By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Morocco marks a significant moment in the evolving geopolitical landscape. Landed at Casablanca on November 21, 2024 Moroccan Prince Malay EL Hassen welcomed the Chinese delegates signalling growing ties between China and Morocco. This visit emphasizes their commitment to deepening their partnership and highlights their mutual aspirations to expand their influence and foster robust economic cooperation. The visit highlights Beijing’s growing strategic commitment for expanding its influence across North Africa, as this region serves as the gateway to Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

During the visit, the discussion centred around deepening economic cooperation, particularly in areas like renewable energy and infrastructure projects, such as Morocco’s first electric vehicle gigafactory (EV), which is taking centre stage. Moreover, this growing partnership is of global strategic importance regarding China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and the utilization of Morocco as a strategic hub for the Chinese army to stretch its footprint across and beyond the region.   At the same time, Morocco’s strategic importance as a global trade hub and the ever-intensifying competition between China and the United States also play a significant role. So, through this paper, I will unpack the dynamics shaping this relationship and what it means for global power, spanning from the geopolitics of infrastructure to the geographic positioning of Morocco and trade and investment and analyze Xi Jinping’s visit and investments in Morocco and future implications.

Geopolitical Implications and Competitions in Africa

Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Morocco underscores China’s expanding influence in Africa, which has become a battleground for global power competition. Africa’s vast natural resources and emerging markets are critical aspects which make this region more pivotal for the strategic goals of big powers. Until now, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has become one of the significant geostrategic initiatives, marking the cutting edge initiative of China to inject billions of dollars into infrastructural developments across the continent, especially the construction of ports.

This has positioned Beijing as a dominant player in Africa’s economic landscape, and BRI impact is evident in the large-scale projects like the Mambasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port in Djibouti; Beijing’s massive investments have modernized key infrastructure across the continent, connecting previously isolated regions to the global markets. Morocco became the first North African country to formalize its Belt and Road Initiative. This partnership has attracted significant Chinese investments, such as the US$ 1.3 billion electric vehicle battery gigafactory being built in Kenitra, a project set to make Morocco a leader in the global renewable energy supply chain.

All these investments and projects cement China’s long-term influence over the region. However, China’s approach has drawn criticism, and many scholars have accused it of fostering debt-trap diplomacy, where developing nations are burdened with unsustainable loans tied to Chinese firms and interests, just like how Kenya struggles with the repayment of its Chinese-funded railway exemplifies these concerns.

On the other hand, the United States has approached Africa through initiatives like Power Africa and Prosper Africa, emphasizing sustainable trade and partnerships governance reforms; unlike China’s infrastructure-heavy strategy, US efforts focus on capacity building and fostering private sector engagements. However, these initiatives have often been criticized for needing to be more visible than China’s tangible large-scale projects. Xi Jinping’s visit to Morocco places the country firmly within the more considerable geopolitical competition as a relatively stable and economically progressive nation in North Africa. Morocco has become a focal point for both Chinese and American engagement.

For Beijing, Morocco is a key partner in extending the BRI to North Africa and leveraging the country’s geographic and economic advantages. By strengthening economic ties with Morocco, China is poised to facilitate smoother trade routes and enhance its regional economic influence, paving the way for increased collaboration in various sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and technology. The implications of this partnership extend beyond mere economics; they also carry substantial geopolitical weight. As China seeks to expand its reach and influence on the global stage, cultivating relationships with key partners like Morocco becomes increasingly important. This partnership reflects a broader strategy of diversifying China’s economic and diplomatic relationships, reducing dependency on any single region, and strengthening its stance as a dominant player in global affairs.

Moreover, the collaboration between China and Morocco is a model for developing nations to engage with larger economies to promote mutual growth. As Morocco continues modernizing its infrastructure attract foreign investment, China’s involvement could accelerate these processes, benefiting both nations. This synergy supports Morocco’s economical developmental aims and aligns with China’s broader objectives under the BRI initiative, paving the way for a more interconnected world. Morocco remains a critical ally for Washington, particularly in counter-terrorism and trade as a bull against China’s growing regional influence. Along with the geopolitical implications, the strategic position of Morocco makes the region more vital not just for China but also for many other countries, mainly the USA.

China’s FDI share in Morocco is 3 per cent and has continued to increase gradually over recent years. However, Morocco has not cut off its relations with the European Union and the United States; instead, it has emphasized the investments. Since the early 2000s, China has invested nearly US$ 1.26 billion in Morocco’s Transport, Communication and Energy. Morocco’s participation in China’s BRI has significantly benefited its economy. This has led to accelerated industrialization, development, and a renewed drive to attract Foreign Direct Investments. Chinese investments, particularly in tourism, have also hugely boosted Morocco’s economy. Chinese firms have entered into hotels and resorts, spas, and amusement parks where visa applications have increased dramatically by 3500% from China to Morocco, significantly improving Chinese tourists to Morocco. Despite being relatively new, Sino-Morocco relations contrast with other North African countries’ trading partnerships. However, Morocco is gradually growing deeper in China’s debt book policy; the North African nation now owe China US$ 1030.55 million. This development is bringing the country nearer to the Asian behemoth China.

Geostrategic Significance

The geographic position of Morocco makes it a strategic lynch for global trade and geopolitics. Situated at the crossroads of Africa, Morocco act as a gateway for trade and investment to Europe and the Middle East. Its proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar is one of the world’s busiest transit points for trade between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Morocco’s Free Trade Agreement with the European Union and the United States provides unparalleled access to major global markets. For China, investing in Morocco is a strategic move to secure a foothold in a region that connects three continents.

Key points illustrate how Beijing is leveraging Morocco’s location to strengthen its global trade networks is mainly through the investments in the Electric Vehicle battery Gigafactory in Kenitra, which Chinese firms announced as a tech-planned investment of US$ 1.3 billion. This facility is poised to make Morocco a hub for green energy supply chains. Trying the country to Europe’s growing demand for EV components, the factory’s initial capacity of 20 GWH, expandable to 100 GWH, will place Morocco at the centre of a burgeoning renewable energy market. China has also widely expressed interest in Morocco’s rail infrastructures, particularly the proposed Maresh-Agader high-speed rail line. This project will enhance domestic connectivity and bolster Morocco’s position as a regional logistic hub. This complements China’s broader strategy of developing African transportation networks into seamless trade corridors that connect African nations to global markets through Chinese-built infrastructures.

Morocco’s strategic location plays a vital role in Europe, particularly for the European Union, as it seeks to diversify its energy sources and reduce its reliance on Russian energy. By establishing Morocco as a renewable energy hub, China is indirectly positioning itself as a critical partner in Europe’s Green Transition. This significant alignment with Europe prioritizes enhancing influences in Africa and Europe for the United States. The strategic importance of Morocco must be considered as a focal point of research. Where Morocco remains a key ally in the region for bolstering military exercises like African Lion, which simultaneously serves as a platform for the US diplomatic and economic initiatives in Africa.

However, as China deepens its economic ties with Morocco, there is growing concern in Washington about the potential erosion of US influence. In order to counterbalance China, the US needs to increase its investments in Moroccan infrastructures, technology and clean energy sectors, aligning its strategy with Morocco’s development goals. China’s stretching of its strategic footprint has broader implications for global trade and geopolitical alignment, which will likely be discussed. China’s investment in Morocco is part of its larger strategy to reshape global trade and power dynamics. By integrating Morocco into its belt and road framework, China has not only strengthened its ties with North Africa but also gained indirect access to European and Middle Eastern markets.

This interconnected strategy enables China to expand its economic and geopolitics influences far beyond Africa. However, this deepening relationship comes with risk for Morocco. One of the main challenges Morocco will be facing is an over-reliance on China’s economic vulnerability and dependence on China. Chinese loans often come with conditions that benefit Chinese companies and may limit the economic sovereignty of the recipient nations. Morocco’s alignment with China for the United States presents challenges and opportunities. While there is a risk of losing strategic influence in North Africa, there is also an opening for collaboration by focusing on complementary investments such as clean energy technology and trade facilitation.

Morocco thus entered the competition for manufacturing value chains to become the geopolitical gatekeeper of North Africa. Morocco has already overtaken Spain and is on its way to becoming a leading maritime nation in the western Mediterranean. In his interview, Dong Liu, an economist for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out that Morocco presents a favourable setting for labour-intensive industrial manufacturing, which could create an excellent transfer opportunity for production from China to Morocco. While it is clear that China and Morocco’s bilateral cooperation and partnership involve more than cooperation and partnership business, the partnership has strategic dimensions for the two countries involved. On the other hand, Chinese enterprises may encounter challenges firmly tied up with French industries because Chinese and French relations are rare, and any hostility between the two countries may be bad news for Chinese business ventures.

Close relations with the countries of North Africa are critical for China due to the significant investments China has made in these countries. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has aimed at some key Mediterranean ports, raising alarm about possible confrontations that may endanger Western interests. Morocco is strategically placed, which has led China and the Western world to focus on this area, though China’s interoperation has adverse effects on Western dominance in Africa. This means a growing political impact through the business front, such as BRI, can bring more Chinese presence in fields like land, sea, air, and cyberspace. The Chinese threat of building or joint construction of a military base in the Maghreb region may alter the balance of naval forces in an important world region. He said that China’s increasing influence in Morocco, an important and strategic country in North Africa, may cause tension with American and European allies, affecting their interests. The Western powers must consider China’s actions in the North African region to protect its interests.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s visit to Morocco symbolizes pivotal bilateral relations in a landscape where international partnerships are crucial for sustained growth and influence. It underscores the significance of collaboration in today’s interconnected global economy, fostering an environment ripe for future developments that could reshape trade dynamics and geopolitical landscapes in the years to come. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, is designed to establish comprehensive land and maritime trade routes connecting China with Europe. This ambitious project seeks to stimulate economic growth and development across the vast expanse of Eurasia, fostering closer cooperation among nations and creating new opportunities for trade and investment. Morocco plays a vital role in this vision due to its strategic geographic position at the intersection of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The country is a crucial link that can enhance connectivity and trade flow between these continents. By strengthening economic partnerships with Morocco, China can streamline its trade routes and expand its influence in the region. The collaboration between China and Morocco goes beyond mere trade facilitation. Both nations can create more efficient logistics networks by investing in infrastructure projects like ports, railways, and roadways. This will benefit these two countries and neighbouring regions, opening new pathways for goods and services.

Moreover, Morocco’s rich cultural heritage and growing economy provide a favourable environment for Chinese businesses seeking to invest and establish a presence in North Africa. As both countries work together, they can drive mutual growth and development, enhancing Morocco’s role as a key hub in the broader context of the Belt and Road Initiative. This partnership symbolizes a new era of symbolizes and economic collaboration, promising to unlock significant potential for both nations and contribute to the overall economic landscape of the region.

The US can strengthen its partnership with Morocco while offering an alternative to Chinese financing. Xi Jinping’s visit to Morocco clearly signals Beijing’s long-term commitment to expanding its influence in Africa and beyond. Morocco’s strategic location and economic potential also make it a valuable partner in the China Belt and Road Initiative. However, they also place it at the centre of a growing rivalry between China and the US. The outcome of this competition will shape Morocco’s future and influence the balance of power across Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. For Beijing and Washington, Morocco represents an opportunity to assert global leadership in an increasingly interconnected world.

By: Paarvana Sree, Research Analyst, GSDN

Russia has been a trusted partner for India. Development of India-Russia relations have been a significant pillar of India’s foreign policy. By signing the Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership in October 2000, India-Russia bilateral ties have gained a new momentum with advanced levels of cooperation in almost all levels including security, defense, political, trade and economy, science and technology, culture and people to people ties. Further in December 2010 India and Russia’s strategic partnership was advanced to a high level of ‘ special and privileged strategic partnership’

Improving the trade and economic relation was the primary concern and considered as priority areas by both the nations. It is expected that bilateral investment will be improved by US$ 50 billion and that of bilateral trade to US$ 30 billion. According to the Department of commerce bilateral trade has reached US$ 65.70 billion in the 2023-24 financial year which is undoubtedly seen as a significant improvement.

In 2019, Russia and India announced their desire to establish a maritime corridor between the ports of Chennai and Vladivostok. Both nations consider it as an economic and geopolitical project. The Chennai-Vladivostok link was operating for a few years during the Soviet Union period. And after years this link is put into consideration for its revival.

One of the primary reasons for India-Russia’s limited trade was the lack of connectivity. But now there is certainly an increase in the trade. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which was established by Russia, Indian and Iran is operating only in specific parts. Both India and Russia remained politically trusted partners in terms of trade. However they faced a number of obstacles in carrying out their economic relations. In order to rectify this situation, the 2019 summit considered improving trade relations with special consideration given to the Russian Far East (RTE). The proposed Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor is significantly a part of this same vision.

Chennai – Vladivostok Maritime Corridor: A brief analysis

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Vladivostok in 2019 to attend the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) and annual Indo-Russian bilateral summit, a Memorandum of Intent (MoI) was signed by the officials on the’ Development of Maritime Communications between the ports of Chennai and Vladivostok. This maritime corridor is introduced to improve the bilateral trade between India and Russia. Presently India and Russia are connected through the Mumbai-St Petersburg shipping route. According to this, goods will take about 40 days to reach the destination. This proposed corridor sought to reduce the distance by saving economic costs. This corridor also has the potential to cover approximately 5,600 nautical miles which is about 10,300 km. As a result it will only take 24 days for the goods to reach the destination.

This corridor can be seen as an opportunity to India for realization of its ‘Act East Policy’. The Indian government can effectively manage its economic and political relations and also security concerns in the Indo Pacific region. This can be viewed as a ‘ game changer ‘ because it can add momentum to India and Russia’s economic relation. With the help of Russia, India is building a nuclear power plant in Kudankulam (Tamil Nadu coast). It is expected that this proposed corridor will automatically accelerate the project. This will also boost up India’s in land waterways with the aid of Russia’s low draft vessel technology system, which is one of the best in the world. Moscow’s increased participation in the project can assure the development of more than 5000 kilometers inland waterway and this can subsequently increase the cargo handling capacity by the ports for about 2,600 million tones.

Benefits for India

Both the countries Russia and India can attain numerous economic benefits by this corridor. It is known that the Middle Eastern region is the largest supplier of oil and Gas to India. This proposed corridor provides Indian companies and extraction opportunities in Russia’s Far East which will reduce India’s dependency on Arabian countries and subsequently provide energy security to India. Apart from this India will attain greater access to other resources like timber, forest resources, tin, gold, diamond, coal, nickel, rare earth minerals that the Russian Far East region holds. The Russian Government has already announced numerous initiatives to attract foreign investment in the region particularly in the areas of agriculture, infrastructure development, mining of mineral resources and precious metal deposits like gold, tin, tungsten and platinum. There are greater opportunities for collaboration in this aspect. India has announced US$ 1 billion  ‘ Line of Credit ‘for the development of this region. Hopefully both the Indian and Russian governments will increase that trade relations to US$ 30 billion by 2025, through this sea route. This serves as a Geo political thrust to India and Russia’s strategic and mutual partnership in Indo – Pacific region in order to counter the Chinese dominance.

India’s geopolitical implications

No doubt that the Chinese government is a bit sceptical about the Chennai-Vladivostok corridor as it passes through the South China Sea. India has enjoyed an important position in the Indian Ocean. But presently it has been challenged by Chinese dominance. So this project is of great importance to India in order to regain its influence in the Indian Ocean as well as around its neighborhood. This trade route enables India to build its own trade route independent of China’s influence. It is also to be noted that India’s maritime presence will be notable by passing the Chennai-Vladivostok sea route from South China and building the essential potential for ‘ Indian Naval Operations ‘ in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, India can counter-balance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region by this corridor. Further India is initiating a strategic dialogue with US, Japan and Australia through Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) in order to counter China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region.

Conclusion

For more than 75 years, India and Russia’s bilateral relationship has remained strong and stable. This relationship is considered as one of the powerful relationships in the contemporary world with shared understanding and common commitment to the multipolar world. It is to be noted that there has been a steady increase in the bilateral trade in the past two years. Also discussions are conducting for increasing exports from India as well as Russia. Many connectivity initiatives are conducted which is considered as pivotal for the bilateral cooperation including the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor.  Further both nations agreed to improve the cooperation in development of the Russian Far East region.

The Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor is now considered as an important project considering the economic and geopolitical interest of both the nations. The successful operationalization of this corridor will benefit both India and Russia to increase in trade and develop a vital and non-volatile channel for movement of goods.

By: Mahima Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

India’s nuclear programme stands as a testament to the nation’s ambition for energy independence and security. Since its inception in the mid-20th century, this programme has evolved from a modest initiative into a complex framework aimed at harnessing both uranium and thorium resources. With approximately 25% of the world’s known thorium reserves, India is uniquely positioned to leverage this resource for sustainable energy production, addressing both current and future energy demands. As the nation grapples with rising energy needs, the significance of nuclear energy becomes increasingly apparent, contributing only 3% to India’s electricity generation today but projected to reach 9% by 2047. This growth is not merely a reflection of energy strategy but also a critical component of India’s broader geopolitical posture, enhancing its standing on the global stage while ensuring a reliable energy supply for its burgeoning economy.

Historical Context

India’s nuclear programme began in the 1940s and 1950s, driven by Dr. Homi Bhabha, who is often referred to as the Father of India’s atomic energy initiative. Recognizing the country’s limited uranium resources—only about 1-2% of global reserves—Bhabha formulated a three-stage nuclear power programme aimed at achieving long-term energy security through the efficient utilization of India’s abundant thorium reserves, which account for approximately 25% of the world’s known supply. This innovative approach was designed to circumvent the limitations posed by scarce uranium while capitalizing on thorium’s potential as a sustainable energy source. The three-stage programme consists of:

1. Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) fuelled by natural uranium.
2. Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) that utilize plutonium-based fuel.
3. Thermal Breeder Reactors for utilizing thorium.

This strategy aims to generate nuclear power while ensuring minimal waste through a closed fuel cycle, where spent fuel from one stage is reprocessed for further use.

The Three-Stage Nuclear Programme

India’s three-stage nuclear power programme is a strategic initiative designed to ensure energy security and independence through efficient use of limited uranium resources and abundant thorium reserves. The stages are:

1. Stage 1: Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs)
   • These reactors utilize natural uranium and are crucial for generating fissile material, specifically plutonium, necessary for subsequent stages.
2. Stage 2: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs)
   • FBRs use plutonium derived from PHWR spent fuel and can generate more fissile material than they consume, effectively breeding additional plutonium.
3. Stage 3: Thermal Breeder Reactors
   • This stage focuses on advanced reactors that utilize thorium as a primary fuel source, converting thorium-232 into uranium-233.
   •  

Significance of Thorium

Thorium holds particular significance for India due to its abundance; the country possesses about 25% of the world’s known thorium reserves, primarily located in coastal monazite sands. Unlike uranium, thorium is not fissile on its own and requires conversion to uranium-233 for use in reactors. The potential for thorium-based energy generation offers several advantages:

• Energy Independence: Utilizing indigenous thorium reduces reliance on imported uranium.
• Sustainability: Thorium reactors produce significantly less nuclear waste compared to conventional uranium reactors.
• Environmental Benefits: Thorium contributes to cleaner energy production with minimal greenhouse gas emissions.

Transitioning to large-scale thorium utilization will require significant advancements in technology and infrastructure, particularly in developing efficient breeding processes and reactor designs.

Current Status of Nuclear Power in India

As of late 2023, India’s nuclear power capacity stands at 8,180 megawatts (MW) from 24 operational reactors, reflecting a growth from 4,780 MW in 2013-14—over a 70% increase in a decade. Annual electricity generation has risen from 34,228 million units in 2013-14 to approximately 47,971 million units in 2023-24. There are 21 additional reactors under development by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), aiming to add about 15,300 MW to the grid. This includes nine reactors under construction with a total capacity of 7,300 MW, and twelve in pre-project activities expected to contribute another 8,000 MW.

New Projects and International Collaborations

India plans significant expansion in its nuclear sector, targeting an increase to 22,480 MW by 2031-32, with an ultimate goal of reaching 100 GW by 2047. Major projects include:

• Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant: In collaboration with Russia, four new reactors with a capacity of 1,000 MW each are planned.
• Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs): The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam marks India’s entry into advanced reactor technology.
• New PHWRs: Approval for ten new PHWRs with a combined capacity of 7,000 MW, developed across various states.

International collaborations with countries like the USA and Russia facilitate technology transfer and enhance operational capabilities.

Challenges Facing the Nuclear Programme

Key challenges include:

1. Need for Advanced Technology and Investment: Despite ambitious plans, the pace of reactor construction has been slow due to quality control issues and financial burdens associated with developing new reactors.
2. Public Perception of Safety: Following the Fukushima disaster in 2011, public concerns regarding nuclear safety have increased scrutiny on facilities worldwide. The government must reassure the public about safety protocols while advancing its nuclear agenda.
3. Civil Liability Laws: Stringent liability frameworks established post-Bhopal gas tragedy raise concerns among foreign suppliers regarding potential liabilities, deterring international collaboration essential for technology transfer.

Future Prospects

India’s nuclear power capacity is projected to expand significantly from 8,180 MW to 22,480 MW by 2031-32, contributing nearly 9% of electricity generation by 2047. Recent developments include adding two indigenously designed 700 MW PHWRs at Kakrapar and ongoing construction of nine more reactors. To facilitate growth in nuclear energy, several policy recommendations include:

• Enhancing Public-Private Partnerships: Collaboration between public entities and private companies can drive innovation and efficiency.
• International Cooperation: Strengthening partnerships for technology transfer is vital for accessing advanced reactor designs.
• Streamlining Regulatory Frameworks: Revisiting civil liability laws could attract foreign investment.
• Investment in Research and Development: Increased funding for R&D is essential for developing next-generation reactors like small modular reactors (SMRs).
• Public Engagement and Education: Transparent communication can build trust regarding nuclear safety.

By implementing these changes, India can navigate challenges facing its nuclear programme while maximizing nuclear energy’s potential as a cornerstone of its future energy strategy.

Conclusion

India’s nuclear programme is crucial for energy security as it seeks to meet growing demands while transitioning to a low-carbon economy. With ambitious targets set by the government to increase capacity significantly—aiming for 22,480 MW by 2031 and ultimately reaching 100 GW by 2047—the programme plays a key role in achieving net-zero emissions by 2070.However, balancing growth with safety and sustainability is essential. Ensuring robust safety protocols will maintain public trust while investing in sustainable practices will minimize environmental impacts. By fostering a culture of safety and sustainability alongside aggressive growth targets, India can position itself as a leader in nuclear energy and contribute significantly to global climate change efforts while securing its energy future.

By: Shashank Khandwe, Research Analyst, GSDN

Myanmar has historically been part of a syncretic region that experienced the political and cultural influences from both India and China. This influence has often lasted in different periods, factored by the domestic political situation in the country. While the post-World War II period saw distinct presence of Indian businesses in Rangoon, the recent decades have observed increasing Chinese domination in Myanmar’s decision-making mechanisms, which raises concerns for India.

Myanmar’s ties with China dates to the lineage traced by the Bamar tribe (Myanmar’s majority tribe) to Tibet. Their engagements date back to the 12^th century CE, when the Song dynasty of China began exchanges with the Pyu dynasty of Burma. In the contemporary period, Myanmar became one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China and established official diplomatic relations in 1950. Recognizing the importance of friendship and shared cooperation, their bilateral relations has been titled as ‘Pauk-phaw’ (siblings in Burmese language). This continues to reflect the share of China in Myanmar’s trade and investment figures. As a resource-rich, least-developed country, Myanmar realizes the importance of China as a source of foreign investment. In the past seven months itself, Myanmar has managed to attract around US$ 40 million in investment from China. It has also emerged as the largest trade partner of Myanmar, with bilateral trade in FY 2022-23 stood at around US$ 2159.412 million.

With the coup by the State Administrative Council (SAC) Junta in 2021, this relation has taken a new dimension. China remained one of the few states to recognize and maintain ties with the military regime. As western condemnation pushed the country farther towards China, concerns emerged for other neighbors like India as the former backed the new regime with its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  China’s long border of around 2000 kms with Myanmar and its strategic interests in its domestic markets and investments pushed for increased role in maintaining domestic stability in Myanmar. On these lines, China brokered a ceasefire in January 2024 at Kunming between the military Junta and the armed organizations led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. As this arrangement eventually fell through, immense pressure from the Chinese side forced the armed groups to unilaterally extend a ceasefire against the Junta forces in North Myanmar.

On the economic front, Chinese infrastructural engagement has seen new development post-coup, with the announcement of three new trade projects that would add on to the existing framework of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These include the construction of a new railroad Indian Ocean route that would connect the Chengdu (Sichuan province) of mainland China to the Yunnan province, extending to the Shan state in the North of Myanmar. The second project aims to create a new trade route between the Chongqing municipality in southern China to Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar. And lastly, a maritime trade route has been envisioned that would connect the Beibu gulf port (Guangxi province) to the Yangon port in Myanmar.

Meanwhile, India’s engagement with the Junta regime has been a tight rope-walk between its economic and strategic interests and its credentials for democracy and human rights. This has created a discontinuity in India’s engagement, where Myanmar has remained central to India’s Act East Policy and has reflected in its multidimensional interactions with the southeast Asian country. Infrastructural investment takes primacy in this, with the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport (KMMTT) project that connects the mainland east coast of India to its Northeastern states through the territory of Myanmar. The control over the Sittwe port became a major strategic advantage to India in this project, as it supports in countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy around the Indian subcontinent. It also reduced the cost and time in transportation of goods from mainland India to the Northeast by almost 50 per cent. Particularly for the Rakhine state of Myanmar, it has created opportunities of economic development and increased trade ties with India, in line to the ambitions of ‘Act East’ policy.

Despite the project being almost completed, what remains crucial is the domestic political dynamics that appear to be changing in the region. Particularly for the Kaladan project which falls in the Rakhine state, the presence of the Arakan army has created concerns for the Indian side, as they control the Rakhine state and aim to maintaining an inclusive administration. Doubts emerge on these ambitions as the potential clashes with the Rohingya militant groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) remains a possibility. Its manner of dealing with the Indian side on the Kaladan project would set an example for the future interactions. What is apparent is the greater influence that China has managed to have on the rebel forces in the vicinity of its borders, like the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), compared to India’s engagement with Arakan Army (AA). This has ensured greater security to Chinese economic interests in the region compared to India.

Similarly on the issue of the refugees, China has had a distinct approach to that of India. Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts has repeatedly led to internal instability and displacement of local population. Since 2016, the Rohingya issue has emerged as a crisis leading to the ethnic cleansing and displacement of millions of ethnic Rohingya Muslims by the Tatmadaw forces and Rakhine Buddhists. China’s stakes in the region are enormous, including its presence on the Kyaukphyu port and the connectivity projects from Rakhine to Yunnan, to the health and security concerns from a potential refugee crisis. Nevertheless, China continued to protect the Myanmar forces on international platforms like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and calls on the ideals of sovereignty and non-intervention in the international law to prevent any action against the perpetrators.

China’s stand comes from the realization that any support to intervention in Rakhine would naturally extend to the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This is also supplemented by its belief system of prioritizing development to human rights, and focus exclusively on its economic interests in Myanmar like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With the case in International Criminal Court still pending with issues on jurisdiction, China continues to stand against the international pressure on the matter.  It keeps Chinese aligned with the junta regime and its economic calculations in the country.

Meanwhile, India’s approach to the Rohingya crisis evolved with time. Initially the Indian response was like China of not taking an active stand and calling it an ‘internal matter’ of Myanmar. India has similar border security concerns as China, in addition to the Bangladesh factor. While the government addressed the Rohingya’s in Bangladesh as ‘displaced persons,’ the vocabulary changed to ‘illegal immigrants’ when in India. The political rhetoric for the Rohingya refugee situation merged with that of Bangladeshi migrant problem in the Northeast states. Gradually, the government came up with plans of deportation of the migrants and support to the Bangladeshi administration with management of the refugee camps.

India also believed that the long-term solution for the refugee crisis is the development of Rakhine state, which brought India in alignment with the ASEAN. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries have themselves failed to provide any sustainable roadmap to the Rohingya problem. The ‘five-point consensus’ that the ASEAN countries put forth has failed to take off. Their response has been divided largely because of the individual differences these countries have in their relationship with the military junta. It has reflected the limitations of the institution and its ‘consensual’ approach to problem-solving.

While India’s position was developed with concerns of internal security and stability, the eventual decision of deportation drew criticism from human rights groups and international media. It has put India in a difficult spot, without solving the actual issues of resettlement of refugees and its challenges to India-Bangladesh relations. The latter has expressed deep concerns about the crisis as Bangladesh hosts around a million Rohingya refugees and did not receive sufficient support from both India and China. These responses from domestic actors or a third country like Bangladesh does not translate into comparable political pressure on China, meanwhile India finds itself struggling within these variables as it tries to engage with the Junta regime. China has found itself in a relatively stable position even on these lines.

The Myanmar issue continues to be another frontier of struggle between India and China. On the challenges of dealing with the Junta regime or issues like the Rohingya crisis, both India and China have attempted to engage with the domestic actors in proportion to their strategic and economic stakes in the country. The recent visit of military Junta leader Min Aung Hliang to Kunming represents the continued importance that China gives to his role in Myanmar’s political future. Similarly, China has pushed for the military regime’s engagement with Chinese-led multilateral forums, reducing the leverage that ASEAN once held on the Junta government. To prevent loosing further ground in the situation, ASEAN has pushed for a renewed support to the five-point consensus to restore political stability in Myanmar.

While the National Unity Government (NUG) and the rebel forces deny any engagement with the Junta forces, Chinese stand underscores the economic rationale without concerns of political morality. India meanwhile has been unable to frame a long-term plan with its democratic credentials and as a responsible regional power. The recent engagement with the military officials is a welcome step, as it shifts the discourse to a ‘Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned solution’ of the present crisis, and helps India navigate the complexities in Myanmar.

By: Manvi Banta, Research Analyst, GSDN

This article mainly focuses on how US-India relations will impact under newly elected President Donald Trump as USA’s 47^th President. It has a potential of redefining bilateral relations and how it is affecting India defense partnerships and geopolitical relations. With Donald Trump securing a second term as President of the United States, the 2024 election marks his second successful presidential run after securing the presidency in 2016 and serving as the 45th president of the United States from 2017 to 2021.

Defense and Strategic Effects

Trump’s administration elevated the U.S.-India relationship to a “comprehensive strategic threat,” encouraging a coalition global strategic partnership. India is a vital member of the QUAD alliance, and the cooperation will probably concentrate on increasing defense, intelligence sharing, and military presence in the area.  Trump’s administration was the first to label China as a “to counter Beijing’s influence”, including the formation of the Quad in 2017. India, which shares 3,488 km of disputed border with China, enhances US-India defense cooperation, especially in countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Trump administration prioritized enhancing defense ties with India, viewing India as a key partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Trump’s rhetoric toward Pakistan was often harsh, as he accused the country of harboring terrorists and providing support to militant groups that destabilized Afghanistan and India as Pakistan is a central player of terrorism.

Under Trump, U.S.-India defense relations were significantly strengthened, with agreements like the COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) and LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), facilitating better interoperability and defense cooperation. A return to the presidency could lead to continued or even enhanced military collaboration.

Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI)

India’s booming digital economy and growing demand for data storage have attracted significant foreign investment in data centers and cloud infrastructure. Global giants like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Oracle have committed to expanding their cloud and data center operations in India.

Indian government’s push for digital transformation, coupled with a large tech talent pool, is positioning India as a key player in AI, machine learning, and robotics. Investments from both Western and Asian companies are increasing in this space.

FPIs are foreign entities or individuals investing in assets that are relatively liquid and easily tradeable, such as equities and bonds, typically with shorter investment horizons than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which involves long-term business commitments.

Both the US and Indian IT sectors stand to gain from increased IT investments. However, offshoring might face challenges if Trump encourages more jobs in the US. A cut in corporate tax by Trump is likely to bring more business for the Indian tech companies.

Under Trump’s first term, IT companies grew at a CAGR of 13% during 2016-2020 and the IT index generated a return of 45% despite challenges on visa and offshoring.

How Trump 2.0 will impact his branded homes in India?

The first Trump Tower in India was unveiled in 2014 in Mumbai and was developed through licensing agreements with Lodha Group. Through Licensing agreements with various developers, Trump Towers came up in Mumbai (Lodha), Pune (Panchshil Developer), Gurugram in NCR and in Kolkata.

Tribeca Developers is the Trump’s Organizations’ exclusive Indian partner, founded by Kalpesh Mehta. Initially, the going for Trump Tower projects in India were slow and Mehta could license the brand only to Lodha in Mumbai and Panchshil in Pune. In 2018, Trump Tower with 250 units was launched in Gurugram and another with 136 units was launched in Kolkata. Trump Towers have also been planned in Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Chennai.

How much are they priced at?

The Trump branded houses are priced in the range of ₹5-15 crore per apartment. The demand for such Uber-luxury homes is going up significantly in India. Across Trump projects in the country, over 600 super luxury homes have been sold with a total combined revenue of more ₹5000-₹6000 crores.