As early 2025, the US and China’s trade war was reached to its inflicting point. In one step, the Trump administration has imposed a universal 10% tariff on most of countries. China was the worst affected country, whereon Trump ratcheted tariffs on goods up to 145%. In reciprocation, China slapped tariffs as high as 125% on the US goods along with restricting rare-earth shipments vital to the latter’s tech and defense supply chains. Originally, Trump’s tariff blitz was started in 2018, whereby he targeted roughly $360 billion of Chinese imports at a 25% rate. It provoked Beijing to retaliate against $110 billion of U.S. goods with duties averaging 20–25%. After a brief spell of downturn, China’s exports rebounded by late 2019, demonstrated its ability to weather external shocks and sustain its export engine.
Given the US blockage of China in its largest market, the latter doubled down on what is being characterized as the “Southward Shift.” China started getting diversified market options and started getting engaged with the Asian, African and Latin American countries. Resultantly, its exports to ASEAN countries increased from 11% in 2017 to 16% in 2023. It was reported by the World Bank, that the increment was propelled by preferential tariff schedules and the rise of regional manufacturing hubs. For the period of January -July, the trade between China and EU has reached 3.35 trillion yuan ($465.3 billion). It shows 3.9% year-on-year growth making up 13% of China’s total foreign trade. Increasing trade with Germany @ 4.3% ($119.7 billion); France @ 2.7% ($46.53 billion); the Netherlands @ 1.5% ($63.40 billion) has reflected the resilient economic ties amidst the ongoing trade war. On the other hand, engagements with Belt and Road Initiative partner countries in Africa and Eurasia have woven dozens of developing countries into China’s economic orbit.
Notwithstanding of the US liberal policies, the US stepped back from the multilateral trade deals. The geo-economic vacuum created by the US trade war, was seized by Beijing. In September 2021, China applied for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It was a signal on part of China, of its readiness to embrace high-standard rules of market access, labour rights, and environmental protections (New Zealand MFAT). Similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in January 2022. The same created a tariff-free corridor among the 15 Asia-Pacific economies. It accounted for 30% of global GDP. It created geo-economic space for China and cemented China’s leadership in regional commerce (ASEAN Secretariat).
In order to overcome the impacts of tariffs at the home front, President Xi Jinping implemented the strategy of “Dual Circulation Economy.” This strategy turbocharged the domestic demands to remain neutralized from the serious impacts by reducing reliance on changing and volatile geo-economic world. This strategy reduced taxes, provided rural credit facilities and hefty subsidies for green infrastructure and tech start-ups. It increased the household consumption’s share of GDP that rose from 38% in 2017 to 44% in 2024 (National Bureau of Statistics). The services sector now accounts for over 53% of GDP, reflecting a structural pivot toward a consumer-led economy that can absorb external shocks.
China has been taking steps to protect its financial system to overcome the challenges on part of Trump’s regime. It has signed agreements with more than 40 central banks of other countries to swap currencies, providing them access to fund of about $600 billion (People’s Bank of China), if those countries needed. China has also been expanding its new digital yuan for international payments. The same was started with trials in Hong Kong and Thailand (PBoC Digital Currency Research) along with Europe and Asia. By the mid of 2024, it had sold $80 billion worth of bonds in these regions.
In order to curb the Chinese capacity of manufacturing semiconductor, the US has imposed a very steep tariffs. Tech Insights has reported that notwithstanding these challenges, Chinese capacity is set to expand from 631 million square inches (MSI) in 2024 to 875 MSI by 2029. It was propelled by Chinese significant investment in 12-inch fabs for advanced chip production. China has prioritized internal demands while strategically directed the surplus to select export markets. China has encountered the impacts of the US tariffs, which was recently doubled from 25% to 50%. This approach enabled China to sustain its growth along with navigating the tariff challenges, and potentially maintaining a competitive influence in the global semiconductor supply chain.
At last, it is concluded that Trump’s trade war was aimed to cripple the Chinese economy, ironically the same had left catalyst impacts on the latter’s economy. By facing the steep tariffs, Chinese leadership has diversified its market outreach through the geo-economic strategy like “Southward Shift,” by deepening economic ties with regions like Asia, Africa, and the EU. The multilateral trade deal like RCEP has neutralized the impacts of steep tariffs. Concurrently, the “dual circulation” strategy at home front, further boosted production, consumption and services, insulating the economy from external economic shocks. Financially, it has expanded currency swaps along with digital yuan trials. These adaptive measures have transformed a punitive trade war into a Chinese strategic opportunity, positioned per se as a resilient, diversified, and increasingly influential player in the global economic order.
The South China Sea, situated in the southern part of the Chinese mainland, is also bordered by countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The countries have bickered over territorial control in the sea for centuries, but in recent years tensions have soared to new heights. The South China Sea is one of the most strategically critical maritime areas and China eyes its control to assert more power over the region. In 1947, the country, under the rule of the nationalist Kuomintang party, issued a map with the so-called “nine-dash line”. The nine-dash line essentially encircles Beijing’s claimed waters and islands of the South China Sea — as much as 90% of the sea has been claimed by China. The line continued to appear in the official maps even after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power. In the past few years, the country has also tried to stop other nations from conducting any military or economic operation without its consent, saying the sea falls under its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China’s sweeping claims, however, have been widely contested by other countries. In response, China has physically increased the size of islands or created new islands altogether in the sea.
The South China Sea sometimes referred to as the “Asian Mediterranean” is a ‘marginal sea’ as it is largely surrounded by land area with access to those areas, for instance between Western Malaysia and Indonesia, the Karimata Straits in the Southwest and the Philippines and Taiwan, the Luzon Straits to the Northeast. The sea covers an area of 3.3 million-kilometer square excluding the Gulfs of Thailand and Tonkin but if they are included the area would increase to 3.8 million kilometer square.
India-Philippines joint strategy in the South China Sea
India and the Philippines launched a two-day naval drill near the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, overlapping with maritime zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The waterway is a strategic shipping route where $3 trillion of annual shipborne commerce takes place. China also prefers resolving bilateral disputes without the interference of any third party. The Philippines has conducted “maritime cooperative activities” with foreign navies since late 2023 as part of its push to counter China’s expansive claims in the waterway, including joint passages with treaty ally the United States, as well as Japan, Australia, France and Canada.
The dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea first emerged when Chinese fishing vessels fished in the West Philippines Sea, which the Philippines claims to be part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). With the presence of Chinese maritime militia, the Philippines felt that its sovereignty was threatened and accordingly raised diplomatic protests. However, such protests were ignored by China. Following this, the Philippines commenced maritime drills within the West Philippines Sea, which subsequently led China to demand such activity be stopped on the grounds of respect for its sovereignty.
India and the Philippines began the two-day “bilateral maritime cooperative activity” on 2nd of August in waters close to theScarborough Shoal, a focal point of the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines. There are several speculations behind India’s stance on this matter but it is obvious that India is joining these efforts owing to its shared concerns about China’s growing maritime power, including in the South China Sea. Indian Navy ships that took part included guided missile destroyer INS Delhi, tanker INS Shakti and corvette INS Kiltan. The Philippines deployed two frigates, BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Jose Rizal.
Bilateral talks and its significance
Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. is on a 5 day state visit to India and India and the Philippines jointly announced an upgraded strategic partnership on August 5, with utmost focus being on the deepening of defence and maritime cooperation, as both the countries are addressing their security concerns due to China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The two nations signed 14 landmark agreements boosting defense, trade, digital tech, space, law, and tourism. PM Modi hailed the 75-year-old bond as a “partnership by destiny,” while President Marcos hailed India as Manila’s fifth strategic partner. India and Philippines thus celebrated their 75 years of diplomatic relations and both the countries also acknowledged the “long-standing friendship based on mutual respect, trust, civilizational contacts, shared values and culture.”
Both the countries have a long history of jointly signing several treaties like the Treaty of Friendship signed on 11 July 1952, the Memorandum of Understanding on Policy Consultation Talks signed on 28 November 2000, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007, and the Declaration on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007. Thus both the countries are seeking to impart a qualitative and strategic new dimension and long-term commitment to the bilateral partnership and to actively develop cooperation in political, defence and security, the maritime domain, science and technology, climate change, space cooperation, trade and investment, industry collaboration, connectivity, health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, digital technologies, emerging technologies, development cooperation, culture, creative industries, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and other fields in the years ahead.
In the political sphere both the countries are cooperating by strengthening engagement through high-level exchanges on a regular basis and dialogue on bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest. Such instances include the convening of the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), Policy Consultation Talks and Strategic Dialogue; Intensifying dialogue through the various bilateral institutional mechanisms, including the Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on Trade and Investment, Counter-terrorism, Tourism, Health and Medicine, Agriculture and Financial Technology; Encouraging interaction between the legislatures of the two countries, particularly exchanges between young leaders of both countries, to further strengthen mutual understanding;
In the sphere of Defence and Security cooperation, both the countries acknowledged the progress made under the Agreement on Defence Cooperation signed between India and the Philippines on 4 February 2006. To facilitate the regular convening of institutional mechanisms major steps have been taken like the establishment of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) and Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee (JDILC) for dialogue on defence cooperation, with emphasis on defence industrial collaboration, defence technology, research, training, exchanges, and capacity building. When we look at maritime cooperation between India and the Philippines, we see a further deepening of relations which includes the annual India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue, first held in Manila on 11-13 December 2024. India would host the next dialogue as a way to maintain the positive momentum of maritime engagement. Both the countries foster greater security cooperation through regular dialogues, engagements and exchanges of best practice on UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), supply chain management, military medicine, global and regional security environment, traditional and non-traditional security concerns such as maritime security, and cyber security and critical technology issues, as well as the protection of critical information infrastructure, and security-related concerns on economic matters;
Economic cooperation has also reached newer heights where both sides have shown a tendency of promoting business and commercial linkages as a key driver of the India-Philippines partnership. There has been a steady increase in bilateral trade, which reached approximately US$ 3.3 billion in 2024-25. There has been a common agreement of fostering partnerships in infrastructure development and in implementation of connectivity and transport projects, facilitating Joint Customs Cooperation Committee meetings for improved trade facilitation through simplified customs procedures.
Strengthening cooperation in the field of Information and Communication Technology including information sharing and exchange of best practices on Edu-tech and Med-tech; Enhancing all modes of connectivity between India and the Philippines, including physical, digital and financial linkages.
Conclusion
The South China Sea remains a strategic mess as far as China and various South-East Asian countries are concerned. There seems to be a never-ending brawl over maritime access and usage. The recent times have seen smaller powers like the Philippines protecting their maritime rights steadily by partnering with various other countries to give a befitting reply to Chinese domination in that area. The latest confrontations consist of dangerous maneuvers, physical interference, continued disputes over legal maritime boundaries, and growing international attention and involvement as both sides seek to assert their respective claims.
About the Author
Aishwarya Dutta is an independent researcher and academician and is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science SGGS College, Chandigarh.
Cyberspace has become a pivotal arena for global power competition, where nations leverage digital tools to project influence, gather intelligence, and prepare for conflict. Among these actors, China has emerged as a formidable cyber power, developing sophisticated capabilities that alarm the United States. From espionage and intellectual property theft to potential disruptions of critical infrastructure, China’s cyber operations pose a multifaceted threat to U.S. national security, economic stability, and global influence. This article explores the evolution of China’s cyberwarfare capabilities, the strategic motivations driving them, the specific risks they present to the U.S., and why these developments are a growing concern for American policymakers and security experts.
The Evolution of China’s Cyberwarfare Capabilities
China’s ascent as a cyber powerhouse reflects decades of strategic investment in technology, policy, and military organization. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has prioritized cyberspace as a critical domain to advance its national objectives, integrating cyber operations into its broader military and geopolitical strategies.
Historical Development
China’s cyberwarfare journey began in the late 1990s, when it recognized the potential of information technology to offset the military superiority of adversaries like the U.S. The concept of “informatized warfare,” introduced in the early 2000s, emphasized integrating digital systems into military operations to enhance precision and coordination. This evolved into “intelligentized warfare” by the 2020s, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and advanced computing to create agile, data-driven operations.
A key milestone was the 2015 establishment of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), which unified cyber, space, and electronic warfare under one command. In 2024, the PLASSF was restructured, with cyber operations transferred to the newly formed PLA Cyberspace Force, signaling China’s intent to further specialize its cyber capabilities. Estimates suggest China’s cyber workforce, including military personnel and civilian contractors, ranges from 50,000 to 100,000, underscoring its significant investment in human resources.
Organizational Structure
China’s cyber operations involve a complex network of state-sponsored actors, including the PLA, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups like APT31 (Zirconium), APT40, and Volt Typhoon. These groups, while sometimes operating independently, are increasingly coordinated under centralized command to align with national objectives. The PLA Cyberspace Force focuses on three core missions: cyber intelligence, defense, and offensive operations. This includes developing advanced malware, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, and conducting large-scale espionage.
China’s domestic technology sector, including companies like Huawei and ZTE, supports these efforts by providing infrastructure that can be leveraged for both defensive and offensive purposes. The 2017 Cybersecurity Law mandates private companies to cooperate with state security efforts, effectively extending China’s cyber reach into the private sector.
Technological Advancements
China has made remarkable strides in technologies that enhance its cyberwarfare capabilities. AI-driven tools enable automated cyberattacks, rapid data analysis, and precise targeting. Cloud computing provides scalable platforms for large-scale operations, while research into quantum computing threatens to disrupt modern encryption standards. China’s dominance in 5G technology, through companies like Huawei, amplifies its ability to conduct surveillance and cyber operations globally, as its telecommunications infrastructure is adopted by nations worldwide.
China’s Cyber Strategy and Motivations
China’s cyberwarfare strategy aligns with its broader national goals: ensuring domestic stability, asserting regional dominance, and challenging U.S. global leadership. Cyber operations allow China to pursue these objectives without triggering open conflict, operating in the “gray zone” below the threshold of war.
Strategic Objectives
Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft: China uses cyber operations to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, and sensitive government data to accelerate its technological and economic growth. These efforts reduce reliance on foreign innovation and bolster industries like AI, semiconductors, and aerospace.
Critical Infrastructure Targeting: China is developing capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure—such as power grids, telecommunications, and transportation systems—in adversary nations. These operations aim to deter intervention in regional conflicts, particularly over Taiwan, by threatening significant disruption.
Influence and Disinformation Campaigns: China employs cyber tools to shape narratives and undermine adversaries through disinformation. These campaigns target domestic audiences to reinforce regime legitimacy and international audiences to sow discord or promote pro-China narratives.
Strategic Deterrence: By prepositioning malware in critical systems, China creates a deterrent effect, signaling its ability to inflict damage during a conflict. This mirrors nuclear deterrence, aiming to dissuade adversaries from actions contrary to China’s interests.
Regional and Global Ambitions
In the Indo-Pacific, China’s cyber operations focus on asserting dominance over neighbors like Vietnam, Japan, and Taiwan. Vietnam has faced frequent cyberattacks tied to South China Sea disputes, while Taiwan endures persistent attempts to disrupt its government and military systems. Globally, China seeks to challenge U.S. dominance in cyberspace and promote a state-controlled internet model, as outlined in its 2015 white paper on a “Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace.” By exporting surveillance technologies and cyber norms to authoritarian regimes, China extends its global influence.
Specific Threats to the United States
China’s cyber operations pose direct and indirect threats to the U.S., targeting government, industry, and critical infrastructure with increasing sophistication.
Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft
Chinese cyber actors have been linked to major breaches targeting U.S. entities. The 2021 Microsoft Exchange Server attack, attributed to the Hafnium group, compromised thousands of organizations, including U.S. government agencies and private firms. APT31 has targeted U.S. officials and critics of the PRC, collecting sensitive data for further intrusions. These operations have resulted in the theft of intellectual property worth billions, undermining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. The U.S. intelligence community has highlighted China’s goal to surpass the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030, with cyber espionage playing a central role.
Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
China’s ability to target U.S. critical infrastructure is a growing concern. The Volt Typhoon group, identified in 2023, has prepositioned malware in U.S. communications, energy, transportation, and water systems. FBI Director Christopher Wray has described this as a “defining threat,” aimed at disrupting civilian infrastructure to deter U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan conflict. In 2024, Chinese hackers breached U.S. telecommunications networks, accessing sensitive data and potentially compromising national security communications. These incidents highlight China’s strategy of embedding cyber weapons for future activation.
Disinformation and Influence Operations
China has expanded its use of cyber tools for disinformation, targeting U.S. public opinion and democratic processes. In 2025, a Chinese-led campaign on WeChat targeted a Canadian politician, demonstrating cross-border influence capabilities. Similar tactics have been used to spread divisive content in the U.S., particularly during elections, undermining trust in institutions and exacerbating social polarization.
Military and Strategic Implications
China’s cyber capabilities enhance its military strategy, particularly in a potential Taiwan conflict. By targeting U.S. military logistics, command-and-control systems, and infrastructure, China could delay or disrupt U.S. intervention, giving the PLA a strategic edge. The integration of cyber operations with space and electronic warfare creates a multi-domain threat that challenges U.S. military preparedness.
Why the U.S. is Concerned
The U.S. views China’s cyberwarfare capabilities as a significant threat due to their potential to disrupt national security, economic stability, and geopolitical influence. Several factors amplify these concerns.
National Security Risks
The ability to disrupt critical infrastructure poses a direct threat to U.S. security. A successful cyberattack on power grids or transportation systems could cause widespread disruption, erode public confidence, and hinder military operations. The Volt Typhoon operation, for instance, underscores the risk of China paralyzing essential services during a crisis, particularly in a Taiwan scenario.
Economic Implications
The economic toll of Chinese cyber espionage is substantial. Stolen intellectual property undermines U.S. competitiveness in high-tech industries, threatening long-term economic growth. Disruptions to supply chains or infrastructure could have cascading effects, impacting global markets and U.S. businesses with international operations.
Geopolitical Competition
China’s cyber capabilities are part of a broader strategy to challenge U.S. global leadership. By promoting a state-controlled internet model and exporting surveillance technologies, China seeks to reshape international cyber norms, clashing with U.S. values of openness and freedom. Cyberattacks on U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Japan and Vietnam, weaken regional stability and challenge the U.S.-led security architecture.
Challenges in Attribution and Deterrence
Attributing cyberattacks to Chinese state actors is challenging, complicating U.S. responses. Groups like Volt Typhoon are believed to be state-sponsored, but China’s denials and counter-accusations of U.S. cyberattacks create diplomatic hurdles. Cyber deterrence is also difficult, as the lack of clear escalation thresholds allows China to operate with relative impunity in the gray zone.
U.S. Responses and Mitigation Strategies
The U.S. is actively countering China’s cyber threat through a combination of defensive, offensive, and diplomatic measures, though challenges persist.
Strengthening Cybersecurity
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) leads efforts to protect critical infrastructure, collaborating with private sector partners to identify vulnerabilities and share threat intelligence. The FBI has emphasized partnerships with industry and academia to build resilience against Chinese cyberattacks.
International Cooperation
The U.S. has sought to build coalitions to counter China’s cyber activities. In 2024, eight nations, including the U.S., Australia, and Japan, issued a joint advisory attributing malicious cyber activity to China. Proposals for an Indo-Pacific cyber intelligence-sharing coalition aim to enhance regional cooperation and deter Chinese aggression.
Offensive Capabilities
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has developed offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt Chinese operations, such as neutralizing Volt Typhoon’s infrastructure in 2024. These actions demonstrate the U.S.’s ability to respond proactively, though they risk escalation if not carefully managed.
Diplomatic Efforts
Diplomatic engagement has yielded mixed results. The 2015 U.S.-China cyber agreement temporarily reduced commercial espionage, but violations have eroded trust. Establishing bilateral cyber norms and crisis management mechanisms remains critical but challenging due to ideological differences.
Conclusion
China’s cyberwarfare capabilities represent a sophisticated and evolving threat to the United States, encompassing espionage, infrastructure disruption, and influence operations. The U.S. is concerned about the immediate risks to national security and economic stability, as well as the long-term implications for its global leadership. China’s ability to operate below the threshold of war, combined with its technological advancements and strategic ambitions, makes it a formidable adversary in cyberspace.
Countering this threat requires a comprehensive approach, integrating robust cybersecurity, international partnerships, offensive capabilities, and diplomatic engagement. However, the complexities of attribution, deterrence, and escalation in cyberspace pose ongoing challenges. As the digital domain becomes increasingly contested, the U.S. must remain adaptive and collaborative to safeguard its interests against China’s cyber ambitions.
About the Author
Sofiqua Yesmin, is doing postgraduation in International Relations from Amity University, Noida, India. Her research interests lie at the intersection of security studies, foreign policy, and geopolitical shifts—particularly in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
Logo of HQ Integrated Defence Staff: source Internet
As the World and South Asia reel in the midst of global & regional uncertainties, three statements merit attention that will have bearing on India after five years. One, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, the Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force expressed concern on January 07, 2025 over the increased militarisation by China and Pakistan and the pace at which technology is growing at a very rapid pace in China.
Two, on March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.
Three, on July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.
From the statements above, it is amply clear that as India is faced with different challenges compared to the one-on-one wars/conflicts/skirmishes fought with either China or Pakistan in 1947-49, 1962, 1965, 1967, 1971, 1999, 2020 and 2025. The war ahead will be of a different dimension and enhanced magnitude.
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was setup after the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. The KRC report tabled in the Indian Parliament on February 23, 2000 recommended the creation of the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and various tri-services organisations to promote jointness and integration amongst the three Services of the Indian Armed Forces comprising the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy.
The Shekatkar Committee headed by Lieutenant General DB Shekatkar in 2016 recommended the creation of three Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs).
After General Bipin Rawat took over as India’s first CDS on January 01, 2020 it was clear that it was a matter of time for the announcement of the ITCs. Next month, in February 2020, General Bipin Rawat announced the setting up of two-five theatre commands.
Thereafter started consultations and conferences amongst the three Services and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials and finally the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 was promulgated, that empowered the commanders of the Tri-Services organisations and the future theatre commanders with full authority over personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force serving under them.
On June 24, 2025 orders were issued empowering the CDS General Anil Chauhan to issue joint orders for the three Services. With the Government of India already having declared 2025 as the “Year of Reforms”, it is imperative that the ITCs are created this year itself as the war clouds on India are darkening.
Why Theatre Commands should not delay beyond 2025?
Pakistan, India’s neighbour on the west has eyes set on the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and China, India’s neighbour on the north & east has eyes set on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
With China commencing the construction of the Medog Dam on July 19, 2025 whose completion year is 2030, India can expect the two-front war jointly by China & Pakistan any time after 2030.
If the ITCs are created this year, the Indian Armed Forces will have a clear five-year window to streamline the newly created ITCs which would include planning, logistics, identifying & making-up deficiencies and operational preparedness.
Subsequent to the PLA defence reforms announced by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015, the five theatre commands of the PLA came into effect on February 01, 2016 and since then the Western Theatre Command of China tasked for operations against India has been regularly carrying out combat exercises. China already has a one-decade lead in theatre command creation in relation to India.
After 2013 when Xi Jinping became China’s President for the first time, the military cooperation between China and Pakistan has increased manifold with regular joint exercises being carried out between the nations in all the six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.
It is against this China-Pakistan combine that is in a tight military embrace now, that the Indian ITCs have to be well prepared. With Bangladesh tilting heavily towards the China-Pakistan combine since August 05, 2024, the implementation of the ITCs can’t be delayed beyond the year end for the Indian Armed Forces, as the magnitude and extent of the war on the horizon any time after five years, will be much greater than any war that India has fought in the past.
It is but natural that the ITCs on formation will have teething problems as it accrues in any new raising. As the administrative dust settles after the formation of the ITCs, operational preparedness will have to start in full swing. For, the litmus test of the ITC will be operations when the balloon goes up (military slang means commencement of war).
Even when a battalion comprising about 900-1000 soldiers is newly raised, it takes some time before it can be inducted either in counter-insurgency operations or a conventional war scenario. An ITC on raising will have anything upward of 100,000 soldiers of different Services with equipment that will require streamlining for optimal combat prowess.
There is always a difference between planning on paper and the actual execution on ground which will entail many challenges to be tackled when execution takes effect. The regional uncertainties are getting complicated with each passing day and so are the geopolitical games that the three superpowers are playing.
General Upendra Dwivedi, the Indian Army Chief on August 04, 2025 has stated that India’s next war is closer than what one thinks, is perhaps the clearest indication by any Indian military leader in the present times of the impending war.
For those who say that China & Pakistan will never attack India as China trades in huge volumes in India, should ask themselves that if this is the case then why is China having the biggest military buildup in the world, knowing fully well that no nation including the USA can ever dare attack China? Clearly, China has military designs and the two immediate targets on China’s radar are Taiwan & Arunachal Pradesh, the north-eastern state of India.
As the famous saying goes “If there is even one percent of war, the nation has to be 100 percent prepared”, the chances of the two-front war are definitely a reality and not a possibility any more as has been clearly enumerated by the Indian Army Chief. And hence should be India’s military preparedness accordingly.
The 88-hour conflict between India & Pakistan in May 2025 known as Operation Sindoor in India, brought to fore the close synergy between the three Services which resulted in a thumping military victory for India. It is time to capitalise on this success and create the Theatre Commands before the year ends so that in the flow of this military success, the implementation of the Theatre Commands fructifies.
Operation Sindoor was the trailer of the big future war that awaits the nation in all the domains of modern warfare. On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, during Operation Sindoor. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.
The Theatre Commands are a step in the right direction to increase India’s combat-potential and combat-prowess and they should be created in the next four months to tackle the biggest military challenge that India will face since gaining independence in 1947.
About the Author
Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.
The Eastern Mediterranean is no longer just a peripheral zone of Middle Eastern diplomacy; it has become a strategic epicenter of global energy, security, and geopolitical rivalry. In this rapidly evolving theater, the partnership between Cyprus and Israel has emerged as one of the most critical and complex bilateral relationships. Driven by shared energy ambitions, maritime security interests, and balancing against Turkish assertiveness, the two states have built a robust alliance. Yet beneath the surface, this alliance is being tested by maritime boundary disputes, diverging foreign policy alignments, and the lingering uncertainty of regional diplomacy.
The Cyprus–Israel relationship oscillates between deep strategic cooperation and geopolitical friction. While both nations benefit from collaboration on natural gas development and trilateral security cooperation with Greece, recent developments such as Israel’s rapprochement with Turkiye, unresolved Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) disputes, and diverging stances on regional conflicts have exposed latent vulnerabilities in their alignment. This article dissects the relationship with granular detail, focusing on the interplay of energy, security, diplomacy, and regional pressure.
Historical Underpinnings: From Distance to Alliance
Cyprus and Israel had historically distant relations for much of the 20th century. Cyprus, despite being geographically close, generally aligned itself with the Arab bloc on issues such as Palestinian statehood and maintained a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. This reflected both ideological concerns and practical diplomatic strategy, as Cyprus sought to maintain balanced ties with the Arab world, crucial for economic and political support. Meanwhile, Israel was closely aligned with Turkiye, particularly after the 1950s, which limited its incentive to engage with Cyprus, a country embroiled in the Cyprus problem, a complex geopolitical conflict that resulted in the division of the island after Turkiye’s military intervention in 1974.
The turning point came after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli naval forces raided a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza, resulting in ten civilian deaths and a breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations. This pushed Israel to seek new strategic allies in the region, namely Cyprus and Greece, who shared concerns over Turkish maritime assertiveness.
Thus began a rapid normalization and expansion of ties, evolving into strategic cooperation encompassing energy, defense, intelligence sharing, and regional diplomacy.
Energy Diplomacy and EEZ Disputes
The discovery of major natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean was a key catalyst in strengthening Cyprus–Israel ties. Israel discovered the Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) gas fields, while Cyprus found the Aphrodite field (2011) in Block 12 of its declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
To coordinate exploration and exploitation, Israel and Cyprus signed an EEZ delimitation agreement in 2010, consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, Turkiye does not recognize UNCLOS or the Republic of Cyprus and has aggressively challenged the legitimacy of these EEZs.
A critical issue is the Aphrodite Yishai gas reservoir, which crosses the maritime boundary between Cyprus and Israel. Israel has argued that a portion of the field lies within its EEZ and that Israeli companies should be entitled to a share of revenues. The disagreement has stalled the development of Aphrodite, with negotiations ongoing since 2011.
Despite multiple rounds of talks, no unitization agreement has been finalized. This remains a lingering technical commercial dispute that has geopolitical overtones, as any mismanagement could sour the broader alliance.
The EastMed Gas Project: Promise and Politics
In 2016, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece proposed the EastMed Gas Pipeline, a €6 billion project to transport gas from the Levant Basin to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. The pipeline is designed to carry 10–12 billion cubic meters of gas annually to reduce EU dependence on Russian energy. While symbolically significant, the project has faced technical, financial, and political hurdles:
The depth and complexity of the seabed route make construction expensive and logistically challenging.
Turkiye has objected vehemently, claiming the pipeline infringes on its claimed continental shelf, particularly after its 2019 maritime delimitation deal with Libya.
The U.S. withdrew support in 2022, calling the project “financially unviable” and pushing for electrification alternatives like the EuroAsia Interconnector.
Israel’s enthusiasm for EastMed has cooled recently. Talks with Turkiye about exporting gas via existing pipelines to Europe have raised fears in Cyprus that Israel could pivot away from the Greek Cypriot route in favor of economic expedience and Turkish normalization. This adds a strategic ambiguity to the Israel–Cyprus relationship.
Trilateral Security Cooperation with Greece
The trilateral partnership between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece has become one of the most active diplomatic formats in the region. Since its first summit in 2016, it has expanded to include annual high-level meetings, joint military drills, and infrastructure projects:
Key defense collaborations include:
“Noble Dina” Naval Exercises: Annual drills involving anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and maritime interdiction scenarios.
“INIOCHOS” Air Exercises: Coordinated by Greece, these involve multi-domain training and are often used for testing Israel’s F-35s and Cyprus’s air defense capacity.
EuroAsia Interconnector: A 1,208 km undersea cable project aiming to link the three countries’ power grids, expected to be operational by 2028.
These initiatives are motivated by a shared perception of Turkish assertiveness as destabilizing. However, analyst Z. Tziarras likes to note that this is a “quasi alliance,” strategically useful but lacking treaty obligations or military guarantees, meaning cooperation remains conditional on current leadership preferences and external shocks.
Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement and Cypriot Unease
In recent years, Israel has worked to repair ties with Turkiye, culminating in the exchange of ambassadors in 2022 and increased energy dialogue. While these moves are welcomed by many international actors, they trigger anxiety in Nicosia. Turkiye has offered Israel the possibility of using its existing pipeline infrastructure to export gas to Europe cheaper and faster than the EastMed pipeline. For Cyprus, this poses a dual threat:
Economic: It undermines the commercial value of Cyprus’s own energy strategy.
Political: It risks marginalizing Cyprus in regional energy diplomacy.
Recent meetings between Israeli and Turkish energy ministers have signaled growing momentum for cooperation, though no formal agreement has been signed as of mid 2025. Still, Cyprus views these developments with strategic caution, concerned that its once exclusive partnership with Israel may become a regional triangle where Ankara reasserts influence.
Divergence on Palestine and the UN
Despite being a strategic partner to Israel, Cyprus maintains diplomatic symmetry with Arab states and has long supported Palestinian statehood. It was one of the first European states to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988 and often votes in favor of UN resolutions critical of Israeli actions, particularly those concerning settlement expansion and military operations in Gaza. Cyprus has historically sought to position itself as a bridge between Europe, the Arab world, and Israel. While this position has been largely respected by Israel, it can at times create diplomatic frictions, especially during periods of intense regional violence or sensitive UN resolutions.
Both states, however, have demonstrated an ability to compartmentalize differences, keeping strategic cooperation separate from their ideological divergences on the Palestinian issue.
External Actors and Regional Balancing
The Cyprus–Israel axis does not operate in isolation. It intersects with a wider constellation of regional powers and international institutions:
European Union: Strongly supports Cyprus’s EEZ rights and opposes Turkish drilling. The EU has backed infrastructure like the EuroAsia Interconnector.
United States: A close Israeli ally, the U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Cyprus in 2020, signaling support for its regional role. However, its withdrawal from East Med support indicates a preference for de-escalation over entrenchment.
Egypt: A key player in the EMGF, it shares energy goals with Cyprus and Israel and maintains its own large gas infrastructure.
Russia: Historically supported Cyprus diplomatically, but its regional role has been weakened by the war in Ukraine.
Lebanon: Shares a maritime boundary dispute with Israel. Recent U.S.-brokered agreements on maritime boundaries have opened the door to future EMGF expansion, potentially including Lebanon in broader frameworks.
This growing web of energy diplomacy and overlapping claims underscores the need for structured, rules-based conflict management in the region.
Conclusion
As Cyprus and Israel continue to navigate the choppy waters of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics, their relationship stands as a test case for modern alliance building in contested regions. The strategic rationale remains solid: shared energy corridors, joint security interests, and a common stance against unilateral regional dominance, particularly by Turkiye. However, as the geopolitical chessboard shifts, the durability of this alliance depends on adaptability, trust, and mutual clarity of intent.
For Cyprus, the challenge lies in ensuring that its sovereignty and maritime claims are not sidelined in Israel’s broader regional recalibrations, especially if ties with Ankara deepen. For Israel, maintaining credibility as a dependable partner while pursuing diversified energy and diplomatic options will require a delicate balance of pragmatism and principle.
Ultimately, Cyprus–Israel tensions are not a sign of a failing alliance but of one grappling with the realities of multipolar diplomacy. If managed wisely, this relationship can serve as a cornerstone for regional energy stability, maritime order, and strategic cooperation in one of the world’s most volatile maritime zones.
About the Author
Drishti Gupta is a postgraduate in International Relations with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Delhi University. She brings a strong foundation in global affairs, diplomatic studies, and strategic policy analysis. Drishti has held multiple research positions with reputed organisations such as Global Strategic & Defence News, The Geostrata, and Defence Research and Studies India, where she has contributed to key research projects on cybersecurity, foreign policy, and India’s evolving defence posture. Her academic and professional journey is marked by a deep interest in international diplomacy, global governance, and national security. She has completed certified programs on Global Diplomacy (University of London), Power and Foreign Policy, and Political Economy of Institutions, alongside the McKinsey Forward Program for professional development.
The rivalry between Greece and Turkey that has its roots in centuries-old conflicts and is marked by frequent crises that have influenced not only the geopolitical environment of the southeast European continent but also that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the larger regional security framework. Greece and Turkey have had a Cold War-style, protracted struggle for at least the past 40 years disrupted by shorter or longer détente pauses. Another way to characterise this situation is as a relationship of manageable tension.
Due to the bilateral relationship’s tumultuous past, competing nationalist narratives are frequently discussed in public. Both nations are regarded as each other’s “founding fathers,” according to their respective occupations before attaining independence that is Greece in 1829 and Turkey in 1923. On both sides, elite thought, public opinion, and national security doctrines are still influenced by these intersecting historical traumas.
The stakes are raised by the fact that both nations are strategically located to control important oil routes, maritime lanes and migrant corridors connecting three continents. The Greece-Turkey relationship is essential to peace and security in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean because of the unresolved maritime boundary disputes such as Cyprus’s partition, migratory pressures and a history of military brinkmanship.
Historical Background
From the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the fascinating coexistence of the progenitors of modern Greeks and Turks inside the Ottoman Empire the history of current-day Greeks and Turks is a case of entangled history. The Greek-Turkish hostility has its origins in the Ottoman era when Greece was ruled by the Ottoman Empire till the Greek War of Independence in the 1800s.
There was even discussion to establish an Ottoman-Greek state during the last decade of the nineteenth century despite the existence of the Kingdom of Greece which was pursuing expansion. Just ten years after the terrible Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 a similar idea resurfaced in the 1930s that was of a Greek–Turkish confederation. Later, Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923 that put an end to hostilities and it attempted to settle territorial disputes while also redrawing country borders and requiring population transfers. However, there were several issues that remained unresolved particularly the ones that pertained to minority rights and Aegean Sea islands.
Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952 because of the Cold War with the goal of promoting collaboration against shared external threats. Both countries constantly pursued different strategic priorities rather than reducing their rivalry. The mistrust was also heightened by Cyprus – related divisions after the island gained independence in 1960 and after the Turkish military intervened on July 20, 1974. Further, there have been frequent crises in the Aegean and continuous disputes over air and maritime space and the bilateral relationship alternated between cautious détente and outright hostility on occasion.
Cyprus Conflict
At the geostrategic intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is Cyprus. It was therefore historically considered an important strategic area for numerous empires and civilisations. Cyprus fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1571. Large numbers of settlers from all across the Empire were brought in by the Ottomans to create a Turkish presence in the local populace.
In exchange for helping the Ottoman Empire defend its eastern provinces from Russian threats, Britain assumed administrative authority of the island in 1878. The emerging Turkish Republic officially ceded its claim of Cyprus to Britain in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The island was officially proclaimed a crown colony by Britain in 1925, two years later.
When the island obtained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, certain Greek Cypriot elites started to demand that it be merged with the Kingdom of Greece before the end of the 19th century. Calls to merge the island with Greece grew among Greek Cypriot elites. Pro-enosis Greek nationalism played a major role in the bloody riots against the British government in 1931. The Greek Cypriots resumed their political involvement following World War II.
On July 15, 1974, a Greek-sponsored coup was carried out as a result of intercommunal violence and desires for enosis or unity with Greece. On July 20, 1974 Turkey responded by launching a military incursion that gave them control of the island’s northern part. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which is solely recognised by Turkey was proclaimed on November 15, 1983 as a result of the ensuing de facto division. Although decades of reunification negotiations have not produced a meaningful settlement, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping personnel have been maintaining a buffer zone since 1974.
In the wake of the Turkish invasion, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim established a new mission of good works. Serious talks about many humanitarian challenges took place during the next 10 months. The main political issues like territory, refugees and the structure of the government however, remained unresolved.
Migration and Refugee Crisis
Migration has become a geopolitical and humanitarian issue. Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers fled Turkey for Greek islands during the 2015 refugee crisis that placed a burden on resources and sparking disagreements over border control. When Turkish officials urged thousands of migrants to approach the Greek land border at Evros in March 2020 tensions reached a height and the Greek security forces responded with. The EU mediated aid packages and border assistance out of concern for its own stability but the underlying friction still exists.
Aegean Sea Dispute
Since the beginning of the twentieth century Greece and Turkey have been at odds over the Aegean islands. Both countries current borders were set by international treaties following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Many Aegean islands however, had no clear status which resulted in continuous ownership and control disputes. Due to competing claims to the region’s borders, Athens and Ankara have been at conflict over maritime matters in the Aegean Sea since the 1970s.
Historical hostility, the demilitarisation of Eastern Aegean islands, disagreements over the boundaries of national seas and the Continental Shelf and regular airspace breaches are the main causes of this protracted Aegean Sea problem. Tensions between the two countries have increased because of the incidents and military posture brought on by these divisive topics. The discovery of substantial natural gas reserves in the area and the 44-refugee crisis affecting Europe are two of the many reasons that have contributed to the recent escalation of tensions between the two nations. Natural gas has increased the stakes with Turkey claiming that because of their closeness to the gas resources islands like Kastellorizo should be under its jurisdiction.
While Turkey opposes the application of UNCLOS in the Aegean and claims concerns over its own coastal security, Greece on the other hand rests its claims on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which it is a signatory. Any Greek attempt to expand its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is viewed as a casus belli by Turkey. The discovery of new energy deposits in the area has intensified rivalry for access and rights to profitable hydrocarbons that makes these disputes more pressing. Frequent diplomatic and military conflicts are fuelled by such disagreements.
Recent Developments
Greece’s strategy to become the EU’s safeguards against Turkey was altered when it realised that closer ties between the EU and Turkey increased the likelihood that it could settle its bilateral issues with Turkey and the Cyprus issue in accordance with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. However, during the height of EU-Turkey relations historic potential were lost.
Prospects for resolving the Cyprus issue were scuttled in April 2004 when Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan. Furthermore, in December 2004 the Greek government did not exert pressure on Turkey to refer the unresolved maritime zone delimitation problems to the Hague’s International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Due to several structural and conceptual issues Greek-Turkish relations have become more tense after two decades of relative peace and lost chances to resolve their differences. The strategic decisions made by both nations were certain to have an impact on the future of their relations because Turkey’s EU membership was no longer a means of resolving bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey. The importance of interaction mechanisms which Greece had deemed crucial to advancing its concept of bilateral cooperation was diminished in Turkey as a result of Turkey’s move away from West institutions and pursuit of strategic autonomy. The nature of bilateral relations was unavoidably altered by this.
When Turkey sent the research vessel Oruc Reis along with warships and a Greek naval mobilisation to perform seismic investigations in disputed seas off the coast of Kastellorizo island on May 20, 2020 tensions significantly increased. Therefore, naval brinkmanship and diplomatic standoffs took place in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Concerned by these events and in solidarity with its member Greece, the EU urged for moderation and threatened sanctions on Turkey. To maintain balance the US called for talks while highlighting NATO unity. In October 2020, more EU sanctions were put in place because to Turkey’s ongoing drilling operations.
Despite multiple standoffs diplomatic channels have remained open. In January 2021 Greece and Turkey resumed exploratory talks after a five-year hiatus while United Nations-facilitated meetings in Geneva sought to revive Cyprus negotiations. NATO facilitated military de-confliction mechanisms by establishing a hotline. Despite these dialogues there were no fundamental breakthroughs were achieved by 2025 which left tensions unresolved but controlled.
Amongst various external powers, one important stakeholder has been the EU which has pushed Turkey with economic penalties and offered Greece diplomatic support. While energy interests and migrant cooperation complicate the EU’s balancing act France increased its naval presence to demonstrate support for Greece. The United States maintains strategic interests that underscore the importance of bilateral stability for NATO’s southern flank and serve as a check on the situation in times of crisis by maintaining military installations in both Greece and Turkey. through communication with Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. By applying its energy expertise Russia seeks to expand its influence and presence in the Mediterranean, further complicating an already complex web of rivalries and alliances.
Economic Interdependence and Strategic Realities
Throughout the 20th century, most peripheral economies have been influenced by the pursuit of economic growth. The years following 1949 established a somewhat stable climate in Greece that facilitated quick development. Growth rates during what became known as the Golden Age were roughly 6.5 percent in the 1950s and 7.4 percent from 1961 to 1979. A lot of this was dependent on fiscal and monetary restraint. However, when that equilibrium was thrown off in the 1970s especially during the oil crisis, inflation increased and foreign inflows decreased, which ultimately had a significant negative impact on employment and economy. As part of the EU’s Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) frameworks the country began to move towards privatisation and market reforms in the 1990s as a result of mounting domestic demands as well as pressure from the EU.
The economic trajectory of Turkey was rather more lopsided. Populist cycles continued and the nation had financial crises in 1994 and 2001. More domestic borrowing was made possible by financial liberalisation but it also increased interest rates and produced fiscal deficits that exposed more serious structural problems.
The 1999 reconciliation did however, inject some fresh vitality. In the early 2000s, trade and investment increased particularly in sectors like building and tourism. Both sides’ business communities appeared optimistic.
All of it, however was unable to keep politics out. Cyprus and Aegean tensions continued to resurface. Additionally, the political resolve to forge closer commercial links declined along with Turkey’s EU process. Large-scale initiatives like the EastMed pipeline might be beneficial but only if political trust is established beforehand.
Pathways to Resolution
The key to long-term de-escalation is diplomatic interaction which can be aided by impartial third parties. Although the UN and NATO offer platforms for communication, political will is necessary for them to be effective. Long-term fixes can be provided by impartial dispute resolution and confidence-building measures. Cooperation needs to be encouraged by economic collaboration, particularly in the areas of energy and regional infrastructure. The best chances for regional stability are supported by international law-based arbitration.
The ongoing disputes between Greece and Turkey over national identity, resources and sovereignty continue to pose a severe danger to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Euro-Atlantic region. Frequent crises indicate the potential for escalation, while initiatives to promote trust and regional diplomatic engagement suggest a path ahead. A successful resolution requires the political might of both Athens and Ankara, as well as the continuous support of international institutions and third-party mediators.
About the Author
Aditi Sharma has recently completed her Master’s in Geopolitics and International Relations, from Manipal Academy of Higher Education, building a strong academic foundation in global affairs. She has previously interned at the Vivekananda International Foundation and is passionate about International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Journalism. Her core interests lie in Indian National Security, Defence, Counterterrorism, and West Asian Studies. She is committed to continuous learning and aims to contribute meaningfully to public and academic discourse.
Pictorial representation of the AI race between the USA & China: source Internet
October 04, 1957 which marked the launch of the world’s first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 by USSR, shocking and surprising the USA who since the end of World War I had been the global leader in technology having taken over the mantle from Germany, gave birth to a new lexicon “Sputnik Moment”.
Without much delay, the USA promulgated the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Act on July 29, 1958 and NASA officially opened on October 01, 1958 and thereafter the USA raced on to become the global space leader.
Sample this. When Bill Gates founded Microsoft in the USA in 1975, China was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution which bluntly put, was a social upheaval revolving on anti-intellect factor. And when Larry Page & Sergei Brin founded Google in the USA in 1998, only 0.2% Chinese had access to internet as compared to 30% Americans.
As the USA increased it scientific prowess, it became the global leader in science and technology and in the year 2000 produced 18,289 Doctorates (PhDs) in Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics (STEM). That year China produced just 9038 PhDs in STEM.
In China the internet started on April 20, 1994 and in the USA on April 01, 1983.
From the period 1994 to 2010, China was known infamously “copy-catting” American cyber technology. And in this duration number of Chinese small-time companies mushroomed across China trying to make the financial kill in this “copy-cat technology” business. Thus, started the “war of copy-cats”.
However, 2010 was the year in China when something started silently that would in the next 15 years give the world another Sputnik moment. On January 20, 2025 when DeepSeek, the Chinese artificial intelligence software that develops open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) was announced, China’s “Artificial Intelligence Sputnik Moment” stunned the world.
The fact that the date of announcement of DeepSeek on January 20, 2025 on the same day as of the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of USA was no coincidence but a well-planned strategy to show China’s biggest rival that it meant business.
A week later, President Donald Trump reacted by terming DeepSeek as a “Wake-up Call” as during the first week of its launch, DeepSeek surged to become the most downloaded free application displacing OpenAI’s ChatGPT. Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google termed the launch of DeepSeek as a turning point in the global AI race.
China’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) ecosystem started gaining ground in 2010 when Guo Hong, a Chinese government official, realising the potential of cybernetics started transforming Zhongguancun, a shanty and dirty suburb of Beijing to create China’s Silicon Valley.
Three years later, in 2013, Zhongguancun’s name was changed to Chuang Dajie which means “avenue of entrepreneurs” in Chinese language after it had metamorphized into a swanky suburb. By this time the dust started settling for “the war of copy-cats” in China and the Chinese Information Technology (IT) firms that survived “the war of copy-cats” now had office space in Chuang Dajie, which offered three-year free rent and Chinese government backed Venture Capitalist (VC) funds coming in a big way.
During the period 2010-2014, VC funds worth US$ 3 billion were given to the Chinese IT firms and in the year 2015, it rose dramatically to US$ 26 billion after the China’s State Council (equivalent of the US President’s cabinet) approved the setting up of Mass Innovation and Mass Entrepreneurship scheme in consequence to Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s announcement on September 10, 2014 in Tianjin.
The Mass Innovation and Mass Entrepreneurship scheme marked a pivotal shift in China from manufacturing-led growth to innovation-led growth. Thus, started China’s pursuit for supremacy in Artificial Intelligence.
In March 2016 China announced the China Brain Project, which was to be a 15-year effort that would prioritise brain-inspired AI over other approaches.
On July 08, 2017 China announced the New Generation AI Development Plan which aimed to advance AI development in China in three stages with the final aim of China becoming the world leader in AI by 2030. The announcement of DeepSeek in 2025 confirmed that China is well on the track for global supremacy in AI.
By the time the Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked on September 04, 2017 that the nation that leads in Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be the ruler of the world, China was already galloping ahead in the AI world.
Few days later, on November 01, 2017 during the Artificial Intelligence and Global Security Summit in Washington, Eric Schmidt warned against complacency when it came to Chinese AI capabilities.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a multinational firm widely recognised as one of the “Big Four” accounting firms, headquartered in London has estimated that by 2030, AI will add up US$ 15.7 trillion to the global GDP of which China’s share will be US$ 7 trillion and US’ share will be US$ 3.7 trillion.
China’s AI foray into modern Warfare & Implications for the Taiwan War
It was but natural that sooner or later, China would use AI to foray in the defence sector as China has been clear in its military aims since the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949. The first military target for China is Taiwan, for which it will wage a war in 2027.
Unlike in the West and for a major part of the world where Chess as a game is popular, in China the game Go is played widely which like Chess is a two-player game but unlike Chess which aims at eliminating the game pieces, Go aims at controlling more territory.
Go pretty much explains the Chinese war strategy too. Incapacitate the enemy through non-kinetic means first and then launch kinetic warfare.
In October 2015, Google launched the game AlphaGo virtually, which soon became a sensation in China.
In May 2017 when AlfaGo defeated Kie Jie who was the world champion in Go, watching this game being telecast live on the Chinese television channels, were some Generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the headquarters of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in the August 1st Building in Beijing.
In the days to come numerous conferences were held in the August 1st Building which also houses China’s Ministry of Defense apart from the CMC, between the military & civil officials and it was decided that AI will be incorporated in China’s weapon systems.
The New Generation AI Development Plan announced by China on July 08, 2017 had a latent aim beneath the civil sounding nomenclature of the plan – use of AI in defence. And there wasn’t much time to waste as the war for Taiwan, the first military target for China, was just a decade away in 2027.
China had well understood that if AI is the new electricity that will play the pivotal role in the future wars, then Big Data is the oil that will power the generators to produce the electricity called AI.
By 2019 China had become the largest global depository of Big Data.
China has replaced its conventional defence networks with cloud network that have the capability to process and communicate at each point of usage. With 5.5G in every PLA network, the autonomy in Chinese weapon systems are at lightning speed level, which has started worrying the US military.
PLA is using AI-driven decision making to accelerate decision cycles and improve strategic planning after the AI systems have predicted potential threats for optimal strategic responses.
Machine learning algorithms are processing Big Data for developing machine learning algorithms that will support rapid decision making and enhance operational efficiency, for China is aware that in case the USA decides to intervene militarily when China attacks Taiwan in 2027, the warring faction that is technologically superior will have the first mover advantage.
On April 13, 2024, China developed the world’s first AI-enabled water canon that has revolutionized non-lethal combat in maritime disputes. Equipped with photoelectric camera & motion sensors, this water canon can automatically identify targets and adjust their power and trajectory in real-time.
On December 31, 2024, China placed orders for one million AI-enabled lightweight kamikaze drones to its top ten drone manufacturing companies under strict & secret agreements with the timeline of delivery as December 31, 2026.
China not only has started incorporating AI in its conventional weapon systems but also in its nuclear weapons. On September 10, 2024 China refused to sign the “Blueprint for Action” agreement in Seoul which seeks to ban AI from controlling nuclear weapons.
China has shown to the world yet again that if policies and plans are implemented in a specific time frame with accountability and responsibility, one decade is enough to reach global leadership in any field.
On June 25, 2025, Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General alarmed the world about the massive Chinese military buildup and potential for Taiwan invasion. Little earlier, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.
The admission of Pete Hegseth on April 12, 2025 that China could destroy the 11 aircraft carriers of the US Navy in just 20 minutes and that all the internal war games of the US military indicated the USA losing to China. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios. This candid confession of the US Defence Secretary is a grim reflection of how ill-prepared is the USA to thwart China’s war for Taiwan in 2027.
Clearly, China has out-manoeuvred the USA in Artificial Intelligence which will have grave implications for Taiwan and the world in 2027.
About the Author
Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.
Iran’s military transformation following the Islamic Revolution of February 11, 1979, represents one of the most significant strategic shifts in modern Middle Eastern geopolitics. Despite facing comprehensive economic sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by the United States and its Western allies, Iran has managed to develop considerable military capabilities through domestic production, strategic partnerships, and innovative procurement methods. The country’s defence spending has evolved from US$ 5.6 billion in 2004 to an estimated US$ 20.5 billion in 2020, demonstrating sustained commitment to military modernisation even amidst severe economic constraints.
Historical Context and Pre-Revolution Military Foundation
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Iran under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi maintained one of the most advanced military arsenals in the Middle East. Between 1925 and 1979, Iran was equipped with cutting-edge Western hardware, often receiving advanced systems before they became standard in their countries of origin. Notable examples include the United States F-14 Tomcat aircraft and British Chieftain tanks, which formed the backbone of Iran’s pre-revolutionary military capabilities.
Following the revolution’s success on February 11, 1979, Iran’s relationship with Western suppliers deteriorated rapidly. Israel severed diplomatic relations with Iran on February 18, 1979, when the new Islamic government adopted an anti-Zionist stance. Subsequently, the United States terminated its economic and diplomatic ties with Iran, banned Iranian oil imports, and froze approximately US$ 11 billion worth of Iranian assets in 1980 dollars.
Economic Sanctions and Their Impact
International sanctions against Iran began immediately after the revolution, intensifying significantly following the Iran hostage crisis of November 4, 1979. Between 2008 and 2013, billions of dollars of Iranian assets abroad were seized or frozen, creating severe constraints on the country’s ability to purchase military equipment from traditional suppliers. Economic sanctions targeted Iran’s banking system, energy sector, and specifically its military procurement capabilities.
Despite these restrictions, Iran’s defence budget allocation demonstrated remarkable resilience. Government economic policies after the revolution shifted from urban-biased and elite-centred approaches to rural-biased and populist strategies, reflecting the new regime’s ideological priorities. Following the nationalisations in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War on September 22, 1980, over 80% of Iran’s economy came under government control, enabling centralised resource allocation for military purposes.
Development of Domestic Arms Production
Confronted with international isolation and arms embargoes, Iran initiated systematic development of its domestic defence industry. In 1979, the country took its first step into manufacturing by reverse engineering Soviet RPG-7, BM-21, and SA-7 missiles. International sanctions and arms embargoes led by the United States, coupled with high demand during the Iran-Iraq War, accelerated Iran’s transition towards self-reliance in military production.
Since 1993, Iran has manufactured its own tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, radars, boats, submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fighter planes. Iran established an arms development programme during the Iran-Iraq War specifically to counter the weapons embargo imposed by the United States and its Western allies. Because of economic sanctions and weapons embargoes, Iran was forced to rely on its domestic arms industry for weapons and spare parts, since very few countries remained willing to conduct business with Iran.
Strategic Military Investments and Spending Patterns
Iran’s military expenditure patterns reveal strategic prioritisation despite economic constraints. Between 1989 and 1992, Iran spent US$ 10 billion on arms, some of which were designed to prevent other states’ naval vessels from accessing regional waters, including marines and long-range Soviet planes capable of attacking aircraft carriers. Iran’s defence budget for 2006 was estimated at US$ 6.6 billion, representing a significant increase from the 2004 level of US$ 5.6 billion.
Research demonstrates that oil revenue has been a major economic factor influencing Iran’s military spending patterns, with the 1970s leading to “petrodollar recycling” that continued to benefit military modernisation efforts. Studies investigating the impact of sanctions on Iran’s military spending, examining historical records from 1960 to 2017 using auto-regressive distributed lag model (ARDL), found that unilateral sanctions by the United States would paradoxically stimulate increased domestic military investment.
Institutional Reforms and Military Organisation
Iran’s post-revolutionary military structure underwent fundamental reorganisation to support enhanced domestic capabilities. Iran established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a parallel military force alongside the regular armed forces, creating dual command structures that enhanced operational flexibility and domestic production oversight. Iranian Revolutionary Guards were placed in charge of overseeing domestic arms production and procurement activities.
Following the Iran-Iraq War’s conclusion in 1988, the government attempted to develop the country’s communication, transportation, manufacturing, and health sectors whilst maintaining military production capabilities. Iran’s military spending in 2019 represented 3.8% of GDP, demonstrating sustained commitment to defence modernisation despite economic pressures.
Innovation in Military Technology
Iran’s arms industry has demonstrated remarkable innovation in developing cost-effective ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) despite facing heavy sanctions. Iran has managed to build a burgeoning arms industry over the last decade, becoming proficient in producing sophisticated military systems that serve both domestic security needs and regional power projection capabilities.
Iran’s defence industry has proven quite unique, having been shaped by a history of ostracisation from the international community, wide-ranging sanctions on the import and export of weapons, and strategic need to counter military powers such as the United States, Israel, and Arab states. These factors have led to the formation of a defence industry that, whilst obsolete in many respects, remains capable of executing many of Iran’s strategic objectives.
Strategic Partnerships and Procurement Networks
Following the tightening of United States sanctions and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China became Iran’s principal military allies. Relations between Iran and Russia improved significantly after Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, with increasingly warmer cooperation in recent years. Iran was able to obtain commercial dual-use items despite international sanctions through sophisticated procurement networks and strategic partnerships.
Iran’s government has maintained relationships with various suppliers willing to provide military technology and components, despite Western sanctions. Strategic partnerships with China and Russia have provided access to advanced military systems and technologies that supplement domestic production capabilities.
Current Military Capabilities and Future Projections
Iran’s military expenditure increased to US$ 7.89 billion in 2024 from US$ 7.39 billion in 2023, according to recent data. On November 8, 2024, Iran announced its proposed military budget for the Iranian year 1404 (March 2025–March 2026), indicating plans to increase military spending by 200 percent. Iran’s military spending in 2023 was approximately US$ 10.3 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Iran’s defence spending in the 2020 budget was estimated at US$ 20.5 billion, representing a substantial increase amid the pandemic and economic crisis that illustrated the government’s enduring commitment to funding institutions used for domestic suppression and international intervention. Plans to raise the military budget by 200% essentially triple Iran’s defence spending, raising concerns about potential regional arms races.
Regional Implications and Strategic Outcomes
Iran’s military development has significant implications for Middle Eastern security dynamics. Iran has allied with and funded several anti-Israeli Islamist militant groups since the revolution, utilising its enhanced military capabilities to support regional proxies. Iran’s military capabilities enable power projection throughout the Persian Gulf region and support for allied forces in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
Iran’s enhanced military capabilities have enabled it to challenge traditional regional power balances, despite economic sanctions and international isolation. Iran’s ability to develop sophisticated military systems domestically has reduced its dependence on foreign suppliers and enhanced its strategic autonomy in regional conflicts.
Conclusion
Iran’s military modernisation following the 1979 Islamic Revolution demonstrates how economic sanctions and international isolation can paradoxically stimulate domestic military industrial development. Through strategic investments in domestic production capabilities, innovative procurement methods, and sustained government commitment to military spending, Iran has transformed from a Western-dependent military power to a largely self-sufficient defence producer.
Iran’s experience illustrates how determined nations can overcome international sanctions through domestic innovation, strategic partnerships, and sustained resource allocation. Despite facing comprehensive economic restrictions, Iran has successfully developed significant military capabilities that enable regional power projection and strategic deterrence. Iran’s military transformation represents one of the most significant strategic developments in modern Middle Eastern geopolitics, with implications extending far beyond the region’s boundaries.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi & President Donald Trump: source Internet
The Trump 2.0 Presidency, most in India thought, would be an easy one for India. After all, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the United States President Donald Trump called each other ‘good friends’ and seemed to share a great personal equation. Modi was also among the first of the world leaders who visited Washington DC soon after Trump took charge in January this year. Modi’s February visit to the United States seemed to then indicate that both leaders were picking up from where they had last left. But since then something seems to have gone amiss in this relationship with Trump’s almost daily tirades against India. It would be fair to say that at this point the India-US relationship seems to be at its lowest in the last two decades or more.
The recent announcement where the United States has slapped India with a 50 percent tariff, the highest among all countries so far, will ensure that the India-US relationship goes into a sharp nose-dive. Brazil is the only other country today facing tariffs as high as India’s. New Delhi responded sharply to this latest onslaught by Trump and pointed out that the tariffs are “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable” and said its imports of Russian oil is based on its objective of securing the energy needs of its nation of 1.4 billion people. But the damage to the relationship is now a done deal.
If one was to try and make sense of how it has all come to this, it would be fair to state that Trump seems irked with India. And there are many theories as to what has upset the US President. Many believe that not giving Trump credit for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan during Op Sindoor has upset him. India has been quite clear that no third country was involved in the ceasefire between India and Pakistan following four days of conflict in May this year. It is important to point out here that it was actually the US President who first announced the ceasefire in a post on social media and claimed credit for it. He has since then taken credit for it almost 28 times. Pakistan was quick to thank him and also went on to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. India diplomatically maintained that no third country was involved in this. Many have since argued that India should try and play up to Trump’s ego and maybe give him the headlines and attention he craves. But that is hard for India to do given the domestic sensitivities when it comes to Pakistan; and Pakistan-sponsored cross border terrorism.
Now Trump has decided to ‘weaponize’ tariffs against India and much of the world. And if that was not enough, Trump has now dragged Russia into the row by pointing out how India’s purchase of Russian oil has in a way funded the Ukraine war.
In his latest move, Trump has raised by 25 per cent the tariffs on India as a punishment over its purchases of cheap Russian oil, which today account for one-third of its imported oil. So in effect India today faces 50 per cent tariffs, one of the highest the US has imposed on any country so far.
“They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine,” he said in a post to his Truth Social network recently. He also accused India of selling Russian oil “on the Open Market for big profits”. In a previous social media post, he went on to refer to both Russia and India as ‘dead economies”.
These almost daily comments have of course upset many in India and there has been a fierce debate on how to deal with Trump and his constant and rather insulting remarks. Some have suggested that perhaps India can assuage his ego a little and give in to his demands to soften his stance. But the majority opinion in India seems to be clear that India must push back and Trump’s behaviour should not be tolerated.
After showing considerable restrain, India’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement 4 August that was clearly a push back against Trump and his various allegations. It was rather strongly worded and for once minced no words about the hypocrisy being displayed by both the US and the European Union with regards to Russia. “India has been targeted by the United States and the European Union for importing oil from Russia after the commencement of the Ukraine conflict. In fact, India began importing from Russia because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the outbreak of the conflict. The United States at that time actively encouraged such imports by India for strengthening global energy markets stability,” said the statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The MEA statement also pointed out that, “In this background, the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable. Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security.”
In the end, what we are now looking at is a bilateral relationship that has hit its lowest. India has decided to stand up and push back at Trump, who is going overboard with his penalties in the form of tariffs. This will push India to seek conciliation with China even as the US moves closer to Pakistan. The coming weeks will now tell whether the India-US relationship is likely to worsen or start repairing.
About the Author
Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9
US President Donald Trump in MAGA cap: source Internet
“Make America Great Again” (MAGA), first coined by Donald Trump during his 2016 presidential campaign, has evolved into a potent political movement grounded in nativist nationalism and populism. Its core message asserts that America has lost its former prosperity and global status due to issues like immigration, globalization, and a perceived cultural decline. Since then, MAGA has left a lasting imprint on Republican politics, public discourse, and international right-wing strategies.
But in 2025, with Trump back in the White House and brandishing slogans reminiscent of MAGA’s origins, the question arises: Is MAGA really happening? To answer, we must examine its electoral strength, ideological unity, institutional influence, ideological potency, and cultural reach. This article delves into MAGA’s current reality from its increasingly visible power to internal rifts, its blueprint for change, and the fragile coalition that sustains it. Only then can we evaluate whether MAGA is a transformative movement reshaping American politics or a personalized brand vulnerable to fractures and contingent upon one man’s influence.
MAGA is more than campaign sloganeering it represents a deeply embedded worldview. According to Britannica, it blends nativist resentment of immigration and globalization with a nostalgic idealism about America’s past. Among Republicans, about half to 60% identify as MAGA-aligned, making it the dominant faction within the party. However, MAGA remains a minority on the national scale, with non-Republican Americans less likely to identify with it.
Beyond politics, MAGA has spawned a parallel economic ecosystem conservative-aligned businesses intentionally cater to its base. Prominent examples include Public Square (a conservative Yelp alternative) and GrabAGun, an online firearms retailer backed by Trump Jr. These ventures are not merely symbolic they’ve raised over US$ 179 million in IPO proceeds and generated meaningful revenue, indicating economic momentum beyond mere rhetoric.
MAGA-like ideologies are crossing borders. Terms such as “Make Europe Great Again” and conservative summits in London reflect a global resonance. While Trump’s foreign populism remains parochial, its theme’s identity, skepticism of globalization resonates among right-wing groups in Europe, Latin America, and beyond.
In July 2025, MAGA’s coherence was jolted by the controversy surrounding the Jeffrey Epstein files. Trump received intense pressure from MAGA influencers like Steve Bannon, Dan Bongino, and Nikki Haley to release grand-jury testimony against liberal elites. When the DOJ disclosed no such “client list,” many within MAGA perceived it as a cover-up.
This generated rare internal backlash at Turning Point USA’s summit, young MAGA leaders booed the administration’s approach and warned that disillusionment could erode support by up to 10%. Axios labeled it a crisis of faith within the base. Although Trump eventually dismissed the controversy and loyalists rallied back, the episode revealed friction MAGA’s predictive influence no longer guarantees command over its audience.
Internal MAGA tensions also arose over foreign and economic policy. Hardline MAGA members criticized Trump’s continued military aid to Ukraine and measured stance on Iran, suggesting he’s drifting from his “America First”. Meanwhile, the signature tax-cut initiative nicknamed the “Big, Beautiful Bill” (BBB) faced criticism conservatives celebrated it, but populists argued it betrayed working-class interests and spiked inequality. This economic divergence underscores the tension between Trump’s plutocratic policies and his working-class supporters.
The MAGA movement now straddles Donald Trump’s personal brand and a deeper ideological current. Trump remains indispensable his actions set movement direction, but MAGA influencers are increasingly vocal in policing deviations. Figures like Bannon and Carlson have publicly reprimanded Trump when they perceive he strays.
Analysts warn this relationship is fraught Trump seeks control, while true believers expect ideological fidelity. That friction tends to emerge over issues like transparency, executive overreach, and foreign alliances and they could intensify if Trump bends to institutional or donor pressures.
Project 2025 is the institutional architecture designed to convert MAGA sentiment into lasting power. Spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation and Trump-aligned officials, it consists of four components a detailed policy manual, a personnel database, training programs, and a “day-one” playbook. Its 900-page plan, Mandate for Leadership 2025, seeks to “deconstruct the administrative state” and accelerate conservative governance.
If enacted, Project 2025 would drastically reshape governance replacing civil servants with loyalists, subsuming independent agencies under the White House, curtailing federal equality and environmental enforcement, and bolstering executive authority. Critics liken it to a template for democratic erosion, with warnings about removing checks and balances and repositioning agencies as political tools.
Despite distancing statements during the 2024 campaign, Trump’s second term has adopted many of the plan’s recommendations. Brookings notes that almost two-thirds of Trump’s early executive actions match Project 2025’s proposals on deregulation, immigration, environmental rollback, and social issues. The Guardian concurs that Trump is using Project 2025 as a century-long governance blueprint.
Public opinion reflects serious concerns. A Navigator poll found most Americans fear that Project 2025 would grant unprecedented presidential power, roll back constitutional rights, and dismantle checks and balances. Legal scholars warn it amounts to democratic backsliding a rewiring of governance toward authoritarian control.
MAGA faithful view Project 2025 as a mechanism to institutionalize their agenda, ensuring permanence beyond electoral cycles. For opponents, it’s a warning sign revealing how ideology can morph into systemic overhaul.
Key MAGA influencers Steve Bannon, JD Vance, Elon Musk, Vivek Ramaswamy are already positioning themselves for future leadership roles. Whether they build successor movements or serve under a future Trump term will shape MAGA’s evolution.
MAGA’s base is an uneasy fusion of rural lower-middle-class populists and billionaire-aligned elites, united by shared suspicion of the liberal establishment. This coalition thrives on policy friction populists want tariffs, protectionism, and cultural conservatism, while elites back deregulation and business-focused governance. Historical parallels to past populist-authoritarian alliances suggest fissures are inevitable.
Young conservatives, especially those aligned with Turning Point USA, continue to champion MAGA ideals rank-and-file maintenance of “America First” rhetoric remains strong. Internationally, MAGA themes appear in conservative movements globally, though adaptations vary.
MAGA’s durability depends on managing internal tensions loyalty vs ideology, Trump vs institutions, populism vs plutocracy. If Trump maintains his authoritarian populist posture, MAGA may persist even grow. Absent Trump, ideological opponents or establishment Republicans might fracture the movement. The Epstein backlash hints at these fragilities, underscoring the continual risk of fragmentation.
So, is MAGA really happening? The evidence suggests yes, but not in a simple or monolithic way.
On one hand, MAGA remains a powerful force. Politically, it shapes Republican primaries and executive decisions. Economically, its parallel ecosystem including IPO-backed conservative platforms continues to expand. Globally, its rhetoric and themes resonate with right-wing movements abroad.
Yet internal tensions pose serious challenges. The Epstein files controversies, economic policy splits, and foreign policy misalignments reveal unseen cracks. Trump’s discomfort with ideological purists and his alliances with mega-capitalists create persistent friction.
Project 2025 exemplifies MAGA’s ambition an institutionalized, authoritarian-flavored blueprint capable of transforming governance. But mishandling ideological divisions or ceding control to non-populist elites could splinter the movement.
MAGA’s future hinges on alignment between leadership, ideology, and institutional structure. If Trump or his ideological heirs remain leaders, and Project 2025 continues driving implementation, MAGA is more than a moment it’s a political transformation underway. But if ideological coherence falters or Trump’s media grip diminishes, MAGA risks splintering into rival factions. In a polarized America, MAGA is undoubtably happening but whether it endures or implodes remains undecided.
About the Author
Sonalika Singh began her journey as a UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations in the governance and policy sector. Over the years, she has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics, along with a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a commitment to insightful inquiry and meaningful contribution in the field of public affairs.
