional disintegration between China and the US can be evident through the trade war between the concerned countries. The analogies are made on the notion of the high dynamics of the Cold War. The contemporary tensions between China and the US are often termed Cold War 2.0, where the conflict which is evident in the Middle East- Israel and Hamas and Russia-Ukraine war is not a sudden event but the result of Cold War 2.0.

In the recent developments Indo-Pacific has emerged as the fundamental flashback while proceeding with Cold War 2.0, notably, China has made a bold step to deploy uniformed police officers to Kiribati. Kiribati is a small island nation in the Pacific with a population of 115,00 people. However, I have given the instances of Kiribati to anticipate the future serious dreadful steps are already being made in India’s neighbourhood. While giving the depth of analysis in India’s neighbourhood region, a Chinese military delegation visited the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to further accentuate cooperation in defense issues. While it is needless to say, the growing strategic inclination of China towards South Asia is a clear indication to counter its strategic rival India for influence in the region by consolidating diplomatic relations with India’s neighbourhood region through “military assistance.”

While making the configuration of Cold War 2.0 visible, the geoeconomic landscape of the bifurcated global system. Simply put, the increased polarised tendency of trade, technologies, and financial systems makes global shifts which shall be discernible in major economic blocs like G20 and BRICS. These major global blocs of economic architecture contribute to a deciding factor for the South Asian region’s economic viability.

India’s way forward in contemporary lens

Under Xi Jinping, China has become a rogue nation, where its closest friends are, North Korea to the east and Pakistan to the South. For Maldives, the recent visit of President Mohamed Muizzu to Beijing is being played by Xi Jinping where Muizzu called China a “valued ally and integral collaborator.” This majorly defines the incredulity of Maldives with the case of Sri Lanka where China blocked the country with its debt trap diplomacy under the weaponization of finance by China. The frame of realpolitik aligns with what Alfred Thayer Mahan, an Admiral in the US Navy, quoted in 1897, “whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia.” Henceforth, this ocean can be one of the deciding factors in the rising emergence of China’s policy of transgression strategically.

Notwithstanding, the recent development in Xi Jinping’s administration China is facing the economic global downscaling. Notably, a long-term, multifaceted challenge to India with China exists in the disputed border with the Line of Actual Control (LAC), along with it, India needs to heed its neighbourhood policy more ostensibly by giving strategic importance to the line of India’s maritime security. Thereafter, China’s military modernization is further escalating in the vision, to complement its BRI project in the prospects, therefore, inviting serious confrontation to be faced by India.

The apprehensive disposition of India has to be amended to sustain a geopolitical factor to transverse Chinese transgression into the South Asian territories. A trend of tense dispositions at the border is unlikely to reverse to its cordial position anytime soon. The three factors through which India’s strategic relation with China can be duly performed. First and foremost, China’s hegemonic rise in South Asia is an alarming stress for India’s security where Morgenthau’s six principles come into play in the pictures. Therefore, in the decisive factors of the disputed border with China (the Line of Actual Control or LAC), the unprecedented proactive and military modernization/expansion of China’s military is the second possibility of India to make a cautious approach with China as K Sibal mentioned ‘diplomacy as an imperative factor while deciding foreign policy.’

According to C. Raja Mohan, it seems a matter of grave concern that if India and China are unable to locate the changing structural shift in the global order then the relationship between the two will no longer be credible or sustainable. Since both are putting a substantial amount of focus on the Global South. The recently conducted NAM and G-77 summit is evidence of the frequency of both India and China leveraging their geopolitical interest in the location. Moreover, China’s pitch escalated on revisiting global economic form whereas India longs for Integration and representation of Global South countries while bridging the gap between Global North and Global South. What lay ahead is, diminishing China’s presence, and this can be substantiated by India’s neighbourhood countries to unite with India to make the region- demographically, economically, socially, and politically self-reliant to the level that India’s neighbourhood need not step in the grab of China’s brutal policy. If the shoulders of strategic actions are slouched by India, then repercussions might have an iota of blameworthiness.

In conclusion, the dynamic nature of international relations is left to be evaluated on the future outcomes of the global summit which underpin the re-alignment of major powers which shall lead through strategic competition, and geoeconomic transition, with hovering bees of military expansion, however, the road for India might be the case as Robert Frost suggests “The Road not taken.”

By: Aastha Agarwal

After the resounding success of his debut book ‘The India Way’ in 2020, S Jaishankar, a veteran diplomat, former Foreign Secretary and the incumbent External Affairs Minister of India (EAM) has brought out his second book called ‘Why Bharat Matters’.

At the outset, the book is pretty compact, a compendium of neatly organised 11 chapters spread across 219 pages. The book explores a series of closely interconnected themes pertinent to Indian foreign policy and its place on the global stage.

Beginning with the title, Why Bharat Matters, there is an evident ‘decolonial’ and ‘anti-colonial’ underpinning, that might have possibly stemmed from the cultural, Indic revival under way in India. Throughout the book, the author asserts that India matters to the world because and when it is more ‘Bharat’, when it sticks with its traditions, its roots, its sanskar, its sanskriti. There are analogous references to episodes from Ramayana to demonstrate India’s strategic culture.

The context of this volume has been set as the last decade which the author calls a ‘deeply transformational era’, both globally and in domestic Indian setting. The author gives an objective picture of current global landscape marked by its challenges and complications like Covid led disruption, sharpening polarisation and the prominence of AI. Coming to how India has significantly changed in its foreign policy approach – he talks of New India that has broken out of the Non Aligned mould and engages vigorously with old and new partners, guided solely by its national interests. Also, the G20 summit has underscored India’s ability to shape global agenda and to emerge as Vishwamitra.

There is an evident ‘hero worship’ tone whenever the EAM speaks of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi leading India’s civilizational resurgence and addressing India’s national concerns of socio-economic development. He holds PM’s grit of character as the most important factor in catalysing the image of New India, Bharat. Examples being – PM as trailblazer in India’s diaspora outreach starting with 2014 Madison Square event and a leader in climate change mitigation. His Neighbourhood approach, SAGAR vision, De-hyphenation of Israel and Palestine and serious messaging on China have been oft hailed by the author.

Thecontents of the book have been systematically organised where the first chapter presents an objective view of the current global landscape marked by sharp polarisation and explosive impacts of technology and suggests India to tell the world that it stands for rules based order, a Ram Rajya for the benefit of all. In the next chapter, the EAM asserts that foreign policy is not just for external national security but it is an exercise to meet citizen needs in routine and in crisis. The cited examples work effectively in instilling confidence of the people in its foreign affairs machinery. The author also touches upon the power of positive narratives to build coalitions over a protracted period to meet these needs.  There is some repetition in the theme of third chapter that says world is deeply interconnected but more fragile and that AI revolution comes with risks of data security.

The next chapter highlights current global challenges – backlash to globalisation, retreat of USA, increasing salience of China and the rise of mini-lateralism and regionalism to deal with challenges in a diplomatically frugal and localised manner.

The fifth chapter seemed the most interesting most informational to me. However, the tone appeared pretty partisan, pretty boastful of the ‘out of the box’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘visionary’ leadership of the prime minister in foreign policy domain.

He calls his tenure as ‘serious work in progress’ laying the foundation of Indian footprint globally – carefully cultivating SAARC, strengthening relations with major powers, tending adequately to middle powers and catering to every sub region Global south, Central Asia, Gulf and Indian Ocean states.

Again he appears as the mouth piece of the PM who has re-written India’s story on the global canvas making her the largest FDI destination. India’s feats in all areas have been underlined – space, diaspora, digital governance etc. PM has been projected as the foremost cultural ambassador of Bharat facilitating the exchange of best practices and championing fresh initiatives on climate change, counter terrorism and connectivity, and forging India’s entry into SCO, MTCR, Wassennar agreement etc.

Chapter 6 has a creative title and an important subtitle on why India should expand its political diplomatic capital to make friends everywhere. There is an exploration of India’s relations with three permanent members of the UNSC i.e. with UK with its colonial baggage, time tested relations with Russia and partnership with France. There’s a repetition of India’s neighbourhood relations, about India’s energised focus on sub regional engagements from the Nordic, and Central & East Europe, to Latin America and Caribbean, and even in the Pacific islands.

The next chapter explains the background of QUAD, and gives a succinct account of India’s bilateral relations with each of the QUAD members. A common thread appears in setback in relation due to India’s nuclear tests, later normalised though convergence in other areas like supply chain resilience, disaster resilient infrastructure etc.

A complete chapter dedicated to China, explains the importance India’s EAM attaches to this country. This chapter is themed on the constant dilemma on how China might be dealt with – realpolitik versus moralpolitik. It gives a systematic history of post-independence bilateral relations between the Himalayan neighbours highlighting points of conflict and confrontation and their little common space eg at WTO, UNFCCC. Previous dispensations have been blamed for their left wing romance with respect to China until recently when the present regime made a realistic assessment of Chinese capabilities and started to bridge this gap through infrastructure augmentation in border areas including tunnelling, road making.

“Corrosion is the new competition” is succinctly the premise of the next chapter. Borrowing from post modernism, author says ‘Knowledge is power’ and that Psy-ops are new forms of warfare. Here, the author comes up from my favourite analogy from Ramayana. He explains that in the present borderless politics, image and narratives, are key to legitimise and delegitimise. The author politely rebukes previous governments to have chosen the comfortable option of over leveraging of low cost options from outside and thus eroding domestic manufacturing.

Tenth chapter has been named creatively and highlights the divergences in the political, strategic understanding / calculations of the towering leaders post-independence. Nehru’s idealist choices have been sharply criticised and his ‘Asian Solidarity’ dismissed as delusion. He has been charged for harbouring false internationalism at the cost of national interest.

In contrast, Patel has been hailed for his strategic clarity on the intentions Pakistan and China. Similarly the concern of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee on Balkanisation of India have been vented. An interesting revelation comes on Mookerjee’s Cultural Diplomacy, specifically Buddhist Diplomacy with South East Asia. Coming to Dr. BR Ambedkar, it has been mentioned that in addition to his advocacy for social reform and inclusiveness, he was much concerned about India’s foreign policy that alienated most of the world; thus India lost support in UN even for its genuine cause and that non alignment jeopardized our prospects of technological advancement. Minoo Masani has been brought to say that NAM paralysed India to repel attack from China. The author thus cautions that ‘acceptance / prestige’ cannot trump national interests and hard power must come prior to soft positioning.

Thefinal chapter of the book makes a powerful assertion on why the world needs India. It begins by commending India’s multifaceted feats – the successful landing of the Chandrayaan, the diplomatic expansion of G20 to G21 through inclusion of African Union, and the Vaccine Maitri program of the pandemic era that established India as the ‘pharmacy of the world’.

The author brings precedents from history to argue that the global mental space is obsessed with India, beginning with the quest to discover sea routes to Bharat – a country with geographical and demographical weights and notable a cultural, civilisational influence.  

There are empirical evidences quoted on how India – its traditions and modern capabilities matters to the world as India advocates rules based world order (eg. UNCLOS) and champions the cause of global south, multi-polarity and decentralised globalisation.

Nationally, it is a testament of ‘democracy that delivers’ and that done efficiently through massive digitalisation of government services plugging leakages. It has focussed on enhancing the quality of its human resource through conscious efforts in health, education and skilling. Indian Diaspora is truly global and so are India’s capacities to help them in distress. India does treat world as a family and walks the extra mile often showing up as the ‘first responder’ in moments of crisis.

To conclude, despite certain repetition and partisan undertones, there seems no exaggeration. The book is a must read for all those interested in India’s story, students and teachers of politics and international relations. The language is scholarly yet accessible. A Hindi translation seems much warranted to reach wider audiences.

By: Deeplaxmi Patil, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Nestled amidst the rugged terrain and towering peaks of Central Asia lies a region for its pivotal role in the global opium trade, the Golden Crescent. Encompassing the mountainous landscapes of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, this sprawling expanse serves as the epicentre of opium production and distribution on an unprecedented scale. Despite Iran’s position as a transit country rather than a primary producer, its significance within this illicit network cannot be understated.

The Golden Crescent pulsates with the relentless clandestine operations, orchestrated by a network of smugglers deeply enmeshed in organized crime. Within this shadowy realm, narcotics and weapons, traverse borders seamlessly, guided by the hands of insurgents, terrorists and state-sponsored agents. These actors, driven by a nexus of greed and geopolitical agendas, exploit the region’s tumultuous landscape of war, violence, and political instability to perpetuate their nefarious enterprises.

Among the labyrinthine corridors of this illicit trade, certain groups have emerged as key players, that privy to the clandestine dealings of the Golden Crescent. Baloch separatists, the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps cast a long shadow over the opium trade, leveraging its lucrative profits to fund their operations and further their agendas.

Furthermore, this illicit commerce extends far beyond the confines of the Golden Crescent, reaching into the heartlands of India. States such as Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat find themselves ensnared in the web of opium production, their proximity to the Indo-Pakistan border rendering them both lucrative markets and strategic supply routes for the flow of hashish and heroin.

Routes to the Golden Crescent

Smugglers operating within the Golden Crescent employ a multitude of intricate methods, often enlisting the aid of local communities in their illicit endeavours. These strategies encompass a range of approaches, from utilizing small trucks and heavily armed vehicle convoys to smuggling on foot or with the assistance of pack animals such as donkeys and camels. The flow of narcotics out of Afghanistan predominantly follows three principal pipelines, each carving distinct paths across the geopolitical landscape.

Firstly, the Balkan route, traversing through Iran and Turkey to reach Europe, stands as the preeminent artery of opiate trafficking globally. Its bustling activity underscores its status as the busiest conduit for the movement of illicit substances.

Secondly, the northern route extends through Central Asia, funnelling opium and heroin towards Russia via Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, this trajectory has contributed to a burgeoning HIV epidemic in Russia, primarily attributed to intravenous drug use stemming from the influx of narcotics along this pathway.

Lastly, the southern route serves as a vital channel for heroin emanating from Afghanistan, meandering through Pakistan and Iran before disseminating to destinations across South Asia, African nations and the Oceania region. This route often relies on sea transport, capitalizing on the expansive reach of the Indian Ocean. The vast expanse of this maritime domain poses significant challenges for authorities tasked with interception and patrol efforts, thereby facilitating the efficiency of drug smugglers.

In response to the escalating concerns surrounding narcotics trafficking within the Indian Ocean region, concerted efforts have been made to address this pressing issue. The Colombo Declaration, adopted with the aim of establishing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a “Drug-Free Zone,” represents a pivotal step towards combating the proliferation of illicit substances within this strategic maritime domain.

Efforts to Combat the Drug Menace in the Golden Crescent Region

In response to the escalating global prevalence of drug usage, nations across Asia and Europe are heightening their attempts to tackle the menace of narcotics while fostering collaboration through regional initiatives. Playing a pivotal role in this, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is actively involved in the combat against drug trafficking within the Golden Crescent region, primarily through its Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries.

Central to the objectives of this program is the enhancement of anti-drug capabilities among participating states by advocating for cooperation and facilitating the exchange of crucial information. A notable initiative spearheaded by the UNODC is the Triangular Initiative, which seeks to forge a collaborative effort between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in combating the illegal drug trade.

Within the framework of this initiative, these nations engage in joint operations aimed at disrupting the illicit flow of narcotics across their shared borders. Facilitating this coordinated approach is a Joint Planning Cell situated in Tehran, serving as a hub for intelligence sharing among the involved parties.

To bolster their operational effectiveness, Strategic Border Liaison Offices have been strategically designated along the shared borders of these countries, enabling prompt and synchronized responses to trafficking activities. Since, its inception in 2009, the Triangular Initiative has executed 11 joint operations, including a significant operation in March 2011, resulting in the seizure of over three tonnes of illicit drugs.

Issues with the Golden Crescent

The widespread cultivation and trafficking of opium in the Golden Crescent region has far-reaching consequences, extending beyond the realm of drug-related activities and significantly impacting the socio-economic landscape.

Escalating Opiate Consumption: The proliferation of opium production in these regions has fuelled a surge in opiate consumption among populations across South East and Central Asia. This upsurge in drug use poses significant public health challenges and exacerbates existing social issues.

HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The rampant trafficking and consumption of opiates have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS within the region and beyond. This epidemic has particularly ravaged areas facilitating the rapid transmission of the virus.

Financing Non-State Actors: Non-state actors, including insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, capitalize on the proceeds generated from illegal drug trafficking to fund their operations. This convergence of narcotics trade and insurgent activities perpetuates instability and undermines efforts for peace and development in affected areas.

Taliban Involvement: The Taliban government in Afghanistan has long been implicated in the opium trade, utilizing it as a lucrative source of revenue to sustain its economy and fund its activities. The exploitation of the drug trade by such entities further compounds the challenges faced in combating illicit narcotics trafficking.

Linkages to Other Crimes: The proceeds generated from illegal drug trafficking often find their way into financing various other criminal activities, including money laundering and naxalism. This interconnected web of criminality amplifies security concerns and hampers efforts for law enforcement and governance.

Conclusion

In the heart of Central Asia, the Golden Crescent stands as a stark testament to the intertwined complexities of geopolitics, illicit trade, and societal challenges. With its vast opium production and distribution networks spanning across Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, this region remains a focal point of global concern. The consequences of the Golden Crescent’s prolific opium trade reverberate far beyond its borders, fuelling the rise of organized crime, exacerbating public health crises such as HIV/AIDS, and providing funding for non-state actors and insurgent groups. The entrenchment of the drug trade within the fabric of society poses significant obstacles to regional stability, development, and security.

Addressing the myriad issues plaguing the Golden Crescent demands a multifaceted approach that encompasses not only law enforcement measures but also initiatives aimed at socio-economic development, public health interventions, and regional cooperation. Only through concerted efforts and collaboration can the Golden Crescent begin to shed its notorious legacy and chart a path towards a brighter future for the generations to come.

By: Sourishree Ghosh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The South China Sea (SCS) is the new arena of geopolitical competition and rivalry. The South China Sea not only holds a regional but also global importance. Geographically, this region encompasses a portion of the Pacific region stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the Southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. Historically, the South China Sea played a crucial role as an important trade route which led to economic growth in the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region. The geopolitical competition for influence in the South China Sea has been a sphere of contestation among various regional powers including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. This region has assumed significant geopolitical significance in the region, thereby has become the latest geopolitical hotspot in the present context of world affairs. The article aims to delve into the economic and geostrategic importance of the South China Sea to understand the geopolitical power play in the region.

Economic and Geostrategic Importance of the South China Sea

The political geography of the South China Sea is one of the factors determining the geopolitical significance of this region. The region is at the crossroads of the international maritime routes which connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The global economic importance of this region also lies in the fact that it accounts for over one-third of global maritime traffic, connecting the vast major economies and connecting Asia with the markets of Europe, Africa and Americas. The South China Sea accounts for more than 60% of the global maritime trade, more than 22% of the total global trade and one third of the global shipping.

It is a crucial hub of trade for the economies of East Asia, South Asia, South Asia and beyond. About a million people rely upon the marine economy of the SCS. The access to the energy reserves and fisheries are at risk and it is vital to the lifeline of several South Asian states. This region is the main artery of trade in Southeast Asia which links waterways from Singapore and Malaysia to Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan. This dispute over the South China Sea is a multifaceted dispute. An example is the 105-kilometre-long Singapore Strait which is integral for economic security of Singapore as it is placed on the most critical sea lanes of communication (SLOC). If there is disruption in the South China Sea, there would be severe damage and disruption to the global supply chain. A study by Kerem Cosar and Benjamin Thomas, University of Virginia, published as a working paper by the US National Bureau of Economic Research, states that major Asia-Pacific economies could potentially incur a loss of up to 12% of their GDP in the situation of the closure of key trade routes of the region. Therefore, the South China Sea is a maritime choke point.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, an estimated US$3.37 trillion worth, or 21% of all global trade passed through this region in 2016. The SCS is also a geopolitical chokepoint for the economies connected to this region. The South China Sea accounts for trade which is equivalent to 5% of the global GDP. The region is also a very important world energy trade route as almost a third of the global crude oil and over half of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the South China Sea every year. According to estimates, the South China Sea contains about 190 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves and 11 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves. The competition over access to these resources have been the source of geopolitical conflict among the nations.

China’s imports and exports flow through these waters, so the SCS is integral to the economic and energy security of the region. This region is also one of the biggest maritime routes of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It is also estimated by the US Energy Information Administration, that about 4.7 trillion cubic feet of LNG (which is around 40% of the global LNG trade) passes through this region. So, the energy security of the extra regional as well as regional countries are dependent on the South China Sea. The Sea also contains important mineral resources including rare earth elements. These minerals play a crucial role in modern technology and manufacturing. The freedom of navigation in the SCS, which means that all nations can travel through the sea and utilise the sea for various purposes without the interference or intervention from other nations. According to the Department of Environment and Natural resources, Philippines, the SCS accounts for one-third of the entire world’s marine biodiversity. The region accounts for around 12% of the world’s fish catch. Moreover, its untapped reserves of oil and natural gas are significant, which is estimated to be around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This is integral for the economic growth of the littoral nations.

There are critical security issues with regard to maritime safety and infrastructure in this region. The South China Sea faces the problem of overfishing and this has led to imbalance in the maritime ecosystem of this region. The significance of preserving the marine ecosystem of this region requires maritime cooperation from all nations. Blake Herzinger, civilian Ind0-Pacific defence policy expert, pointed out that food security in the South China Sea can quickly cause national instability in the Southeast Asia region.

Major Players and their Interests in the South China Sea

South China Sea is characterised by an intersection of territorial demands and strategic importance, thereby making it one of the most contentious regions of the world. There are major regional security challenges of this region on account of the ongoing disputes over the islands, reefs and waters. This geopolitical rivalry among major powers has also threatened the peace and stability of this region. There are many regional and extra-regional countries which are shaping the evolving dynamics of the South China Sea. This region has also become the latest arena of clash between the US and China.

The most pressing geopolitical conflict is the delicate and complicated territorial disputes of the region. The strategic location of these islands has made the South China Sea a geopolitical hotspot. The Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) is one of the most disputed islands in this region. It is a resource rich and strategically positioned archipelago. This island is at the heart of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Paracel Islands is another site of territorial dispute. This island is the hub of fishing and world’s fourth most productive fishing zone. This also plays a vital role for the economies of China and Vietnam.

The Scarborough Shoal is a subject of conflicting claims between China and the Philippines. The whole conflict in the South China Sea also revolves around China’s contentious “Nine-Dash Line” claim over territories which overlap and clash with the territories of the maritime waters (Exclusive Economic Zones) of the other neighbouring states, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia. Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. These nations allege that China is establishing its hegemony over this region by militarising this region. The military bases developed by China would give China significant geopolitical leverage in this region and project its power.

The territorial disputes have grown in recent times as states have tried to exert their sovereignty in this region. Historically, the South China Sea has been an arena of disagreements and antagonisms. The regional players such as Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia have high stakes in the region with regard to their national security.

The United States has been playing the role of maintaining the regional equilibrium and supports the claims of some of China’s neighbouring states and implements the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and also upholds the commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty (1951). This treaty mandates mutual assistance if either of the parties is harmed. This injects further complexity into the South China Sea.

A military dispute would lead to disruption of regional equilibrium. China is unilaterally taking aggressive initiatives for changing the status quo in the South China Sea by building artificial islands and militarisation of the SCS. The economic security of China is closely tied with the South China Sea. This region is an arena of geopolitical contestation among major powers. The United States has always maintained a strong presence in the region along with its regional allies, including Japan and the Philippines.

China has been aggressively pursuing its territorial claims and the Chinese Government created artificial islands with military facilities and declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the region. Russia also shares its own set of concerns and interests in this region. In August 2023, the US Navy sent destroyer ships to the coast of Alaska when around a dozen of Russian and Chinese warships were spotted in the nearby international waters.

Japan also has high stakes in this region for securing its commercial and energy needs, thereby supporting the freedom of navigation in the region and territorial conflicts. There has been a substantial increase in the military deployment by the US, Philippines and Japan in recent years to uphold the Freedom of Navigation in the international sea.

The South China Sea also holds geostrategic importance for India’s economy in the context of India’s national security. India also has high geopolitical stakes in the region given India’s trade in the Indo-Pacific Region. A Lok Sabha reply states that over 55% of India’s trade passes through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits. So, the evolving dynamics of the South China Sea would also determine the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. India, as a State party to the UNCLOS, in its foreign policy has put forward its stance that it supports the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce based on the principles of international law as reflected in the UNCLOS (UN Convention of the Law of the Sea).

The freedom of navigation through the Special Economic Zones also determines the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the maritime borders of the littoral states. The economic security of the regional states is closely tied with the South China Sea. This region has geopolitical as well as geostrategic importance for the energy and economic security of the littoral countries. To conclude, the ongoing diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea has significant political and economic implications for the future of this region.  

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Balochistan which is the largest of the four provinces of Pakistan by area, has the ignominy of forced disappearances dating back to the 1970s. However, since the early 2000s, enforced disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings have become a vital tool of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency policy in Balochistan. During these decades, the victims’ families have sometimes received sympathy but never justice. The Pakistani policy towards the problem of forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings has remained one of inaction, but its stance on the issue switches between denial and justification. The rise in forced disappearances in Balochistan has created a grave humanitarian crisis and clouded the socio-political environment of the area. People disappear without a trace, leaving families in turmoil and communities paralyzed by dread and uncertainty.

These people are frequently targeted for their alleged activism or opposition. The disappearances are said to have been planned by governmental agencies and are systematic in nature, which highlights long-standing problems with human rights abuses, governance, and the degradation of civil freedoms. It is critical to promote accountability, openness, and the defense of basic rights as the world community brings attention to this urgent problem. A coordinated effort is needed to address the issue of forced disappearances in Balochistan in order to protect human dignity, respect the rule of law, and create an environment where everyone feels trusted and treated fairly.

History of Forced Disappearances

The history of forced disappearances in Balochistan is deeply entrenched in the region’s tumultuous socio-political narrative, with numerous documented cases highlighting a pattern of systematic human rights abuses. While exact figures are challenging to ascertain due to the clandestine nature of these disappearances, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have extensively documented numerous cases.

According to Amnesty International’s reports, between 2009 and 2019, over 1,200 cases of enforced disappearances were reported in Balochistan. These cases often involve individuals, including activists, journalists, and students, who are allegedly, abducted by the Pakistani security forces or intelligence agencies. Many of them are held incommunicado, without any official acknowledgment of their detention or whereabouts, denying them access to legal representation or due process.

Human Rights Watch has also raised alarm over the situation in Balochistan, noting a disturbing trend of disappearances and extrajudicial killings targeting Baloch nationalists, students, and intellectuals. The organization’s reports indicate a pervasive climate of fear and intimidation, with families of the disappeared facing harassment and intimidation when seeking information about their loved ones.

The issue of forced disappearances in Balochistan gained international attention in 2011 when the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances raised concerns about the alarming number of cases in the region. Despite calls for accountability and justice, perpetrators continue to operate with impunity, exacerbating tensions and perpetuating a cycle of violence and distrust. The history of forced disappearances in Balochistan underscores the urgent need for a transparent and impartial investigation into these grave human rights violations.

Addressing this issue requires concerted efforts from both the Pakistani government and the international community to uphold the rule of law, protect fundamental rights, and ensure accountability for those responsible for these heinous crimes against humanity.

Shocking Statistics of Forced Disappearances

Forced disappearances in Pakistan originated during the military dictator General Pervez Musharraf tenure as the President of Pakistan from 1999 to 2008. The practice continued during subsequent governments. The term missing persons is sometimes used as a euphemism. According to Amina Masood Janjua, a human rights activist and chairperson of Defence of Human Rights Pakistan, there are more than 5,000 reported cases of forced disappearance in Pakistan. Human rights activists allege that the law enforcement agencies in Pakistan are responsible for the cases of forced disappearance in Pakistan. Since 2011, the government of Pakistan established a Commission to investigate cases of enforced disappearance in Pakistan. The Commission reports that it has received 7,000 cases of enforced disappearance since its inception and it claims to have resolved around 5,000 of those cases.

The year 2022 was a dreadful year for Balochistan as Pakistan Army, forcibly disappeared 629, extrajudicially killed 195 and tortured 187 people, according to the annual report released by Paank, the human rights organization of the Baloch National Movement.

The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances convened by the Pakistan Government, records 2,752 active cases of enforced disappearances in the province as of January 2024, but Pakistan’s interim Prime Minister claimed in a recent interview with the BBC that only about 50 people are missing.

Futile Protests

Amina Masood Janjua, a human rights activist and chairperson of Defence of Human Rights Pakistan, has stated that there are more than 5,000 reported cases of forced disappearance in Pakistan. Defence of Human Rights Pakistan is a not-for-profit organization working against forced disappearance in Pakistan. The families of missing persons have also staged protest across Pakistan demanding to know the whereabouts their missing family members. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, a non-profit organisation representing family members of those who disappeared in Balochistan, says approximately 7,000 cases have been registered with them since 2004.

Complicity of Pakistan Security Forces in Forced Disappearances

There are a number of complicated elements at play when it comes to Pakistani troops’ involvement in forced disappearances in Balochistan. The following are some explanations for why Pakistani soldiers would be drawn to or participating in such activities:

Counterinsurgency Operations: There has been a protracted insurgency movement in Balochistan, with several nationalist organizations of the Baloch people calling for increased autonomy or independence from Pakistan. Targeting activists, suspected separatists, and supporters, the Pakistani military and intelligence services may use forced disappearances as a means of stifling criticism and putting an end to conflict.

Threat to National Security:   Because of their support for separatist or suspected connections to militant activity, some people or organizations in Balochistan may be seen by Pakistani authorities as a threat to the country’s security. Therefore, the government may use forced disappearances.

Retaining Control and Authority:   Pakistani military may use forced disappearances as a means of quashing opposition and generating terror in Balochistan. This will help them to hold onto power and keep control over the area. Disappearances can create an environment of dread that deters activism and opposition, which helps the state achieve its goal of general stability.

Refusal of Rights and Resources:  Natural resources abound in Balochistan, including minerals, gas, and strategically located ports. Due to the Pakistani state’s need to keep control over these resources, possible challenges to resource extraction and economic exploitation may be avoided by using forced disappearances as a means of suppressing opposition.

Causes of Forced Disappearance

The intricate socio-political dynamics of Balochistan are at the core of the many factors contributing to forced disappearances in the province. The frequency of forced disappearances in Balochistan is attributed to the following causes:

Political turmoil and Nationalist Movements:   Balochistan has a history of nationalist movements and political turmoil as they strive for increased independence or autonomy from Pakistan. Crackdowns and other forms of repression. Forced disappearances of suspected separatists, activists, and supporters, are frequently used by the state in reaction to these movements.

Counterinsurgency operations and military operations:   To suppress separatist organizations and preserve authority over the province, Pakistani intelligence and military forces carry out counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan. The local populace is frequently intimidated, information is gathered, and resistance is quelled through the use of enforced disappearances.

Lack of Accountability and Impunity : The culture of impunity surrounding forced disappearances in Balochistan allows those who commit these crimes, like as intelligence services and state security forces, to act without worrying about facing consequences. Violence and abuse are perpetuated by a cycle of impunity for human rights abuses.

Regional diversity:   Tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims as well as between Baloch nationalists and other ethnic groups are examples of the ethnic and sectarian diversity of Balochistan. Conflicts can be made worse by these tensions, which can also serve as an excuse for governmental persecution and forced disappearances. The geopolitical aspects of forced disappearances are further complicated by Balochistan’s advantageous location since it borders both Afghanistan and Iran. State and non-state entities could operate differently in the region due to regional rivalries, security issues, and international interests.

The Way Forward to stop Forced Disappearance

Reforms to Law and Policy:   Pakistan Government should pass and implement laws that clearly forbid forced disappearances. Laws now in place must to be changed to guarantee responsibility and openness in situations involving forced disappearances.

Independent Inquiries:    Form impartial task groups or commissions to look into claims of forced disappearances. It is important to provide these committees with sufficient funding, power, and autonomy so they can carry out in-depth, objective investigations.

Accountability:           Ensure that those responsible for forced disappearances face just trials and follow the proper procedures. This involves bringing charges against state representatives, security guards, or anybody else in charge of directing or carrying out forced disappearances.

Judicial Reforms:        To ensure prompt and unbiased decision-making in situations involving forced disappearances, the judiciary should be strengthened. Educate judges, attorneys, and law enforcement personnel about human rights norms and practices. Ensuring openness in detention institutions and providing relatives and legal representatives with updates on the location of imprisoned persons are important aspects of information sharing.

Support for Victims and Families:     Offer psychological support, financial aid, and legal assistance to victims and their families who have been subjected to forced disappearances. Encourage civil society organizations to keep an eye out for and report instances of enforced disappearances. Guard journalists, activists, and human rights advocates who stand up for the rights of victims.

Resolution of Conflicts and Dialogue :           Hold meaningful discussions and agreements with impacted communities to address the underlying issues and disputes that give rise to forced disappearances. Ensure fair development in Balochistan by addressing socioeconomic disparities.

Pressure and Support from the International Community:    Work to bring attention to the problem of forced disappearances in Balochistan by interacting with the UN and human rights groups, among other international bodies. For projects aimed at increasing capacity, look for technical help and advice.

Preventive measures include enforcing proper oversight of security forces, encouraging respect for human rights within law enforcement, and increasing public awareness of the ramifications of enforced disappearances. The goal is to prevent forced disappearances from happening in the first place.

Reforms to Pakistani Laws:    In order to make forced disappearances clearly illegal and hold those responsible accountable, Pakistan may pass new laws or make changes to current ones. It is important to have well-defined legal frameworks and investigative and prosecution procedures.

Institutional Accountability:    It is imperative to bolster the institutions in charge of security and law enforcement. This involves steps to guarantee accountability, transparency, and monitoring within these organizations in order to stop abuses like enforced disappearances.

Discussion and Reconciliation: Opening up communication with Baloch nationalist organizations and resolving their complaints amicably may serve to calm tensions and aid in resolving the fundamental issues that give rise to conflict, which may in turn assist to minimize the number of enforced disappearances.

Global Collaboration: In order to tackle the problem of enforced disappearances, Pakistan can go to the United Nations and human rights agencies for support. Exchange of best practices, technical assistance, and capacity-building projects are a few examples of collaboration with foreign partners.

Engaging the Civil Society:   It is crucial to support and foster the work that human rights advocates, civil society groups, and independent media perform in tracking down, recording, and denouncing enforced disappearances. Additionally, it is critical to defend the rights of journalists and activists covering these topics.

Assistance for Victims and Families: Offering legal counsel, psychological assistance, and rehabilitation programs to those who have been subjected to forced disappearances can help mitigate the pain and lingering consequences of these events.

Mechanisms for Accountability and Transparency:  Establishing procedures for keeping open and honest records of arrests and detentions, along with making sure that families and legal counsel are kept informed, can help avoid instances of enforced disappearances and hold offenders accountable.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Since highly enriched Uranium was discovered, the authorities of Iran and the UN watchdog have been discussing the nuclear safeguard. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection report on January 22, 2023, confirmed that enriched uranium up to 83.7% had been found at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located in the south of Tehran (capital of Iran) – controlled by ‘Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’ (AEOI). This Report has put Iran under the suspicion of many nations for trying to make nuclear weapon grade material to potentially develop Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

According to the 2015 nuclear deal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was limited to enriching uranium up to 3.67% for 15 years and allowing the IAEA to inspect the nuclear facilities. According to the IAEA, 3.67% enriched uranium is sufficient for peaceful nuclear energy use; anything above that could be considered as a threat. Although the weaponization of uranium material can only be done at 90% or higher uranium enrichment, 83.7% is very close to it.

Uranium Stockpile in Iran

Since February 2021, Iran has restricted the IAEA’s complete ability to monitor and inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran has also been producing 60% enriched uranium since 2021. IAEA estimates the Iranian nuclear stockpile is more than 18 times larger than expectation. Though experts believe Iran has no use for 60% pure uranium. In January 2023, Grossi warned that Iran now has enough uranium to produce nuclear bombs if it chooses, because Iran’s Stockpile of U-235 at 60% purity has reached 70Kg and 20% purity has reached 1000kg.

The IAEA’s inspection report of February 2023, stated that Iran has 434.7 kg of 20% enriched uranium, which is 48 kg more than the 386.4 kg mentioned in the November 2022 report. Similarly, Iran has 87.5 kg of uranium at 60% purity, which is 25 kg more than the 62.3 kg mentioned in the previous report. The IAEA also estimated an increase of around 87 kg in Iran’s total uranium stockpile, making it 3760.8 kg as of February 12, 2023.

According to the IAEA, 42 kg of uranium of 60% purity is the approximate amount needed to possibly make a nuclear explosive device. Although experts believe, in practical, some material is wasted during enrichment; therefore, more than 55 kg of the same purity level will be needed. Currently, Iran has enough Uranium stockpile to make several Nuclear bombs. According to March 31 IAEA report, Iran has stockpiled 114Kg of 60% pure Uranium and if the enrichment reaches to 90%, it is sufficient to develop three nuclear bombs.

In 2023, between June to November Iran slowed down the average enrichment to 3 kg per month, but at the end it increased to 9 kg per month. After November 2023, Iran installed 6 new advanced centrifuge cascades and have the total of almost 7400 advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow facilities, resulting the increase of average increase of enrichment. As of February 2024, Iran continues to enrich nuclear material approximately 7 kg per month up to 60% purity. As of March 2024, Iran has the total stockpile of 5525.5 kg including 712.2 kg of 20% purity, 2396.8 kg of 5% purity, 1934 kg of 2% purity, 121.5 kg of 60% purity and 361 kg of unidentified enrichment level of UF6 in chemical form.

Global Impact of Enriched Uranium discovery in Iran

Enriched Uranium discovery in Iran has raised concern not only for the IAEA but all over the world that Iran might use that material for the production of a nuclear bomb. For instance, European authorities have said that it would force them to break the 2015 nuclear agreement. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated that “There is no plausible civilian justification for such a high enrichment level”. Similarly, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen said there are two options to deal with Iran: either reimposing the UN ‘snapback’ sanctions that enshrined the 2015 nuclear deal or attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities with military force. Although, IAEA says military attack on nuclear facilities is illegal.  

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom accused Iran to violate ‘Security Council Resolution-2231’ last year when Iran supplied drones to Russia during the Russia-Ukraine conflict even though Iran knows that Russia might use the Drones to target the Nuclear Facilities. The US and Iran were trying to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, but because of the indirect negotiations, it broke in September 2022, although Biden says the US is ready to make a deal if Iran is willing to comply. This 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal has been wavering since Donald Trump abandoned it in 2018.

CIA director Bill Burns stated that US intelligence has found no evidence against Iran’s uranium weaponization. He also stated that Iran might not have yet made any decision for the weaponization, but their enrichment program has advanced enough that if Iran chooses to make a weapon out of the enriched uranium, it will be ‘the matter of weeks‘. Burns also showed concern that Iran was now nearing to become a nuclear state since they have also been advancing their missile systems by stating that “What we also see are signs that…Russia is proposing to help the Iranians on their missile program and also at least considering the possibility of providing fighter aircraft to Iran as well”. Saudi Arabia has shown signs of obtaining the nuclear weapon if Iran ever successfully detonates one.

The US defence authority Colin Kahl stated that with this advanced technology, Iran might make one nuclear bomb’s worth of fissile material in just 12 days instead of 12 months. Though Iran will take more than one year to restarting a complete weaponization program which was stopped in 2003, but with Russia’s help it could be sooner than expected. Iran is the closest to test a nuclear weapon for the first time. In early 2000s, Iran was developing the ‘Project Midan’ to identify the location for the nuclear testing. Iran also possess the nuclear weapon design and have the ballistic missiles.

Other than that, there are few EU sanctions including missile, nuclear and other weapon, that has expired in October 18, 2023. On which Iran said it will be illegal for the EU to maintain sanctions on Iran. Re-establishing 2015 JCPOA deal and limiting Iranian stockpiling at this point will not stop the Uranium weaponization in Iran, because Iran has enough material to develop two Nuclear bomb. Thought one nuclear bomb is not enough to deter Iran from nuclear threat. Grossi said that there will be instability if the IAEA is unable to tell world that the nuclear program of Iran is completely peaceful.

Response from Iranian Authority

In defence, Iran says that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was enriching uranium up to 60% purity, but the traces of an extremely high enrichment might be an ‘unintended fluctuation’. The traces of 83.7% enriched uranium were found while inspecting the two interconnected cascades of advanced centrifuge machine used to enrich uranium up to 60% at Fordow facility. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) authority Behrouz Kamalvandi says that this fluctuation might be a momentary side effect of trying to achieve 60% purity or while replacing the feed cylinder in November 2022. Iran nuclear authority Mohammad Eslami stated that the IAEA’s inspector had made a mistake and the report is ‘incorrect’. Mohammad Eslami also stated that the discovered particles cannot even be seen with a microscope, and the volume was also small. On June 11, 2023, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed that Iran is not trying to make a nuclear bomb by stating if ‘we wanted to develop a nuclear weapon, we would have done so and the west would not have been able to stop’.

While IAEA Director General Grossi visit to Iran in February 2023, he mentioned an improvement in the relation between the IAEA and AEOI since Iran was ready to cooperate with them. The IAEA chided Iranian authorities that they made a change in those cascades without informing since these particles were discovered after the inspection. The Iran and the IAEA came to an agreement in April 2023, to reinstalling the monitoring equipment to regain access to information, people, and places to ensure nuclear safeguards, which was limited by Iran since February 2021. But the gap of three years has made monitoring difficult for the IAEA to make sure that all the nuclear material is under the safeguards.

However, the scenario changed quickly. In June 2023, Supreme leader of Iran wanted a new nuclear deal with some changes, which will help Iran to maintain its nuclear threats. Iran has shown sign of compliance by slowing down the Uranium enrichment production. But the West was sceptical about it. On September 16, 2023, the Director General IAEA, stated that Iran has withdrawn the safeguard agreement from inspectors which were assigned to verify activities of the Iranian facilities. This step of Iran has further deteriorated the hope of restoring the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.

Recently, Iran has diluted some of their enriched nuclear material. The rate of dilution has been more than the production of new enriched material, due to which the stockpile of 60% enrichment purity has fallen slightly, from 128.3 kg in October 2023 to 121.5 kg in March 2024, a total reduction of 6.8 kg.  As of now, Iran has enough enriched weapon grade nuclear material for 2 nuclear weapons. The US expressed that the Iran should ‘downblend’ all of its near weapon grade material and not just some of it.

It is not cleared why Iran down blending the enriched material at the same time also enriching new material, which doesn’t have any civil use. Iran says they have all rights for enriching the nuclear material up to high level of purity, all while denying the intentions to make a nuclear weapon. In January 2024, director general of IAEA sated that Iran is ‘very close’ to making the nuclear weapon. At the rate they are progressing it may only take few weeks to make the weapon of mass destruction.

Conclusion

Although, Iranian authority claimed to enrich uranium unintentionally, they changed the cascade in Fordow fuel enrichment facility without informing the IAEA and have been enriching nuclear material up to 60%. Iran has no civilian use for even 60%, let alone 83.4% purity. Simultaneously, they are trying to improve missile technology with the help of Russia, all while the IAEA monitoring system is limited. While Russia is trying to help, EU missile sanctions are also about to expire in October 2023. This will give Iran freedom over EU monitoring.

While US is distracted dealing with Ukraine and Israel, and IAEA’s attention also divided to the Ukraine’s power plants safety, Iran may speed up its nuclear program. Despite the repercussions, it seems very likely for Iran to develop nuclear weapon and become the Nuclear armed nation. Right now, Iran has enough weapon grade material to develop several nuclear bombs and they might potentially be closing to test the first nuclear weapon. If Iran is really not trying to develop the nuclear weapon, then Iran needs to cooperate by giving full control of its nuclear fuel cycle program to IAEA for better safeguards of nuclear material and to ensure that the nuclear power is only used for peaceful purpose.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

Introduction

A non-communist regime popularly construed as a “pseudo-democracy”, Singapore is home to the ‘healthiest’ and the most ‘disciplined’ population of the world fashioning one of the world’s most effective and efficient governments at work. The city-state has retorted immaculately to the snobbish “little red dot” remark (which was made by B.J. Habibie, in 1999, then President of Indonesia) with its incredible accomplishments. Thriving on the themes of ‘survival’, ‘prosperity’, and ‘order’, Singapore assumes a remarkable role in the Indo-Pacific region. Being located at the eastern mouth of the Malacca Strait, the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific and one of the world’s most important chokepoints, Singapore has become a very vital commercial hub for trade and various other services. With a strategy to become ‘East Asia’s equivalent of New York or London’, Singapore has established a commanding position and also articulated a rigorous capability development plan which obviously flows from its overall strategic posture and outlook.

Internal dynamics

The so-called ‘little speck on the map’ compared to its ‘massive neighbors’, has successfully grown into the third largest economy of Southeast Asia. It is ranked among the world’s most competitive economies. Post independence, Singapore witnessed a rapid development from a low-income country to a high-income country. Singapore was ranked the best country in the world in Human Capital Development in 2019. Starting from traffic rules to cleanliness, the regulation of citizen behavior has yielded great results in Singapore’s success. The condition at the time of independence was horrifying, yet the People’s Action Party (PAP) headed by Lee Kuan Yew brought about fundamental changes by introducing efficient economic and social policies.

Centralized, top-down and integrated policies coupled with one-party rule, totally against the western conceptions of a democracy, led to the establishment of a ‘parochial rule’ in the hands of one leader and his successors. As described by William Safire (1995), a New York Times columnist, Singapore is a family dictatorship which reflects the “old-fashioned European totalitarianism”. So far Singapore has been ruled by three leaders: Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong (Yew’s son), who is also the current Prime Minister of Singapore. Yew had an unmatchable impact on Singapore. His governance was a mixture of the Western style democratic institutions and the Asian-style hegemonic political party system.

Oscillating in a continuum where democracy stands at one end and authoritarianism at the other, Yew strongly bent towards a total control of the country in each and every aspect which was best evident in the 1980s when he totally went far from open and pragmatic policies. Surprisingly, his rule achieved universal support and legitimacy. In the 1990s Singapore was in the hands of Goh, a close aide to Yew who took charge with utmost sincerity and dedication to Yew and his empire. In 2004, Yew’s son Lee Hsien Loong assumed office and is serving till date. Through Yew’s guidance and mentorship, Loong has been successfully leading Singapore.    

The opposition party/parties have very little say partly due to the factional politics and partly due to the rigid rules that curtail any opposition groups or any other dissenting voices thus representing an altruistic state (in Hegelian terms) which prioritizes solidarity and order over interest group competition. Parties like the Barisan Socialists, the Singapore Democratic Party and the Worker’s Party exist just for the sake of existing. The prevalent rigidity is also reflected in the fact that Singapore has a unicameral legislature and steady bureaucratization. In spite of a rigorous bureaucratic control, Singapore experiences less corruption as compared to other Southeast Asian states as evident from its inclusion in the five least corrupt countries in the world in the annual ranking of the Transparency International.

Despite being a country with an ethnically heterogeneous population, the society is quite homogeneous culturally and people have one thing in common and that is their distinct Singaporean identity.

Role in the Indo-Pacific

Apart from its domestic success, the city-state also plays a predominant role in maintaining security and stability in South East Asia if not the Indo-Pacific region. Singapore believes in the concept of “total defense” when it comes to security, with five important pillars: military, civil, economic, social and psychological. The government has adopted a “comprehensive, technocratic, forward-looking approach to security that greatly informs the country’s unique social model.” It is to be noted that Singapore is a mixture of capitalist and socialist economics, with emphasis on the former.

In the new international era, Singapore is maintaining a balance by interpreting China to the US and the US to China. It is Singapore’s dream to achieve peace with and between China and the United States. Any conflict between the US and China or any other power in the Indo-Pacific could derail the postwar Asian miracle and threaten Singapore’s economic or physical security.

Singapore maintains a strong security cooperation with the US which was formalized in the Strategic Framework Agreement which was signed by US President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in Washington in July 2005. Singapore thus relies on extra regional powers like the US to maintain a balance of power and to prevent a larger power from dominating the smaller Asian states. Back in the 1990s when US base negotiations with the Philippines had failed, Singapore provided the US military access to facilities in Singapore to fill the security void and to ensure a US presence in the region.

Some analysts predict that Singapore is so keen on US cooperation because they think that the US is much more preoccupied with Iraq and the Middle East and is not paying enough attention to Asia. Even when it comes to other states in South East Asia, Singapore maintains a specific balance. For instance, Singapore’s policy towards Taiwan is one where Singapore is trying to balance its interests in expanding its economic relationship with China and in helping to manage China’s rise as a peaceful actor in the Asian security system.

Besides playing an active role in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Singapore also has a Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with major powers like the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia which provides additional security to Singapore. Singapore has calibrated its ties with the regional greater powers like India, Japan, the United States, and China very carefully. Given the current trends, Singapore seems well-positioned to continue expanding its strategic space and overall security through continued military modernization and geopolitical balancing achieved through bilateral and multilateral means.

Conclusion

After a careful analysis of Singapore’s state of affairs, we can say that the “little red dot” is not so little and it is an exception in Southeast Asia in terms of culture, ethnicity, geography, state capacity, and level of economic development. Singapore is destined to play a vital role in international trade, commerce, and finance as long as the ships need the Malacca Strait to transport food, manufactures, and oil between Asia and the world.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

‘Bring the weapon; do you support Fano?’ – a question amongst that many Amnesty International officials asked to the victims of civilian attacks made by the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The Horn of Africa has emerged as a geopolitical zone of conflict, with the security crisis coming to the fore after clashes were reported between the government troops and the ENDF insurgents in the Amhara Region on March 01, 2024. The government extended the state of emergency for four months until June 2024, which was initially imposed on August 04, 2023 over months of volatile clashes between the military and militiamen in the Amhara region.

The region is also affected by an ethnic conflict between Oromo and Amhara (Ethiopia’s largest communities) in Western Tigray. The government enabled a federal arrangement for the ethnic groups to create their own state by a referendum as per the provisions laid out in the 1994 constitution. The relations between the central government and ethnic groups in the Tigray Region, however, broke down as the government made efforts to disband and reintegrate the ethnic armed groups into the mainstream community, which was met with strong opposition and armed confrontations with the government security forces.

The federal government has been accused of launching military attacks on civilians against their alleged support for the ethnic armed rebellious groups including Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Fano is an insurgent group that operates without a formal leadership structure and is spread out into groups in the region. The group backed the federal troops in the Tigray War carried out from November 2020 to November 2022. The war ended in the signing of the Ethiopia–Tigray Peace Agreement (Pretoria Agreement) between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), under the mediation of the African Union on November 02, 2022. The peace deal called for:

• the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region
• cessation of hostilities, including the end to hate speech
• restoration of essential services in the Tigray region
• access to humanitarian aid in the Tigray region
• disarmament of TPLF combatants
• commitment to protect civilians – especially women and children
• taking steps toward the implementation of a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.

The conflict continues despite the signing of the peace deal, as the government is accused of disregarding Amhara’s security. Further, there have been apprehensions regarding the centralization of power by Prime Minister Abey Ahmed with the dismantling of state paramilitaries across the country in April 2023. Declaration of an emergency in Amhara followed in August 2023, which allowed for roadblocks to be imposed, suspension of transport services, imposition of curfew, and military to take over in certain areas.

Human Rights Violations

The ongoing conflict pose a threat to the country’s stability – the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported repeated outbreaks of violence including raids carried out by the forces, highlighting at least 45 extrajudicial civilian killings undertaken by the government security forces on January 29, 2024 in the village of Merawi (Amhara). Similar killings were reported in the regions of Seba Tamit, Bahir-Dar, Abune Hara, and Lideta neighbourhoods of the Kebele 14 area from August 2023 to October 2023. The government stated that the attacks are a part of ‘joint security operation and house-to-house surveillance’ conducted to eliminate the extremist forces.

The EHRC reports of violations of international humanitarian law carried out by the regional forces in Tigray and Oromia including extrajudicial executions, bomb attacks, and enslavement of women carried out during the civil war, which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. There were reports of ethnically-targeted attacks and violence against Tigrayans living in Amhara and Afar regions. The ongoing emergency provisions in the Amhara region have resulted in internet shutdowns, communication blackouts, preventive detention, and curtailment of the freedom of speech and media, despite signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which also amounts to a violation of the right to life.

Amnesty International reported on the social and economic impact of the violations of international humanitarian law. The conflict has resulted in the displacement of civilians, with over 60,000 people reported to have fled to Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia is home to more than 3,779,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs), with the majority of refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. The United Nations (UN) reports that ongoing violence and drought have left about 20 million people in critical need of emergency humanitarian aid. The drought conditions affecting eastern and south-east Ethiopia can also lead to  famine conditions  as observed in 1984-85.

The conflict can undermine the essence of the Pretoria Agreement, hinder reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts, and result in potential sanctions by the United States (US) in case of human rights violations. The US government announced a pause in its food assistance program due to widespread corruption and aid diversion in 2023; while the humanitarian aid resumed in December 2023, humanitarian assistance required for the IDPs is hindered due to roadblocks and only 14 percent of those targeted for food aid had received it by January 21, 2024.

Deal with Somaliland & Access to the Red Sea

The country is the world’s most populous landlocked region, which lost its coastline after the secession of Eritrea in the 1993 War of Independence. Ethiopia is thereby dependent on the Addis-Djibouti Corridor for international trade and aims to gain access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia signed a deal with Somaliland on January 01, 2024, to access the Port of Berbera for commercial marine operations and naval activity in the region. Ethiopia, meanwhile offered support for the declaration of independence for Somaliland. The deal poses a threat to the regional stability in the Horn of Africa, as Somalia claims authority over the self-governing breakaway state of Somaliland, despite of autonomy announced in 1991.

Ethiopia gained the ownership in 2017, with a 19 percent share in the Port of Berbera (Gulf of Aden), however, the country failed to make timely payments which resulted in the fall of the deal. There have been reports that Ethiopia might step back from the deal due to potential regional implications as well as intervention from Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia. Further, incongruity in the terms of the deal suggests that the facility will have both military and commercial purposes, against the claims made to build only a naval base. Ethiopia considers access to the port as a means to strengthen maritime security, and economic and political influence in the region.

Internationalization of Conflict

An escalation of conflict in the Horn of Africa due to the potential fall of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia could give rise to the activity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa. The terror group is reported to have increased international recruitment from Ethiopia and Kenya. International Security Studies (ISS) reports that there have been attempts by the terror group to call for youth in Ethiopia to fight against the federal government. Ethiopia is a part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), though the forces are set to exit Somalia by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of Ethiopian soldiers as a part of African Union peacekeeping missions amid the potential rise of conflict could pave the way for Al-Shabaab to expand its terror operations.

Somalia in turn termed the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and is backed by the US, UK, and Türkiye. Kenyan Prime Minister William Ruto in association with the regional bloc of The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been enabling to mediate the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, where the leaders reached an agreement termed as ‘Nairobi Declaration’ on February 28, 2024, and February 29, 2024. Ethiopia and Kenya released a joint statement pledging to respect the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of states’ without naming Somalia. Kenya assured of the security of the Lamu Port, South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, which provides Ethiopia an alternative to Port Berbera.

Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti raised apprehensions regarding the possibility of Ethiopia taking military means to gain access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia, however, lacks military capabilities to escalate the conflict, though the resurfacing of the issue can draw regional blocs of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia and the UAE to contain any power play in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Further, it could jeopardize the revenue source for Djibouti, which relies on shipping fees from Ethiopia against the access to the Port of Djibouti.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

Egypt has raised opposition to the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile upstream from Egypt to Sudan. The project is undertaken as a potential violation of international law and a 2015 agreement on the development of the dam on mutual understanding; with Ethiopia filling the dam upstream threatens the water supply to Sudan and Egypt downstream. The dam lies in northern Ethiopia’s highlands accounting for 85 percent of the flow of River Nile in the region, which remains critical for the energy security of 60 percent of the population in Ethiopia, in addition to aiding energy requirements for Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Eritrea.

Conclusion

The country affected by internal conflict, food insecurity, humanitarian crisis, high inflation, foreign debt, and FOREX crisis relies on aid package negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Union (AU); while joining the BRICS forum could boost the investment opportunities and post-conflict reconstruction. Ethiopia as a key member of counterterrorism missions undertaken in association with the AU and the United Nations (UN) since 2007 highlights the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. Potential escalation of the conflict could affect the containment of internal security crisis with Ethiopia relying on drones from China, Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are deployed against the advance of insurgent groups. Reconciliation and recovery efforts with the mediation of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in the humanitarian crisis and diplomatic resolution of the conflict in the Horn of Africa could pave way for balance of power in the region already affected by geopolitical turbulence of civil war in Sudan and Houthi Attacks over the Red Sea.