Working within the realms of ambiguity is the hallmark of a true leader. It is the crucible where the weight of the four stars is tested against the friction of political reality. Yet, the ongoing storm in Parliament over General M.M. Naravane’s stalled memoir, “Four Stars of Destiny”, raises a fundamental question about the nature of our higher echelons. Are we witnessing the rise of “leaders of convenience,” who prioritize personal legacy and post-retirement prospects over the decisive, often uncomfortable, actions required while in the chair?
In his memoir — excerpts of which have recently triggered acrimonious exchanges in the Lok Sabha—General Naravane recounts the night of August 31, 2020, as a “hot potato” moment. As Chinese tanks rumbled toward Rechin La, he describes a frantic search for clear orders from the very top. The message that finally reached him from the Prime Minister, conveyed via the Defence Minister (RM), was: “Jo uchit samjho, who karo” (Do whatever you deem appropriate).
The Protocol Fallacy
Apologists for the General argue that his hands were tied by the 1996 and 2005 bilateral agreements that forbade firing within 2km of the LAC, or that he was paralyzed by the need for concurrence from the bureaucratic China Study Group (CSG).
But this defence fails the moment one remembers the 20 brave Indian soldiers who made the supreme sacrifice at Galwan just weeks prior. Their blood was the ultimate testimony that the “peace deals” were dead; the enemy had already torn up the rulebook. To cite “no-firing” protocols while tanks are advancing in 2020 is not professional restraint; it is a failure of character. A leader of character recognizes when the strategic landscape has shifted and acts to protect the nation’s sovereignty. If the General felt the political leadership was “hollow,” his duty was to force a resolution—or resign in protest—while he still held the baton. Having chosen to be silent then, even if we assume to maintain a united front at the strategic levels with the “enemy at the gates”, he should have maintained his “omerta” in respect to the institution of COAS rather than write a post mortem now!
Delegation as a Test of Character
A true military leader also does not view a “carte blanche” from the political establishment as a burden. In the higher echelons of command, being told to “do what you deem fit” is the ultimate restoration of military authority. It is the moment the state trusts the General to be a commander, not a clerk.
Yet, Naravane’s narrative suggests he felt “onus” and “abandonment” rather than empowerment. This is the hallmark of a leader of convenience—one who is comfortable when the responsibility is shared by a committee, but who comes a cropper when the ambiguity of war requires a solitary, bold decision.
The Shadow of Ambition
The optics are further muddied by the race for the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) post. During the long vacancy following General Bipin Rawat’s passing, the perception of “auditioning” for the role became unavoidable. When a sitting Chief seems to be navigating ideological currents or leveraging his home advantage to secure his next move, his objective military advice is compromised, as is the weight of any post retirement indictment he chooses to offer! Did the desire for the next “big post” temper the professional pushback required during the Ladakh crisis? A leader of character keeps both eyes on the battle; a leader of convenience keeps one eye on his next office. While Naravane has since claimed he “never questioned the wisdom of the government” regarding the CDS appointment, his memoir ironically seeks to do that and maybe also something to embarrass the govt, just to get even!
COAS on Probation
The govt also has an equal share in this fiasco by taking too long and playing musical chairs with the military hierarchy in their selection to the CDS. The tragedy of the nine-month CDS vacancy was that it forced a sitting Chief into an unintended “probation.” For a commander leading a standoff at the LAC, even the whisper of a post-retirement ‘reward’ is enough to devalue his strategic voice. The powers that be should surely realize the damage that this could do to the institution of COAS and CDS in particular and the Services at large!
The Verdict
The moral authority of the baton is not a pensionable asset to be spent later in a tell-all book. A General who waits for a book deal to find his voice hasn’t led; he has merely observed.
If we allow the “Retirement Revelation” to become the standard for our top brass, we degrade the institution of the Army Chief. We need leaders of character who are willing to risk their careers for the mission, not leaders of convenience who save their “truths” for the publisher. True leadership is exercised when the risk is personal and the consequences are immediate—not in a four-star post-mortem written from the comfort of a study.
The dramatic deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban marks one of the most consequential geopolitical reversals in South Asia in recent decades. Once perceived as strategic allies bound by ideological affinity and convergent interests against external actors, Islamabad and Kabul now find themselves locked in escalating hostility that borders on open conflict. The transformation is striking: Pakistan, long accused of nurturing and sheltering the Taliban during the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, is today conducting cross-border strikes against targets inside Afghan territory. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime in Kabul resists Pakistani pressure, asserts sovereignty over contested border regions, and deepens diplomatic outreach beyond Islamabad’s traditional sphere of influence.
This rupture is not a sudden rupture but the culmination of structural contradictions embedded in Pakistan’s long-standing “strategic depth” doctrine. For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment viewed a friendly regime in Kabul as essential to offset India’s influence and secure its western flank. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was therefore initially welcomed in Islamabad as a geopolitical dividend. Yet the outcome has proved far more complex. Instead of subservience, the Taliban have pursued autonomy; instead of stability, Pakistan faces intensified attacks from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What was once considered a strategic asset has evolved into a multidimensional liability.
Understanding this shift requires unpacking three interconnected dynamics: the Durand Line dispute, the resurgence of the TTP, and the Taliban’s recalibrated foreign policy, particularly its cautious outreach to India and regional powers. Together, these factors illuminate why former allies are drifting toward confrontation and what this means for the broader regional order.
Historical Foundations: Strategic Depth and Its Miscalculations
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy since the late 1970s has been deeply shaped by two enduring strategic anxieties: its rivalry with India and its fear of encirclement. Within the Pakistani military establishment, particularly the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was never viewed merely as a neighbouring state; it was seen as a critical buffer space. The concept of “strategic depth” emerged from this worldview — the belief that a friendly or compliant government in Kabul would provide Pakistan with rear security in the event of a conventional war with India and prevent New Delhi from gaining a foothold on Pakistan’s western flank. This thinking crystallized during the anti-Soviet jihad (1979–1989). When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became the frontline state for the U.S.-led effort to arm and fund Afghan mujahideen factions. With financial and military support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a central role in selecting, training, and equipping Islamist groups fighting Soviet forces. This period institutionalized Pakistan’s influence networks within Afghanistan and reinforced the belief that militant proxies could serve long-term strategic objectives.
After the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of Afghanistan into civil war, Pakistan backed factions it believed would secure its interests. When the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s under Mullah Mohammad Omar, promising order amid chaos, Islamabad quickly recognized their potential utility. In 1997, Pakistan formally recognized the Taliban regime, becoming one of only three countries to do so, alongside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban’s ideological conservatism was less important to Islamabad than their geopolitical orientation: they were perceived as anti-India, anti-Iran (at the time), and dependent on Pakistani logistical and diplomatic support.
During the Taliban’s first rule (1996–2001), Islamabad believed its strategic objectives were largely being met. India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan was eliminated, and Pakistan enjoyed considerable influence in Kabul’s political and security circles. The expectation was that this alignment would translate into long-term stability along the western border and suppress Pashtun nationalist claims that historically challenged Pakistan’s control over its frontier regions. The events of 9/11 fundamentally disrupted this equation. After the United States launched its military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan officially aligned itself with Washington as a key non-NATO ally in the “War on Terror.” However, this alignment was layered with strategic ambiguity. While Pakistan cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and received billions in military and economic aid, it was widely accused of maintaining selective tolerance for Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. This dual-track policy was rooted in long-term calculations: Pakistan feared that the eventual U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, and it sought to retain leverage over any future political settlement in Kabul.
Over two decades of conflict, the Afghan Taliban reorganized and regrouped, benefiting from sanctuary networks and cross-border tribal linkages. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s own security landscape became increasingly volatile with the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant umbrella organization formed in 2007. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the TTP directed its violence against the Pakistani state itself. Nevertheless, Islamabad continued to differentiate between “good” and “bad” Taliban, maintaining that the Afghan Taliban were strategically useful while the TTP posed an existential threat.
When the Taliban regained control of Kabul in August 2021 following the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan’s leadership initially viewed the development as a strategic vindication. Statements from senior Pakistani officials suggested a sense of triumph, interpreting the Taliban’s return as the collapse of Indian influence and Western presence in Afghanistan. There was a widespread expectation within Pakistan’s security establishment that the new Taliban regime would prioritize Islamabad’s concerns, particularly by curbing TTP activities and recognizing the Durand Line as the official border.
However, these assumptions underestimated two structural realities. First, the Taliban, despite years of external support, are fundamentally rooted in Afghan nationalism. Their leadership has consistently resisted the perception of being Pakistan’s proxy. Domestic legitimacy within Afghanistan requires demonstrating independence from foreign influence — especially from Pakistan, which many Afghans historically view with suspicion. As a result, the Taliban have been reluctant to concede on politically sensitive issues such as border recognition or decisive military action against the TTP. Second, the Taliban’s victory in 2021 had a powerful symbolic impact across militant networks in the region. The success of an insurgent movement in expelling a superpower emboldened ideologically aligned groups, including the TTP. Instead of weakening anti-Pakistan militancy, the Taliban takeover indirectly strengthened it. The TTP found renewed sanctuary and operational space across the porous border, increasing attacks within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.
Thus, the strategic depth doctrine began to unravel under the weight of its own contradictions. A policy designed to secure Pakistan’s western frontier instead contributed to internal instability. A regime expected to function as a compliant partner asserted sovereign autonomy. What Islamabad perceived as a geopolitical asset evolved into a complex liability, exposing the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a transformed post-American Afghanistan.
Border Faultlines: The Durand Line and Escalating Military Tensions
At the heart of current tensions lies the unresolved status of the Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometre boundary demarcated in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan. Pakistan regards the Durand Line as the legitimate international border, inherited under international law after 1947. Afghanistan, however, has historically disputed its legitimacy, arguing that it divided Pashtun tribal lands without proper consent. No Afghan government—monarchist, republican, or Taliban—has formally recognized the border. Pakistan’s attempt to fence the entire border accelerated after 2017 to curb cross-border militancy. The project, involving hundreds of checkpoints and surveillance installations, was framed as a security necessity. Yet Taliban fighters have repeatedly dismantled fencing segments, declaring them illegal encroachments.
Since 2022, border clashes have intensified in regions such as Torkham, Chaman, Spin Boldak, and Kunar. Artillery exchanges, closure of trade crossings, and civilian displacement have become recurring features. These incidents signify more than tactical disagreements; they reflect a clash between Pakistan’s security-driven border consolidation and the Taliban’s refusal to legitimize colonial-era demarcations. The border question also carries symbolic weight. For the Taliban, acquiescing to Pakistani demands risks undermining domestic legitimacy among Pashtun constituencies. For Pakistan’s military establishment, failing to assert control undermines state authority and emboldens insurgents. Thus, the Durand Line dispute has transformed into a litmus test of sovereignty and power projection.
The TTP Challenge: Blowback and the Security Dilemma
The most immediate catalyst for hostility is the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Formed in 2007, the TTP seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state and impose its version of Sharia law. It was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan’s history, including the 2014 Army Public School massacre in Peshawar.
Following Pakistan’s military operations—Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017)—many TTP militants fled into Afghanistan. Islamabad expected that the Taliban’s return to power would result in decisive action against these elements. Instead, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach. While occasionally facilitating talks between Islamabad and the TTP, they have resisted direct confrontation, viewing the group as ideological brethren and fellow jihad veterans. A temporary ceasefire brokered in 2021 collapsed in late 2022. Since then, TTP attacks have surged, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistani officials accuse the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary and logistical support. Kabul denies these claims, insisting that Pakistan’s security issues are internal matters. In response, Pakistan has conducted airstrikes targeting suspected TTP hideouts inside Afghan territory, including in provinces such as Khost and Paktika. These strikes have killed militants but also civilians, provoking sharp condemnation from Kabul. The Taliban government has warned of retaliation and characterized the strikes as violations of sovereignty.
This dynamic exemplifies classic blowback: policies designed to cultivate militant proxies for external leverage have generated internal insecurity. Pakistan now confronts a security dilemma where coercion risks escalation, but restraint enables militant consolidation.
The India Factor and Regional Realignments
One of the most significant shifts complicating Pakistan–Taliban relations is the Taliban’s evolving approach toward India. Historically, India opposed the Taliban during their first regime (1996–2001) and supported the Northern Alliance. During the U.S.-backed Afghan Republic (2001–2021), New Delhi invested over $3 billion in infrastructure, development projects, the Afghan Parliament building, the Salma Dam (Afghan-India Friendship Dam), and capacity-building initiatives. For Pakistan, India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan was viewed through a zero-sum lens — as strategic encirclement. Islamabad’s support for the Taliban was partly driven by the objective of eliminating Indian influence from Afghan soil. However, after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, India adopted a pragmatic recalibration rather than confrontation. It reopened channels of communication, resumed humanitarian assistance (including wheat shipments and medical aid), allowed limited diplomatic presence in Kabul, and engaged Taliban representatives in Doha and Afghanistan. The Taliban, seeking international legitimacy, economic relief, and political recognition, responded cautiously but positively. High-level engagements and the gradual normalization of contact indicate that both sides are willing to compartmentalize past hostilities in pursuit of present interests. For Pakistan, this development is strategically unsettling because it weakens the very premise of “strategic depth” — the assumption that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would automatically align against India.
Beyond India, the Taliban have pursued a broader strategy of regional diversification. They have engaged China on economic cooperation and the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, participated in Moscow-led regional dialogues, maintained working relations with Iran despite border and water disputes, and strengthened ties with Qatar and Central Asian republics. China’s approach remains cautious and transactional, focused on security assurances against militant spillover and potential mineral investments. Iran, meanwhile, has confronted the Taliban over water-sharing issues related to the Helmand River and refugee flows, demonstrating that Kabul’s assertiveness extends beyond Pakistan. Russia and Central Asian states maintain limited but pragmatic engagement aimed at containing instability. This multipolar outreach reflects the Taliban’s strategic intent to avoid overdependence on any single actor, particularly Pakistan. By expanding diplomatic options, the Taliban enhance their bargaining leverage, assert sovereign independence, and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. For Islamabad, this emerging autonomy challenges long-held assumptions about influence and control, underscoring the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.
Conclusion
The breakdown in Pakistan–Taliban relations marks a decisive strategic inflection point in South Asia. What Islamabad once considered a geopolitical triumph—the return of the Taliban to Kabul—has evolved into a complex security and diplomatic liability. The foundational logic of “strategic depth” has collided with Afghan nationalist assertion, the Durand Line dispute, and the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead of ensuring a compliant western flank, Pakistan now faces cross-border militancy, escalating military tensions, and a Taliban leadership unwilling to be perceived as subordinate. Simultaneously, Kabul’s calibrated outreach to India, China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian states reflects a deliberate attempt to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.
This evolving confrontation underscores a broader lesson about proxy politics and regional power management. Influence built on tactical convergence rather than institutional trust is inherently fragile. For Pakistan, sustainable stability will require policy recalibration—strengthening internal security frameworks while institutionalizing diplomatic engagement with Kabul. For the Taliban, long-term legitimacy depends on balancing sovereignty with responsible regional conduct. The trajectory of this strained relationship will not only define bilateral ties but also shape the wider strategic architecture of South Asia in the years ahead.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
In February 2026, as French President Emmanuel Macron stood beside Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his official visit to India, the symbolism was unmistakable. The declaration that India–France ties stretch “from the deep oceans to the tallest mountains” was not diplomatic hyperbole; it captured the strategic breadth of a partnership that has matured into one of India’s most stable and trusted global relationships. What began as a buyer–seller defence equation in the 1950s has evolved into a comprehensive strategic alignment grounded in shared commitments to sovereignty, multipolarity, and strategic autonomy.
The 2026 visit, coinciding with the “India–France Year of Innovation,” underscored that the bilateral relationship is no longer confined to defence procurement. It now spans advanced technology, maritime security, space cooperation, climate transition, nuclear energy, and critical supply chains. Yet, at its core remains defence cooperation—the anchor of trust and continuity in a volatile international system. The transition underway—from procurement to co-development, from licensed assembly to intellectual property co-ownership—signals a decisive structural shift. The Rafale MRFA project and the unprecedented DRDO–Safran AMCA engine collaboration represent not merely defence contracts, but a redefinition of industrial sovereignty.
This article argues that 2026 marks an inflection point in India–France defence ties: a movement toward genuine technological partnership that could reshape India’s aerospace ecosystem and recalibrate power equations in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond conventional defence trade, the emerging framework emphasises co-design, joint research, industrial integration, and intellectual property sharing. Such a shift strengthens India’s strategic autonomy while positioning France as a pivotal long-term collaborator in advanced defence innovation and regional security architecture.
Historical Foundations: Trust Forged in Combat and Autonomy
India–France defence cooperation began formally in 1953, when India signed a contract with Dassault Aviation for the acquisition of the Dassault Ouragan fighter aircraft. Known in India as the “Toofani,” this platform marked one of independent India’s earliest major defence procurements from a Western supplier. At a time when India was still shaping its post-colonial strategic identity, the decision to diversify beyond British equipment signalled New Delhi’s desire for operational flexibility and diplomatic balance. The Toofani aircraft were not merely symbolic acquisitions; they were actively deployed during the 1961 liberation of Goa and undertook reconnaissance missions during the 1962 India–China War. These early operational deployments laid the foundation for institutional familiarity between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and French aerospace systems.
The partnership deepened with the induction of the Mystère IV, another Dassault platform that saw combat during both the 1965 and 1971 India–Pakistan wars. By this stage, French aircraft were no longer experimental additions but had become integrated into India’s frontline strike and air superiority capabilities. Importantly, this period established a pattern: French platforms proved reliable in high-intensity conflict conditions, reinforcing professional confidence within the IAF.
The late 1970s marked a structural shift from procurement to industrial collaboration with the induction of the SEPECAT Jaguar, a Franco-British aircraft. Nearly 180 Jaguars were delivered over two decades, with the majority manufactured under licence in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. This arrangement went beyond simple purchase agreements; it embedded technology absorption, domestic assembly lines, and maintenance ecosystems within India’s defence industrial base. The Jaguar’s long service life—participating in operations ranging from the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) deployment in Sri Lanka to the 1999 Kargil War—demonstrated the durability of this industrial partnership.
In the 1980s, India inducted more than 50 Mirage-2000 fighters from Dassault Aviation. The Mirage-2000 became one of the most trusted platforms in the IAF’s inventory. During the 1999 Kargil War, its ability to deliver precision-guided munitions at high altitude proved decisive in neutralising fortified Pakistani positions. Two decades later, in the 2019 Balakot airstrike, Mirage-2000 aircraft again played a central operational role. These missions elevated the platform’s status from a tactical asset to a strategic instrument of deterrence. Both the Jaguar and Mirage fleets are widely assessed to contribute to the air-based leg of India’s nuclear triad, underscoring the level of trust reposed in French-origin systems.
Perhaps most significantly, the partnership endured geopolitical turbulence. Following India’s 1998 nuclear tests, several Western countries imposed sanctions and restricted defence cooperation. France, however, maintained engagement and avoided a punitive rupture. This decision left a lasting impression in New Delhi’s strategic community. It reinforced the perception that Paris pursues an independent foreign policy and values long-term strategic partnerships over short-term political signalling. Thus, over seven decades, India–France defence ties have evolved through combat-tested platforms, licensed production, industrial learning, and diplomatic steadiness. The continuity of engagement—across wars, sanctions, and shifting global alignments—has forged a rare foundation of trust. It is this accumulated operational confidence and shared commitment to strategic autonomy that continues to anchor the bilateral defence partnership today.
India’s fighter squadron strength has declined to nearly 30 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, creating a widening operational gap at a time of growing regional security challenges. The Defence Acquisition Council’s Acceptance of Necessity for 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) — widely expected to favour additional Dassault Rafale jets — reflects the urgent need to restore combat capability. Unlike the earlier 2007 MMRCA tender, which collapsed over cost and liability disputes and led to the 2016 Intergovernmental Agreement for 36 Rafales, the new MRFA proposal is designed to go beyond procurement. Under current plans, 18 aircraft would be delivered in fly-away condition, while more than 90 would be manufactured in India with substantial transfer of technology (ToT), targeting over 50 percent indigenous content under the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026. This approach aligns with India’s broader goal of reducing import dependency while simultaneously strengthening deterrence capabilities across both western and northern borders.
At the heart of this shift is an expanding industrial ecosystem led by Dassault Aviation in partnership with Tata Advanced Systems Limited and other Indian firms. The upcoming Rafale fuselage plant in Hyderabad and Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) facilities in Noida signal India’s integration into Dassault’s global supply chain. Collaboration with Safran (engines), Thales (avionics), and MBDA (missile systems) further strengthens this ecosystem. Beyond manufacturing, the project is expected to generate skilled employment, boost MSME participation in aerospace supply chains, and encourage technology absorption in advanced materials and avionics. Valued at around US$35 billion, the MRFA deal could become the largest in IAF history and would consolidate the Rafale as a unified platform across both air force and naval variants, streamlining logistics, training, and operational readiness well into the 2030s while bridging the gap until the indigenous AMCA becomes operational.
The AMCA Engine Breakthrough: A Strategic Game-Changer
If the Rafale MRFA deal strengthens India’s fighter fleet, the AMCA engine partnership strengthens India’s technological independence. The agreement between the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Safran to jointly develop a powerful 120–140 kN engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is a major milestone. For the first time, India will receive 100 percent transfer of technology for highly sensitive engine components, including single-crystal turbine blades and advanced heat-resistant materials. These parts are critical because they allow engines to function at extremely high temperatures without losing performance.
Jet engines are among the most complex machines in the world. Very few countries have the capability to design and produce advanced fighter jet engines on their own. At present, only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—have full expertise in this field. Through this partnership, India moves closer to joining this small group of technologically advanced nations. The new engine will power the AMCA Mk2, expected to enter service in the mid-2030s, with testing likely to begin around 2028. But the impact goes beyond one aircraft. The same engine technology could later be used in unmanned combat drones (UCAVs) and future naval fighter jets. Importantly, producing engines in India reduces the risk of supply disruptions or sanctions during geopolitical crises.
India’s earlier Kaveri engine project did not succeed, but it helped Indian scientists gain valuable experience in metallurgy and engine design. The Safran partnership builds on those lessons. Unlike older agreements where India only assembled foreign engines, this project involves joint design, shared expertise, and Indian ownership of intellectual property. In simple terms, India is not just buying an engine—it is learning how to build one, improve it, and control its future development.
Expanding the Strategic Canvas: Trade, Technology, and Indo-Pacific Convergence
India–France defence cooperation today operates within a much wider economic, technological, and geopolitical framework. Bilateral trade has crossed €15 billion in recent years, with both governments setting ambitious targets for expansion in high-technology sectors such as green hydrogen, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cyber security, and critical minerals supply chains. France has emerged as one of the leading European investors in India, with cumulative investments exceeding €10 billion across infrastructure, metro rail projects, renewable energy, smart cities, and aerospace manufacturing. Companies such as Airbus, Safran, Thales, and EDF have significantly expanded their industrial footprint in India, aligning with New Delhi’s push for domestic manufacturing and resilient supply chains.
Civil nuclear cooperation remains a strategic pillar. The proposed Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project in Maharashtra—planned in partnership with EDF—is expected to host six EPR reactors and, upon completion, become the world’s largest nuclear power facility. Though negotiations over pricing and liability frameworks have been complex, the project symbolizes long-term trust in sensitive, high-technology domains. Beyond electricity generation, Jaitapur represents energy security, low-carbon transition goals, and India’s commitment to diversifying its clean energy mix. It also reflects France’s confidence in sharing advanced reactor technology and supporting India’s long-term nuclear expansion strategy.
Space cooperation between Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and National Centre for Space Studies (CNES) continues to deepen, particularly in earth observation, climate monitoring, and maritime domain awareness. Joint satellite missions enhance surveillance across the Indian Ocean Region, complementing defence cooperation. Maritime convergence has intensified through the Varuna naval exercises and reciprocal logistics agreements that allow access to French bases in the western Indian Ocean, including Réunion. As a resident Indo-Pacific power, France shares India’s concerns regarding freedom of navigation and strategic stability amid China’s expanding maritime presence.
Scholars such as C. Raja Mohan have argued that the India–France partnership reflects a “coalition of autonomy,” where both states seek multipolar balance without alliance entanglements. Similarly, strategic analyst Harsh V. Pant notes that France’s willingness to share critical technologies distinguishes it from many Western partners. The India–EU Trade and Technology Council and ongoing FTA discussions further institutionalize this convergence. In this broader ecosystem, defence co-development does not stand alone; it reinforces economic interdependence, technological co-creation, and a shared Indo-Pacific strategic vision.
Conclusion
As Emmanuel Macron and Narendra Modi reaffirmed the depth of bilateral ties in 2026, it became clear that India–France defence cooperation has entered a decisive new phase. What began in the 1950s as a straightforward buyer–seller relationship has matured into a strategic partnership anchored in trust, resilience, and shared technological ambition. The collaboration between the Defence Research and Development Organisation and Safran on next-generation jet engines, alongside the expanding industrial ecosystem around Dassault Aviation and the Rafale platform, demonstrates a shift from procurement to co-development. This transition reflects more than defence modernisation—it signals India’s determination to achieve technological sovereignty and France’s willingness to act as a long-term, reliable strategic partner in a turbulent global environment.
In a world increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition and supply chain vulnerabilities, the India–France partnership offers a model of strategic autonomy without alliance dependency. Defence cooperation now intersects with maritime security, civil nuclear energy, space collaboration, and Indo-Pacific stability, forming an integrated framework of shared interests. Beyond immediate capability enhancement, these initiatives are laying the foundations for joint research ecosystems, skilled workforce development, and deeper private-sector integration across aerospace and high-technology domains. As India strengthens its aerospace capabilities and France reinforces its Indo-Pacific footprint, both nations are positioning themselves not merely as partners, but as co-architects of a more balanced, technologically empowered, and multipolar global order for the decades ahead.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
India Between Israel and Palestine Tensions: Source Internet
Introduction
In an era defined by sharpening geopolitical fault lines, India’s West Asia policy stands at a delicate crossroads. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent high-profile engagement with Israel—amid intensifying violence in Gaza and regional polarization—has renewed debate over whether India is recalibrating its historically balanced approach toward a more overt strategic alignment. The stakes are high. West Asia is not merely a distant theatre of conflict; it is central to India’s energy security, diaspora interests, maritime connectivity ambitions, and emerging trade corridors such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). For decades, India carefully balanced solidarity with Palestine and pragmatic engagement with Israel. Yet the current geopolitical environment—shaped by the October 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel’s military response in Gaza, U.S.–Iran tensions, and great-power competition—has intensified scrutiny of India’s diplomatic posture. Is New Delhi abandoning strategic autonomy for strategic partnership? Or is it practicing a refined form of multi-alignment suited to a multipolar world?
This article argues that India is not “taking sides” in the conventional sense. Rather, it is attempting to institutionalize a strategic equilibrium—deepening defense and technology ties with Israel while preserving historical commitments to Palestinian statehood and maintaining robust relations with Arab partners. Understanding this recalibration requires historical grounding, geopolitical analysis, and attention to recent diplomatic initiatives.
Historical Foundations: From Non-Alignment to Calibrated Engagement
India’s calibrated approach toward Israel and Palestine must be understood not merely as diplomatic maneuvering, but as part of a broader civilizational and strategic worldview that evolved across distinct geopolitical phases. In the early decades after independence, India’s support for Palestine was embedded within its anti-colonial identity and leadership role in the Global South. Jawaharlal Nehru viewed the Palestinian struggle through the prism of decolonization, drawing parallels with India’s own freedom movement. This normative positioning was reinforced by India’s central role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), where solidarity with Arab nations strengthened New Delhi’s moral stature among postcolonial states. Energy interdependence further deepened this alignment. By the 1970s, West Asia had become indispensable to India’s oil security. Simultaneously, the migration of millions of Indian workers to the Gulf created socio-economic linkages that made political goodwill with Arab governments a strategic necessity. Support for the Palestinian cause thus aligned moral principle with pragmatic economic calculation.
The end of the Cold War, however, marked a structural inflection point. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived India of a key strategic partner, while economic liberalization compelled integration with global technology and defense markets. Establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 was therefore less an ideological shift and more a recalibration to emerging systemic realities. Israel’s advanced defense technologies, agricultural innovations, and intelligence capabilities complemented India’s modernization needs. The 1999 Kargil conflict became a pivotal moment, reportedly accelerating defense cooperation and fostering operational trust. Over the following decades, ties expanded into counterterrorism, cyber security, water management, and innovation ecosystems. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel symbolically marked the institutionalization of this partnership, while India simultaneously maintained high-level engagement with Palestine, including development assistance and budgetary support.
This historical trajectory reveals continuity within change. India’s West Asia diplomacy has consistently combined normative commitments with strategic pragmatism. Rather than oscillating between ideological poles, New Delhi has pursued strategic autonomy—seeking to preserve flexibility in an increasingly polarized region. The present moment, shaped by renewed conflict and shifting regional alignments, represents not a rupture but the latest phase in this long pattern of calibrated engagement.
The Strategic Deepening of India–Israel Ties
What began as a cautious and politically sensitive engagement has evolved into one of India’s most strategically significant partnerships in West Asia. Today, Israel stands among India’s leading defense collaborators, supplying advanced missile systems such as the jointly developed Barak-8 (MR-SAM/LR-SAM), unmanned aerial vehicles including the Heron platform, precision-guided munitions, and sophisticated border surveillance technologies. Over the past decade, the relationship has moved beyond a traditional buyer–seller framework toward co-development and joint innovation under India’s “Make in India” initiative. Institutional mechanisms such as the India–Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F) have fostered collaboration in defense-adjacent technologies and civilian high-tech sectors. Cooperation now extends into cybersecurity architecture, counterterrorism intelligence-sharing, and homeland security frameworks—areas that gained renewed urgency following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks and Israel’s subsequent military operations in Gaza.
Beyond defense, the partnership has entered a technologically transformative phase. Bilateral engagement increasingly centers on artificial intelligence, quantum communication, semiconductor design, space collaboration between ISRO and the Israel Space Agency, water desalination systems, and climate-resilient agriculture. Recent discussions have focused on semiconductor ecosystem cooperation, aligning India’s production-linked incentive schemes with Israel’s strengths in chip design and deep-tech innovation. The operationalization of labor mobility agreements in 2024—facilitating employment opportunities for thousands of Indian workers in Israel’s construction and caregiving sectors—adds a new societal dimension to what was once an elite strategic partnership. Trade diversification, fintech collaboration, renewable energy projects, and academic exchanges further embed the relationship within long-term developmental frameworks.
Geopolitically, India–Israel ties are now nested within broader minilateral and connectivity initiatives. The I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, UAE, United States) and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced during the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, position Israel within a larger geo-economic architecture linking South Asia to Europe via the Gulf. While regional instability has complicated implementation timelines, these frameworks underscore Israel’s strategic relevance to India’s supply-chain diversification and technological sovereignty goals. As scholars such as Efraim Inbar argue, Israel views India as a civilizational partner and stabilizing Asian power, while Indian analysts like C. Raja Mohan interpret the relationship as central to India’s pursuit of multipolar strategic autonomy. In an era of geopolitical volatility and technological competition, the India–Israel partnership has matured into a multidimensional alliance—simultaneously strategic, technological, and geo-economic in scope.
Palestine, Arab Partnerships, and Strategic Balancing
India’s West Asia calculus extends far beyond Israel; it is anchored in deep structural interdependence with the Arab world. The Gulf region supplies more than half of India’s crude oil requirements and an increasing share of its liquefied natural gas imports, making energy security inseparable from regional stability. Moreover, over eight million Indian expatriates reside across the Gulf monarchies, forming one of the largest overseas communities. Their remittances—amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually—constitute a stabilizing pillar of India’s external finances. Any diplomatic miscalculation in West Asia therefore carries immediate economic and social consequences.
Over the past decade, India’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have undergone a qualitative transformation. The 2022 India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement significantly expanded non-oil trade, fintech collaboration, logistics integration, and investment flows. The UAE has emerged as a critical partner in infrastructure, renewable energy, and sovereign wealth investments in India. Saudi Arabia, under its Vision 2030 reforms, has deepened cooperation in energy transition, petrochemicals, and strategic investments, while institutionalizing a Strategic Partnership Council with India. Simultaneously, negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council aim to embed economic integration at a bloc level, signaling long-term institutional convergence rather than episodic engagement.
India’s balancing strategy also includes sustained developmental assistance to Palestine, including budgetary support, capacity-building initiatives, and infrastructure projects in the West Bank. In multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, India continues to endorse a two-state solution and has supported humanitarian ceasefire resolutions during periods of escalated violence. Prime Minister Modi’s outreach to Ramallah in 2018—conducted independently of an Israel visit—symbolized the operationalization of de-hyphenation: engagement with Israel and Palestine as parallel, not mutually exclusive, tracks.
The emergence of minilateral arrangements such as I2U2 and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced during the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, reflects India’s preference for issue-based coalitions over rigid alliances. IMEC, in particular, envisions multimodal connectivity linking Indian ports to the Gulf and onward to Europe through Israel, integrating logistics, energy grids, and digital infrastructure. Crucially, this initiative does not replace India’s Arab partnerships but rather incorporates them into a broader geo-economic framework. India’s West Asia strategy, therefore, is not a zero-sum alignment but a layered equilibrium—simultaneously safeguarding energy security, diaspora welfare, technological access, and normative commitments to Palestinian statehood.
Navigating Fault Lines: Strategic Autonomy Amid West Asia’s Geopolitical Crosscurrents
India’s contemporary West Asia policy sits at the intersection of intensifying geopolitical rivalries, ideological contestations, and shifting regional alignments. Scholars remain divided in their interpretation of New Delhi’s trajectory. Some strategic analysts argue that deepening defense cooperation with Israel and expanding engagement with the United States signal a gradual tilt toward a quasi-alignment structure embedded within the Indo-Pacific and broader Western security architecture. Others counter that India is practicing an advanced form of multi-alignment—simultaneously strengthening ties with Israel while sustaining robust partnerships with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and even Iran. This interpretation frames India not as a camp follower but as a system-shaping actor leveraging overlapping networks of cooperation. The revival of connectivity negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, continued high-level exchanges with Arab capitals, and participation in flexible groupings such as I2U2 illustrate a strategy anchored in issue-based coalitions rather than bloc politics.
The Iran dimension introduces an additional layer of complexity. India’s investment in the strategic Chabahar Port project reflects its long-standing objective of securing overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, thereby bypassing Pakistan. However, U.S. sanctions regimes and escalating U.S.–Iran tensions complicate financial flows, insurance mechanisms, and long-term infrastructure planning. Any regional escalation risks disrupting maritime trade routes in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial portion of India’s energy imports transit. Simultaneously, Iran’s evolving alignment with Russia and China adds another geopolitical variable. For Indian policymakers, managing this triangle—Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv—requires calibrated signaling and diplomatic agility. The challenge is not merely bilateral but systemic: preserving strategic space in an increasingly polarized international order.
The Gaza conflict has further amplified the stakes. As civilian casualties mounted and global protests intensified, Western European states such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom faced scrutiny over their diplomatic positions. India, positioning itself as a leading voice of the Global South—particularly after hosting the 2023 G20 Summit—must reconcile moral expectations with material interests. From a realist lens, India’s approach reflects interest maximization: safeguarding defense supply chains, protecting energy security, and ensuring diaspora stability. From a constructivist perspective, however, India must balance its historical identity as a champion of anti-colonial solidarity with its emerging image as a technological and strategic power integrated into advanced security networks. Recent diplomatic messaging—unequivocally condemning terrorism while advocating humanitarian pauses and reiterating support for a two-state solution—captures this delicate equilibrium. In an era defined by hardened binaries, India’s strategy is less about choosing sides and more about sustaining maneuverability within contested geopolitical terrain.
Conclusion
India’s engagement in West Asia today is neither accidental nor reactionary; it is the outcome of a long-evolving doctrine rooted in strategic autonomy and calibrated pragmatism. Far from abandoning its historical commitments, New Delhi is attempting to reconcile legacy principles with contemporary power realities. Its expanding partnership with Israel reflects hard security and technological imperatives in an era defined by defense modernization, supply-chain resilience, and innovation-driven growth. Simultaneously, its sustained political support for Palestinian statehood and deepening economic interdependence with Gulf Arab states underscore that India’s regional calculus remains multidimensional. The logic is not alignment but equilibrium.
The volatility unleashed by the October 2023 Hamas attacks and the subsequent Gaza conflict has sharpened global polarization, compelling states to clarify their positions. Yet India’s diplomatic messaging—condemning terrorism while urging humanitarian restraint and reaffirming support for a two-state solution—demonstrates an effort to preserve maneuverability. This balancing act is not without risks. Energy security, diaspora welfare, maritime stability in the Strait of Hormuz, and emerging trade corridors such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor intersect in a region prone to escalation. However, India’s layered engagement—spanning defense innovation, development assistance, connectivity initiatives, and minilateral frameworks—suggests institutional depth rather than ad hoc positioning.
Ultimately, India’s West Asia strategy reveals a broader transformation in its foreign policy identity. It is no longer merely a postcolonial moral voice, nor solely a rising security consumer; it is an aspiring system-shaping power seeking influence across overlapping geopolitical theatres. Strategic equilibrium, therefore, is not a temporary adjustment to crisis but an evolving doctrine suited to a multipolar world. In navigating between Israel and Palestine, between Washington and Tehran, and between principle and pragmatism, India is not choosing sides—it is shaping space.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
Global trade is no longer merely an economic exchange of goods and services; it has become a strategic instrument of power, influence, and resilience. The post–Cold War optimism surrounding rules-based multilateralism under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has steadily given way to a more fragmented and competitive landscape. Trade agreements are now deeply embedded in national security, technological competition, supply-chain resilience, and geoeconomic rivalry. The rise of protectionism, weaponization of tariffs, industrial subsidies, digital trade restrictions, and sanctions regimes has fundamentally altered the grammar of globalization.
India, once seen as a cautious and defensive trade actor, has recalibrated its approach. Moving beyond its historically protectionist stance, New Delhi is crafting a calibrated but assertive trade strategy aimed at integrating into global value chains, attracting investment, securing technology flows, and positioning itself as a credible alternative manufacturing hub. This transformation reflects structural shifts: the relative decline of multilateralism, intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, supply-chain diversification after the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ongoing fallout from the Russia–Ukraine war.
India’s evolving trade diplomacy thus represents more than economic reform—it signals a strategic repositioning within a multipolar world order. This article examines the transformation of global trade governance, the decline of WTO-centric multilateralism, the rise of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, and India’s emerging role as a pivotal node in twenty-first century trade networks.
The Erosion of Multilateral Trade Governance
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 marked the institutional consolidation of the global trading system. Built upon the earlier General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO expanded trade disciplines beyond goods to include services (GATS) and intellectual property (TRIPS). For decades, this system provided predictability, binding commitments, and a credible dispute settlement mechanism that constrained arbitrary protectionism. However, structural cracks began to emerge in the early 2000s. The Doha Development Round stalled amid disagreements between developed and developing countries over agricultural subsidies, market access, and special and differential treatment. The paralysis deepened when the WTO’s Appellate Body ceased functioning in 2019 after the United States blocked judicial appointments, effectively crippling the organization’s enforcement capacity.
The resurgence of unilateralism under the Donald Trump administration marked a decisive rupture. Tariff wars—particularly with China—invoked national security exceptions under Article XXI of GATT, stretching the boundaries of trade law. The U.S.–China trade conflict not only disrupted global value chains but normalized the use of tariffs as geopolitical leverage. Simultaneously, mega-regional trade agreements bypassed WTO mechanisms, signaling a shift toward selective integration. The COVID-19 pandemic intensified these fractures. Export bans on personal protective equipment, competition over vaccine supplies, and semiconductor shortages revealed the fragility of hyper-optimized supply chains. Even advanced economies adopted inward-looking measures, challenging the liberal premise of open markets. The subsequent disruptions triggered debates over “strategic autonomy” in the European Union and “economic security” doctrines in the United States and Japan.
Scholars diverge sharply in interpreting this transformation. Dani Rodrik argues that hyper-globalization constrained domestic policy space, making backlash inevitable, while Robert Keohane views the erosion of institutional trust as a symptom of shifting power balances rather than institutional design flaws. Others, like Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, highlight the emergence of “weaponized interdependence,” where states exploit central nodes in financial and technological networks for coercive leverage. In this evolving landscape, trade governance is fragmenting into competing blocs and issue-based coalitions, raising a pressing strategic question: how can middle powers like India navigate—and potentially shape—this transition without being subsumed by great-power rivalry?
The Rise of Mega-Regionals and Strategic Trade Blocs
As WTO-led liberalization stagnated, countries turned toward preferential trade agreements (PTAs), free trade agreements (FTAs), and comprehensive economic partnerships. These arrangements now govern a substantial share of global commerce and increasingly set rules that extend beyond tariffs into digital trade, state-owned enterprises, labor protections, and environmental governance.
One of the most consequential developments has been the formation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), comprising ASEAN states plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Covering nearly 30 percent of global GDP, RCEP reflects Asia’s consolidation into a production-centric trade architecture centered on supply-chain integration. India’s 2019 withdrawal underscored domestic anxieties over trade imbalances and concerns about import surges, particularly from China. Parallelly, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership established high-standard rules on e-commerce, intellectual property, labor, and environmental standards. Its emphasis on regulatory convergence demonstrates that modern trade agreements increasingly function as governance frameworks rather than mere tariff-cutting exercises. The United Kingdom’s accession further underscores the pact’s expanding geopolitical footprint.
In Europe, the European Union integrates sustainability clauses and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism into trade policy, linking market access with climate compliance. Meanwhile, the African Continental Free Trade Area seeks to boost intra-African trade and reduce commodity dependence, signaling the Global South’s search for collective resilience. Latin America’s MERCOSUR negotiations with the EU and Asia reflect similar recalibrations. Collectively, these mega-regionals illustrate what scholars term “competitive liberalization”—a race to shape rule-making domains before rivals do. Trade blocs are thus no longer peripheral arrangements; they are strategic platforms embedding geopolitical alignment, technological standards, and regulatory influence. States unable to embed themselves within these evolving architectures risk structural marginalization in the emerging geoeconomic order.
India’s Strategic Trade Recalibration
For decades, India’s trade strategy was characterized by cautious liberalization, calibrated tariff protection, and defensive multilateral positioning within the World Trade Organization. Concerns over agricultural vulnerability, infant industry protection, and persistent trade deficits shaped a relatively guarded posture. However, post-2020, India has undertaken a decisive shift toward targeted bilateralism, supply-chain integration, and geoeconomic positioning.
The India–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in 2022 with the United Arab Emirates has now doubled bilateral trade, emerging as a catalyst for Indian non-oil exports and strategic investment flows into fintech, infrastructure, and green energy sectors. Building on this momentum, India has deepened engagement with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, formally launching negotiations for a comprehensive FTA with the GCC bloc in late 2025, reflecting India’s aim to institutionalize partnerships with oil-producing states and Gulf markets worth ~$178 billion in bilateral trade.
A major breakthrough in 2026 has been the signing of a long-pending free trade agreement with the European Union, described as the “mother of all deals,” which will phase in tariff liberalization across goods and services between India and a bloc encompassing nearly one-third of global trade and 25% of world GDP. This deal represents a strategic convergence of mutual interests—not only in market access but also investment, regulatory cooperation, and digital trade standards. Simultaneously, bilateral “interim” trade frameworks with the United States were formalized in early 2026, cutting tariffs to an average 18% across key sectors and signaling substantive progress toward a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). High-level discussions between India’s Commerce Minister and U.S. economic representatives in February 2026 further underscore both sides’ desire to deepen cooperation and reduce trade frictions. On the Commonwealth front, India concluded a landmark Free Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom in 2025, reducing tariffs on almost all goods and services and creating a platform for future cooperation in sectors such as clean energy, education, and digital services. Complementing these deals, India has initiated FTA negotiations with Israel (first round held in February 2026) and is advancing talks with Latin American partners like Chile and Mexico, signaling an intentional widening of its trade network beyond traditional partners. The results of this calibrated diplomatic push are already visible. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal recently stated that India has concluded nine free trade agreements covering 38 nations, granting preferential access to nearly two-thirds of global markets—an unprecedented expansion of New Delhi’s trade footprint.
From a scholarly perspective, this strategic recalibration aligns with the concept of “selective multilateralism”, where middle powers engage selectively with multiple partners to maximize strategic autonomy while embedding themselves in diversified economic networks. Analysts like C. Raja Mohan argue that this approach reflects India’s transition from a reluctant globalizer to a proactive architect of trade rules, balancing market access with regulatory safeguards. Others highlight that India’s strategy blends industrial policy (e.g., Production-Linked Incentives) with diplomacy—a model reminiscent of East Asian economies’ staged engagement with globalization, but calibrated to India’s development priorities. Unlike earlier eras defined by reactive protectionism, India today seeks to shape trade architectures across regions and sectors—balancing openness with resilience in a geopolitically charged economic landscape.
Trade, Technology, and Geoeconomics
Trade in the twenty-first century extends far beyond the exchange of goods. It encompasses cross-border data flows, digital infrastructure, intellectual property regimes, rare earths, semiconductors, and critical minerals essential for green technologies. The intensifying contest for technological primacy—particularly between the United States and China—has normalized export controls, outbound investment screening, technology denial regimes, and sanctions as standard tools of economic statecraft. Washington’s restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports to China and Beijing’s countermeasures on gallium and germanium exports underscore how supply chains have become strategic battlegrounds.
The Russia–Ukraine war further demonstrated the weaponization of interdependence. Western sanctions targeting Russia’s central bank reserves, SWIFT access, and energy exports reconfigured global oil flows, accelerated ruble-based transactions, and deepened conversations around de-dollarization. Scholars such as Nicholas Mulder argue that sanctions have become embedded instruments of modern economic warfare, while others warn that overuse may fragment the global financial architecture itself.
Digital trade represents an equally transformative frontier. Negotiations increasingly incorporate provisions on cross-border data transfers, algorithmic transparency, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence governance. Frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) emphasize supply-chain resilience and digital standards without traditional tariff concessions, signaling a shift toward rule-setting coalitions. Meanwhile, the European Union has advanced regulatory assertiveness through the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, shaping global tech compliance norms through what Anu Bradford terms the “Brussels Effect. Climate-linked trade measures further complicate the landscape. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), implemented in its transitional phase in 2023, imposes reporting obligations on carbon-intensive imports, potentially affecting Indian steel, cement, and aluminum exports. Simultaneously, the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act ties green subsidies to domestic content requirements, raising concerns about subsidy races and trade distortions.
Trade today is inseparable from national security doctrines, climate commitments, and technological ecosystems. As Susan Strange’s concept of structural power suggests, control over standards, finance, and production networks defines influence. In this geoeconomic era, economic agreements no longer merely reduce tariffs; they architect technological alliances, climate obligations, and strategic dependencies that will shape the balance of power for decades.
Conclusion
The global trading system is undergoing profound transformation. Multilateralism under the World Trade Organization faces stagnation; mega-regionals and bilateral FTAs are proliferating; geoeconomic rivalry is intensifying; and resilience has replaced efficiency as the guiding principle of globalization. The breakdown of the WTO Appellate Body, supply-chain shocks during COVID-19, and the strategic aftershocks of the Russia–Ukraine war have collectively accelerated this shift toward a more securitized trade order.
In this fragmented environment, India’s evolving trade diplomacy signals strategic maturity. Agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Australia, renewed negotiations with the European Union and the United Kingdom, and engagement in frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reflect an outward-looking recalibration. India’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, semiconductor mission, and green hydrogen initiatives further align domestic industrial policy with global supply-chain realignments. Scholars like C. Raja Mohan view this as India’s transition from “reluctant globalizer” to “strategic trade actor,” while others caution that execution, not intent, will define outcomes.
Yet challenges persist: infrastructure deficits, regulatory unpredictability, export competitiveness gaps, and compliance with evolving environmental and digital standards. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and emerging AI governance norms demand technological adaptation. Meanwhile, debates on data localization and digital sovereignty require India to balance openness with autonomy—echoing Dani Rodrik’s warning about the tension between globalization and domestic policy space.
Trade policy today is inseparable from grand strategy. As power diffuses and alliances become fluid, India’s ability to leverage trade for technological access, energy security, and diplomatic influence will shape its global standing. The future of globalization may not be universally multilateral—but it will reward states capable of blending economic reform with geopolitical foresight. India’s task, therefore, is not merely integration but rule-shaping. In an era where economics and geopolitics converge, trade has become statecraft—and India stands at a pivotal moment to exercise it with confidence and strategic clarity.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
The Department of Political Science, in collaboration with the Internal Quality Assurance Cell (IQAC) of Galsi Mahavidyalaya, successfully organised its Sixth International Conference on January 9 and 10, 2026, on the theme “Global Rise of Democratic India in the 21st Century: Integrating Indigenous Wisdom with Inclusive Governance.” Sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi, the two-day international academic event brought together eminent diplomats, vice-chancellors, distinguished scholars, academicians, and researchers from across India and abroad. The conference emerged as a significant intellectual platform for critically engaging with India’s democratic journey, its indigenous knowledge systems, and its expanding global leadership in contemporary international politics.
The conference commenced with a solemn inaugural ceremony marked by the traditional watering of plants by the distinguished guests, symbolising intellectual growth, sustainability, and the nurturing of democratic and civilisational values. The inaugural session was graced by an eminent panel of dignitaries, including Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar, former Ambassador of India to Sweden, Latvia, and Kazakhstan; Professor Dr Mohan, Honourable Vice Chancellor of Sri Venkateshwara University, Sikkim; and Professor Harihar Bhattacharyya, Publius Distinguished Scholar and former Professor of Political Science at the University of Burdwan, who delivered the keynote address.
The inaugural ceremony was further enriched by the presence of academic leaders from MoU partner colleges of Galsi Mahavidyalaya. Among those present were Dr Sukanta Bhattacharyya, Principal of Mankar College; Dr Pradip Kumar Bandhopadhay, Principal of Vivekananda College; Dr Sudip Chatterjee of Gushkara Mahavidyalaya; Dr Shrabanti Banerjee, Principal of Jamalpur College; and Dr Bhim Chandra Mondol, Principal of Nikhil Banga Sikshan Mahavidyalaya. Their presence reflected the spirit of academic collaboration and institutional partnership, which continues to strengthen research culture and intellectual exchange among higher education institutions in the region.
Delivering the welcome address, the Principal of Galsi Mahavidyalaya, Dr Amit S. Tiwary, warmly welcomed the distinguished dignitaries, resource persons, scholars, faculty members, and participants. He emphasised the increasing global footprint of India in political, economic, and intellectual domains. Highlighting the relevance of the conference theme, he observed that India’s indigenous wisdom, rooted in centuries-old traditions and community-based governance practices, provides a strong foundation for inclusive and democratic governance. He expressed gratitude to ICSSR, New Delhi, for its generous support and acknowledged the guidance of the University of Burdwan and the contributions of partner institutions and organisers. He expressed confidence that the conference would generate meaningful academic dialogue and contribute to understanding India’s democratic evolution.
The introductory remarks were delivered by Dr Abhisek Karmakar, Associate Professor of Political Science, IQAC Coordinator, and Convener of the conference. In his address, Dr Karmakar highlighted the pluralistic and heterogeneous character of Indian society, noting that India’s democracy has successfully accommodated vast diversity in terms of caste, religion, language, ethnicity, and culture. He emphasised that despite numerous challenges arising from diversity and socio-economic inequalities, India’s democratic framework has demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability. He further stressed that integrating indigenous knowledge systems with modern governance practices is essential for strengthening inclusive democracy and sustainable development.
A major highlight of the inaugural session was the formal release of the edited volume titled “Democracy and Tolerance: Reflections on the Political Ideas and Recent Debates,” edited by Dr Abhisek Karmakar, which represented the scholarly outcome of the department’s previous (Fifth) international conference. The book release symbolised the department’s continued commitment to promoting academic research and intellectual engagement.
In his inaugural address, Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar emphasised the contemporary relevance of indigenous knowledge systems in shaping India’s governance and foreign policy. He noted that India’s civilisational heritage of over 5,000 years has provided a strong foundation for its democratic resilience and global leadership. Referring to India’s rise as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and its emergence as a leading voice of the Global South, he highlighted the importance of democratic institutions, constitutional values, and rule of law in sustaining India’s global credibility. He emphasised that India’s foreign policy reflects its civilisational ethos of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and global cooperation, embodied in the philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.
Vice Chancellor of the Sri Venkateshwara University Professor Dr Mohan, in his address, emphasised that India’s democratic traditions have deep roots in ancient institutions such as Sabha and Samiti, which embodied participatory governance. He observed that India’s democratic system integrates technological progress with humanistic values and constitutional responsibility. He highlighted India’s successful conduct of democratic elections involving millions of voters as evidence of its democratic vitality and emphasised the importance of combining indigenous wisdom with technological innovation to achieve inclusive development and global leadership.
The keynote address by Professor Harihar Bhattacharyya stood out as one of the most intellectually profound moments of the conference. In his deeply analytical and theoretically rich lecture, Professor Bhattacharyya emphasised that India’s democratic evolution must be understood through multiple intersecting discourses, including democracy, development, identity, and federalism. He argued that India’s democracy has evolved through continuous negotiation between diversity and unity, inclusion and development, and tradition and modernity. He highlighted that India’s federal structure and democratic institutions have played a critical role in accommodating diverse identities and ensuring political inclusion, thereby strengthening democratic legitimacy.
Professor Bhattacharyya emphasised that India’s democratic resilience is remarkable given its immense cultural diversity, historical inequalities, and socio-economic challenges. He reflected on historical challenges such as the Emergency period of 1975–77, noting that democracy was ultimately restored through popular will, demonstrating its institutional strength. He further observed that India has successfully transformed its global image from a developing postcolonial nation to an emerging global power with stable economic growth and political continuity. He emphasised that India’s democracy derives strength not only from its constitutional institutions but also from its civilisational knowledge systems, cultural diversity, and participatory political culture. He concluded by emphasising that democracy is not a fixed achievement but an evolving process shaped by political actors, institutions, and citizen participation. His keynote address provided a powerful theoretical framework for understanding India’s democratic resilience, inclusivity, and global rise.
The technical sessions featured distinguished scholars from India and abroad who presented insightful analyses on diverse aspects of India’s democratic and global transformation. Professor Dr Rajkumar Kothari, Honourable Vice Chancellor of Sanskrit University, Kolkata, delivered a significant lecture on India’s foreign policy and global engagement. He emphasised that India’s foreign policy reflects a unique synthesis of national interest and ethical values rooted in its civilisational traditions. He observed that India has emerged as a major global actor through its participation in international organisations such as BRICS, SCO, and multilateral forums, reflecting its growing diplomatic influence. He introduced the concept of “Realpolitik Plus,” explaining that India’s foreign policy integrates strategic interests with moral and philosophical values such as non-violence, cooperation, and mutual respect.
Professor Kothari further emphasised that India’s global engagement reflects not merely a pursuit of power but also a commitment to promoting peace, dialogue, and cooperative international order. He highlighted that India’s foreign policy demonstrates a balanced approach that integrates traditional civilisational values with modern diplomatic strategies, enabling India to maintain constructive relations with both developed and developing nations. He also noted that India’s ability to balance realism with ethical values enhances its credibility and moral authority in international politics, positioning India as a responsible global leader in the 21st century.
Dr Nisanka Sanjeewani Ariyarathne from the University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka, examined indigenous epistemologies and their role in shaping governance in South Asia. She emphasised the importance of indigenous knowledge systems in addressing contemporary challenges and highlighted India’s potential leadership role in integrating traditional wisdom with modern governance frameworks.
Professor Maidul Islam of Keimyung University, South Korea, provided a comparative analysis of economic development in India and South Korea. He emphasised the importance of export-led growth, human capital development, industrial policy, and infrastructure investment for sustainable economic development.
Dr Payal Ray Chowdhury Dutt of Rabindra Bharati University highlighted the importance of indigenous lived experiences and human rights in shaping inclusive governance. She emphasised that governance must be sensitive to cultural diversity and local realities to ensure democratic legitimacy and social justice.
A major highlight of the conference was the presentation of 126 research papers in 12 parallel technical sessions, where scholars, assistant professors, and researchers from across the country presented their research on diverse themes related to democracy, governance, indigenous knowledge, political theory, public policy, and international relations. These sessions were charied by academicians like Dr Shilpa Nandy, Associate Professor of Khudiram Bose Central College; Dr Amrita Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Bidhan Chandra College, Asansol; Dr Bimalendu Ghosh, Associate Professor of Kanchrapara College; Dr Partha Sarathi Dey, Assistant Professor of Dinabandhu Mahavidyalaya, Dr Jayprakash Mondal, Assistant Professor of Bangabasi Evening College; Dr Tulika Chakravorty, Associate Professor of Bangabasi Morning College; Dr Sriparna Dutta, Principal of the Sonarpur College, Dr Selvakumar, Associate Professor and many. These sessions facilitated vibrant academic dialogue, critical engagement, and exchange of ideas among participants, significantly enriching the intellectual depth of the conference.
The second day of the conference featured additional technical sessions chaired jointly by Professor Harihar Bhattacharyya and Professor Dr Mohan. Distinguished speakers including Professor Dr Sunil Mahawar, Dr Pratip Chatterjee, Dr Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas, Dr Nandini Basistha, and Dr Pradipta Mukherjee presented insightful analyses on Indian political culture, indigenous knowledge systems, consociational democracy, and inclusive governance.
Professor Dr Sunil Mahawar, in his address on Indian Political Thought through the Lens of Indian Knowledge System, critically examined the dominance of Eurocentric frameworks in political theory and emphasised the need to rediscover India’s indigenous intellectual traditions rooted in ancient democratic practices such as Sabha and Samiti. He argued that India’s democratic legacy is deeply embedded in its civilisational ethos, which prioritises dialogue, coexistence, and ethical governance.
Dr Pratip Chatterjee focused on the regional dimensions of India’s democratic rise and emphasised the importance of institutional strength, democratic culture, and constructive engagement with neighbouring countries. He highlighted that India’s global leadership is closely linked to its ability to maintain democratic stability internally while fostering regional cooperation and diplomatic synergy externally.
Dr Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas, in his lecture on Understanding Indian Political Culture, emphasised that Indian political culture is shaped by historical experiences, social diversity, and citizens’ attitudes toward governance. He stressed the importance of civic education, transparency, youth participation, and institutional accountability in strengthening democratic participation and ensuring political stability.
Dr Nandini Basistha highlighted the crucial but often overlooked role of women in preserving and transmitting indigenous knowledge systems. She explained how women contribute significantly to sustainable practices in agriculture, environmental conservation, and community life, and emphasised that recognising their knowledge is essential for building inclusive and sustainable development models.
Dr Pradipta Mukherjee discussed the concept of consociational democracy in the Indian context, emphasising how India’s pluralistic society has successfully accommodated diversity through inclusive democratic institutions. He highlighted that India’s secular and federal framework plays a crucial role in integrating diverse social, linguistic, and cultural groups, thereby strengthening democratic unity and national cohesion.
Collectively, their presentations highlighted the importance of institutional accountability, civic participation, indigenous epistemologies, and democratic inclusion in strengthening India’s democratic framework and reinforcing its position as a resilient and inclusive democracy.
The valedictory session featured a thought-provoking address by Professor Shibashis Chatterjee, who examined India’s global rise through multiple theoretical perspectives. He emphasised that India’s rise cannot be understood solely through conventional frameworks of power politics but must be analysed in terms of its civilisational identity, democratic values, and cultural diversity.
Certificates were distributed to participants and paper presenters in recognition of their scholarly contributions. In his concluding remarks, Principal Dr Amit S. Tiwary expressed sincere gratitude to ICSSR, distinguished guests, MoU partner institutions, scholars, faculty members, participants, and organisers for their invaluable contributions.
The conference concluded with a formal vote of thanks delivered by Convener Dr Abhisek Karmakar, who acknowledged the contributions of dignitaries, partner institutions, scholars, and participants. He emphasised that the conference successfully fulfilled its objective of promoting academic dialogue on India’s democratic journey and its emerging global leadership.
The ICSSR-sponsored international conference reaffirmed India’s position as a vibrant and resilient democracy rooted in civilisational wisdom and inclusive governance. It also strengthened academic collaboration, fostered intellectual exchange, and contributed significantly to scholarly discourse on India’s democratic evolution and global rise in the 21st century.
About the Author
Dr Abhisek Karmakar is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Galsi Mahavidyalaya, West Bengal, India. He also teaches in Rabindra Bharati University as an ad-hoc faculty. He completed his MPhil and PhD at the University of Burdwan. His book, Making of a Democratic Intellectual Tradition in India, was published in 2019 from Germany and Mauritius. He has authored over 41 articles in international and national journals including UGC CARE listed journals. In 2025, his co-authored book Federal Thought, is set to be published as it is signed by Routledge. He edited Challenges to Democracy in South Asia (2021) and has co-edited three additional books. A regular contributor to major English dailies, Dr. Karmakar has participated in international conferences in Germany, Italy, South Korea and Bangladesh. He is a life member of several academic associations and frequently appears in electronic media as a political analyst.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent two-day state visit to Israel his first since the landmark 2017 trip that made him the first Indian prime minister to set foot on Israeli soil marks a pivotal moment in India’s evolving West Asia policy. Framed as a step toward a “special strategic partnership,” the visit underscores the steady expansion of India–Israel relations across defense, technology, trade, and innovation. Yet, taking place amid the continuing devastation in Gaza and heightened regional tensions, the visit also raises complex moral, diplomatic, and geopolitical questions. Its implications for peace in the Middle East extend beyond bilateral cooperation, touching upon India’s credibility as a balancing power, its commitment to international norms, and its potential role in fostering long-term regional stability.
India’s relationship with Israel has undergone a profound transformation over the past three decades. Although India recognized Israel in 1950, full diplomatic relations were established only in 1992, reflecting Cold War alignments, domestic political sensitivities, and strong ties with Arab states. Historically, India championed the Palestinian cause, becoming one of the first non-Arab countries to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988. Over time, however, shared concerns about terrorism, technological complementarities, and defense requirements drew New Delhi and Tel Aviv closer. Modi’s 2017 visit symbolized the “de-hyphenation” of India’s Israel and Palestine policies engaging Israel on its own merits while maintaining rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood. His current visit consolidates that trajectory, signaling that India’s Middle East engagement is now guided primarily by strategic pragmatism.
At the core of the visit lies a robust and expanding defense partnership. Israel has emerged as one of India’s top suppliers of advanced military technology, including drones, missile systems, radar platforms, and surveillance tools. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India accounted for a significant share of Israeli defense exports in recent years, highlighting the depth of this strategic alignment. Discussions during the visit reportedly include joint development of ballistic missile defense systems, laser weapons, and next-generation drones. For India, such cooperation enhances deterrence capabilities and strengthens national security. For Israel, partnership with a major democracy provides a stable market and opportunities to scale production. However, critics argue that these technologies are not abstract innovations, but tools deployed in contested environments, raising ethical concerns about their use in contexts of occupation and civilian control.
The security dimension of India–Israel ties is closely linked to counterterrorism cooperation. Both nations face threats from extremist violence and cross-border militancy, fostering collaboration in intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, and homeland security. Proponents contend that such cooperation contributes to regional stability by strengthening state capacity against non-state actors. Yet detractors caution that framing security cooperation solely through the lens of counterterrorism risks obscuring the broader political realities of occupation and asymmetrical conflict in the Palestinian territories. This tension underscores the broader dilemma facing India how to pursue legitimate security interests without appearing indifferent to humanitarian concerns.
Beyond defense, the visit emphasizes expanding economic and technological collaboration. Bilateral trade has grown steadily, reaching approximately $4 billion in 2024, with negotiations underway for a comprehensive free trade agreement. Cooperation spans agriculture, water management, desalination, waste treatment, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and cybersecurity. Israel’s expertise in drip irrigation and desert agriculture aligns with India’s development priorities and offers solutions applicable across arid regions of the Middle East. Such initiatives have the potential to address resource scarcity one of the underlying drivers of conflict thereby contributing indirectly to regional peace. At the same time, dual-use technologies in AI and surveillance raise concerns about their potential deployment in security infrastructures that restrict civilian freedoms.
The visit also reflects broader geopolitical realignments in West Asia. Israel’s normalization agreements with several Arab states have shifted regional dynamics from ideological confrontation toward pragmatic cooperation. India’s engagement with Israel complements its deepening ties with Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as well as its longstanding relationship with Iran. This multi-vector diplomacy positions India as a potential bridge among rival blocs. However, the optics of Modi’s visit particularly his address to the Knesset and visible camaraderie with Israeli leadership may be interpreted by some regional actors as a tilt toward Israel, complicating India’s carefully cultivated image of strategic autonomy.
The humanitarian crisis in Gaza forms the most contentious backdrop to the visit. Ongoing military operations, large-scale displacement, and civilian casualties have prompted global calls for ceasefire and accountability. Critics within India, including opposition leaders and civil society voices, argue that deepening ties with Israel at such a moment undermines India’s historical support for Palestinian rights and weakens its moral standing. Statements by political figures such as Jairam Ramesh, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra, and M. A. Baby reflect domestic unease, framing the visit as inconsistent with India’s anti-colonial legacy and long-standing advocacy for self-determination. A parliamentary panel led by Shashi Tharoor has also warned that the timing and symbolism of the visit could affect India’s global image, underscoring the importance of foreign policy messaging.
India maintains that its support for a two-state solution remains unchanged. Yet critics contend that rhetorical commitment appears hollow when accompanied by expanding defense and intelligence cooperation with Israel. This perceived inconsistency is compounded by India’s voting patterns at the United Nations, where it has sometimes abstained on resolutions critical of Israel while supporting others condemning settlement expansions. Such oscillations have drawn domestic and international scrutiny, raising questions about whether strategic interests are overshadowing normative commitments. For India to play a credible role in promoting peace, it must reconcile these tensions and articulate a coherent policy that aligns actions with principles.
From Israel’s perspective, Modi’s visit carries significant diplomatic value. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, facing domestic political pressures and international criticism, can present the visit as evidence that Israel is not isolated and retains strong partnerships with major global actors. The personal rapport between Modi and Netanyahu, often highlighted through public displays of warmth, reinforces this narrative. For Israel, engagement with India enhances its legitimacy and expands its diplomatic network, particularly in the Global South. However, this dynamic also underscores the asymmetry of perceptions: while Israel views the partnership as a strategic breakthrough, India must balance its bilateral gains against broader regional sensitivities.
The visit also intersects with emerging multilateral frameworks such as the I2U2 grouping comprising India, Israel, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). These initiatives aim to promote economic connectivity, infrastructure development, and food security, fostering interdependence among regional actors. By participating in such frameworks, India contributes to a cooperative architecture that could reduce incentives for conflict. Economic integration and shared development projects create mutual stakes in stability, offering a pathway toward peace that complements traditional diplomacy.
Iran’s role in the regional equation further complicates the implications of Modi’s visit. India’s strategic investments in Iran’s Chabahar Port and its historical energy ties underscore Tehran’s importance in India’s extended neighborhood. Balancing relations with Israel and Iran require careful diplomacy, particularly amid tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Analysts suggest that India prefers a negotiated diplomatic solution to regional disputes, reflecting its broader commitment to stability. However, visible alignment with Israel could strain perceptionsin Tehran, illustrating the delicate balancing act inherent in India’s West Asia policy.
The broader question raised by Modi’s visit concerns the moral compass of foreign policy. Can strategic partnerships and technological cooperation justify engagement with a state facing serious allegations of human rights violations? For India, a nation that has historically championed anti-colonialism and self-determination, this question carries resonance. The pursuit of national interests is an inevitable aspect of foreign policy, yet moral credibility remains a vital component of global leadership. India’s ability to reconcile strategic pragmatism with ethical consistency will shape its international reputation and influence.
Despite these challenges, the visit also presents opportunities for India to contribute constructively to Middle East peace. India’s development partnerships in agriculture, water management, healthcare, and digital infrastructure can address root causes of instability, including poverty, resource scarcity, and economic inequality. By sharing scalable, cost-effective solutions tailored to developing contexts, India can support regional resilience and foster conditions conducive to peace. Moreover, India’s longstanding ties with both Israel and Arab states position it uniquely to facilitate dialogue and confidence-building measures, even if it does not serve as a formal mediator.
India’s concept of strategic autonomy remains central to its approach. Rather than aligning exclusively with any bloc, India seeks to maintain balanced relations across the region, guided by national interests and global responsibilities. Modi’s visit to Israel must therefore be understood within this broader framework. While the optics may suggest alignment, India continues to engage actively with Palestine, Gulf states, and Iran, emphasizing that its partnerships are not zero-sum. The challenge lies in ensuring that this balanced approach is perceived as credible and consistent by all stakeholders.
In conclusion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel represents a complex and consequential moment in India’s foreign policy. It consolidates a multifaceted strategic partnership encompassing defense, technology, trade, and innovation, while also raising profound questions about ethics, diplomacy, and regional stability. The visit highlights India’s emergence as a significant actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics, capable of influencing regional dynamics through development partnerships and multilateral engagement. Yet its implications for peace in the Middle East depend on India’s ability to balance strategic interests with moral responsibility, maintain credibility as a supporter of Palestinian rights, and leverage its unique position to promote dialogue and cooperation.
As West Asia navigates a period of volatility and transformation, India’s role will be shaped not only by its partnerships but by the principles guiding its engagement. Modi’s visit underscores both the opportunities and the dilemmas inherent in this role. If India can align its strategic ambitions with a consistent commitment to justice, human dignity, and inclusive development, it may yet contribute meaningfully to a more stable and peaceful Middle East.
About the Author
Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs.
In an era defined by shifting power balances and intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific, the United States’ release of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) represents more than a bureaucratic update — it is a signal flare illuminating Washington’s evolving worldview and strategic priorities. Unlike previous defence blueprints, the 2026 NDS boldly recasts American global posture around a renewed focus on homeland defence and hemispheric security, while tethering overseas engagements to clearly defined, self-interested aims. This recalibration comes at a time when the US is asserting tougher rhetoric and actions closer to home — from the reported capture of Nicolás Maduro to President Donald Trump’s strategic pursuit of Greenland — moves that symbolise a shift toward territorial security and hemispheric consolidation.
But beneath this American introspection lies a message with global reverberations: for emerging powers in the Indo-Pacific — and India in particular — the era of relying on US unilateral security guarantees is drawing to a close. Although Washington still acknowledges the Indo-Pacific’s importance, it now insists that allies and partners take on significantly greater responsibility for their own defence. Most tellingly, the new strategy omits any explicit reference to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — a grouping long viewed as a linchpin of regional deterrence against strategic challengers — triggering debate in New Delhi about the durability of American commitments. The implicit message is clear: the Indo-Pacific remains central to global geopolitics, but India’s security calculus must now be grounded not in rhetoric, but in enhanced material capability — especially enhanced naval power projection to secure its interests across increasingly contested seas.
From Post–Cold War Primacy to Burden Sharing
To understand the strategic import of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), it is essential to situate it historically. After the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole superpower, underwriting global security through alliance systems in Europe and Asia. From the expansion of NATO to bilateral security treaties with Japan and South Korea, Washington positioned itself as what scholars termed the “apex security provider.” The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent interventions in the Balkans reinforced perceptions of uncontested American military dominance.
The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” institutionalized Indo-Pacific centrality, later reframed under President Donald Trump and his successor as the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia—was revived in 2017 as a consultative mechanism to balance China’s assertiveness. The First Island Chain (FIC), stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, became central to deterrence strategy against Beijing, particularly amid tensions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.
However, Trump’s strategic worldview departs from liberal internationalism. His doctrine of “peace through strength” emphasizes military superiority but rejects unconditional alliance commitments. The NDS bluntly argues that allies have become “dependencies,” urging greater burden sharing. Europe is expected to shoulder more responsibility against Russia; South Korea must bolster deterrence against North Korea; West Asian partners are pressed to counter Iran. The implication for Asia is unmistakable: the US will deter China, but not at disproportionate cost.
Scholars such as Barry Posen have long argued for “restraint,” advocating reduced US overextension and greater allied responsibility, while others like John Mearsheimer frame burden sharing as a natural correction in a multipolar order. Recent events—including the Ukraine war’s strain on US stockpiles and China’s rapid naval expansion—have reinforced arguments that America must husband resources. The NDS’s pledge to “supercharge” the Defence Industrial Base (DIB) reflects anxieties over munitions shortages and shipbuilding gaps vis-à-vis Beijing. In essence, Washington seeks strategic economy: concentrate power where indispensable, incentivize partners to invest more, and preserve long-term deterrence without unsustainable commitments.
The Indo-Pacific and the Missing Quad: Strategic Implications for India
One of the most striking omissions in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is its silence on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Unlike the National Security Strategy (NSS), which briefly acknowledged India’s regional role, the defence document offers no direct reference to the grouping. This has led some analysts to speculate about a possible G-2 accommodation between Washington and Beijing—though such an interpretation may be premature. The absence masks continuing operational cooperation. The four Quad partners recently conducted a field training exercise under the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network (IPLN), aimed at rapid contingency response and military aid coordination. Bilateral engagements between Washington and New Delhi remain steady, including complex naval exercises such as the Malabar series and expanding logistics interoperability under foundational agreements like LEMOA and COMCASA.
Recent years have also witnessed tangible defence deals reinforcing India-US strategic convergence. India has moved forward on procuring MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones from the United States, enhancing maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean. The 2023–25 period further saw progress under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), linking defence innovation ecosystems and facilitating co-production discussions in jet engines and armoured platforms. Simultaneously, India has deepened defence ties with Japan and Australia, signalling that the Quad’s operational relevance extends beyond declaratory politics.Yet symbolism matters in strategy. By not naming the Quad, Washington signals that formalized collective security arrangements are secondary to bilateral or flexible alignments. The NDS prioritizes defence of the American homeland and the First Island Chain through “denial-based deterrence”—preventing China from achieving its objectives rather than threatening retaliatory escalation.
For India, this has layered implications. First, US commitment to Indo-Pacific stability persists, but conditionality has increased. Second, American strategy remains primarily maritime and Pacific-centric, focused on constraining China’s advances near Taiwan and the South China Sea. Third, Washington expects Eurasian actors—including India—to shoulder primary responsibility for their own security environment.
Scholars such as C. Raja Mohan argue that India must transition from being a “balancing power” to a “leading power” in maritime Asia, while Ashley Tellis emphasizes that long-term deterrence credibility depends on India’s indigenous military modernization rather than external guarantees. The NDS’s clinical clarity thus suggests a world where partnerships endure, but self-reliance is indispensable. India cannot assume that US presence automatically translates into guaranteed strategic cover—whether along the Line of Actual Control or across the Indian Ocean Region. Strategic autonomy, backed by credible naval capability, becomes not merely a doctrinal preference but a structural necessity.
India’s Naval Imperative: East of Malacca and Beyond
In the twenty-first century, power will be measured not merely by territorial control, but by command of the seas. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the primary arena of geopolitical competition, where maritime routes carry the lifeblood of global trade and naval fleets signal strategic intent. Against this backdrop, the latest National Defense Strategy underscores the defence of the First Island Chain as central to American deterrence strategy. For India, however, the maritime canvas is even broader—stretching from the Arabian Sea across the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific. If New Delhi seeks to be recognised not just as a balancing power but as a shaping force in regional order, it must expand credible naval power projection, particularly “east of Malacca,” where the strategic contest is intensifying and long-term influence will be decided.
Historically, India’s maritime orientation was continental, shaped by land wars and unresolved borders. However, post-1991 economic reforms and the Look East—later Act East—policy began shifting attention seaward. The Indian Navy has since developed blue-water aspirations, commissioning aircraft carriers such as INS Vikrant, operating nuclear-powered submarines like INS Arihant, and expanding long-range maritime surveillance through P-8I aircraft. These assets signal intent, but intent must be matched with sustained investment.
Recent years have witnessed significant defence partnerships. India has deepened interoperability with the United States through logistics agreements and joint exercises such as Malabar. The 2023 approval of the MQ-9B SeaGuardian drone acquisition strengthened maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The GE–HAL agreement to co-produce F414 jet engines reflects growing trust in high-end defence technology collaboration under the broader iCET framework. With France, India continues submarine and carrier cooperation, while with Australia and Japan it has expanded coordinated patrols and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Domestically, Atmanirbhar Bharat has accelerated indigenous shipbuilding, including Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, Scorpene-class submarines, and the development of the next-generation aircraft carrier debate (IAC-2). However, scholars such as Ashley Tellis argue that without sustained capital allocation and faster procurement cycles, India risks capability gaps vis-à-vis China’s rapidly expanding PLA Navy. China now fields the world’s largest navy by hull count, increasing its deployments in the IOR and Western Pacific.
Projecting presence east of Malacca—towards the South China Sea and Western Pacific—serves three purposes: signalling resolve, safeguarding sea lanes, and embedding India in regional security architecture. It also reassures Southeast Asian partners wary of great-power rivalry. Defence spending, therefore, becomes critical. Incremental increases are insufficient; structural reallocation toward capital-intensive naval assets—aircraft carriers, submarines, replenishment ships, amphibious platforms, and integrated undersea surveillance networks—is essential. Maritime power will determine whether India shapes Indo-Pacific order or merely adapts to it.
Calibrated Power Politics: Between Strategic Autonomy and Strategic Convergence
Scholars remain divided on India’s optimal response to American recalibration under the National Defense Strategy. Realist analysts argue that greater burden sharing aligns with India’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy. Rather than free-riding on US power, India enhances its leverage by becoming indispensable to regional stability. Contributing more meaningfully to maritime security—whether through expanded naval deployments, logistics access agreements, or joint exercises—could insulate New Delhi from policy volatility in Washington, especially amid transactional shifts in US foreign policy.
Others, however, caution that overextension carries risks of entrapment. If US-China rivalry intensifies—particularly over Taiwan or the South China Sea—India may face mounting pressure to align explicitly with Washington. The NDS’s emphasis on denial-based deterrence suggests calibrated competition rather than outright confrontation. Some scholars view this as strategic prudence; others interpret it as subtle accommodation toward Beijing, shaped partly by economic interdependence.
Recent developments reinforce this debate. The strengthening of India-US defence industrial cooperation under iCET, the expansion of Malabar exercises, and India’s participation in multilateral maritime initiatives signal growing convergence. Yet India has simultaneously maintained engagement with Russia and deepened ties with Southeast Asia, reflecting hedging rather than alignment.Within India’s strategic community, voices such as C. Raja Mohan advocate a shift from “non-alignment” to “multi-alignment,” while Ashley Tellis emphasizes capability-building as the foundation of credible autonomy. The absence of India by name in the NDS is instructive: symbolism matters, but power commands respect. If India consolidates its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and an active maritime actor in the Western Pacific, its strategic relevance will be embedded not in rhetoric, but in reality.
Conclusion
The release of the National Defense Strategy does not herald American retreat from the Indo-Pacific; rather, it formalizes a shift from primacy to conditional engagement. Washington remains committed to deterring China, defending the First Island Chain, and preserving a favourable balance of power. Yet it is equally clear that the United States no longer sees itself as the unquestioned guarantor of regional order. The language of “burden sharing,” the silence on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the emphasis on denial-based deterrence collectively signal a doctrine of selective strength. Allies are partners—but not dependents.
For India, this strategic recalibration is not a setback; it is a clarifying moment. The debate is no longer about whether the Indo-Pacific matters—it unquestionably does. The real question is whether India possesses the material capability to shape outcomes within it. Geography has already conferred strategic advantage: India sits astride critical sea lanes linking the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. But geography without power is vulnerability. As China expands its naval footprint from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, India’s response cannot remain incremental.
Naval power is not merely a military instrument; it is a political signal. Aircraft carriers, submarines, logistics agreements, and maritime partnerships communicate resolve, credibility, and staying power. If India seeks insulation from volatility in Washington and coercion from Beijing, it must build strategic insurance through sea control, sea denial, and sustained maritime presence east of Malacca.
The NDS ultimately offers India a strategic opportunity disguised as a warning. It underscores that partnerships endure, but guarantees diminish. In this emerging order, influence will accrue to those who contribute meaningfully to regional stability. If New Delhi invests decisively in naval modernization, defence industrial capacity, and interoperable partnerships, it will not merely respond to American recalibration—it will shape the Indo-Pacific balance itself. The age of rhetorical alignment is over. The age of maritime capability has begun.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
India–Armenia relations have entered a decisive phase of strategic consolidation, shaped by intensifying geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus and the emergence of a Pakistan–Türkiye–Azerbaijan alignment. What was once a historically rooted diplomatic partnership has evolved into a security-driven strategic alignment. The four-day official visit of Anil Chauhan to Armenia on 1 February 2026 symbolised this transformation. The visit, which included meetings with Suren Papikyan, an address at the National Defence Research University (NDRU), and the inauguration of an IT laboratory and distance-learning centre at the Vazgen Sargsyan Military Academy, underscored a deepening commitment to defence industrial collaboration, training exchanges, and technological modernisation.
Driven by shared geopolitical and geostrategic interests, India and Armenia are recalibrating their defence partnership in response to shifting power balances in Eurasia. The relationship today reflects not merely arms transactions but a broader aspiration for multipolarity, strategic autonomy, and regional balance in the face of emerging trilateral pressures.
This transformation must also be situated within the broader churn in Eurasian geopolitics. The South Caucasus has re-emerged as a corridor of strategic consequence, linking Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and West Asia through critical energy routes and transit networks. The aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, coupled with Russia’s preoccupation elsewhere, has unsettled traditional security arrangements and encouraged regional states to diversify partnerships. For India, engagement with Armenia aligns with its expanding defence diplomacy and export ambitions, reinforcing its image as a responsible security provider. For Armenia, partnership with India offers technological diversification and diplomatic balance. Together, both states are crafting a pragmatic alignment anchored not in bloc politics but in calibrated cooperation, sovereign choice, and long-term strategic convergence.
Historical Foundations: From Diplomatic Recognition to Strategic Depth
India and Armenia established diplomatic relations in 1992, shortly after Armenia’s independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, cultural and civilisational linkages predate formal diplomacy, with Armenian merchant communities historically present in India, particularly in Kolkata, Chennai, and Mumbai. The Armenian Church in Kolkata and archival records of Armenian trade networks stand as enduring symbols of this early connectivity. For decades, bilateral engagement remained modest, focused largely on cultural exchange, educational cooperation, and coordination in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. High-level political exchanges were limited but cordial, laying a foundation of trust without immediate strategic intensity.
The turning point emerged in the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the 44-day war, Türkiye provided active military and logistical support to Azerbaijan, while Pakistan extended diplomatic and strategic backing to Baku. Armenian sources alleged the involvement of Pakistani military personnel during combat operations, though these claims remain contested internationally. The conflict exposed Armenia’s heavy dependence on Russian arms supplies—Moscow accounted for nearly 94 percent of Armenia’s arms imports between 2011 and 2020. However, Russia’s subsequent engagement in Ukraine constrained its ability to meet Armenian defence requirements, prompting Yerevan to diversify its suppliers. This strategic vacuum created an opportunity for India. As both Armenia and India historically operated Russian-origin military platforms, compatibility in training and logistics facilitated defence cooperation. India emerged as a reliable partner capable of supplying advanced yet cost-effective military systems while supporting Armenia’s security modernisation.
Concrete defence agreements soon followed like In 2022, Armenia signed a contract to procure the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system from India, marking New Delhi’s first major arms export to the South Caucasus. This was followed by the acquisition of the Swathi Weapon Locating Radar system, enhancing Armenia’s counter-battery capabilities. Reports also indicated discussions on the supply of Akash air defence systems, reflecting Armenia’s priority to strengthen layered air defence after the 2020 conflict. High-level visits reinforced this trajectory. The visit of Suren Papikyan to India in 2022 and subsequent defence consultations institutionalised cooperation. More recently, the February 2026 visit of Anil Chauhan to Yerevan underscored a transition from transactional arms sales to structured military-to-military engagement, including training exchanges, defence industrial dialogue, and technology transfer discussions. Collectively, these developments signal a gradual but unmistakable shift—from diplomatic recognition to strategic depth grounded in security convergence.
Expansion of Defence Engagements: Deals, Deliveries, and Industrial Cooperation
India’s defence engagement with Armenia began to take concrete shape in 2020 with a US$40 million contract for Swathi Weapon-Locating Radars. Developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Swathi system detects and tracks enemy artillery within a 50-kilometre range. Armenian defence authorities reportedly assessed the indigenously developed system as superior to competing Russian and Polish alternatives. The deal aligned with the Make in India initiative under Narendra Modi, reinforcing India’s ambition to expand defence exports.
The partnership expanded significantly in 2022 when Armenia became the first foreign buyer of the Akash surface-to-air missile system, placing an order worth approximately US$720 million for 15 units. Designed by DRDO and produced by Bharat Dynamics Limited, the Akash system provides air defence against fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones. Deliveries began in 2024, substantially enhancing Armenia’s air defence capabilities. To counter the growing threat posed by unmanned aerial vehicles, India also supplied advanced anti-drone systems capable of detection, tracking, and neutralisation.
Further strengthening this trajectory, Armenia finalised agreements to procure Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher systems, with initial deliveries commencing in July 2023 and an additional consignment dispatched from Nagpur in January 2026. The upgraded Pinaka variants extend operational range to 75 kilometres, significantly improving Armenia’s strike capabilities. Between 2020 and 2024, Armenia emerged as the principal recipient of Indian defence exports, with total contracts estimated at approximately US$2 billion. Yerevan has also expressed interest in acquiring 8 to 12 Su-30MKI multirole fighter jets, valued at nearly US$3 billion. This potential acquisition follows Azerbaijan’s reported US$4.6 billion deal with Pakistan for JF-17 Thunder fighter jets. Although negotiations remain exploratory, the interest signals Armenia’s intention to rebalance its air power capabilities through diversified procurement.
For Armenia, the Su-30MKI offers long-range strike capability, advanced avionics, and compatibility with a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, potentially strengthening deterrence and airspace control. The platform’s integration into Armenia’s existing Russian-origin inventory would also ease training and maintenance transitions. From India’s perspective, such a deal would mark a landmark high-value export of a frontline combat aircraft, elevating its defence export profile globally. If realised, the agreement would not merely alter the regional air balance but symbolise a new level of strategic trust and technological partnership between New Delhi and Yerevan.
The Strategic Calculus: Countering the Pakistan–Türkiye–Azerbaijan Axis
The deepening India–Armenia partnership must be viewed against the backdrop of a consolidating Pakistan–Türkiye–Azerbaijan alignment. This trilateral cooperation spans joint military exercises such as “Three Brothers,” defence-industrial collaboration—particularly in drone warfare and precision munitions—and coordinated diplomatic messaging on issues ranging from Kashmir to Nagorno-Karabakh. For India, which faces enduring security tensions with Pakistan, Azerbaijan’s growing defence ties with Islamabad and Ankara represent an expansion of strategic competition into Eurasia. Ankara’s active support to Baku during the 2020 war and subsequent defence-industrial integration have altered the regional balance, compelling New Delhi to factor the South Caucasus into its extended security calculus.
India’s defence exports to Armenia serve multiple objectives. First, they secure a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, a region historically influenced by Russia but increasingly contested by regional and global actors including the European Union and Iran. Second, they counterbalance the growing influence of Türkiye and Pakistan in the region. Third, they project India as a dependable defence exporter capable of delivering advanced systems without overt political conditionality.
Importantly, Indian policymakers have framed these exports as instruments of balance rather than escalation. By enhancing Armenia’s defensive capabilities—through systems such as the Swathi, Akash, and Pinaka—New Delhi contributes to preserving equilibrium rather than altering territorial realities. Scholars at the Observer Research Foundation argue that India’s outreach to Armenia reflects a broader pattern of “defence diplomacy 2.0,” where calibrated arms transfers complement geopolitical signalling. Analysts such as Harsh V. Pant suggest that India’s expanding defence exports are not merely commercial ventures but instruments of strategic statecraft aimed at shaping regional balances without direct military deployment.
Further, Armenia’s growing engagement with Western institutions—evident in enhanced EU monitoring missions and political outreach—has diversified its external partnerships, creating diplomatic space for India’s deeper involvement. The cumulative value of defence agreements since 2020, estimated at nearly US$2 billion, underscores the scale of this transformation. Between 2020 and 2024, Armenia reportedly became the largest recipient of Indian defence exports, signalling both trust and strategic convergence.
Military Training, Technology Integration, and Joint Production Prospects
Beyond hardware transfers, India and Armenia are investing in institutional capacity-building. During his February 2026 visit, Anil Chauhan emphasised joint exercises, professional training, and technology integration in modern warfare. Armenian officers are increasingly exposed to Indian doctrines of mountain warfare, cyber-enabled operations, integrated air defence management, and drone countermeasures. Given Armenia’s mountainous terrain and evolving threat environment, India’s operational experience along high-altitude frontiers offers practical relevance. Structured training exchanges, staff-level dialogues, and expanded slots in Indian military academies are gradually institutionalising defence cooperation at the doctrinal level. Such engagement modernises Armenia’s operational approach while fostering long-term interoperability and professional familiarity between the two armed forces.
Technology integration forms a second pillar of this partnership. The induction of systems such as the Akash, Pinaka, and Swathi requires not only procurement but also sustained training, maintenance ecosystems, and digital command integration. Indian technical teams and defence firms have reportedly supported capacity-building in maintenance and lifecycle management, ensuring operational sustainability rather than one-time delivery.
Armenia’s pursuit of joint production and research initiatives reflects its desire to reduce reliance on a single foreign supplier. India, advancing its defence indigenisation agenda, benefits from collaborative ventures that expand production networks and demonstrate export viability. Discussions around co-development of ammunition, surveillance technologies, and potential local assembly facilities suggest movement beyond a traditional buyer–seller dynamic toward shared industrial participation.
This evolution underscores India’s broader ambition to position itself as a credible defence exporter in a multipolar world. By supporting Armenia’s security architecture through training, technology transfer, and institutional linkages, New Delhi demonstrates its capacity to contribute to stability beyond South Asia. The defence relationship thus acquires geopolitical resonance, linking South Asia and the South Caucasus within a durable and strategically embedded framework of cooperation.
India–Armenia as a Strategic Balancer in Eurasia
The transformation of India–Armenia relations from a historically cordial partnership to a comprehensive defence alignment reflects changing realities in Eurasia. Driven by shared security concerns and evolving trilateral pressures from the Pakistan–Türkiye–Azerbaijan axis, both countries have recalibrated their engagement toward strategic depth.
Highlighted milestones—including the US$40 million Swathi radar deal (2020), the US$720 million Akash missile contract (2022), the Pinaka rocket system deliveries (2023–2026), and the February 2026 defence visit of Anil Chauhan—illustrate the rapid expansion of defence cooperation. Between 2020 and 2024, Armenia became the largest recipient of Indian defence exports, with agreements totalling approximately US$2 billion. Prospective fighter aircraft discussions, expanded air-defence integration, and joint production initiatives further reinforce this trajectory, signalling long-term strategic intent rather than episodic transactions.
For Armenia, diversification of arms suppliers reduces structural overdependence on Russia and strengthens credible deterrence amid an uncertain regional order. For India, engagement with Yerevan secures a strategic presence in the South Caucasus, reinforces its defence export credentials, and demonstrates its capacity to operate as a responsible security partner beyond South Asia. More importantly, this partnership reflects a subtle yet significant shift in India’s grand strategy—from a traditionally reactive posture in extended geographies to a proactive balancing role in emerging theatres of competition.
In a geopolitical landscape marked by renewed great-power rivalry, fractured supply chains, and fluid alignments, India–Armenia security cooperation represents calibrated statecraft. It avoids overt bloc formation while shaping regional equations through capability enhancement and institutional trust. As the South Caucasus becomes an increasingly contested crossroads of power politics, New Delhi and Yerevan are constructing a partnership that blends defence industrial cooperation, doctrinal exchange, and technological modernisation.
Ultimately, India–Armenia ties exemplify how middle powers can leverage strategic convergence to reinforce multipolarity. Anchored in sovereignty, balance, and strategic autonomy, their evolving alignment signals not only a bilateral strengthening but a broader reconfiguration of Eurasian security architecture—measured, pragmatic, and forward-looking.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
India–Malaysia relations have entered a phase of strategic consolidation that reflects wider transformations within the Indo-Pacific order. Anchored in diaspora linkages, strengthened by expanding trade flows, embedded within ASEAN institutional frameworks, and shaped by maritime realities, the bilateral relationship is acquiring structural depth. The elevation of ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in August 2024 marked not merely a diplomatic upgrade but a recognition that both countries’ long-term strategic trajectories are increasingly intertwined. In a geopolitical environment characterised by intensifying great-power competition, uncertainty in transatlantic alignments, and mounting pressure on ASEAN cohesion, India and Malaysia are recalibrating their engagement to reflect converging economic and security imperatives. Rather than episodic diplomacy driven by summitry, contemporary India–Malaysia ties are defined by layered interdependence: a 2.75 million-strong Indian-origin community in Malaysia, bilateral trade approaching US$20 billion, growing defence coordination, and increasing alignment within ASEAN-centred security platforms. Together, these dimensions position the relationship as a quiet but consequential pillar within the wider ASEAN–India architecture and the evolving Indo-Pacific strategic order.
Historical Foundations: From Post-Colonial Solidarity to Strategic Maturity
The foundations of India–Malaysia relations predate Malaysia’s independence, rooted in colonial-era labour migration that brought large numbers of Indians—particularly Tamils—to Malaya. These early movements created enduring social and cultural linkages that continue to shape bilateral engagement. Following Malaya’s independence in 1957, diplomatic relations were established promptly, framed by post-colonial solidarity and shared participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. Leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Tunku Abdul Rahman envisioned cooperation among newly independent Asian states as central to preserving sovereignty amid Cold War rivalries. However, during the Cold War decades, engagement remained cordial but limited, shaped largely by economic exchanges, Commonwealth connections, and multilateral cooperation. The relationship lacked the strategic intensity seen in contemporary ties, partly due to differing regional priorities and limited economic complementarities.
A substantive shift began in the 1990s with India’s Look East Policy, which sought to reintegrate India economically and strategically with Southeast Asia. Malaysia, under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad, was itself championing Asian economic cooperation and South–South solidarity. Mahathir’s advocacy of the “Look East” ethos in Malaysia and India’s outreach to ASEAN created parallel trajectories that facilitated greater economic engagement. Bilateral trade expanded steadily, particularly in palm oil imports, infrastructure cooperation, and construction services. The signing of the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 2011 institutionalised these economic linkages, embedding them within a rules-based trade framework.
The relationship gained further strategic momentum when India’s Look East Policy was revitalised as the Act East Policy under Narendra Modi. This recalibration moved beyond commerce toward defence, maritime security, and connectivity. India’s economic liberalisation and Malaysia’s export-oriented industrialisation created new complementarities in energy, commodities, and manufacturing, while defence dialogues and naval engagements gradually expanded. Nevertheless, periodic political tensions and domestic sensitivities—particularly regarding diaspora politics and public commentary on internal affairs—occasionally slowed progress. These episodes, however, did not fundamentally derail the trajectory of engagement, as institutional mechanisms provided resilience against short-term diplomatic strain.
The elevation of ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in 2024 represents the culmination of a gradual transition from cultural proximity to strategic convergence. The CSP formalised cooperation across defence, digital economy, semiconductors, green technology, and counter-terrorism. Recent events underscore this deepening. The Malaysia–India Defence Cooperation Committee (MIDCOM) meeting in February 2025 expanded discussions on maritime domain awareness and defence industry collaboration. In January 2026, India and Malaysia co-chaired the Experts Working Group on Counter-Terrorism under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, conducting a joint Table Top Exercise that highlighted growing operational coordination. Concurrently, negotiations to modernise the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) reflect Malaysia’s support for strengthening ASEAN–India economic integration amid global supply-chain disruptions.
Scholarly interpretations view this evolution as part of a broader Indo-Pacific recalibration. Analysts such as C. Raja Mohan argue that India’s engagement with Southeast Asia is increasingly strategic rather than merely economic, reflecting recognition that ASEAN centrality is critical to maintaining a balanced regional order. Malaysian scholars similarly emphasise pragmatic hedging—deepening ties with India as a complementary partner without alienating major powers. From this perspective, the CSP is less about alliance formation and more about embedding bilateral cooperation within inclusive regional frameworks that prioritise stability, maritime security, and economic resilience.
Thus, the contemporary phase of India–Malaysia relations is neither abrupt nor accidental. It is the product of decades of incremental engagement, institutional layering, and shared adaptation to changing geopolitical realities. The 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership formalises a recognition on both sides that bilateral cooperation must extend beyond trade and diaspora linkages toward coordinated responses to maritime security, technological disruption, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and transnational threats. In doing so, it transforms a historically cordial relationship into one of strategic maturity within the Indo-Pacific landscape.
Economic Interdependence and Emerging Strategic Sectors
Economic engagement constitutes the backbone of India–Malaysia relations. Bilateral trade has demonstrated resilience despite global economic volatility, reaching approximately US$19.8–20 billion in 2024–25. India’s exports—valued at roughly US$7.3 billion—are driven primarily by petroleum products, engineering goods, and chemicals, while imports from Malaysia, amounting to approximately US$12.5 billion, are anchored by palm oil, electronics, and machinery. This asymmetry reflects Malaysia’s role as a key supplier of critical commodities and components within regional value chains. As one of India’s key ASEAN trading partners, Malaysia occupies an important position in New Delhi’s broader regional economic calculus, particularly at a time when supply-chain diversification and energy security have become central policy priorities.
Beyond trade flows, investment dynamics reveal a gradual pivot toward long-term capital integration. Malaysian foreign direct investment in India stands at approximately US$1.29 billion, with announced plans of up to US$1 billion in multi-sector projects spanning infrastructure, logistics, renewable energy, and services. These developments signal movement away from transactional trade toward a structural economic partnership grounded in capital flows and industrial cooperation. The review and modernisation of the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) further underscores the shared commitment to strengthening ASEAN–India economic integration. Malaysia’s support for concluding a revised AITIGA reflects a belief that deeper economic interdependence stabilises regional markets and fortifies ASEAN–India ties against geopolitical volatility, particularly amid disruptions caused by protectionist trends and technological decoupling.
Emerging sectors increasingly define the strategic trajectory of bilateral economic ties. Semiconductor cooperation, digital economic integration, financial connectivity initiatives including Unified Payments Interface (UPI) linkages, and infrastructure collaboration illustrate the shift toward technology-driven engagement. Malaysia’s well-developed electronics manufacturing ecosystem, particularly in semiconductor assembly and testing, complements India’s push to expand its domestic chip fabrication and design capabilities. As global supply chains diversify amid US–China strategic competition, these complementarities acquire strategic significance. Digital payments cooperation and fintech integration aim to reduce transaction friction, facilitate SME participation in cross-border trade, and enhance financial transparency.
Recent high-level engagements have reinforced this technological and investment-oriented pivot. During discussions following the 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, both sides explored collaboration in semiconductor value chains, green hydrogen initiatives, and digital public infrastructure, including interoperability frameworks linked to India’s UPI ecosystem. Malaysian investment agencies have signalled interest in India’s production-linked incentive schemes, particularly in electronics and renewable energy sectors, while Indian firms are expanding participation in Malaysia’s technology parks and services sector. Analysts such as C. Raja Mohan argue that India’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia increasingly reflects strategic pragmatism—leveraging trade and technology partnerships to secure supply-chain resilience without entering rigid alliance structures. Malaysian scholars similarly interpret deeper economic ties with India as a hedging strategy that diversifies external economic partnerships beyond major-power dependencies. In this context, economic cooperation transcends commerce; it becomes a stabilising instrument of middle-power statecraft in the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing resilience against systemic shocks while embedding both economies within broader regional production and innovation networks.
Maritime Convergence and Defence Institutionalisation
Maritime geography lies at the strategic heart of India–Malaysia relations. Malaysia’s position along the Strait of Malacca and its proximity to the South China Sea situate it at a critical maritime crossroads through which a substantial proportion of global trade flows. For India, over 55 percent of external trade transits these waters, rendering maritime security in Southeast Asia a core national interest. Consequently, cooperation with Kuala Lumpur has expanded steadily in defence and naval domains.
Institutionalised mechanisms such as the Malaysia–India Defence Cooperation Committee (MIDCOM), convened most recently in February 2025, provide continuity and structure to bilateral defence engagement. Regular exercises including Harimau Shakti and Samudra Laksamana enhance operational familiarity and interoperability. Moreover, both countries participate actively in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which serves as a central platform for ASEAN-led security cooperation. In January 2026, India and Malaysia co-chaired the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and conducted a Table Top Exercise, signalling increasing coordination in addressing non-traditional security threats.
This maritime and defence collaboration reflects alignment on shared priorities: combating piracy, addressing maritime terrorism, enhancing cyber resilience at sea, and strengthening humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities. Importantly, the partnership operates within ASEAN-centric frameworks, thereby reinforcing ASEAN centrality rather than undermining it. In contrast to overtly alliance-based arrangements, ASEAN-led mechanisms prioritise inclusivity and consensus, allowing India to deepen security ties without exacerbating regional polarisation. As strategic competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, such calibrated engagement reduces friction within ASEAN while strengthening collective responses to emerging challenges.
Diaspora Diplomacy and Societal Anchoring
What distinguishes India–Malaysia relations from many other bilateral partnerships is their deep societal foundation. Malaysia hosts approximately 2.75 million Persons of Indian Origin and an estimated 225,000 Indian nationals, representing around nine percent of Malaysia’s population. This long-settled community, particularly rooted in Tamil language and culture, serves as a socio-economic bridge between the two countries. Far from being a symbolic link, the diaspora plays a tangible role in business networks, educational exchanges, and political familiarity.
Recent initiatives highlight the strategic recognition of diaspora linkages. Agreements on audiovisual co-production, expanded welfare frameworks for overseas Indians, scholarship programmes such as the Thiruvalluvar Scholarship, Technical and Vocational Education and Training collaboration, and the ‘Study in India’ programme collectively strengthen people-to-people connectivity. Scholars of diaspora diplomacy argue that stable, integrated communities act as stabilisers in bilateral relations, reducing misperceptions and cushioning diplomatic turbulence during periods of political strain. In the India–Malaysia context, the diaspora underwrites trust and continuity, embedding the relationship within social structures that transcend political cycles.
Moreover, cultural and educational cooperation supports long-term resilience. Expanded student mobility, joint research initiatives, and industry-academia partnerships can transform symbolic exchanges into institutionalised collaboration. By investing in human capital linkages, both countries enhance the durability of their strategic partnership, ensuring that geopolitical shifts do not easily disrupt bilateral momentum
Conclusion: From Strategic Alignment to Enduring Regional Pillar
The future trajectory of India–Malaysia relations will depend on the effective operationalisation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. While recent high-level engagements have produced a flurry of memoranda of understanding across sectors, sustained implementation remains critical. Defence cooperation must evolve beyond exercises toward joint maritime domain awareness initiatives, interoperability in emerging domains such as cyber and space, and potentially cooperative defence production. Economic engagement would benefit from finalising the AITIGA review, deepening semiconductor ecosystem integration, and expanding digital payments connectivity to reduce transaction friction for small and medium enterprises.
Embedding bilateral initiatives within ASEAN-centric platforms will remain essential. By strengthening coordination within ADMM-Plus, ASEAN–India Joint Cooperation mechanisms, and broader Indo-Pacific frameworks, India and Malaysia can reinforce norms of openness and multilateralism while defusing zero-sum pressures arising from great-power rivalry. Both countries have explicitly condemned cross-border terrorism and rejected double standards in global counter-terrorism regimes, signalling convergence on broader security principles that extend beyond the bilateral sphere.
In conclusion, India–Malaysia relations are undergoing a process of strategic consolidation that reflects deeper structural trends in the Indo-Pacific. Anchored in a large and historically embedded diaspora, sustained by nearly US$20 billion in trade, institutionalised through defence mechanisms such as MIDCOM and ADMM-Plus engagement, and aligned around ASEAN centrality and maritime security, the partnership is evolving into a regionally stabilising force. Unlike headline-driven strategic alignments, this relationship is characterised by calibrated convergence—quiet, pragmatic, and institutional. If effectively implemented, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership could transform India–Malaysia ties into a strategically embedded and operationally relevant pillar within Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, reinforcing an inclusive and rules-based regional order at a time of mounting geopolitical fragmentation.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
