Seal of the US Department of Defense: source Internet
The Indo-Pacific region, comprising some of the world’s most critical economic and military chokepoints, has emerged as the focal point of contemporary global geopolitical tensions. At the heart of this shift is the United States’ increased military presence in the region, primarily aimed at countering the growing strategic influence of China. This strategic recalibration is seen as necessary to ensure the stability of the region and maintain a balance of power that favours the U.S. and its allies.
This article analyses the drivers behind the U.S. military’s expanded footprint in the Indo-Pacific, the implications for regional and global security, and the broader geopolitical and economic consequences. By examining the evolving military dynamics, security challenges, and diplomatic ramifications, it seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of the U.S. military’s growing engagement in the region.
The Indo-Pacific region holds tremendous global importance due to its economic, military, and strategic value. It encompasses key global shipping routes such as the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, which facilitate the flow of goods, energy resources, and critical maritime trade. The region is home to over half of the world’s population and some of its largest economies, including China, Japan, and India.
A number of U.S. allies and security partners reside in the Indo-Pacific—namely Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. The U.S. military’s presence in the region is crucial for maintaining defence cooperation and ensuring access to strategically located bases. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), headquartered in Hawaii, oversees a force of more than 375,000 military personnel, including approximately 85,000 in Japan, 28,500 in South Korea, and several thousand stationed across Guam, Australia, and Hawaii.
Moreover, the U.S. maintains over 60 major military installations in the Indo-Pacific, including Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, and Camp Humphreys in South Korea—the largest U.S. overseas military base. The U.S. Navy regularly deploys two to three aircraft carrier strike groups in the region, including the forward-deployed USS Ronald Reagan and rotating carriers through the 7th Fleet, bolstering its rapid response capabilities.
U.S. Military Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
The U.S. military’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific has evolved over recent years, primarily driven by the rise of China as a strategic competitor. Under the Obama administration, the “Pivot to Asia” was introduced to strengthen partnerships and promote a rules-based international order. The Trump administration adopted a more confrontational posture, framing China as a primary strategic adversary. The Biden administration has continued this trajectory, emphasizing alliance reinforcement and strategic deterrence.
Key components of the strategy include:
Reinforcing Alliances and Partnerships
Strengthening defence cooperation with allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India through joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and technology transfers. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia—has gained significance as a balancing mechanism to China’s regional aspirations.
Enhanced Military Deployments
The U.S. has significantly increased its forward deployments in the Indo-Pacific. This includes stationing F-35 fighter jets, deploying THAAD missile defence systems in Guam and South Korea, and expanding naval assets across the 7th Fleet. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea reaffirm U.S. commitment to upholding international maritime law.
Multilateral Security Frameworks
The U.S. is actively engaging in multilateral defence initiatives through platforms like the Quad, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meetings, and AUKUS. These engagements foster interoperability, address shared threats, and build a consensus on regional security norms.
Capacity Building for Regional Partners
Smaller Indo-Pacific states are receiving enhanced U.S. military aid in the form of training programs, funding, and equipment transfers. This enables countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and island nations in the Pacific to bolster their maritime security and resist external coercion.
Global Implications of the Increased U.S. Military Presence
Military Competition and Arms Race
China perceives the U.S. military posture as a direct threat to its regional ambitions and is rapidly modernizing its military in response. Beijing is investing in hypersonic glide vehicles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), cyber warfare, and AI-enabled battlefield systems. The technological rivalry between the U.S. and China risks spiralling into a full-scale arms race, potentially involving destabilizing weapons such as nuclear-capable delivery systems and space-based strike capabilities.
Regional Security and Stability
The U.S. military presence serves as a deterrent and contributes to freedom of navigation and crisis management. However, it simultaneously fuels Chinese suspicions of containment. This fragile equilibrium increases the risk of accidental clashes, especially around Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula.
Additionally, the bifurcation of regional alliances may lead to competing security blocs, undermining ASEAN’s centrality and multilateralism. Smaller states face pressure to align with one of the two great powers, weakening regional cohesion and collective resilience.
Economic Implications
The U.S. Navy’s safeguarding of trade routes underpins global supply chains, with uninterrupted transit through the South China Sea alone accounting for over $3.4 trillion in annual trade. However, U.S.-China strategic decoupling—exacerbated by sanctions, tariffs, and technology bans—threatens to fragment economic interdependence.
Foreign investment flows could shift, especially from China, depending on regional alignments. Countries viewed as too closely aligned with Washington may face retaliatory economic measures from Beijing, while others could benefit from reshored U.S. supply chains and increased defence-related investment.
Global Governance and Diplomatic Implications
The geopolitical rivalry is now influencing global governance structures. U.S.-China tensions have spilled into institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and climate forums, impeding collective action. Washington’s push to uphold international law, especially regarding maritime sovereignty, faces resistance from Beijing’s counter-narrative of “territorial integrity.”
This rivalry risks paralyzing multilateral consensus on urgent transnational issues such as climate change, pandemic response, and non-proliferation, further weakening the liberal international order.
Conclusion
The U.S. military’s increasing presence in the Indo-Pacific represents a strategic necessity rooted in deterrence, alliance commitments, and the preservation of a rules-based order. However, its ramifications are complex and far-reaching. While reinforcing stability for allies and ensuring maritime security, it also contributes to rising tensions, military competition, and regional polarization.
To navigate these challenges, the U.S. must couple its military posture with sustained diplomatic engagement, confidence-building measures, and inclusive multilateralism. Only through balancing strength with dialogue can the Indo-Pacific be steered toward long-term peace, prosperity, and strategic equilibrium.
The site of Pahalgam terrorist attack of April 2025: source Internet
The recent Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir underscores a hard reality in the realm of intelligence, strategic, and security affairs, the idea of achieving or ensuring permanent or absolute solutions to security threats like that of terrorism remains an elusive myth. Despite years of progress and preparedness through intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism strategies, and military presence, the attack has revealed an inherent limitation that no amount of planning or technology can ensure complete security. This piece delves into why the notion of a permanent solution is a myth, highlighting the realistic objectives of any state about the idea of security is about: minimising, retaliating, and safeguarding threats and risks.
The immediate reaction that ruled the entire discourse points out various aspects that resulted in the deadliest Pahalgam terrorist attacks, many experts and certainly politicians have stressed various reasons whether its ‘intelligence failure or miscalculation’, to that of the government’s incapacitation to ensure absolute security in Jammu Kashmir, which can be unfolded before the citizens in future investigation. Watching the horrors, that have sent shockwaves across India and the world many asked a significant ‘What is the permanent solution’ to this decade-old problem? After the abrogation of Article 370 and extensive military presence in the valley, many expected that the issue of terrorism would be eradicated from the land of Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in chronic normalcy both in the lives of people and the heaven on earth. However, this attack has brought everything back to square one and brought out a debate on the table about ‘Can States ensure complete security?’
The notion of a permanent solution or absolute security to terrorism and strategic threats is not new but remains constantly evasive. Security threats today are no longer traditional, those days are gone when enemies or elements of threats were easily identifiable, the modern threat prospect includes trans-national terrorist networks, equipped with the same modern advantages that the states are also equipped with, for instance, when states rely on intelligence, the adversaries opt for significant counter-intelligence, simultaneously, no matter how many troops are deployed to ensure security, it is not practically possible to secure every inch or corner of the landmass.
Terrorists with the advantage of hiding their identity using both money and influence also succeed in carrying out operations using strategic loopholes employed by security agencies. The challenge is not just limited to India, internationally, for instance countries around the world struggle to guarantee complete protection against threats, whether it’s the United States of America or Israel who are seen as countries having both technology and intelligence to counter threats from enemies. However, history shows a different picture, the 9/11 in America or the recent Hamas attack on Israel on October 07, 2023 question the very claim of strategic edge these countries possess and exemplify how most tactically advanced systems can be circumvented by unforeseen situations. The United States and Israel even after having internationally acclaimed intelligence agencies namely, the CIA and the Mossad failed to stop the mentioned events.
Similarly, in India’s case, the tragic incidents of the 2008 Mumbai attack, the Uri attack in 2016, and later the 2019 Pulwama attack, epitomise that even after extensive efforts of intelligence agencies, and armed forces, the government cannot promise total protection or absolute security. As, ‘Security is a matter of degree, not of totality’, it should be understood in relative terms, as today’s security may be tomorrow’s crisis. Acknowledging, the limitation of ensuring complete security, governments and security agencies must focus on three achievable and practical goals encircled around, minimise risks, retaliate against attacks, and safeguard their citizens and country’s interests. Firstly, minimisation involves reducing the vulnerability and impact of potential attacks by employing a robust intelligence-gathering framework based on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology, risk assessments, preventive security measures, and awareness programs.
Secondly, Retaliation serves as a deterrent and a mechanism of signalling that terrorist acts have consequences, not only for immediate perpetrators but also for their subsequent direct and indirect sponsors and supporters. This can be through diplomacy, economic action, and also demonstrative military action. Thirdly, Safeguard is about actions and policy decisions focused on protecting resources, and citizens, at the time of crisis, and even beforehand using a threat prediction system. These proactive strategies do not fully claim to prevent all attacks but try or aim to mitigate as much as causalities, preserve subsequent order in the state, ensure a sense of confidence among the public, and maintain the continuity of further action.
In conclusion, The Pahalgam terrorist attack should serve not merely as a moment of grief but as an occasion for strategic introspection. It reminds us that the pursuit of absolute security is not just only futile but also very impractical to promise. As a result, India and other countries must embrace and elevate a strategic doctrine rooted in pragmatic realism, like the one that is currently driving India’s foreign policy, one that emphasises threat minimisation, demonstrative retaliation, and robust safeguarding.
Author giving lecture to residents of Kulgam: source Author
Kulgam, often called the heart of South Kashmir, is a land of deep emotions—filled with stories of both struggle and hope. As I travelled through this beautiful region, I heard many voices. Some were filled with pain, but many others spoke of pride and belief in a better future. I had the chance to speak with the officers of the 34 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) of the Indian Army—the Adjutant, the Second-in-Command (2IC), and the Commanding Officer (CO). After hearing their stories, one message stood out to me clearly: the real spirit of Kashmiriyat—the essence of unity, compassion, and respect—is truly reflected in the work of 34 RR. Their mission is simple yet powerful: We belong to South Kashmir, and its people are our family. The Commanding Officer shared something beautiful. He said, our happiness comes from being part of the people’s lives—their joys and their struggles. We hope to be welcomed into their homes for a cup of tea. Not because we need it, but because that one cup builds trust, love, and understanding.
They openly accept that mistakes can happen—even by the Army. But what touched me most was their honesty and their strong desire to listen, learn, and make things right. If people have questions, let them come to us. We will always listen and do our best to help, the CO said with genuine care. During my time there, I met many young people from South Kashmir. Some were brave and wanted to help the Army fight terrorism. But their biggest fear wasn’t the enemy—it was what society would say.
One young man told me, If I say ‘Jai Hind’ to an Army officer, by the evening, our neighbours question my parents. They ask why their son is walking with the Army. These youth have hope in their hearts and trust in the Army—but fear of judgment stops them from stepping forward. When I asked the Commanding Officer what 34 RR was doing to help society, he smiled and said, Go visit our area. Talk to the people. You will see why they call us ‘Iron fist for terrorists, velvet glove for the people’.
And he was right.
In their area, I saw a school—Shaheed Lt. Ummer Fayaz Army Goodwill School, Behibagh. There are already many schools nearby, so why did the Army start one more? The answer was clear: not for profit, but for trust. The school sends a simple message: We care about your children’s future. Beside the school, there’s a Medical Room, offering free treatment to local people. Through Operation Sadbhavana, 34 RR also supports the education of children from poor families, giving them a chance at a better life.
Author with children of Kulgam: source Author
One of their most powerful efforts is through the JKSSS scheme, where they sponsor full college and university education for deserving students—up to 1.2 lakhs per student. These silent acts of kindness are changing lives, even if many people don’t know about them. I had more questions, so I spoke with the unit’s religious teacher (Dharam Guru). I asked him, What is the religion of the Indian Army?
He smiled and gently replied: “Seva Parmo Dharma” – Service is the highest duty. He also said something wise: Everyone makes mistakes. But judging an entire group because of a few people’s actions is the biggest mistake of all. There are good and bad people everywhere. It’s up to us to choose what we focus on.
During my time in Kulgam, I gave a few lectures and met students who deeply admire Lt Gen D.P. Pandey (Retd), the former commander of 15 Corps. When I shared this with him, he sent back a message for them: “Stay focused on your goals. Don’t let the darkness distract you.”
I also felt how much people still love and remember Shaheed Lt. Ummer Fayaz. His sacrifice still inspires young people to dream of joining the Army and serving the nation. 34 RR keeps his memory alive through their work—just as he would have wished. Though I wrote this article, every word in it belongs to the Indian Army, the people of Kulgam, and especially the youth who want to change their land—but are held back by fear. Many only see the Army’s role in operations. But few see how they risk their own lives to protect and care for civilians during those same missions.
One young student once told me, We trust the Army, sir. We just don’t trust society. Some even said they once threw stones at soldiers—but today, they want peace. They say proudly: Our Army is good, because their hearts are pure. One day, an elderly grandmother invited me to her home for tea. After serving it with love, she asked, How is the tea, beta? I smiled and replied, Daadi, it’s very good. She laughed warmly and said, In Kashmiri, we say ‘Chai Chu Asal’—when the tea is good, it means everything is good.
Then she added, Tell your CO sahib from 34 RR to come have tea at my home one day. Ask him to say ‘Chai Chu Asal’ when he does. That one cup of tea, shared with love, says more than any weapon ever could. It’s a symbol of peace, trust, and unity. 34 RR doesn’t just fight terrorists. They dream of a time when militancy itself will end. That belief is what makes them who they are. After spending time with them and with the people of Kulgam, I now understand why they are called the Sentinels of Kulgam.
They guard more than borders—they protect hope. And they truly live by the words: Iron fist for the enemy, velvet glove for the people.
Nestled in the eastern Himalayas, the Kingdom of Bhutan has long maintained a delicate balance between its two giant neighbors, India and China. Historically, Bhutan has cultivated a special relationship with India, rooted in the 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which has shaped its foreign policy and ensured close strategic alignment with New Delhi. Bhutan’s lack of formal diplomatic relations with China, combined with its policy of avoiding ties with any permanent members of the UN Security Council, reflects its cautious approach to international engagement However, recent developments particularly Bhutan’s intensified border negotiations with China and Chinese infrastructure activities in disputed territories have sparked debates about whether Bhutan is tilting toward Beijing, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. This article explores Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China through recent examples, assesses the extent of any perceived tilt, and examines the implications for Bhutan, India, and the broader Indo-Pacific region, drawing on reliable sources such as academic analyses, think tank reports, and international media.
Bhutan’s Historical Stance and India’s Influence
Bhutan’s foreign policy has been shaped by its geographical position, sandwiched between India to the south and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region to the north. The 1949 treaty, updated in 2007, allows Bhutan greater autonomy in foreign affairs but maintains close coordination with India, particularly on security matters. India remains Bhutan’s primary trading partner, financier of hydropower projects, and provider of military training, with the Royal Bhutanese Army relying on Indian support to secure its borders. This relationship is critical given Bhutan’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip connecting India’s mainland to its northeastern states, which is strategically vulnerable to Chinese influence.
Bhutan’s historical ties with China have been limited, marked by a lack of formal diplomatic relations and ongoing border disputes along their 477-km frontier. These disputes, dating back to the 1950s when China annexed Tibet, center on areas like the Doklam Plateau in the west and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north, with China recently claiming Bhutan’s eastern Sakteng region. Since 1984, Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of border talks, with agreements in 1988 and 1998 to maintain peace and the status quo along the border. Bhutan’s cautious approach stems from its desire to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries and preserve its sovereignty, guided by its philosophy of Gross National Happiness.
India’s influence has historically deterred Bhutan from pursuing closer ties with China. For instance, during the 2017 Doklam standoff, when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in the disputed tri-junction area, Indian forces intervened on Bhutan’s behalf, halting construction after a 73-day confrontation. This incident underscored Bhutan’s reliance on India for security and its reluctance to engage China independently. However, recent developments suggest Bhutan may be reevaluating its approach, driven by domestic pressures and China’s persistent diplomatic and territorial advances.
Recent Developments Signaling a Potential Tilt
1. Bhutan-China Border Negotiations and the 2023 Beijing Visit
A significant indicator of warming Bhutan-China relations is the resumption and acceleration of border talks. In October 2023, Bhutanese Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji made a historic visit to Beijing, the first by a senior Bhutanese official, marking the 25th round of boundary negotiations the first since 2016. The visit followed a 2021 memorandum of understanding (MoU) outlining a three-step roadmap to expedite border demarcation, finalized during a 2020 expert group meeting. During the 2023 talks, Bhutan and China signed a cooperation agreement establishing a joint technical team for border delimitation, signaling progress toward a potential resolution.
Chinese officials expressed optimism about establishing diplomatic relations, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice-President Han Zheng hosting Dorji warmly. Dorji reportedly indicated Bhutan’s willingness to “strive for an early settlement of the boundary question and advance the political process of establishing diplomatic ties”. This rhetoric alarmed Indian observers, as Bhutan’s traditional policy avoids diplomatic relations with major powers, including China. The timing of the visit, amid strained India-China relations following the 2020 Ladakh clashes, raised concerns in New Delhi about Bhutan drifting toward Beijing.
Bhutan’s urgency to resolve the border issue may stem from domestic pressures. Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, in a 2023 interview with La Libre, emphasized that all three parties Bhutan, China, and India have equal stakes in resolving the Doklam dispute, a departure from Bhutan’s earlier deference to India’s strategic concerns. Tshering’s remarks suggest Bhutan seeks a pragmatic solution to secure its northern borders, possibly involving a land swap where Bhutan cedes Doklam for northern territories like Jakarlung and Pasamlung. Such a deal could grant China strategic access to the Doklam Plateau, threatening India’s Siliguri Corridor.
2. Chinese Infrastructure in Disputed Territories
China’s construction activities in Bhutanese-claimed territories provide compelling evidence of Beijing’s assertive approach and Bhutan’s constrained response. Since 2015, China has built over 22 villages, roads, and military outposts in Bhutan’s northern Beyul Khenpajong region, particularly in the Jakarlung and Menchuma valleys, covering areas revered for their cultural and religious significance. Satellite imagery from September 2023 revealed new outposts in Jakarlung, suggesting China’s intent to establish permanent control. These actions violate the 1998 agreement to maintain the status quo, challenging Bhutan’s sovereignty.
In 2020, China escalated tensions by claiming the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan, a region never previously disputed, during a Global Environment Facility meeting. This claim, alongside construction in the west and north, is seen as a pressure tactic to push Bhutan toward a border deal favorable to Beijing. For example, the village of Gyalaphug in Beyul, developed since 2015, includes extensive infrastructure, indicating long-term Chinese presence. Bhutan’s response has been notably restrained, with officials maintaining “disciplined silence” to avoid antagonizing China or India. This reticence, coupled with ongoing talks, suggests Bhutan may be open to conceding some territories to secure peace, a move that could align it closer to China.
3. Bhutan’s Domestic and Economic Pressures
Bhutan’s evolving stance is also driven by internal factors. Since transitioning to a constitutional monarchy in 2008, Bhutan has faced growing economic challenges, including youth unemployment (19% in 2024) and outmigration, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2024). Hydropower exports to India remain a key revenue source, but non-hydro sectors lag due to high trade costs and a small domestic market. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2024–2029) and the ambitious Gelephu Mindfulness City project aim to diversify the economy through foreign investment and tourism, but these require regional stability.
China’s economic success and Belt and Road Initiative appeal to some Bhutanese elites, who see engagement with Beijing as a path to development. The 2021 MoU and 2023 talks reflect Bhutan’s pragmatic approach to resolving border disputes to unlock economic opportunities, such as trade routes through Tibet. However, Bhutan’s democratic government faces pressure to balance economic growth with sovereignty and India’s security concerns, complicating its China policy.
Assessing the Extent of Bhutan’s Tilt
While recent developments suggest warming Bhutan-China ties, the notion of a significant “tilt” toward Beijing must be qualified. Several factors indicate Bhutan is navigating a delicate balance rather than aligning with China:
1. Continued Reliance on India
Bhutan’s strategic and economic dependence on India remains robust. India finances 70% of Bhutan’s hydropower projects, which account for 30% of GDP, and provides critical security support. The election of Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay in January 2024, whose People’s Democratic Party is seen as pro-India, signals continuity in Bhutan’s India-centric policy. Tobgay, who served as prime minister from 2013 to 2018, is expected to prioritize India’s interests, particularly regarding Doklam, and maintain close consultation with New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swift congratulations post-election underscored the enduring partnership.
Bhutan’s historical perception of China as a threat, rooted in the 1950 Tibet annexation and subsequent refugee influx, persists among its leadership and Buddhist populace, who share cultural ties with Tibet. The 2017 Doklam intervention by India reinforced Bhutan’s trust in New Delhi as a security guarantor, making a full pivot to China unlikely.
2. Bhutan’s Strategic Silence and Non-Alignment
Bhutan’s approach to China reflects its long-standing policy of strategic silence and non-alignment. By engaging China in border talks, Bhutan seeks to reduce tensions without committing to formal diplomatic relations, which would provoke India. Analysts like Yun Sun from the Stimson Centre argue that Bhutan is unlikely to negotiate without India’s involvement, especially on Doklam, which requires tripartite consent. Bhutan’s rejection of China’s Sakteng claim in 2020 and its cautious rhetoric during talks demonstrate its intent to protect sovereignty while avoiding confrontation.
Bhutan’s “disciplined silence” on Chinese construction, as noted by commentator Tenzing Lamsang, is a pragmatic strategy to avoid escalation while maintaining dialogue (India Today, 2023). This approach allows Bhutan to explore economic benefits from China without alienating India, aligning with its GNH philosophy of balanced development.
3. China’s Aggressive Tactics and Bhutan’s Constraints
China’s territorial encroachments, such as the construction of Gyalaphug and Pangda villages, place Bhutan in a difficult position. With a population of 727,145 and a small military, Bhutan lacks the capacity to counter China’s actions directly. Beijing’s “salami-slicing” strategy gradual territorial expansion through infrastructure mirrors its tactics in the South China Sea and along the India-China border, pressuring Bhutan to accept a deal that legitimizes Chinese gains. For instance, China’s offer in the 1990s to cede 495 km² in the northern valleys for 269 km² in Doklam was rejected due to India’s concerns, but recent talks suggest Bhutan may revisit this swap.
Bhutan’s willingness to negotiate does not necessarily indicate a pro-China tilt but rather a pragmatic response to China’s growing presence. The 2023 Beijing visit and cooperation agreement reflect Bhutan’s attempt to manage this pressure diplomatically, but any agreement ceding Doklam would likely involve India’s approval, limiting the extent of Bhutan’s alignment with China.
Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region
Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China has significant implications for the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the context of India-China rivalry and the broader geopolitical contest.
1. India’s Strategic Concerns
A Bhutan-China border deal, especially one ceding Doklam, would undermine India’s security. Control of Doklam would give China a vantage point over the Chumbi Valley and proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, enhancing its ability to threaten India’s northeast. Indian analysts warn that New Delhi cannot afford to lose Bhutan as a “reliable security partner” in the Himalayas, prompting calls for deeper engagement with Thimphu. India’s response includes increased economic aid, such as $500 million for Bhutan’s 13th Five-Year Plan, and military cooperation to reinforce the partnership.
2. China’s Regional Ambitions
China’s push for a border deal and diplomatic relations with Bhutan is part of its broader strategy to expand influence in South Asia, challenging India’s traditional dominance. By establishing settlements in Bhutan, China seeks to create “facts on the ground,” pressuring Bhutan to concede territory and potentially open the door for Belt and Road investments. A successful deal could embolden China to pursue similar tactics with other neighbors, escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
3. Bhutan’s Small-State Agency
Bhutan’s engagement with China highlights the agency of small states in navigating great power competition. By balancing dialogue with China and loyalty to India, Bhutan asserts its sovereignty while mitigating risks. However, its limited resources and China’s territorial assertiveness constrain its options, underscoring the challenges faced by small states in the Indo-Pacific.
4. Broader Indo-Pacific Dynamics
Bhutan’s border talks occur amid heightened Indo-Pacific tensions, with the U.S., India, and allies like Japan and Australia countering China’s expansionism through frameworks like the Quad. A Bhutan-China deal could weaken India’s position, prompting a stronger U.S.-India alignment to secure the Himalayan frontier. Conversely, Bhutan’s balanced approach could inspire other small states to engage China diplomatically without fully aligning, fostering a multipolar regional order.
India’s Perspective
From India’s perspective, Bhutan’s engagement with China is a cause for concern but not yet a definitive tilt. New Delhi views Bhutan as a critical buffer against Chinese aggression, particularly after the 2020 Ladakh clashes, which killed 20 Indian soldiers. The Doklam Plateau remains a flashpoint, with India wary of any agreement that enhances China’s strategic position. India’s close ties with Bhutan, reinforced by economic aid, military training, and cultural affinity, provide leverage to maintain influence. However, India must address Bhutan’s economic challenges and youth unemployment to prevent Beijing’s economic allure from gaining traction.
India’s strategy includes deepening engagement with Bhutan while countering China’s regional influence. Prime Minister Modi’s visits to Bhutan in 2019 and 2024, alongside increased funding for hydropower and infrastructure, aim to solidify the partnership. India also leverages its role in regional forums like SAARC and BBIN to integrate Bhutan economically, reducing its reliance on China. Nonetheless, India must tread carefully to avoid pressuring Bhutan, which values its autonomy and non-alignment.
Conclusion
Bhutan’s recent engagement with China, marked by the 2023 Beijing visit, accelerated border talks, and China’s territorial encroachments, suggests a pragmatic shift rather than a definitive tilt toward Beijing. Driven by domestic economic pressures and China’s assertive tactics, Bhutan seeks to resolve its border disputes to ensure stability and development, but its deep ties with India and strategic caution limit the extent of alignment with China. India remains Bhutan’s primary partner, with Tobgay’s pro-India government and New Delhi’s economic and security support anchoring the relationship. However, China’s infrastructure activities and diplomatic overtures pose challenges, potentially reshaping Bhutan’s foreign policy and Indo-Pacific dynamics.
For India, maintaining Bhutan’s trust requires addressing its economic needs while reinforcing security cooperation. For Bhutan, balancing India and China demands careful diplomacy to preserve sovereignty and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries. The Indo-Pacific region watches closely, as Bhutan’s choices could influence the balance of power in the Himalayas and beyond. While Bhutan is not yet tilting decisively toward China, its evolving stance underscores the complexities of small-state agency in a contested geopolitical landscape.
The Great Depression was one of the most terrible events that started in the United States in 1929 and has lasted since 1939. Historians are of the view that Great Depression certainly was one of the triggering reasons that caused the Second World War.
The US stock market cracked in 1929. Before the crash, people’s financial situations were way better than they ever had. It was much easier to get credit, which meant that there was a lot of spending on things that were luxury items. Prices rose, as people began to spend more. The heavy industries that emerged to build the things needed for the First World War were still producing iron and steel. There was an increase in building cars because more people could afford them and car manufacturers needed to hire workers.
Farmers were producing more food than they actually could sell, so at one point they began throwing away vegetables, eggs, milk, wheat and rice instead of selling it cheaply. The US economy could not maintain these expensive spending. When the stock market crashed, the country slid into a major economic crisis.
By the crash it is meant that major stocks dropped to their lowest levels. Most of the companies were closed during this time because they did not have sufficient money to pay salaries. As a result people lost their jobs at most of the people were unemployed. Banks were also closed as a result people lost any money that they had in stocks or savings account.
Lot of Americans lost all their jobs. People stopped their spending which caused many business that supplied goods and services to close. Putting food on the table was a challenge for many Americans. As a result there were wide spread food riots scattered across the country and some large cities reported that some families died from starvation or diseases related to malnutrition. The entire country plunged into panic. Countries all over the world had similar experiences.
Most of the people were hungry and homeless all over the world. Countries in Europe were all struggling to recover from the huge damages that happened to their countries during the war. There citizens were disappointed and this led to the import of food and raw materials from other countries. By the mid 1930 there was slight improvement in economic condition, but total recovery was not accomplished until the end of the decade.
At the end of the great depression in Europe a large number of politicians took the opportunity to give rise to power. In addition to people struggling in US, people in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, UK and USSR were basically tired of being poor and hungry. They were in a mind to follow and support leaders who promised to bring their countries to prosperity and greatness. Adolf Hitler in Germany, Stalin in USSR, Francisco Franco in Spain and Mussolini in Italy started getting popular.
These men became dictators who ruled their countries by force, once there were in power. They never made life of the people better. They began taking total control over the way people lived and made decisions about how they could live with their lives. Citizens slowly began losing their rights to freedom of speech and religion. People who disagreed with the dictators were sent to concentration camps to forced labour camps. This made countries to build their military strength and create plants to take control of the neighbouring countries. Leaders began promoting ethnic pride, military might and importance of national prestige.
Between the period of 1920 and 1930, the European authoritarian government had adopted two different types of political systems: communism and fascism. Although the Great Depression was not the main reason for the Second World War, it definitely affected what happened in countries or over the world. When the first world war ended, European Nations who had been badly damaged by all the wars and what they could to live in peace. One major thing they all agreed on was that it was important to keep Germany happy and under control. This was called “appeasement”.
Unfortunately, that Treaty of Versailles did not produce the desired result. Italy was unhappy and they were not given enough money or territories to make up for what they had lost. France was unhappy because they wanted Germany to be harshly punished. The Soviet Union had not even been invited to the peace conference. Spain had remained neutral throughout the war and all the people were split in support, and Spain did not officially support either side.
The policies of appeasement that Germany was supposed to follow in turn actually made Hitler bolder and gave him more time to build up a massive Army. The German people were insulted that Germany had to take responsibility for starting the war, hated the situation they were living in.
The country had huge fines they knew they could never pay. Lots of territory all over the world had been confiscated and divided up among other countries. The Great Depression made everything worse.
To conclude, it is evident that The Great Depression, though not the only reason for the World War II, had greatly contributed to its start. The worldwide economic crisis meant that economies and citizens everywhere were at their lowest points. Loss of jobs, loss of money and hardships created by the war all made them vulnerable. The great Depression was in fact a starting point for World War II.
Riyadh marked the first stop of President Donald Trump’s much-anticipated return to the Middle East in his second term – an itinerary that notably excludes Israel.
The visit, billed by the White House as a “historic return to the Middle East,” includes stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The administration has positioned the trip as part of a broader strategy to advance “a shared vision of stability, opportunity, and mutual respect” with Arab partners.
However, the absence of Israel from the president’s travel schedule has raised concerns in Jerusalem and evoked comparisons to President Barack Obama’s first major overseas trip to the region in 2009. At that time, Obama visited Saudi Arabia and delivered a widely discussed speech in Cairo outlining a new approach to the Muslim world, but bypassed Israel. That decision was perceived by many in Israel as a diplomatic slight and set the tone for what would become a strained relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Now, more than a decade later, a similar dynamic appears to be unfolding under Trump – despite the longstanding rapport between the two leaders.
Israeli officials reportedly inquired about the possibility of adding a stop in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv to Trump’s itinerary, but those hopes were dashed when Trump made it clear he had no such plans. “We will be doing it at some point,” he told reporters last week. “But not for this trip.”
Netanyahu had earlier touted his close ties with Trump, being the first foreign leader to visit the White House during Trump’s second term in February. He returned again in April to initiate discussions on a potential new trade deal following Trump’s decision to impose sweeping tariffs. That visit yielded no agreement, and instead left Israeli officials blindsided by Trump’s surprise announcement of renewed talks with Iran.
Former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas noted that Netanyahu’s influence in Washington appears diminished. “There’s nothing that Netanyahu has that Trump wants, needs, or that he can give him—as opposed to, say, the Saudis, the Qataris, or the Emiratis,” Pinkas told CNN. These Gulf nations are reportedly preparing announcements of major arms deals and investment packages that Trump can present as victories for U.S. jobs and manufacturing.
Despite years of vocal support for Trump, Netanyahu is now seen as having little leverage. While he previously relied on U.S. Republicans to influence Democratic administrations, his strategy is less effective under a friendly Republican White House that appears more focused on transactional diplomacy with Arab powers.
Trump’s Unpredictable Diplomacy Raises Israeli Concerns Ahead of Gulf Visit
As President Donald Trump prepares to begin a high-profile tour of the Middle East, concerns are mounting in Israel over what new diplomatic surprises may emerge from the trip.
In the weeks leading up to the visit, the Trump administration has taken a series of steps that have reportedly caught Israeli officials off guard. Chief among them is Trump’s revived push for nuclear negotiations with Iran – talks that, according to sources, may allow Tehran to retain elements of its civilian nuclear program. Israeli leaders, long wary of Iran’s intentions, see the move as a significant concession.
Another major point of concern is the ceasefire agreement brokered between the U.S. and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The deal, while aimed at reducing regional tensions, does not explicitly stop the Houthis from launching attacks on Israel – an omission that has raised red flags in Jerusalem.
Additionally, a report revealed that the U.S. is no longer insisting on Saudi normalization with Israel as a precondition for supporting a Saudi civil nuclear program. The apparent policy shift has deepened Israeli fears that normalization efforts with Gulf states may be losing momentum under Trump’s current strategy.
Perhaps the most unexpected development came Sunday, when the Trump administration bypassed Israel to negotiate directly with Hamas for the release of Edan Alexander—the last known living American hostage held in Gaza. Trump described the release as a humanitarian breakthrough and suggested it could be the first step toward a broader resolution. “Hopefully this is the first of those final steps necessary to end this brutal conflict,” he wrote on social media.
Israeli officials are now struggling with what Trump’s time in the Gulf – where he will meet leaders who have been openly critical of Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza – may signal for U.S. policy on ceasefire negotiations and humanitarian aid.
According to sources familiar with the discussions, the U.S. has intensified pressure on Egypt and Qatar in recent weeks, urging them to push Hamas toward a hostage release deal that could unlock a temporary ceasefire and pave the way for sustained humanitarian relief into Gaza. With Alexander’s release now secured, a second source indicated that the Trump administration is eyeing the moment to launch “immediate peace deal negotiations.”
Trump has made clear that ending the war is a top priority. But that stance increasingly places Washington at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has publicly reaffirmed his commitment to defeating Hamas – insisting that dismantling the group takes precedence over any near-term hostage agreements.
U.S. officials now believe that if a broader deal with Hamas appears achievable, pressure on Israel to accept it will intensify, especially during Trump’s high-stakes visit to the Gulf. Some in Israel fear that Hamas, and its leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar, may have managed to outmaneuver Israeli diplomacy this time by engaging directly with Washington.
Tensions Surface as Trump Pushes Agenda With Little Consultation
Further, as U.S. President Donald Trump intensifies his diplomatic push for a ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza, tensions with Israel appear to be mounting, fueled by an apparent breakdown in communication and trust between the two long-time allies.
“There has to be a practice of no surprises on either side,” said Dan Shapiro, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank. “Otherwise, the trust that is so essential for this partnership breaks down really, really quickly.”
According to Shapiro, Trump is moving “like a bulldozer” in pursuit of his goals in the region, which currently center on brokering a ceasefire and securing further hostage releases. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cautious approach to decision-making, coupled with what many see as a tendency to prioritize domestic political calculations, has reportedly tested the White House’s patience.
“He’s clearly frustrated with Netanyahu, as every other president who’s worked with Netanyahu has been,” Shapiro told.
Amid these strains, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has attempted to downplay any signs of a rift. Huckabee expressed confidence that Trump would visit Israel later in the year and emphasized the president’s long-standing support.
“No president has ever cared as much and done as much as President Trump has for the state of Israel,” Huckabee said. “And his relationship with the prime minister is, I think, remarkable.”
However, public perception in Israel paints a different picture. The popular daily Yedioth Ahronoth featured a front-page cartoon last Thursday depicting Trump preparing a soup labeled “a policy of surprises,” while Netanyahu watches uneasily in the background.
Even Israel HaYom, a newspaper known for its strong support of Trump, has acknowledged signs of discord. In a weekend opinion piece, columnist Shai Golden wrote: “The old saying ‘Be careful what you wish for, you might just get it’ perfectly captures the trap Netanyahu has fallen into with Trump.”
The Last Bit
What once seemed like an unshakable alliance between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu is beginning to show visible fault lines. The absence of Israel from Trump’s high-stakes Middle East tour and the series of policy moves made without prior consultation point to a growing divergence in priorities.
Trump’s bulldozer diplomacy, which now favors transactional gains with Gulf Arab states, hostages-for-ceasefire breakthroughs, and nuclear bargaining with Iran, appears to be leaving Israel – and its embattled prime minister – in the diplomatic shadows.
Netanyahu, once considered a fixture in Trump’s inner foreign policy circle, now seems relegated to the periphery of the conversation. The Israeli PM’s cautious, survival-driven politics are clashing with Trump’s hunger for quick wins and global optics. While official statements and loyal envoys attempt to preserve the illusion of harmony, Israeli media, diplomats, and even allies quietly acknowledge a shift: Jerusalem may no longer be the first call, or even the second, when Washington acts in the region.
If this trajectory continues, Netanyahu could find himself not only out of sync with a president he once claimed as a steadfast partner, but increasingly isolated on the world stage. The realpolitik of Trump’s second term suggests that loyalty without leverage may no longer be enough to guarantee Israel a seat at the table or even a stop on the itinerary.
A thick cloud of mystery hangs over Pakistan’s Kirana Hills. Ever since India carried out a series of precision strikes under Operation Sindoor, speculation has flared on social media and defense circles about a possible nuclear radiation leak emanating from the highly sensitive region in Pakistan’s Sargodha district.
As of May 13, 2025, there have been no confirmed medical emergencies in Pakistan that would indicate exposure to high levels of radiation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains silent, and Pakistani officials have neither confirmed nor denied the swirling allegations. Still, in the age of open-source tracking and real-time digital chatter, the absence of confirmation is not always the absence of crisis.
Kirana Hills, A Fortress Wrapped in Secrecy
For decades, Kirana Hills has remained one of Pakistan’s most closely guarded military zones. Nestled in the Sargodha district, the region is believed to house a network of over ten underground tunnels, long suspected of being used to store Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Its proximity to the Sargodha Air Base (just 20 km away) and the Khushab nuclear complex (approximately 75 km distant) only adds to its strategic sensitivity.
It’s precisely this geography that has triggered alarm bells.
Despite widespread speculation, India’s Air Force maintains it did not strike Kirana Hills. Air Marshal AK Bharti stated unequivocally: “We have not hit Kirana Hills—whatever is there.” India insists that the targets under Operation Sindoor were limited to terrorist infrastructure and military assets, not nuclear facilities.
The Spark That Lit the Fire, Origins of the Leak Rumour
The origins of the radiation scare seem rooted in unverified reports that one of India’s strikes occurred near Sargodha, uncomfortably close to the Kirana zone. These whispers gained traction online after supposed sightings of American and Egyptian aircraft monitoring the area.
Most notably, a BrahMos missile, India’s supersonic precision strike weapon, was rumored to have been used near the vicinity. While this added to the urgency of the discussion, there is no credible evidence to support claims that India directly targeted Kirana Hills, let alone caused a nuclear leak.
Yet, one element in the narrative refuses to fade: the reported flight of a U.S. Beechcraft B350 “Aerial Measuring System” (AMS) aircraft over or near Pakistan.
The US Aircraft That Changed the Conversation
Enter the Beechcraft B350 AMS, an aircraft unlike any other routinely seen in South Asia’s skies. This isn’t a combat drone or a spy plane, it’s a nuclear emergency response aircraft operated by the U.S. Department of Energy. Part of the elite Aerial Measuring System, its purpose is chillingly clear: detect radiation leaks, map nuclear fallout, and support disaster response teams during radiological crises.
Its unexpected presence, if verified – speaks volumes.
Historically, the B350 AMS has flown missions after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, during U.S. nuclear weapons tests, and in the wake of major radiological exercises. Its deployment overseas is exceptionally rare, and when it happens, it usually requires diplomatic clearance and a specific mission tied to a potential or ongoing nuclear event.
What was it doing near Sargodha?
Two Possibilities
Open-source flight data suggests that a B350 AMS variant with tail number N111SZ briefly entered Pakistani airspace. Intriguingly, some defense analysts claim this aircraft was transferred to Pakistan’s Army Aviation in 2010. If accurate, that would mean either:
Pakistan deployed its own former-US nuclear emergency aircraft in response to a suspected radiation scare, or
The United States, in coordination with Pakistan, dispatched a radiation monitoring aircraft to evaluate potential fallout, possibly fearing something far more serious occurred behind closed doors.
Neither option is ordinary. Both suggest a level of concern that has not been reflected in public statements by either country.
Under The Lens – Something Stirred in Kirana
There are moments in geopolitics when official silence says more than press briefings. The air is unusually thick around Pakistan’s Kirana Hills, and not because of spring dust or monsoon winds. Following India’s precision strikes under Operation Sindoor, something stirred deep beneath Pakistan’s most fortified terrain and the world may never be told what.
So, what are we to make of it?
To understand the implications, one must understand the real significance of Kirana Hills. Located roughly 20 km from the major Sargodha Air Base, the area is believed to host a network of underground tunnels possibly used to store Pakistan’s tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Its proximity to Khushab, a site linked with plutonium production, elevates it from merely “sensitive” to potentially “existential.”
India’s Operation Sindoor was touted as a calibrated, preemptive strike targeting terror infrastructure and forward-operational bases. But in modern warfare, even the best-laid flight paths are not immune to proximity risks. Could a high-yield, high-precision weapon like the BrahMos have landed too close for comfort?
If even a tremor affected subterranean nuclear silos, Pakistan would be compelled to assess any possible breach. That’s where the B350 AMS comes in.
Equipped with gamma-ray spectrometers, real-time isotope mapping tools, and low-altitude scanning capability, the Beechcraft B350 AMS is a flying Geiger counter on steroids. It doesn’t circle over cities for fun.
The B350 AMS can not only detect the presence of radioactive particles, but also identify specific isotopes, helping authorities understand if nuclear material has escaped, been tampered with, or is simply unguarded.
So when this aircraft shows up in your airspace, you’re not just worried about image management. You’re worried about containment.
Whose Plane Was It, Really?
Here’s where the plot thickens. The tail number N111SZ previously belonged to a U.S.-owned AMS aircraft , one that was transferred to Pakistan Army Aviation in 2010, according to open-source records.
So was the plane flying last week:
A U.S.-operated mission, requiring diplomatic clearance?
Or a Pakistani-operated AMS platform, scrambled in urgency?
Or a joint exercise cloaked in plausible deniability?
Each possibility is significant. If it was American, it implies U.S. concern over a potential nuclear incident and quiet coordination with Pakistan. If it was Pakistani, it indicates a deep internal worry about radiation exposure, a level of concern that belies their official silence.
Either scenario tells us one thing – something triggered nuclear monitoring protocols.
Final Word – We May Never Know But We Must Keep Watching The truth about what happened in Kirana Hills may not emerge for months or ever. But the choreography of this incident Indian strikes, silence from nuclear watchdogs, and the arrival of a radiation-hunting aircraft speaks volumes.
It tells us that in the shadowy corridors of nuclear deterrence, every tremor is taken seriously, even if no mushroom cloud follows. It also reminds us that in this part of the world, nuclear flashpoints are never more than one miscalculation away.
Until official records speak, if they ever do Kirana Hills remains a riddle shrouded in gamma rays and geopolitics.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced his readiness to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Turkey this Thursday, just hours after U.S. President Donald Trump publicly urged Kyiv to accept the Kremlin’s latest proposal for direct talks. The announcement comes as diplomatic tensions hit new heights, and both Europe and the U.S. weigh in on how to bring the brutal conflict to a halt.
Zelenskyy’s overture capped a whirlwind 48 hours in which European leaders, during a high-profile visit to Kyiv, pressed for a 30-day ceasefire starting Monday. Their message was unequivocal – either halt hostilities or face a new round of “massive” sanctions. The Kremlin, however, responded with a counter-proposal, an offer for the first direct Russia-Ukraine talks since the early months of the 2022 invasion, with Istanbul suggested as the venue.
Zelenskyy took to X (formerly Twitter) to challenge Putin directly, writing, “I will be waiting for Putin in Türkiye on Thursday. Personally. I hope that this time the Russians will not look for excuses.” The message was amplified by his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, who posted on Telegram: “What about Putin? Is he afraid? We’ll see.”
Trump’s Intervention Shifts the Conversation
Complicating things further was the unexpected intervention from Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee for the 2024 U.S. presidential race. Taking to his social media platform, Truth Social, Trump posted a late-night statement:
“President Putin of Russia doesn’t want to have a Cease Fire Agreement with Ukraine, but rather wants to meet on Thursday, in Turkey, to negotiate a possible end to the BLOODBATH. Ukraine should agree to this, IMMEDIATELY.”
Trump’s position directly contradicted the European-led effort to first secure a ceasefire before proceeding to negotiations. Instead, he called for immediate engagement to assess the feasibility of peace and “determine where everything stands.”
His statement illustrated the pivotal role Washington continues to play. Ukraine depends heavily on U.S. military and financial support – lifelines that could shift depending on who occupies the White House next year. Kyiv, for its part, is eager to maintain bipartisan backing, while Moscow sees a window of opportunity to ease sanctions and reshape its global story.
What’s on the Table?
In a televised address timed for prime viewership in the United States, Putin called for “direct negotiations without any preconditions.” But within hours, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov complicated matters, stating any talks must consider both a shelved 2022 draft peace framework and “the current situation on the ground.”
This diplomatic phrasing masks significant Russian demands. The 2022 draft framework, leaked shortly after talks in Istanbul that year, reportedly called for Ukraine’s permanent neutrality in exchange for security guarantees and an acceptance of de facto Russian control over parts of eastern and southern Ukraine – a non-starter for Kyiv, which sees such concessions as a form of surrender.
The war, now in its third year, has left hundreds of thousands dead or wounded and triggered the most perilous East-West confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russian forces have made slow but steady gains in recent months, yet the cost in human lives and economic fallout remains staggering.
A Calculated Move or Political Move?
Analysts remain divided over whether Putin’s offer is a genuine olive branch or a calculated move to fragment Western unity, especially with elections looming in both the U.S. and key European nations. For Zelenskyy, the counter-proposal presents both an opportunity and a trap – an opening to demonstrate Ukraine’s willingness to seek peace, but also a test of whether Russia’s intentions are sincere or simply strategic.
Regardless of whether the Turkish meeting materializes, one thing is clear: global pressure on both sides is reaching a boiling point. As Trump attempts to reassert himself on the world stage and Europe pushes for a ceasefire, the question remains – will Putin show up?
Putin Rejects ‘Ultimatums’; Europe and Ukraine Hold the Line for Ceasefire
Even as the prospect of direct Ukraine-Russia negotiations loomed larger, President Vladimir Putin pushed back sharply against mounting international pressure, rejecting what he characterized as Western “ultimatums” for a ceasefire. In a statement that signaled defiance more than concession, Putin dismissed demands from European leaders and Ukraine for a full and unconditional 30-day truce starting May 12, suggesting instead that any dialogue must first tackle the “root causes” of the conflict – a Kremlin euphemism widely interpreted to mean recognition of Russian territorial gains and Ukraine’s neutrality.
Russia’s foreign ministry further clarified the Kremlin’s position, stating that any discussion of a ceasefire was premature unless the underlying issues behind the war were addressed. This included reference to the now-defunct 2022 draft peace framework, which Kyiv has repeatedly dismissed as unacceptable, as it implicitly demands Ukraine surrender significant territory and alter its geopolitical orientation.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stood firm, reiterating that Kyiv’s proposal for a ceasefire beginning Monday still stands. “We await a full and lasting ceasefire, starting from tomorrow, to provide the necessary basis for diplomacy,” he said in his nightly video address. Zelenskyy emphasized that while Ukraine is committed to peace, its forces would be ready to respond if Russia failed to observe the truce. The U.S. embassy in Kyiv also issued a security alert warning of a “potentially significant” Russian airstrike in the coming days – indicating how tenuous the situation remains.
Ceasefire Appeal Backed by European Powers and Trump
Zelenskyy’s latest outreach comes in the wake of a high-stakes diplomatic push in Kyiv on May 10, where the Ukrainian leader was joined by French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. The show of unity was visually captured in a widely circulated photo of the leaders in Kyiv, following a joint video call with U.S. President Donald Trump.
In a forceful joint statement, the leaders demanded that Russia agree to a “full and unconditional” ceasefire beginning May 12, warning that any preconditions by Moscow would be seen as attempts to prolong the conflict. The statement laid out the contours of a potential peace framework that included a complete halt to all military operations – air, land, and sea – and the initiation of diplomatic efforts to establish long-term security, political, and humanitarian guarantees for Ukraine. The ceasefire was described as a prerequisite for credible negotiations, and the leaders stressed that monitoring would be conducted in close cooperation with the United States.
“We agreed that a month-long ceasefire is essential to create diplomatic space,” Zelenskyy said. “Without silence, there can be no dialogue. Without dialogue, there can be no peace.”
In a warning aimed squarely at Moscow, the joint communiqué declared that failure to comply would trigger a significantly tougher 17th package of EU sanctions, aligned with similar measures from the U.S., UK, and Norway. These would target key sectors of the Russian economy, particularly energy, banking, and the so-called “shadow fleet” allegedly used by Russia to evade oil embargoes.
War of Optics: From Kyiv to Moscow
The Kyiv meeting of allied leaders coincided with Putin’s grand Victory Day celebration in Moscow on May 9, where he played host to foreign dignitaries including the Presidents of China and Brazil. The stark contrast between the two scenes—one focused on diplomacy and peace, the other on military parades and pageantry—was not lost on observers.
Ukraine had refused to honor the May 8–10 unilateral ceasefire declared by Putin, calling it a “sham.” Both sides accused each other of violating that short-term truce, adding to the tension ahead of the potential Istanbul meeting on May 15.
Western leaders used the Kyiv meeting to express solidarity with Ukraine in deeply personal terms. “Ukraine’s security is our security,” said British PM Keir Starmer, who also visited war memorials and paid tribute to fallen soldiers. “We will not rest until there is a just and lasting peace,” he added.
Macron, too, sought to personalize the stakes, sharing a video of a warm embrace with Zelenskyy, captioned: “Count on us, my friend.” German Chancellor Merz called Zelenskyy a “partner and friend” and assured continued support: “Always, if you want. You can call.”
Putin’s Countermove – Istanbul Summit on May 15
As Ukraine and its Western allies rallied for peace, Putin made a countermove by proposing direct talks in Istanbul on May 15, describing them as a chance for “durable peace” and “addressing the root causes of the war.” However, Kremlin spokespersons quickly muddied the waters by asserting that talks must reflect “current realities” – a veiled reference to Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian territories and its demand for Kyiv’s neutrality.
Despite widespread skepticism over Putin’s intentions, Trump seized upon the Russian leader’s proposal as a breakthrough moment. “This could be a potentially great day for Russia and Ukraine,” he posted on Truth Social, urging Zelenskyy to accept the offer and attend the Istanbul talks.
Whether Putin will show up in person remains uncertain. He and Zelenskyy have not met face to face since December 2019, and relations between them remain openly hostile. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy posted on X:
“I will be waiting for Putin in Türkiye on Thursday. Personally. I hope this time the Russians will not look for excuses.”
As the week begins, the eyes of the world are fixed on two cities – Kyiv and Istanbul – wondering whether this moment could mark a genuine opening in a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, destabilized Europe, and redrawn the global balance of power.
Alarming Turn Back To Landmines, five European countries – Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania- have initiated steps to withdraw from the landmark Ottawa Treaty, an international agreement that prohibits the use, production, and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines – a shift that has alarmed disarmament campaigners and human rights groups,
Citing escalating security concerns posed by Russia, the five nations- all of which share borders with the Kremlin-controlled state – argue that the 1997 treaty no longer reflects the current geopolitical reality. Their decisions mark a significant departure from decades of global progress toward eliminating one of the world’s most indiscriminate and enduring weapons.
Anti-personnel landmines, designed to maim or kill upon contact, have long been condemned by humanitarian organizations for their devastating impact on civilians. These weapons can remain active for decades after hostilities end, continuing to claim lives and limbs long after peace is restored. Since the Ottawa Treaty’s adoption more than 25 years ago, the use of landmines has declined significantly, and the treaty has been credited with saving tens of thousands of lives and reducing civilian harm.
However, the renewed sense of vulnerability along NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has prompted a reassessment among some of its frontline members.
In March, Poland and the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania issued a joint statement declaring their intention to withdraw from the treaty. They emphasized the need to give their militaries greater “flexibility and freedom of choice” in response to the growing threat from Moscow, calling for a fresh evaluation of what constitutes acceptable defense weaponry in the current context.
In April, Latvia became the first to formalize its withdrawal, after its parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the move. Under the treaty’s provisions, Latvia will officially exit six months after submitting its notice after which it will be legally permitted to stockpile and deploy anti-personnel landmines again.
Finland followed suit shortly thereafter. Speaking to journalists, Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said that Russia represents a long-term threat to European security and that the decision to leave the treaty will allow Finland to adapt its defense strategy accordingly. “Withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way,” Orpo stated.
The announcements have drawn swift condemnation from international watchdogs. Amnesty International described Finland’s move as a “disturbing step backwards,” warning that it “goes against decades of progress on eliminating the production, transfer and use of inherently indiscriminate weapons.” The organization said the shift could endanger civilian lives not only in Finland but also in other potential conflict zones across the region.
As of early 2025, the Ottawa Treaty had 165 signatories. However, several major military powers – including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the United States – have never signed the accord, a long-standing point of criticism among disarmament advocates.
The decisions by these five European states come amid growing anxiety over what comes next after the war in Ukraine. While Western support for Kyiv continues, some NATO members fear that once Russia reaches a resolution in Ukraine whether through victory, stalemate, or negotiated settlement it may turn its attention elsewhere.
Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House and author of Who Will Defend Europe?, cautioned that Moscow’s ambitions are unlikely to end with Ukraine. “If and when Russia’s grinding conflict in Ukraine does come to an end by whatever means,” Giles said, “Moscow will be readying itself for its next target.”
For now, the return of landmines to Europe’s strategic calculations illustrate the broader unraveling of post-Cold War arms control agreements and a sobering reminder that peace and progress, once taken for granted, may now be giving way to hardline deterrence.
Military Logic Meets Humanitarian Concern
As five European countries exit the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, defense analysts argue the decision is driven by urgent national security concerns in the face of a resurgent Russia. The move, while drawing criticism from human rights groups, is also backed by military logic that sees landmines not as relics of a brutal past, but as strategic tools in modern warfare.
“Nobody is in any doubt that Russia is looking for further means of achieving its objective in Europe,” said Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, in an interview. His stark assessment of the security environment captures the mindset driving these nations – Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania – to abandon a long-standing commitment to disarmament.
Giles emphasized that the military rationale for landmines is well-established. These buried explosives can slow an advancing army, either by forcing them to divert into more defensible terrain or by delaying their momentum while attempting to cross mined areas.
“They are a highly effective tool for augmenting the defensive forces of a country that’s going to be outnumbered,” he said, indicating their potential utility for smaller NATO countries facing the prospect of Russian aggression.
The experiences of the war in Ukraine, he argued, have likely reinforced the perception of landmines as a necessary evil. Russian forces have employed vast minefields along Ukraine’s southern front, significantly impeding the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. The mines didn’t just slow military progress, they redefined the pace and strategy of the war.
According to United Nations assessments, Ukraine has become the most heavily mined country on the planet. Ukrainian government figures estimate that Russian forces have contaminated more than 174,000 square kilometers (around 65,637 square miles) of land with mines and unexploded ordnance. This poses an ongoing hazard to civilians, particularly in areas previously under Russian occupation and now back under Ukrainian control.
“The large-scale contamination of land by explosive ordnance has created an ‘invisible threat’ in people’s minds,” noted a February 2024 report by Humanity & Inclusion, an international charity focused on aid for communities affected by war and disaster.
“As a result, people’s movements are extremely reduced or restricted, they can no longer cultivate their land, and their social, economic, or professional activities are hindered.”
While international outrage has focused largely on Russia’s indiscriminate use of landmines, the issue is not entirely one-sided. A 2023 report by Human Rights Watch revealed that Ukrainian forces, despite being a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, have also used anti-personnel mines and received them from allies such as the United States.
Still, Giles was quick to note the critical difference in intent and design between nations. “There are very different design philosophies,” he said, pointing to a fundamental divergence in the way landmines and cluster munitions are produced and deployed. “Some countries are not concerned with civilian casualties- or may even deliberately seek to cause them. Others are trying to avoid them.”
This distinction lies at the heart of how Finland and other withdrawing nations are attempting to frame their decision. While they have opted out of the Ottawa Treaty, they maintain they will not abandon humanitarian principles in the process. Finland, for example, has pledged to use landmines responsibly, with a focus on minimizing civilian impact.
“Finland is committed to its international obligations on the responsible use of mines,” President Alexander Stubb posted on X (formerly Twitter), as the government formally announced its exit from the treaty.
Defense officials argue that responsible landmine use is achievable through strict protocols, including accurate mapping and documentation of minefield locations, educating local populations about mine dangers, and clearing or deactivating mines once hostilities end. These steps, they say, are critical to reconciling military necessity with ethical warfare.
Despite these assurances, critics remain unconvinced that any use of landmines can ever be truly “humane.” For organizations like Amnesty International and Humanity & Inclusion, the very nature of landmines—indiscriminate and enduring—makes them incompatible with modern humanitarian standards.
Despite these nations’ assurances that they will use the weapons responsibly, experts and advocates are warning that the decision could undo years of hard-won progress in reducing civilian casualties from these explosive remnants of war.
Landmines have a long and devastating history. They have killed or maimed tens of thousands of civilians worldwide and continue to pose a significant risk long after a conflict has ended. According to the 2024 report from the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, at least 5,757 people were killed or injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2023 alone. Shockingly, civilians made up 84% of those casualties, indicating the disproportionate toll on non-combatants.
Putin Rejects ‘Ultimatums’; Europe and Ukraine Hold the Line for Ceasefire
