By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

Russia and North Korea have a convoluted history of relations constructed of features of history, geopolitics, and regionalism. With the world trying to come to terms with the dangers of the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and moves toward strategic games by Russia, the dynamic of this relationship takes a more prominent role. The article attempts to give a comprehensive overview of Russia-North Korea relations with a focus on its historical background, their economic, military and diplomatic interaction, and other aspects of the relationships and how this might impact the security of the region and the world.

Historical Context

Russia-North Korea relations may be traced back to World War II. The peninsula of Korea was split into two different states: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The central feature about the Soviet Union is that it was the main factor that set up the communist regime in North Korea as it offered economic and military assistance that put the basics of the political scenario in North Korea.

During the first years after division the dominance of the Soviet Union prevailed. North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, followed a Stalinist style of governance which was largely dependent as far as development of economy and military was concerned by the Soviet assistance. The aid of the USSR was not only financial but also came in terms of the military training, equipment and ideological direction, which only strengthened the power of the regime.

The Korean War and The Aftermath

The Korean War (1950-1953) became another milestone of the relationship between Russia and North Korea. The Soviet Union’s support of North Korea in its invasion into South Korea was another imperative in the conflict. The war left the situation in a stalemate hence the creation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and an ongoing separation of the peninsula.

The post-war USSR still gave much assistance to North Korea that played a very important role in its reconstruction and growth. It is during this time when North Korea was getting militarized and advanced weapons and technology were provided to them by the Soviet Union. The friendship cropped up between the two countries that included the ability of the two nations to support each other and North Korea acted as a buffer state against the effects of the United States in the region.

 

Dynamics of the Cold War

During the Cold War, North Korea had a good relationship with USSR because they shared ideological beliefs as well as common interest. The Soviet Union saw North Korea as an essential ally in its campaign against influence of the U.S. in East Asia. North Korea, on the other hand, depended on the Soviet to keep its regime in power and follow its dreams of accumulating military power.

Nevertheless, the relationship did not go on so well. Tensions were present in the 1960s due to the Sino-Soviet split since North Korea was trying to balance between the two communist powers. Efforts at independent action in foreign policy made by Kim Il-sung brought him to clash with Moscow, although the general necessity of allies preserved the alliance.

The Post Cold War Era

In 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union brought a fundamental change in the state geography of East Asia. North Korea being badly hit economically, desired to retain its bond with Russia though with reduced finances. The decade of the 1990s was marked by the survival crisis of North Korea whereby its foreign policy had to be re-examined.

Russia itself was caught up with its internal problems at the time such as the economic disturbance and political instabilities. This forced Moscow to have little capacity to give North Korea significant support. Yet, the two countries remained highly involved in diplomatic relations, with the intention of North Korea trying to capitalize its history and become popular among the Russians.

Geopolitical Dynamics: China and its Emergence

Since China became a global power in the late 20^th century, its association with North Korea became very important. China rose to become a regional powerhouse due to the left economic reforms that were started by Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s. Since it realized that both Russia and China were important to its relations, North Korea tried to make a relationship with Beijing.

The shift in strategy could be observed during the early 2000s when both countries tried to work together over the problem of regional security. To put an equal weight against the role of China, Russia tried to enhance its relationship with Pyongyang. The North Korean-Chinese relationship has however been typified in most times with a certain amount of tension in the way that the activities that North Korea is involved in may not augur well to the interests of China.

Nuclear Crisis in North Korea

Nuclear crisis in North Korea has been the cusp of the region and it has affected relations between Russia and North Korea. Russia became more complex when North Korea was creatively engaging in its nuclear program. Although Moscow has criticised North Koreas nuclear test, it has been urging a dialogue and openness to an isolated approach.

This is quite a sophisticated position which reflects Russian need to keep its influence in the area and resolve the issues of security. Russia has taken the role of intervener in the crisis and has been playing the role of promoting a diplomatic solution to the crisis and this will have the United States, South Korea, and China included.

The International Sanctions and its Role

The issue of the North Korean nuclear program has posed difficulties to economic cooperation following international sanctions directed towards the country. Nevertheless, Russia has frequently been against these sanctions and has always argued in favor of a dialogue and interaction. This position has enabled certain trade to remain open through under the dim light of international interest.

These sanctions have also influenced North Korea to look at other economic partners and Russia appears as the possible partner that may help in bypassing these sanctions. The association has been defined through a certain level of pragmatism whereby the two countries want to leverage on their collaboration despite the pressure imposed on them.

Economic Relations: Investment and Trade

There are not many economic contacts with Russia and North Korea, but there have been some changes depending on the politics of the moment. Trade has been stimulated in these past few years, especially in the aspects of energy, agriculture, and infrastructural development. Russia has tried to invest in North Korea infrastructure such as building of railway lines and energy generation.

This increase in economic cooperation is reflected by the development of the Rajin-Khasan railway project which links the Far East of Russia to North Korea. The purpose of this project is to improve the connection of trade and the distribution of goods between the two countries. Furthermore, Russia has shown interest in joint energy ventures among them which involves North Korea natural gas provision.

Economic Cooperation and the Effect of Sanctions

The sanctions imposed on North Koreans have greatly affected the economy of the country, which had to depend more on the foreign partners. Russia has come out as a possible economic rope to North Korea since it is prepared to trade with North Korea as well as investing in vital sectors. Nevertheless, the sanctions have added pressures to economic collaboration since the two countries have to deal with the dynamics of foreign investigation.

Nonetheless, Russia has been pursuing the desire to put its economic presence in North Korea. The two countries have been carrying on negotiations in order to improve the trade relationship, having in mind areas like agriculture, mining and energy. Economic cooperation potential is also quite high, especially since North Korea is approaching economic diversification of its relations.

Future of Economic Relationships

In the future, the situation in economic relations between Russia and North Korea will hinge on a number of factors, among which it is possible to distinguish a geopolitical situation, the existence of international sanctions and the desire of both countries to establish real cooperation with each other. With North Korea still suffering with regard to its economy, it is even possible that its economic relations with Russia grow stronger.

Military Cooperation: Past Military Relationships

The closest military ties existed between Russia and North Korea during the Korean War, when the Soviet Union supported the North greatly. This alliance has remained intact as over the years Russia has been providing North Korea with military guns and weaponry. Past collaboration on military affairs has provided the basis of the current peaceful cooperation existing in the field of defense.

Recent Developments in Military Collaboration

During the current years, cooperation in the sphere of military activities has acquired new colors, especially when speaking about nuclear plans of North Korea. Russia has raised alarm about violence that could erupt in this region and has even tried to pose itself as a spokesperson in the events that are happening between North Korea and the United States.

There has been observed joint military exercises and exchange of military personnel as an indication of the willingness to enhance defense relations. Further, Russia has supplied military technology and gear to North Korea, an action that has strengthened the two countries defense dealings.

Consequences of the Military Collaboration

Military relationship between Russia and North Korea implies potential consequences to the security regime within the region. The possibility of military cooperation is high as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear prowess and this is very alarming to the other countries in the neighborhood and also to the international community. Engagement of Russia in military collaboration with North Korea can be seen to hinder the resolving of the nuclear crisis, and this may cause more tensions in the region.

Diplomatic Engagement: High-Level Visits and Summits

Diplomacy Russia-North Korea relations have been off-set by high-ranking visits and summits. It is specific because the interest of North Korea in Russia is reflected in the meetings of the leadership in 2019 and 2021 with the head of that state, Kim Jong-un. Such meetings involved the improvement of bilateral relations, and the promotion of security in the region.

In these summits the two leaders focused on the importance of embracing each other and working together on some of the issues such as economic growth and security. The high-level encounters act as a stage to deliberate on common grounds as well as commit to working together.

Multilateral Forums

Russia had engaged in multilateral meetings over the North Korean problem, such as the Six-Party Talks. These discussions have had their fair share of obstacles however, the inclusion of Russia into the process attests to its desire to reach a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. The multilateral approach will enable Russia to deal with other stakeholders such as the United States, South Korea and China in an attempt to deal with the complexities of the situation in North Korea.

The Problems of Diplomatic Interaction

Irrespective of the endeavours of diplomatic involvement, there are obstacles in the Russia-North Korea relationship. The tensions in the region of North Korea and its nuclear program as well as the difference in the interests of the regional powers makes the field of diplomacy even more problematic. The competing interests of other stakeholders especially the United States and South Korea usually challenge the position of Russia as a mediator.

Regional Implications: Korean Peninsula and Beyond

Russia and North Korea relations have a huge implication to the Korean Peninsula and East Asia as a region. With the threats between North Korea and the United States going on, the role of Russia as a potential mediator gains higher significance. Also, the relationship has influenced the dynamics of regional security especially due to the influence of China.

The involvement of Russia with North Korea acts as a contraction to the dwelling of Americans on political dominance in the region, which makes the geopolitics of the region tough. The future Russia-North Korea relations will depend on the flow of the historic preconditions, economic manipulations, and military alliances.

What the United States is and What the United States Responds to

Russia-North Korea relation has been watched carefully by the United States as the U.S. looks through the prism of its strategic interests. The reaction by Washington has been the imposition of sanctions and diplomacy to isolate North Korea and at the same time limit the influence by Russia in the region. The U.S. has been worried about the possibility of military relations between Russia and North Korea especially on the aspect of selling arms and technology transfers.

The Role of China

One thing that cannot be overlooked is the role of China in the relationship between Russia and North Korea. China is the major trade partner and ally of North Korea hence controls most of its activities. The interest of Russia in North Korea could be held in the perspective of the necessity to oppose the penetration of additional influence of China in the region. The relations which will develop among these three countries will determine the future of stability and security in East Asia.

Conclusion

The interconnection between Russia and North Korea is rather complicated and multifactorial, the process of connection is predetermined with historical links, geopolitics interests, and the play of forces in the region of occurrence. The relationship between the two countries will keep growing as they pursue their interests in the 21^st century, with concerns about its impact on peace in the region and the world at large. This sort of relationship remains important to understanding the larger structural aspect of geopolitics in East Asia.

The future course of relations between Russia and North Korea will be written by the interrelation of the historical legacies, mutual economic interests, military cooperation and relations. North Korea will also depend more on Russia as it struggles with the economy and geopolitics pressures hence the closeness. On the other hand, the relationship between North Korea and Russia will be determined by Russian strategic interests in the region where the latter will want to balance its relations with other regional powers.

To summarize, Russia and North Korea have formed an ever- evolving association that is going to take its bearings on the geopolitical affairs of East Asia. The two countries will enjoy fruitful cooperation in the 21^st century as they work out the dynamics of the century and the cooperation will bring sweeping consequences to regional security and international relations.

By: Chethana Enugula

When the BRICS countries met again in their regular summit in 2025, concerns about relevance, success, and future direction hung heavily over the bloc. With the world’s geopolitical and economic map changing rapidly, as new alliances are forged, technological revolutions emerge, and new economic threat areas appear, the 2025 summit was the main event to watch, with hopes of seeing some progress or even further division. This article looks deep into the results of the BRICS 2025 summit to determine whether the group had achieved anything major or had merely reaffirmed its current rhetoric.

Background: The BRICS Vision

The BRICS bloc appeared at the beginning of the 21st century, and the idea behind it was to change the global order so that the voice of the emerging economies could be strengthened. These were originally called the BRIC term, which economist Jim O’Neill coined, but later it was considered official after the inclusion of South Africa in 2010. Collectively, they had over 40 percent of the world population and almost a quarter of the GDP across the world by the 2020s.

BRICS has undergone a transition over the years from an economic association of powers into a political alliance that promotes multipolarity, reforms of international organizations (such as the UN and IMF), and increased cooperation between the South and South. The intraregional differences, the bilateral difference, especially that between India and China, and the variation in economic directions have, however, dented the cohesiveness of the group.

The Situation of the 2025 Summit

December 2025 marked the 2025 BRICS summit held in Cape Town, South Africa, with anticipation and skepticism in mind. The last couple of years have witnessed the world suffering the aftermath of the pandemic, inflation, geopolitical conflicts (the current Russia-Ukraine war), and technological decoupling between the West and China.

In this background, BRICS endeavoured to establish its relevance. In its turn, South Africa, as the host, was interested in promoting a revitalized unity and cooperation among its members and in proposing BRICS as an alternative to the Western-centric multilateral bodies, including G7 and NATO.

Significant Topics and Agendas to Be Discussed

– The Economic Cooperation and the BRICS Currency Initiative

The BRICS currency proposal, which has received so much publicity as a possible successor to the US dollar in intra-group trade, also dominated headlines at BRICS 2025. Initially, the concept was floated in 2023 when there was increased discontent with the financial systems dominated by the dollar.

Although a full-fledged BRICS currency is still way beyond its implementation, the new task force was created at the summit to discuss the technical and policy aspects of the proposed currency. The countries were willing to use local currencies more in trade and enhance the mechanism of settlements by relying on the New Development Bank (NDB).

Was there any gain?

Improvements were not material. Political commitment is rising, but actual implementation will take a number of years.

– Strategic autonomy and geopolitical gearing

At a time when the world is divided into more polarized blocks, the BRICS leaders once again committed to strategic autonomy. They reiterated multipolarity, non-interference in internal policies, and diplomacy, which diplomatically criticized the Western sanctions and interventions.

India and China insisted that the world be restrained from the wrangles of conflict, but they differed in their disagreements concerning certain points, such as Ukraine and Taiwan. Russia wanted to find a diplomatic ally and an alternative economic source through the use of the forum due to the ongoing sanctions.

Was there any gain?

The group has succeeded in having unity in diversity, which is not a small achievement. Nevertheless, the absence of specific solutions left the boundaries of the political coordination of BRICS open.

– BRICS+ and Regional Integration

The BRICS 2025 witnessed the further development of the BRICS+ mechanism, where such countries as Argentina, Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia joined the talks. The topic of formulating new members was discussed as well, but there was no agreement.

The outreach multiplied the bloc’s soft power and legitimacy in the Global South. However, institutional reforms must be implemented; otherwise, it is likely to dilute the key aims of BRICS countries.

– Sustainable development and climate change

Emphasis was given to environmental cooperation, and BRICS countries pledged to increase the sharing of green technologies and the development of renewable energy. India and Brazil focused on climate financing, whereas China suggested the BRICS Green Development Fund.

There were good proposals about what should be done; follow-up will play a critical role. One of the concrete products was the establishment of a Green Task Force.

– Technology Sharing and Technology Transformation

With the emerging trend of digital economies in the world, BRICS 2025 initiated the “BRICS Digital Partnership Initiative,” which serves the purpose of promoting cooperation in the areas of AI, cybersecurity, and digital infrastructure.

In India, a new Digital Innovation Center was announced in Bangalore to incubate BRICS-nation-based start-ups.

Yes. It was one of the most practical outcomes of this summit, which could have increased technology self-sufficiency among the members.

The Role of the New Development Bank (NDB)

The NDB, commonly referred to as the BRICS Bank, remained at the center stage. The bank has secured 10 billion in new lending in 2025 in its target areas of infrastructure and clean energy, as well as pandemic preparedness. The bank has also established its first regional office in Cairo to serve the African development needs.

Challenges before BRICS

Even though the summit was held on a positive note, many old issues remain:

–        Internal Threats: Indo-Chinese tensions and different national interests reduce the ability to act together.

–        Economic Asymmetries: The economic power of China greatly outweighs the rest of the members, and hence, the issue of dominance is brought into question.

–        Institutional Weaknesses: BRICS does not have a permanent secretariat, and it is hard to coordinate and continue.

–        Absence of Enforcement Mechanisms: Enforcement structures are rare when it comes to agreements; many agreements are declaratory only.

Impression and Western interpretations

The emergence of BRICS 2025 was looked on as wary encouragement by Western analysis. On the one hand, they accepted the possibility that the bloc could reorder global governance; on the other hand, they were not confident in its unity. Some viewed the summit as a symbolic meeting with minimal geopolitical effect; others were concerned about not underestimating its overall trend.

To counter this appeal, the G7 has stepped up its efforts to befriend the developing nations and provide them with alternatives in the form of funding and infrastructure offers.

Civil society manifestation and the public mood

Interestingly, BRICS 2025 involved increased input from the civil society as compared to its earlier editions. The marquee summit was accompanied by youth forums, academic exchanges, and media panels, which raised such issues as digital literacy, environmental justice, and cultural exchange.

Did we get anything? A Fair Verdict

BRICS 2025 indeed failed to bring about game-changing developments, but it made some modest accomplishments that might define its future course. Both the growth of discussions and the renewed attention to the use of local currencies, digital innovation, and cooperation on the environment comprise actual (though small-scale) progress.

Yet the summit also highlighted the structural weaknesses of the bloc. Unless something more institutional and powerful, and the resolution of the internal contradictions, occurs, BRICS may be at risk of stagnation or a complete lack of revenue.

Conclusion

The BRICS 2025 summit was more about an incremental change and not a breakthrough. Although the group failed to present spectacular reforms, such as introducing a shared currency or designing new international rules that would be binding, it reinforced its promises of multipolarity, economic integration, and reforms of international institutions. Concrete measures entailed putting extra focus on trade in local currency, the opening of the Digital Innovation Center in India, and suggestions of further cooperation on green technology and climate finance. These developments indicate that BRICS is making marginal but significant progress in terms of cementing its position as a platform of the opposite economies and an alternative to global governance.

Nonetheless, the summit revealed long-term internal weaknesses. The rivalry in the political sphere, particularly between India and China, and the imbalance in terms of economic scale and power, particularly with China, also restrain joint efforts. The lack of an effective institutional framework or binding processes also undermines the considerations of BRICS being able to deliver on what it promises. Nevertheless, all failings have not made the group obsolete, at least to the Global South, which sees it as a source of collective voice and collaboration beyond the confines of the forums that are probing the Global South. With this in mind, it is perhaps not seen that BRICS 2025 was a turning point but as a gradual and positive step forward in the developmental process that the group is taking.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

The 1975 Hindi-movie Sholay which starred two Indian superstars Amitabh Bachchan and Dharmendra was based on everlasting friendship between the two, and is till date referred to as the finest movie ever made in India.

Since 1867 after the British North America Act created the Dominion of Canada that saw the emergence of Canada as an independent nation, the relations between USA & Canada have been typical of the close friendship that the movie Sholay portrays. However, all changed on December 18, 2024 when Donald Trump, the then President-elect of the USA spoke of incorporating Canada as the USA’s 51^st state. After Donald Trump’s inauguration as the USA’s 47^th President on January 20, 2025, on multiple occasions has the American President reiterated his desire of seeing Canada as part of the USA. The relations between Canada and the USA have been on a downhill ever since.

Relations between the USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 32-nation military alliance too have been on the rocks after Donald Trump’s ascendancy to power. With the USA asking NATO members to step up defence spending to 5% of the GDP to Donald Trump casting doubts on NATO solidarity on March 07, 2025 including threats of the USA abandoning commitments to the alliance, clearly didn’t have the NATO members reassured.

The Great American Pushback didn’t exactly begin with Donald Trump’s return to the US Presidency after a four-year period. China’s emergence as the world’s third biggest economy in 2007 was the year when The Great American Pushback had first started which gained intensity after China became the world’s second biggest economy in 2010.

USA’s three blunders have catapulted China to the powerful position it is in today – US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China from February 21-28, 1972 culminating in formal diplomatic relations between the two superpowers on January 01, 1979, President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy announced on December 21, 2011 and Donald Trump’s policies after his return to the American Presidency on January 20, 2025.

The USA’s first blunder of President Richard Nixon’s visit to China from February 21-28, 1972 culminating in formal diplomatic relations between the two superpowers on January 01, 1979 saw the emergence of China as a manufacturing hub as the USA started procuring manufactured goods from China in large magnitudes. Soon China became the world’s manufacturing hub with 36.7% of the global manufacturing being done on the Chinese soil. This brought in financial strength that the Chinese so badly had wanted. Monetary power saw the military strength of China increase at a breakneck speed, with China emerging as the undisputed leader in 57 of the 64 critical technologies in the world.

America’s second blunder saw the US President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy announced on December 21, 2011 which resulted in bulk of the US military in the Middle East being moved to the Indo-Pacific Region to counter the growing aggressiveness of China.

Though in the intervening period of 1979 to 2011, there occurred an occasion which led to the turbulence between China and the USA known as The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that lasted from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996 which was a military confrontation between China and Taiwan. It entailed the USA getting embroiled in. Clearly, the USA didn’t pretty much not learn a lesson of China’s military designs in annexing Taiwan and continued business as usual with China. China’s economic and military might kept on steadily increasing after The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

And the USA’s third blunder proved to be Donald Trump’s policies after his return to the American Presidency on January 20, 2025. Be it Donald Trump declaring Canada as the USA’s 51^st state or riling the NATO alliance or the tariff war that was unleashed on the world on April 09, 2025. The Great American Pushback peaked in 2025.

After China became the world’s second biggest economy in 2007, as it started flexing its muscles militarily, The Great American Pushback was off the block. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, the Americans were found wanting as China stood rock-solid behind Russia. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Americans were found wanting yet again.

The US led-Multi Coalition Force in Afghanistan had started facing serious challenges soon after they were inducted in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Eight years later, President Barack Obama announced an additional 17,000 troops to be deployed in Afghanistan to the existing 37,000. The top US military commander in Afghanistan was changed on May 11, 2009. Finally, the US had to beat a hasty retreat at midnight of August 15, 2021 leaving the Afghanis in lurch.

The Americans failed to capitalise on Arab Spring that spread across much of the Arab world that started in Tunisia in January 2011 and soon spread to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan. With the notable exception of Jordan, the American gains in the other 12 nations that witnessed Arab Spring were insignificant.

As the Arab Spring was weakening by end-2011, President Barack Obama announced the East Asia Strategy also known as Pivot to Asia on December 21, 2011 under which bulk of the American troops stationed in the Middle East were moved to the Indo-Pacific Region to counter the growing aggressiveness of China. The vacuum that was created in the Middle East as a result of this policy, saw Russia & China making strong gains in the Middle East specially amongst the Arab nations.

It was around this period that Hamas which had taken power in the Gaza Strip on June 14, 2007 started being supported clandestinely by China. This started increasing the power of Hamas substantially and finally when Hamas struck on Israel on October 07, 2023, Israel and in turn the USA, were found wanting as the main benefactor of Israel is the USA. The Israel-Hamas War continues 22 months on.

Iran which has been under the US-led economic sanctions since the last 38 years won the pyrrhic victory over Israel in the 12-day war that lasted from June 13-25, 2025. This was another blow to the global dominance that the USA once enjoyed.

On the Russia-Ukraine War front too, that started with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 the USA hasn’t been able to ensure Ukraine’s victory with the Russians occupying 20% of the Ukrainian territory as on date. Ukraine’s repeated pleas for American troops has had no effect and Ukraine continues to be hammered militarily by Russia.

And finally, President Donald Trump’s Trade War announced on April 09, 2025 just 79 days into his second Presidency, proved to be the bete noire for whatever was left of the American credibility. The world soon lost count of the Tariffs that Donald Trump was unleashing every other day and countries like China, Brazil etc were clearly undeterred. The Great American Pushback was reaching greater proportions.

India which has gravitated towards the USA after the announcement of the Pivot to Asia policy in 2011, too was not spared by Donald Trump’s jibes. 26 times the American President has taken credit for the ceasefire announced after the 88-hour India-Pakistan Conflict 2025, despite India categorically stating that no third country played any role in the ceasefire with Pakistan after the short but intense military confrontation in May 2025.

Rubbing salt further, Donald Trump invited the Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir to lunch in the White House in June 2025. Not to forget, the American President praising Pakistan in handing over a dreaded terrorist to the USA, in his inauguration speech on January 20, 2025. And on July 26, 2025 the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, thanked Ishaq Dar, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for “Pakistan’s partnership in countering terrorism and preserving regional stability”. Though it well known globally that Pakistan is the epicentre of terrorism and the pivotal factor for South Asia’s regional stability.

Overwhelming majority of the Global South that comprises 134 nations out of the 195 nations that exist in the world today are in strong Chinese & Russian grip. The European Union including the Western Europe countries are slowly tilting towards China.

Australia and Japan who constitute the four-nation Quad alliance along with the USA and India are gravitating towards China. The Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s statement “Engaging with China is in our interest to build a stable & secure region” on July 13, 2025 during his six-day visit to China clearly shows the Australian change in stance towards China, a far cry from 2020 when Australia had called for an international inquiry to probe China’s involvement in the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Another Quad alliance member Japan and a long-term ally of the US in the North East, South Korea are in fast-paced talks since July 01, 2025 for trilateral cooperation with China amid the US Tariff War unleashed by President Donal Trump in a proactive effort to safeguard regional stability and economic resilience.

Thus, The Great American Pushback is now global from Australia to South America, from Western Europe to Africa.

Lessons for Nations at War Risk

On January 17, 2024 Grant Shapps, the British Defence Secretary warned of multiple war theatres opening up in the next five years which would involve Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. How prophetic his words have turned out to be with the recently concluded Israel-Iran War and the US-Iran military strikes. And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

Clearly, the era of the 21^st Century wars has already started with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas War. And is set to intensify in the coming years. The nations at war risk and dependant on the USA need to learn from The Great American Pushback.

After 1979 war with Vietnam in which China was defeated, China focussed on its economic and military preparedness as the USA was embroiled in every war and conflict the world over. Since the USA gained independence on July 04, 1776, till date it has taken part in 204 wars and conflict in the world, directly or indirectly.

China has not taken part in any war or conflict in the world directly or indirectly since its defeat to Vietnam in 1979, baring two instances.

One, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that lasted from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996, though in this military stand-off, no life was lost. Two, the Galwan Valley Clash on June 15, 2020 with India which has been covered in detail by the author.

The famous quote “Choose your battles wisely because if you fight them all, you’ll be too tired to win the really important ones” is an apt reflection on China and the USA with a great lesson to the nations at a war risk.

It is very important that nations at war risk develop defence technologies domestically. For, during wars there is no guarantee of any nation supplying the weapon systems. A strong Military Industrial Complex based on the rock-solid foundation of domestic defence technologies will rule out dependency on foreign suppliers. Be it the USA, Russia, China or Isreal, all have a robust Military Industrial Complex pivoting on domestic defence technology bedrock.

Ukraine finds itself in a tight-spot as the American defence supplies are not forthcoming at the rate Ukraine requires and the biggest handicap of Ukraine is the absence of a Military Industrial Complex for this prolonged war.

Sample this. During the three-day period July 07-09, 2025, Russia launched more than 1300 missiles and drones at Ukraine. The USA has an annual production rate of 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles per year. Two such missiles are required by Ukraine to neutralise one incoming Russian projectile. Clearly, the mathematics don’t add up. Cost wise, one Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles costs US$ 7 million to manufacture. The USA can’t guarantee Ukraine supply of such expensive defence systems for a prolonged period.

Take another case of M1A2 Abrams tanks. Annually, 30 tanks are produced in the USA. Russia by contrast, produces 300 T-90 tanks every year. Even if the USA want to help Ukraine with more armour, it has to first look after its domestic defence requirements. Thus, having minimal scope to help Ukraine in this issue.

Countries at war risk should refrain from crying hoarse repeatedly about conspiracy theories as it is a distraction from economic & military aims and objectives. It is a well-known fact that as in a person’s professional life, rarely does anyone help. Similarly, as a nation progresses very few nations have a helping attitude. Nations should focus on the future goals. Another point needs mentioning is that nations at war risk should learn from history and not remain stuck-up in History, and prepare for the future keeping in mind the lessons learnt.

And finally, the nations at war risk should not count for help on the alliances they are in. In the present era, talks and treaties have lost relevance. It is only hard power that will matter.   The USA hasn’t proved to be trusted ally in the last two decades. The present American geopolitics can be easily summarised in one word “Transactional”.

The quote “Transactional leaders tend to look at the world through a lens of punishment, rewards, and or exchange for motivation. While transformational leaders focus on listening, collaboration, and leading by example” holds great weightage for the USA as the era of modern wars has already begun. For long, the USA had been regarded as the bulwark of democracy but since 2007, has been abjuring from this great responsibility that had become synonymous with America.

By: Chethana Enugula

The collusion of their strategic interests has propped up a new challenge for India – a strong three-sided grouping and a menace with multidimensional implications threatening the security, economic and diplomatic outlook in South Asia. This new nexus fuelled by the spread of the Belt and Road Initiative of China, the economic stability and military modernization effort of Pakistan and the legitimacy of international recognition of Afghanistan governed by the Taliban regime opens opportunities to restructure the present power status quo in the region and even surround India with the strategic challenges.

In India’s view, the regional setup consisting of many influential neighbours is not a mere diplomatic contest but an actual threat to the national interests of the country. The plan endangers the stability in the region, border security, and existing trade routes that all rely on India’s position as a central power in the region. The military, economic, and diplomatic aspects of the trilateral form a complex multi-front security dilemma that makes India thoroughly reconsider its value system of defense and foreign policies.

Genesis and Evolution of Trilateral

The so-called trilateral dialogue mechanism was officially initiated back in 2017 to enable China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to develop political confidence, hone anti-terrorism collaboration and promote economic integration in the region. It soon encountered some potholes, with Pakistan and Afghanistan rubbing each other in the wrong way, but top-level contact has managed to renew and keep it alive over the last few years.

There was a true turning point when the foreign ministers informally met in Beijing in May 2025. They once again promised to combine their efforts in security and economic connectivity. They ended the affair with some of their major successes. Pakistan and Afghanistan decided to improve their embassy relations at the diplomatic level and appointed ambassadors, which was a hit endorsed by China. They also approved a widening of the Belt and Road initiative and indicated preparations to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan. All these commitments helped the talks shift from just talks to real actions towards greater integration.

Through the two-day interaction, the key agenda was counter-terrorism, eco-integration, the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) footprint, and trust-building. The best moment of it all was in July 2025 when Russia acknowledged the Taliban officially, giving the bloc real diplomatic traction and insinuating that other governments could follow soon.

Strategic Objectives of the Trilateral Members

China’s strategic goals in the Trilateral are strongly interconnected with BRI and CPEC, but having pro-BRI incumbency of Burhanay in Afghanistan may bring a new route into the world of Beijing, the Wakhan Corridor, which will give direct overland access to China, skirting geopolitical strangles and making Beijing the coordinator of the main trade in the region. In the meantime, the Afghanistan state, with its untapped mineral reserves valued at $1 trillion (copper, rare earth, lithium), gives China the bargaining chip in its approach towards the Taliban regime in the context of resource diplomacy; state-owned enterprises have already started discussing the extraction rights of oil and copper projects.

Security issues support economic reasons. Beijing is keen on ensuring that the anti-China militant groups do not spread to Xinjiang or Pakistan, whereby CPEC-related also suffered the loss of Chinese lives in several militant attacks since 2021. Pakistan, in turn, views CPEC as a lifeline, including much-needed infrastructure and energy schemes through which it sustains its economy, as well as increases its geopolitical influence by enabling Afghanistan to gain access to Gwadar Port and new pipelines to Central Asia. Islamabad also considers the CPEC extension to be an effective counter-strategy to the so-called Indian encirclement strategy, which ties regional stability to economic growth.

Pakistan is also highly dependent on Chinese military equipment, as 81 percent of the Chinese military imports in Pakistan come in the form of J-10C fighter jets, J-35 stealth fighters awaiting delivery, and HQ-9 air-defense systems rolling out. This strategic deal provides Pakistan with a hedge against India, which has had high military capabilities, as it was reported in May 2025 to have given the strategic visions in the India-Pakistan conflict by providing Beijing with live-standing situations regarding the movements of the Indian troops.

The issues of international isolation and huge economic distress are piling up in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The regime is resorting to the trilateral deal, which is a potential saviour in the name of legitimacy and development. The overall objective is to board the BRI and continue with CPEC, which can result in much-needed foreign investment, especially in the mineral-rich country.

Impact on India’s Security Interests

The emerging “China-Pakistan-Afghanistan” trilateral nexus presents complex security considerations to India and produces a challenge that is not only multidimensional but also emanates from a military, economic, and political battlefield.

First is the rising China-Pakistan military nexus, which is the most pressing among the three. Beijing maintains the defense posture of Pakistan through large arms sales, the result of which is the ability of Pakistan to hedge against India. The large field tempo of engagement observed in the May 2025 battle, a collaborative, rapid-paced, and integrated threat involving the real-time sharing of intelligence and the use of UAVs in China, resembles a well-orchestrated threat.

The second problematic front is Afghanistan. Though the Taliban have been promising to be cooperative in counter-terrorism, the government continues to serve as a hub for various terror groups. According to reports published by the United Nations, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Affiliates of Al-Qaeda are permitted to practice and launch assaults along with the Taliban regime. Organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed that had past connections with Al-Qaeda and were also found in the earlier version of the Taliban still threaten the Indian nation, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

The emerging nexus also exposes India’s geographic vulnerabilities, especially the Line of Actual Control with China and the critical tract in the Siliguri Corridor. This Strait is only 20-22 km across, crosses Assam and is the only terrestrial connection between India and its northeastern states, which opens this Corridor to yet another unending source of danger. Beijing’s swelling infrastructure in the Chumbi Valley heralds the encirclement possibilities that can see Indian forces extended along several borders.

There is also economic rivalry. The Chinese-led plan to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan provides a landlocked Kabul with easy access to the Gwadar port in Pakistan in response to the India-led International North-South transport corridor and Chabahar port. The project will pose a direct challenge to the long-term Central-Asian connectivity dreams of New Delhi because it provides an alternative way in which trade can be carried out to Central Asia.

India’s Strategic Response

India is being multilateral and multifaceted by combining modernization of its military, outward relationships, and additional economic routes. 

The modernization of the military places an emphasis on the indigenous manufacturing of the products in the context of the “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” principles, which lowers foreign sourcing and increases the autonomy of the technological production in the military sector. The major improvements come in the form of native helicopters and Apache assault helicopters, as well as state-of-the-art innovations such as AI-powered drones and electromagnetic arms. 

Realizing the weaknesses of the Siliguri Corridor, India is also planning alternative routes of northeastern connectivity with the major investment of border infrastructure in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Planned projects include India-China border roads, advanced landing grounds, and new railway lines so that forces can be quickly deployed and avoid reliance on the vulnerable Corridor. 

Diplomatically, India applies the Neighbourhood First policy when dealing with immediate neighbours using consultative and outcome-based engagements. India continues to support humanitarian assistance and development aid to Afghanistan, as well as attempting to thwart Chinese and Pakistani influence by realistically engaging them, even as it continues to beef up its influence in the country in the face of strained relationships. The enhanced alliances with the Quad members and states of the Central Asia region provide flexibility and influence on diplomatic platforms and strategic dimensions to overcome trilateral problems. 

On the economic front, India is moving fast towards the development of alternative corridors, especially the use of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the operationalization of Chabahar Port. These projects give the Central Asian and Russian countries important access routes that bypass Pakistan.

Future Scenarios and Implications

The future of the trilateral is determined by multiple factors, including enhancing integration on the one hand and major internal problems on the other. One of them is formalized bloc deepening, where further Chinese economic investment in the region, the growth of CPEC opening Afghan mineral resources, and a greater degree of security cooperation would take place. The international endorsement that is indicated by the diplomatic upgrade of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the recognition of the Taliban by Russia is an indication that the consensus is growing in acceptance of this bloc.

Nevertheless, there are high internal obstacles that may block complete realization. The stability of Taliban regimes is uncertain, and as long as the country has internal conflicts, as well as threats from rival groups such as ISIS-K. The ability of the Taliban to actually control terrorist activities, especially those with regime connections, is doubtful in spite of the promises. The CPEC project has security risks, is not financially feasible, can disrupt the economies, has risks of debt burden, and the current delays in the projects have viability issues.

Recommendation

India needs to be more focused on a quick acceleration of indigenous defense production with an emphasis on the technological growth of its AI-based systems, hypersonic systems, and advanced air defense, among others. Additional progress on border infrastructure, especially in sensitive regions such as Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, is vital in order to avoid operational readiness and the ability to respond in time.

The step up in intelligence gathering of terror groups against Afghanistan-based terror organizations, as well as multilateral pressure against the Taliban to take verifiable counter-terrorism measures, will solve short-term security questions. On the economic front, the new willingness to proceed with INSTC and the operationalization of Chabahar Port further offer major connectivity options to Chinese-controlled routes.

On the diplomatic front, the revival of the philosophies of the Neighbourhood First Policy by emulating pragmatic flexibility, with the support of more powerful entities as well as alliances and the search for new alliances with greater strategic interest, provides greater spheres of influence working against the influence of China. India has developed potent public diplomacy to frame its regional role and strategic vision, which is the fundamental story that meets the concerns about encirclement.

Conclusion

The China-Afghanistan-Pakistan, theoretically and practically, is a developing, serious problem that needs to be met soundly and strategically with a mixed approach. The extent of strategic autonomy that can enable India to safeguard its national interests is the capacity to be resilient, innovative, and proactive in all major spheres: military, economic, and diplomatic. The long perspective indicates an even more competitive, multi-polar S. Asia where India’s strategic fortunes will be decided by its overall reaction to this complicated geopolitical issue, and its regional influence/connectivity ambitions remain securely intact.

By: Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the Maldives is a significant one and will help re-set the bilateral ties. India and the Maldives share an old connection but the last few years saw tensions spike in this relationship. Modi will visit the Maldives on July 25-26 after his visit to the United Kingdom.

On the invitation of the Maldivian President, Dr. Mohamed Muizzu, Modi’s state visit to the Maldives will begin on 25 July. Modi will be the “Guest of Honour” at the 60th anniversary celebrations of the independence of the Maldives which is on 26 July. Muizzu had paid a visit to India in October 2024 and that was seen as a first step towards the normalization of ties between the two nations. After his election victory in 2023, Muizzu had taken a stand that was generally seen as confrontational vis-à-vis India. He was also seen as being pro-China and that had increased tensions in the bilateral relationship.  

Fast forward to 2025 and it seems geopolitics, and for India, the China factor, will provide the thrust needed to get this bilateral relationship back to a new normal. China has been working hard to increase its footprint in the South Asian region. From Nepal to Bhutan, China has been wooing smaller nation states with its economic prowess. The trilateral meet between China-Pakistan-Bangladesh held in June this year is a worrying development for India. The active Chinese support to Pakistan during Op Sindoor is another clear indication that China is actively pursuing its agenda to get its feet firmly into India’s neighbourhood.

During the visit of the Maldivian President in Oct 2024, India stepped in to help the Maldives which was in the midst of an economic crisis. India provided a currency swap for about US$ 750 million and rolled over US$ 50 million in credit. India was not too happy with Muizzu but also realised that India’s strategic interests in the region were best served by keeping the Maldives close. Modi’s visit on July 25-26 is India going further down that road and strategy.

It is also no secret that China is now working on forming a new regional grouping to replace SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). It is being actively supported in this endeavour by Pakistan and reports in Pakistan media suggest that the Maldives, along with Sri Lanka and Afghanistan will be part of the new grouping. SAARC today is a defunct grouping, courtesy the India-Pakistan bilateral issues. The last SAARC Summit was held in 2014 in Kathmandu, and in 2016 when the Summit was to be held in Pakistan, India declined to participate pointing to Pakistan’s role behind the Uri attacks. After Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan also declined to participate in the Islamabad meet, the Summit was called off. Even the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) grouping has not proven to be as effective as India had hoped for.

In the backdrop of all these factors, Modi’s visit to the Maldives assumes greater significance. It also points to how both the leaders have realised that since geography ties them in a close embrace, the wise thing would be to co-operate as allies and partners.

During the 2024 State visit of the Maldivian president, a joint vision for a comprehensive economic and security partnership was adopted which has become the “guiding framework” for ties. India today is one of the largest trading partners of the Maldives, with two-way trade worth almost US$ 500 million. Both sides are also engaged in discussions for a free trade agreement (FTA) and an investment treaty, particularly focused on renewable energy and fisheries.

Muizzu, who had been elected in 2023 on a “India Out” campaign also seems to have realised that India remains a reliable partner. In Jan 2025, when the Maldivian Defence Minister Mohammed Ghassan Maumoon visited India, both countries agreed to strengthen their defence co-operation. India reaffirmed its readiness to support the Maldives to boost its defence preparedness, including through provisioning of defence platforms and assets to augment its capacities, in line with its national priorities, and New Delhi’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and the vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region).

Modi’s visit to the Maldives then comes at a critical time for India. The Maldives and its leadership seem to have shrugged off the earlier anti-India sentiments and the relationship seems poised for a strengthening of ties. It also remains an important move by India to counter China’s attempts to spread its wings in the region.

By: Brigadier Anil John Alfred Pereira, SM (Retd)

” There is no friendship without self-interests. This is a bitter truth.”  – Chanakya

History is replete with examples of sworn adversaries transforming into strategic allies when their interests align. France and Germany, which fought two World Wars, are today the anchor of the European Union as partners in peace and progress. The United States and Vietnam, once bitter enemies, now cooperate on trade and regional security. Japan and South Korea, despite a painful history, work together in technology and regional security. To see the Dragon and Elephant tango together may seem improbable today but could very well become tomorrow’s strategic necessity when the future takes precedence over the past.

The Past

India and China, with our millennia-old civilisational legacies and modern geopolitical heft, are natural candidates for a transformation from adversaries to friends as qualified by the phrase “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai“, coined in the early 1950s. Bound together by land and history, we share ancient philosophies, vibrant traditions, and parallel struggles. While time and tensions have dimmed that spirit, the possibilities for renewed cooperation remain vast in today’s complex, multipolar world.

Both India and China are proud inheritors of great river valley civilisations that gave rise to profound systems of thought, spirituality, governance, and innovation. From ancient scriptures, universities, medicines to intricate arts and crafts, both nations shaped global culture and knowledge. For centuries, we were among the world’s largest economies, trading silk, spices, ideas, and inventions across Asia and beyond. The colonial and imperial periods, however, changed this trajectory. Both nations suffered foreign domination, internal turmoil, and economic decline. Poverty, hunger, and disempowerment gripped our populations for decades until in late 20th century when both India and China began charting a new course towards development and global relevance.

The Present

Today, our countries stand as resurgent powers. China, with its manufacturing prowess and infrastructure boom, and India, with its demographic dividend, vibrant democracy, and technological growth, are reshaping the global economic and political landscape. We are among the world’s largest producers of grains, minerals, steel, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and digital services. Both countries are now assertive participants in global trade, commerce and innovation. Despite distinct languages and traditions, we share deep-rooted cultural similarities that reflect our parallel civilisational evolution. Our societies place a strong emphasis on family values, respect for elders, collective harmony, and the pursuit of knowledge and advocate moral conduct, self-discipline, and societal duty. Festivals in both nations celebrate nature, harvest, and spiritual renewal. The shared legacy of Buddhism, which originated in India and took deep root in China, is perhaps the most profound cultural bridge, visible in art, sculpture, philosophy, and monastic traditions across both countries.  These enduring commonalities remind us that cultural understanding between the two nations is not a new aspiration, but a rediscovery of long-standing ties.

Convergence of Interests

Despite geopolitical frictions, we both share many overlapping interests. We seek economic growth, energy security, food sufficiency, and technological advancement for our massive populations. Our positions in multilateral platforms like BRICS, SCO, and G20 often align on reforming global institutions to better represent developing nations. We have invested heavily in renewable energy, green technologies, artificial intelligence, and digital public infrastructure. Issues like climate change, pandemic preparedness and fair-trade offer ample ground for practical collaboration. A stable and peaceful neighbourhood is in the interest of both countries. Avoiding conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and pursuing confidence-building measures can free up resources and finances for developmental goals. People-to-people exchanges, cultural collaborations, and academic linkages can help foster mutual understanding beyond political narratives.

Divergence of Interests

At the same time, the divergences between our countries are real and persistent. The unresolved boundary dispute remains a flashpoint, as seen in recent standoffs. China’s close strategic and economic ties with Pakistan, including infrastructure projects in disputed territories and until recently the weapon and material aid with intelligence support provided during Operation Sindoor are not acceptable to us. China’s forays into the immediate neighbourhood i.e. Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Region are viewed with suspicion in India. Similarly, India’s growing alignment with the United States, Japan, and Australia through groupings like the Quad is often perceived by China as a counterbalance. There are also tensions over trade deficits, market access restrictions, and differing worldviews India being a democracy and China a one-party state. Additionally, regional influence in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific is a subtle but significant arena of competition. Nationalist sentiments on both sides often aggravate these fault lines, making dialogue challenging, even when mutual benefit is apparent.

The Future

In today’s shifting global landscape, where unipolar dominance is giving way to a multipolar world order, India and China have a historic opportunity to lead by cooperation instead of being rivals locked in distrust and suspicion. We can serve as co-creators of a more balanced, equitable rules based global order built on pillars of stability, cooperation, and balanced development. Our combined voice can amplify the concerns of the Global South, push for sustainable development, and resist coercive economic models. Peaceful resolution of border issues and mutual respect for sovereignty can unlock immense potential in trade, innovation, and cultural exchange.

History teaches that civilisations rise and fall not just through war, but through their capacity to adapt, collaborate, and learn from each other. If India and China can navigate their differences with maturity, and build on their civilisational wisdom and shared aspirations, we can become beacons of peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia and the world. India and China are well-placed to demonstrate that even powerful neighbours with differences can rise together, neither at the cost of the other, nor at the mercy of external powers. The road ahead may be long and uneven, but the journey is worth taking. The promise of renewed Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai relations can become the beacon of hope the world needs in these turbulent times. In its success lies the promise of an Asia that rises together, united in its diversity and destiny.