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January 7, 2026
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Global Implications of Iran-Russia Growing Strategic Partnership

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Iran & Russia’s flags: source Internet

The recent Iran-Russia growing strategic partnership has shifted the attention towards the Middle East and elevated the concerns for nuclear security. This bilateral military-technology trade partnership increases the military capabilities in each country’s respective area of influence such as Ukraine in Europe and Israel in the Middle East. This strategic partnership has big implications not only in the Middle-East or Eastern Europe but many other countries. The relationship between Iran and Russia has made U.S. put economic and political sanctions on both countries. This can push both countries to come even closer and rely on each other and potentially have a big impact on global nuclear regime.

Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership

The two countries have been engaged in unprecedented rapprochement since the start of the war in Ukraine. The peak of military co-operation between the two countries came in 2022, when Iran supplied drones to Russia to be used in the Russia-Ukraine war. On January 17, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian signed an historic 20-year strategic agreement. This new “strategic partnership” between Russia and Iran was finally signed in the Kremlin just three days before the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president.

The treaty spans forty-seven articles, covering almost all major areas, including trade, energy, security, nuclear issue, port visits and joint officer training. They pledged not to allow their territory to be used in any military action against the other, or help anyone to attack the other, and would cooperate to counter outside military threats. The agreement, however, does not directly or explicitly talk about a “mutual defence clause”. The text also includes exchanges “in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy” including “the construction of nuclear energy facilities,” according to information released by the Kremlin.

The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, exacerbated by the air strikes conducted by the United States (US) on Iranian nuclear sites, has significantly escalated tensions in the Middle East. Russia has condemned both Israel and the US for ‘violating international law and the United Nations Charter’. But all that condemnation was only on paper that yielded no efforts from Russia to stop the crisis. This muted reaction showed the reality of Iran-Russia strategic partnership for all the rhetoric of anti-Western solidarity. This silence is all the more striking given that Iran is one of the few countries actively supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, supplying drones, arms, and military equipment but Russia not helping Iran militarily in return.

Despite all the agreement between Iran-Russia, Russia has not supplied any arms to Iran. The Kremlin has limited itself to a formal condemnation while leaving the Islamic Republic to deal with what initially appeared to be an existential crisis that has now been temporarily paused through a ceasefire. Vladimir Putin said that Iran had not asked for help since the beginning of Israel’s air campaign. The Russian president added that the comprehensive partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran has no articles related to the military sphere.

Impact on Global Nuclear Regime

Global focus has been shifted to the Middle East, allowing the Kremlin to intensify its attacks on Ukraine, hoping for military gains there, and if the Iranian regime overcomes this crisis, it will emerge more dependent on Russia for its survival. A collapse of the Islamic Republic or a potential Iranian nuclear breakout could destabilize the broader region, erode Moscow’s strategic foothold, and expose the limitations of its capacity to shape regional power dynamics and secure its southern periphery.

The United States of America has always been against the idea of Iran becoming a nuclear state. Due to which, Trump always opted for the “Maximum Pressure” by putting more economical sections on Iran and the supporting nation Russia. This Maximum Pressure has the potential to push Tehran and Moscow Even Closer. This can increase Iran’s keenness towards making nuclear weapon or at least increase the chance of Iran asking for technological help from Russia for the development of nuclear weapon technology Nuclear Weapon Technology.

Russia recognizes that the war’s outcome has the potential to reshape its global stature, fundamentally alter the dynamics of the “Iran question” in which Moscow has long claimed a central role or as a moderator and impact global strategic stability and non-proliferation efforts. Although, Russia’s role in the Iran-Isreal crisis is constrained by its deep involvement in Ukraine crisis and the U.S. is criticised by many nations for funding the genocide in Gaza and the West-Bank. These conflicting pressures presents both risks and opportunities, with risks currently outweighing potential gains. Simultaneously, due to international sanctions, Russia grew increasingly reliant on longtime Iranian rivals for the oil-price coordination and investments in civil nuclear program and Missile development. 

Due to the ongoing crisis and global focus shifting to the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation regime has been affected. Some states may grow more interested in nuclear weapons such as Iran and South Koria. If Iran makes a nuclear weapon, the bordering countries in the Middle-East may also be forced to build deeper underground, more secretive facilities that are less vulnerable to conventional attacks. Similarly, South-Koria has repeatedly asked the U.S. to help them with North-Koria which is a nuclear country. But not getting significant response from U.S. has made them believe that America’s Nuclear Umbrella is reliable. The U.S. is losing its influence in many countries. For example, they already have strategic pacts with North Korea and close ally Belarus, as well as a partnership agreement with China. The concern about national defence and security could make them choose nuclear option.

The progress of Iran’s civil nuclear program may also be at stake due to the U.S. sanctions for limiting Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, the progress of Western sanctions on Iran and Russia have complicated Russian efforts to receive payment from Iran for work on the Bushehr plant. Russia reduced half billion dollars in debt from Iran in 2023. Yet work on new reactors at Bushehr 2 has been slow. By early 2025 only 17% of the project was completed. Isolated from the West and facing China’s investment hesitance, Tehran has little option but to rely on Russian technology. This close relationship strengthens Russia’s grip globally over civilian nuclear energy.

Iran has signed multiple treaties in the past as well with several other major nations Iran and Russia’s partnership allows the opportunity to challenge the United States and the West. Countries includes China, North Korea, Venezuela, Cube, and Belarus share similar objectives to decrease American hegemony and to create a multipolar world. China and India also seek a multipolar world but do not suffer from the same political and economic isolation levied against the Russians and Iranians.

China’s support for Iran’s nuclear ambition has been constant, which now, extends to investment in infrastructural projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, proposing a massive investment of $400 billion over the next 25 years. North Korea has signed a pact with Iran, enhancing its missile technology. Venezuela, on the other hand does not have much to offer, but has still signed the strategic pact as a tool of mutual defiance against US. Belarus, a staunch Russian ally, has consistently shown its support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear purposes.

For Europe, the Israeli–Iranian conflict has exposed its geopolitical marginalization. Efforts to align closely with the US and Israel have brought strategic risks, while excluding Europe from the decisions shaping key developments in the region. Europe faces new challenges in its relations with both Iran and Russia, arising from the war in Ukraine and the dynamics of nuclear diplomacy.

Future prospects

Nuclear talks between Iran or Russia and the United States could lead to one of these scenarios. If Iran or Russia agrees with U.S., it will likely result in a ceasefire in Ukraine and the genocide of Palestinian civilians will continue. This will reduce the U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, might give some economic relieve for both countries. Moscow’s reliance on military cooperation and alternative economic partnerships with countries like Iran, China and North Koria could diminish. This could increase the west influence and decrease the Russia’s influence in the Middle-East. This also erase all the chances of Iran acquiring Weapon of Mass Destruction and it will could also impact the Iran’s civilian nuclear program.

On the other hand, an agreement could take place between Iran and Russia, whether through tighter Western sanctions on Russia or increased pressure on Iran. In this case, America will try to put more sanctions on both nations. Russia will most likely try to bolster its ties with countries like China and North Koria and simultaneously increase control in the Middle-East. The economic and Military cooperation between Iran and Russia can speed up Iranian weapon program and grow arm supply in many countries. This can potentially end the genocide in Gaza and West-Bank, although nothing can be said about Russia-Ukraine war. This could potentially drive Tehran and Moscow into even closer strategic alignment.

Conclusion

The Iran-Russia 20-year agreement is important not just from a bilateral context but has wide raging geopolitical ramifications. The evolving alignment between Tehran and Moscow will likely continue to operate on a spectrum between transactional cooperation and strategic coordination, advancing in selective areas of mutual benefit while avoiding the risks of overcommitment. Systemic pressures have created conditions that are pushing Tehran and Moscow toward deeper cooperation, and that will continue to shape the intensity and trajectory of the partnership in the future.

Reset in India-Canada Relations

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

India & Canada flags: source Internet

The India–Canada reset in relations represents one of the most consequential diplomatic recalibrations undertaken by New Delhi in recent years, striking a balance between pragmatism and cautious optimism. For decades, India and Canada have shared a robust partnership grounded in democratic ideals, parliamentary systems, economic complementarities, and deep-rooted people-to-people connections that have flourished across generations. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, bilateral engagement has historically rested on a framework that combines trade, education, scientific collaboration, and cultural exchanges. However, the crisis triggered by the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in mid-2023 tested these pillars in unprecedented ways, causing a protracted freeze in high-level dialogue and a sharp deterioration of trust. New Delhi consistently rejected Canada’s “credible allegations” as unsubstantiated and politically motivated, emphasising in multiple official statements that India remained committed to addressing security concerns through lawful channels rather than what it described as public grandstanding.

Despite the turbulence, by early 2025, a combination of domestic political shifts in Ottawa and strategic compulsions in both capitals created conditions ripe for rapprochement. The arrival of Mark Carney as Canada’s new Governor of the Bank of Canada provided the first real opportunity to reset ties after nearly two years of strained relations. Carney’s pragmatic approach stood in stark contrast to the Trudeau era, with his administration signalling its readiness to compartmentalise individual legal proceedings from the broader strategic partnership. According to MEA press releases, India welcomed this shift, describing it as an “opportunity to restore momentum to a relationship of substantial promise.”

One of the first visible outcomes of the reset was the decision to fully restore diplomatic staffing at both High Commissions in New Delhi and Ottawa, which had been operating at reduced capacity since late 2023. Consular services, including visa processing for students, tourists, and business travellers, resumed within weeks of the Carney-Modi meeting on the sidelines of the 2025 G7 summit in Alberta. This development was particularly significant for the Indian diaspora in Canada, which at over 1.8 million strong represents one of the largest and most influential immigrant communities in the country. As noted in the MEA Annual Report 2024–25, restoring normal consular operations was a priority to minimize disruptions for families and businesses affected by the standoff. Beyond immediate normalisation, India and Canada have outlined an ambitious roadmap for future engagement that spans economic, technological, and security cooperation.

On trade, both sides agreed to revive negotiations toward the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and an interim Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA), with a stated goal of concluding at least the interim pact within a year. According to the Government of Canada, CEPA could unlock preferential access for Canadian exporters in sectors ranging from pulses, potash, and forestry products to advanced manufacturing and services. At the same time, Indian companies would benefit from reduced tariffs on textiles, pharmaceuticals, and IT services. The India–Canada CEO Forum, reconstituted after a hiatus, has been tasked with developing a roadmap to scale bilateral trade beyond USD 15 billion by 2030, focusing on key sectors and potential trade barriers.

The MEA has also emphasised that the new chapter in ties will involve closer cooperation on climate action, critical minerals, and the deployment of clean technology. India is looking to Canada as a partner in its National Green Hydrogen Mission, which aims to transform the country into a global hub for green hydrogen production and export. Canada, endowed with abundant reserves of lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, is eager to position itself as a reliable supplier to India’s booming battery and electric vehicle sectors. The two countries are also exploring joint ventures in grid modernisation and carbon capture, utilisation, and storage, areas where Canadian expertise aligns with India’s ambitious decarbonization targets under its updated Nationally Determined Contributions.

Security collaboration, which had nearly collapsed following the Nijjar crisis, is cautiously resuming through structured institutional mechanisms. As reported in The Hindu, the MEA and Canada’s Global Affairs have agreed to expand the annual Strategic Dialogue to include working groups on counter-terrorism financing, radicalisation prevention, and cybersecurity. A new track-1.5 dialogue involving senior security officials and think tanks is planned for early 2026 to deepen understanding of transnational extremism and strengthen legal cooperation. Canadian authorities, while maintaining that due process will continue in the Nijjar investigation, have signalled their readiness to clamp down on organisations that incite violence or promote secessionist propaganda. Indian diplomats have described this as an essential confidence-building step to insulate strategic engagement from domestic political pressures.

One area identified by the MEA as ripe for future collaboration is defence industrial cooperation. India has expressed interest in sourcing advanced simulation technologies, Arctic weather gear, and specialised aircraft components developed by Canadian firms. Canadian aerospace companies, in turn, are exploring opportunities in India’s rapidly expanding civil aviation market and defence modernisation programs. While no major defence deals have yet been finalised, the potential for collaboration in this area is significant, and both sides are expected to convene a dedicated Defence and Security Cooperation Working Group later in 2025, paving the way for a promising future.

People-to-people ties remain a robust foundation and a source of both opportunity and challenge. According to Statistics Canada, Indian immigrants are now Canada’s largest source of new permanent residents and students. In the wake of the reset, provincial governments, such as Ontario and British Columbia, are collaborating with the Indian High Commission to establish smoother pathways for academic mobility and professional accreditation, particularly in critical sectors like healthcare and engineering. The MEA has also emphasized the importance of safeguarding Indian students from fraudulent immigration consultants and ensuring that unscrupulous agents do not exploit labour mobility agreements. Looking ahead, the India–Canada reset is significant as it is poised to become a test case for how democratic countries can navigate disagreements while advancing shared interests in a multipolar world. Both nations are deeply committed to reforming global governance institutions to reflect contemporary realities better. India’s G20 presidency and Canada’s engagement in the G7 have provided platforms to align positions on inclusive digital transformation, sustainable finance, and resilient supply chains. The MEA has indicated that India expects Canada to be an important partner in championing reforms of the World Trade Organisation, democratisation of climate finance, and more representative frameworks for technology governance.

Perhaps most tellingly, senior Indian officials have consistently framed the reset not as a return to status quo ante but as an opportunity to define a more mature, resilient partnership built on clarity of red lines and mutual respect. As stated in the MEA briefing, “India remains committed to engaging constructively with Canada based on sovereign equality, non-interference, and shared values.” This commitment will likely be tested as the Nijjar investigation continues and as both societies grapple with the challenge of managing diaspora politics without undermining national security. Nevertheless, the Carney-Modi dialogue has already produced measurable dividends—complete restoration of diplomatic channels, resumption of trade negotiations, incremental intelligence cooperation, and a roadmap for expanding clean energy and innovation partnerships. Over the next decade, India and Canada have the potential to redefine their engagement through sustained high-level exchanges, deeper business integration, and a clearer understanding of each other’s domestic constraints. If this reset is grounded in consistent policy and mutual accountability, it could become a model for other democracies seeking to reconcile their strategic ambitions with the realities of complex, pluralistic societies.

 It is essential to examine the future of India-Canada relations through the lens of strategic, cultural, and economic dimensions, with a significant emphasis on defence cooperation. Despite recent tensions and diplomatic standoffs that have periodically strained bilateral ties, the underlying imperatives driving mutual engagement suggest that both countries have strong incentives to recalibrate and deepen their relationship. The socio-political landscapes of both nations are evolving, shaped by internal pressures, diaspora dynamics, and global strategic realignments. While current diplomatic frictions—particularly over politically sensitive issues involving diaspora activism and allegations of interference—have impeded progress, these appear to be temporary setbacks in a broader context marked by potential for long-term collaboration. The future relationship will likely be shaped not only by government-to-government negotiations, but also by deeper, multifaceted linkages in trade, people-to-people contact, cultural exchanges, technological cooperation, and, increasingly, defence partnerships. In terms of defence and strategic affairs, a convergence of interests is emerging.

India’s growing emphasis on self-reliance in defence manufacturing (Atmanirbhar Bharat) aligns well with Canada’s advanced technological capabilities and innovation ecosystem. As global threats become more transnational—ranging from cyber warfare to climate-related security risks—there is scope for increased collaboration in intelligence sharing, maritime security, cybersecurity frameworks, and peacekeeping operations. Canada’s status as a NATO member and its increasing participation in Indo-Pacific dialogues position it as a valuable partner in India’s Act East policy and broader regional strategic outlook. Although Canada has traditionally maintained a restrained defence posture in the Indo-Pacific, pressures from allies such as the United States, Australia, and Japan may compel it to take a more proactive role, one where India could emerge as a critical strategic interlocutor. The future could witness joint training exercises, strategic dialogues, and the establishment of formal defence mechanisms, especially as both countries seek to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and uphold the rules-based international order.

Cultural ties will continue to serve as a resilient foundation of bilateral relations, mainly due to the significant Indian diaspora in Canada, which is one of the largest globally. This community not only contributes to the economic and political fabric of Canada but also acts as a bridge for cultural understanding, educational exchanges, and soft power diplomacy. Over time, cultural diplomacy is likely to assume a more formalised role, with expanded programs in language, cinema, art, and education. India’s soft power—manifested through Bollywood, yoga, cuisine, and festivals—resonates strongly within Canada’s multicultural ethos. Universities and academic institutions from both countries have the potential to become platforms for shared innovation and global research, particularly in fields such as clean energy, artificial intelligence, and public health. These cultural and educational ties may help to soften political differences, fostering greater understanding and reducing the friction caused by conflicting domestic narratives. Economically, both countries have strong incentives to revitalise trade and investment ties. While a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has remained elusive for years, the urgency of diversifying global trade relationships in a post-pandemic world may revive negotiations. Canada’s vast reserves of critical minerals and clean energy resources are of particular interest to India’s burgeoning technological and manufacturing sectors.

Meanwhile, India’s massive consumer base and digital economy offer Canadian firms access to one of the fastest-growing markets in the world. Strategic investments in sectors such as agriculture, information technology, and green energy could be mutually beneficial, supported by regulatory harmonisation and visa facilitation. The evolution of this economic partnership will depend mainly on political will and the ability to compartmentalise differences on sensitive issues while advancing mutually beneficial areas of cooperation.

Furthermore, multilateralism could become a key area of cooperation, particularly in the context of global governance reforms, climate change, and global health resilience. Both countries, as democratic nations with pluralistic values, have overlapping interests in preserving an open international system. Canada’s advocacy for human rights and inclusive governance, when expressed with diplomatic sensitivity, can find resonance with India’s constitutional values, albeit with recognition of its unique socio-political context. In terms of climate cooperation, Canada’s experience with carbon pricing and sustainable infrastructure could complement India’s ambitious renewable energy goals. Engagement in forums such as the G20, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations provides further avenues for alignment on global challenges, particularly as both nations increasingly recognise the importance of South-South cooperation and equitable development.

However, the relationship will not be without its challenges. Political rhetoric, fuelled by domestic electoral considerations in both countries, can hinder diplomatic progress. Diaspora politics, especially when it intersects with separatist movements or perceived interference in domestic affairs, will continue to be a recurring flashpoint. However, the maturity of the relationship will be tested not by the absence of conflict but by the capacity to manage disagreement through institutional mechanisms, dialogue, and mutual respect. Canada’s evolving understanding of India’s strategic sensitivities and India’s appreciation of the complexities of liberal democracies will be crucial in navigating contentious issues. Over time, both nations may develop a more pragmatic approach—one that allows for disagreements without derailing cooperation in other domains.

While India-Canada relations are presently navigating a complex phase, the long-term forecast remains cautiously optimistic. Defence cooperation stands poised to become a new pillar, supported by shared concerns over regional stability and global security. Cultural linkages and diaspora relations will continue to serve as a deep connective tissue, offering resilience even during diplomatic downturns. Economic complementarities and multilateral engagements offer rich opportunities for constructive collaboration. The future relationship will not be linear nor devoid of challenges, but it will likely be defined by increasing interdependence, strategic dialogue, and a maturing understanding of each other’s priorities. As both nations seek to assert themselves in an increasingly multipolar world, their relationship—if anchored in pragmatism and mutual respect—could evolve into a comprehensive partnership that contributes meaningfully to global peace, prosperity, and democratic resilience.

Could the US–Russia Détente be the Key to Ending Humanitarian Crisis?

By: Dr. Bawa Singh

USA & Russia flags: source Internet

Civilian casualties have been rising, with someone dying every 12 minutes in conflict zones on account of humanitarian crisis. Whereas on the other hand, the military expenditure is growing exponentially of the major powers.  As of today, the countries engaged in conflicts, disputes, wars and on account of this background, million people are suffering a major humanitarian crisis. Since 2024 onwards, the world has been facing its gravest humanitarian crisis. An estimated 186.5 million people across 72 countries, direly needed humanitarian aid. Yet, the donors have provided only US$ 22.58 billion out of the US$ 49 billion needed i.e., leaving a shortfall to the amount of $26.42 billion resulting in vulnerabilities of food insecurity, collapsed health systems, and seriously devastated livelihoods.

The above-mentioned figures revealed stark paradoxes as the so-called major powers cannot mobilize required resources needed to avert a mass humanitarian crisis. On the one hand, millions are not able to manage their basic needs and on the other hand, military unproductive expenditure is growing exponentially.  In 2024, it is reported that global military spending surged to a record US$ 2.718 trillion, which roughly comes to the amount of 2.5 percent of world GDP. The humanitarian assistance declined from US$ 37.5 billion in 2023 to US$ 33.9 billion. Major donor countries cut their aid programmes up to 40 percent even as they expanded their defense budgets to counter perceived threats. How the world is paradoxical with stark misalignment? Major economic powers arming for war instead of providing humanitarian aid to protect vulnerable people in conflict/war zones. Currently, million people have been facing humanitarian crisis resulting in deaths, displacements, refugees, lack of basic necessities like food, health, education etc.

The US and Russia are wielding outsized strategic influence over both conflict escalations and relief operations in the conflicting zones. When their bilateral tensions grow, sanctions used to choke off aid funding, airspace restrictions take place resulting in restrictions on medical and food deliveries, and resolutions are blocked for safe corridors. If a thaw takes place in the US–Russia relations, consequence would be positive resulting in unlock of frozen assets, coordinate targeted relief for life-saving goods, and establish de-confliction corridors. It used to amplify humanitarian relief in the conflicting zones.

For example, the humanitarian lifeline proved vulnerable to political shifts in early 2025. It  became even more critical,  when the US’s Executive Order 14169 imposed a 90-day pause on nearly all foreign assistance. In view of this, the UN warned that the suspension could cause up to 350,000 excess deaths.  More than 32 million women would be deprived of reproductive health services along with 12.8 million displaced people of basic healthcare. About 10 million refugees could not avail emergency aid. This reflected how strategic disagreements directly result into life-and-death outcomes for the conflict zone entrapped people.

If Washington and Moscow can rebuild trust by defusing their bilateral and other geopolitical tensions, then the multilateral bodies would gain vital resources and political backing. For example, a shared US-Russia framework for ceasefire could empower the UN to establish safe corridors in Yemen and Ethiopia. While their joint funding commitments, could close the current US$ 26 billion aid shortfall that impacted seriously millions with malnutrition and preventable disease.

Beyond their direct assistance, cooperative US–Russia diplomacy can strengthen the Security Council’s capacity to adopt binding resolutions for humanitarian relief access. In 2016, adhoc US–Russia geopolitical understandings, had enabled the cross-border convoys into besieged Syrian territories. Today, similar collaboration is required to handle the grave humanitarian crisis. It could unlock frozen assets in billions for reconstruction, provide access of humanitarian aid in conflict-eroded health systems, drinking water, sanitation, and shelter projects across Gaza, the Sahel etc.

Ultimately, it is argued that genuine détente between Washington and Moscow is direly needed. Such cooperation would be helpful in liberating the financial, logistical, and diplomatic resources from perpetual crisis management. The liberated sources can be redirected toward accessibility of humanitarian aid. Even a considerable amount of their combined military budgets reallocated towards humanitarian aid. These two powers could reduce the current funding shortfall. It could prevent million deaths, and restore hope for better life battered by conflict. Therefore, détente is direly needed between the US and Russia, which could become an urgent humanitarian lifeline.

About the Author

Dr. Bawa Singh has been teaching in the Department of South and Central Asian Studies at the School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. His research expertise includes the geopolitics of South and Central Asia, Indian foreign policy, regional cooperation, maritime security, and global health diplomacy.

Why Jordan and Syria matter in the Middle East?

By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Middle East: source Internet

The Middle East carries the imprint of being perceived as an exceptional region, mainly due to its unique culture, geography, and not to mention its profound religious centrality, as being the cradle of three predominant monotheistic religions- Judaism, Islam and Christianity. While discussing about the Middle East, spotlight currently casts upon Iran, Israel or Saudi Arabia, but in the meantime two nations- Jordan and Syria remain pivotal and more or less overlooked.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, commonly known as Jordan and Syria are two naturally beautiful, culturally vibrant nations of the Middle East region. In contemporary times, the region is commonly known for two of its most flagrant aspects – ginormous oil reserves with on and off power struggles. However, both the nations are unique in their own ways, not due to abundant natural resources, as they possess little of it but sure they face reoccurring struggles within and between nations. Although such challenges are not specific to any one nation but Middle East has a bad reputation for ongoing conflicts.

In the beginning…

The beginning of all these difficulties can be traced back to the post-World War I period, when the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 led to a window of opportunity for Britain and France partitioning the region. Both Jordan and Syria, as we know them today have their modern borders and early political frameworks designed by the mandates imposed by these western colonial powers. Through the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British gained control of Iraq and Palestine, which included Jordan, whereas the French took Lebanon and Syria. The two mandates differed in implementation as the British mandate was more of an indirect rule, they chose to install local leaders, whereas the French ruled by direct civilian and military rule. 

The legacies of British and French mandates understandably had a lingering impact on political matters of Jordan and Syria. In the meantime, their geographical locations have also played an equally critical role in enlightening why both the nations still matter in the Middle East.

Geography matters

Jordan is one of the few nations with a special strategic location in the Middle East region, as it’s located at the focal meeting point between two continents of Asia and Africa. Apparently, such unique advantage of location provides Jordan a crucial role in political and economic cooperation, not just within the region but has also elevating its stature in the international politics. Jordan is to a large extent considered as a connecting thread between the Middle East and the Western world as it remaining a reliable ally for many international powers. It also works as an ideal buffer state between some of the larger Arab nations and Israel, establishing it as a hub for political and diplomatic negotiations and a meeting point for different actors in the region and the world. So, it is not an exaggeration to state that its positioning made it a gateway between the Arab/Islamic culture and Western culture.

Similarly, Syria today is one of undeniably the most dynamic at the same time controversial location of the region. Syria is part of the Levant, highlights its historical and strategic centrality in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Syria particularly is the vital bridge linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian interior, providing the routes for trade and military logistics across the region. The historic Silk Route, one of the important trade routes, passed through Syria, linking Asia with Europe. Empires throughout history has a common intention to control over this area. Even after independence, during the Cold War era, Syria’s strategic positioning never failed to attract the attention of superpowers, which later made it an arena for contending ideologies.

It is evident that, both the nations’ geopolitical location continues to bear importance in forming their policies in different spheres, particularly in matters of security and stability.

Balancing security and stability

On many occasions, Jordan under the leadership of King Abdullah, has led the way towards security and stability in the region through enhancing regional cooperation to tackle common obstacles such as terrorism, climate change and economic crises. Jordan has successfully managing its image as a dependable partner during the war on terror. Being a strategic partner in the fight against radical terrorism, it contributes admirably to deal with this growing nuisance. Surrounded by major conflicting actors, Jordan has become a venue of advanced security services that can combat security threats emanating from such volatile neighborhood. As a country that seeks to maintain peace and stability The Jordan Armed Forces-Arab Army (JAF) is among United States Central Command’s (CENTCOM) most dedicated and strongest allies. On October 26, 1994, The Wadi Araba Agreement was concluded between Jordan and Israel that officially ended decades of hostilities to enhance stability between the two nations and across the region. However, Jordan has been and continues to be one of the most prominent advocates for Palestinian rights in various international platforms.

Its contributions to regional peace and stability, has demonstrated its ability to play a mediating role in regional and international conflicts. The Kingdom is trusted by international actors; on regional level it maintains somewhat moderate relations. But, Islamist non-state actors remain suspicious and view it as an ally of the Western bloc. Jordan faces numerous difficulties on the path to supporting peace and stability in a turbulent region. Albeit its own limitations, Jordan continues to committed to regional peace.

Syria, on the hand, become severely entangled in terrorism and proxy conflicts/wars, often catching national and international eyes as a hotbed for regional and international rivalries. During March 2011, pro-democracy protests erupted in Syria against President Basher al-Assad, following violent government crackdown. Soon, before anyone could anticipate, the protests spiraled into an anarchical war-like situation in the region, involving government forces, rebellious groups, and militias.

Battleground for a Proxy-war

The Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad was quick to escalate an insurgency along with groups such as the Free Syrian Army. Anti-Assad forces received support and arms from states like- Qatar and Turkey. In contrast, Iran and Russia were assisting Pro-Assad forces with financial and military support. Such devastating situation with the collapse of local governing body, created a power vacuum in large parts of Syria, which paved way for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a designated terrorist group. Later, United States and other Western allies joined to launch a military campaign against ISIS, marking Syria a geopolitical chessboard.

Russia, maintains strong ties with Syria mostly to protect its own strategic interest, particularly the naval base at Tartus, a strategic gateway for arms and logistics. Russia, in fact tried to shield Assad regime from global interventions. The US, in this scenario, is trying to advance its own agenda, i.e. to checkmate Russia and Iran in Syria, and maintain hegemonic stability in the region.

The refugee crisis

Throughout that crisis, countless people endured extreme human rights violation, such as-massacres, indiscriminate killings, kidnapping of civilians, physical abuse, sexual violence, destroying civilians’ property, and unjust detentions. Millions of people unable to withstand the situation forced to flee to other nations. Since the beginning of the war, approximately 13 million Syrians have been displaced, and scattered around neighboring states, even in some parts of Europe. This rises another ongoing controversial issue of immigration and refugee intake. To the EU, stability within the Syria is vital. Because, if the conflict continues/worsens, the EU might face an increased flow of refugees.

When Syria’s revolution began and intensified into civil war, neighboring state Jordan guided by compassion, opened its borders. Within a few years, a huge number of Syrians crossed into Jordan, it became a home to more than 1.4 million Syrians. Working closely with international agencies, Jordan’s rapid actions involved setting up temporary shelters for the refugees; build refugee camps, most notably Za’atari, which quickly became one of the world’s largest refugee camps and providing basic healthcare services. Even though Jordan has not offered citizenship or permanence to these refugees, yet its policies seems to have gradually shifted from emergency relief to managing prolonged displacement.

The influx of refugees from Syria and Palestine has unfolded some significant challenges to Jordan’s economic resources and social services. The Jordanian economy has burdened by a complex set of internal and external challenges that, to some extent have disrupted its development. Massive population growth, high unemployment, strained social services, dependence on external aid and a scarcity of natural resources, such as water and oil, have collectively complicates economic self-sufficiency and curtails growth opportunities. While bearing all these ongoing burdens, the nation has been globally praised for its efforts in this regard and its promptness to manage this humanitarian crisis.

The fuel behind everything

Jordan also plays an important role in energy and water cooperation in the Middle East. Jordan is considered as one of the leading nations in the region in renewable and clean energy. It also plans to working toward the development of a hydrogen strategy to support green energy export. However, it is counted among the most water-scarce nations in the world, therefore compelled to depend on external sources, particularly on Israel for fresh water. On July 2021, Israel increased the water quota sold to Jordan by 50 million cubic meters for three years, later on 16 May 2024, amid bumpy relations, Israel and Jordan renewed its water-sharing agreement for another six months. Moreover, on November 8, 2022, the two nations formulated a memorandum of understanding under the auspices of the United Arab Emirates, to advance the “Water for Energy” project, which envisions Israel providing Jordan 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water annually in exchange for Jordan supplying renewable solar energy from a UAE-sponsored solar farm.

Regarding Syria, prior to the outbreak of civil war, the nation’s oil and natural gas reserves were self-sufficient in terms of energy supplies also had exported oil. Multiple foreign companies participated in development of natural gas resources. Exporting oil and gas provided almost 20 percent of the then government’s revenue. Syria, in fact, annually generated approximately to 29.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, though its consumption was only about 25.7 billion kilowatts. A significant portion was produced by thermal power plants, that fueled by oil and natural gas. But, then the war came into the picture and Syria transitioned from energy sufficient to become dependent on imports. During these times, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have pledged to supply fuel and electricity to Syria. The revenue drop from exporting oil was a major setback in the regime’s inability to cope with public unrest.

The regime change

In early December 2024, Hayet Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) toppled the Assad regime. On March 29, 2025, Syrian people under new President Ahmed Al Shara, witnessed the new transitional administration. Amid regime change and security concerns, international momentum is growing towards state rebuilding. For now, with the new President taking office, opens the possibility of reopening trade and boosting its economy. That said, signaling a diplomatic initiative, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi became the first Arab foreign minister to visit Syria to meet the new Head of the state. However, like other nations in the world Jordan’s approach continues to be a careful one.

Conclusion

In summary, Jordan and Syria face a series of challenges and opportunities that define its role in the world politics. Despite the common mutual volatility, Jordan, to a large extent has played a significant role in maintaining security. Throughout Jordan’s history, it has established itself as a comparatively stable with the monarchy and moderate nation in a region that is best known for conflicts. Jordan’s willingness and ability to continue strong diplomatic ties, manage the refugee crisis, effectively charting a path out to economic and political dynamics in parallel with its commitment to assisting Syria in its recovery and reintegration- are evidence to its resilience. On the other hand, Syria has a complex past but due to a blend of both avoidable/unavoidable circumstances it gripped in tumultuous crisis. However, Syria’s nascent efforts to revive, such as reestablishing governance, rebuilding infrastructure, relations- signals a cautious step towards post-war nation building. While the prospects for peace in these territories or, for that matter, in the broader region is uncertain, but one cannot deny Jordan and Syria’s importance in the Middle East.

China’s 7th Domain of War: Water!

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Three Gorges Dam: source Internet

On January 17, 1999, the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf War, two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui released their book “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s master plan to destroy America”. The date chosen for release of the book had special significance as the Gulf War of 1991 was the first war of the modern era in which computers were used to take out the daily flight plans of over 1000 fighter aircrafts that were operating in Iraq as part of the US-led 42-nation multi-coalition force. For the first time ever, computers were used in live military operations.

The 196-page well-written book had just a simple message to convey that anything that can be weaponised, will be weaponised. The book did not garner much interest in the USA for many years after its release, till it was too late and China had overtaken the USA in economic, military and diplomatic power. The book now is a compulsory-read in most of the US military training institutions and combat formations. A typical example of “Too little, too late”.

After the success of the Gulf War of 1991, militarily known as Operation Desert Storm, which lasted from January 17, 1991 to February 28, 1991 saw the USA led 42-nation coalition, exhibiting unprecedent level of professionalism that included a whopping 1000 aircraft sorties being undertaken daily, which were totally decided by computers based on the daily inputs given, USA promulgated the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, replacing the Airland Battle Doctrine of 1982.

The Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine of 2001enshrined that the cumulative effect of dominance in air, land, maritime, space domains and information environment that includes cyberspace, that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. This would espouse a strategic intent capable of achieving full spectrum superiority in a conflict, enabling the control of any situation across the range of military operations, by defeating any adversary.

Surprisingly, China became the only nation in the world to publicly declare its competency and capability to fight any nation in the world in consonance with the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine. In 2014, PLA in its military doctrine called Joint Integrated Operations stated that it is ready to fight any country anywhere in the world in all the six-domains of war consisting Land, Sea, Air, Cyber, Electromagnetic Spectrum and Space.

Interestingly, such a declaration has not been made till date by any other military of the world including USA, who despite propounding the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, lay basking in its success of the 1991 Gulf War, whilst China stealthily and secretly worked towards establishing supremacy in the full spectrum operations warfare, pretty much understanding well how the future modern wars would be fought.

Water as a War Domain

On July 08, 2025, Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that borders China, in a candid statement admitted that the Medog Dam being built by China is a “ticking water bomb” and poses an existential threat to the state, became the first Indian government functionary to openly admit so.

Location of Medog Dam: source The Economist

This statement by the Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister set all speculations to rest over a raging debate in Indian media and social media regarding the danger that the Medog Dam on the River Brahmaputra, poses to India. Thereby, heralding China’s 7th domain of war – Water!

River Brahmaputra, known as River Yarlung Tsangpo in China, flows for a total length of 2900 kilometres. Of which, 1625 kilometres is in China, 916 kilometres in India and the balance 359 kilometres is the flow in Bangladesh, before entering the final destination of the Bay of Bengal.

The Medog Dam, whose construction was officially announced by China on July 19, 2025 with the groundbreaking ceremony being held at the dam site of Nyingchi’s Mainling hydropower station in the Tibet Autonomous Region, is being built at a cost of US$ 167.8 billion. The project consisting of five cascade hydropower stations will generate 300 billion kWh of electricity each year, after it is completed in 2030. On completion, the Medog Dam will be three times bigger than the Three Gorges Dam constructed by China on River Yangtze in 2003 which is regarded as the biggest dam constructed till date.

The Medog Dam, regarded as the largest infrastructure project in the world on completion, is being built at a huge gorge in the Himalayan reaches where the River Brahmaputra makes a big U-turn and the river plunges nearly two kilometres, to flow into Arunachal Pradesh onto Assam and then further to Bangladesh.

Once the Medog Dam is completed in five years, China will control the river flow at a scale and size that would enable it to release large amounts of water to flood the areas downstream in times of hostilities commencing between India and China. The major brunt of this intentional flooding would be Arunachal Pradesh, as this Indian state is China’s military target.

Why Arunachal Pradesh is being eyed by China?

Interestingly, till 2007 China showed no great interest in Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, after China’s win over India in the 1962 war, it withdrew back from NEFA as Arunachal Pradesh was known then, despite entering as much as 60 kilometres inside India at some places in this area.

After the 1962 war, while China did not withdraw from Aksai Chin in its Western Sector, it did so from Arunachal Pradesh in its Eastern Sector, thus showing clearly that it did not accord much importance to the occupation of Arunachal Pradesh that time.

Rather it is widely believed that till 2007, China’s occasional raising of the Arunachal Pradesh issue was more to use it is a bargaining chip with India to gain India’s recognition of Aksai Chin as a part of China, in turn of China’s recognition of Arunachal Pradesh being part of India. This is exactly what Zhou Enlai had proposed in his November 04, 1962 letter to Jawaharlal Nehru as the India-China War raged on.

However, China’s attitude towards India on the Arunachal Pradesh issue changed drastically after it became the world’s third biggest economy in 2007. With deep pockets that China was now sitting with, it felt that it was time to make it clear to India about its reversal of intentions over Arunachal Pradesh.

Two important events happened in 2009 which made clear China’s interest for Arunachal Pradesh.

One, China started issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh desirous of visiting China for any purpose, be it tourist, business or official. This was a clear signal from China that it no longer recognises Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India. A stapled visa is different from a regular visa in the sense that the country issuing stapled visas does not stamp the visa on the passport of the individual, rather a paper slip visa is stapled to the passport.

Two, the two visits of The Dalai Lama, the Highest Spiritual Leader and Head of Tibetan Buddhism, to Arunachal Pradesh in April & November 2009, were taken adversely by China. A statement issued by China during the nine-days visit in April 2009 of The Dalai Lama warned India of bilateral ties being hurt and peace being severely damaged.

And during the four-day November 2009 visit, The Dalai Lama hinted that the next Dalai Lama will not be from China. A clear indication that his successor would come from this Indian state that borders China and has 11.77% Buddhist population. China was infuriated.

For, it brought to fore an issue that seemed to have faded away. On May 14, 1995, The 14th Dalai Lama announced Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the six-year-old Buddhist born in Tibet, as the 11th Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama is the second-highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism and is traditionally recognised as the next Dalai Lama. Three days later, this young boy was kidnapped in China, never to be found ever again.

On December 08, 1995, China announced Gyaincain Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama which was rejected outright by The Dalai Lama and the Tibetans residing in China as well as those in exile in India.

However, the period 1996 to 2008 saw relative calm on the successor issue, till The Dalai Lama’s two visits to Arunachal Pradesh in 2009 riled the Chinese. The statement by His Holiness on March 10, 2025 that his successor will be born outside China in the “free world” signalled the announcement of his successor any time soon, has led to increased tensions between India and China. These tensions will aggravate after China wages the war for Taiwan in 2027, as Taiwan is China’s first military target.

The next military target after Taiwan for China after it attacks this island nation in 2027, is Arunachal Pradesh.

India’s preparedness for China’s Water War

Before the River Brahmaputra enters India from China, it has only 14% of the total Annual Water Yield (AWY), with the balance 86% being filled-up in India. 33 tributaries contribute to the river’s AWY on the Indian soil.

The maximum discharge of the Brahmaputra recorded has been 72,779 cubic metres per second (CUMEC) in August 1962 and the minimum water discharge has been 1757 CUMEC in February 1968. Thus, implying that the campaigning season (military slang for the duration when war is expected the most) of winter months from October to March will have the least water flowing in the river. With a colossal storage facility in the form of the Medog Dam, China can suddenly release water which will result in flooding in Arunachal Pradesh in matter of days, as the location of the Medog Dam is just 30 kilometres from the border, also known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Arunachal Pradesh is roughly 650 kilometres wide (West to East) and 320 kilometres in length (North to South), with a total area of 83,743 square kilometres. China flooding the River Brahmaputra (known as River Siang in Arunachal Pradesh) in the state, will create problems of immense magnitude and this process will not take more than 48-72 hours to put the flooding in effect.

India’s plans to build a dam on the river in Begging, a remote village in Arunachal Pradesh known as the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP), 267-metres tall dam with a targeted output of 11,000 MW at a cost of US$ 17.5 billion. SUMP is India’s counter to China’s Medog Dam.  On May 21, 2025, the team of National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) tasked with conducting the pre-feasibility study for the construction of SUMP was met with stiff resistance by the local populace, leading to them retreating to the town of Pasighat, 98-kilometers away.

SUMP has failed to take-off whereas the construction of the Medog Dam has commenced.

Arunachal Pradesh currently has only the 68-meters tall Ranganadi Dam in Lower Subansiri constructed in 2001 while the 130-metres tall Subansiri Lower Hydro Electric Dam is under construction since December 2007.

Clearly, India’s preparation for the water war that China will unleash consequent to the completion of the Medog Dam is grossly inadequate. China’s military target is Arunachal Pradesh; hence it would let the flooding create catastrophe in the state before it unleashes the other six domains of modern warfare on India.

The two-front war on India

Out of the seven domains of modern warfare that China will unleash on India, in three of them air, space and water, India is at a gross disadvantage.

As far as air power is concerned, India will have 29 squadrons of fighter aircrafts after the MiG-21 fighter aircrafts are phased out in September 2025, as against the authorised strength of 42 squadrons. China has 66 squadrons. Pakistan has 25 squadrons of fighter aircrafts. Thus, September 2025 onwards, 29 squadrons of the Indian Air Force will be pitted against 91 squadrons combined of the PLAAF and Pakistan Air Force in the event of the outbreak of the two-front war.

In space power, China has 246 military satellites whereas India has 26 military satellites. China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite System is fully functional with 56 satellites. The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System, known operationally as NavIC, is facing severe challenges with only four of the 11 satellites operational. Of these four, one satellite (IRNSS-1B) has exceeded its planned life of 10 years and can stop functioning anytime and another satellite (IRNSS-1F) has only a year left to complete its service.

In the domain of water warfare, as explained above India will be at a great disadvantage after China completes the Medog Dam in 2030.

Thus, out of the seven domains of modern warfare that China will wage on India when the Balloon Goes Up (the military slang meaning the commencement of war), that include land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic spectrum, space and water, India in on a clear backfoot in three – air, space and water.

Ever since the regime change has happened in Bangladesh on August 05, 2024, the nation has been turning blatantly anti-India and the collusivity between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh has been deepening. And so is the military cooperation between the three nations increasing. On July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.

Laamu Atoll in Maldives, Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hamabantota port in Sri Lanka, Kyaukphyu island in Myanmar and Cox Bazaar port in Bangladesh are part of China’s “String of Pearls” plan to encircle India by the sea-route.

As it is, the LAC & Line of Control (the militarised border between India & Pakistan) are one reinforced front as far as China & Pakistan is concerned. With Bangladesh clearly in their kitty and Nepal too tilted towards the China & Pakistan combine, China is planning to encircle India by the land-route as well.

The two-front war to be waged jointly by China & Pakistan on India will commence any time after 2030 as by then the construction of the Medog Dam would be completed.

The two-front war to be waged by China & Pakistan on India will commence with China’s newest domain of modern warfare, Water. The two-front war will see Pakistan initiating the war by kinetic means on the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, after China commences the flooding from the Medog Dam. And then to support Pakistan’s kinetic action on India, China will use the issue of the Dalai Lama’s successor to attack India in Arunachal Pradesh by launching cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space warfare and little later will the PLA involve kinetic warfare comprising its army, navy and the air force.

As the flooding starts taking effect in Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian response would naturally be flood rescue and relief and it is at this point of time that China will use cyberwarfare, electromagnetic spectrum warfare and space warfare to disrupt and disturb India non-kinetically before eventually launching kinetic warfare.

It is these domains of modern warfare that India has to be fully prepared for, as India will be combatting the seven domains of the modern warfare in Arunachal Pradesh and the six domains of modern warfare in Jammu & Kashmir as China will fully aid and abet Pakistan with cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space capabilities. A trailer of which was clearly visible in Operation Sindoor, the 88-hour military conflict that lasted between India & Pakistan in May 2025.

On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, as the two nuclear-armed neighbours were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation from May 07-10, 2025. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.

Pakistan in a one-on-one military confrontation has never been a challenge for India. But the China-Pakistan two-front war that can be waged any time after 2030, looks a formidable challenge to India in the present conditions and circumstances. India has just over five years to prepare in all the seven domains of modern warfare, that includes Water!

The statement of the Indian Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan on July 25, 2025 that there are no runners-up in a war, holds immense significance as the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh military embrace gets stronger with each passing day and the construction of the Medog Dam progresses towards its completion in 2030.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

Is China’s closeness to Canada creating Problems for the USA?

By: Abhinav Prakash, Research Analyst, GSDN

China, Canada & USA’s flags: source Internet

This year marks the 55th anniversary of China-Canada diplomatic ties and the 20th anniversary of the China-Canada strategic partnership. Both sides are viewing this as an opportunity to promote and improve bilateral relations. China and Canada’s past diplomatic relationship was filled with a series of cooperation, challenges and mutual skepticism. On this occasion, they agreed to resolve past frictions, and advocated for stronger business ties in areas like clean energy, technology, and trade.

In the recent past, Canada-China ties have been a source of tension for the United States. Due to the trade war, Canada is attempting to diversify its trading partnership rather than being completely dependent on US, as Trump in February 2025 imposed 25% tariffs on goods and 10% tariff on Canada’s oil and energy, which he announced would increase up to 35% in August 2025. The reason cited for the recent action is to hold Mexico, China and Canada accountable for illegal immigration, flow of fentanyl and other contraband drugs into US.

The US consistently remains the first and largest trading partner of Canada. The bilateral merchandise trade between the US and Canada significantly declined from US$ 968.4 billion in 2023 to US$ 762.1 billion in 2024. Whereas, China is the second largest trading partner of Canada with bilateral merchandise trade of US$ 119 billion and US$ 117 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively.

As Trump aggressively remarked, “I deal with every country, indirectly or directly. One of the nastiest countries to deal with is Canada. We don’t need Canadian lumber, we don’t need their energy, we don’t need anything. We certainly don’t want their automobiles”, also referred “Prime Minister of Canada as Governor Trudeau” and made a disproportional estimate of the American trade deficit with Canada, proclaiming that “Canada was meant to be the 51st state because we subsidize Canada by US$ 200 billion a year.” These insensitive words from President Trump were totally unacceptable and against the sovereignty and integrity of Canada.

The above remarks have sparked retaliatory actions, threats and boycotts of American goods in Canada, and resulted in bitterness between the two historically friendly nations. Pew polling shows 59% of Canadians now view the U.S. as their greatest threat, up from just 20% in 2019, driven by contentious U.S. policies. Former Canadian P.M. Trudeau remarked “I suggest that not only does the Trump administration know how many critical minerals we have, but that may be even why they keep talking about absorbing us and making us the 51st state.”

The Trade war has acted as a catalyst in China and Canada relations. They already had the 2018‑2028 Memorandum of Understanding, for collaboration on emissions trading systems, carbon pricing, technology exchanges, including ministerial-level dialogues. The resumption of the Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETC) in 2025 after Mark Carney became P.M and a meeting between the Canadian Minister of International Trade and China’s Minister of Commerce in Paris, indicates a deliberate effort to resume the dialogue and address outstanding trade issues between Canada and China.

In May 2024, the expanded Trans Mountain Pipeline (TMEP) began its commercial operations in Canada, TMEP has allowed Canada to expand its market beyond the United States, which was previously its largest customer, China has emerged as the primary buyer of Canadian crude shipped through the expanded pipeline, which will strengthen their partnership in energy sector. The China-Canada Business Council (CCBC) has initiated a Canadian Agri-Food Mission to China in November 2024, emphasising on Canada’s commitment to agri-food exports.

Cultural relations between China and Canada have served as a bridge for mutual understanding, facilitated by student exchanges, joint initiatives, and community programs. The Canada-China Scholar’s Exchange Program remains active, offering scholarships to Canadian students, faculty, and professionals for studies or research in China and to Chinese scholars for research in Canadian studies in Canada.

In June 2025, the Chinese Embassy in Canada organized a symposium on China–Canada relations, bringing together nearly 20 experts and representatives from major Canadian universities, think tanks, media outlets, and business councils deliberating cooperation across trade, agriculture, energy, climate, and people-to-people exchanges.

China-Canada cooperation and closeness is only observed in sectors like trade, energy and education and culture. This means Canada strongly aligns and has historic strategic partnership with the US. The Arctic Security issue is the bone of contention between Canada and China; The melting ice caps will present China and Russia an alternative sea route to major markets of Europe. China calls itself a “nearby Arctic state” and its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, describes China’s priority in “shipping, resource development, regional governance and science” and has a “Polar Silk Road Plan” in the Arctic region.

In 2020, the Canadian government blocked Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd. from acquiring TMAC Resources Inc., which is a Canadian gold mining company that operates in the Arctic. The decision was based on national security concerns, specifically under the Investment Canada Act, which allows the government to review foreign investments that could be detrimental to national security.

In December 2018, Canada arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in December 2018 at the request of the US. The aftermath of the event was Chinese retaliation and detention of two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, which observers describe as “hostage diplomacy”. The Canadian federal government has banned Huawei and later ZTE from working on Canada’s fifth-generation networks over security concerns. The government also ordered the withdrawal of 5G equipment from Huawei and ZTE used in Canada.

During October 2024, Canada imposed 100% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and 25% on steel/aluminum. In response, China reciprocated with 100% tariffs on Canadian peas, canola, rapeseed oil, and 25% tariffs on seafood and pork. Canada’s International Trade Tribunal found evidence of domestic investigations on trade dumping that steel strapping from China may have harmed domestic industry through dumping and subsidies, with preliminary determinations expected by August 8, 2025.

The Canadian government in June 2025 has ordered Chinese surveillance camera manufacturer Hikvision (Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co), to cease operations in Canada over national security concerns. Hikvision has faced many sanctions and restrictions by the United States, over the past five years for the firm’s dealings and the use of its equipment in China’s Xinjiang region, where human rights organizations have documented abuses against the Uyghur community and other Muslim population.

Canada might appear drifting towards China in terms of trade and economic relations especially during the Trump regime, but overall, China-Canada partnership has undergone lots of turbulence in recent past years. “A full reset of Canada-China relationship isn’t feasible… government should focus on building stable, respectful diplomatic relations… to manage disagreements and mitigate any possible worsening of the relationship…” says the former Canadian diplomat & geopolitical advisor Michael Kovrig.

How are India-US Relations Faring Under Donald Trump 2.0?

By: Sanskriti Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

India & the US’ flags: source Internet

India and the United States (US) have had a rocky relationship in the past because of changing governments, global events, and regional needs. The return of Donald J. Trump to the White House in January 2025 marked the start of a new chapter in the relationship between the two countries. With Trump 2.0 once again focusing on the “America First” doctrine, it is important to look at how this administration affects India-US relations in terms of trade, defense, technology, immigration, and people-to-people engagement.

Strategic and Defense Cooperation

The India-US strategic partnership has stayed strong during Donald Trump’s second term. India is still seen as an important partner in the Indo-Pacific for keeping China’s power in check.


In March 2025, joint military exercises like Yudh Abhyas and Malabar were held again, which was a big step forward. These drills not only made it easier for the Indian Armed Forces and the US Armed Forces to work together.

The Trump administration has also given the green light for the sale of high-tech defense gear worth about $3.5 billion, such as MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones and advanced artillery systems. Trump’s transactional foreign policy often looks for clear benefits for both sides. India has skilfully dealt with this by strengthening its role as a net security provider in South Asia.

Trade Relations and Economic Diplomacy

Trade is still a hot topic in the India-US relationship, but it is changing. There were tariff wars and India was kicked out of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) during Trump’s first term. Trump 2.0 hasn’t brought back GSP, but trade talks picked up speed after the India-US Trade Dialogue in New Delhi on April 17, 2025.


At this meeting, both sides agreed to work together to fix trade imbalances and make it easier for people to do business in areas like e-commerce, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. A big result has been the announcement of a $1.2 billion bilateral investment package that will focus on clean energy and infrastructure.

Even with these gains, Trump’s protectionist stance still makes things hard for Indian exporters. His government has also put new tariffs on some steel and aluminium goods, which has hurt India’s manufacturing sector. But the fact that the two economies are becoming more dependent on each other may stop both sides from taking extreme actions.

Technology and Cyber Cooperation

The collaboration in technology, especially in semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity, has become a key part of India-US relations. In February 2025, the two countries launched the US-India Future Tech Partnership during US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s visit to Mumbai on February 10, 2025. 

This partnership, supported by an US$ 850 million joint innovation fund, aims to improve research collaborations, promote secure digital infrastructure, and address cyber threats from both state and non-state actors. With both nations cautious about technology dependence on China, this partnership strengthens their shared strategic interests. 

Additionally, the presence of Indian-origin CEOs in major American tech companies and the ongoing growth of Indian IT firms in Silicon Valley are important factors in solidifying this relationship.

Immigration and Diaspora Engagement

Immigration policy under Trump has been strict. Trump 2.0 has introduced more limits on H-1B visas. These changes start on March 1, 2025. They tighten the eligibility criteria for high-skilled workers, which greatly impacts Indian professionals.

However, Trump has also proposed a merit-based immigration reform bill in June 2025. This bill includes measures for speeding up green cards for highly skilled workers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. The Indian-American community, which makes up over 75 percent of H-1B visa holders, has welcomed this change cautiously.

Additionally, Trump has increased efforts to connect with the Indian diaspora. He recognizes their political importance in key US states. His participation in the “Namaste America” event in Houston on May 5, 2025, received significant attention. It highlighted cultural ties and the role of Indian-Americans in connecting the two democracies.

Climate Change and Energy Cooperation

Climate policy is still a point of contention. Trump 2.0 has rolled back several environmental regulations, withdrawn from international climate agreements, and promoted fossil fuels. However, energy cooperation with India has continued in practical ways.

In June 2025, India and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for a US$ 500 million joint investment in green hydrogen technology and bioenergy research. While the Trump administration focuses on energy security instead of climate responsibility, India’s climate leadership has led to selective partnerships in clean energy.

The US still exports liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil to India. This helps diversify energy sources. These actions provide economic benefits to the US and support India’s move toward sustainable energy.

Geopolitical Convergence and Divergences

The political landscape of Trump 2.0 has major implications for India. With Washington choosing a more unilateral foreign policy, India’s strategic independence faces both challenges and opportunities.

On one hand, Trump’s confrontational approach toward China gives India more room to strengthen defense and technology partnerships with the US. On the other hand, Trump’s unpredictable stance on global alliances, including strained relationships with NATO and scepticism about the United Nations, creates uncertainty.

Additionally, Trump’s decision to cut aid to several countries, including Pakistan, has received a positive response in New Delhi. His support for India’s role in regional stability, especially in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal, has led to better defense intelligence sharing.

Nonetheless, differences still exist. Trump’s tepid support for multilateral institutions, inconsistent position on Russia, and transactional diplomacy have often limited deeper institutional cooperation.

Human Rights, Democracy, and Value-Based Diplomacy

India-US relations have often been seen as a partnership based on shared democratic values. However, under Trump 2.0, diplomacy focused on values has been overshadowed by strategic and economic interests.

Concerns about human rights, press freedom, and religious freedoms in India have not been addressed as openly during Trump’s administration. This approach has helped avoid public diplomatic tensions, but it has also faced criticism from civil society groups on both sides.

Still, informal talks and visits by parliamentary delegations have kept the lines of communication open. These efforts allow for discussions about concerns without upsetting the overall relationship.

The Road Ahead

As Donald Trump transitions into his second term, the India-us relations possibly are sleek but multifaceted corresponds to a program of resilience. Strategic and defense cooperation are plentiful, especially as tied through Technology and Energy, extreme -come what may – pressure on Economic relations has thus far been progressively constructive.

While immigration and climate issues raise friction between us, both countries seem committed to a dialogue on working through the differences without abandoning the opportunity for bilateral opportunities through Trump’s transactional diplomacy. This said, it is certainly not a cookie-cutter approach, but India as an emerging new global power level, will need to adopt a more independent and assertive, diversified foreign policy.

At the end of the day like the first Trump term, the partnership however, will be based not on ideologies, but on shared interests, strategic need and mutual benefit. These factors will likely only evolve and become salient as more uncertainty defines our global environment. The world seems to need pragmatism, this is likely the basis of enduring partnerships, particularly between India-US partnership.

Relationship between Russia and North Korea: An Analysis

By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

North Korea & Russia’s flags: source Internet

Russia and North Korea have a convoluted history of relations constructed of features of history, geopolitics, and regionalism. With the world trying to come to terms with the dangers of the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and moves toward strategic games by Russia, the dynamic of this relationship takes a more prominent role. The article attempts to give a comprehensive overview of Russia-North Korea relations with a focus on its historical background, their economic, military and diplomatic interaction, and other aspects of the relationships and how this might impact the security of the region and the world.

Historical Context

Russia-North Korea relations may be traced back to World War II. The peninsula of Korea was split into two different states: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The central feature about the Soviet Union is that it was the main factor that set up the communist regime in North Korea as it offered economic and military assistance that put the basics of the political scenario in North Korea.

During the first years after division the dominance of the Soviet Union prevailed. North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, followed a Stalinist style of governance which was largely dependent as far as development of economy and military was concerned by the Soviet assistance. The aid of the USSR was not only financial but also came in terms of the military training, equipment and ideological direction, which only strengthened the power of the regime.

The Korean War and The Aftermath

The Korean War (1950-1953) became another milestone of the relationship between Russia and North Korea. The Soviet Union’s support of North Korea in its invasion into South Korea was another imperative in the conflict. The war left the situation in a stalemate hence the creation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and an ongoing separation of the peninsula.

The post-war USSR still gave much assistance to North Korea that played a very important role in its reconstruction and growth. It is during this time when North Korea was getting militarized and advanced weapons and technology were provided to them by the Soviet Union. The friendship cropped up between the two countries that included the ability of the two nations to support each other and North Korea acted as a buffer state against the effects of the United States in the region.

 

Dynamics of the Cold War

During the Cold War, North Korea had a good relationship with USSR because they shared ideological beliefs as well as common interest. The Soviet Union saw North Korea as an essential ally in its campaign against influence of the U.S. in East Asia. North Korea, on the other hand, depended on the Soviet to keep its regime in power and follow its dreams of accumulating military power.

Nevertheless, the relationship did not go on so well. Tensions were present in the 1960s due to the Sino-Soviet split since North Korea was trying to balance between the two communist powers. Efforts at independent action in foreign policy made by Kim Il-sung brought him to clash with Moscow, although the general necessity of allies preserved the alliance.

The Post Cold War Era

In 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union brought a fundamental change in the state geography of East Asia. North Korea being badly hit economically, desired to retain its bond with Russia though with reduced finances. The decade of the 1990s was marked by the survival crisis of North Korea whereby its foreign policy had to be re-examined.

Russia itself was caught up with its internal problems at the time such as the economic disturbance and political instabilities. This forced Moscow to have little capacity to give North Korea significant support. Yet, the two countries remained highly involved in diplomatic relations, with the intention of North Korea trying to capitalize its history and become popular among the Russians.

Geopolitical Dynamics: China and its Emergence

Since China became a global power in the late 20th century, its association with North Korea became very important. China rose to become a regional powerhouse due to the left economic reforms that were started by Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s. Since it realized that both Russia and China were important to its relations, North Korea tried to make a relationship with Beijing.

The shift in strategy could be observed during the early 2000s when both countries tried to work together over the problem of regional security. To put an equal weight against the role of China, Russia tried to enhance its relationship with Pyongyang. The North Korean-Chinese relationship has however been typified in most times with a certain amount of tension in the way that the activities that North Korea is involved in may not augur well to the interests of China.

Nuclear Crisis in North Korea

Nuclear crisis in North Korea has been the cusp of the region and it has affected relations between Russia and North Korea. Russia became more complex when North Korea was creatively engaging in its nuclear program. Although Moscow has criticised North Koreas nuclear test, it has been urging a dialogue and openness to an isolated approach.

This is quite a sophisticated position which reflects Russian need to keep its influence in the area and resolve the issues of security. Russia has taken the role of intervener in the crisis and has been playing the role of promoting a diplomatic solution to the crisis and this will have the United States, South Korea, and China included.

The International Sanctions and its Role

The issue of the North Korean nuclear program has posed difficulties to economic cooperation following international sanctions directed towards the country. Nevertheless, Russia has frequently been against these sanctions and has always argued in favor of a dialogue and interaction. This position has enabled certain trade to remain open through under the dim light of international interest.

These sanctions have also influenced North Korea to look at other economic partners and Russia appears as the possible partner that may help in bypassing these sanctions. The association has been defined through a certain level of pragmatism whereby the two countries want to leverage on their collaboration despite the pressure imposed on them.

Economic Relations: Investment and Trade

There are not many economic contacts with Russia and North Korea, but there have been some changes depending on the politics of the moment. Trade has been stimulated in these past few years, especially in the aspects of energy, agriculture, and infrastructural development. Russia has tried to invest in North Korea infrastructure such as building of railway lines and energy generation.

This increase in economic cooperation is reflected by the development of the Rajin-Khasan railway project which links the Far East of Russia to North Korea. The purpose of this project is to improve the connection of trade and the distribution of goods between the two countries. Furthermore, Russia has shown interest in joint energy ventures among them which involves North Korea natural gas provision.

Economic Cooperation and the Effect of Sanctions

The sanctions imposed on North Koreans have greatly affected the economy of the country, which had to depend more on the foreign partners. Russia has come out as a possible economic rope to North Korea since it is prepared to trade with North Korea as well as investing in vital sectors. Nevertheless, the sanctions have added pressures to economic collaboration since the two countries have to deal with the dynamics of foreign investigation.

Nonetheless, Russia has been pursuing the desire to put its economic presence in North Korea. The two countries have been carrying on negotiations in order to improve the trade relationship, having in mind areas like agriculture, mining and energy. Economic cooperation potential is also quite high, especially since North Korea is approaching economic diversification of its relations.

Future of Economic Relationships

In the future, the situation in economic relations between Russia and North Korea will hinge on a number of factors, among which it is possible to distinguish a geopolitical situation, the existence of international sanctions and the desire of both countries to establish real cooperation with each other. With North Korea still suffering with regard to its economy, it is even possible that its economic relations with Russia grow stronger.

Military Cooperation: Past Military Relationships

The closest military ties existed between Russia and North Korea during the Korean War, when the Soviet Union supported the North greatly. This alliance has remained intact as over the years Russia has been providing North Korea with military guns and weaponry. Past collaboration on military affairs has provided the basis of the current peaceful cooperation existing in the field of defense.

Recent Developments in Military Collaboration

During the current years, cooperation in the sphere of military activities has acquired new colors, especially when speaking about nuclear plans of North Korea. Russia has raised alarm about violence that could erupt in this region and has even tried to pose itself as a spokesperson in the events that are happening between North Korea and the United States.

There has been observed joint military exercises and exchange of military personnel as an indication of the willingness to enhance defense relations. Further, Russia has supplied military technology and gear to North Korea, an action that has strengthened the two countries defense dealings.

Consequences of the Military Collaboration

Military relationship between Russia and North Korea implies potential consequences to the security regime within the region. The possibility of military cooperation is high as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear prowess and this is very alarming to the other countries in the neighborhood and also to the international community. Engagement of Russia in military collaboration with North Korea can be seen to hinder the resolving of the nuclear crisis, and this may cause more tensions in the region.

Diplomatic Engagement: High-Level Visits and Summits

Diplomacy Russia-North Korea relations have been off-set by high-ranking visits and summits. It is specific because the interest of North Korea in Russia is reflected in the meetings of the leadership in 2019 and 2021 with the head of that state, Kim Jong-un. Such meetings involved the improvement of bilateral relations, and the promotion of security in the region.

In these summits the two leaders focused on the importance of embracing each other and working together on some of the issues such as economic growth and security. The high-level encounters act as a stage to deliberate on common grounds as well as commit to working together.

Multilateral Forums

Russia had engaged in multilateral meetings over the North Korean problem, such as the Six-Party Talks. These discussions have had their fair share of obstacles however, the inclusion of Russia into the process attests to its desire to reach a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. The multilateral approach will enable Russia to deal with other stakeholders such as the United States, South Korea and China in an attempt to deal with the complexities of the situation in North Korea.

The Problems of Diplomatic Interaction

Irrespective of the endeavours of diplomatic involvement, there are obstacles in the Russia-North Korea relationship. The tensions in the region of North Korea and its nuclear program as well as the difference in the interests of the regional powers makes the field of diplomacy even more problematic. The competing interests of other stakeholders especially the United States and South Korea usually challenge the position of Russia as a mediator.

Regional Implications: Korean Peninsula and Beyond

Russia and North Korea relations have a huge implication to the Korean Peninsula and East Asia as a region. With the threats between North Korea and the United States going on, the role of Russia as a potential mediator gains higher significance. Also, the relationship has influenced the dynamics of regional security especially due to the influence of China.

The involvement of Russia with North Korea acts as a contraction to the dwelling of Americans on political dominance in the region, which makes the geopolitics of the region tough. The future Russia-North Korea relations will depend on the flow of the historic preconditions, economic manipulations, and military alliances.

What the United States is and What the United States Responds to

Russia-North Korea relation has been watched carefully by the United States as the U.S. looks through the prism of its strategic interests. The reaction by Washington has been the imposition of sanctions and diplomacy to isolate North Korea and at the same time limit the influence by Russia in the region. The U.S. has been worried about the possibility of military relations between Russia and North Korea especially on the aspect of selling arms and technology transfers.

The Role of China

One thing that cannot be overlooked is the role of China in the relationship between Russia and North Korea. China is the major trade partner and ally of North Korea hence controls most of its activities. The interest of Russia in North Korea could be held in the perspective of the necessity to oppose the penetration of additional influence of China in the region. The relations which will develop among these three countries will determine the future of stability and security in East Asia.

Conclusion

The interconnection between Russia and North Korea is rather complicated and multifactorial, the process of connection is predetermined with historical links, geopolitics interests, and the play of forces in the region of occurrence. The relationship between the two countries will keep growing as they pursue their interests in the 21st century, with concerns about its impact on peace in the region and the world at large. This sort of relationship remains important to understanding the larger structural aspect of geopolitics in East Asia.

The future course of relations between Russia and North Korea will be written by the interrelation of the historical legacies, mutual economic interests, military cooperation and relations. North Korea will also depend more on Russia as it struggles with the economy and geopolitics pressures hence the closeness. On the other hand, the relationship between North Korea and Russia will be determined by Russian strategic interests in the region where the latter will want to balance its relations with other regional powers.

To summarize, Russia and North Korea have formed an ever- evolving association that is going to take its bearings on the geopolitical affairs of East Asia. The two countries will enjoy fruitful cooperation in the 21st century as they work out the dynamics of the century and the cooperation will bring sweeping consequences to regional security and international relations.

BRICS 2025: Has Anything Been Achieved?

By: Chethana Enugula

BRICS 2025: source Internet

When the BRICS countries met again in their regular summit in 2025, concerns about relevance, success, and future direction hung heavily over the bloc. With the world’s geopolitical and economic map changing rapidly, as new alliances are forged, technological revolutions emerge, and new economic threat areas appear, the 2025 summit was the main event to watch, with hopes of seeing some progress or even further division. This article looks deep into the results of the BRICS 2025 summit to determine whether the group had achieved anything major or had merely reaffirmed its current rhetoric.

Background: The BRICS Vision

The BRICS bloc appeared at the beginning of the 21st century, and the idea behind it was to change the global order so that the voice of the emerging economies could be strengthened. These were originally called the BRIC term, which economist Jim O’Neill coined, but later it was considered official after the inclusion of South Africa in 2010. Collectively, they had over 40 percent of the world population and almost a quarter of the GDP across the world by the 2020s.

BRICS has undergone a transition over the years from an economic association of powers into a political alliance that promotes multipolarity, reforms of international organizations (such as the UN and IMF), and increased cooperation between the South and South. The intraregional differences, the bilateral difference, especially that between India and China, and the variation in economic directions have, however, dented the cohesiveness of the group.

The Situation of the 2025 Summit

December 2025 marked the 2025 BRICS summit held in Cape Town, South Africa, with anticipation and skepticism in mind. The last couple of years have witnessed the world suffering the aftermath of the pandemic, inflation, geopolitical conflicts (the current Russia-Ukraine war), and technological decoupling between the West and China.

In this background, BRICS endeavoured to establish its relevance. In its turn, South Africa, as the host, was interested in promoting a revitalized unity and cooperation among its members and in proposing BRICS as an alternative to the Western-centric multilateral bodies, including G7 and NATO.

Significant Topics and Agendas to Be Discussed

– The Economic Cooperation and the BRICS Currency Initiative

The BRICS currency proposal, which has received so much publicity as a possible successor to the US dollar in intra-group trade, also dominated headlines at BRICS 2025. Initially, the concept was floated in 2023 when there was increased discontent with the financial systems dominated by the dollar.

Although a full-fledged BRICS currency is still way beyond its implementation, the new task force was created at the summit to discuss the technical and policy aspects of the proposed currency. The countries were willing to use local currencies more in trade and enhance the mechanism of settlements by relying on the New Development Bank (NDB).

Was there any gain?

Improvements were not material. Political commitment is rising, but actual implementation will take a number of years.

– Strategic autonomy and geopolitical gearing

At a time when the world is divided into more polarized blocks, the BRICS leaders once again committed to strategic autonomy. They reiterated multipolarity, non-interference in internal policies, and diplomacy, which diplomatically criticized the Western sanctions and interventions.

India and China insisted that the world be restrained from the wrangles of conflict, but they differed in their disagreements concerning certain points, such as Ukraine and Taiwan. Russia wanted to find a diplomatic ally and an alternative economic source through the use of the forum due to the ongoing sanctions.

Was there any gain?

The group has succeeded in having unity in diversity, which is not a small achievement. Nevertheless, the absence of specific solutions left the boundaries of the political coordination of BRICS open.

– BRICS+ and Regional Integration

The BRICS 2025 witnessed the further development of the BRICS+ mechanism, where such countries as Argentina, Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia joined the talks. The topic of formulating new members was discussed as well, but there was no agreement.

The outreach multiplied the bloc’s soft power and legitimacy in the Global South. However, institutional reforms must be implemented; otherwise, it is likely to dilute the key aims of BRICS countries.

– Sustainable development and climate change

Emphasis was given to environmental cooperation, and BRICS countries pledged to increase the sharing of green technologies and the development of renewable energy. India and Brazil focused on climate financing, whereas China suggested the BRICS Green Development Fund.

There were good proposals about what should be done; follow-up will play a critical role. One of the concrete products was the establishment of a Green Task Force.

– Technology Sharing and Technology Transformation

With the emerging trend of digital economies in the world, BRICS 2025 initiated the “BRICS Digital Partnership Initiative,” which serves the purpose of promoting cooperation in the areas of AI, cybersecurity, and digital infrastructure.

In India, a new Digital Innovation Center was announced in Bangalore to incubate BRICS-nation-based start-ups.

Yes. It was one of the most practical outcomes of this summit, which could have increased technology self-sufficiency among the members.

The Role of the New Development Bank (NDB)

The NDB, commonly referred to as the BRICS Bank, remained at the center stage. The bank has secured 10 billion in new lending in 2025 in its target areas of infrastructure and clean energy, as well as pandemic preparedness. The bank has also established its first regional office in Cairo to serve the African development needs.

Challenges before BRICS

Even though the summit was held on a positive note, many old issues remain:

–        Internal Threats: Indo-Chinese tensions and different national interests reduce the ability to act together.

–        Economic Asymmetries: The economic power of China greatly outweighs the rest of the members, and hence, the issue of dominance is brought into question.

–        Institutional Weaknesses: BRICS does not have a permanent secretariat, and it is hard to coordinate and continue.

–        Absence of Enforcement Mechanisms: Enforcement structures are rare when it comes to agreements; many agreements are declaratory only.

Impression and Western interpretations

The emergence of BRICS 2025 was looked on as wary encouragement by Western analysis. On the one hand, they accepted the possibility that the bloc could reorder global governance; on the other hand, they were not confident in its unity. Some viewed the summit as a symbolic meeting with minimal geopolitical effect; others were concerned about not underestimating its overall trend.

To counter this appeal, the G7 has stepped up its efforts to befriend the developing nations and provide them with alternatives in the form of funding and infrastructure offers.

Civil society manifestation and the public mood

Interestingly, BRICS 2025 involved increased input from the civil society as compared to its earlier editions. The marquee summit was accompanied by youth forums, academic exchanges, and media panels, which raised such issues as digital literacy, environmental justice, and cultural exchange.

Did we get anything? A Fair Verdict

BRICS 2025 indeed failed to bring about game-changing developments, but it made some modest accomplishments that might define its future course. Both the growth of discussions and the renewed attention to the use of local currencies, digital innovation, and cooperation on the environment comprise actual (though small-scale) progress.

Yet the summit also highlighted the structural weaknesses of the bloc. Unless something more institutional and powerful, and the resolution of the internal contradictions, occurs, BRICS may be at risk of stagnation or a complete lack of revenue.

Conclusion

The BRICS 2025 summit was more about an incremental change and not a breakthrough. Although the group failed to present spectacular reforms, such as introducing a shared currency or designing new international rules that would be binding, it reinforced its promises of multipolarity, economic integration, and reforms of international institutions. Concrete measures entailed putting extra focus on trade in local currency, the opening of the Digital Innovation Center in India, and suggestions of further cooperation on green technology and climate finance. These developments indicate that BRICS is making marginal but significant progress in terms of cementing its position as a platform of the opposite economies and an alternative to global governance.

Nonetheless, the summit revealed long-term internal weaknesses. The rivalry in the political sphere, particularly between India and China, and the imbalance in terms of economic scale and power, particularly with China, also restrain joint efforts. The lack of an effective institutional framework or binding processes also undermines the considerations of BRICS being able to deliver on what it promises. Nevertheless, all failings have not made the group obsolete, at least to the Global South, which sees it as a source of collective voice and collaboration beyond the confines of the forums that are probing the Global South. With this in mind, it is perhaps not seen that BRICS 2025 was a turning point but as a gradual and positive step forward in the developmental process that the group is taking.

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