By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala

China and Taiwan have been involved in the conflict dating back to the Chinese civil war which ended in 1949. Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) claimed its sovereignty over the self-governed, democratic island of Taiwan. With its One-China policy, China views Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Taiwan considers itself a sovereign, independent country with its own constitution and democratically elected government. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by President William Lai, maintains that a formal declaration of independence is unnecessary as the Republic of China (ROC) is already a sovereign state. Most Taiwanese citizens support maintaining the current status quo. China has increased its military activity towards Taiwan. It has significantly ramped up military pressure through “grey zone” tactics, frequent incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and conducting large scale military drills simulating blockades or invasions. The question is- WHY?

Why does China want Taiwan? Historical claims, significant geostrategic advantages, and critical economic interests in Taiwan’s high-tech industries are the main reasons responsible for China’s assertiveness. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reclaiming the island is a matter of national pride and political legitimacy. The Chinese civil war never concluded with a peace treaty, the communists took over the whole of China and the nationalists retreated to Taiwan. According to PRC’s belief, it is the successor to the ROC, hence, the whole territory of China including Taiwan should be under their jurisdiction.

Taiwan is located at a strategically vital position. Having control of Taiwan would help China control the western pacific routes and its navy more efficiently which is a major security concern for the US and its regional allies.

Taiwan is a powerhouse in the technology sector, especially in semiconductor manufacturing. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s most valuable chip-making company and controls a majority of the global market share for advanced semiconductors, which are crucial for electronics, phones, and cars worldwide. Taking over         Taiwan’s economy would significantly bolster China’s tech industry and reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

General Secretary Xi Jinping has made the goal of integrating Taiwan a fundamental part of his political narrative because failure to bring Taiwan under Chinese control could be perceived as a weakness and a significant loss of face for the CCP leadership.

China insists on peaceful reunification but has been quite straightforward in stating that it may use force, if necessary, in order to prevent Taiwan from formally declaring independence.

Taiwan’s Military Preparation-

Taiwan is enhancing its military preparedness by resorting to an “asymmetric warfare” strategy, acquiring mobile, hard-to-target weapons, increasing its defence budget, and strengthening international partnerships. Taiwan’s core defence strategy is the ‘porcupine approach’. This aims to prevent a Chinese invasion by making the potential cost of an attack prohibitively high. It focuses on asymmetric capabilities such as using smaller, mobile, and cost-effective weapon systems that can survive an initial Chinese missile barrage and disrupt amphibious landings. Examples include anti-ship missiles (Hsiung Feng II/III), mobile missile launchers, sea mines, and drone swarms. It has started to emphasize on cyber or electronic warfare and guerilla-style tactics for urban defence, preparing for prolonged resistance. This strategy mirrors Ukraine’s defence model, focusing on denial rather than outright victory.

Taiwan’s doctrine emphasizes denial and attrition. The aim is to make any attempted cross-strait seizure physically and politically costly by inflicting losses on invading forces, disrupting sustainment, and prolonging resistance so as to complicate China’s political objectives. Exercises increasingly focus on distributed operations, small-unit anti-landing tactics, joint sensor-to-shooter linkages, and operations under degraded communications. Importantly, Taiwan recognizes that asymmetric defences work only if they are backed by credible logistics, robust command and control, and a trained reserve force that can execute follow-on operations after initial PLA strikes.

Taiwan has increased its defence budget. Taiwanese government has steadily increased the country’s military expenditure and is close to $20.25 billion in 2025 which is approximately 2.45% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). President Lai Ching-te announced an additional $40 billion investment over eight years. It aims to raise its defence spending to 5% of its GDP by 2030. Funds are directed toward advanced missile systems, cyber defence, and indigenous weapons development.

Taiwan is enhancing its grip on land, water and air. It has developed long range precision missiles which enhance deterrence by threatening Chinese bases. Taiwan’s defence ministries and private firms have adapted commercial drones for military use, and procurement plans include hundreds of small drones to provide real-time targeting data and augment artillery and missile effectiveness. Taiwan has also upgraded its domestic weaponry. Its investments include indigenous submarines and modern frigates. Taiwan is upgrading 141 older F-16A/B jets to the advanced F-16V and purchasing 66 new F-16Vs. These jets feature improved avionics and radars, designed to counter China’s J-20 stealth fighters. It has installed a multi-layered air defence systems like the new T-Dome and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors to protect critical assets and counter China’s air and missile threats.

The Taiwanese armed forces have expanded the length and frequency of their annual ‘Han Kuang’ military exercises, covering land, sea, and air operations to improve combat readiness. It runs extensive defence drills simulating Chinese attacks. Taiwanese government has also included civilians in order to keep everyone alert and ready for any situation. In 2025, these defence drills were the largest mobilization of reservists in history, involving civilians across cities and towns. Recognizing that Taiwan’s small active force cannot sustain prolonged high-intensity combat against the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA), It has invested in reserve reforms like reducing the active service gap, increasing training frequency, and improving the equipment and integration of reserve units so they can be a credible second line of defence. President Lai’s government has proposed supplementary defence budgets aimed at strengthening reserve readiness and broadening civil defence capabilities. Taiwanese armed forces and government have integrated civil and military. Exercises extend beyond bases and are held at train stations, supermarkets, schools and other public places reflecting Taiwan’s ‘whole-of-society’ defence approach. Citizens are taught survival skills, first aid, and emergency response. Schools and communities have integrated defence awareness into daily life, fostering unity. The government is preparing the civilian population for potential conflict through civil defence handbooks and developing communication backup networks to ensure societal resilience under attack.

Taiwan’s preparedness strategy depends heavily on international relationships, both in terms of material support and deterrence signalling. While Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic recognition from most countries, it enjoys substantive security ties with the United States and cooperation with like-minded partners. US arms sales, training, intelligence sharing, and political support are central pillars. Recent US approvals of missile defence and other packages underscore continuing US willingness to help Taiwan modernize its air-defence and sustainment capabilities. NATO and Pacific partners’ transits through the Taiwan Strait and statements of concern over coercive actions also create a broader international attention that China must account for during crisis decision-making. United States remains Taiwan’s primary arms supplier, providing advanced fighter jets, missile systems and training. Taiwan also has good relations with Japan and other Indo-Pacific allies and increasing cooperation with these countries is beneficial for Taiwan for a stronger control over the region. Domestic arms production is also essential to reduce foreign dependence to a certain extent and ensuring sustainability during conflict.

Challenges and Limitations for Taiwan

The PLA’s numerical advantage in aircraft, missiles, amphibious lift and sustainment remains daunting. Even a well-designed asymmetric defence can be stressed by a high-intensity, multi-axis campaign that combines cyber, missile strikes and amphibious landings. Taiwan faces demographic decline, reducing available recruits. It lacks manpower in comparison with China. Opposition parties sometimes resist large defence budgets, questioning sustainability. China’s economic and diplomatic coercion complicates Taiwan’s ability to secure enough international support. Modernization programs take years, while China’s military capabilities grow rapidly. Taiwan’s ability to sustain prolonged operations hinges on dispersal of logistics, redundant C2 and assured fuel and munitions stocks. Building these quickly is expensive and politically sensitive. Mobilization requires not only hardware but also a population ready and willing to endure disruptions. Taiwan has made strides in reserve and civil defence reforms, but full societal resilience is an ongoing challenge.

By: Col Ashwin Baindur (Retd)

India has a fighter aircraft problem — we simply do not have enough of them. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is authorised to operate 42 squadrons but today fields barely around 29 effective squadrons, many composed of Jaguars, MiG-29s and Mirage-2000s nearing retirement. If theatre commands are implemented — redistributing aircraft across independent theatres — internal assessments suggest the requirement could rise to ~ 55 squadrons. Whether one accepts the upper figure or not, the conclusion is inescapable: India needs a dramatic expansion in combat aircraft strength.

From today’s depleted strength, the IAF needs not only around 26 squadrons to reach 55, but also replacements for around 10–12 squadrons of legacy platforms. That implies a requirement exceeding 35–38 squadrons over the next decade — larger than the current IAF fleet itself. Even reaching sanctioned strength would require inductions equal to the size of today’s combat force. Put simply, India is running a fighter deficit of strategic proportions.

Why indigenous development struggled

India’s indigenous fighter journey, though visionary, was handicapped by two structural realities.

1. A steep technological climb

We attempted to leap from an HF-24 era knowledge base to building a modern multi-role fighter. The Light Combat Aircraft (later christened Tejas) was initially conceived as a simple MiG-21 replacement — cheap, light and easy to manufacture. Over time the goalpost shifted to a highly capable 4+/4.5th-generation platform with world-class avionics, fly-by-wire (FBW), radar, electronic warfare, and weapons-integration capabilities. Specifications increased, but the research and development capability had to be built from scratch — every failure, delay and learning curve had to be paid for in time — exacerbated by the fact that the main development was done by government agencies.

Compounding delays, the 1998 nuclear tests triggered technology sanctions. Foreign consultants — including Lockheed Martin, who assisted ADA in validating LCA’s flight-control system — had to disengage due to U.S. restrictions after Pokhran-II. This forced India to develop all critical FBW technologies independently. A deepening commitment to indigenisation followed — culminating in today’s Atmanirbharta drive.

Institutional support was also inconsistent. Political backing waxed and waned, budgets fluctuated, and user confidence was not always steady. Even today Tejas Mk 1 has just begun inducting; Tejas Mk-2 has yet to fly; the Twin Engine Deck-based Fighter (TEDBF) and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) Mk-1 remain in early development (TEDBF, AMCA Mk-1) stage; and the AMCA Mk-2 is still in the conceptual stage. Our indigenous fighter aircraft program has begun but has a long way to go.

2. The engine bottleneck

Our greatest shortfall was propulsion. The Kaveri engine, though a technological milestone, never matured to Tejas-use power levels. We relied on the American F-404 for Tejas and now the F-414 for the prospective Tejas Mk-2, Twin Engine Deck-based Fighter and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft Mk-1 — both critical choke points. Delivery schedules will determine how fast we can build aircraft, and it is uncertain whether supply will match our needs. Even though GE has agreed to joint-production of F-414 in India, export controls and delivery timelines remain a strategic vulnerability. A future indigenous 110–120 kN engine is essential for real autonomy and scale. A recent agreement with Safran for development of a 110-120 kN engine, with full transfer of technology and production-cum-export rights, is a step in the right direction.

It has to recognised that if engine deliveries lag or sanctions return, our entire combat-fleet modernisation could slow, or even halt. The long-term solution must be a Kaveri-derivative capable of replacing the F-404 and later competing with the F-414.

Foreign acquisition – poor outcomes, slow pace

In four decades, we have inducted only two squadrons of Rafales and a handful of replacement Su-30MKIs. The MMRCA processes dragged on without result. Rafale is excellent, but expensive. Some contract elements remain pending, and most critically, France will not share mission-computer source codes or deep ToT, ensuring dependence for weapons integration through the aircraft’s life-cycle, a situation incompatible with India’s thrust for indigenisation. Production slots are full, meaning delivery for additional orders would take close to a decade. Rafale thus becomes a capability enhancer over time, but not a fleet builder.

Why the Su-57 deserves consideration

Russia offers the Su-57 — a 5th-generation stealth fighter. It may not match the F-22/F-35 in all metrics, but for India it offers several advantages:

• It is a 5th-generation stealth aircraft bringing completely new capabilities to the IAF, unlike 4.5th-generation alternatives.
• Full production/ToT offers are reportedly on table.
• We already operate Su-30s, easing training, logistics and maintenance integration.
• HAL’s production ecosystem can adapt to Su-57 quickly.
• Delivery timelines may be within 5–6 years instead of 10–12.
• Russia historically imposes minimal operational restrictions.
• Cost per capability delivered appears favourable versus Rafale.

While analysts debate Su-57 maturity, for India it remains the only near-term 5th-gen platform with potential for local manufacture, weapons integration freedom and technology access.

Crucially, India needs numbers, not token strength. Two or three squadrons of Su-57 add some capability as well as prestige, not deterrence. To matter, we need at least 9–10 squadrons — four for each front, one for the maritime/southern theatre. Indigenous manufacture would accelerate Atmanirbharta, lift our fighter-technology base by two decades overnight, and create spillover benefits for AMCA and even 6th-gen projects. Access to the Izdeliye-30 engine could relieve AMCA engine pressure and allow time to develop an Indian 120+ kN class engine.

Affordability & strategic logic

Some argue India cannot afford a major program. The counterpoint is simple: India cannot afford NOT to. Spending massively on limited Rafales gives quality but no quantity, no sovereignty in software, and little indigenisation. Large-scale Su-57 manufacturing, in contrast, builds both numbers and capability while strengthening domestic aerospace industry.

Hurdles to Su-57 procurement remain but they are external to the platform-related arguments made above. Procurement from Russia could draw CAATSA sanctions from the United States. India faces problems in paying for trade with Russia due to global financial sanctions. Lastly, India has a balance-of-payments problem with Russia of the ratio 10:1 in favour of Russia. Lastly, India’s geopolitical stance has been a strategic balancing, with the West on one hand, and Russia/China on the other; this complicates procurement. Regardless, it is in India’s interest to do what is best in its long-term security interests, and a very strong case can be made that procurement of the Su-57 is in India’s best interests.

What India should aim for

India needs numbers, not boutique fleets. Small batches of each type — Jag/Mirage/MiG-29/Su-30/Rafale/Su-57 — increase logistics complexity without mass.

A credible path could look like this:

1. Keep legacy fleets operational safely as long as possible.
2. Build Tejas Mk-1A in volume; accelerate Mk-2 development.
3. Push GE for timely F404/F414 deliveries while fast-tracking Kaveri maturation.
4. Pursue a Su-57 production negotiation, contingent on deep ToT and sovereign integration rights.
5. Execute Super-Sukhoi upgrades rapidly.
6. Commit to long-term indigenous mass production: e.g., 150–200 Tejas Mk-1A, 200 Mk-2, 200 AMCA over life-cycle, not token orders.
7. Use the momentum to advance toward a 6th-gen program.

Only then can India realistically reach 42 squadrons, and eventually 55.

Importantly, India cannot afford gaps in airpower — what we truly cannot afford is delay.

About the Author

Col Ashwin Baindur (Retd) is a veteran combat engineer. He is a member of the Current and Strategic Affairs Forum (CASA) and the United Services Institution (USI).

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By: Cdr Kalesh Mohanan

The Naval War College (NWC), located in Goa, stands as a cornerstone in India’s maritime strategic ecosystem. As a premier institution of the Indian Navy, it plays a critical role not only in shaping the leadership capabilities of senior officers within the Indian Armed Forces, but also in fostering regional maritime cooperation through its extensive engagement with foreign naval forces. Established with the vision of enhancing strategic and operational acumen, the NWC today serves as a hub for intellectual and diplomatic exchange in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Through its advanced academic programs, collaborative courses for international officers, and high-level symposiums, the college contributes significantly to regional security and naval diplomacy.

The Naval War College operates under the Southern Naval Command—the Indian Navy’s principal training command—and forms one of the three primary war colleges in India. Alongside the Army War College in Mhow and the College of Air Warfare, the NWC represents the tri-services approach to military education and strategic development. However, what distinguishes the NWC is its strong maritime focus and its unique positioning in Goa, a coastal state that symbolises India’s naval heritage and operational reach in the Arabian Sea.

The origins of the Naval War College trace back to 17 September 1988, when it was initially established as the College of Naval Warfare (CNW) at Karanja, Mumbai. It began its academic journey with the inauguration of the Naval Higher Command Course (NHCC) in the same year, aimed at preparing Indian naval officers for higher leadership roles. In 1994, the Technical Management Course (TMC) was introduced, reflecting the increasing need for technically sound and managerially skilled officers in the Navy. As part of a broader reorganisation, the Naval Academy was shifted to Ezhimala in Kerala, prompting the relocation of CNW to Goa. In August 2010, CNW was formally renamed the Naval War College, and the move to its present location in Goa was completed in August 2011. The new Naval War College building was inaugurated on 04 March 2024 by Shri Rajnath Singh, the Defence Minister.

Today, the NWC offers a structured academic curriculum tailored to the evolving demands of maritime security and regional defence cooperation. The flagship offering, the Naval Higher Command Course (NHCC), runs for 42 weeks and is attended by mid-career officers—Captains, Colonels, Group Captains and Commandants—from the Indian Navy, Army, Air Force and Coast Guard. The course focuses on developing strategic thinking, operational planning skills, and inter-service cooperation, preparing officers for higher command appointments within the armed forces. Participants of the NHCC also receive a MA(Hons) in Defence and Strategic Studies from the University of Mumbai, cementing the course’s academic rigor and recognition.

Complementing the NHCC is the Maritime Security Course (MSC), an eight-week program specifically designed for officers of Friendly Foreign Countries (FFCs). Participants typically include officers of the rank of Colonel, Captain, or Group Captain from countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Maldives, Seychelles and Oman. The course emphasizes cooperative strategies in maritime security, information-sharing mechanisms, and capacity-building, thus fostering trust and interoperability among regional naval forces. This platform not only strengthens bilateral and multilateral ties but also reinforces India’s position as a net security provider in the IOR.

The Naval Staff and Technical Management Course (NSTMC) is a distinguished programme that underscores the Navy’s dedication to technological proficiency and leadership development. Conducted over a duration of 24 weeks in collaboration with the Jamnalal Bajaj Institute of Management Studies (JBIMS) and University of Mumbai, the course awards participating officers of the rank of Commander a Post Graduate Diploma in Management Studies (PGDMS) and a Master of Arts in Maritime and Management Studies. The curriculum integrates advanced technical training with contemporary management principles, equipping officers for senior staff appointments in the domains of logistics, maintenance, and operational readiness.

Beyond formal academic courses, the Naval War College has emerged as a vibrant center for dialogue, research, and regional cooperation through its international events. The Goa Maritime Conclave (GMC) and Goa Maritime Symposium (GMS) are two flagship initiatives that provide a diplomatic and strategic forum for maritime nations of the IOR. These events bring together chiefs of navies, senior officials, and scholars from across the region to deliberate on shared challenges such as piracy, maritime terrorism, disaster response, and freedom of navigation. The themes of these conclaves reflect real-world concerns and help shape a common understanding of maritime governance.

Equally significant is the NWC’s participation in faculty exchange programs with other major international naval institutions, such as the Naval War College in the United States, Tokyo, and Myanmar. These academic linkages facilitate cross-cultural military education, joint research, and shared pedagogical methods. Through such exchanges, Indian naval officers gain insights into global best practices, while the visiting faculty experience India’s regional maritime perspectives. These academic and strategic bridges are crucial for maintaining long-term partnerships and operational compatibility in multilateral missions.

The College also hosts the annual Commanders’ Conclave, a high-level event attended by the Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag Officers Commanding-in-Chief from all major naval commands, including the Western, Eastern, Southern, and Andaman and Nicobar Commands. This event serves as an internal platform for reviewing strategic doctrines, operational readiness, and future planning. It highlights the central role that the NWC plays not just in education but in shaping the Navy’s strategic trajectory.

Through its diverse offerings and initiatives, the Naval War College, Goa, has established itself as more than just a training institute. It functions as a strategic asset, contributing to India’s maritime diplomacy, capacity-building among regional partners, and intellectual leadership in naval warfare and strategy. In a region marked by shifting geopolitical dynamics and increasing maritime competition, the importance of such an institution cannot be overstated.

By consistently attracting international participants and facilitating meaningful maritime dialogue, the NWC strengthens regional frameworks for cooperation and mutual security. Its courses for foreign officers and multinational events are a testament to India’s commitment to fostering a secure, stable, and rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, the Naval War College not only enhances the professional capabilities of its students but also reinforces India’s role as a responsible and influential maritime power.

In summary, the Naval War College, Goa, plays a vital role in maintaining and advancing regional maritime cooperation. Its history reflects a legacy of adaptation and growth, while its courses and events address contemporary challenges with strategic foresight. Whether through its educational programs for Indian officers, training engagements with foreign navies, or the hosting of regional maritime dialogues, the NWC continues to serve as a beacon of knowledge, partnership, and security in the maritime domain.

By: Capt Vikas Anand, Indian Navy

The Indian Navy owes its origins to the warrant from the Lord High Admiral which authorised combatant status to the erstwhile Indian Marine on 01 May 1830. From the humble beginnings in the late 19^th century, the (Royal) Indian Navy experienced phenomenal expansion during the Second World War. The expansion continued post-Independence, and the Indian Navy has grown in strength to become the formidable force that we know today.

Despite this incredible progress over the years, one question looms in the minds of many Indians – What does the Indian Navy do?

To a layman, the difference between Merchant Navy, which has become a sought-after career option for many youngsters, and the lesser exposed Indian Navy, may not be very apparent. This article is aimed towards simplifying the understanding of Indian Navy’s role, and highlight the major differences between Indian Navy and Merchant Navy.

In very simple terms, Merchant Navy does at sea, what the trucks do on the roads, that is, transport items from one place to the other. The items carried by Merchant Vessels or Merchant Ships can vary from food products like rice, wheat grains, pulses, & packaged and canned food to household products like electronics, furniture, clothes, shoes, mobile phones etc. In addition, the Merchant Tankers, which are specialised Merchant Ships, carry fuel oil, coal, LPG, CNG, and other fuel products. The Merchant Shipping industry acts as a prime mover of the country’s trade, since 95% of India’s trade by volume and 70% by value is conducted via sea. Thus, the contribution of Merchant Shipping for the economic growth of the country is humongous. Owing to this importance, there is a need to secure the trade through the sea. And this is where the Indian Navy comes in.

The Indian Navy is responsible for seaward defence of the nation, which is undertaken primarily through the warships, capable of carrying weapons, including missiles of varying ranges, and aircraft. The Indian Naval Ships patrol waters around the country to thwart any Maritime Security incident in the area, including attack on trade bound to/ from India. Other types of Maritime Security incidents include, but are not limited to, anti-piracy operations, anti-hijack operations, Search and Rescue Operations (saving lives at sea), etc. The Indian Navy is also the first responder in case of any natural calamity in the Indian Ocean Region, and the deployed Indian Naval ships are always ready to provide support in such a scenario. These include the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations post calamities like a cyclone, flood, earthquake or Tsunami, as also providing assistance to civil administration to save lives of the citizens.

While the Merchant Navy is all about ships, Indian Navy includes ships, submarines and aircraft, in its arsenal. And each of these assets are further sub-divided into various classes of ships, submarines, helicopters, patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, and UAVs. The one factor common to all Merchant Navy assets is that all Merchant ships carry different types of cargo all over the world. However, the one common thread binding all assets of Indian Navy is the responsibility of defence of the nation. All of the Indian Navy’s assets are deployed to ensure safety and security of seafarers, and the seas around them.

Over the last few decades, personnel from across the length and breadth of the country have joined Indian Navy, and this has improved the understanding of work done by Indian Navy. The misnomer about the number of sailing days, which was prevalent in the yesteryears about Indian Navy – six months onboard the ship(s), and six months at home, has also been addressed owing to the improvements in awareness levels as also due to ingress of social media.

The Indian Navy, like any other Defence Force, is up, about and ticking 24X7. Indian Naval ships sail for specific missions, of different durations, and the crew is granted leave or is turned around depending upon the mission. Whilst in harbour, the ship becomes a place of work, where personnel work during the working hours, and return home to their families in the evening. Additionally, the ship also acts like a home to the non-married personnel, who have their earmarked living spaces within the ship. Thus, while the personnel work on the ship whilst in harbour, they work as well as stay on the ship when the ship is sailing.

Let me come back to the main question – What does the Indian Navy do?

The primary purpose of the Indian Navy is to prevent war and conflict. However, in case they occur, the Indian Navy would play a decisive role in bringing them to an early and favourable conclusion. The Indian Navy is the principal manifestation of India’s maritime power, while playing a central role in safeguarding and promoting her security and national interests in the maritime domain.

But, how is it done?

Indian Naval assets are deployed in the waters not only around India, but around the world. At any point of time, a number of Indian Naval Ships, submarines and aircraft are sailing or flying at sea, either securing the waters around the country, or providing assistance to areas which have suffered a natural calamity, or engaging with navies around the world, to enhance maritime cooperation with the friendly foreign countries. And all this is possible only due to the sincere men and women working tirelessly, in the middle of the ocean for days together, with the sole aim of keeping the seas around the country safe and secure.

So, the next time you see a ship, submarine or aircraft with the markings of Indian Navy, or any person donning the white uniform of Indian Navy, remember that they are the silent naval warriors who brave the mighty seas, to ensure peace on land.

Sam No Varunah

By: Lt Cdr Deepak Sharma

Every year on 04 December, India pauses to honour the men and women in Whites, who guard our seas; often far from our sight, yet never far from our nation’s heartbeat. We commemorate the Indian Navy’s daring Operation Trident in the 1971 War, when our forces struck Karachi harbour and showed the world what courage at sea looks like.  Indian Navy Day is more than a ceremonial date; it is a reminder of how deeply the Navy is interwoven into our national security, economic vitality, and global identity. As we commemorate Navy Day 2025, it feels especially meaningful to reflect not just on past victories, but on how the Indian Navy is shaping the future of the Indian Ocean Region, and with it, India’s destiny.

India’s Strategic Position: A Nation at the Centre of the Indian Ocean

India sits like a keystone in the vast Indian Ocean astride one of the world’s most important maritime highways. Nearly $5 trillion worth of global trade passes through this region every year. For India specifically, over 90% of our trade by volume and approximately 70% by value is carried by sea. These aren’t just abstract numbers. They represent the energy that fuels our cities, the raw materials powering our industries, food and essentials to sustain our people and more importantly, the exports that carry the “Made in India” brand to the world. With such enormous economic stakes riding on the ocean, the Indian Navy doesn’t merely defend our shores—it safeguards our economic bloodstream.

Indian Navy: Guardian of Trade, Anchor of Stability

In the vastness of the Indian Ocean, threats do not always appear in the form of conventional enemies. Piracy, illegal trafficking, maritime terrorism, and hostile interference can choke trade routes and disrupt economies. This is where the Indian Navy’s commitment stands out. Be it anti-piracy patrols escorting merchant vessels in high-risk areas or mission-based deployments ensuring 24/7 presence across choke points like the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait or humanitarian assistance missions, the Navy has repeatedly proven why India is considered the Preferred Security Partner in the Indian Ocean.

Championing a Rule-Based Order and Free Seas

The world’s maritime economy depends on the assurance that the seas will remain open, safe, and governed by international law. India’s vision, therefore, is clear; freedom of navigation, respect for UNCLOS and international maritime norms and open sea routes free from coercion and conflict. The Indian Navy’s presence reinforces this rule-based order, ensuring that no state or non-state actor disrupts the lifelines of global commerce.

SAGAR: Security And Growth for All in the Region

Guiding this maritime philosophy is the SAGAR doctrine,India’s vision for inclusive cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region is focused on collective security of the region in partnership with like-minded maritime neighbours, humanitarian aid and disaster relief in times of crisis, capacity building and training towards collective growth and shared prosperity.  SAGAR is not merely a policy; it is the foundation of India’s maritime outlook, finding practical expression in the everyday operations of the Indian Navy.

IFC-IOR and IFC Singapore: Quiet Heroes Behind Maritime Safety

Today, maritime security is as much about information power as naval power. A big part of making this happen on ground (or should we say, on the waves) are hubs like the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram and its close collaboration with the IFC in Singapore. These aren’t flashy centres, yet, they are the eyes, ears and brains behind the naval operations. IFC-IOR fuses data from satellites, radars, and partner nations to create a real-time picture of what’s happening at sea – spotting suspicious vessels, warning about storms, or coordinating rescues. Linked with Singapore’s IFC, they share “white shipping” information (peaceful maritime traffic), disseminate alerts to mariners, and cue quick responses to threats. Whether it’s a fishing boat in distress or a potential piracy incident, these centres help coordinate operations across borders. The result? Safer merchant marine – those hardworking cargo ships and their crews that are truly the backbone of global and Indian economy.

The Growing Responsibility of the Indian Navy

As India rises in economic stature, its maritime responsibilities naturally expand.A stronger India means not just a larger share of global trade but also deeper strategic interests across the Indo-Pacific besides meeting expectations of our international partners and neighbours to ensure maritime safety. From supporting Sri Lanka during crises to aiding Maldives and Seychelles with maritime awareness, the Indian Navy has consistently stepped forward; not as a dominant power, but as a dependable partner. As the world becomes more dynamic than ever before, India is poised to play a prominent role in the Indian Ocean Region. The Navy’s role becomes even more central in this endeavour of contribution towards ensuring safe seas not just for India, but for the wider Indo-Pacific.

A Timeless Reminder

Perhaps the importance of the Navy is best captured in the words of Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of the Naval Staff: “The necessity of a navy… springs from the existence of peaceful shipping”.This simple truth resonates powerfully today as our nation’s prosperity sails on the shoulders of those who guard our oceans.

Celebrating Courage, Commitment, and Vision

On this Navy Day, we honour not only the operational brilliance of the Indian Navy, but also its quiet, steadfast contribution to India’s economic strength, regional stability, and global credibility. Let’s raise a toast (or a coconut water, if you’re on duty!) to our sailors. As we look toward a future of greater trade, deeper partnerships, and higher aspirations, one thing is certain; the Indian Navy will continue to be the shield that protects our seas and the anchor that steadies our rise.

By: Lt Cdr Devinder Singh

Every year on 4 December, Indian Navy Day gives us a chance to reflect not just on ships, sailors, and operations, but also on the relationships and partnerships, that make the seas safer and the region stronger. This year, as I celebrate Indian Navy Day in Singapore, away from my home shores, the day has a different meaning. Celebrating it here with colleagues from the Republic of Singapore Navy, feels both familiar and special.

A Partnership Anchored in Training

Many Singaporeans may recognise the Indian Navy from ships frequently visiting Changi Naval Base or from the long-running SIMBEX exercise. However, fewer may know that since 1999, India has had a military training presence at SAFTI Military Institute (MI). For 25 years, Indian Navy officers have rotated through, becoming part of the training ecosystem and shaping young RSN officers.

This partnership has matured steadily over time. In classrooms, field exercises, and everyday conversations between instructors and cadets, the India–Singapore defence relationship has grown not through grand gestures, but through shared lessons, mutual respect, and consistent training. For an officer, standing in a SAFTI MI classroom wearing Indian Navy uniform and teaching future RSN leaders reminds us of how intertwined our maritime stories are. It also reflects something Singaporeans understand well: Training builds Trust.

At Sea Together: MSTD

Another vivid example of this trust is the Midshipman Sea Training Deployment (MSTD). Each year, a junior Indian Naval officer joins an RSN ship as midshipmen; budding footsteps towards their sea journey. They train, learn, and navigate together, often forming friendships that last beyond the deployment. Singaporeans appreciate the pride the RSN has in the Midshipman Course. For an Indian officer to be invited into that experience each year shows the confidence built over decades. In 2026, the deployment will take a significant step forward as Indian Navy Instructor deputed at SAFTI will also participate in MSTD. This role is a quiet acknowledgment that both navies trust each other enough to share not just ships and training programs, but also mentorship responsibilities. Collaborating on a ship’s bridge wing while watching midshipmen apply their lessons adds a new layer to our cooperation.

Strengthening Instruction Together

Another important step this year is the opportunity for the Indian Instructor at SAFTI MI to attend the SAF Instructor Course at the Institute of Military Learning. Anyone who has trained in Singapore recognises the SAF’s reputation for clarity, structure, and rigour in teaching. Being invited into that system shows both professional goodwill and a sense of belonging, as Indian officers here are contributors to a shared training environment, and not just guests. While this harmony may seem small at a glance, it has a big impact. It creates a smoother training experience for officer cadets and strengthens the interoperability of both navies long before they operate together at sea.

Why it Matters

These initiatives, participation in MSTD, the SAF Instructor Course, and the ongoing presence at SAFTI Military Institute, may seem just another training engagement when seen from India, but their significance here in Singapore is worth noting. Singapore and India are maritime nations by nature. Both are located near key international sea lanes and rely on the security and freedom of navigation in the high seas. Both countries also view security and stability in the Indo-Pacific as a shared responsibility. When two navies work together in classrooms, on training grounds, and at sea, they do more than exchange skills. They shape generations of officers who instinctively understand each other, officers who, years later, may command ships operating together in real missions.

A Singapore Experience

Serving in Singapore as an Indian Naval Instructor at SAFTI-MI has provided me a close-up view of this partnership. You notice the professionalism of RSN officers, the curiosity of midshipmen eager to learn how another navy approaches the profession of naval sea faring, and the genuine warmth that Singaporeans show to foreign officers living and training among them. As I get ready to join MSTD as an Instructor, I look forward not just to the sea time, but also experience how Singaporean midshipmen put their shore-based learning into practice. It’s a reminder that naval training, whether in India or Singapore, rests on a shared foundation of mentorship, discipline, and respect for the sea.

Celebrating Navy Day from a Different Shore

Observing Indian Navy Day from Singapore underscores a fundamental truth: Naval service extends far beyond Territorial waters. It is about building enduring partnerships, forging trust, and sustaining the security and stability of the maritime domain. The 25-year presence of Indian naval instructors at SAFTI MI is more than a training exchange; it is a tangible symbol of the professional cohesion and mutual confidence between India and Singapore. Navy Day reminds us that the real strength of a Navy is measured not only in ships or firepower, but in the relationships, shared values, and partnerships that safeguard the seas for all nations. To everyone who works at sea, trains those who go to sea, or supports them from home, this day is as much a tribute to their role in keeping our oceans safe, open, and peaceful.

By: Cdr Kalesh Mohanan

The Chola dynasty emerged as a dominant force in South India during the medieval period, ascending to imperial heights under the leadership of monarchs such as Rajaraja Chola I (985–1014 CE) and his successor Rajendra Chola I (1014–1044 CE). From the late 9th century onward, the Cholas transformed from a regional Tamil kingdom into an expansive empire that exercised both territorial and maritime dominance. Central to their ascendancy was a highly organized administrative system, military efficiency, and most crucially, a formidable navy. This naval force not only defended coastal territories but also enabled overseas expeditions, culminating in the audacious campaign against the Srivijaya Empire in 1025 CE.

This military undertaking marked a watershed moment in Asian history. It was the first major Indian naval expedition that successfully projected hard power across the Bay of Bengal and deep into Southeast Asia. The campaign was not merely an exercise in conquest; it was underpinned by economic imperatives and strategic calculations. At its core, the Chola expedition was a response to rising constraints on Tamil commercial interests and a bold attempt to reshape the balance of power in maritime Asia.

By the early 11th century, the Cholas had established complete hegemony over peninsular India, stretching their influence from the eastern Deccan to the Coromandel Coast. With their land frontiers secured, they turned seaward. The Chola navy was one of the most advanced of its time, boasting large fleets capable of transoceanic voyages. These naval capabilities were not limited to warfare; they were intricately tied to commerce, diplomacy, and cultural dissemination.

The Bay of Bengal, a critical maritime highway connecting India with Southeast Asia and China, became the arena of Chola maritime engagement. Tamil merchant guilds—such as the Ayyavole, Manigramam, and Ainnurruvar—had long operated along these sea routes, establishing commercial enclaves across ports in Sri Lanka, the Malay Peninsula, and the Indonesian archipelago. However, their trading networks increasingly faced obstacles from Srivijaya, a powerful maritime empire based in Sumatra.

Srivijaya controlled vital choke points, most notably the Strait of Malacca, which served as the primary conduit for maritime trade between India, China, and the Islamic world. The kingdom leveraged its geographic position to impose tolls on merchant vessels and demanded that ships reroute through its ports. Indian merchants, particularly from Tamil Nadu, were often coerced—through maritime intermediaries such as the Orang Laut (sea people)—to dock at Srivijayan harbors, redirecting profits toward Palembang, the Srivijayan capital.

This systematic obstruction of Tamil commercial activity led to growing tensions. Scholars such as K.A. Nilakanta Sastri have argued that the Chola campaign was motivated more by economic retaliation than imperial expansion. The interference in trade routes posed a direct threat to Tamil merchant guilds, who were integral to the Chola economy. The Chola rulers, keen to protect these networks and assert dominance over critical sea lanes, saw military action as a necessary intervention.

In 1025 CE, Rajendra Chola I launched a massive naval expedition that would become one of the most sophisticated maritime operations of the medieval world. Chola inscriptions describe this undertaking with pride, referencing the deployment of “many ships in the midst of the rolling sea.” The campaign was notable for its logistical audacity and strategic ingenuity.

The Cholas employed diversionary tactics to confuse Srivijayan defenses. A secondary squadron was sent toward the northern reaches of the Strait of Malacca to create a false sense of threat, prompting Srivijaya to mobilize its forces in that direction. Meanwhile, the primary fleet sailed along the western coast of Sumatra, passed through the Sunda Strait, and launched a surprise attack on Palembang from the south. This route avoided heavily fortified areas and exploited the element of surprise—a rare feat in premodern naval warfare.

Inscriptions from the period list over a dozen port cities raided during the campaign, including Palembang (Srivijaya’s capital), Kadaram (modern-day Kedah, Malaysia), Pannai, Malaiyur (Jambi), Mevilimbangam, Talaittakkolam, and Mappapalam, among others. These cities were located across Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Myanmar, and the Nicobar Islands. The campaign led to the capture of King Sangrama Vijayatunggavarman of Srivijaya, along with elephants, treasures, and symbolic artifacts such as the jewelled war-gate, Vidyadhara-torana.

The Cholas did not attempt to establish lasting administrative control over these regions. Instead, their goal was to dismantle Srivijaya’s stranglehold over sea routes, humiliate its leadership, and open access for Tamil merchants. While Srivijaya continued to exist after the raids, its maritime supremacy was permanently weakened, creating space for emerging regional powers like the Khmer Empire in Cambodia and the Javanese state of Kahuripan.

Despite the military aggression, trade resumed relatively quickly. Chinese records from the Song dynasty indicate the arrival of Srivijayan emissaries in China as early as 1028 CE, only three years after the invasion. However, the balance of power had shifted. Tamil merchant guilds, emboldened by the Chola victory, expanded their reach across Southeast Asia. For the next century, they maintained significant commercial and cultural influence in key ports.

Archaeological and epigraphic evidence supports this narrative. Tamil inscriptions have been discovered in Kedah, Palembang, and Jambi. Artifacts and temple remains in these regions show stylistic features characteristic of South Indian architecture. Tamil loanwords entered local languages, and Tamil merchant settlements became integrated into the fabric of Southeast Asian port life.

This period also witnessed an increase in cultural and religious exchanges. While military in nature, the Chola intervention did not disrupt the longstanding flow of religious and philosophical ideas. On the contrary, Tamil Shaivism and Vaishnavism continued to spread alongside Mahayana Buddhism, contributing to the syncretic religious landscapes of Southeast Asia.

Historians remain divided on the underlying motives of the 1025 expedition. Early scholars such as G.W. Spencer interpreted the campaign as a classic case of imperial overreach—a desire to project Chola sovereignty across the sea. In contrast, more recent analyses emphasize the economic dimensions, viewing the campaign as a reaction to Srivijayan harassment of Indian traders.

Supporting this economic thesis, Chinese sources such as Zhufan zhi note Srivijayan acts of piracy and coercion directed at vessels bypassing their ports. These incidents, seen as economic provocations, suggest that the Cholas were not seeking territorial conquest, but rather the protection of trade routes vital to their polity.

Regardless of the lens through which the campaign is viewed, its consequences were far-reaching. It marked a shift from soft cultural influence to hard military projection. It demonstrated the capacity of an Indian polity to undertake long-range naval operations—a feat rare in ancient and medieval history.

In 2025, India commemorated the millennium of Rajendra Chola’s naval expedition with a series of national celebrations. Events included cultural exhibitions at Gangaikonda Cholapuram (the imperial capital), the release of a ₹1,000 silver commemorative coin, and a renewed focus on maritime history in Tamil Nadu’s tourism initiatives.

These celebrations were not merely historical tributes. They were framed within the context of contemporary strategic narratives, particularly India’s “Act East” policy and its Indo-Pacific maritime strategy. The Chola legacy was invoked to underline themes of ancient connectivity, maritime sovereignty, and regional engagement with ASEAN nations.

The campaign has also served as a case study in maritime strategy. Analysts highlight how the Cholas understood and exploited maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca—insights that remain relevant for present-day India’s naval doctrine. The strategic use of monsoon winds, navigational skill, and synchronised fleet movement offer valuable lessons in premodern logistics and planning.

Furthermore, the Chola model of decentralised governance—through local village assemblies (sabhas and urs)—has been cited in policy discussions on participatory governance and administrative reform. It illustrates how a strong central authority can coexist with local autonomy, a concept increasingly pertinent in discussions of federalism and rural empowerment.

The Chola naval expedition to Kadaram in 1025 CE represents the pinnacle of medieval South Indian maritime ambition. It was an unprecedented assertion of state power across the seas, executed with precision and strategic foresight. The campaign disrupted Srivijaya’s regional monopoly, safeguarded Tamil commercial interests, and paved the way for a century of Tamil economic and cultural prominence in Southeast Asia.

It also marked a departure from centuries of peaceful exchange to an era where military force became an accepted tool in regional geopolitics. Yet the Cholas did not seek territorial annexation. Their goal was pragmatic—ensuring free access to trade corridors, defending economic interests, and elevating prestige.

In modern times, the expedition stands as a reminder of the enduring link between maritime power and national influence. It underscores how strategic vision, technological adaptation, and commercial protection can coalesce into effective policy—principles as relevant today as they were a millennium ago.

Most importantly, the legacy of the Chola expedition should be appreciated not through the lens of cultural supremacy, but as a testament to the complex interplay between trade, diplomacy, warfare, and cultural exchange in shaping the history of the Indian Ocean world.