By: Varshitha Eddula, Research Analyst, GSDN

SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Council of Heads of State meeting, hosted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marked the first time India chaired the summit of regional countries. India became a full SCO member in 2017, along with Pakistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation focuses on cooperation with international and regional organisations. The strengths of the Shanghai Corporation Organization are that it covers 40% of the global population, nearly 20% of the global GDP and 22% of the world’s land mass. The SCO has a strategically important role in Asia due to its geographical significance, this enables it to control Central Asia and limit the American influence in the region.

BRICS

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is an important grouping bringing together the major emerging economies of the world. According to World Bank data of 2019, it comprises of 41% of the world population, having 24% of the world GDP and over 16% share in the world trade. BRICS countries have been the main engines of global economic growth over the years.

Over some time, BRICS countries have come together to deliberate on important issues under the three pillars of political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people. 

The central objective of BRICS is the reformation of global governance institutions (UNSC, IMF, World Bank) reflecting the changing nature of the global financial order. It is also an advocate of multipolarity and involves in various activities, including counter-terrorism and developmental activities. It was in this regard that BRICS formed the New Development Bank (NDB) to finance the infrastructure development in emerging economies.

China and SCO

China is one of the six founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was established in 2001 as a regional organisation for non-traditional security cooperation between China, Russia and four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Although the SCO Charter sets out a broad array of objectives and potential areas of cooperation, the SCO has so far focused on, and gained most visibility through, its fight against regional terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism.

For China, as for the other members, the SCO represents a new and unique cooperation model, reflecting its vision of a multipolar world order as opposed to cooperation models based on US hegemony and unilateralism. Since the SCO’s inception, China has pushed its agenda and has successfully pursued its national security, geopolitical and economic interests. It has used the SCO umbrella as a multilateral platform to address external threats posed by non-state actors on its vulnerable western border; to gain a strong economic and political foothold in Central Asia without putting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership at risk; and to enhance its energy security through large-scale infrastructure investment in, and trade with, the Central Asian member states.

China and BRICS

China sees natural common ground with emerging economies, especially in the pursuit of a new international economic order and the democratization of international relations.

For China, since the BRICS countries’ share and importance in the world economy has been growing but has not yet surpassed the developed countries’, the next step, naturally, would be for them to act as one group to increase their collective voice and bargaining power against traditional developed countries. In China’s view, this momentum would democratize international relations by offering developing countries more voice and rights.

In Chinese strategic thinking, the BRI and BRICS are deeply interconnected. BRICS, comprising the world’s best performing emerging economies, is a less controversial platform and more appealing to the developing world. It is often seen as the key international mechanism that can act as the second front or as the “leading geese”, aiding and advancing China’s BRI objectives. As China-US rivalry intensifies and the BRI faces a plethora of challenges, BRICS is increasingly gaining significance for China.

Within the grouping, China sees itself as the ‘core’ of BRICS, while India as its weakest link. Brazil and South Africa are often dismissed as “free-riders”, while Russia is considered the main tool to advance Chinese interests within the BRICS framework. China is aiming to undercut the role and agency of India, Brazil and South Africa—if possible, winning over the last two using its financial heft—while utilising China-Russia ties as the bedrock for further developing BRICS in a direction that suits their interests.

It is not always easy for China to implement such a strategy. Brazil and South Africa, with their deteriorating economic performance and unstable domestic political situations, are unwilling to commit much to China and thereby compromise on their foreign policy flexibility. On the other hand, there is a constant game between China and Russia over who will use whom, to further its self-interest.

It is against this backdrop that China is proposing a BRICS expansion. Economic strength and development potential are not the sole criteria for China while considering potential BRICS members. Political and identity commonality in the context of China-US competition, geographic and locational advantages, willingness to support the BRI, are seen as important points. India needs to accurately grasp the geopolitical shifts taking place within BRICS and deftly navigate the complex dynamics between the member states to safeguard its own interests within the grouping and avoid being drawn passively into China’s Great Game.

India and SCO

India’s association with the SCO began in 2005 as an Observer country, and it became a full Member State at the Astana Summit in 2017.The government has held that joining the originally Eurasian group was important as it focuses on regional security and connectivity — areas key to India’s growth and making up its challenges, such as terrorism in Pakistan, and Chinese aggressions as well as the Belt and Road Initiative. Being “inside the tent” is important, especially as Pakistan is a member, even if that means conducting joint exercises under the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. SCO gives India an interface with Central Asian markets and resources. India-Central Asia Dialogue is a platform to engage with Central Asian Region. But SCO far outweighs India Central Asia Dialogue. Finally, joining the SCO was a key part of India’s stated ambitions on “multi-alignment” and “strategic autonomy” while becoming a “balancing power” in the world.

It was expected that India’s turn to chair the SCO this year would be a major event, rivalling the expected pomp around the G-20 meet in September. In addition, given Russia’s and China’s blocks on the G-20 joint communiqué that India is keen to find consensus on, the SCO summit would have been a convenient venue for Mr. Modi to negotiate a resolution with his counterparts. However, India’s decision to postpone the SCO summit due to the Prime Minister’s U.S. State visit, and then to turn it into a virtual summit may have been a dampener on the SCO outcomes.

India’s concerns with hosting Xi Jinping given the LAC hostilities, or Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif’s possible ‘grandstanding’, or even the optics of welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin may have been factors. Whatever the reason, while the members hammered out a New Delhi declaration and joint statements on radicalisation and digital transformation, the government was unable to forge consensus on other agreements including one on making English a formal SCO language, while India, despite being Chair, did not endorse a road map on economic cooperation, presumably due to concerns over China’s imprint.

India and BRICS

BRICS’s development-focused diplomacy resonates strongly with India’s core interests – energy security, combating terrorism, and climate change financing. At the same time, its wider and deeper issue items and agenda separate BRICS from other strategic forums that India currently participates in. BRICS constantly emphasizes themes ranging from “promoting economic recovery,” “expediting implementation of 2030 agenda on sustainable development,” and “strengthening and reforming multilateral governance.” These further reflect the socioeconomic realities that developing countries face. India’s global aspirations and interests, such as on reforms in multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund, WTO, United Nations, and U.N. Security Council are also backed by BRICS.

BRICS gives India the opportunity to voice its developmental interests in a way that no other grouping can match. In addition, BRICS members are playing a greater role in shaping the global political landscape, an area where India finds itself standing against the likes of the United States, Japan, and Australia – fellow members of Quad. In the contemporary world, BRICS represents global socioeconomic realities that are often relegated to the periphery of international politics. Indian strategic circles recognize BRICS’s primary role in shaping the international trade order, climate change policies, financing, and reformed multilateralism. New Delhi aims to play a larger role in international politics and negotiations, which would further emphasize the critical role of BRICS.

To ensure a multi-polar Asia, it is imperative for India to prevent China from increasing its area of influence through organizations like SCO and BRICS. It is also in the interest of Washington since it does not want these groupings to be echo chambers of Sino Russian axis.

The biggest challenge that India faces as a member of BRICS is China. China is actively trying to use BRICS to further its sphere of influence and to make it an anti-west group which is evident from the Chinese push for expansion of membership as well as from its stance on common currency for BRICS nations. While India, with its strategy of issue-based alignment or multi-alignment, requires BRICS for active engagement with emerging economies and for furthering its interests. While there is a call for India to come out of BRICS, it seems better for India to create a room in BRICS rather than give it away for China to further its interest. It should ensure that it does not become an anti-west grouping by making sure that new membership to the group does not take place in such a way that ensure China’s dominance. A common BRICS currency is not in the interest of India since it may affect its engagement with the West.

SCO-CHINA-BRICS-INDIA

BRICS should have balanced itself against Chinese hegemony by reviving the spirit of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) grouping, which predated BRICS. Had the IBSA spirit worked, then China and Russia would not have held sway over BRICS. Instead of the IBSA spirit, divergent reactions from South Africa and Brazil have emerged.

China will use these institutions for disseminating President Xi Jinping’s vision of international order like the Global Security Initiative and Global Development Initiative. China is trying to have a domination in these groupings and make them anti-USA and G7. China floated the idea of a common currency at BRICS. But India disapproved. China wants to expand the groupings through giving membership to countries, which are inherently pro-China. Many SCO and BRICS members are recipients of China’s investments through BRI. China will always aim to have greater influence over members in these organisations. But decisions in BRICS and SCO are taken on a consensus. Trying to ease out India from these groupings is difficult for China. As India has significant friendly relations with other member countries. Secondly, India is an important trading partner with China. Therefore, India and China are tangled up multilaterally and bilaterally.

By: Sanoop Suresh, Research Analyst, GSDN

After Narendra Modi took the oath of office in 2014, India started a journey towards deeper ties with the United Arab Emirates, and the Indian Prime Minister visited the UAE five times in the eight years afterwards. When he made his maiden trip to the UAE in 2015, Modi became the country’s first prime minister to do so in 34 years. Modi’s visit to Abu Dhabi was well received, and the following year, the ruler of the UAE, HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, paid a visit to India and later served as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebration in 2017. Over the past nine years, India and the UAE’s diplomatic and economic ties have expanded. According to official figures from the UAE, there are close to 3.5 million Indian nationals living there, making them the country’s largest ethnic group with almost 30% of the total population. As a result, the UAE is a significant player that India cannot afford to risk losing. Despite the hurdles that still lie ahead, Narendra Modi’s recent day-long visit to Abu Dhabi on July 15, 2023 offers signs of a win-win situation for both India and the UAE.

What is the outcome of this visit?

The Indian Prime Minister concluded his tour after attending various discussions on subjects ranging from economics to climate change by writing on his Twitter account, “India and UAE will keep working closely to further global good.” The main objective of the talks, according to the PMO’s official statement, was to further solidify the trade and economic ties between the two countries. In these discussions, both countries underlined their commitment to the promotion of robust and resilient food supply chains, and sought the possibilities of cooperation and diversification in the health sector. The discussion between the Indian Prime Minister and HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, also emphasized bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, including oil, gas, and renewable energy.  Additionally, both parties agreed to enhance investments across the board in the energy sector, including the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Programme of India. Both leaders called on the international community to preserve the long term goals of the Paris agreement and display their solidarity on “the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, considering the diverse national circumstances of each nation”, as outlined in the agreement. However, the highlight of this trip was the signing of three MoUs between India and the UAE.

The tripartite Memorandum of Understanding agreed for establishing the first-ever IIT Delhi international campus in Abu Dhabi is a significant development of Modi’s visit to the UAE. In order to operationalize IIT Delhi-Abu Dhabi by January 2024 with a Master’s programme in Energy Transition and Sustainability, the Indian Institute of Technology (Delhi), Ministry of Education, and Abu Dhabi Department of Education & Knowledge (ADEK) signed the MoU. This is a follow up to the Virtual Summit between the two leaders, which occurred in February last year, when they agreed to establish the Indian Institute of Technology in the UAE. The Reserve Bank of India and the Central Bank of the UAE also signed two other Memoranda of Understanding on the same day, and it is expected that these agreements would fundamentally alter commerce between India and the UAE.

Why will these MoUs become a game changer?

Owing to the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed on 18 February 2022, the UAE emerged as the third biggest trade partner in terms of USD $85 billion for the fiscal year 2022–2023 and the second largest export destination. With this deal, India was granted preferential market access for 97% of its tariff line in a number of industries, including pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, automobiles, jewelry and gemstones. The newly signed MoUs sought to better simplify business relations between the two nations. One among them calls for the collaboration of the Fast Payment Systems (FPSs) of the two nations, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) of India and the Instant Payment Platform (IPP) of the UAE. It also seeks to connect their payment messaging systems as well as card switches (UNSWITCH and RuPay switches).

The second MoU pushes forward for greater cooperation in trade through establishing a mechanism to promote local currencies, which is Rupees and Dirham, for Cross-border Transactions by creating a Local Currency Settlement System (LCSS). According to this, exporters and importers would be able to invoice and pay in their respective home currencies, which would promote the growth of a foreign exchange market for the INR and AED. As transaction costs and settlement times are lowered, it is anticipated that a greater usage of local currencies will benefit Indians residing in the UAE in general and low-wage employees in particular. It should be noted that these initiatives coincide with India’s efforts to reduce its reliance on the US Dollar through extending the use of the INR.

At the Micro level, Banks from 18 countries, including the UK, Germany, Malaysia, Israel, and Russia, approved to open Vostro accounts for rupee trade, and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia showed interest in local currency trade. India expects that such agreements will increase currency stability and minimize the volatility in international commerce relative to the value of the US dollar. On a macro level, the US dollar’s dominance is occasionally questioned, and more nations are attempting to trade in their own currencies to protect bilateral commerce from external fluctuations. Despite the fact that India and the UAE assert that there is no plan to “de-dollarize” the world economy by citing the bilateral character of this agreement, this initiative drives the efforts in that direction. Although this visit and the associated agreements can be seen as a step forward in India and the UAE’s relationship, it is also under the shadow of uncertainties and challenges.

Why isn’t it a straight road for India and UAE?

Although there is a leap in the India-UAE trade share as a result of the CEPA of 2022, the disparity in the Import-Export rate is considerably huge and these statistics raise some questions regarding the future of the India-UAE agreement on the use of local currency in bilateral trade. According to data released by the Indian Embassy in the United Arab Emirates, the value of bilateral commerce between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi surged by 68.3% in the fiscal year 2021–2022 compared to the prior year, totaling USD 72878.31 million. However, there is a 16,788.55 million USD deficit in Indian exports to the UAE. According to their most recent estimate, this disparity persisted in 2022–2023 between April and September with an imbalance of $12,341.51 million USD. This disparity leaves Abu Dhabi with an excess of INR and raises the question of whether this agreement will take the same trajectory as the debate over trade in rupees and rubles. To get around all of these concerns, India has to increase its share of bilateral trade, and New Delhi expects the CEPA will make that possible.

Another hurdle in their usually cordial relationship is the deadlock in their negotiations to revise the 2014 Air Service Agreement (ASA). The UAE ambassador to India noted that “it would be difficult to accommodate the new demands for travel between the two countries” unless India agreed to find common ground in modifying ASA. The Ministry of Civil Aviation expressed reluctance to expand the number of seats between UAE cities and around 15 Indian cities due to worries that it may hurt Indian airlines’ business, which led to a 45–50% spike in airfare in the nation’s major cities. Breaking through these impasses and locating a common ground is crucial to enhancing the connection between the two nations when we take into account the significance of India-UAE ties and the recent developments signal a more promising future for both countries.

By: Aqib Rehman, Research Analyst, GSDN

There is little doubt that China has been rising since last 40 years and now is presenting a formidable challenge to the United States of America with its rising economic power. Whether in the West Asia or in the Central Asia, America is facing significant challenge to its hegemony from the Peoples Republic of China.

In this case Afghanistan which is considered of great importance in the regions of South and Central Asia becomes more important for China to increase its presence in both the regions. After America withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, China found a window to promote its interests and started not only backdoor communication with the Taliban but also invited their leaders to China. Therefore, it becomes important to understand the China’s interests in Afghanistan and examine the geopolitical implications of China’s increased presence in Afghanistan. However, it is important to first look at the historical connections between the two countries.

History of the Relations

The ancient relations between China and Afghanistan were closely tied to the historic Silk Road, an extensive network of trade routes that facilitated the exchange of goods, culture, and ideas between the East and the West. The Silk Road was not a single route but a web of interconnected trade paths that spanned from China through Central Asia, the Middle East, and into Europe.

Taking advantage of this rute China exported silk, porcelain, tea, spices, and other luxury goods to the West, while Afghanistan and the surrounding areas provided valuable commodities like precious stones, metals, textiles, and agricultural products. This route also facilitated the exchange of culture, art, religion and knowledge. The spread of Buddhism in China from India was an important contribution of the Silk-Route. This route also provided the means of communication and diplomatic interactions between China and Afghanistan. This gave a strategic importance to this route.

After the successful liberation of China in 1949, Afghanistan was among the first countries to recognise China’s new government under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Both the countries established formal relations in the year 1955. Under the non-alignment ideology, both rejected the interference by major powers in the internal affairs of third-world countries.

The Sino-Soviet split during 1960s as a result of ideological differences posed a significant challenge to the Afghan rulers and they first sort to balance the relations between the two. However, as the tensions deepened, Afghans gravitated towards USSR. The communist coup of April 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a decade-long war known as Soviet-Afghan war.

China strongly opposed the Soviet invasion and provided support to various Afghan resistance groups, including the mujahideen, through arms and other means.

China was deeply concerned about the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan for several reasons like Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was perceived as a direct threat to China’s security interests. Afghanistan’s proximity to China’s western Xinjiang region raised concerns about potential spillover effects of the conflict. China feared that instability in Afghanistan could spill over into its own territory, possibly inspiring separatist movements among its Muslim minority population in Xinjiang.

the Soviet Union’s military presence in Afghanistan also raised concerns about its expanding influence in the region. China viewed the invasion as part of a broader Soviet strategy to gain greater control in South Asia and the Middle East, which would have ramifications for China’s strategic interests.

After the fall of Taliban in 2001, China Afghan relations continued to evolve influenced by the regional developments and the global shifts in the international order. During the first two decades China focused its energy in the areas of security, economic engagement and regional stability.

Chinese companies were interested in the natural resources of Afghanistan and they invested heavily during this period in Afghanistan. Most notable investment was by the China national petroleum corporation in the exploration of oil resources in the Northern Afghanistan. China was also concerned about the regional stability and the spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan to the Xinjiang province. To counter this, China cooperated with the regional players.

Apart from engaging with the Afghan leaders, China during this period provided humanitarian, infrastructural and economic aid to Afghanistan. It also participated in the Afghan peace process and favoured the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

As the U.S. announced its plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2014, China adopted a more pragmatic approach towards the Taliban. With the prospect of a potential power vacuum and concerns about regional security, China engaged with the group to safeguard its interests. However, it did not explicitly endorse the Taliban as a legitimate government in Afghanistan.

China in Afghanistan: Geopolitical implications

The first important geopolitical implication of Afghanistan is its location. It is located at a place where it connects two regions of Asia with each other. Afghanistan’s location makes it potentially important for China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure and trade project connecting China with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Afghanistan’s inclusion in BRI could facilitate better connectivity and trade routes for China.

Second geopolitical or geoeconomic importance of Afghanistan is its abundance in natural resources. It has rear-earth metals such as lanthanum, cerium, neodymium and veins of gold, silver and zinc. China, who’s economy is hungry of raw materials had maintained backdoor connections with the Taliban leaders is now seeking the exploration of these resources. The abundance of natural resources is of great geopolitical significance not only for the Chinese but some neighbouring countries are also concerned about the China’s growing influence in this region.

Third important geopolitical implication of China in Afghanistan is related to the regional stability and the counterterrorism. China is constantly worried about the spillover effect of Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. It does not want the separatists of Xinjiang province to be emboldened by this situation. Therefore, it is important for China to cooperate with the Taliban government to ensure stability in the Xinjiang province.

Another significant geopolitical implication of China’s involvement in Afghanistan is related to its dream of becoming a global leader. By engaging in Afghanistan’s affairs and actively supporting the country’s development and peace efforts, China seeks to present itself as a reliable partner and mediator in resolving international conflicts. China is aware of the fact that in order to become a global leader it first needs to be a regional leader.

By engaging with Afghanistan, China can demonstrate its willingness to take on a more proactive role in addressing regional challenges and conflicts. This engagement can also strengthen China’s ties with other neighbouring countries and enhance its influence in Central Asia. China also provides humanitarian aid to Afghans. This is considered as a tool to project country’s soft-power. By employing such steps China seeks to improve its global image of a benign and a responsible power.

One of the important geopolitical implications of China’s involvement in Afghanistan is that countries like India who have strategic interests in Afghanistan are witnessing significant decline in the kind of influence which they once enjoyed. China, which is seeking a global leadership will not allow any other regional country to exert influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important for the countries like India to find suitable ways to engage with the Afghan government in order to protect their strategic interests.

China from the ancient times has had a cordial relation with Afghanistan. Silk-Route had been a primary means of communication between the two countries which is now being revived through the Belt and Road Initiative. China never involved itself in the Afghanistan by using its army. Therefore, it enjoys favourable conditions within the Taliban government and has been allowed to explore the natural resources of Afghanistan. This is of great geopolitical significance not only for the Chinese but also for the other regional players like India. Only the time will tell whether China will be able to sustain itself in Afghanistan or it will face the same fate as the previous global powers. After-all, Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires.

By: Khushboo Agrahari

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has experienced significant transformations in its domestic and international standing. This note examines India’s role in the new world order and the impact of Prime Minister Modi’s leadership on shaping India’s global engagement, economic policies, and strategic initiatives.

Economic Reforms and Global Integration

Under his tenure we have witnessed a strong focus on economic reforms and attracting foreign investments. Initiatives like “Make in India” and “Digital India” have aimed to boost manufacturing, promote entrepreneurship, and harness India’s demographic dividend. The introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) have streamlined India’s business environment, making it more attractive to investors. These efforts have positioned India as a global economic player and improved its ease of doing business ranking.

Act East Policy and Regional Integration

Prime Minister Modi’s Act East Policy has emphasized India’s commitment to strengthening its ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s engagement with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations, Japan, Australia, and other regional powers has deepened economic cooperation, strategic partnerships, and people-to-people ties. The expansion of India’s Look East Policy to an Act East Policy reflects a proactive approach in leveraging regional integration and advancing India’s interests in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Diplomatic Outreach and Soft Power

Prime Minister Modi’s leadership has invigorated India’s diplomatic engagements and enhanced its soft power globally. Frequent high-level visits, including to countries that were previously neglected, have bolstered bilateral relations and opened new avenues for collaboration. The personal rapport Prime Minister has cultivated with world leaders has elevated India’s international standing. Furthermore, initiatives like the International Day of Yoga and the International Solar Alliance have projected India’s cultural and technological prowess, further enhancing its soft power.

Security and Counterterrorism Efforts

We saw how the Prime Minister has prioritized national security and counterterrorism measures to safeguard India’s interests in the new world order. The “Neighborhood First” policy aims to strengthen India’s relationships with its immediate neighbors, promoting stability and economic cooperation. Under his leadership, India has taken a strong stance against terrorism, particularly in the context of cross-border attacks, and has advocated for global cooperation in combating the scourge of terrorism.

Geopolitical Shifts and Strategic Partnerships

He has pursued strategic partnerships with key global powers to address regional and global challenges. Strengthening ties with the United States, Japan, and Israel has resulted in deepened defense cooperation, technology transfers, and joint military exercises. These partnerships have not only bolstered India’s security capabilities but have also contributed to a more multipolar world order.

His leadership has played a significant role in positioning India in the new world order. Through economic reforms, regional integration efforts, diplomatic outreach, and security initiatives, India has emerged as a major global player under his stewardship. As India continues to navigate the complexities and opportunities of the new world order, Prime Minister Modi’s vision and strategic approach will undoubtedly shape the trajectory of India’s engagement on the global stage.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Background of Indian-African Relations

The historical relationship between Africa and India can be traced back to ancient times, specifically the Bronze Age in the Indus Valley Civilization and interactions between India and ancient Egypt. During the medieval period, there was an increase in commercial routes between the Mediterranean and Asia through Arabia, which facilitated contact between India and Africa. This period also witnessed the presence of Hindu traders along the southeastern coast of Mozambique in Africa.

The historical dimension of African-Indian relations is imbued with political implications. Both Africa and India experienced the intrusion of colonialism and its subsequent consequences, as the British colonial administration exerted control over the Indian Subcontinent and significant portions of Africa. The aforementioned concept was further strengthened by India’s endorsement of anti-colonial liberation movements and the attainment of independence by African nations, along with India’s display of solidarity during the Cold War in the 1960s.

Upon observing various regions in Africa, particularly East, and Southern Africa, one can discern the presence of significant cultural connections between the continent and India. According to a report from 2014, the Indian diaspora in Africa holds significant economic and cultural significance. The report indicates that Indian communities can be found in 46 African nations, constituting approximately 12.37% of the total Indian Diaspora. During the tenure of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Indian government demonstrated its “resource diplomacy” in Africa by organizing the inaugural India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008. This summit brought together leaders from 14 African nations, who collectively pledged $ 5 billion in credit and provided substantial amounts of aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, in the year 2010, Singh founded the Indian Overseas Facilitation Centre to enhance economic relations and commemorate the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Indian indentured laborers in South Africa.

Importance of Africa

Geostrategic

The geographical proximity between India and Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa region, renders Africa of utmost significance to India’s security. This region is characterized by the emergence of threats such as radicalism, piracy, and organized crime.

Economic

• Africa has the potential to contribute significantly to the diversification of our energy sources, aligning with the stated objective of our Integrated Energy Policy.
• Africa is home to a significant abundance of valuable minerals and metals, such as gold and diamonds.
• Africa offers a favourable environment for Indian investment.
• Africa possesses a substantial amount of agricultural land that has the potential to contribute significantly to India’s food security. India is considering the possibility of leasing land in Africa as a potential solution to address the scarcity of arable land that we currently encounter.

Geopolitical

The endorsement of African nations holds significant importance for India’s pursuit of securing a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Africa serves as a platform for showcasing both India’s soft and hard power capabilities.

India has demonstrated a proactive engagement in fostering peace and stability within African nations by actively participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. India is actively engaged in the process of enhancing the capabilities and skills of African nations through capacity building initiatives. Africa is the primary recipient of India’s ITEC program, which is the largest in terms of beneficiaries.

The Current Areas of Collaboration between India and Africa

The Conclave of India-Africa Project Partnership was formed in 2005, with the primary objective of fostering economic collaboration between India and Africa. The project has played a crucial role in fostering the establishment of Indian enterprises in Africa. Furthermore, the establishment of the India-Africa Summit played a crucial role in institutionalizing and formalizing India’s diplomatic ties with its African counterparts, representing a significant landmark in the realm of Indian- African relations. In recent times, there has been a notable focus on economic engagement between India and Africa, characterized by an increasing trade volume and a growing portfolio of investments. India exhibits a proclivity towards the private sector when it comes to skill and capacity-building initiatives in domains such as health care, agriculture, the digital revolution, and educational collaboration. Moreover, it is worth noting that the significance of marine security cannot be understood in the context of India’s diplomatic ties with countries such as Kenya, South Africa, and other coastal nations and islands.

Areas of collaboration:

1. Economic Involvement: Africa’s rich resources, growing middle class, and big working-age population attract international competitors and global powers. India’s consumer-driven goods in agriculture, clothes, pharmaceuticals, and automotive components have enhanced the continent’s significance thanks to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). India launched concessional lines of credit (LOC) in 2003 to boost development collaborations. From 2008 to 2011, India pledged about US$8 billion in LoCs to African states.

Despite the difference between promised funds and actual lines of Credit (LoCs) provided to Africa, recent reports have positioned India as one of the continent’s main funders. India is one of Africa’s top five investors with $74 billion invested in oil and gas, mining, banking, pharmaceuticals, textiles, automotive, and agriculture. The Ministry of External Affairs of India said that under LoCs with Africa in different sectors, 193 projects have been completed, 66 are under execution, and 88 are under pre-execution.

Bilateral trade between India and Africa has grown consistently year after year. For example, in 2020, India exported 5.2% of the continent’s global exports and imported 7%, India has made a substantial investment of $7 billion in a gas field located in Mozambique. Simultaneously, he also asserted that India serves as the third-largest export destination for Africa. Petroleum products accounted for the majority of India’s exports, followed by pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and grains. Moreover, India’s primary African export destinations encompass South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania Conversely, India predominantly imports mineral fuels, crude oil, natural or cultivated pearls, and precious stones from South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt and Morocco among other countries.

• Medical Tourism: India’s involvement and development cooperation with Africa includes health care delivery, as shown by the US$10 million India-Africa Health Fund created during the 2015 third India- Africa Forum Summit. Africans traveling to India for medical treatment increased from 5.4% of total tourist visits in 2010 to 15.4% in 2019, Indian and African healthcare professionals work together on hospital construction and capacity development. India offered food help to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea and 150 metric tonnes of medical supplies to 25 African countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. While some African authorities have condemned the West’s attitude to the continent’s COVID-19 immunization efforts, India kept its vaccine supply lines open throughout the pandemic.

• Education and Information Technology: In recent times, there has been a growing interest among individuals from African nations in Indian universities and research institutions. As of the year 2022, the Indian government has disbursed more than 30,000 scholarships to students from Africa, to the commitment made by the country in 2015 to provide a total of 50,000 scholarships over ten years.

The Indian technological and economic partnership program helps Africa research and build capacity via training and scientific and technological partnerships. Considering the significance of the information and communication technology (ICT) industry in the progress of Africa and the endeavours of various African nations to expedite their technological infrastructure and digital identification, as well as optimize the trade advantages offered by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), India has emerged as a prominent suggestion for collaboration and cooperation. The flagship ICT project Pan African e-Network, proposed in 2004 and launched in 2009 by India and the African Union, connects African countries through a seamless and integrated satellite, fiber optics, and wireless network and uses Indian IT skills to improve healthcare and education in their institutions.

         The first international campus of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) in Tanzania represents a milestone in India’s Global South initiative and highlights the commitment to develop educational relations between India and Africa. The digital transformation in India has played a significant role in enhancing education and healthcare in Africa through the implementation of e-VidyaBharti, a tele-education platform, and e-ArogyaBharti, a telemedicine platform. 

• Security and Defence: The aspect in question is frequently disregarded in scholarly discourse concerning the relations between India and Africa. While there is a perception that India’s increased focus on Africa is a response to China’s growing influence on the continent, encompassing trade, business, and maritime activities, PM Modi addressed the issue of collaboration with Africa during his visit to Uganda in 2018.

He emphasized India’s commitment to combat terrorism, promote peacekeeping efforts, and enhance cyber security as fundamental principles guiding India’s engagement with Africa. India’s historical assistance, which established military academics and trained national cadres and military personalities in African countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria and sent UN missions to Congo and Liberia, may be its greatest asset in this regard. India cooperates with Mauritius, Seychelles, and numerous African coastal nations on maritime security. The Africa-India field Training Exercise-2019 and numerous Indian institutes have promoted Indian-made weaponry to African nations facing instability. 

Can India Effectively Compete with China in Africa?

India and China are pursuing their interests in Africa in numerous ways. Despite the Indian government’s claim that its cooperation with Africa is a blend of India’s development goals and the African Union’s long-term vision, most of India’s policies and trade patterns with Africa remain constrained. India’s ties with the African Union, capacity and skills development, education and research, healthcare, and information technology demonstrate its people-centered approach to the continent. The Indian government also prioritizes cultural contacts with Eastern and Southern Africa, which some experts see as a chance to reestablish historical ties. 

Nevertheless, China’s dominant economic influence and significance in Africa remain unparalleled, surpassing not only India but also numerous other contenders. In 2021, Beijing’s total bilateral trade with Africa surged by 35.3% to reach USD 254.3 billion. China’s strategic focus primarily lies in the implementation of ambitious infrastructural projects, which serve the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and establish partnerships encompassing resource extraction and high-level government agreements.

These large-scale endeavours are aimed at bolstering China’s economy, expanding its global influence, and safeguarding its strategic objectives. China has a plan to promote its interests among regional blocs and geostrategic African states, unlike India’s limited outreach and penetration. India’s security and military collaboration with Africa is limited, the private sector doesn’t properly grasp Africa’s investment climate. China, on the other hand, has helped military reform in Africa by providing weapons, technology, and independent capacity-building. Since the West sanctioned Russia, China has increased its military outposts, maritime activity, and arms sales to African governments.

Potential Strategies for Progress

a) It is imperative to assert direct authority over our development programme rather than delegating the allocation of funds to intermediaries whose objectives may diverge from those of India.

b) Our assistance should be bilateral and linked with the recipient state’s interests, which should be a major stakeholder and co-investor in plans and projects from start to finish.

c)Second, India should prioritize developing nations with major interests, both current and future. Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Angola, and Algeria are India’s top six commercial partners in Africa, accounting for about two-thirds of its commerce and half of its exports to the continent, although they are not prioritized in India’s growth.

d)The consideration of India’s domestic requirements for raw materials, commodities, and markets should be taken into account when determining its aid strategy.

e) In addition, it is advisable to prioritize assisting nations that demonstrate a willingness to collaborate with us by granting access to their natural resources, rather than relying solely on our generic alternatives.

f) The assisted project should meet local needs. Cost-effective, scalable, future-proof, and commercially repeatable.

g) India should favor public sector assistance initiatives for transparency.

Conclusion

Historically, India’s diplomatic ties with Africa have been rooted in their shared endeavours to combat colonialism, apartheid, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and hunger. There have been modifications in policy, strategy, and implementation. The profound reflection of this sentiment is most evident in the two outcome documents of the India-Africa Forum Summit Ⅲ (IAFS-Ⅲ), namely the Delhi Declaration 2015 and the India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation. India’s leadership’s effectiveness in calming Africa’s concerns will be shown in the following months and years. It’s crucial to show Africa that India’s foreign policy prioritizes it. A white paper on Africa might solidify India’s African strategy.

By: Rahul Wankhede

Introduction

After a period of inactivity following the Balakot airstrikes carried out by the Indian Air Force, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terror group, headquartered in Bahawalpur, seems to have revitalized its tactics to regain prominence in the terrorism landscape of Kashmir. In April 2023, the group claimed responsibility for the Poonch terror attack, where Indian Army soldiers were ambushed by Jaish terrorists. Additionally, the group has issued threats to target mines and industries in the region. Given the group’s renewed focus on Kashmir, it becomes crucial to examine its origins and journey up until 2019.

How the group was formed

JeM, meaning the ‘Army of Mohammed,’ is a relatively new organization founded on December 31, 2000. It is a Sunni Islamic group with its headquarters in Bahawalpur, located in the Pakistani Punjab province. The founder of JeM is Maulana Masood Azhar, who was previously associated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and shares ideological alignment with the Deobandi school of thought. Masood Azhar received training at the same religious seminary in Karachi as the Taliban founder Mullah Omar.

After gaining experience in Afghanistan, Masood Azhar established alliances with Harkat affiliates in Chechnya, Central Asia, and Somalia. He also established connections with Osama bin Laden during his fundraising mission in the United Kingdom. Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested by security forces on February 11, 1994, in Anantnag, Jammu and Kashmir, while serving as the General Secretary of the now-defunct Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in December 1999 was orchestrated to secure Masood Azhar’s release from prison. His younger brother, Mufti Abdul Rauf, and brother-in-law, Yusuf Azhar, were among the hijackers. Following his release, Azhar travelled to Bahawalpur, Pakistan, and announced the formation of a new outfit called JeM at the Binori mosque in Karachi, which received significant participation from existing terror groups. JeM has been officially banned in Pakistan since 2002.

Objectives of Jaish-e-Mohammed

 JeM shares similar objectives with other terrorist organizations operating in the Kashmir region, primarily aiming to secede Kashmir from India and merge it with Pakistan. Once Kashmir is liberated, the group intends to expand its jihad to other parts of India, with the goal of driving out Hindus and non-Muslims from the Indian subcontinent. JeM also seeks to expel United States and Western forces from Afghanistan. Masood Azhar, in 1994 after his arrest in Kashmir, expressed his intention to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule and establish Islamic rule. He also voiced his opposition to Israel and what he perceived as “anti-Muslim” forces worldwide. Masood Azhar, in a speech in Karachi, was reported to have said, “Marry for jihad, give birth for jihad, and earn money only for jihad until the cruelty of America and India ends.”

Ideological Foundations

 The Binori mosque serves as a significant source of ideological foundations for JeM, adhering to the Deobandi Sunni school of thought. Extremist leaders such as Fazlur Rahman Khalil of HuM and Maulana Azam Tariq, a leader of Siaph-e-Sahiba, are alumni of this mosque. Masood Azhar himself was a student of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of Sipah-e-Sahaba. JeM also had a website that published articles written by Masood Azhar, which often focused on the so-called “Jewish conspiracy to incite America for the invasion of Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

Leadership & Organizational Structure

 JeM operates through several departments overseen by a 12-member consultative committee called Markaz-e-majilis-e-Shura. The organization consists of departments such as the Military Department, Department of Prisoners, Department of Dawat and Irshad, Martyrs Department, Department of Grievance Redressal, Department of Matrimony, and Department of Broadcasting and Publication. The Military Department further comprises four sub-units: Madrasa Syed Ahmed Shaheed in Balakot, Camp Muzaffarabad, Camp Hajera, and Camp Mansehra. The Balakot Madrasa serves as an advanced training ground for JeM fighters and hosts annual conferences. Family members of Masood Azhar actively participate in the functioning of JeM. His brother, Abdul Rauf Asghar, holds a senior leadership position within JeM and serves as its intelligence coordinator. He was involved in the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 and directed the terrorists during the 2016 Pathankot attack through telephone communication. Abdul Rauf Asghar has been designated as a “global terrorist” by the US Treasury Department.

Areas of Operations & Strategy

 JeM primarily focuses on carrying out attacks within India. They have conducted suicide bombings, targeted state authorities, army bases, camps, convoys, and other significant establishments. Their weapons of choice include machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, IEDs, and rocket-propelled grenades. JeM has also engaged in activities like abductions, hijackings, and targeted bombings. The group exhibits sophisticated communication methods, meticulous attack planning, and effective utilization of local human intelligence, making them deadlier than other militant groups in Kashmir. Simultaneously planning multiple high-profile attacks has become a recent trend for JeM, as seen after the CRPF convoy attack, where a suspect from Bathinda was arrested in a car bomb blast case, reportedly intended to replicate the Pulwama attack.

Outside of India, JeM carried out an attack on the Indian Mission in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, in 2016. The group has operational ties with other militant organizations like HuM, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, conducting joint operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. JeM has engaged in suicide missions targeting Pakistani officials in cities such as Islamabad, Karachi, Murree, Taxila, and Bahawalpur.

Capabilities (military and finance)

 JeM receives funding primarily through charitable front trusts like Al-Rasheed and Al-Akhtar, which operate as social welfare organizations but are involved in raising funds for various terror groups. The group has also allegedly received financial support from Al Qaeda. Donations are raised through propaganda, distribution of pamphlets, posters, and write-ups in religious and political magazines. The JeM has reportedly invested funds in commodity markets, real estate, and the production of commodity goods. Pakistan seized JeM’s bank accounts in the country, but the group had already withdrawn its funds. JeM has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Support Bases

JeM witnessed rapid advancement after its establishment in 2000, and its launch in Karachi attracted around 10,000 attendees. The group has bases in various locations, ranging from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Doda in South Kashmir. JeM benefits from ground support and sheltering provided by the Pakistani ISI. A significant portion of JeM’s membership is from Punjab in Pakistan, particularly from Multan, Bahawalpur, and Rahim Khan districts. The shared ethnicity with the Pakistani military corps (Punjabis) was expected to align JeM with the military’s strategic goals. JeM also has members from Afghanistan and Arab countries. Ahmed Omar Sheikh, convicted of murdering American journalist Daniel Pearl, has close associations with JeM leaders. The group maintains connections with its ancestor organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, as well as operational ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba. JeM is part of the ISI-sponsored United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization of militant groups operating in Kashmir.

Current Status, Emerging Trends, Scope for Growth

While senior leader Ghazi Baba was killed in an operation by the Indian Army in August 2003, JeM still poses an active threat due to its global networks. The earthquake of 2005 destroyed many of its training camps, but the group quickly recovered. JeM is now considered one of the deadliest terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, with a broader agenda of Pan-Islamism and anti-Americanism due to its international connections. The Pakistani government’s detention and subsequent release of Masood Azhar on multiple occasions, often under external pressure, represent a futile exercise in showcasing justice. JeM exemplifies the complex network of cross-border terrorism faced by India and indicates the trend of decentralization in the new era of international terrorism, where self-inspired lateral networks are proving to be more dangerous than the original group itself.

The February 2019 Balakot strike by the Indian Air Force is said to have done a significant damage to JeM, as the chosen target area was sealed off for almost a month by Pakistan and access to outside people was cut off. Since then, JeM has not been able to carry out any kinds of anti-India activity. This is not to say that all future attacks have been prevented or the group is now defunct. This period is being used as a breathing time by the outfit to regroup and plan future attacks, obvious in which, the help of Pakistani deep state will be instrumental. A tinge of this was felt in 2022 when a Jaish terrorist recruited from Pulwama, came to Nagpur for conducting a reconnaissance of the RSS Headquarters and other prospective targets. He was subsequently arrested and is currently lodged in a jail.

A change of tactic that has been adopted by Jaish is to create affiliate groups and operate through them. One such group goes around by the name of PAFF – People’s Anti-Fascist Front. The wording of this name is different and ‘secular’ from the religious toning of the previous name of ‘Jaish-e-Mohammed’. The name also gives out a false impression that its target is ‘fascist forces within India’. This will be later on used to selectively portray the Indian state as a ‘fascist force’. This change of names and tactics is due to severe international pressure on Pakistan to act against terror groups. While Jaish is located inside Pakistan, PAFF claims to have originated in Kashmir itself – another change of tactic to give legitimacy to their cause. A third visible change of tactic is moving away from spectacular and high-value attacks to ambushes and localized attacks with an added aspect of marketing and publicity.

While the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack were quite big in terms of the ‘target value’ and the location, the attack in Poonch was a commando style operation – carried out by a small team of terrorists who came in to attack, carried out the killings and fled the spot. They did not come there to wait and hold ground and to ‘die like a shaheed’. The Poonch attack was very well planned and coordinated by them, obviously not without local support. The target selection and the location of attack was also selected in way that would benefit the terrorists. As a result, the army vehicle was completely destroyed in the attack, and all soldiers occupying the army truck died on the spot, except one who is battling for his life in a hospital. The terrorists also recorded some clips of the attack as was visible from some of the clips shared by PAFF online, with complementary propaganda of more attacks to be done, just a few days after the attack. This is a strategy used to earn media coverage and signal to the government that ‘we are still capable of hurting you’.

It now remains for the security agencies to be on their high alert and work towards preventing further attacks, a long-term strategy for which would be to try for complete elimination of this problem from its very roots, that includes conducting overt and covert operations against all the terror groups, especially in areas where they are mainly located (outside and inside the Indian borders). This demands policy and perspective changes at the highest levels of national security management and decision making that needs to evolve as per the dynamic contemporary security scenarios.

By: Sanoop Suresh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Once more, France embarks on a movement, but this time the demand is not the reversal of pension reforms or the control of the rising cost of living, but rather the elimination of institutionalized racism. Racism is not a new phenomenon in France. In fact, the current events are a part and parcel of the normal lives of many minorities in the nation. The inception of the current riots in France is because an African Muslim teenager was shot to death by a police officer. This triggered a lot of motions across the country which called out the blatant racism existent in the nation. This event has been linked to the 2005 riots wherein two teenage boys of minority ethnicity died after hiding from police. These riots and their history gave insight into the background of racism in the nation.

Why France Protests?

On June 27, 2023, a police officer shot and killed 17-year-old Nahel M., in the chest while attempting to stop his rental car that had broken many traffic rules. Two police officers are seen attempting to stop the car in a video that has gone viral on social media and has been verified by the French news agency AFP. One of the police officers points his gun at the driver through the window and fires at close range when it appears that the driver is still trying to move the car. Before colliding, the automobile traveled a few meters. After the teenager’s death, a fight between frustrated citizens and the police broke out, leading to the deployment of 45,000 police when the demonstrations turned violent and the protesters vandalized various public facilities. Nahel came from the underprivileged neighborhoods of France and had Algerian descent. The fatal police shot was described as “unforgivable” and “inexplicable” by the president of France, Emmanuel Macron, as an attempt to ease the tension. The demonstrators demand that the government take action against the police since they stand accused of enjoying a “culture of impunity” and abuse. According to reports, over 3,600 people have been detained at an average age of 17 in France. Even though the violence receded over time, it left numerous lawsuits for vandalism and more than 800 law enforcement officers injured. These events also brought back concerns about the methods used by the police, who frequently target residents in low-income areas, especially minorities.

Is French Police Racist?

Owing to memories which long back to the Second World War, since the people officially designated as Jews were sent into concentration camps, the French government never collected data regarding race, ethnicity, and religion. Still, the racial biases in French institutions have often been pointed out by various agencies. The French Police is no exception in practicing institutionalized racism and often bears the blame for failing in their duty to provide impartial treatment.

A black music producer named Michael Zeckler was severely beaten by four police officers in Paris in November 2020, and the video of this incident gained widespread attention. This video came amidst the debates over a law which prohibits recording active police on duty and, consequently, the law was nullified by the top court due to concern over the accountability of police practices. According to research, people from low-income minority groups frequently have similar experiences. A 2017 study by the independent administrative body “Defender of Rights” reveals that police identity checks mostly target young men from visible minorities, supporting the notion that such checks are based on race. “80% of people corresponding to the profile of ‘young man perceived as black or Arab’ declare that they have been checked in the last five years,” according to a representative sampling of more than 5,000 people. On the other hand, only 16% of other respondents declare that they have been checked in identity check practice. Even while data indicate a bias inside the French police institution, a closer examination will provide more light on the changes in French politics brought on by the emergence of far-right political groups.

How Color Blind is France?

Even though France describes itself as a color-blind society, its politics is becoming less inclusive as a result of rising Far-Right political participation. There has been an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes across French society, and the far-right political groups frequently try to gain electoral support by appealing to the resentment of ordinary citizens towards the influx of immigrants. In November 2022, Grégoire de Fournas, a French lawmaker from the far-right National Rally party, was suspended from the assembly for yelling “Go back to Africa” during a speech by Carlos Martens Bilongo, a black colleague, about the difficulties faced by migrants while aboard a rescue boat operated by the non-profit organization SOS Méditerranée. Similar to this, Marine Le Pen, the leader of National Rally’s parliamentary party, gained 41.5% of the vote in the second round of the 2022 presidential elections despite being accused of supporting anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalist, and anti-Islamic policies, even though she was eventually defeated by Macron.

When we look at two similar fundraisers that are taking place at the same time, we can see the changes in French society. A fundraiser for Nahel M.’s family reportedly brought in more than 200,000 euros from about 100,000 contributions. On the other hand, another fund-raiser for the family of the 38-year-old police officer who shot Nahel is taking place in France. It was established by Jean Messiha, an independent far-right populist and former Marine La Pen aide. In this, more than 1 million Euros has been raised from nearly 52,000 contributors. The considerable difference between these two fundraisers provides two important insights. Firstly, there is a growing indifference in French society regarding the plight of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Secondly, it highlights the polarization of wealth, and how it plays out in the debate over the elimination of systematic racism.

How Equal Is France?

According to a study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, there was a noticeable shift in who benefited from French economic strategies between 1950 and 2014. The data shows that between 1950 and 1983, the bulk of the population benefited from growth. However, after 1983, such gains have only been experienced by the top percentile. According to multiple reports, the disparity in the distribution of wealth in French society is at an all-time high and the Russia-Ukraine war makes the situation worse for the economically deprived suburbs in France.

The death of Nahel M. became the tipping point for the long-standing resentment over institutional apathy as there was an increasing sense of disillusionment among the socioeconomic strata. One of France’s poorest regions economically is the Paris suburbs, where the riots have been taking place. The feeling of marginalization felt by France’s ethnic minority fueled the violence. The social exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in France is characterized by high unemployment, low educational achievement, and poverty compared to the majority of the French population.

Because the major political parties disregarded their demands for equitable economic distribution and inclusive policies, voting for smaller parties or staying home during elections became the norm in the suburbs. These communities find it challenging to voice their complaints and requests to the current political structures due to their perception of political disenfranchisement. Racial tensions and persistent social and economic inequalities were once more brought to light in French debate, but there were fewer prospects for effective remedies.

Will France Change?

The ethnic minority groups who belong to the low- income suburbs of France face three significant risks. Firstly, there is a growing racial apathy in French institutions and society, which is paired with the emergence of Far-Right ideas. Secondly, there is the financial hardship brought on by the political system’s failure to adopt inclusive policies. Finally, the lack of representation in France’s political institutions as a result of their incapacity to change into a political pressure group. Unsurprisingly, all of these issues were discussed in French politics, but they have never successfully changed the country’s political landscape.

Only the development and use of an open and impartial political system can restore trust in these institutions and the primary duty of French administration. To accomplish this, society and the government must consider the needs of ethnic and economic minorities when formulating policies and guarantee that everyone is treated fairly. Similarly, the political system has a duty to treat all segments of society equally from the institutions that have legal authority and are held accountable for their deeds. The assimilation of many socio-economic groups in mainstream society is hindered by the polarization of anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalist views, and it is questionable how well French politics would perform in an altering political environment. Time alone has the answer to that query.

By: Vaibhav Borude, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Indian Ocean is the third-largest of the world’s five oceanic divisions, covering   19.8% of the water on Earth’s surface. It is bounded by Asia to the north, Africa to the west and Australia to the east. To the south it is bounded by the Southern Ocean or Antarctica. Along its core, the Indian Ocean has some large marginal or regional seas such as the Arabian Sea, Laccadive Sea, Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Indian Ocean is strategically and geo economically one of most important place of earth. Indian Ocean connects the petroleum producing gulf region to the wider market, thus makes an important place for transport and service sector.

The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically important in the world with more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through the Indian Ocean and its vital chokepoints, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait.

Considering, this many countries had always tried to increase their power differentials in Indian Ocean space. Britian has long standing dispute with Mauritius on Chagos archipelago. USA has its naval base in Diego Garcia. Now, China wants to control the vital Indian Ocean, so is using its power to develop military bases and economic trade point like Chinese port in Djibouti.

With world gearing up to increase their influence in Indian Ocean, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is trying to provide an unique platform for countries in this region to increase cooperation and coordination in Indian Ocean.

Indian Ocean Rim Association is an intergovernmental organization established on March 07, 1997. The late President of South Africa Nelson Mandela inspired this vision of Indian ocean rim association during his visit to India. “The natural urge of facts of history and geography should broaden itself to include the concept of an Indian Ocean RIM for socio- economic cooperation” was the vision of late president Nelson Mandela.

The structure of IORA consists of apex body ie the Council of Foreign Ministers (COM) which meets annually. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) assumed the role of Chair from November 2019 – November 2021, followed by the People’s Republic of Bangladesh November 2021 – November 2023. A committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meets twice a year to progress IORA’s agenda and consider recommendations by Working Groups and forums of officials, business and academics to implement policies and projects to improve the lives of people within the Indian Ocean Member States.

The charter of IORA has defined the various objectives that members seek to achieve. This includes, to promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic co-operation. To focus on areas where economic cooperation can be achieved. To look for all avenues for trade liberalization, strengthen cooperation and dialogue among countries. The Priority Areas of the Indian Ocean Rim Association are:

1. Maritime Safety and Security;

2. Trade and Investment Facilitation;

3. Fisheries Management;

4. Disaster Risk Management;

5. Academic,

Science and Technology Cooperation; and

6. Tourism and Cultural Exchanges.

The IORA has also started many flagship initiatives such asIndian Ocean dialogue. The Indian Ocean Dialogue is established in its role as a stand-alone Track 1.5 discussion, encouraging an open and free flowing dialogue by key representatives of IORA Member States such as scholars, experts, analysts, and policy makers from governments, think tanks and civil societies on a number of crucial strategic issues of the Indian Ocean Region.

Somalia and Yemen development program is organized as a special capacity building program for this region. As the region has been the worst sufferer of conflict, radicalisation and civil war. The IORA has also launched theIORA Sustainable Development Program. The IORA Sustainable Development Program (ISDP) was introduced in 2014 and is dedicated for the least developed countries (LDCs) that require assistance and support to conduct projects, and with the main purpose to promote sharing experiences and best practices among IORA Member States. IORA has collaborated with UN Women to strengthen research on women’s economic empowerment, and promote the Women’s Empowerment Principles in the region, supported by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

India’s Role in IORA

• India continues to promote its official policy of “coordination, cooperation and partnership” in the regional maritime domain.
• As coordinator to the priority area on disaster risk management, India has published guidelines for IORA. It has also urged partners to join the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure launched at the UN in September 2019.
• India has been trying to emerge as the net provider of information in the IOR and in that direction it created the Information Fusion Centre located in Gurugram to assist member countries of IOR with real-time crisis information. Bangladesh, Mauritius, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Seychelles have been part of the information support structure of India.
• Indian policy takes into consideration that IOR is not an India-run maritime domain and that is reflected in the government’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) programme, which aims to turn the region more inclusive.

With rising importance of the Indian Ocean Region, a secure maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is crucial for both India and African countries for securing national interests and achieving sustained national development. Such security means not only guarding the coastline or territories, but also safeguarding the countries’ interests in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as well as protecting trade and shipping routes, and sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs).

There are a number of challenges this region is facing. The region around western Indian Ocean is prone to threat from pirates. They threaten the development of secure sea lane communication in the region. India has net security provider of Indian ocean, has deployed its Naval forces to act against these threats and has been successful in reducing the intensity of pirate attacks.

The next big challenge of the region is in China’s ambition of making the Indian Ocean as its own backyard, like USA maintained its hegemony in the Pacific Ocean. China is trying to increase its influence in the region by using its Strings of Pearls theory. That aims to encircle India by the sea-route. They are aiming to gain upper hand in sea lanes of communication in this region for this they have launched a maritime component of Belt and Road Initiative ie Global Maritime Silk Route. That aims to develop trade links all around the world from China to Europe. China is also using its debt trap diplomacy to force countries in taking unsustainable debts and then when they fail to repay their infrastructure are taken on long lease by them. The Chinese have used this strategy well in Sri Lanka and also is trying to use it in Maldives and Mauritius.

The next big challenge facing this region is rising sea levels due to climate change. Many of this region face existential threats due to rising sea level. Many parts of this region would be submerged thus resulting in threat to survival for these countries. Despite many of them being net negative carbon emitters, the threat they face is highest. Mainly due to emission from developed countries.

However, with challenges come opportunities. India has a lot of opportunities in this region. Indians have a sizable number of diaspora in many of these countries that have been able to create an image of good friendly neighbour. India’s soft power has been greatly enhanced.

Along with it the rising stature of the Indian economy provides opportunities for the region to align with our trade goals and in the end develop their own economy. With the rising middle class in India, many countries of this region can develop from tourists from India. In an effort to become the primary source of information in the IOR, India established the Information Fusion Centre in Gurugram, which provides member nations with crisis information in real time. Bangladesh, Mauritius, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and the Seychelles have all contributed to India’s information support system. The Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) program, which strives to make the region more inclusive, reflects Indian policy’s recognition that the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is not an Indian-run maritime domain.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association A(IOR) must be India’s main priority. IOR’s mission to advance regional development that is both sustainable and equitable must be the cornerstone of any new initiative in the region. A unique regional cooperation initiative on the blue economy must be taken into consideration by IORA. That will fulfil the aspirations of the IOR countries.

By: Hitti Chopra, Research Analyst, GSDN

G7 is the group of seven countries that is an informal organization of the world’s advanced economies which dominate the international financial system and global trade. They are France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. Russia belonged to the group from 1998 till 2014 when the block was known as G8 (Group of 8) but it was suspended following its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region.

History

The world in 1975 was experiencing high inflation followed by sparks of recession by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo leading to grouping of 6 countries – The United States, the UK, Japan, France, Italy and West Germany to counter the economic and political challenges at that time. Canada joined the grouping in 1976. G7 is not a formal institution with a secretariat and a charter. The Presidency rotates on an annual basis which is responsible for setting up of the agenda. Sherpas, ministers and envoys hammer out policy initiatives before the summit. All the G7 countries are a part of G20.

G7 and Russia

Russia formally joined the inter-governmental political forum in 1998, making it G8. The membership of Russia was indefinitely suspended due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The restoration of Russia membership was suggested by various countries. The German foreign minister in 2016 stated that “none of the major international conflicts can be solved without Russia”, and the G7 countries will consider Russia’s return to the group in 2017. But in 2017, Russia formally announced that it would permanently leave the G8 grouping.

G7 was considered a grouping that could serve ‘collective-action’ and have like minded nations but it was challenged during President Donald Trump’s tenure. He wanted readmission of Russia in the bloc and believed it was “common sense” to include Russia in the “outdated” group.

The “collective action” bloc and multilateralism

Multilateralism has always been the leading edge in the global geopolitics since the second world war. The emergence of United Nations, creation of forums like G7 and G20, the world has witnessed a transition from unipolar order towards multipolarity. It has given a rise to solving common global threats together but at the same time new uncertainties have intensified the relations between nations like US and China. The countries might resort to protectionist policy due to transnational issues however it is integral for nations to align regional, national, global strategies to maintain the global order. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in G20 summit has mentioned that “Today, we do not need to fight for our survival-our era need not be one of war. Indeed, it must not be one.”

G7 is an exclusive group of industrialised nations and was created with the aim to maintain the economic stability of these seven nations. G20 is a group of both developing and developed countries and is focused on international cooperation and decision making. It covers around 85 percent of world GDP and two thirds of world population. Emerging powers including India, Brazil, Mexico, China, and South Africa, whose absence from the G7 is often mentioned, all belong to the G20. The overlapping of G7 and G20 mandates can be synergized ensuring a balance between the developing and developed worlds. Multilateralism is necessary in the multipolar world especially after COVID 19 pandemic. The G7 and G20 can work together in the support of multilateralism and can play an important role in global cooperation and coordination. The issue of food security, climate change, cyber warfare, technological disruptions, the common global threats which both institutions face can be addressed together and both the institutions can work together to build consensus among member states.

Challenges the group face

The G7’s future has been challenged by continued tensions with Russia and China. The bloc has imposed coordinated sanctions on Russia in response to the Ukraine war. The current G7 Presidency is under Japan and the latter has raised concern over the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

The rise of Belt and Road Initiative of China is also a major concern for the grouping and recently in the springs G7 summit in Hiroshima, the bloc vowed to deliver the goal of up to $600 billion in financing for quality infrastructure through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment, which is a rival to China’s Belt and Road initiative. During a trip to China prior to the G7 summit in 2023 as mentioned by the Council on Foreign Relations, French President Emmanuel Macron said the EU should avoid becoming pulled into a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, drawing some backlash from U.S. lawmakers.

Beijing has also often faced backlash for its human rights policy against its citizens from G7. The bloc leaders said in their statement “We call on China not to conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities, the integrity of our democratic institutions and our economic prosperity”, citing the Vienna Convention which regulates diplomatic affairs.

The industrialised G7 countries accounting for 20 percent of global emissions have been lukewarm with their commitments and majority of the pledges have been diluted further. The bloc has been under constant scanner for their ongoing dependence on fossil fuels especially coal. The G7 countries have to redirect and mobilize their financial support to renewable energy and aim to remove market distortions.

Conclusion

The current spring G7 summit conducted in Hiroshima Japan has showcased how the leaders of G7 came together on unified positions regarding Russia and China. The grouping can be of global good if it aligns its mandate vis a vis other multilateral forum across world like G20 and Quad which can result in fostering regional and global development, enhance cultural interchange and strengthen global governance.