The growing bond between Putin And China’s President Xi Jinping has been a subject of many debates and even as the world sits up and takes notice of this growing camaraderie, so has India.
Xi Jinping will pay an official visit to Russia from May 7-10, during which he will hold talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and attend the Victory Day celebrations, the Kremlin said on Sunday.
“During the talks, the main issues of further development of relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, as well as current issues of the international and regional agenda will be discussed,” it said.
The two leaders would sign several bilateral inter-governmental and inter-departmental documents during Xi’s visit at the personal invitation of President Putin, it added. Xi last visited Russia in October 2024 for the BRICS summit
Russia had invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the Victory Day parade, but it was decided that Defence Minister Rajnath Singh would attend the event. However, Singh is also set to skip the Victory Day parade and his deputy Sanjay Seth is likely to represent India at the event. The move comes amid increasing tensions between India and Pakistan over the Pahalgam terror attack.
Leaders of 20 countries, including Brazil, Venezuela and Vietnam, are expected in Moscow on May 9 for the Victory Day celebrations, marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II.
Pakistan Runs To Russia
Meanwhile, in the wake of the deadly terror attack in Pahalgam that claimed 26 lives, Pakistan has turned to Russia for diplomatic intervention to help defuse mounting tensions with India. Pakistan’s ambassador to Moscow, Mohammad Khalid Jamali, has formally sought Russia’s assistance in de-escalating the situation.
Speaking in an interview set to be published by Russia’s state-run TASS news agency, Ambassador Jamali spotlighted Moscow’s position as a privileged strategic partner of India while maintaining strong ties with Pakistan. He expressed hope that Russia could leverage this dual relationship to play a constructive mediating role, much like it did in 1966 during the Tashkent negotiations that helped end the armed conflict between India and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, on Friday, during his phone call with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged the two sides to de-escalate following the Pahalgam attack in the spirit of 1972 Simla Accord and 1999 Lahore Declaration which provide for bilaterally resolving issues without third-party mediation.
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar also held a telephonic conversation with Lavrov, according to a statement by Pakistan’s Foreign Office. Dar apprised Lavrov of recent regional developments, the statement added. “Lavrov expressed concern over the situation and stressed the importance of diplomacy to resolve issues. He emphasised that both sides should exercise restraint and avoid escalation,” the Foreign Office said.
It is to be noted here that ties between India and Pakistan plummeted following the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir that killed 26 people, mostly tourists, in the deadliest attack in the Valley since the Pulwama strike in 2019. India, among other punitive actions, announced the suspension of the 1960 Indus accord, which governs water sharing between the two countries. Earlier on April 24, Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to punish the terrorists involved in the Pahalgam terror attack and their backers.
The Russia-China Axis, A Complication for India’s Strategic Posture
The deepening alignment between Russia and China is perhaps one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the decade—and one that India watches with growing unease. Once the cornerstone of India’s defense and strategic ecosystem, Russia now seems to be tilting eastward toward Beijing, in a partnership that appears increasingly ideological, economic, and military in nature.
For India, the implications are manifold. First and foremost is the concern over India’s continued reliance on Russian military hardware, a dependency that stretches back decades – with Western sanctions isolating Russia and forcing it into Beijing’s embrace, New Delhi fears it could find itself squeezed if Moscow chooses to prioritize its newer, more lucrative alliance with China.
Moreover, as China grows bolder in its assertiveness, especially along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC), the idea of Russia tilting toward a China-aligned worldview puts India in an awkward strategic bind. In particular, the possibility of a Russia-China-Pakistan trilateral dynamic—once unthinkable—is beginning to find subtle but undeniable expression.
For Pakistan, this moment offers a geopolitical opening. As India finds itself increasingly at odds with both Beijing and Islamabad, Pakistan is quietly leveraging Russia’s need for new allies and diversified partnerships, perhaps!
India, meanwhile, is caught in a delicate balancing act. On one hand, it remains committed to the historical legacy and strategic depth of the Indo-Russian partnership—one that has survived Cold War politics, economic liberalization, and more recently, divergent stances on global conflicts like Ukraine. However, New Delhi is also diversifying its strategic engagements – investing heavily in forums like the QUAD, strengthening defense ties with the United States, France, and Israel, and asserting its own role in multilateral spaces like BRICS, SCO, and the G20.
Yet these hedging strategies do not erase the foundational truth: India’s strategic comfort with Russia is no longer a given. As Russia edges closer to China, and by proxy, Pakistan, New Delhi must prepare for a future in which Moscow may not always side with Indian interests – especially in flashpoints like Kashmir or the Indo-Pacific.
From Moscow’s perspective, the balancing act is no less complex. While Russia is aware of the historical warmth and defense interdependence it shares with India, it cannot ignore the strategic and economic pull of China, especially in an era of Western economic isolation. At some point, Moscow may be forced to choose between maintaining its legacy friendship with New Delhi and embracing a new axis of power with Beijing and de facto Islamabad.
When Modi Met Putin
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia last year, and the promise of greater collaboration and trade, was a crude reminder of India’s significance – not just to Russia and President Vladimir Putin, who welcomed Modi warmly, but as a balance to Western touchstone.
India is the second largest importer of Russian oil behind China. India assists Russia’s circumvention of international sanctions by allowing Moscow to pay with its own national currency for its trade with India.
But Modi has made sure India is also incredibly well integrated with the West along economic and security grounds. According to the European Commission, the EU is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for 12.2 percent of India’s total trade (China and the U.S. account for 10 percent each). According to India’s Department of Commerce, the EU is one of India’s largest sources of foreign direct investment, valued at nearly $108 billion by December 2023. But this is less than half of EU foreign investment in China and Brazil, which are both well over $200 billion. The EU and Indian trading relationship is ultimately in India’s favor, however slightly. According to the Indian embassy in Brussels, the trade deficit was valued at around 16.4 billion euros (around $18 billion).
The EU is not alone in turning to India to counterbalance an economic dependency on China. The U.S. Trade Representative stated that, in the year between 2021 and 2022, U.S. FDI in India increased 15 to 1. Trade totaled nearly $200 billion in 2022, with India exporting far more than the United States did.
India’s economic relations with Russia are not the same as its ties with the West, but they are still important. India is not without alternatives for rich friends and allies – Russia is.
Russia cannot replace China with India, and the recent summit was not an attempt to do so. For example, the $100 billion bilateral trade target Modi and Putin set for 2030 would be less than half the value of Sino-Russian trade in 2023 alone. What India has done for Russia is provide some breathing room.
From Cold War Brotherhood to Strategic Realignment
To understand the optics and undertones, one must revisit the deeply entrenched history of India-Russia ties, ties forged not merely through economic deals but through decades of geopolitical kinship. During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union were near-ideological partners. India, although officially non-aligned, leaned heavily towards Moscow for military technology, space cooperation, and diplomatic support especially in forums like the United Nations, where the USSR’s veto power often shielded India from Western pressure on issues like Kashmir.
That trust didn’t disappear with the collapse of the USSR; it evolved. Post-liberalization, India began courting the West, but never quite dropped the Russian hand it had held since the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Russian-made MiGs and Sukhois still fly in Indian skies. Indian nuclear submarines still partly bear Russian design signatures. Even the Kudankulam nuclear plant is a Soviet legacy reborn.
But as the 21st century progressed, so did India’s ambitions. And Russia, increasingly isolated after Crimea and now more so after Ukraine, began looking East.
The Shifting Sand
In the evolving geopolitical theatre, India has mastered the art of strategic tightrope walking and while Russia drifts dangerously close to China’s gravitational pull, India is pulling it ever so slightly back into balance.
The rise of a possible Russia-China-Pakistan axis, even if tentative, should not be underestimated. It could mark a realignment in South Asia’s security architecture, and India is right to stay wary. Unlike Moscow, which increasingly looks like the junior partner in its embrace with China, India retains its agency and, perhaps more importantly, its alternatives.
