By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Resting at the heart of Eurasia, Central Asia has long been more than just a geographic expression— it is a strategic location, deeply rooted in history and instrumental in the rise of great powers. In 1991, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian Republics (CAR): Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan emerged as independent and sovereign nations. The region is phenomenally rich in culture and natural beauty, economically vibrating corridor between Asian and European nations and remains undeniably crucial in global geopolitics.

Whenever, the topic of discussion is Central Asia, two theories are bound to emerge. First is, Sir Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory”. He was a British geographer who argued that Eurasia was the core of world power and Central Asia its “geographical pivot” or “Heartland”. According to him, whoever controlled this Heartland, could dominate the “World Island” and shape global politics. Years later, Nicholas Spykman, a political scientist shifted the focus to the role of maritime/sea-power in his “Rimland Theory”. To him, “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”— basically focused on coastal Eurasia and Central Asia remained crucial region as a connector between Heartland and Rimland.

In terms of location, Central Asia usually covers a vast area extending from the Chinese border in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west, and from Russia in the north to Iran and Afghanistan in the south. The five states together cover a large landmass. Since the era of the historic Silk Road, Central Asia continues to be a land of great significance for traders and invaders throughout history. The region functioned as a vital channel for transportation of fabrics, such as cotton, wool, linen and particularly silk from China to the West and vice versa. Cities like Samarkand and Bukhara, became prominent centres for trading textiles. Central Asia and neighbouring region’s traders also imported a wide variety of spices along with tea, carpets and rugs. Central Asia region was also a gateway in circulating papermaking and printing technology that invented in China, that revolutionized the way knowledge was recorded and spread. Along the way, the region also emerged as a prime source of transition in multiple domains of knowledge combined with religious sciences and architecture. Beyond transportation of goods, the legacy of Silk Road remains significant, in terms of cultural development, knowledge exchange and most importantly connecting civilizations. Thus, Central Asia’s role as a vibrant bridge between diverse cultures is still undoubtedly relevant in contemporary times.

In the present context, Central Asia is still considered as a strategically productive region, and thereby acquiring privileged status in contemporary geopolitics. Potential source of energy resources like oil, natural gas, coal, minerals along with its growing role in transcontinental trade corridors substantially contribute to its significance. Particularly rare earth materials demand is increasing in Western industries. Almost 18 out of the 30 rare earth materials that is vital for the EU economy are produced only in Kazakhstan, including titanium, niobium beryllium, and tantalum. In fact, Kazakhstan is also the largest producer of uranium in the world, 43% of global production in 2022. After the collapse of USSR, in terms of petroleum and natural gas production, four Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were quickly considered a good alternate to Russia. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have considerable energy resources and production. To put that in perspective, Kazakhstan’s oil reserves amounted to 30 billion barrels as of January 1, 2025. Turkmenistan proved natural gas reserves valued at approx. 71.5 billion barrels, makes it the fifth-highest in the world. In the meantime, Turkmenistan is the world’s 11th-highest natural gas producer, and Uzbekistan was the 17th-highest natural gas producer in 2023.

The Central Asian nations are also evolving in green energy with major focus in solar, wind, and hydrogen. There are also discussions going on regarding water diplomacy. Transboundary climate change, water and environmental challenges in Central Asia, rises the need of cooperation. Leaders from Central Asia had raised concerns over the Aral Sea crisis and climate change at global forums, accentuating the sustainable use of water and other natural resources, as well as risk reduction of water-related challenges. Western collaboration with Central Asian nations, whether public or privet, in developing sustainable energy production not just uplifts their regional initiatives against climate change but also ensures energy security in the global level. So, even from the perspective of green energy and sustainable development Central Asian states are very important.

The regional dynamics, however have been reshaped by recent developments, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and China’s growing economic domination etc. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a comprehensive strategy that includes Central Asia to boost regional cooperation by promoting infrastructure and economic integration. China’s heavy investments in Central Asian states have acted as a catalyst, propelling significant growth, economic development and strengthening regional connectivity. One such strategic   development is the newly launched China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line, likely the route of economic breakthrough for the Central Asian region. Such initiatives have led to increased transport efficiency, reduced costs, and increased bilateral trade among states. Due to its location, the region became a geostrategic backbone of the BRI, while also reshaping China’s influence across the region. Such crucial changes have caught the attention of other powers.

Recognizing the strategic need of connectivity, these states are actively working on developing their regional connectivity and infrastructure. Central Asia, in this regard seeks to maintain closer economic and diplomatic ties among neighbouring countries and beyond the region. Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is an integral multimodal transport route joining China and Southeast Asia to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, and Turkey through a network of railways, highways, and maritime routes. Central Asian corridor is arguably the most potential hub for trade and investment— attracting sustainable growth and prosperity for the entire region. Improved connectivity accentuates other region’s presence, to influence and firm stance across the Central Asia.

To further increase engagement with foreign nations, these states created the C5+1 platforms, that connects the five Central Asian states with partners such as Japan, followed by the US, the EU, Russia, and China and so on. In 2024, the US also launched the B5+1 forum, in order to boost economic integration.

Over the past few years, the region has witnessed several internal and external changes, that have contributed to its evolution into its current form. It was once part of Soviet Socialist Republics governed by the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Initially, these newly independent nations were deeply dependent on Russia for institutional and economic stability. Simultaneously, their leaders reinvented their roles and authority for strengthening their power over their land. The region carries a profound historical and cultural imprint left by the Mongols and Turks and with the spread of Islam, it became a vibrant catalyst, driving the rise of prominent centres of knowledge during the medieval times. This legacy not only shaped the identity of Central Asian nations but also position the region as a pivotal point for transformation and exchange.

These days, Central Asia has gained attention and importance across the world in light of the Ukraine war. The major cause for such a growing interest is the notion that estimated fading influence of Russia on Central Asia. Such estimation currently intensified a kind of inevitable competition among a number of Russia’s competitors to deepen ties with the Central Asian nations. Several states like–the United States, Turkey, Germany, France, India etc. have started to intensify their engagements with the CAR region in various means to expand their influence.

Amidst the changing political dynamics, these states navigate through a series of complex decisions in order to protect their sovereignty and secure economic gains by carefully managing their relations with major powers. They also need to address internal issues as well. Central Asian states occasionally witnessed large-scale border related, security and anti-governmental protests. However, these states are relatively stable and coordinated.

Central Asia still does not have a regional organisation. Across the world, regions have established notably strong organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Southeast Asia, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in North America or the African Union (AU) in Africa. But in Central Asia, there are only regional institutions, established with specific goals/objectives prompting greater prosperity but, limited in scope and often dominated by the neighbouring great powers.

Another issue in the region is water sharing and border disputes. Rapidly melting glaciers, overexploitation of Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, water sources cross national boundaries and, dam construction etc contribute to disputes. Competition over water rights has led to clashes, prominently in the Fergana Valley and other transboundary areas. Parallelly, with poorly demarcated borders turned irrigation disputes into broader border conflicts. People in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, living near the water bodies have been forced to leave as a result of environmental degradation and related socio-economic issues. Similarly, armed clashes also have erupted between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan around a major cross-border water supply facility.

From the security and stability perspective, Central Asian Republics occupy a pivotal position in the wider Eurasian region. Their proximity to Afghanistan exposes them to a number of serious cross-border challenges such as terrorism, violent extremism, and drugs trafficking, particularly Afghan heroin flowing continually through Central Asia into Russia and Europe with authorities seized less than 3 percent.

As matters stand, Central Asia continues to grapple with terrorism. Numerous cases of terrorist acts committed by Central Asians outside of the region, for instance- Karachi airport in Pakistan in 2014, Istanbul in 2017, and the Moscow concert hall attack on March 2024. It appears that Central Asians have been involved in extremist activities at the global level, but such incidents within the region itself remain rare.

Surely, Central Asia is actively combating extremism, and other geopolitical vulnerabilities, but many unavoidable internal issues, governance, social grievances, and reliance on external powers limit the effectiveness of these measures.

However, the five states have become more unified and active on the international platforms. They, in fact, openly discuss and comment on world events. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have all publicly supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similarly, they also supported peaceful resolution of on-going Israel-Iran crisis, to maintain regional stability. With so many crisis-like situations going on in the world and having experienced major shifts in its own political environment, the region is currently less tense and much more cooperative in political, diplomatic and economic spheres, than in the years immediately following its formation.

In the past couple of years, the geopolitical situation in the Central Asia region has been rapidly developing in the course of many events. Most Central Asian states seek to pursue a so-called diversified foreign policy, focusing on multilateral approach, remaining open to function with different actors. However, unlocking the region’s full potential requires very strategic collaboration among states, regional institutions and external partners. The evolvement of Central Asian states from a well-known crossroads to being a modern-day geopolitical hotspot, highlights their ever-growing importance in world order.

In conclusion, the world to a great extent, is turning towards a multipolar order. Engaging with each other is not only important but a necessity. And within this evolving world order, Central Asian states have assumed a vital position and their importance/influence on global affairs is continuously growing almost by default. The region’s strategic position and their existing resources play a decisive role in influencing outcomes. Natural resources have become a strong asset for the growth of the Central Asia. Since 1990s, the United States has sought to divert the oil and gas flows away from Russia. However, the greater part of their produced oil and gas is now going towards China, making it a vital ally of the Central Asian states. In this context, Russia’s involvement in Ukraine conflict, provided China with a window to seize more economic opportunities and influence over the region. Observing these shifts in the geopolitical scenery have led numerous actors to re-adjust their approaches in Central Asia. Central Asian states are also becoming more and more careful on guiding through the complexities of the region and work accordingly.

By: Kashif Anwar

The Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor which highlighted the nature of India-Pakistan relationship and India’s military capabilities was followed by a period of uncertainty and unease in the Indo-US relationship. Despite enjoying a healthy Indo-US relationship and meeting between India’s PM Narendra Modi and the US President in February 2025, recently the Indo-US relationship continued to face litmus tests. The developments post Operation Sindoor like growing relationship between the US and Pakistan, increasing US involvement in South Asian geopolitics and US tariff threat to allies, partners and friends worldwide have made India worried. Such developments and geoeconomic challenges from the US reflect heightened concerns regarding the Indo-US comprehensive global strategic partnership; a status-quo achieved in the last few years. India despite being a strategic partner of the US and vital player in the US Indo-Pacific policies, the US imposed an additional 25% tariff on India which came into practice on August 27, 2025, bringing it up to 50% – 25% implemented on August 7, 2025 and additional 25% came into effect on August 27, 2025 – which put India along with Brazil to be fined the highest tariff in the world.

 

Considering China being an adversary to the US who was spared from additional tariff by giving China a 90-days mutually agreed tariff truce till November 10, 2025, India finds itself on the hammer side. Further, Pakistan regaining the status of “phenomenal counter-terror partner” for the US, such developments not only impacted the ongoing negotiation to achieve a new Indo-US trade deal and achievement of Modi-Trump’s February 2025 meeting, it also impacted the Indo-US relationship and created new strategic challenges for India. Amidst all this India shifts to further recalibrate its bilateral relationship with Russia and China and position within BRICS grouping. As the current situation offers India some opportunities, on the other hand, the implementation of heavier tariffs on India impacts its position from a comprehensive global strategic partner for the US to a coercive economic actor that could affect the India-US ties.

 

Trump’s Ceasefire Narrative and India’s Rejection

As US President Trump claimed, since he assumed office, he has stopped six conflicts worldwide, and such claims from him are seen as spreading misinformation and taking credit. On 12 May 2025, he claimed that “a couple of calls” from his end also stopped the India-Pakistan fighting and sees it as the first war he stopped as the US President. Although India immediately rejected such assertions and claims, on the issue, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar clarified that during the four-day conflict, all the conversations with the US were “routine diplomatic exchanges, not negotiations”. Further, there was no US or third-party involvement, and the ceasefire – after intense, strategic and calculated air warfare – was reached through “direct military channels” between India and Pakistan.

 

In this regard, India’s rejection of US involvement to secure a ceasefire between India and Pakistan is based on three main premises. Firstly, India’s acceptance of the US involvement in the ceasefire process would have legitimised third-party mediation on Kashmir, which could have violated India’s long-standing red line. Secondly, Trump’s narrative, which equated a democracy responding to cross-border terrorism with a state accused of sponsoring it, was seen as a means that would allow the US to take credit for the ceasefire. Thus, acceptance of US involvement would have also blamed India for the situation, as such a claim could have blurred the distinction between the victim and aggressor on the world stage. Lastly, domestic politics further amplified the sensitivity and opposition parties who accused the government of “diplomatic surrender”; therefore, the Indian government’s acceptance of the US offer or mediation was politically costly.

 

US Tariff Coercion and the Collapse of Trade Assurances

Following such claims and India’s rejection, the relationship between the US and India remains focused on the purchase of the F-35 versus the Su-57 fighter jet, growing geoeconomic challenges and threats due to the US tariff threat. As the US set 1^st August as the deadline for many nations, including India, to sign a trade deal or face steep tariffs after the deadline, it pushed both countries to hold a series of negotiations, which are still in process, to achieve a trade deal. However, on 6 August 2025, President Trump imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian exports, which raised import duties on affected Indian items to 50 per cent. It also placed India next to Brazil, with both nations being imposed the highest tariff among all the US trading partners. As the US continues to face challenges from China, the new tariff was imposed on India which will impact the India-US relations and strategic partnership which was achieved in recent years. The US Presidential executive order explicitly mentioned India’s continued import of Russian oil worth US$52 billion in 2024 as justification for the decision to impose additional tariffs on India. On the other hand, it omitted comparable Chinese purchases of US$62.6 billion from Russia, which met 20% of China’s energy demand in the same year.

 

As a result of such tariff imposition, the economic implications are severe for India, and the development is viewed as a serious concern. As India currently enjoys a trade surplus with the US; the new tariffs will have an inimical impact on India’s key export industries, economic growth, and broader trade relationship with the US. Considering India’s merchandise exports to the US in 2024 were US$87 billion, and sectors such as textiles, footwear and gems and jewellery now confront a 30-35% competitiveness gap relative to Bangladesh, Vietnam and Japan. The Federation of Indian Export Organisations warns that as a result of additional tariffs on India, 55% of US-bound shipments will be disrupted, impacting around US$48.2 billion worth of India’s merchandise exports.

 

It is estimated that a protracted tariff regime could shave 0.5 percentage points off India’s FY 2025-26 GDP growth and also pull India’s GDP below 6%. From a political and geopolitical perspective, this move has significantly impacted the Modi-Trump understanding, which was reached on 13 February 2025, aiming to achieve an “early harvest” trade package and to raise bilateral trade to US$500 billion by 2030. An additional 25% tariff on India will take effect on 27 August, casting a shadow over the next round of negotiations between India and the US, happening on 25 August with new hope arising recently. Such a delay in imposition and proximity to the next negotiation date highlight and are seen as a US strategic move to create a negotiating window and pressurise India, which could also impact the India-US defence relationship in the coming times.

 

US-Pakistan Rapprochement and South Asian Realignments

As a result of Operation Sindoor and the US imposing heavier tariffs on India, the geopolitics of South Asia underwent a dramatic transformation, with the US and Pakistan working to deepen their bilateral relationship. Following the operation, the US Department of State described Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner” in counter-terrorism, and subsequently, Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, was invited to attend the US Army’s 250th anniversary parade on 14 June 2025. Such an invitation and development have not only symbolically reversed years of limited senior-level contact between the nations. Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif, who acknowledged Trump’s “pivotal and paramount role” in achieving a ceasefire between Pakistan and India, was welcomed by President Trump and allowed Pakistan to secure favourable economic treatment from the US.

           

For India, who sees such gestures as a confirmation that US strategic interests in Pakistan – supply routes to Afghanistan and leverage over the Taliban – remain intact, which will have direct implications for India’s South Asia policy. In this regard, reports in the Indian press allege that US agencies’ cultivation of the Bangladeshi student movement has resulted in Sheikh Hasina’s resignation on 5 August 2024; however, conclusive evidence remains absent. Further, the developments taking place in Bangladesh under the interim government of Mohammad Yunus, the improvement in relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, Pakistan and the US, and Bangladesh and the US has made India cautious.

 

India’s Pivot to Russia, China and the BRICS Pathway

At a time when geopolitics in South Asia and bilateral relations between India and the US are changing, India’s recent strategic pivot toward Russia, China and BRICS reflects a calculated response to evolving geopolitical pressures and opportunities for diplomatic diversification. In this regard, Prime Minister Modi’s scheduled visit to China for the SCO Summit on August 31 and September 1, clearly marked a significant improvement in India-China relations. Further, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India on August 18, 2025 and met NSA Ajit Doval and PM Modi and also extended an invitation to PM Modi to attend SCO summit in Tianjin. As result of such meeting which witnessed development to resolve tension along the Line of Actual Control and begin groundwork to delimit to adopt non-offensive military posture along the border and work toward achieving permanent demarcation by resolving long-standing border dispute. Such development and progress are seen in the right direction which will allow India and China to further reduce tension along the Line of Actual Control and potentially resume trade and achieve pre-Galwan bilateral relations.

 

In recent times, as India and the Indian Air Force are engaged in a drive to address the declining number of squadrons which will be reduced to 29 from 31 after the retirement of Mig-21 Bison by the end of this year. As India aimed to have sanctioned 42 squadrons to face any future two-front war in near future it once again put light on the current state of Tejas jet, Kaveri engine, AMCA programme and relation with other nations to acquire advanced fighter jets. In this regard, as first half of the 2025 was filled with F-35 versus Su-57 debate, and considering India’s reliable defence partnership with Russia and renewed Indo-Russian relation post Trump’s 50% on India, Su-57 will be back on the table during Russian President Vladimir Putin visit to India in December, 2025. With Russia offering a potential defence deal to India which is compelling, India is still weighing the scale which includes planning to acquire more Rafael and how to ensure defence cooperation and relations with Russia continue without raising alarm in the West.

 

Lastly, as the role and position of India within BRICS and QUAD frameworks have been solidified in recent years. In the case of BRICS, on the issue of de-dollarisation and securing its bilateral trade and national interest India has started to embrace alternative financial mechanisms like saw the use of Rupees to conduct trade with Russia and around 30 countries including BRICS members showing interest in using Rupees as a form of payment in 2025. Further, since 2022, the Reserve Bank of India has been signing direct settlement agreements allowing transactions in rupees without dollar conversion by using Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs) mechanism which have been further streamlined recently. However, whether India has accepted or approved the de-dollorisation, statements from the Indian government recently stressed it isn’t a part of India’s financial agenda, rather sees it as a way which allows India to diversify payment and trade relations with its partners and also reduces India’s risk amid rising US tariff threat.

 

Such strategic initiatives clearly represent India’s pragmatic hedging approach to leverage partnerships with both authoritarian and democratic powers to maximise economic benefits and strategic autonomy and also maintain flexibility in an increasingly growing multipolar world order. With the latest US tariff being active, it could impact India’s surplus trade with the US – US$ 45.7 billion in 2024 as per the US Census Bureau and stand 10^th and next to Canada with US$ 63.3 billion – pushing the Indian government to cover up the losses and mitigate the impact India is working to boost domestic demands, provide sectoral support and is engaged in strategic diplomatic engagement. Such an approach and financial mechanism will enable New Delhi to diversify dependencies without completely abandoning existing Western relationships and provide India a wonderful opportunity to revive the RIC – Russia India and China – trilateral forum which will strengthen India’s balancing act.

 

Implications for the Quad, De-dollarisation and India’s Strategic Options

Considering, the Indo-US relationship is going through a rough phase recent statement from Peter Navarro, Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing to US President Donald Trump made a startlink remark on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that if India stops buying Russian oil, it can get 25% off tomorrow and sees it as a ‘Modi’s War’. In the wake of such a situation the RBI has stated it is ready to step in to support the economy and engage with the industry, and on the other hand, if a situation arises and becomes a necessity a senior government official from the Indian government state India may relax certain FDI restrictions on Chinese investment to further improve bilateral relationship.

 

In such a situation, the issue of QUAD, de-dollarisation and India’s strategic options come into the picture. The implementation of 50% tariff on Indian export to the US has further caused more difference to achieve a new Indo-US trade deal which has put 70% of India’s export to the US with textiles, gems and electrical machinery majorly affected. India, who sees the tariff as unfair, unjustified and unreasonable as it caused the worst phase in Indo-US relationship in the last two decades. With tariffs holding various geo-economic challenges and India continue to engage with the US, statement from Vikram Misri, India’s Foreign Secretary that India continues to attach a high value to the QUAD provided a respite that the 2025 QUAD Leaders’ summit which will be held in India later this year remain unharmed or impacted.

On the other hand, as India’s engagement with Russia and China have increased in the last few weeks with India strengthening its engagement with the BRICS+ members will evolve further in the coming times. Steps taken by India like SRVA and Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS) developed by the RBI is seen as an alternative to SWIFT to conduct international transactions. As India sees such measures as a way to ease rules to promote use of Rupees-based trade with BRICS members with the Ministry of External Affairs affirming such steps shouldn’t be seen as India’s formal confirmation to adopt the de-dollarisation.

 

Such an approach adopted by India recently not only highlights that the Indian government wanted to have a balanced bilateral relationship with QUAD and BRICS members with India’s current strategy being driven by national interest and hedging approach to have multipolar engagement. For India, embracing alternative payment mechanisms through BRICS represents a calculated response apart from its relation with the US and BRICS members to have leverage. Further, regarding China, Russia and the US, India is advocating for systemic economic sovereignty driven by deeper and more sustainable countermeasures to secure India’s interest at domestic and global level and to achieve maximum strategic flexibility.

 

Conclusion

Former UK Prime Minister Lord Palmerston in his famous 1848 speech to the House of Commons when he stated “there are no permanent friends or enemies only permanent interests” which later became the foundation of political theory of realpolitik which still stand valid till today. Such a statement fits perfectly in the case of India considering how Indo-US relationships have evolved and strengthened multi-fold in the last two decades. The imposition of 50% tariff on India export to the US and improvement of US-Pakistan relationship on the other should be seen as a watershed moment in the Indo-US relationship, and India should see it as an opportunity to diversify its export with like-minded countries and also increase the acceptance and relevance of Rupee and SFMS in bilateral trade and globally respectively.

 

The current tariff which will impact trade with the US and if extended could impact India’s approach, role and outlook towards QUAD and therefore rather India should see it also as an opportunity to further strengthen bilateral relations with individual members of the group especially with Japan. Although tariff has given India an opportunity to further secure its interest to further strengthen BRICS and should see it as a vital opportunity to revive the RIC forum giving India leverage. Considering the rich history of Indo-Russian relations and meeting between PM Modi and President Putin on the sideline of 2025 SCO summit, India should see the development and President Putin visit to India later this year as an advantage. Such development will allow India to further enhance its presence in the BRICS and in the Global South geopolitics and keep its interest secured and protected while keeping a check on China. Considering the history of China who opens its door on its own terms and if the Indo-US economic relationship is back on track for India such diversification and such steps should continue as it will only secure and enhance India’s annual total export and thwart any such development in the near future. Such steps, measures and developments will allow India to navigate the complexities of a fragmented international system and assert its role as a key player in shaping the global order.

By: Rudraksh Saklani, Research Analyst, GSDN

In this era, which is not of war, but of geo-economics rather, the latent nature and unmet potential of the South American continent have begun to witness realignment within the broader rules-based global order. As the intra-nation as well as inter-nation power dynamics shift, in order to not repeat the mistakes of the past, it is only fair to not underestimate the impact and capability of the nations that make up this continent. It is equally imperative to let go of and overcome the stereotypes that engulf the image South America holds in the eyes of rest of the world, often restricted to its football prowess, Iberian colonial past, oil reserves, infamous drug cartels and a unifying hero in the form and resilient spirit of Simón Bolívar.

Introductory Perspective

South America, often mistaken to be on the periphery, is actually central to the global discourse and logistical realities pertaining to food, energy, and climate security. Amidst rising great power competition between the United States of America (USA) and China. South America most definitely matters geopolitically because of its multi-layered dynamism as a continent.

The countries of South America are the likes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela and French Guiana (which is an overseas territory of France, not a sovereign state per se). The population of South America, is officially estimated to be between 438–453 million during 2025, as per United Nations (UN) Data.

As Alberto Methol Ferré has famously proposed “a continentalist outlook of South America as a geopolitical unit, within a Latin American national dimension”, it indicates the desired cohesion, integration and shared identity.

Historical Underpinnings

It certainly is strange and fascinating in equal measure, that most countries of South America (except Suriname), despite exercising sovereignty and achieving independence since the 19th century still get overlooked. A continent so rich in natural resources, so crucial to the global oil supply chains and still struggling to break free from the shackles of rampant corruption, rising crime rates, declining economies, environmental degradation and a serious drug problem? The questions are varied and their reasons are significantly embedded in the whirlwind of geopolitical undercurrents.

To reconstruct the past, it is imperative to revisit and recall it first. South America’s colonial past, especially the Spanish-Portuguese legacy reverberates centuries later in its economic traditions and popular culture, spheres that manifest into geopolitical ramifications. The history of economic dependency through an extractive model, later followed by becoming a reluctant battleground in the struggle for ideological supremacy between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union in the second half of 20th century have been markers of the journey that the region has had.

While the Spanish and Portuguese empires turned South America into an exporter of raw commodities — silver from Potosí (Bolivia), gold from Brazil, sugar and coffee from plantations — this hampered the region’s self sufficiency, autonomy and agency. With that kind of a historical backdrop, the continent’s economy continues to be entrenched with inequality and dependency on external markets.  This pattern explains why South America has always been a supplier of strategic resources (then silver, gold, sugar; now oil, lithium, soy).

The Cold War showed that control of South America mattered for ideological balance and global security. Today’s great power rivalry (U.S. and China, with Russia re-emerging) is a direct echo of these tensions. Many South American states although resisted full alignment with either superpower. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had strong Latin American participation (e.g., Argentina, Peru, Brazil to some extent). Countries pursued regional initiatives to reduce dependence (like early precursors to Mercosur “Mercado Común del Sur”.

These non-aligned tendencies established a tradition of strategic autonomy, which continues till date.

Political Ethos & Chaos

The political fiber of the continent, despite varying country-wise, also has a thread that has held them all together, that thread being of chaos and instability. With the onset of the Pink Tide 1.0 in the 2000s, left-leaning leaders gaining ground (like Chávez, Lula, Morales) and the subsequent right-wing resurgence in the 2010s, which has now gone back to left (Lula’s comeback, Boric in Chile, Petro in Colombia) shows the diversity of public opinion, overpowering the waves of real politik that the world has tried time and again to associate South America with.

This frequent democratic fragility, almost across the board, including the coups like that of Bolivia in 2019, impeachment crises (like those in Brazil, Peru), have had repercussions on the policy swings that have hindered long-term strategies to either unite, or integrate into the changing tech-savvy world order.

Colombia’s cocaine trade menace, organized crime spilling into politics, the Venezuelan crisis forcing millions of refugees to look for shelter and opportunities elsewhere, bankruptcy, hyper-inflation has destabilized the path to mainstreaming of modernity, innovation and collaboration.

Whether it’s Argentina’s Falkland Islands unresolved issue with the United Kingdom (UK), or the Venezuela-Guyana territorial conflict regarding the Essequibo region, the equations are subject to change and scrutiny within South America as well as outside, making it a geopolitically charged entity.

Natural resources-Exploited yet under-utilized

The continent has a lot to offer – like soybeans, lithium, copper, and oil. Venezuela holds the world’s largest oil reserves, but on the flip side, the recent instance of aggressive posturing by the U.S. near its coast (some have gone on to the extent of terming it as an instance of doorstep warfare) and the not so friendly rapport that President Lula from Brazil or President Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela share with President Trump cast aspersions on the viability and feasibility of maximizing the potential of these resources.

Brazil and Argentina are now big players in exporting soybeans, especially because of the trade issues between the US and China, which has made China look for more soybean suppliers in Latin America. This makes South America a stakeholder in the global food supply chain. Also, Argentina’s new policies under President Javier Milei and other countries in the region making it easier for businesses have boosted investors’ hope and confidence. Plus, the continent is key for clean energy, with Chile, Bolivia and Argentina (the Lithium Triangle with 60% of global reserves) providing lithium used in batteries, putting South America on the map in green technology. Regarding renewable energy potential, the wind energy landscape in Patagonia and the hydropower caliber of Brazil are treasure troves of geo-economic transformation waiting to be unlocked and unleashed.

Expanding relationship with China and its alarming aspects

China has solidified its position as South America’s leading trading partner by heavily investing in energy, infrastructure of railways and ports, and military sectors through the Belt and Road Initiative, of which various South American countries are signatories. In 2025, China hosted regional leaders and announced a US$ 9 billion investment credit line, reinforcing its economic influence. Chinese companies have filled the gap left by declining Western investment, building goodwill through aid, investment, and cultural diplomacy. Beijing’s increasing military cooperation, particularly with Venezuela, has raised concerns in Washington regarding the strategic implications for hemispheric security. Another area of suspicion is the Chinese technological and military footprint (courtesy Huawei’s operations under the scanner, satellite stations in Argentina etc).

The shifting alliances on the Taiwan issue—most recently highlighted by Honduras switching recognition to China in 2023—illustrates Beijing’s growing diplomatic influence. More importantly, Beijing’s history of charging exorbitantly high rates of interest when lending and wolf warrior diplomacy coupled with expansionist tendencies repeatedly put on display, the risk of debt dependency is as real as one can safely speculate.

Strategic partnership with India

Meanwhile, the diplomatic engagement with India and the geopolitical vitality that it has in New Delhi’s outlook has been on an upward trajectory. South America, collectively, now has the defining choice to make – to continue to work with India as a strategic partner in mobilizing the Global South and be the voice of reason in multilateral forums.

The transition from non-alignment to all-alignment, as long as there is issue-based cooperation and the strategic autonomy stays intact, has been India’s policy so far in these unprecedented times of sanctions. With South America on-board, and the diversity, credibility and newness that it brings, the sky is the limit to realize mutually beneficial outcomes. Therefore, South America clearly has a role to play bridging the divide and communication gap that exists and persists in the world, in the form of camps and alliances.

Security and regional equations

An economic bloc like the Mercosur, but with issues of uneven integration has had some history. UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) meanwhile stands rather weakened and UN CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) signals a revitalizing attempt at ensuring Latin American unity. With the newfound activity within BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), of which Brazil is a permanent member and from which Argentina withdrew is another instance of different countries making different choices, often at the expense of contrast. While this does signify autonomy, but as a whole, it is also how fragmented the region really is.

South America’s ambitions to influence global standards on development, climate change, and conflict resolution are highlighted by Brazil’s 2025 BRICS chairmanship and the region’s heightened participation in international fora like the G20 (Group of 20).

Its role as a resource-rich periphery still defines its geopolitical importance, after being historically turned it into a strategic arena where resources, ideology, and autonomy collide. These same factors corroborate why the region is even more geopolitically vital today.

Geographical and environmental domain-Climate politics

The geo-strategic location of South America, if we were to look at it from the lens of Rimland theory or Mackinder’s theory, is a myriad of gateways to oceanic spaces and land borders. The presence of the “lungs of the Earth” Amazon rainforest in the context of biodiversity preservation and conservation and also transnational security, the proximity to the Panama Canal with respect to movement in world trade, the direct access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as trade routes, the Andes mountains as resource hub and the Atacama desert as a natural barrier – are all to be factored in while ascertaining the sheer impact it has on the global ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) goals.

The politics surrounding climate change has also assumed a more pronounced geopolitical character with deforestation, illegal unchecked mining, wildfires and overall climate negotiations taking the centre stage in what we now know as climate justice amidst fulfillment of common but differentiated responsibilities. This very climate security ties South America to global future.

The US conundrum

With the Monroe Doctrine (1823) declaring Latin America as the US “backyard”, thereby shutting out European colonial ambitions, South America has always been fundamental to U.S. hemispheric stability and security doctrine. Throughout the 20th century, Washington is often found to be somewhat considered by many, as party to interventions, coups, and economic pressure to secure its dominance. The classic case of Chile (1973) when the U.S. supported Pinochet against socialist Salvador Allende serves as a famous example.

One famous school of thought amongst geopolitical commentators suggests that this is partly because of their geographical proximity to a superpower that at times overshadowed/overpowered them, unintentionally and otherwise. Albeit the U.S. influence off late has been viewed as declining with rise of China, Russia, and regional assertions, but it still holds well in the spheres of military, migration, anti-narcotics operations. Today, the U.S. faces the historical baggage and legacy of these policies and rightly so, as many South Americans remain persistently uncomfortable with, or skeptical of American influence and power.

Economic sustainability

South America has historically been the supplier of raw materials in global supply chains. However, as the circumstances and economic priorities have changed over the years, the situation is a lot more optimistic brimming with recovery and expected reforms, of which increased geopolitical relevance is a natural consequence.

Brazil, apart from being a full-time G-20 member, is the continent’s largest economy, followed by Argentina and Colombia. While South America’s total nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2025 is projected at around US $4.3 trillion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimate a real GDP growth rate for South America of 2.7% in 2025, driven by recoveries in Argentina and Ecuador and steady expansion in Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay.

As South America has largely and consciously chosen to stay neutral as tensions rise between the United States, China, and the European Union. This nuanced approach enables South America to position itself as an important hub for foreign direct as well as institutional investments. For example, the recent completion of trade talks between the EU and Mercosur (bloc with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) in December 2024 shows how South America is working to build partnerships with different groups. Over 64% of local business leaders see the current split in global trade as a chance to grow.

Way forward

South America’s geopolitical importance ought to be rooted in realism, with special emphasis on its strategic location, resource-richness and climate change-related food security to be utilized as a leverage while carrying out its balancing act between various world powers.

As South America is no longer a passive participant or a dormant observer, but a key arena in the 21st-century multi-polar order, but it still faces multiplicity of challenges like political instability, economic inequality, corruption, water shortage, weak logistical base, and regional ideological fragmentation. By cracking new trade agreements and treaties, welcoming foreign investment, and carefully handling relationships with major world powers, the continent as a whole is coming up as a key player.

By: Megha Mittal, Research Analyst, GSDN

India-China relations have always been portrayed as a fine balancing act between cooperation and confrontation. They share civilizational linkages and a long history of cultural exchanges, but mostly, their modern political relations have been shaped by contested borders, security concerns, and shifting power equations. The violent clash on the border after about four decades, resulted in 20 Indian soldiers being killed in action along with an unknown number of Chinese troops dead in the month of June 2020 in the Galwan Valley. It has come to represent, more than just a military confrontation, the erosion of trust built in decades of agreements and dialogues since the 1990s.

For India, Galwan was not only a territory dispute: it was questioning whether China respects the principles of peaceful coexistence that it once promised under Panchsheel. For China, the incident was a reflection of strategic assertiveness, not just along the LAC but all over Asia in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions. The clash significantly changed perceptions in India both at the government and society levels, asking the vulnerable question: Can India ever again trust China?

For India, Galwan was not only a territory dispute: it was questioning whether China respects the principles of peaceful coexistence that it once promised under Panchsheel. For China, the incident was a reflection of strategic assertiveness, not just along the LAC but all over Asia in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions. The clash significantly changed perceptions in India both at the government and society levels, asking the vulnerable question: Can India ever again trust China?

Historical Context of India–China Relations

India, until the mid-20th century, hosted one of the oldest civilizations whose interstate relations were interwoven with the diversity and shifted between cooperation and confrontation. Especially after the end of British colonial rule, a feeling of solidarity was evoked between the two neighbors on account of their being cradled in history under the subjugation of foreign powers and a desire for Asian resurgence. During the 1950s, this era of goodwill was immortalized in popular songs heralding the age of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” after the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement that specifically worked to strengthen the spirits of peaceful coexistence and mutual non-interference conjured between the two sovereign nations. However, this cycle of goodwill was to be surprisingly short-lived.

The year 1962 was an ominous epoch in the Indian expectation of China as a friendly neighbor. This humiliation drilled into India how ill-prepared she was for these defense contingencies. These events were at the heart of the Indian national psyche. Stiffness returned, along with suspicion and doubt, and a slow healing of diplomatic relations went on through the 1970s and ’80s. Attached to memory is that 1988 day when the historic visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was made to Beijing to initiate dialogue and confidence-building measures. But, the key problem of the border stood unaired.

The rapid growth of commercial and economic cooperation had in a way created an illusion of convergence between the two Asian Giants after the Cold War. By the turn of the millennium, China had firmly set its grounds as one of the major trading partners of India. India and China began negotiations on a series of cooperative agreements along the LAC with the intent of maintaining peace between the two sides. Over time, however, the spirit of the agreement took a series of hits because of border incidents, with the incidents of Depsang, 2013, and Doklam, 2017 standing out on sharp reminders on margins for both sides on how fragile such engagement can become. Galwan in 2020 offered strong testimony to the fact that, at the end of the day, foundational grievances and un-agreed borders take precedence over the relationship itself with the result being almost an impossibility for trust-building.

The Galwan Valley Clash: A Turning Point

The Galwan Valley confrontation in June 2020 stands as a major landmark in Indo-China bilateral relations. Situated in eastern Ladakh, Galwan had not been a big flashpoint in the past, but the place suddenly turned into the deadliest confrontation in over 40 years. The clash killed 20 Indian soldiers, including one commanding officer, whereas the Chinese side was pretty much silent on their casualties at first but later admitted of losing several troops. Apart from the whole casualty aspect, this incident also really symbolized a breach of trust between India and China.

For decades, India and China had several CBMs and protocols in place-along the lines of the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC and the 1996 Agreement on Military CBMs-to ensure that even if patrols clashed, they would do so without violence. But the Galwan incident showed that these mechanisms had failed. This was the first violent encounter since 1975, and the first deadly one since the 1962 war.

The Indian response was quick, multifaceted, and comprehensive. Militarily, New Delhi reinforced LAC positions, brought in additional troops, and sped up infrastructural developments in the bordering areas. Economically, the attempt was to water down India’s dependence on China through banning over 200 Chinese apps, stopping Chinese investments in strategic sectors, and promoting alternate supply chains. On the diplomatic front, India has engaged China in several rounds of talks, becoming unwavering on the bottom line of peace on the border before proceeding to normal relations.

The Galwan clash was not just another skirmish: it has changed strategic calculations. It shattered the notion that economic interdependence aspired to stability. Public mistrust of China and against China rose in India, emphasizing the national security and self-reliance bases. In certain ways, Galwan is the 21st-century Rubicon that reawakened old traumas and laid bare the inherent volatility of an indefinite border.

China’s Strategic Behaviour and India’s Concerns

The sustained actions of China over the last two decades have undoubtedly created an aura of assertiveness rightly viewed with suspicion by India. The Galwan clash, it seems, was never to be a singular case: it stands as yet another facet of Beijing’s grand design for military expansion, economic penetration, and geostrategic engineering south of the Himalayas and beyond. From a military point of view, the PLA has developed advanced infrastructure all across Tibet and Xinjiang, from which it can quickly deploy its forces against the LAC. Incursions have been increasing; salami-slicing tactics began to erode India’s capacity to hold up deterrence, with the changing attempts at altering the status quo slowly undermining deterrence on the Indian front.

On the economic end, trade imbalances have been exploited to hold India vulnerable. Even though China has been India’s largest trading partner, the relationship has been disproportionately skewed in favor of China, because India has run enormous deficits and has become an exporter and importer of Chinese goods in critical sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and technology. The Galwan incident demonstrated that economic interdependence might not translate to peace, and thus India was compelled to restrict Chinese investments and diversify its supply chains.

Anyhow, China’s growing influence in South Asia had become another cause of concern. Its close relationship with Pakistan, especially through CPEC, along with growing outreach in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, had carved out India’s traditional sphere of influence. All the while, the increasing Chinese naval power and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific present the maritime security concern to India. Such developments present a clear evidence of China’s comprehensive thrust toward altering the regional order in its favor. For India, Galwan stood as an unfortunate reminder that neither past agreements nor economic relations can guarantee stability and practically deepened the trust deficit, thereby maintaining the demand for vigilance.

Trust Deficit: Why Galwan Changed Everything

The Galwan clash was a pivotal event that broke the delicate trust framework that had kept India–China relations together since the 1990s. The previous three decades had seen both sides relying on confidence-building measures and border agreements to provide a shield from violence even during moments of tension. June 2020 saw this mechanism fail with the deaths of Indian soldiers, prompting India to revisit China’s credibility as a negotiating partner. China now showed a blatant disregard for its agreed understandings, sending across clear signals that whenever hard-nosed strategic interests come into play, they would willingly take precedence over diplomacy.

The ripples, however, spread beyond the battlefield. Galwan incident created an odium against China, pushing India for stronger border security and economic self-reliance. From a strategical point of view, this proved that Beijing could no longer be considered to honor its commitments, as those commitments once were supposed to stabilize the upward curve on escalation. Perhaps, this incident also exposed the asymmetry of intent-there, where India was pushing for keeping the peace and stability along the Line of Actual Control, China appeared intent on altering the facts on the ground by measured aggression.

In essence, Galwan was not merely a soldiers’ clash; rather, it represented a clash between expectations. It displayed how fragile diplomatic commitments could be and afterwards transformed that very relationship into one defined by suspicion. For India, the lesson was clear: once trust is lost, it is hard to rebuild it, especially if issues of sovereignty and national security are involved.

India’s Strategic Dilemma: Engage, Compete, or Confront?

After the Galwan clashes, India followed a difficult strategic dilemma—whether to engage with China, compete by pursuing capability-building, or confront Beijing directly. Engagement remains essential because the two countries enjoy a long border, are members of multiple forums such as BRICS and SCO, and have significant trade between them. Cutting all ties is neither feasible and nor desirable. India, however, acknowledges the dangers of over-dependence and has therefore competed by building up border-side infrastructure, upgrading armed forces for modern requirements, and more recently, inked closer partnerships with like-minded countries through platforms like the Quad. Confrontation carries maximum risk, given that initiation of escalation along the Line of Actual Control could spiral into detonation of a wider conflict between these two nuclear powers, thereby destabilizing the entire region.

Thus, India’s approach has been cautiously balancing China—diplomatically whenever necessary, economically and strategically in order to reduce vulnerabilities on its side, and militarily to deter further aggression. The dilemma does not lie in choosing one path and traversing it exclusively but in going down all three simultaneously, to make sure India hangs onto her sovereignty without closing the door on a dialogue.

Should India Trust China? Different Perspectives

The issue differentiating analysts on whether India should trust China post-Galwan has perspectives falling into a few strategic schools of thought. Realists deny trust, for states act only in the interests of self-security. In Chinese conduct at Galwan, the Chinese put territorial claims and strategic advantage above agreements, so India must gear for a long-term conflict rather than cooperation with China. Liberals, on the other hand, consider that channels of engagement cannot be closed entirely despite tensions. The existence of shared interests, such as trade, climate change, and regional stability, forces engagement, although in this case, reduced trust remains a factor. Constructivist thinkers would point to the underlying issue of perception: that memories from the 1962 war, nationalism, and competing narratives fuel distrust, making reconciliation as much about the transformation of mindsets as about negotiating borders.

In a nutshell, India finds itself caught in-between reality. While repeated violations of agreements should perhaps have put absolute trust in China out of reach, an economic and geographical dependency should have at the same time deterred total disengagement. The pragmatic way should be to adopt a policy of managed mistrust-by engaging with China only when it is mutually beneficial and never by putting trust on goodwill alone. Through such a policy, India will keep her sovereignty intact but maintain some dialogue.

Conclusion

The Galwan Valley incident of 2020 set a serious tone in India-China relations. What had been a fragile balance maintained by drafting agreements and ensuring economic engagement, broke apart on bickering over mistrust and strategic rivalry. For India, the incident was no mere sterile matter; the very question put forward challenged whether China is ever to be trusted to keep its word. Historical acts and experiences have taught India to lean heavily toward suspicion, if not downright caution.

Building trust in international relations is never absolute in nature, but Galwan made it clearly understood that building trust with China was an uphill task. Diabolical transgressions of agreements, adverse military and geopolitical posturing constitute a consistent pattern of behavior that India cannot brush aside. Simultaneously, however, geography and economics simply prohibit disengagement. India must therefore, tread a razor-edged pathway of engaging when necessary, competing strategically to protect its interests, and deterring aggression with military preparedness and partnerships.

In essence, the question is less about whether India should trust China and more about how it should manage mistrust. By strengthening its internal resilience, diversifying its external partnerships, and maintaining firm vigilance along the border, India can deal with China from a position of confidence. After Galwan, blind trust is not an option—but pragmatic caution is.

 

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

In 1977, David Hirst authored the book “The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East” which is the best book written on the Israel-Palestine issue as it comprises facts and figures evident by the colossal research and reading that went into the writing of the book.

In the book released 48 years ago, David Hirst writes that though Israel is economically and militarily powerful but, in the times, ahead the Arab nations will become stronger economically and militarily and will pose a serious challenge to Israel in the Middle East. The author signs off from book recommending two-state solution as the only path for peace in the Middle East.

48 years down the line on September 17, 2025, when Saudi Arabia & Pakistan announced the signing of Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) that includes the key clause of “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”, the foundation of Islamic NATO had been laid, and the words written by David Hirst nearly five-decades earlier proved correct.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, the founding document for the military alliance North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), signed on April 04, 1949 and has 32 members as on date, states that an attack on one member is an attack on all.

The term Islamic NATO is an informal name given to the grouping that will see more Muslim nations joining the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan type SMDA which will have the key clause similar to that of Article 5, which strongly binds the NATO nations militarily. Time will only reveal the formal name that Islamic NATO will acquire in the near future.

Islamic NATO will have serious implications for both Israel & India. Both nations need to take this development seriously and not negate it as yet another balloon that will burst shortly. Israel and India are the two nations that will face the initial consequences of the fructification of the Islamic NATO due to the Jammu & Kashmir and the Palestine issue respectively.

Islamic NATO and implications for Israel

After modern nation-states came into being following the treaty called Peace of Westphalia in 1648,nations have staked claim over portions of other nations land based on historical and mythological claims. But rarely has any nation ceded any portion of their land peacefully, based on any historical or mythological claims.

There are numerous examples of wars and conflicts being waged after 1648 for reclaiming land by nations. Some were successful, some weren’t.

After the World War I started on July 28, 1914 between the Central Powers comprising Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire pitted against the Allied Powers consisting France, British Empire, Russia, Italy and the United States, the Middle East was proving tough for the Allied Powers as the Ottoman Empire was well-entrenched militarily.

Realising that it was impossible to defeat the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt corresponded with Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, promising to support an independent Arab state in the Middle East in exchange for the Sharif of Mecca launching the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.

Over the ten letters exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon and Hussein bin Ali during the period July 1915 to March 1916, known as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire commenced.

As the Ottoman Empire started weakening and the Allied Powers were now certain of their victory, the Britishers silently renegaded from the promise made to the Arabs under the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and in a secret pact with France called as the Sykes-Picot Agreement on May 09, 1916 divided the Ottoman provinces between Britain and France, which was to take affect after the end of the World War I. The Arabs were unaware of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and they continued supporting the British Empire against the Ottomans.

Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Britishers got the present-day Israel, Palestine, Jordan and southern Iraq while France got control over southeastern Turkey, Kurdistan region, Syria and Lebanon.

Almost a year before the World War I ended on November 11, 1918, on November 02, 1917, Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary in a letter to Lord Rothschild promised support for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. This letter which came to be known as the Balfour Declaration was at total variance to the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence.

Thus, after the end of the World War I started communal clashes between the Jews and the Arab Muslims in area that comprises the modern-day Israel, Gaza Strip and the West Bank as the Arabs realised that they had been betrayed by the Britishers and the Jews saw it as an opportunity for their homeland.

USA which emerged as the superpower after World War I constituted the King-Crane Commission in 1919 regarding the future course of action in the Middle East. In its report made public in 1922, the Commission stated that creation of Israel will ensure turbulence in the region.

The period 1918-1947 saw increased violence between the Jews and Arab Muslims which eventually led to the United Nations declaring in its Resolution 181 (II) on November 29, 1947 the two-state solution demarcating Israel and Palestine as sovereign nations. However, disputes arose over its unfair division which was unproportionate to the population of both the communities and Israel declared its unilateral independence on May 14, 1948, the very day on which the British Mandate in the region was to end.

True to the King-Crane Commission’s report of 1922, the Middle East never seen peace till date.

From 1948 till date Israel has fought multi-front and single-front wars with its neighbours. Some were initiated by the Arab nations and some by Israel. But in each war/conflict till October 2023, Israel emerged victorious.

Two major defence reforms by Israel in 2015 and 2020 saw the combat prowess of the Israel Defence Forces denuding. Be it the nearly two-year ongoing war between Hamas and Israel that commenced on October 07, 2023 or Iran’s pyrrhic victory over Israel in the 12-day war in June 2025, Israel is unable to declare complete victory in any front be it with Hamas, Houthi or Hezbollah.

Just as Israel’s defence woes were not finishing came the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s address in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25, 2025 stating in no unequivocal terms of the possibility of formation of a Muslim-nations alliance with the charter of defence and security included. This clearly showed the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact signed eight days before had started getting the desired impact in the Islamic world.

Just a day earlier on September 24, 2025, the US President Donald Trump met eight Muslim nation leaders on the sidelines of the UNGA meetings, assuring the Muslim leaders that he won’t allow the Israeli annexation of the West Bank and presenting a white paper on ending Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip. President Trump went on to state that this meeting with the eight Muslim nation leaders was the most important of the 23 meeting that he had on the sidelines of the UNGA.

President Donald Trump knows that the path for his dream to Make America Great Again (MAGA) lies through the rich Arab nations of the Middle East. In his four-day trip to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE from May 13-16, 2025, the US President was able to get investments of over US$ 4 trillion from the three rich Arab nations apart from being personally gifted a US$ 400 million aircraft from Qatar!

Pakistan, the only nuclear-armed Muslim nation is the new poster boy of President Trump and is emerging as the leader of the Islamic world. No wonder, the closeness between the USA and Pakistan in the last four months has reached beyond normal comprehension levels. Since May 2025, when India defeated Pakistan militarily in the 88-hour conflict known as Operation Sindoor in India, the Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir has visited White House thrice and apart from having lunch with the US President on June 18, 2025, all the three visits have got unprecedented attention in the American media.

This has emboldened Pakistan to champion itself as an important leader of the Islamic world. Pakistan is the only nation in the world that has good relations with all the three superpowers viz the USA, Russia and China.

The Islamic NATO has started firming up. The first aim for the Islamic NATO as and when it finally fructifies will be the creation of Palestine as an independent nation. With more and more countries in the world recognising Palestine that includes the Western nations of Australia, France and Canada, the country that is getting isolated is Israel.

And with the United Nations declaring the Israeli action in the Gaza Strip as genocide on September 16, 2025, Israel is on a clear backfoot. On September 26, 2025, Palestine formally applied for BRICS membership, a move that was welcomed by China. Russia and China stand rock-solid behind Palestine and the Muslim nations.

The combined military power of the Islamic nations along with Russia and China far exceeds the combined military power of Israel and the USA. With no certain help assured from the Western or the NATO nations, Israel will have a tough time militarily, in case the USA decides to step-back from its support to Israel as the G3 is rising.

Given to choose between the cash-rich Arab nations and Israel, President Donald Trump will choose the former as with deep pockets they present a clear roadmap for MAGA. The Islamic nations know it well and it is matter of time before the Islamic NATO fructifies.

Implications for India after creation of Islamic NATO

In case the Islamic NATO is successful in creation of Palestine as an independent nation, its next target will be the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.

In 1947, as the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan was imminent, there existed 565 princely states also called as native states, that were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan. 

Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, who would go on to become India’s first Home Minister, by his efforts persuaded 562 princely states to join India. Jammu & Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh, was amongst those three princely states that refused to either join India or Pakistan, the other two being Mysore and Hyderabad.

On August 20, 1947 just six days after Pakistan became a new nation on August 14, 1947 the Pakistan Army prepared a plan code-named Operation Gulmarg to wrest Jammu & Kashmir. According to this plan 20 Lashkars (tribal militias), each consisting of 1000 Pashtun tribesmen, were to be recruited, armed and trained for seizing Jammu & Kashmir. Operation Gulmarg was to be launched on October 22, 1947 with 10 Lashkars detailed to capture Srinagar, the winter capital of Jammu & Kashmir and 10 Lashkars detailed to capture Jammu, the summer capital of Jammu & Kashmir.

As per the original planning, 10 Lashkars headed to seize Srinagar. They moved with ease and encountered no/little resistance as the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces were small in number, and the Lashkars reached Baramulla, a small town just 26 kilometres from Srinagar. Over-confident and over-joyed that now Srinagar was not too far away, the Lashkars started plundering the residents of Baramulla and raping the women too. Their move thus got stalled as they took to these macabre activities.

Aware of the gravity of the situation, Maharaja Hari Singh asked for assistance from India. Help was agreed to be given by India on the condition of the Maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession to India.

On October 26, 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India and the very next day on October 27, 1947 the Indian Army landed in Srinagar and moved immediately to Baramulla where the Lashkars were busy plundering the town and raping the women.

The Indian Army fought hard to the last man, last round and the Lashkars started retreating back and a clear and total military victory for the Indian Army was on the horizon. And then India did the unexpected, by approaching the United Nations on January 01, 1948 calling upon the international body to call out Pakistan to end the aggression.

The move backfired and the United Nations, on January 20, 1948 adopted a resolution to set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to establish peace in the region.

While the United Nations started working on ways and means to end the war, the war raged with greater fury between the Indian Army and the Lashkars, as the Pakistan Army regulars too had entered the war openly in mid-1948 and the fighting intensified between the two armies.

This war lasted till January 01, 1949 when a United Nations mandated ceasefire came into effect, and resulted in 1104 fatal casualties on the Indian side and 6000 fatal casualties on the Pakistani side.

The UNCIP ceasefire resolution called upon Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Jammu & Kashmir and India to withdraw the bulk of its forces after the Pakistanis had withdrawn, except a bare minimum force which India was to maintain for law and order. The resolution further went on to state that the future of Jammu & Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

Though the war stopped between India and Pakistan but the UNCIP ceasefire resolution was neither acceptable to India nor to Pakistan. India felt cheated by the UNCIP resolution as it had approached the United Nations with the only aim of the international body telling Pakistan to withdraw from Jammu & Kashmir. And Pakistan would have nothing less than the whole Jammu & Kashmir.

Meanwhile as the ceasefire came into effect, India got the control of two-thirds of Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan got the control of the remaining one-third. Clearly, by approaching the United Nations as a military victory seemed pretty much in sight, was a grave blunder that resulted in India losing one-third of Jammu & Kashmir to Pakistan.

Pakistan calls its one-third occupied portion of Jammu & Kashmir as Azad Kashmir while India terms the one-third portion illegally occupied by Pakistan, as Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK).

Also, Cease Fire Line (CFL) was created post the Karachi Agreement which was signed on July 27, 1949 between India and Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir which till date is monitored by United Nations observers. CFL got converted to the Line of Control in 1972.

Pakistan waged four more unsuccessful war/conflicts on India to wrest Jammu & Kashmir, apart from supporting terrorism in India since 1980.

Pakistan has since long rallied the Muslim nations to support it for Jammu & Kashmir, but barring a handful of nations like Turkey and Niger, almost all of the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have ignored Pakistan’s such requests.

But, the fructification of Islamic NATO and the creation of Palestine as an independent nation will give fillip to Pakistan efforts for Jammu & Kashmir.

Out of eight neighbours of India in South Asia, baring the tiny Bhutan, all nations are in tight Chinese grip. With the formation of the Islamic NATO, problems for India will increase manifold. Three statements from top Indian military officer’s merit attention.

One, on March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.

Two, on July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, as the two nuclear-armed neighbours were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation from May 07-10, 2025. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.

Three, on July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.

To add to the above three statements, the formation of Islamic NATO will create more challenges for India.

Israel and India have to ensure that the Islamic NATO doesn’t fructify under any circumstances. For, the creation of Islamic NATO will compound problems of unimaginable proportions for both Israel and India.

By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

The triangular relationship between the United States, Pakistan, and India has historically shaped the geopolitics of South Asia. Washington’s policies toward Islamabad and New Delhi have often oscillated, influenced by Cold War alignments, counterterrorism priorities, nuclear proliferation concerns, and, more recently, the strategic competition with China. In the mid-2020s, signs of a renewed U.S. Pakistan engagement have surfaced. Washington has increased diplomatic outreach, revived selective military cooperation, and emphasized the importance of Pakistan in counterterrorism, nuclear stability, and regional geopolitics. For India, these developments are worrying. New Delhi views U.S. support for Islamabad as potentially emboldening Pakistan’s military establishment, reviving its strategic leverage, and complicating India’s role as Washington’s key partner in the Indo-Pacific.

This article examines the historical roots of U.S.–Pakistan relations, current drivers of re-engagement, and the strategic implications for India. It draws upon verified figures, historical records, and contemporary analyses to provide a comprehensive assessment.

Historical Context: US–Pakistan–India Balancing

The U.S. Pakistan relationship has been marked by cycles of intense engagement and sharp estrangement. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship has swung between close cooperation and estrangement. In the Cold War era, Pakistan joined SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955), becoming a key U.S. ally and receiving over US$ 5 billion in aid during the 1980s Afghan jihad. Ties soured in the 1990s when U.S. aid was cut under the Pressler Amendment due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. After 9/11, relations revived as Pakistan was named a major non-NATO ally and received more than US$ 20 billion (2002–2011) for counterterrorism and Afghan operations. Meanwhile, U.S. ties with India strengthened, culminating in the 2008 civil nuclear deal.

This dual-track policy strengthening India as a democratic partner while maintaining Pakistan as a counterterror ally has been a consistent source of Indian unease.

Pakistan’s Renewed Strategic Utility for the U.S.

The CRS report identifies Pakistan as “vital to U.S. interests” owing to its role in terrorism, Afghan stability, nuclear security, and regional tensions. Washington’s renewed engagement is shaped by four key factors.

First, counterterrorism cooperation remains essential, as Pakistan hosts groups like the Haqqani Network, TTP, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose activities gained renewed relevance after the Taliban’s 2021 takeover in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan’s nuclear program estimated at 170 warheads by SIPRI (2024) and expanding rapidly continues to raise U.S. concerns about proliferation and security. Third, China’s growing influence through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has heightened U.S. worries about Pakistan drifting further into Beijing’s orbit. Finally, Pakistan’s recurring financial crises, including its near default in 2023 that required a US$ 3 billion IMF bailout, provide Washington with economic leverage through its role in international lending institutions.

U.S. Assistance and Defense Cooperation with Pakistan

From 2001 to 2017, Pakistan received over US$ 33 billion in U.S. assistance, including:

• US$ 14.5 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to reimburse Pakistan for counterterror operations.
• US$ 4 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to purchase U.S. weapons, including F-16 fighter jets, attack helicopters, and night-vision equipment.
• Billions in economic support funds (ESF) for infrastructure and governance.

Although aid declined sharply after 2018 under the Trump administration, reports since 2022 indicate renewed U.S. efforts to provide military spare parts, training programs, and limited defense equipment to Pakistan. For India, such support raises alarms given Pakistan’s history of diverting counterterror funds toward conventional military capacity against India, especially in the context of Kashmir.

Indian Concerns Over U.S.–Pakistan Rapprochement

India’s anxieties about U.S.–Pakistan engagement stem from both historical experience and strategic logic. A key concern lies in arms transfers:

U.S.-supplied F-16s, officially designated for counterterrorism, were deployed by Pakistan during the 2019 Balakot crisis, reinforcing Indian suspicions about misuse. Diplomatically, Islamabad has often leveraged its ties with Washington to internationalize the Kashmir issue, despite India’s firm stance that it remains a bilateral matter. Counterterrorism is another fault line. New Delhi argues that U.S. dependence on Pakistan in this domain overlooks Islamabad’s selective approach acting firmly against anti-state groups while allowing anti-India militants to operate. Finally, the China–Pakistan–U.S. triangle heightens Indian concern, as even limited American engagement could inadvertently bolster Pakistan’s bargaining position with both Washington and Beijing, complicating India’s strategic environment.

China Factor: Strategic Triangles in South Asia

China’s presence looms large in the U.S.–Pakistan relationship. With CPEC investments exceeding US$ 60 billion, Beijing has entrenched itself as Pakistan’s economic lifeline and security partner. The U.S. seeks to avoid Pakistan becoming a full Chinese satellite state, but India views this triangulation skeptically. For New Delhi, U.S. engagement with Pakistan under the pretext of “countering China” could legitimize Pakistan’s role without reducing the risks to India.

U.S.–India Partnership: A Strategic Counterweight

Despite concerns, India remains Washington’s long-term bet in Asia. The Quad grouping (U.S., India, Japan, Australia), defense agreements such as COMCASA, LEMOA, and BECA, and the 2023 iCET framework on emerging technologies underscore the U.S. commitment to India. India has become the largest arms export market for the U.S., with defense trade growing from US$ 200 million in 2000 to over US$ 20 billion in 2023. Yet, New Delhi fears that tactical U.S. reliance on Islamabad in Afghanistan or counterterrorism may dilute the credibility of Washington’s India-first strategy.

Policy Recommendations for India

To mitigate risks from U.S.–Pakistan rapprochement, India should:

1. Engage Washington Proactively: Ensure U.S. policymakers are briefed on India’s concerns over arms transfers and military aid.
2. Leverage Strategic Autonomy: Balance ties with the U.S. while maintaining defense cooperation with France, Russia, and Israel.
3. Regional Diplomacy: Deepen ties with Gulf states, ASEAN, and Africa to offset Pakistan’s narrative.
4. International Platforms: Use FATF and UN Security Council mechanisms to highlight Pakistan’s terror networks.
5. Economic Leverage: Showcase India’s market and investment potential as a counterweight to Pakistan’s instability, reminding Washington where its long-term interests lie.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s deepening engagement with the United States is driven by Washington’s counter-terrorism priorities, nuclear security concerns, and China-containment strategy. While this engagement may appear tactical, it poses significant strategic anxieties for India. History demonstrates that U.S. support—military, financial, or diplomatic—has often emboldened Pakistan’s military and destabilized South Asia. For India, the task ahead is clear: reinforce its role as Washington’s most reliable partner in Asia, while ensuring that any U.S.–Pakistan rapprochement does not translate into security costs for New Delhi.

As South Asia remains entangled in great-power rivalries, India must play a nuanced balancing act, combining diplomacy, economic strength, and military modernization to ensure that its strategic interests are not compromised.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

The recent Russia-India-China (RIC) Trilateral relations uniting to form an alternative power bloc against the United States has become a topic of intense discussion in global politics. Through platforms like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and bilateral engagements, these countries have signalled their intent to reshape the global economic and political landscape. These nations, with their significant populations, growing economies, and military capabilities, are increasingly asserting their influence on the global stage, seeking to create a counterbalance to Western hegemony. As the world transitions toward a multipolar order, the growing cooperation among these three nations, driven by shared interests and strategic alignments, raises questions about their potential to challenge the longstanding dominance of the United States. This group opposes unilateralism and supports the idea of a multipolar global governance model. The RIC triangle has the potential to reshape the international system in which Asia speaks with a stronger voice, multipolarity gains ground, and new forms of regional cooperation are tested against the limits of history, mistrust, and competing ambitions.

What derived this relation

US President Donald Trump’s trade war has hit countries trading with Russia by imposing steep tariffs. Now, India’s oil imports are facing penalties as high as 50%. The goal was to cut Russia’s export revenue and push India to scale back ties. The recent economic crisis between US-India relations has been one of the greatest crises for Indian diplomacy in decades. The fresh Trump tariffs which have specifically targeted BRICS countries, and India in particular, have once again made India suspect of the USA. In a world marked by turbulence, fractured alliances, and the decline of unquestioned Western supremacy, the rationale for closer strategic cooperation between Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing is stronger than ever.

The rise to the idea of RIC and multipolar world was drawn from the post-Cold War euphoria. In the late 1990s, foreign minister of Russia Yevgeny Primakov proposed a “strategic triangle,” in which they aim to break free of Western dominance and reassert Eurasia as a geopolitical centre. Over the years, it facilitated over 20 ministerial-level meetings, fostering cooperation in foreign policy, economics, & security among the 3 nations. Unipolarity of U.S. had forcing sanctions and crisis have pushed Russia closer to the East, India forced to maintain its balancing act with Moscow and the United States, and China has emerged as the rival to Western global influence. Unlike Western alliances bound by shared ideology, the RIC triangle unites three countries with sharply different political systems. Yet all shares a preference for independent foreign policies, resistance to Western dominance, and a vision of a multipolar order.

India and Russia share a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership that has grown for over 70 years. Their ties cover trade, defence, energy, science, and technology. Russia supplies a big part of India’s oil, and both countries are building an “Energy Bridge” with nuclear, hydrocarbons, hydel, and renewable projects. Together, they can Western banking systems by transacting in their own national currencies—rupees, yuan, and roubles—bolstering regional connectivity. This trilateral cooperation extends beyond trade to industrial modernisation in aerospace, advanced materials, and mining technology, emphasising self-reliance and diminished dependence on Western technologies. Defence cooperation, highlighted by India’s push for indigenous weapon manufacturing, further fuels economic growth and technology sharing, supported by regular dialogues and joint exercises with Russia.

Change in global power dynamics

Together, Russia, India, and China account for nearly 30 million square kilometres, over 2.5 billion people, vast natural resources, and combined GDP approaching one-fifth of global output. China is the world’s second-largest economy, India has become the fastest-growing major economy, and Russia remains a formidable military and energy power. They hold the world’s second largest, fourth largest (soon to be third) and 11th largest economies and account for 23% of the world’s GDP.

India, China, and Russia are employing several key mechanisms to bypass the US dollar in trade settlements and reduce reliance on Western financial systems. RIC have established currency swap arrangements to settle trade in their own national currencies, allowing them to bypass the dollar and avoid sanctions. This enables direct conversion and payment without using the dollar as an intermediary currency. This structure facilitates trade settlements purely in Indian rupees without converting to the dollar. Together, these mechanisms provide a survival strategy under US sanctions and trade restrictions, reducing transaction costs and financial vulnerabilities by creating a multipolar trade settlement environment outside the dollar sphere.

For example, China and Russia do nearly 95% of their trade settlements in yuan and roubles. India’s trade with the Russia-led EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) has jumped to $69 billion in 2024, mainly through Russian oil. India’s exports to Russia have also doubled in recent years, rising from $2.39 billion in 2019 to $4.88 billion in 2025. Both countries are even looking to restart a rupee-ruble payment system to cut down dependence on the dollar. India and Russia actively use rupees and roubles in growing trade volumes, including energy imports to India.

Their combined power extends beyond economics. The trilateral relation between Russia, India and China is game-changing. RIC consists of a third of the world’s population and a fifth of the global landmass. Each of the three nations are geopolitical power in their own neighbourhood, i.e., Russia in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; China across East Asia and the Pacific. Scientifically, technologically and industrially, they are amongst the leaders in the world and possess vast resources of oil, gas, food and minerals. They are amongst the top four military powers of the world, after the US.

China brings industrial capacity and financial resources, India contributes human capital and technological dynamism, and Russia offers energy, natural resources, and defence technologies. A stronger RIC framework could evolve into a regional platform for security cooperation. And most importantly they could counterbalance Western dominance in setting global norms. In global forums such as BRICS, the G20, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, closer RIC alignment enhances the ability of emerging powers to shape debates on trade, climate change, finance, and technological development.

Challenges and future prospects

Russia often views RIC primarily as a geopolitical lever against the West, India tends to fluctuate between Eastern and Western ties, China envisions RIC as part of a broader Eurasian architecture anchored by its Belt and Road Initiative. Russia remains protective of its influence in Central Asia, India remains wary of China’s closeness with Pakistan, China must balance its ties to Islamabad with its desire for stable relations with New Delhi. Sino-Indian boarder tensions are unsolved and India’s ties with the western States and its role in QUAD is concerning for Russia to oppose western hegemony. This alignment with Western powers complicates India’s role in any anti-U.S. alliance. While India maintains a policy of strategic autonomy, balancing its relationships with both Western and non-Western powers, its deepening ties with the United States, particularly in defence and technology, create a delicate balancing act. These mismatched priorities dilute momentum remain the most serious fault in the relation. All this problem shows how fragile this trilateral relation could be and how important it is to resolve these obstacles in order to achieve the common goal.

Russia’s economic constraints further complicate the equation. While it possesses significant military and energy resources, its economy is heavily reliant on energy exports and is significantly smaller than those of China and India. Western sanctions have further weakened Russia’s economic position, making it dependent on China for trade and investment. Another critical factor is the differing national priorities of these three countries. China’s aggressive foreign policy and territorial ambitions often clash with the interests of its neighbours, including India. Its dominance in any potential alliance could create unease for India and Russia, both of which value their sovereignty and strategic independence. India may hesitate to fully commit to an anti-U.S. alliance, especially if it risks alienating key partners like the United States, which provides critical technology and investment.

Despite these challenges, the potential for India, China and Russia to form an alternative power bloc cannot be dismissed. The global order is undergoing a profound transformation, with the rise of multipolarity challenging the unipolar dominance of the United States. The growing influence of non-Western institutions like BRICS and the SCO reflects a broader shift toward a more balanced global system. The economic dimension of this potential alliance is particularly significant. By promoting trade in local currencies and developing alternative financial systems, these countries aim to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar and Western financial institutions. This shift could have far-reaching implications for global trade and finance, weakening the United States’ ability to use economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. Moreover, their combined technological advancements, particularly in areas like artificial intelligence, space exploration, and renewable energy, could position them as leaders in the next phase of global innovation.

Conclusion

The potential of India-Russia-China Trilateral relation is yet to be defined since its more rhetoric than reality. However, the trio’s capabilities grow as the rivalry between U.S. and RIC deepens. Indeed, its progress since 1998 has been uneven and often symbolic but in the fast-moving world, Russia-India-China cannot afford disunity. The RIC triangle is an unfinished project and may not become a formal alliance. But it demonstrates that flexible and multipolar world that provides diversity while pursuing shared strategic interests. If the trio can overcome mistrust, it has the potential to become not only a stabilizing force in Eurasia but many other countries. In a century where power is diffusing and old hierarchies are fading, the RIC trio may well prove to be one of the keys to building a more balanced and multipolar world.

If Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing can strengthen their strategic planning, institutionalize cooperation, and draw lessons from other multilateral experiments, the RIC triangle could rise from a rhetorical construct into a genuine pillar of global governance. These developments signal a robust and growing alliance designed to challenge the current global economic order, create new supply chains, and foster a global system prioritising independence, resilience, and regional currency use, marking a shift from unipolar Western dominance to a more diversified multipolar world order.

By: Brig AJA Pereira, SM (Retd)

“The great danger of the modern world is that we are drowning in information but starved for wisdom,” warned historian EO Wilson. In the last two decades, digital technologies have shrunk the world into a smartphone which is just a click away from global currents of news, outrage, and protest. This easy and cheap access has empowered individuals, democratized information, and amplified voices that were once silent. But it has also made societies more vulnerable, exposing fault lines within nations and creating fertile ground for unrest. The paradox of our age is clear: the world has become smaller, but far more divided.

The story of digital revolutions began in Tunisia when the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010 set off a firestorm, carried not just by word of mouth but by Facebook posts, X hashtags, and YouTube videos. The Arab Spring spread across North Africa and West Asia, toppling regimes and unsettling entrenched powers. Similar waves of unrest touched Ukraine, leading to the Orange Revolution, and rippled further into South and Southeast Asia. In our immediate neighbourhood, Pakistan saw protests against corruption and military dominance, Sri Lankan economic crisis morphed into mass unrest, Bangladesh’s student protests snowballed and now Nepal is simmering with same volatile mix of popular frustration and internet-fuelled dissent. What unites these disparate movements is not geography, ideology, or leadership but technology. Social media platforms, almost all owned by the Western world provide the launch pad for outrage, stage for mobilization, and the echo chambers for anger.

These platforms that connect families also spread calls for disobedience, glorify violence, and erode faith in institutions. It is no longer a secret that the content individuals consume is curated not by choice but by algorithms. A subtle tweak in ranking systems or recommendations can amplify anger, spread disinformation, or radicalise entire groups. This begins by igniting internal strife due to economic inequality, corruption, or governance failures, followed by digital amplification and mass mobilization which leads to breakdown of law and order followed by regime change or instability. This “playbook” is not accidental. It thrives on societal divides and digital manipulation, leaving nations fractured long after the protests fade. The pattern has repeated with disturbing similarity across countries.

For China, these “digital revolutions” are existential threats of external manipulation disguised as popular uprisings. Unlike other nations, China has invested in a fully indigenous digital ecosystem i.e. WeChat (WhatsApp, Facebook, PayPal combined), Douyin (TikTok), Weibo (X), Xiaohongshu (Pinterest and Instagram), Bilibili (YouTube), Zhihu (Quora), Youku (YouTube and Netflix) etc. These platforms operate under strict surveillance and censorship by the Chinese Communist Party, ensuring that narratives challenging the state are swiftly neutralized. The “Great Firewall” keeps Western platforms largely out, insulating the population from external influence. In this way, China has created a digital sovereignty model that prioritizes regime stability above individual freedom.

Pakistan has a nationwide firewall to block and filter internet content with advanced technology from China’s Geedge Networks, with components from the U.S and France. Countries like Russia, North Korea, Iran, Vietnam, and Myanmar have also implemented similar systems of censorship and control influenced by Chinese technology and policies.

India presents the opposite picture. We are deeply reliant on Western technologies be it Google’s Android, Apple’s iOS, Microsoft’s Windows, Facebook, Instagram, X, and YouTube etc. Nearly every aspect of our digital life is dependent on foreign operating systems, hardware, and platforms. Layered on top of this is our own social reality which is fractured along caste, religion, language, and class. These divides make us particularly vulnerable to the same “digital revolution” playbook that has destabilized our neighbours. A single manipulated narrative, amplified through millions of smartphones, could easily tip local unrest into nationwide crisis.

In order to be a global power, we must secure our digital sovereignty. We need to accelerate the creation of homegrown social media platforms, search engines, and digital tools that can compete with foreign platforms while ensuring accountability. Investment in secure, indigenous operating systems, chips, and cloud infrastructure is critical to reduce dependency on external powers. A robust legal and regulatory framework must define how foreign platforms should operate in India. Citizens must be educated to identify disinformation and resist digital manipulation. A digitally literate society is less prone to being swayed by orchestrated narratives. Ultimately, the best defence is unity. Addressing internal inequalities and promoting social cohesion will blunt the effectiveness of digital triggers.

Digital technologies have shrunk the world but have also turned local sparks into global wildfires. The revolutions from Tunisia to Tehran and Sri Lanka to Nepal reveal a consistent pattern of unrest amplified by Western-controlled social media, leaving societies weakened and divided. To prevent becoming the next domino in this chain of digital revolutions, we must build indigenous capacity, reduce foreign dependency, and strengthen our social cohesion to survive and prevail in the digital age.