By: Brigadier Anil John Alfred Pereira, SM (Retd)

As the geopolitical sands shift, India’s commitment must be to nurture the belief that true security and stature are earned, not gifted.

On May 10, 2025, just 88 hours after India launched Operation Sindoor, Pakistan stood battered militarily, humiliated diplomatically, and economically cornered. Precision Indian strikes damaged forward air bases, destroyed key terrorist infrastructure deep inside Pakistan, and exposed glaring failures in Chinese supplied radars and early warning systems. Public morale sank as the military brass scrambled to contain the fallout, painfully aware that their “iron brother” China had offered no overt support when it was needed most. Desperate to stave off collapse, Islamabad turned back to an old patron the United States.

American Lifeline

The United States stepped in with President Trump personally announcing the ceasefire to the world. Emergency packages from the IMF and World Bank stabilised Pakistan’s teetering economy and prevented default. Washington also fast-tracked the long-stalled F-16 upgrade and maintenance programme, shoring up Pakistan’s air combat readiness despite heavy losses. In a symbolic show of renewed favour, Pakistan’s Army Chief, Asim Munir, was elevated to Field Marshal. He was then welcomed to Washington for high-level talks with the US President signalling to the world that once again, America would not let Pakistan fail.

A History of Patronage

This rekindled embrace is hardly new. Post-independence in 1947, Pakistan quickly positioned itself as America’s frontline ally against Soviet expansion, receiving billions in military aid, modern weaponry, and economic support that propped up its fragile economy and emboldened its wars against India in 1965 and 1971. Washington’s patronage fuelled Pakistan military’s obsession with strategic parity with India and cemented a dependency that made the US a pillar of Islamabad’s regional leverage until trust ruptured dramatically after 9/11 when Osama bin Laden was found sheltered in Abbottabad under Pakistan’s protection.

‘Iron Brother’ Steps In

Disgraced in the eyes of the West, Pakistan pivoted to China, cultivating an ‘all-weather friendship’ romanticised as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the sea.” This was more than rhetoric with Beijing investing over US$ 60 billion through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), transforming roads, railways, ports like Gwadar, and vital energy infrastructure. China became Pakistan’s largest arms supplier, providing nearly 80% of its modern weapon systems and steady diplomatic support in global forums. For two decades, China’s loans and largesse underwrote Pakistan’s economy and reinforced its leverage against India, filling the vacuum left by a wary West.

Operation Sindoor Exposes Cracks in Sino-Pak Nexus

However, Operation Sindoor starkly revealed the limits of this ‘iron brotherhood’. As Indian jets struck deep and airbases were damaged, Beijing offered no intervention, leaving Islamabad to fend for itself. This betrayal forced Pakistan back into America’s arms, highlighting an uncomfortable truth in Pakistan’s eyes, allies may change, but national survival demands constant courtship of stronger powers.

Impact on India

For India, Washington’s swift rescue of Pakistan, reopened old wounds. The supposedly US brokered ceasefire, financial bailouts, and revival of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet are seen in New Delhi as undermining of India’s gains and a validation of Pakistan’s disruptive tactics. Meanwhile, India’s deep defence and energy ties with Russia, refusal to commit to American F-16 and F-35 jets, and repeated delays in critical US supplies such as the GE-414 engines for India’s indigenous fighter project, Apache helicopters, MQ9 drones etc have compounded frustrations. Many in India now question whether Washington truly prioritises India’s security interests over Pakistan.

India’s immediate neighbourhood is also turning into a chessboard for Chinese and American influence. China is tightening its grip on Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and the Maldives through loans, mega projects, and diplomatic cover often targeting regimes weary of India’s might. The US, eager to check Beijing’s Belt and Road footprint, has stepped up its own outreach with aid, training, and security pacts. This double courtship has emboldened smaller neighbours to play both sides, fuelling subtle anti-India sentiment and eroding India’s natural regional leadership

India’s Road Ahead: Self-Reliance and Strategic Maturity

In an age of shifting alliances and great power rivalries, India’s clearest lesson is this that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only enduring national interests. To thrive securely, India must double down on indigenous defence production, strengthen economic resilience, and diversify critical supply chains. Diplomatic agility will be key to deepening trusted partnerships while preserving strategic autonomy to avoid becoming a pawn in someone else’s game. Equally vital is restoring neighbourhood goodwill through connectivity, fair economic ties, and respectful diplomacy to outcompete China’s chequebook and America’s overtures. India must also harden its cyber frontiers, invest in technological innovation, and build robust information warfare capabilities to protect its narrative space.

Security Earned, Not Gifted

As the sands of geopolitics shift once more, India must remember that true security and global stature as Viksit Bharat are built from within by nurturing self-belief, investing in capability and capacity, and putting national interests above fleeting friendships. Only then can India stand steady in an uncertain world, secure in the knowledge that its destiny is determined at home, not dictated abroad. As the geopolitical sands shift, India’s commitment must be to itself first nurturing the belief that true security and stature are earned, not gifted.

By: Sonalika Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The G7 is an informal bloc of industrialized democracies, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, that meets annually to discuss pressing global issues such as economic governance, international security, and, more recently, artificial intelligence (AI). Originally originated in 1975, when the United States, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany formed the Group of Six to coordinate their response to economic turmoil, including inflation and a recession caused by the OPEC oil embargo. Canada joined in 1976, and Cold War politics soon became part of the group’s agenda.

The European Union has participated fully in G7 meetings since 1981 as a “nonremunerated” member, represented by the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. While there are no formal membership criteria, all G7 members are high-income democracies. As of 2025, the combined GDP of the G7 countries (excluding the EU) were approximately 44% of global nominal GDP and approximately 10% of the world’s population.

Unlike organizations such as the United Nations or NATO, the G7 is not a formal institution. It lacks a charter and a permanent secretariat. The rotating presidency sets each year’s agenda and manages summit logistics. Policy development is coordinated in advance through meetings of ministers and envoys known as sherpas. Nonmember countries are sometimes invited to attend.

The G7’s future has faced growing challenges, particularly due to tensions with Russia, formerly a member from 1998 until its suspension in 2014 following the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and increasingly with China. Internal disagreements over trade and climate policies have also tested the group’s cohesion. Nonetheless, shared concerns about Moscow and Beijing have fostered renewed unity. In a sign of closer cooperation, the G7 has coordinated sanctions against Russia in response to its war in Ukraine and launched a major global infrastructure investment initiative to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Russia joined the G7 in 1998, transforming it into the G8. Then U.S. President Bill Clinton believed that membership would grant Russia international legitimacy and encourage its post-Soviet leader, Boris Yeltsin, to align more closely with Western democracies. Clinton also hoped it would ease Russia’s concerns over NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe.

However, the move sparked concerns particularly among finance ministries due to Russia’s weak economy and high public debt. Over time, Russia’s drift toward authoritarianism under President Vladimir Putin led to growing tensions with G7 members. The turning point came in 2014, when Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea region. In response, it was indefinitely suspended from the group. Relations further deteriorated over Russia’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad especially after chemical attacks attributed to Assad’s forces and over interference in U.S. and European elections.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 significantly deepened its international isolation, prompting the G7 countries to impose unprecedented sanctions, including phasing out imports of Russian oil and gas, barring Russian banks from transacting in U.S. dollars and euros, and implementing export controls aimed at weakening Russia’s military capabilities.

Additionally, G7 members have provided substantial financial and military support to Ukraine, collectively contributing hundreds of billions of dollars. In 2025, they also agreed to loan Ukraine $50 billion, using windfall profits from frozen Russian assets as collateral.

The 51st G7 Summit the group’s 57th annual meeting was held from June 15 to 17, 2025, in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada. It was the second summit hosted in Kananaskis since the 28th G8 Summit in 2002 and the seventh overall to be held in Canada. Canada previously hosted six G7 summits and joined the group in 1976, alongside France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to coordinate responses to global economic and political crises. The European Union was invited to participate starting in 1977.

Canada assumed the presidency of the G7 for the seventh time on January 1, 2025, and is hosting the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, from June 15 to 17, 2025. This high-level event provides an opportunity for G7 member countries and invited guests to discuss some of the world’s most urgent challenges, including international peace and security, global economic stability, and the ongoing digital transition. Canada’s presidency is centered around three main priorities: protecting communities both at home and abroad, building energy security while accelerating the digital transition, and securing long-term, future-focused partnerships.

The G7 is a consensus-based grouping that operates without a formal treaty or permanent secretariat. The G7 presidency rotates annually among the seven member countries in the following order: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, with the European Union participating fully but not holding the rotating presidency. Each year, the presiding country sets the G7’s priorities and organizes the Leaders’ Summit, as well as ministerial meetings and related events. The number and type of these ministerial meetings are determined by the host country, and they typically conclude with joint communiqués or action plans. Although the annual summit and ministerial meetings are the most prominent events, the G7 operates continuously throughout the year. Leaders and ministers often convene additional meetings in response to urgent global crises, while expert groups and working-level officials meet regularly to implement commitments made at the high-level meetings.

Independent, non-governmental stakeholder groups known as G7 engagement groups also contribute to the G7 process by submitting annual policy recommendations. These groups often organize their own summits in the months leading up to the G7 Leaders’ Summit. The engagement groups represent various sectors of society, including business, civil society, labor, science, think tanks, women, and youth.

Mark Carney chaired the 51st G7 summit. The 2025 summit marked the first such meetings for European Council President António Costa, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and it was the first G7 summit for U.S. President Donald Trump since the 45th meeting in 2019. It was also the first visit to Canada for Prime Ministers Starmer, Ishiba, Chancellor Merz, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and South Korean President Lee Jae‑myung, while President Trump made his second visit since the 44th G7 summit in 2018.

 Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were attending Canada for the third time. In May, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum was invited and later confirmed that attending remained “a possibility,” and on May 30 Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received an invitation and was expected to attend. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia was invited in June but ultimately declined to participate. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto initially accepted an invitation from Prime Minister Carney but announced on June 12 that he would skip the summit to meet Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and Russian President Vladimir Putin instead.

The core G7 members at the summit included host Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada, President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of Italy, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba of Japan, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, President Donald Trump of the United States, European Council President António Costa, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Invited leaders included Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Korean President Lee Jae‑myung, and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. Representatives from NATO, the United Nations, and the World Bank, Mark Rutte, António Guterres, and Ajay Banga, respectively also attended.

Although not a formal member of the G7, India is increasingly recognized as a powerful and influential global player. Since 2003, India has been regularly invited to participate in G7 Summits as an outreach partner, reflecting its rising economic and geopolitical importance.India has attended outreach sessions at the G7 Summit more than eleven times and has received invitations every year since 2019. This consistent engagement highlights India’s position as the world’s fifth-largest economy and a leading voice for the Global South on critical global issues such as climate change, energy security, and sustainable economic development.

The Canadian Prime Minister’s Office released an event schedule noting that the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting took place in Charlevoix, Quebec, from March 12 to 14, 2025, the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ gathering was held in Banff, Alberta, from May 20 to 22, 2025, and the Leaders’ Summit occurred in Kananaskis Village, Alberta, from June 15 to 17, 2025. During the Charlevoix meeting on March 13, the G7 foreign ministers reached agreements on Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security, regional stability in the Middle East, enhanced security in the Indo-Pacific, resilience-building in Haiti and Venezuela, support for peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and reinforcing sanctions while combating hybrid warfare and sabotage.

On June 14, Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Starmer met in Ottawa, where Starmer remarked en route that “Canada is an independent, sovereign country and a much‑valued member of the Commonwealth” in response to President Trump’s joking threats to annex Canada as the 51st state. That evening, the two leaders dined at Rideau Cottage and watched an NHL game between the Edmonton Oilers and the Florida Panthers. They agreed to establish an Economic and Trade Working Group, deepen the Trade Continuity Agreement, and Carney pledged that Canada would ratify the UK’s accession to the CPTPP. This meeting also marked the first conversation between the two leaders since Israel’s strikes on Iran, which had sparked a diplomatic push led by Starmer aimed at de‑escalating the Middle East crisis.

President Trump met with Chancellor Merz on June 16 but later stated he needed to leave early to manage the U.S. response to the Iran–Israel war, leading him to skip some scheduled meetings. On that same day, G7 leaders issued a joint statement affirming that “Israel has a right to defend itself,” reiterating their support for Israel’s security, and declaring that they regard Iran as “the principal source of regional instability and terror.”

Member nations announced several key outcomes and initiatives, one of the major agreements was the adoption of the Kananaskis Wildfire Charter, which aligns with the commitments outlined in the 2021 Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use to halt and reverse global deforestation and land degradation by 2030. The Charter was notably endorsed by India.

The G7 also launched the Critical Minerals Action Plan, building upon the Five-Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security established during Japan’s G7 Presidency in 2023. India likewise endorsed this new plan, reflecting growing cooperation on resource security beyond the G7. In addition, G7 leaders committed to strengthening the World Bank-led Resilient and Inclusive Supply Chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership, aiming to bolster global supply chain resilience through coordinated investment and collaboration.

The summit included a strong condemnation of transnational repression (TNR), defined as efforts by states or their proxies to intimidate, harass, harm, or coerce individuals and communities outside their national borders. Leaders emphasized that such actions represent a form of foreign interference and must be countered collectively. The G7 also reaffirmed its commitment to prevent and counter migrant smuggling, through the G7 Coalition to Prevent and Counter the Smuggling of Migrants and the 2024 G7 Action Plan addressing this global challenge.

As the 2025 G7 President, Canada launched the G7 GovAI Grand Challenge and announced the creation of a series of “Rapid Solution Labs” aimed at developing innovative, scalable solutions to support the adoption of artificial intelligence in the public sector.Finally, the G7 pledged to work toward closing the global digital divide, aligning their efforts with the objectives of the United Nations Global Digital Compact, and reaffirming their commitment to equitable digital transformation worldwide.

The G7 Summit serves as a vital platform for India to strengthen diplomatic relations, advocate for the interests of the Global South, and contribute to shaping global economic, security, and technological policies.  The next milestone,the 52nd G7 Summit, scheduled for June 2026 in Évian-les-Bains, France will test whether this cautious rebuilding of consensus can lead to sustained, long-term cooperation.

“In Kananaskis, Canada’s Presidency showed that we’re ready to create new international partnerships, deepen alliances, and lead member nations into a new era of global co-operation. Canada has the resources the world wants and the values to which others aspire. Canada is meeting this moment with purpose and strength” stated The Rt. Hon. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada.

By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

In today’s changing world, the strong military partnership between Turkey and Pakistan stands out as a key relationship between two major Muslim nations. While both countries share cultural and religious ties, their military cooperation goes beyond that. It is shaped by history, shared goals, and the need to respond to regional and global challenges together.

This article explains why Turkey supports Pakistan militarily by looking at their historical connections, strategic interests, political systems, and growing defense cooperation.

A History of Military Ties

The friendship between Turkey and Pakistan began soon after Pakistan became independent in 1947. In 1955, both countries joined the Baghdad Pact, later known as CENTO, along with other U.S.-allied countries. This marked the beginning of their military relationship based on collective security during the Cold War.

Turkey helped Pakistan gain access to Western military aid in the 1950s. One study from that period highlights how Turkey supported a broader defense partnership with Pakistan and other Muslim nations in the region.

Since then, Turkey has supported Pakistan during major conflicts with India, and Pakistan has backed Turkey on issues such as Northern Cyprus. This mutual support shows how military cooperation also reflects political solidarity.

Similar Military and Political Backgrounds

Turkey and Pakistan both have a history of strong military influence in their politics. In both countries, the armed forces have played leading roles in shaping national policy, often stepping in during political crises. Scholars point out that in both countries, the military has seen itself as a protector of national identity secularism in Turkey, and Islamic nationalism in Pakistan.

Because their military institutions have similar roles, this makes it easier for both countries to cooperate, exchange training, and understand each other’s defense strategies.

Defense Production and Technology Sharing

In recent years, Turkey and Pakistan have taken big steps toward working together on defense production and military modernization:

• Naval Projects: Pakistan signed a US$ 1.5 billion deal with Turkey in 2018 to buy four MILGEM-class warships. These ships are being partly built in Karachi, showing Turkey’s willingness to share military technology.

• Helicopters and Drones: Pakistan agreed to buy Turkish-made T129 ATAK helicopters, and both sides have shown interest in joint drone production, especially Turkey’s well-known Bayraktar TB2 drones.

• Training and Exercises: Turkish military schools train Pakistani officers, and the two armies often hold joint drills such as the “Ataturk” exercises.

These actions show a high level of trust and commitment. Pakistan normally only works this closely on military technology with countries like China.

Religious and Cultural Bonds

Religion and shared cultural values also play a role. Both countries see each other as part of the wider Muslim Ummah (community). Turkey openly supports Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, while Pakistan supports Turkey’s position on Cyprus and its internal security matters. This mutual respect and Islamic brotherhood help strengthen their military alliance. As one Turkish analyst put it, “Turkey is our friend and a brother Muslim country,” which makes its support more trustworthy to Pakistanis.

Countering Regional Rivals

One reason for closer defense ties is that both countries face strong regional rivals. Pakistan sees India as its main competitor, while Turkey has tense relations with Greece, Cyprus, and sometimes Israel. By working together, Turkey and Pakistan can balance the influence of these other powers. For example, Turkish drones and ships give Pakistan better tools to defend its borders and sea routes. In return, Turkey benefits from Pakistan’s military experience and regional connections.

A Changing World Order

The world is moving away from U.S.-led global dominance toward a multipolar system, where regional powers like China, Russia, and India are rising. Both Turkey and Pakistan are adjusting to this shift.

• Turkey, once closely aligned with NATO and the U.S., has moved toward a more independent foreign policy. Its military cooperation with Russia, and its growing role in regional conflicts, shows this change.

• Pakistan, similarly, has moved away from relying on U.S. support and is now more deeply engaged with China, Russia, and Central Asian countries through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

This shift makes it natural for both countries to build stronger defense ties outside Western alliances. As one study notes, military cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan helps them protect their national interests in a world where the West no longer dominates global politics.

Strategic Significance of Pakistan’s Nuclear Status

Turkey is not a nuclear power, but Pakistan is. Some experts wonder if Turkey sees its relationship with Pakistan to learn from its nuclear experience or at least benefit from its strategic position.

Although no official nuclear cooperation has been reported, their military closeness raises questions about whether deeper defense collaboration could eventually include such discussions especially as Turkey invests more in missile and drone technology.

Political Leadership and National Identity

Domestic politics also play a role in the military relationship. Both Turkey and Pakistan are led by governments that promote strong nationalist narratives, often centered around military strength and independence.

Leaders in both countries such as President Erdoğan in Turkey and the military-backed leadership in Pakistan support stronger military cooperation as part of a broader nationalist and Islamic vision. Their messages focus on self-reliance, strong defense, and Islamic values, which appeal to large sections of their populations. Joint defense projects, especially with Muslim allies, help strengthen this image.

At home, both countries also face internal security threats, like terrorism and insurgency. Sharing counterinsurgency strategies and training makes practical sense.

Conclusion: A Growing Strategic Brotherhood

Turkey’s military support for Pakistan is not just about selling weapons. It’s part of a deep, long-term partnership based on shared history, similar political systems, Islamic solidarity, and common strategic interests. As the global order changes, both countries are working to protect their regional positions and reduce their dependence on Western alliances. Their growing military cooperation reflects these goals.

However, challenges remain. Turkey’s ties with NATO are uncertain, and Pakistan’s economic problems could affect future defense deals. Also, strong military influence in both countries can raise concerns about democracy and civilian control.

Still, the military relationship between Turkey and Pakistan is likely to grow stronger in the coming years. It stands as a powerful example of how two nations with shared values and goals can build a lasting strategic partnership.

By: Afridi Ahmed, Research Analyst, GSDN

In 1994 after emerging from the Apartheid regime, South Africa has been considered the most advanced economy in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting its modernized industrial initiatives, well-maintained infrastructure and pace of GDP growth. As the leading voice of the Global South in the African continent, it holds more strategic importance in global geopolitics, having membership in pivotal regional and international alliances, such as BRICS+ (a cornerstone of its foreign policy), the G20, the African Union, SADC, SACU, and the Commonwealth of Nations.

As a founding member of the United Nations, it has spent it has contributed in UN-backed peacekeeping missions in conflict-ridden areas. As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it has played a key role as a mediator and a peace facilitator in the regional crisis, aiming for Peace and Development, such as in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc. Reshaping the international order, Pretoria’s growing role in regional and global diplomatic trends, multilateral forums, and economic alliances has anchored it as a middle power.

This article examines the relevance of South Africa, which often goes underappreciated in global geopolitics: its strategic location, regional leadership and mediation, hunger for global governance reforms, role in maritime security and resource diplomacy, and its unprecedented ability to balance diplomacy amidst great power rivalries.

Strategic and Geopolitical Relevance 

South Africa sits at a unique geographical location, the Cape of Good Hope, a breakthrough in European exploration connecting Europe and Asia and controls the maritime routes of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This maritime corridor is among the main and busiest shipping routes essential for global trade.

The Ports of South Africa, Durban and Cape Town, and Saldanha Bay hold great importance for maritime activities related to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as they facilitate sea trade connectivity to global markets, support maritime security and increase naval cooperation, promote fuel-driven economic diplomacy and most importantly, support South Africa’s larger goal of sustainable industrial and green energy growth.

Durban Harbour, situated on the east coast of South Africa, handles more than 30 million tons of cargo annually and is visited by 4500 commercial vessels every year, making it the busiest shipping terminal. It links sea trade with the Far East, the Middle East, Australia, South America, North America and Europe. Additionally, it serves as a transhipment hub for East Africa and the Indian Ocean islands.

Despite performance issues, the Port of Cape Town handles 1035896 million tons of Dry Bulk cargo, 459118 million tons of Break Bulk cargo and 4933587 million tons of Liquid cargo. It is the second-largest cargo terminal exporting fruits, fish and frozen products to South America and the Far East.

Strategically, it also hosts the country’s warships and foreign navies to enhance diplomatic ties and naval cooperation. For example, on August 21, 2023, INS Sunayna entered the port to engage in a passage exercise with South African Navy Ship SAS King Sekhukhune I. This exercise not only warmed the diplomatic partnership between India and South Africa but also aimed at increasing interoperability, cooperation and sharing best practices between both navies.

Any shifts around these ports do not concern South Africa alone; they go beyond its borders, impacting regional and international maritime trade and security dynamics. 

Resource Diplomacy and Clean Energy

South Africa has a variety of natural resources, holding the world’s largest reserves of Gold, Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), Chrome Ore and Manganese Ore. In addition to this, it also has reserves of zirconium, vanadium and titanium. It has the world’s fifth-largest mining sector, making it a key player in the green energy and green tech race. The major players, the U.S. and China, are competing to gain access to these critical minerals. The U.S. has partnered with South Africa under the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), while China is using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to secure critical mineral supply chains. 

Apparently, South Africa contributes more than any developing nation to clean energy and carbon footprint reduction. The reason why South Africa seems a key supplier in the global energy transition is particularly green technology metals like Manganese, Nickel, Cobalt, Copper, Lithium, Vanadium and other rare earth elements (REEs). South Africa has a large number of these metals and a skilled workforce to accommodate the international demands for critical minerals used for clean energy generation, particularly the making of electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce the dependence on fuel-driven technologies for transport and other purposes.

Statistically, 36% of manganese is produced by South Africa, which contributes to global production of critical minerals, adding US$ 2.5 billion to the country’s foreign exchange and employing thousands of people in 2022. Additionally, in the past few years, due to the drastic growth of the EV sector, the need for manganese has increased to manufacture lithium-ion batteries. In fact, Aqora, an energy company in South Africa, has unveiled its plan to set up the continent’s first lithium-ion battery cell manufacturing facility in 2023. This makes South Africa geopolitically significant and shows potential for renewable energy and tech innovation leadership in Africa, making it a regional hub for critical mineral and battery manufacturing and a wise destination for investment in green energy projects to meet the needs of a sustainable future and growth.

However, in the context of energy transition, it faces a dilemma of decarbonizing its heavy coal industry (a major energy source contributing around 77% to the country’s energy) without economic meltdown and unemployment. Under the Just Energy Transition Partnership announced during COP26, the United States has pledged an US$ 8.5 billion package to support the country’s energy transition from coal to a low-carbon economy.

Meanwhile, in August 2024, Pretoria concluded an energy sector agreement with Mozambique to use its natural gas for the transition from coal and diesel. In an interview with Mozambican journalists, South African Minister of Energy and Electricity Kgosientso Ramokgopa spoke of mutual gains that the agreement would bring to both countries. The agreement would be used to address the supply crisis.

Regionally, as a member of the South African Customs Union (SACU), on January 31, 2024, South Africa became the first country to initiate exporting goods from Durban Harbour to Ghana and Kenya under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) framework. This marks the beginning of duty-free intra-Africa trade, providing opportunities for business entities beyond the borders and integrating markets. This is a milestone in the history of Africa, giving employment to millions of people around the continent and affecting global economic growth. Similarly, it would encourage the other countries of the continent to initiate the duty-free trade, opening other avenues of cooperation, especially green energy projects and mindful use of critical minerals across the whole of Africa. 

BRICS and Global South Unity

A small nation, South Africa joined Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) in 2010, becoming the only country representing the African continent and their needs and also broadening the voice of the Global South on the international stage. Since then, from this platform, South Africa has consistently pushed for democratization of international institutions, especially in the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank, where developing nations of the Global South remain unheard and underrepresented. Through BRICS, South Africa not only embraces the economic benefits from the grouping but also steps into the U.S.-China rivalry. While the BRICS is considered a threat to Western institutions, challenging their hegemonic role in the global order and providing a financial alternative to the countries. 

At the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the BRICS, marking the expansion of the grouping and a great leap for a multipolar world. On this expansion, Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “It shows the determination of BRICS countries for unity and cooperation with the broader developing countries.”

While adhering to Nelson Mandela’s legacy and the non-alignment movement, South Africa is playing a crucial diplomatic role by advocating for multipolarity and bridging Africa and developing nations of Asia while also doing a balancing act—getting benefits from China’s economic investments in the country while also maintaining relations with the West, especially with the U.S. and India. 

Balancing Great Power Rivalries

Since its independence, South Africa’s foreign policy has been quite clear: to maintain non-alignment in the great power struggle while putting the country’s national interest at the forefront. In this new cold war, the U.S. tries to destroy the tech giants of China. South Africa holds on to its strategic autonomy, maintaining economic ties with China and the U.S., indicating the country’s vision of securing a large market by not joining any particular bloc or taking sides with a country. 

Looking at the figures, with US$ 52.4 billion of trade in goods, Beijing is the largest trading partner of South Africa, while the US also has a sizable amount of trade in goods worth US$ 20.5 billion in 2024 with duty-free access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Recently, the Trump Administration cancelled US foreign aid to South Africa with immediate effect—a great upside-down in the diplomatic relations of both countries. The aid was cancelled in light of the alleged racial discrimination against the white Afrikaners. Although the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa denied such claims, in his weekly message to the country, he said South Africans “should not allow events beyond our shores to divide us or turn us against each other.” While not naming anybody, he continues and says, “In particular, we should challenge the completely false narrative that our country is a place in which people of a certain race or culture are being targeted for persecution.” This diplomatic storm should serve as a reminder for South Africa to design domestic policies that conform to its economic trade partners. 

While South Africa’s strategic autonomy is questioned on matters like the Russia-Ukraine war and naval exercises with Russia and China, South Africa has refused to side with the West against Russia on any Ukraine-related resolution in the United Nations. In fact, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries, including South Africa, remain neutral on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Instead of taking sides, South Africa decided to walk on the path of dialogue and de-escalation. In 2023, for the first time, President Cyril Ramaphosa led a peace mission beyond the continent with African leaders to Kyiv and Moscow to end the Russia-Ukraine war—unfortunately, it remained inconsequential. In the Same year, South Africa conducted joint naval drills with Russia and China off the east coast, to which the White House has expressed its concerns. 

Challenges to Its Geopolitical Role 

Beyond the African continent, South Africa has shown its geopolitical influence, demonstrating its significance in multilateral organizations. But it remains surrounded by domestic and diplomatic issues undermining its credibility on the global stage. 

According to the World Bank, “South Africa is the most unequal country in the world,” holding rank 1 out of 164 countries in the World Bank’s global database of Gini coefficients. After so many years of independence, the majority of blacks are still the victims of unequal wealth distribution and access to basic amenities such as education, food and employment. 

Economically, one of the major domestic issues and structural problems is overwhelming unemployment in the country, with 31.9% in the last quarter of 2024 and the highest among the youths between the age groups 15 and 24, at 59.6%. The government should work on reducing unemployment and inequality while adhering to the World Bank guidelines and recommendations to avoid civil unrest like the Zuma riots in 2021. The pre-election survey of 2024 also highlighted the major challenges the South Africans are facing, listing unemployment on top, followed by load-shedding and corruption. 

In the 2024 elections, for the first time, the African National Congress (ANC)—once led by Nelson Mandela—lost its majority and clung to the coalition, reflecting the changing political landscape and public mood in the country. South Africa is in political turmoil due to problems like corruption, increasing unemployment and growing dissatisfaction among the voters. This unstable political climate in the country is problematic for the foreign commitments, making the state unfocused on external strategic issues.

Lastly, as of February 2025, Eskom, the state company of the most industrialized nation on the continent, South Africa, is in heavy debt of approximately R395.3 billion (US$ 22.1 billion). For decades, the frequent power cuts or load-shedding have disrupted the economic potential, leading to a decline in confidence among investors and weakening the position of the country in leading the regional energy corridors or clean energy transition. Recently, the government unveiled the plans to support Eskom, while it lacks the investment needed to recover loans.

Conclusion

South Africa may not be a great power, but its geopolitical importance is unmatched and undeniable, sitting on multiple strategic domains, including African leadership, mineral wealth, the voice of the Global South, maritime positioning and multilateral diplomacy. In this unjust and competitive world, it carries the voice of developing nations, seeking fair space and recognition and their participation in the international institutions. 

Pretoria’s ability to negotiate with great powers and its contribution to the global governance reforms position it as a middle power. Whether through platforms like BRICS, the African Union and the UN, South Africa continues to shape the geopolitics of the 21st century.

By: Gayathri Pramod

The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has evolved into a prolonged economic confrontation with significant global implications. As of mid-2025, both nations have experienced economic challenges due to the ongoing trade tensions. This section delves into the tariff war’s origins, progression, and current state, setting the stage for a detailed analysis of its impacts on both economies. The trade dispute between the United States and China began with the U.S. imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, citing unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. China retaliated with its tariffs, leading to a tit-for-tat escalation. Over the years, this conflict has affected global supply chains, market dynamics, and economic growth trajectories. Since its inception, the tariff war has seen multiple rounds of tariff impositions, negotiations, and temporary truces. Key milestones include the implementation of significant tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods, affecting various sectors such as technology, agriculture, and manufacturing. Despite several negotiation attempts, a comprehensive resolution remains elusive, with both nations maintaining substantial tariffs as of 2025. As of mid-2025, the tariff war continues to exert pressure on both economies. The U.S. has experienced a slowdown in economic growth, with the OECD projecting a decrease from 2.8% in 2024 to 1.6% in 2025, attributing this decline primarily to the trade war and associated tariffs. On the other hand, China faces challenges such as a decline in exports to the U.S. and a slowdown in its manufacturing sector, with the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) indicating reduced factory activity.

Economic Impact on China

The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has profoundly affected China’s economy. As of 2025, the ramifications are evident across various sectors, including exports, manufacturing, and domestic consumption. This section provides a comprehensive examination of these impacts. China’s exports to the U.S. have experienced a significant downturn due to the imposition of tariffs. The ongoing trade tensions have decreased demand for Chinese goods in the American market, compelling Chinese exporters to seek alternative markets and adjust their strategies.

The manufacturing sector, a cornerstone of China’s economy, has been adversely affected. The Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for China’s manufacturing industry has shown fluctuations, indicating instability in the sector. For instance, in January 2025, the PMI stood at 49.1%, suggesting a contraction in manufacturing activity. This contraction is significant as it indicates a decrease in production and potential job losses. However, by February 2025, it rebounded to 50.2%, indicating a slight expansion. Despite these fluctuations, the overall trend points to a slowdown, with small and medium-sized enterprises facing more significant challenges than larger firms.

Beyond external trade pressures, China faces internal economic challenges that the tariff war has exacerbated. The property sector, for instance, has seen a decline, with home prices dropping and developers struggling with debt. This downturn has decreased consumer confidence and spending, further slowing economic growth. Additionally, the rise of unlicensed “home bars” in Beijing reflects the broader economic strain on consumers, particularly among younger demographics. These informal establishments have emerged as cost-effective alternatives to traditional bars, highlighting shifts in consumer behaviour amid economic uncertainty.

Strategic Responses and Adaptations

China has implemented several strategic measures to mitigate its economic impact in response to the tariff war. One notable action is the imposition of export bans on critical minerals and rare earth magnets, which are essential components in various industries, including automotive and technology. This move has disrupted global supply chains and is seen as a strategic countermeasure in the ongoing trade tensions. Furthermore, China’s leadership has adopted a more assertive stance in trade negotiations. Vice Premier He Lifeng, known for his hard-line approach, has replaced the more conciliatory Liu He as the chief trade negotiator. This shift indicates China’s intent to protect its economic interests and resist external pressures to alter its economic structure.

The prolonged tariff war poses risks to China’s long-term economic stability. Persistent trade tensions can lead to structural changes in global supply chains, with companies seeking to diversify away from Chinese markets. This shift could result in a permanent loss of market share for Chinese exporters. Moreover, the erosion of multilateral trade relationships and the undermining of international trade institutions could have lasting effects on global economic stability and China’s role. The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has prompted both nations to implement strategic measures to mitigate economic impacts and assert their positions in the global trade landscape. As of 2025, these strategies have evolved, reflecting the dynamic nature of international trade relations. This section comprehensively examines the strategic responses and adaptations the United States and China undertake.

United States Strategic Measures

The United States has undertaken strategic measures to reassert its economic position and protect domestic industries in response to the ongoing trade tensions and growing concerns over chronic trade imbalances. One of the central initiatives of the U.S. administration has been the introduction of ‘reciprocal’ tariffs—tariff rates designed to match those imposed by foreign trading partners. These tariffs are designed to create a more level playing field for American producers by making imported goods more expensive. This strategy was formalized through a Presidential Memorandum signed on February 13, 2025, which mandated a comprehensive review of non-reciprocal trade practices believed to be contributing to the U.S. trade deficit. The move reflects a broader protectionist shift in U.S. trade policy, aiming to reduce dependence on imports and level the playing field for American producers. However, the implementation of these tariffs has been far from smooth. Legal uncertainty arose when a federal court issued an injunction freezing the tariffs shortly after they were announced. The situation evolved rapidly when an appeals court overturned the decision, reinstating the tariffs and creating a climate of ambiguity for businesses and investors attempting to plan amid a constantly shifting regulatory environment.

In parallel, the U.S. Commerce Department advanced a separate set of tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a provision allowing for the imposition of tariffs on national security grounds. These new levies targeted various imported goods, including copper, lumber, and prescription drugs. Unlike the reciprocal tariffs, Section 232 involves a more detailed protocol: a public comment period, an investigation by the Commerce Department, and a subsequent report to the President recommending action if a national security threat is identified. These tariffs are part of a broader strategy to bolster domestic manufacturing capacity in critical national defence and economic security sectors. However, they have also sparked concerns about rising input costs for U.S. manufacturers and the potential for escalating trade disputes with key allies.

A particularly notable development occurred concerning tariffs on metals. Seeking to provide further relief to struggling domestic metal producers, the U.S. government announced a sharp increase in tariffs on steel and aluminium imports—from 25% to 50%. This decision was framed as a necessary intervention to revitalize domestic production capabilities and reduce strategic dependence on foreign suppliers. While it was welcomed by some segments of the U.S. steel and aluminium industry, it also prompted backlash from downstream manufacturers who rely on competitively priced raw materials. Many of these firms voiced concerns that the increased costs would hamper their global competitiveness, squeeze profit margins, and lead to job losses in sectors beyond metal production. Additionally, there are fears of retaliatory tariffs from major trade partners, which could further strain diplomatic and economic relations.

Amid mounting global scrutiny and the approach of a critical tariff deadline, the White House intensified efforts to negotiate favourable trade deals. U.S. trade officials issued urgent requests to foreign governments, calling on them to submit their most comprehensive and competitive trade offers. The goal was to secure agreements that could pre-empt the implementation of further tariffs. These discussions encompassed a wide range of trade elements, including the establishment of quotas for U.S. product purchases, reductions in tariffs on American goods, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, and reforms to digital trade policies. The administration also emphasized the importance of incorporating provisions that promote economic security and safeguard intellectual property, reflecting growing concerns over the strategic dimensions of international commerce. This aggressive negotiating posture signalled the U.S. government’s intention to leverage tariffs as a protective mechanism and a bargaining chip in a broader effort to reshape the global trade landscape in its favour. These strategic measures underscore a significant shift in U.S. trade policy toward a more assertive and unilateral approach. While they aim to address longstanding issues such as trade deficits, foreign subsidies, and unfair trade practices, their long-term efficacy remains uncertain. The risk of retaliatory actions, legal challenges, and disruption to global supply chains poses a complex challenge, leaving U.S. policymakers to balance short-term political gains with potential long-term economic consequences.

 China’s Strategic Measures

In the face of escalating U.S. tariffs, China implemented carefully calculated strategic measures to protect its economic interests, maintain global trade relevance, and assert its geopolitical standing. One of the most significant moves was the imposition of export controls on critical minerals and rare earth magnets—materials indispensable to a wide range of high-tech and defence-related industries, including automotive manufacturing, aerospace, semiconductors, and advanced electronics. These restrictions, announced during the peak of trade tensions, had a pronounced ripple effect across global supply chains. By limiting the export of these strategically vital resources, China sent a strong signal about its ability to wield economic leverage, particularly in areas with near-monopoly control over production and processing. The policy was widely interpreted as an economic countermeasure designed to retaliate against U.S. tariffs and underscore China’s essential role in the global industrial ecosystem.

Simultaneously, China accelerated its efforts to diversify trade partnerships to reduce its economic dependence on the United States. By deepening its engagement with emerging and established markets across Asia, Europe, and Africa, China sought to establish a more resilient and multipolar trade network. This strategy involved negotiating bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, investing in infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, and strengthening economic diplomacy with regions less influenced by U.S. foreign policy. These initiatives enabled China to open new export channels and mitigate the adverse effects of American tariffs. By redirecting trade flows and expanding its influence across the Global South, Beijing positioned itself as an alternative economic partner to countries looking to escape the binary pressures of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry.

China also imposed tariffs on various American goods, focusing on politically sensitive sectors such as agriculture as part of its retaliatory strategy. These counter-tariffs targeted products like soybeans, pork, and corn—key exports from states that form part of the U.S. electoral heartland. By directly impacting the livelihoods of American farmers and agribusinesses, China aimed to exert domestic political pressure on the U.S. administration, leveraging economic interdependence as a tactical advantage. This move was not merely reactive but strategically designed to highlight the global interconnectedness of trade and the potential consequences of unilateral protectionist policies.

China also focused heavily on strengthening domestic industries, especially high-technology and advanced manufacturing sectors, to bolster its long-term economic resilience. Aware of its vulnerabilities due to reliance on foreign—often American—technology, the Chinese government launched initiatives to foster homegrown innovation and technological self-sufficiency. Substantial investments were funnelled into research and development alongside policy incentives to promote industrial upgrading, artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and semiconductor production. Although downplayed in public discourse, the Made in China 2025 strategy continued to serve as a guiding framework for this transformation. These efforts underscored China’s determination to insulate itself from external pressures and to shift from being the “world’s factory” to a global leader in innovation.

Despite the hardline measures from both sides, there were intermittent attempts to de-escalate the trade war through diplomatic negotiations. One of the more significant milestones occurred in Geneva, where representatives from both countries temporarily agreed to scale back some of the more severe tariff measures. According to the terms of this accord, the United States agreed to reduce its average tariff rate from 145% to 30%, while China committed to cutting its rate from 125% to 10%. This breakthrough was welcomed by global markets and interpreted as a signal of possible reconciliation between the two largest economies in the world. However, the optimism proved to be short-lived. Subsequent actions by both parties—ranging from renewed tariff threats to accusations of non-compliance—highlighted the fragility of the truce. These developments made it clear that while temporary compromises might be reached, the underlying structural and ideological conflicts between the two nations continued to pose significant barriers to lasting resolution.

Taken as a whole, China’s strategic measures reveal a multidimensional approach to the trade war, balancing immediate retaliation with long-term planning. From weaponizing control over essential resources to reengineering its role in global trade, China has not only responded forcefully to U.S. tariffs but also laid the groundwork for a more independent and diversified economic future. Nevertheless, the enduring nature of U.S.-China tensions underscores the reality that global trade has entered a more fragmented, politicized, and unpredictable era—one in which economic policy increasingly serves as a tool of geopolitical strategy.

The U.S.-China tariff war has profoundly impacted global trade dynamics, prompting significant shifts in supply chains and economic strategies worldwide. This section examines the multifaceted consequences of the trade conflict, highlighting key developments and adaptations across various regions and industries. Imposing tariffs between the U.S. and China has disrupted established supply chains, particularly in sectors heavily reliant on cross-border trade. Electronics, automotive, and semiconductors have faced increased costs and logistical challenges, leading companies to reassess their sourcing and manufacturing strategies. For instance, with its intricate network of suppliers and manufacturers across Asia, the electronics sector has experienced significant upheaval due to tariff-induced cost escalations. In response to supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the trade war, businesses are increasingly adopting regionalization and near-shoring strategies. By relocating production closer to end markets, companies aim to mitigate risks associated with long-distance trade and geopolitical tensions. This trend is evident in the automotive industry, where manufacturers are expanding operations in Mexico and other parts of Latin America to serve the North American market more efficiently. Countries actively seek to diversify their trade partnerships to reduce dependency on any single nation. For example, Vietnam has emerged as a key manufacturing hub, attracting investments from companies looking to circumvent tariffs on Chinese goods. The U.S. has engaged in trade talks with Vietnam, presenting a list of demands to reduce the country’s reliance on Chinese imports. The trade war has contributed to a slowdown in global economic growth. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has revised its global growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 to 2.9%, citing the adverse effects of increased tariffs and trade uncertainties. The U.S. economy is projected to grow by only 1.6% in 2025, a significant decrease from previous estimates. Asian economies are adjusting their strategies in light of the shifting trade landscape. China is focusing on expanding its domestic market and investing in high-tech industries to reduce reliance on exports. Simultaneously, countries like India and Indonesia are positioning themselves as alternative manufacturing destinations, offering incentives to attract foreign investment and capitalize on the realignment of global supply chains.

 Technological Advancements and Automation

The trade war has accelerated the adoption of automation and advanced manufacturing technologies. Companies are investing in robotics and artificial intelligence to enhance efficiency and reduce dependence on human labour, particularly in regions where labour costs are rising. This shift addresses immediate challenges posed by tariffs and positions businesses for long-term competitiveness in a rapidly evolving global market. The ongoing U.S.-China trade war has significantly impacted global diplomacy, reshaped alliances and influencing the geopolitical landscape. China has responded to U.S. tariffs by imposing countermeasures, including tariffs on $20 billion worth of U.S. imports such as coal, gas, and key minerals. Additionally, China has initiated antitrust investigations into major U.S. technology companies like Google, signalling a broader strategy to assert its position in the tech sector and respond to U.S. economic policies.

The trade conflict has also led to a fragmentation of the global technology sector. The U.S. has imposed restrictions on Chinese tech firms, aiming to sever access to critical technologies, including semiconductor chips and software. In response, China has increased its investment in domestic innovation, particularly in semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, and green technologies. These decoupling places Asian tech leaders—such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—in a precarious position as they navigate between adhering to U.S. policies and maintaining critical supply chains in China.

Furthermore, the trade war has accelerated shifts in Global Supply Chains. Companies are seeking alternatives to Chinese manufacturing hubs, with countries like Vietnam, India, and Mexico emerging as potential beneficiaries. However, replicating China’s efficiency remains challenging due to bureaucratic hurdles, insufficient infrastructure, and political instability in these alternative hubs. In the realm of diplomacy, China’s approach has evolved. Facing turbulence in its relationship with the United States, China aims to shore up diplomatic capital with other countries. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has indicated a preference for constructive negotiations with the United States to stabilize ties while also expressing readiness to retaliate if Washington takes further trade or economic actions. The trade war’s impact extends to the Middle East, where countries navigate uncertainty between two economic giants. The region’s unique vulnerabilities to economic tremors are exacerbated by the U.S.-China rivalry, affecting supply chains, manufacturing costs, and diplomatic alliances. The U.S.-China trade war has evolved into a defining geopolitical conflict encompassing broader technological, economic, and military dimensions. This rivalry tests the resilience of global diplomacy as nations are compelled to navigate the conflictual environment created by the two countries. However, the deep-rooted structural differences between the two economies and a legacy of mutual distrust make the success of these diplomatic overtures uncertain. The path toward a sustainable resolution remains fraught with challenges, requiring careful negotiation and concessions.

Conclusion

Determining who won the tariff war between the United States and China is far from straightforward. The prolonged trade conflict, which began in 2018 and continues into the present, has significantly altered global economic patterns, strained political relations, and forced both countries to recalibrate their strategies. When looking solely at economic performance, both nations suffered considerable setbacks. American consumers and businesses faced higher prices on many goods due to tariffs, while China’s retaliatory measures struck U.S. farmers and exporters. The overall growth of the U.S. economy slowed, with forecasts for 2025 revised downward and inflationary pressures increased. China, too, saw its export-driven industries disrupted, causing slower growth and uncertainty among investors. While Beijing took measures to stabilize its economy, both countries ultimately endured economic losses without gaining a clear advantage. However, China seemed to gain the upper hand in its ability to adapt strategically to the challenges posed by the tariff war. China accelerated investments in technology and innovation, expanding its capabilities in critical sectors like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Its leadership also skilfully leveraged new trade partnerships, particularly within Asia and through initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Belt and Road Initiative, to diversify its economic relationships.

Additionally, China’s targeted export controls on rare earth minerals and other critical supplies underscored its ability to use trade as a strategic tool without provoking widespread backlash. In contrast, the United States faced challenges coordinating a cohesive response, grappling with domestic political divisions and legal uncertainties around tariffs, diluting its overall effectiveness. On the international stage, the trade war caused many countries to rethink their alliances and trade dependencies. While the United States’ unilateral tariff policies appeared increasingly protectionist and unpredictable, China strengthened its role as a reliable trading partner to many nations. This shift enabled China to enhance its global influence and expand its network of trade relationships. The U.S., meanwhile, faced scepticism from traditional allies and missed opportunities to re-engage with multilateral trade frameworks, which further diminished its standing.

Domestically, the political consequences were more pronounced in the United States. Many American industries and consumers bore the brunt of tariff-related cost increases, fuelling criticism of the government’s approach and sparking political debates. This internal friction influenced public opinion and added complexity to the country’s broader political landscape. With its centralized governance and state-controlled media, China was better positioned to manage public sentiment and maintain political stability despite economic challenges. Looking ahead, China appears better poised to emerge stronger from the trade war over the next decade. Its efforts to build self-reliance in technology, diversify trade, and solidify its position in emerging markets provide it with a strategic advantage.

Nevertheless, China faces hurdles, including demographic shifts and economic vulnerabilities. The United States, despite some setbacks, retains significant strengths in innovation, financial dominance, and a robust network of potential allies, provided it chooses to reengage more constructively on the global stage. Ultimately, the Tariff War has not produced a clear winner. Instead, it has exposed vulnerabilities, accelerated shifts in global economic structures, and realigned political and trade relationships. While China may hold a slight strategic edge, both countries have paid substantial costs, and the broader international community has felt the repercussions. By their very nature, trade wars tend to result in mutual losses rather than outright victories, reshaping the world in complex and unpredictable ways. Hence, in International Politics, there are no permanent enemies or friends. Only interest matters the most.

By: C Shraddha

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is one of historical richness. This can be mapped back to the 7th century when the archipelagos were indispensable parts of ancient kingdoms and empires of Majapahit, Johor-Riau, Aceh and Srivijaya. As the colonial powers spread their reign across continents, they carved up territories in Indonesia and Malaysia through different treaties. In 1641, Malaya fell into the reign of the Dutch, who were succeeded by the British Empire in 1824 through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. Under the treaty, Malaya was to be under the governance of the United Kingdom, while the East Indies was dominated by the Dutch.

The region witnessed shifting power dynamics throughout the war. During World War 2, Japanese forces had a stronghold over Malaya and the East Indies. However, this proved to be futile when the brutal defeat of the Japanese forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined with the rise of nationalism within the East Indies, led to the declaration of independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta. However, despite their efforts, the Dutch forces were fixated on recolonising the region. What followed was a violent four-year war from 1945 to 1949, which ended with the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia during the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference.

The life of the archipelago was navigated by the Malay way of life, which consisted of three primary elements- the language, the religion of Islam, and the notion of the Kingdom. Adhering to the structures of a kingdom, the dominant ethnic community in the archipelagic Southeast Asia spoke the Malay language and followed Islam. Because of their interlinked identities, leaders of newly independent Malaysia and Indonesia shared familiar strategic apprehensions of the regional order. The leaders viewed the region as a singular unit represented and protected by the Malay World. Nevertheless, this common outlook marked the extent of their strategic alignment.

The two nations differed widely on their strategic interests. Indonesia viewed itself as the superior nation due to its momentous independence struggle, its territorial vastness and population density. Malaysia faded further into the background as the Soekarno regime asserted its dominance in a bid to establish Indonesia’s strategic foothold over archipelagic Southeast Asia. In his eyes, the two countries lacked any common strategic interest. Indonesia did not consider Malaysia powerful or capable enough to be perceived as a reliable ally. So, instead, they aimed to overpower Malaysia.

Malayan leaders, however, opted for a contrary stance. They believed that the survival and security of the archipelagos depended on each other. In 1963, then-Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed the country’s interest “to forge the closest links with Indonesia.” Common identities and shared strategic interests became the pillars on which these imagined ties were placed. For the leaders, Indonesia was not only their nearest neighbour, rather they shared deep “sentimental and blood ties” with each other. However, their geographical proximity to Indonesia facilitated the realization of mutual strategic dependence. 

The sheer influence and power possessed by Indonesia could be observed in the way it unintentionally impacted Malaysia’s foreign policy. Their two common links inculcated an understanding of the necessity of the Malay Archipelago for the survival of the states, the geographical expanse of Indonesia necessitating Malaysia to establish itself closer. “As we were too small to stand alone, our only hope for security was to live in close association with Indonesia in particular, and other countries in Southeast Asia in general,” Tunku expressed. Their need to position themselves closer to Indonesia generated unified aspirations of peace.

To maintain and promote peace, cooperation, and stability in Southeast Asia, they established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, along with the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. This period in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was “marked by friendship, harmony and cooperation.” The newly established Suharto government aimed to reverse the old ways of political confrontation with Malaysia and actively engage in building regional cooperation. Considered to be the most influential player in Southeast Asia, the country’s involvement in the establishment of ASEAN undoubtedly ensured harmony and stability in the region.  

Despite their commitment to uphold ASEAN goals, the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship is not one without skirmishes. Sipadan and Ligitan, two islands in the Sulawesi Sea, became the epicentre of the territorial dispute between the two nations. Although territorially compact, the question regarding the ownership of these Islands and the continental shelf consequently led to the involvement of international bodies. The negotiations reached an impasse as both sides insisted on using maps that excluded each other’s claim to the two islands. Consequently, in 1969, all negotiations were suspended as Indonesians claimed that it was beyond their power to negotiate the sovereignty of the Islands. For the Indonesians, the questions regarding the ownership of the Islands were to be left unsettled while maintaining the status quo. However, as far as Malaysian negotiators were concerned, the Sipadan and Ligitan belonged to Malaysia.

In December 1979, the Malaysian government issued a new map that showed Sipadan and Ligitan as part of their territory, thus publicizing the dispute. By February of the following year, the Indonesian government “formally objected to the new map”. However, the resulting discussions between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Hussein Onn failed to resolve the territorial dispute. Subsequently, the usage of the Islands by private dive companies, rising ownership claims over the territory by Malaysia and violation of status-quo led the countries to consult the International Court of Justice in 2002. The sixteen-to-one ruling of the court under Judge Shigeru Oda favoured Malaysia’s claims to the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan.

The presence of undocumented Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia has emerged as another point of contention between the two countries. Conversely, the harsh treatment of Indonesian formal and informal sector labourers by Malaysian employers, combined with the inaction of the Malay government in protecting the exploited, has further aggravated this relationship. The labour movement of Indonesian workers to Malaysia accelerated in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as the country’s rapid modernisation and development during the 1980s and 1990s rendered it an attractive site for impoverished Indonesian workers. However, the influx of Indonesian workers coincided with an increase in crime rates in Malaysia, specifically in the 1990s. Indonesian migrants were convicted of various crimes, including petty theft, rape, robberies and murders. In 2001 alone, approximately 1,051 Indonesian workers were arrested for such offences. Additionally, Malaysian forces also discovered the smuggling of weapons in illegal migrant squatter camps throughout Peninsular and East Malaysia. Notably, an estimate showcases that up to 36 per cent of prison inmates throughout Malaysia are illegal Indonesian immigrants.

The rising workers, illegal and otherwise, seemingly altered the social fabric of the Malay way of life. The assimilation of Indonesian immigrants into the community and identity raised concerns amongst the Islam-following citizens as the former used shared ethnicity and language as a strategy to proselytise the Malay society. This was perceived as a substantial threat to the culture and identity of the nation, to the extent that a Malaysian Cabinet Minister described it as the “biggest threat facing Muslims in Malaysia today.” While both countries have undertaken several legislations to reduce the flow of illegal workers across the borders, the economic disparity and demand for cheap labour have rendered the efforts inadequate.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is historically intertwined. This interconnectedness has given birth to differential claims of ownership over certain cultures and traditions. The cultural disagreement started in 2007 when a Malaysian Ministry of Tourism ‘Malaysia Truly Asia’ campaign included the Indonesian Reog Ponorogo dance and the traditional Rasa Sayange song. This angered the Indonesian public, who accused Malaysia of appropriating and claiming their cultural heritage.

Another dispute arose in 2009 when a documentary on Malaysian cultural heritage titled ‘Enigmatic Malaysia’ showcased a clip of Pendet dance from Bali. Soon, protests erupted across Indonesia for misrepresenting and claiming unlawful ownership over their culture. Soon after, the Malaysian Minister of Culture and Tourism apologised to their Indonesian counterpart. However, the apology was criticised by certain members of the Indonesian government, who considered it to be insufficient in proportion to the actions committed.

However, the behaviour of the governments in dealing with matters of cultural heritage has shifted significantly over the years. In 2020, Indonesia and Malaysia jointly nominated Pantun, a traditional form of poetry, to UNESCO for its addition to the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) of Humanity at the ICH Intergovernmental Committee sessions in France and Jamaica. This was the first time both governments had jointly proposed a cultural heritage. Now, Pantun has officially become Indonesia and Malaysia’s first shared cultural heritage added to the ICH list.

Over the years, the relationship between the two archipelagos has become more amicable. On January 27, 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was honoured with the Darjah Kerabat Johor Yang Amat Dihormati Pangkat Pertama or The Most Esteemed Royal Family Order of Johor award from the Johor Kingdom during a state visit. The award was presented by Malaysia’s King, the 17th Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Sultan Ibrahim, at the country’s national palace.

The state visit reflected the renewed interests of both countries to ensure strong bilateral relations. Ever since his inauguration, Prabowo has visited Malaysia multiple times, indicating the country’s need to maintain amicable relations with its neighbour. During a recent media briefing, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called Prabowo a “close friend”, while the latter expressed that he views the archipelagos as “strong regional partners with the same interests as the ASEAN founder.”

Economic cooperation has become a cornerstone in strengthening the peaceful ties between the two nations. In 2022, the countries surpassed US$ 27 billion in bilateral trade, with palm oil, electronics and petroleum products topping the list. From April 2024 to April 2025, the exports of Indonesia to Malaysia increased by 6.55 per cent, while imports increased by 17.2 per cent. The status of the two countries as renowned palm oil producers was reflected in the 2025 year-on-year growth in Indonesia’s export to Malaysia, with the export of Palm oil growing by 846 per cent. Regardless of past disputes in the palm oil sector, both countries have undertaken efforts to ensure sustainable palm oil practices, including the establishment of Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) and Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification programmes.

The Indonesia- Malaysia relationship is one rooted in centuries of shared history, community, geography and identity. While this relationship has witnessed its fair share of friction and competition, both nations have increasingly prioritised cooperation. They recognise each other’s importance in ensuring peace, stability, and security in the Southeast Asian region. In the ASEAN spirit of dialogue and non-confrontation, the nations have not only managed to address sensitive issues diplomatically but have also continued to ensure cooperation with each other on regional matters. While old tensions may not fully disappear, continued diplomatic measures, shared regional aspirations, economic interdependence, and a unique cultural identity shared between the two neighbours ensure the possibility of a prosperous and united future.