China is taking extensive efforts to modernize its Navy. During the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the then President Hu Jintao made a call for China to become a “maritime power” which is capable of safeguarding its maritime interest and rights. President Xi Jinping repeated this position in April 2016 and remarked that “that task of building a powerful navy has never been as urgent as it is today. China’s 2019 defence white paper highlighted the need “to build a strong and modernized naval force” which is capable of carrying out “missions on the far seas”.
The outcome of the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is an extensive growth in fleet size and capabilities. Research conducted by the leading organisation RAND suggests that China’s surface fleet in 1996 contained 57 destroyers and frigates, but only 3 of these vessels carried short-range Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), making them “defenceless against the modern Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM)”.
In the past few decades, China’s navy made a rapid expansion. Around 2015, the Chinese Navy surpassed the US Navy in size and the PLAN made a continuous expansion year since then. The estimates of the US Congressional Research Service reveal that the Chinese Navy consists of 348 ships and submarines in 2021, while the US Department of Defence (DoD) puts the figure slightly higher than 355 vessels. It is to be noted that the fleet sizes of the other leading nations are smaller comparatively. As of 2021, the British Royal Navy consists of 76 ships and the Royal Australian Navy had a fleet of 44 ships.
Between the period of 2017 and 2019, China built more vessels than India, Australia, Japan, France and the UK combined. The vice admiral of Germany Kay-Achim Schonbach said that in 2021 that the Chinese Navy is expanding roughly equivalent to the entire French Navy in 4 years. In 2021, China commissioned 28 ships, while the US could only make 7 ships that year. If China continues to commission the ships at a similar rate, it could have 425 battle force ships by 2030.
According to DoD, a significant intention of the PLAN’s modernization effort is upgrading and augmenting its littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In response to this China extended up the production of Jiangdao – class (Type 056) corvettes. Since the first being commissioned in 2013, at the end of 2021, approximately 70 types of corvettes have been commissioned. Among this approximately 20 to 22 were transferred to the Chinese coast guard and left 50 to 52 of these vessels to the PLAN. In early 2020, China completed the work on its final type of corvettes 056 and ceased the production to provide attention to advance its blue water capabilities.
It is to be noted that the capabilities of the Chinese Navy are expanding in other areas as well. RAND made a report that, based on the contemporary standards of the ship production for about 70% feet in 2011 is considered to be “modern” from less than 50% in 2010. China is also trying to produce large ships which are capable of accommodating advanced amateur and on board systems. The PLAN’s first type 055 cruisers for example entered service in 2019 and made a displacement between 4,000 to 5,000 tons than the type 052D which entered in service in 2014. The type 055 contains 112 vertical launch systems (VLS) missile cells that can help in area defence while accompanying China’s aircraft carriers in blue waters.
China is also making extensive efforts to build an overall tonnage of new ships that are being put into the sea. The number of ships launched by China between 2014 and 2018 approximately consists of 6,78,000 tons which is larger than that of navies of France and Spain. Moreover the total tonnage of the PLAN remains less than that of the navy of the US. As of 2018, the gap between the two corresponding navies is estimated at roughly 3 million tonnes. The difference can largely be dedicated to the US fielding 11 aircraft carriers, each displaying approximately 100,000 tons.
The growing and rapid expansion of PLAN has been undergirded by China’s growing ship building capability. During the period of the mid 1990s favourable conditions of the market and joint ventures with Japan and South Korea helped China to upgrade its ship building facilities and operational techniques. According to DoD, the expansion of these ship yards has further increased China’s ship building capacity and capability for all types of military projects including submarines, naval aviation and sea lift assets.
These also made China into a commercial ship building superpower. Merchant ship building rose from 1 million gross tonnes in 1996 to 39 million gross tonnes in 2011 which is thrice more than that of Japan in the same year. In 2018 China excelled South Korea to become a global leader in ship building and as of 2020, Chinese ship builders travelled to capture over 40% in the global market in terms of tonnage.
It is to be noted that the same state on companies that dominate ship building industries are also the major players in the military space. Until 2019 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and China State Ship Building Corporation (CSSC), China’s two largest ship building companies contained three quarters of China’s overall ship building output. In November 2019, these two major companies merged into a single massive entity, the China Ship Building Corporation also known as (CSSC) which almost accounted for 21.5% ship orders in 2021.
There are basically 6 shipyard spreads across China that fulfils the share of China’s naval ship building needs. These shipyards contain the facilities for producing the commercial vessels. Jiangnan shipyard for instance has produced several type 055 cruisers and it is also responsible for building China’s third aircraft carrier. 20 shipyards are also responsible for delivering one of the world’s largest ethane and ethylene capable tankers. These shipyards continue to build numerous commercial container and tanker vessels.
China’s rapid naval expansion has positioned it as a leading global maritime power, challenging traditional naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. With a modernized fleet, aircraft carriers, advanced submarines, and a growing presence in strategic waterways, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is a key player in global security dynamics. Its naval strategy, bolstered by technological advancements and territorial ambitions, influences geopolitical tensions, particularly in the South China Sea. As China continues to project power, its naval capabilities will shape global maritime security, trade routes, and diplomatic relations, reinforcing its status as a formidable force in international waters.
The aspiration to create a better world is not merely a contemporary slogan but a longstanding ambition society has pursued throughout history. From post-war reconstruction and economic revitalization to sustainable development initiatives, humanity has continually sought to establish a more just, prosperous, and resilient global order. This vision holds renewed urgency in pressing global challenges, including climate change, economic disparities, political instability, and technological disruptions. The role of key global players—such as the United States, China, India, the G7, and BRICS—remains instrumental in shaping the world’s trajectory. However, differing interests and strategic approaches often lead to conflicts, making pursuing a truly better world a complex and contested endeavor. One significant initiative addressing global development challenges is the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative. Introduced by the G7, B3W is designed to promote “values-driven, high-standard” infrastructure development, particularly in the developing world. In response to the mounting infrastructure deficit exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the initiative seeks to mobilize private sector investments across four critical sectors: climate, health security, digital technology, and gender equity and equality. Rooted in the G7’s broader post-pandemic recovery efforts, B3W emphasizes sustainable economic growth, environmental protection, and adherence to democratic values, including freedom, the rule of law, and equality.
If effectively implemented, B3W has the potential to emerge as one of the most significant infrastructure initiatives led by democratic nations. With a broad geographic reach spanning Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific, the initiative strategically assigns each G7 member a regional focus, prioritizing support for low- and middle-income countries. While not explicitly positioned as a direct competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), B3W naturally offers an alternative to the BRI’s vast global network, which connects Asia, Africa, and Europe through the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. The interplay between these initiatives underscores the broader geopolitical competition shaping the global development landscape and highlights the diverging approaches of leading powers in fostering economic progress and international cooperation. Therefore, through this article, I will explore various facets of Bring Back Better World and its present scenario.
Philosophical Underpinning
The concept of rebuilding a better world has evolved significantly over time, shaped by historical events, economic shifts, and global crises. One of the most significant turning points in modern history came after World War II when the world witnessed large-scale reconstruction efforts to restore economic stability and prevent future conflicts. Among these efforts, the Marshall Plan was crucial in revitalizing war-torn Europe, providing much-needed financial assistance to rebuild infrastructure, industry, and governance systems. The success of the Marshall Plan not only facilitated Europe’s recovery but also strengthened international economic ties and set a precedent for future global cooperation.
Alongside these economic reconstruction efforts, establishing the United Nations in 1945 marked a monumental step toward fostering international collaboration. The UN was founded on diplomacy, collective security, and the prevention of large-scale conflicts. Its creation symbolized a global commitment to resolving disputes through dialogue rather than warfare, reinforcing that a peaceful and cooperative world was possible. Economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also emerged to stabilize economies, promote financial stability, and support development projects in struggling nations. These institutions became key pillars in the global economic order, ensuring that countries had access to financial resources that could help them navigate economic challenges and foster long-term growth.
By the latter half of the 20th century, the focus of global development shifted towards globalization, trade liberalization, and rapid economic expansion. Technological advancements and increased international trade facilitated unprecedented economic growth, lifting millions out of poverty and transforming emerging economies such as China and India into global economic powerhouses. The expansion of multinational corporations, financial markets, and global supply chains interconnected economies in ways that were previously unimaginable. This era of globalization was characterized by economic optimism, with many countries embracing free markets, deregulation, and foreign investments as paths to prosperity. However, despite the benefits of economic expansion, this period also exposed the vulnerabilities of an interconnected world. Economic disparities widened as wealth concentrated in certain regions and among specific populations. Fueled by industrialization and excessive resource exploitation, environmental degradation has become an alarming global issue. Moreover, financial crises, such as the 2008 global economic downturn, revealed the fragility of financial systems and the risks associated with unregulated markets. These challenges underscored the need for a more balanced approach to economic growth, prioritizing social welfare, sustainability, and resilience.
As the world entered the 21st century, it faced various new and complex challenges. Climate change emerged as one of the most pressing issues, with rising temperatures, extreme weather events, and environmental disasters threatening global stability. Meanwhile, digital transformations revolutionized industries, communications, and economies, bringing opportunities and challenges. The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, automation, and digital finance created new avenues for growth but raised concerns about job displacement, data privacy, and economic inequality. The COVID-19 pandemic further intensified these challenges, exposing weaknesses in global healthcare systems, supply chains, and economic resilience. As nations grappled with the economic and social repercussions of the pandemic, the phrase “Build Back Better” gained prominence, emphasizing the need not just to rebuild but to create a stronger, more equitable, and sustainable global system.
US and China’s role and significance
The United States has historically positioned itself as a global leader in promoting democracy, economic growth, and human rights. The US has played a crucial role in shaping global systems, from spearheading post-war reconstruction to leading the digital revolution. However, in recent years, its influence has been challenged by internal divisions, economic shifts, and the rise of new global players like China. Under the Biden administration, the US has actively promoted the concept of “Build Back Better World” (B3W), a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The B3W aims to invest in infrastructure, climate resilience, and economic partnerships with developing nations, particularly in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. However, the challenge lies in execution, as domestic priorities, political divisions, and financial constraints often limit its global ambitions.
Additionally, the US faces tensions with China over trade, technology, and military influence. While it continues to champion democratic values, its foreign policies sometimes appear inconsistent, leading to skepticism among allies and partners. The challenge for the US is to balance its leadership role while addressing domestic concerns and adapting to a multipolar world.
China’s approach to building a better world is vastly different from that of the US. Instead of emphasizing democracy and human rights, China focuses on economic development, infrastructure, and technological advancements as the primary means of global improvement. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is central to this vision, connecting countries through massive infrastructure projects, trade partnerships, and financial investments. Over the past decade, China has expanded its influence across Asia, Africa, and Europe through BRI, offering an alternative to Western-led financial institutions. While this has accelerated development in many countries, critics argue that it has also led to debt dependency, environmental concerns, and political leverage by China. The growing geopolitical rivalry with the US has further complicated its efforts, as many nations struggle to navigate between the two superpowers. China’s vision of a better world includes technological supremacy, with significant investments in artificial intelligence, 5G networks, and digital finance. However, concerns over data privacy, surveillance, and authoritarian governance have raised global debates on whether China’s model truly represents a better world or a more controlled one. The country’s role in climate initiatives and global trade remains crucial, as its policies significantly impact global carbon emissions and economic stability. China’s economic power has allowed it to create alternative financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which competes with Western institutions like the World Bank. However, questions remain over China’s long-term intentions and the sustainability of its investments in partner nations.
India has maintained a cautious stance regarding China’s BRI, viewing it as a strategic challenge rather than an opportunity. While many neighboring countries have embraced Chinese investments, India has opted to strengthen its regional influence through initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and its collaborations with Japan and the U.S. India’s vision for a better world focuses on democratic values, inclusive economic growth, and digital innovation. India is a key player in global development efforts as one of the fastest-growing economies. However, challenges such as income inequality, infrastructure gaps, and bureaucratic inefficiencies continue to hinder its progress. In response to China’s growing influence, India has strengthened its ties with the G7 and BRICS, balancing its partnerships with Western and emerging economies. Its role in climate action, digital governance, and regional stability will be critical in shaping the future global order.
The Group of Seven (G7), composed of the world’s largest advanced economies, has traditionally led efforts in global governance, economic stability, and climate initiatives. However, its influence has been challenged by the rise of emerging economies and shifting global dynamics. The G7’s commitment to rebuilding a better world is evident in initiatives like the B3W and climate action agreements. However, internal divisions, economic slowdowns, and geopolitical uncertainties have made it difficult to implement large-scale reforms effectively. The expansion of G7’s engagement with countries outside its traditional sphere is seen as an attempt to maintain relevance, but skepticism remains about its ability to drive real global change.
On the other hand, BRICS represents a counterbalance to Western-led institutions, advocating for a more multipolar world. The group focuses on economic cooperation, financial independence from Western systems, and technological collaborations. However, internal disagreements among BRICS members and geopolitical tensions, particularly between India and China, have limited its effectiveness as a unified force. The ongoing economic struggles in member nations like Brazil and South Africa have also raised doubts about BRICS’ ability to act as a coherent alternative to Western-dominated financial systems. Despite these challenges, the G7 and BRICS hold significant potential in addressing global issues such as poverty, climate change, and digital transformation. The key lies in fostering greater cooperation, bridging ideological divides, and ensuring that economic growth translates into real social benefits for all.
Bringing back a better world is not a straightforward process. The biggest challenges include geopolitical rivalries, economic disparities, environmental degradation, and technological disruptions. The increasing divide between democratic and authoritarian governance models adds another layer of complexity, making it difficult to establish a universal path to progress. Additionally, global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, financial instability, and regional conflicts have exposed weaknesses in existing systems. The need for a new global framework prioritizing sustainability, social equity, and innovation is more urgent than ever. However, achieving this requires genuine collaboration, responsible leadership, and a willingness to adapt to new realities. While nations like the US, China, and India play key roles, no single country can dictate the future alone. Multilateral efforts through G7, BRICS, the United Nations, and other global institutions must be strengthened to create a more inclusive, fair, and resilient world. Civil society, businesses, and technological innovators must also be part of the process, ensuring that progress benefits not just powerful nations but all of humanity.
The vision of restoring a better world is a historical pursuit and a present-day necessity. From post-war reconstruction to modern economic strategies, the quest for a better world has taken many forms, shaped by geopolitical interests, technological advancements, and social aspirations. Today, as the world faces complex challenges, the role of major global players—whether the US, China, India, G7, or BRICS—has never been more crucial. While their visions may differ, the ultimate goal remains the same: a world that is stable, prosperous, and sustainable for world future generations. The key lies in finding common ground, fostering cooperation, and ensuring that economic and technological progress translates into meaningful benefits for all. The journey may be long and complex, but with strategic efforts and global commitment, a better world is still within reach.
Conclusion
Today, the aspiration to build a better world is pursued through various global initiatives and power blocs, each offering distinct visions for the future. The European Union, for example, has prioritized sustainability and social welfare, implementing policies to combat climate change and promote economic inclusivity. China’s Belt and Road Initiative focuses on infrastructure development and economic connectivity, aiming to enhance trade and economic cooperation across multiple regions. The United States and its allies continue to advocate for democratic values, technological leadership, and strategic economic partnerships to counterbalance emerging global powers. International organizations such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, and IMF also play critical roles in addressing global issues, from public health and poverty alleviation to conflict resolution and humanitarian aid. As the world moves forward, the evolution of the idea of reconstruction continues to be shaped by changing circumstances and new global priorities. The lessons of history have demonstrated that cooperation, innovation, and resilience are essential in navigating the challenges of an ever-changing world. The need for sustainable development, economic inclusivity, and global stability remains at the forefront of discussions on the future of international cooperation. While the road ahead may be uncertain, the commitment to building a more equitable and resilient world drives local, national, and international efforts, shaping human progress for future generations.
The prospect of simultaneous elections holds promise for some and peril for others. Supporters argue that it frees democracy from the curse of vested and repeated disruptive electoral cacophony; which breeds corruption, populist offerings, mushrooming costs, and logistical nightmares in organising this gargantuan exercise. Detractors contend that it violates the basic structure by diluting parliamentary democracy and ‘nationalises’ federal politics. Simultaneous elections are not a new concept and are practised in different combinations in Sweden, Germany, Japan, the Philippines, etc. Wider consultations and discussions will conclude whether it is apt and needed in India and in what form.
The Union Cabinet has vetted the recommendations of the High-Level Committee on One Nation One Election (ONOE). The latter had proposed concurrent elections to Lok Sabha and state assemblies in the first phase. Within 100 days, elections will be held for local bodies. In practice, simultaneous elections to Lok Sabha and state assemblies had been a norm in the 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 elections. However, rampant abuse of Article 356 led to disruption in several state assemblies’ tenures, and the cycle of the synchronised polls broke. The 170th Report of the Law Commission had maintained that separate elections to states’ legislatures should not be a rule but an exception.
Critics argue that if simultaneous elections are held with 2029 LS polls, then assembly tenures of 17 state assemblies will be curtailed, violating the federal principle that it will undermine regional politics by presidentialising elections, overshadowing local concerns. Coinciding elections till 1967 did not make India a unitary state; on the contrary, it led to better coordination between the Union and states. Some maintain that while regional parties may see a reduced expenditure in the eventuality of simultaneous polls, they may be unable to create discourses making regional demands. The centrist narratives may dominate the political landscape, and local issues may be sidelined, curtailing a pluralist political system. This is disputable as despite the “national wave” favouring the BJP in the 2014 elections, Biju Janata Dal in Odisha increased its vote share from 37% in the 2009 elections to 44% in 2014. Continuous elections one after another may, in effect, foster biases in voter choice, coopting her to choose the party that won the most recent election. Gaps in electoral cycles allow time for introspection and deeper engagement with policy alternatives offered by political parties.
Contrarian research by IDFC Institute on ONOE shows that it induces 77% of voters to select the same party for both state and national legislatures, dropping to 61% if there is a six-month gap between elections. Another fact comes from the Tamil Nadu elections in 1989, 1991, and 1996, when the votes polled by INC and AIADMK differed in state and national elections. In the 2014 Arunachal Pradesh elections synchronised with Lok Sabha parties got different vote shares nationally and in the state. It can be concluded then that electoral fortunes depend on the localised nature of politics, like the presence of alternatives, political contests, voter bribery, and community dynamics, and cannot be generalised. ONOE has the potential to generate a unified and single-minded national resolve on significant issues – a key trigger for the nature and content of third-generation reforms.
Operationalising simultaneous elections would require 18 amendments to existing laws and 13 constitutional amendments. The first constitution amendment bill will deal with the transition to a simultaneous electoral system and the eventuality of premature dissolution of legislatures, which Parliament can pass without states’ ratification. Article 82(A) will be inserted for a fixed five-year term, and another amendment to Article 327. It will discuss the modality of fresh elections for “unexpired term”. The second constitutional amendment will involve panchayat and municipal elections, requiring half of the states’ legislatures’ ratification. There are provisions for preparing a single electoral roll for the entire country and synchronising local bodies’ elections with Lok Sabha and state assemblies. Fixed tenure of five years for Lok Sabha and State assemblies will necessitate amendments to Articles 83, 85, 172, and 174 dealing with the duration and dissolution of two legislative bodies. Article 356 would also need to be amended.
The debate over the cost of election vs the cost of democracy is raging in this context. The Election Commission has called Indian elections the “largest event management exercise on earth during peacetime”. Expenses ranging from voter outreach events, star campaigners’ expenditures, personnel costs, etc., have ballooned legally reported election-related expenses, with almost 3-4 times the amount spent in the parallel black economy. EC has calculated that ONOE can be conducted in US$ 79.5 billion. In perspective, the 2024 Lok Sabha elections cost more than US$ 1000 billion approximately, whereas the combined US presidential and Congressional elections cost US$ 6.5 billion in 2016. However, a counterargument states that EC would need to simultaneously arrange 2.5 million EVMs and VVPATs (currently possessing only 1.2 million) for streamlined polls.
Some contend that elections are the lifeblood of democracy, and their value cannot be judged by the once-in-a-five-year expense they generate. However, taxpayers’ money can be diverted towards much more virtuous developmental goals promising substantive welfare more than procedural satisfaction of a successful election. Given the precarious nature of the external security situation with a simmering two-front war – India’s defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP clocked less than 2% in the 2025 Budget. Even internally, a continuous cycle of elections incentivises political parties to foster a bureaucratic-politician nexus to recover money spent on recurrent elections via corruption and black money, hurting the prospects of the real economy in the long run. Some allege that public works are virtually suspended during the electoral heat, resulting in a monumental waste of government resources.
Till 2021, the country experienced elections of 2-5 state assemblies every six months. Repeated promulgations of the Model Code of Conduct suspend major developmental work and welfare schemes, as noted by the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s 79th Report. ONOE will nip policy paralysis in the bud, producing less disruption of everyday public life due to road shows, noise pollution, and paper waste through campaigning material. It will ensure the stability and predictability of programmes with policy continuity. Otherwise, the current system predisposes the political class to opt for safe and revadi policies, avoiding politically risky, unpopular transformational change. Fixing “full term” at five years will encourage long-term visionary policy-making, deepening representation, and truly enabling elections as a “festival of democracy”.
It is well-known that Indian elections tend to be a spectacle of larger-than-life political drama and high-decibel knockouts. For months altogether, all elements of public life (from boardrooms to drawing rooms) are consumed in this tamasha – imperilling the cause of good governance. If we were to look at this issue from the perspective of human security, then we would find that the mammoth expense (including black money), a stranglehold on public life and raucous disruption of civility in campaigning necessitate some level of simplification and pruning of electoral process. ONOE (with some modifications) seems apt to sanctify the conduct of elections. The threat of ‘presidentialising’ of the electoral outcome is present in the current scenario. However, with concurrent polls, critics point to the ’subservience’ of state legislatures to the term of Lok Sabha, while constitutionally, this hierarchy is unacceptable. Policymakers need to be cautious of fomenting federalist dissensions on this front and need extensive consultations to resolve these cracks in the proposed format of ONOE.
Reduced accountability is possible as artificially fixing rigid electoral cycles impinges on voter choice and lessens democratic will. A parliamentary system is founded upon executive responsibility to legislature, which will be compromised if fixed tenure is imposed. Since the 1951 elections, 60% of Lok Sabha MPs were never re-elected to the lower House after their first term ended, signalling that irrespective of the tenures of legislatures, accountability to the electorate is strong in India. The High-Level Committee has proposed that in case of the dissolution of the legislature prematurely, another election is proposed to be conducted for an “unexpired term.” By-elections will be clubbed together and held once a year. In the event of loss of confidence, midterm elections will usher in a new government for the remaining term, for which voters may find fewer stakes to vote or less incentive for contestants to stand in the poll fray.
One way to deal with this conundrum is to hold simultaneous elections in two phases; if the
assembly or Lok Sabha gets dissolved mid-way, then EC can coordinate elections with the next phase for the remaining term, or if less tenure remains, then president rule can be imposed. The goal is to quell voter fatigue stemming from repeated elections and reduced turnout in elections that are held later. In Sweden, elections towards Riksdag (parliament), county council assemblies and municipal councils take place on the same day – saving valuable time and effort for voters, candidates and polling officials. To quell the premature dissolution of assemblies, the German model of a constructive vote of no confidence can be adopted to dissuade factionalism and horse trading from toppling governments.
Concurrent polls also offer rationalised security forces deployment, who otherwise are diverted from their core competency year-round to man electoral booths. A counterargument is that simultaneous elections will demand huge manpower to be utilised simultaneously, creating an opportune moment for security risks as 4,719 companies of CAPFs. EC would need to secure an additional 2.6 million ballot boxes and 1.8 million VVPATs. The issue of harmonising elections with geographical, weather, cultural (festivals), and security challenges is also noted. And yet, the Indonesian experience of the world’s largest single-day election, with Presidential, Vice Presidential, Parliamentary, Regional Assemblies and Municipal elections on the same day, indicates that it is possible to smooth over logistical roadblocks. The 2024 Lok Sabha election saw more than 600 million voters exercise their franchise, while the European Union has only over 400 million registered voters. Managing the world’s largest electorate is a humongous task, but EC is more than competent in evolving SOPs with trial and error.
The report of the 22nd Law Commission should be awaited in this regard. Concerns of regional parties and some political activists on ONOE should be given due importance. EC can also consider reducing electoral phases to reduce expenditure and maintain voting momentum. Further, as in Sweden, fixed dates can be announced for Parliamentary and municipal elections for predictability in election management. A modified version of ONOE, where the country could be divided into zones for electoral purposes, will stymie the regional concerns of centrist forces usurping the agenda as local issues will remain in the fray. The way forward is to host a broader debate within the parliament and civil society on ONOE.
From a strategic perspective, ONOE impacts the federal relationship between the Union and states – whether this mock unification of polling cycles can produce the consciousness of programmatically aligned and purposive governance is a moot question By, proposing to rationalise expenditure and other human and material costs – it favourably disposes the exchequer to allocate the said funds on capex and other prudent heads. The predictability of elections also lessens the volatility of stock markets and opportunistic fluctuations in capital markets. Take the case of Belgium, where the parliamentary elections are held every five years in tandem with the European elections- and this periodicity flushes out possibilities of bad actors manipulating outcomes due to the foreseeability of the electoral timetable. It also helps the stakeholders to plan their electoral strategies in time adequately.
There are also fears that the ONOE can translate into ‘one voice’ – since if the national legislature collapses, state assemblies would likewise dissolve, thereby contravening the federal principles. This and other lacunae of the Indian electoral system, including defection and horse-trading, can be curbed by the German example of ‘constructive no confidence’ motion. However, due to fracas raised on some disconcerting points – the government must provide clarity and tread the path of wider consultations on the prospect of simultaneous elections. The argument that separate elections enable regional politics to thrive and that ONOE risks binding India into artificial synchronicity is worth pondering. Given that India currently has a thirty-year window to race up towards Viksit Bharat status – we cannot afford to have fundamental divergences such as these, as a sound electoral system is the foundation for a stable and visionary political leadership.
In the context of an increasingly interconnected world, the significance of bilateral relations between countries cannot be overstated. One such example of potential for growth and cooperation lies in the burgeoning relationship between India and Azerbaijan. These two nations, despite being geographically distant, share a multitude of interests, values, and strategic objectives that can contribute to building a strong, mutually beneficial partnership.
India, the world’s largest democracy and one of the fastest-growing economies, stands at a crossroads in terms of its foreign policy and global partnerships. As it looks to expand its presence and influence in global affairs, strengthening ties with nations like Azerbaijan offers a strategic opportunity. Azerbaijan, located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, is a key player in the South Caucasus region, strategically positioned at the intersection of major energy routes and geopolitical interests.
Both nations, though different in size, history, and geography, find in each other a valuable partner capable of driving long-term collaboration across various domains. From energy cooperation to trade and strategic alliances, the India-Azerbaijan relationship has vast potential for mutual benefit.
India and Azerbaijan enjoy warm relations, rooted in civilizational linkages, cultural affinities, and shared values of understanding and respect for one another’s cultures. The Ateshgah fire temple near Bakuis a prime example of the long-standing historical relations and cultural exchanges between India and Azerbaijan. This 18th-century monument, with an even older history, features wall inscriptions in Devanagari and Gurmukhi. It serves as a lasting testament to the trade links and hospitality enjoyed by Indian merchants traveling along the Silk Route to Europe, particularly in Azerbaijani cities such as Baku and Ganja.
The cultural exchanges over ages between Azerbaijan and India have led to close cultural affinity and shared traditions. World renowned Azerbaijani poet Nizami Ganjavi had a profound influence on eminent Indian poets like Amir Khusrau. In recent past, the famous Azerbaijani artist, Rashid Behbudov, a noted tenor who switched to singing popular Azerbaijani songs in European classical tradition, was a close friend of late Raj Kapoor. Indian intellectuals like Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore are well known in Azerbaijan.
During the period when Azerbaijan was part of the former Soviet Union, India’s Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, former President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan (as Vice President in 1956), and former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (in 1961) visited the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.
India recognized Azerbaijan as an independent country in December 1991 and established diplomatic relations in February 1992. The Indian Mission in Baku was opened in March 1999, while Azerbaijan opened its resident mission in New Delhi in October 2004.
Former Vice President of India, Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu, visited Baku for the NAM Summit from 24-26 October 2019, accompanied by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar. More recently, Dr. Jaishankar met Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on the sidelines of the 19th NAM Summit in Kampala in January 2024. Former External Affairs Minister, Smt. Sushma Swaraj, visited Azerbaijan in April 2018 to attend the NAM Ministerial Conference and for a bilateral visit. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the online NAM Summit on the theme “United against COVID-19,” held at the initiative of Azerbaijani President on 04 May 2020. Anupriya Patel, Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, visited Baku for the 6th meeting of the Inter-Governmental Commission on 25 October 2023.
Several ministerial-level visits from Azerbaijan to India have taken place since 1991. Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Elnur Mammadov visited India in November 2022 for Foreign Office Consultations and again in March 2023 to participate in the Raisina Dialogue. Deputy Minister of Economy Mr. Sahid Mammadov visited India to participate in the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in January 2019. Mr. Mukhtar Babayev, Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, visited Delhi to attend the 5th Inter-Governmental Commission in October 2018. Mr. Samir Sharifov, Minister of Finance, visited India in February 2018. Mr. Nagif Hamzayev, Member of Parliament, visited India under ICCR’s Distinguished Visitors’ Programme in August 2019.
In June 1998, the two countries signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and in April 2007, they signed a deal to establish the India-Azerbaijan Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation. This marked the beginning of a stronger and more meaningful relationship between the two nations, creating new opportunities for cooperation and mutual benefit. However, in recent decades, China’s growing influence in Eurasia and the ongoing hostility between India and Pakistan have hindered India’s efforts to establish direct connectivity for robust trade and economic relations with the region.
To overcome these obstacles and revive its historic relationship with the Caucasus region, India has pursued several connectivity projects. In 2002, India, Russia, and Iran signed an intergovernmental agreement to construct the 7,200-km International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transport route that includes sea, rail, and road links connecting Mumbai (India) to Saint Petersburg (Russia) via Iran. India has also invested heavily in the Chabahar Port in the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan. However, these initiatives have faced delays due to investment challenges following renewed US sanctions on Iran, inter-regional disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles for certain projects, such as the 628 km-long Chabahar-Zahedan railway line and the 164 km Rasht-Astara railway line. Nevertheless, in July 2022, the INSTC recorded its first shipment from Russia’s Astrakhan Port to India’s Jawaharlal Nehru Port.
Azerbaijan became part of the INSTC in 2005, and its well-developed railways and strategic seaport in Baku have paved the way for the Western Route of the INSTC, which runs west of the Caspian Sea. The Western Route connects the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas in the Arabian Sea to the vast railway networks in Eurasia, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Batumi or Baku-Tbilisi-Kars transnational rail connections constructed under the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), sometimes referred to as the ‘Middle Corridor.’ The TITR is a multimodal route that enhances connectivity between Asia and Europe, spanning Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus. This makes the Western Corridor of the INSTC via Azerbaijan more economical and strategic for India.
Furthermore, the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2021 Suez Canal blockade have underscored the need for new transport corridors and connectivity projects across Eurasia, which spans an area of 54.76 million square kilometers and is home to about 60 percent of the world’s population. At the same time, India’s robust economy requires connectivity to the vast Eurasian markets to ensure reliable, resilient, and diversified supply chains. Enhancing connectivity between India and the broader Eurasian region is vital for fostering regional stability and promoting economic growth for the countries involved.
One of the most important areas of collaboration between India and Azerbaijan is in the field of energy. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and natural gas reserves, presents India with an opportunity to diversify its energy sources. Energy security remains a priority for India, given its growing population, industrial expansion, and increasing demand for energy. Azerbaijan’s large deposits of hydrocarbons make it an essential partner for India in the quest for alternative energy suppliers.
The Southern Gas Corridor, which connects Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to Europe, exemplifies the potential of this energy partnership. Azerbaijan, as a key player in the Caspian region, is well-positioned to offer India access to its oil and gas resources. By establishing reliable trade routes for energy, India can mitigate the risks posed by its dependence on traditional sources of energy, such as the Middle East.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan is exploring renewable energy sources, particularly in wind and solar power, areas where India has a burgeoning expertise. Cooperation in the development of these technologies could be another area of significant bilateral collaboration. India’s experience with large-scale renewable projects, such as its solar energy program, could provide Azerbaijan with the technical know-how required to build and scale such projects.
Azerbaijan’s favorable business climate, along with India’s growing demand for goods and services, presents an excellent opportunity for trade expansion. India is the seventh-largest trading partner of Azerbaijan, with bilateral trade totaling US$ 1.435 billion in 2023. That same year, India became the third-largest destination for Azerbaijan’s crude oil. Azerbaijan also saw a significant increase in tourism from India, with over 115,000 Indian visitors, nearly double the number of arrivals in 2022. As the fourth-largest source of inbound tourists to Azerbaijan, after Russia, Türkiye, and Iran, India stands as the largest source of tourists for Azerbaijan when excluding neighboring countries. Direct flight connectivity between New Delhi and Baku has grown to 10 flights per week, while there are 4 direct flights per week between Mumbai and Baku. Additionally, in the past four years, around 30 Indian movies and advertisements have been filmed at various locations across Azerbaijan.
The Indian community in Azerbaijan comprises of more than 1500 people, including professionals employed with international companies in the oil and gas sector, businessmen engaged in commodities trading, catering & restaurant business, and construction workers on short-term contracts. There are five Indian associations in Azerbaijan, viz., Indian Association Azerbaijan (IAA), Baku Malyalee Association (BMA), Baku Tamil Sangam (BTS), Azerbaijan Telugu Association (ATA), and Indian Student Association Azerbaijan (ISAA), which work in close association with the Embassy. They regularly hold social events to celebrate major Indian festivals and events. The Indian community is very active both professionally and socially and has integrated well with the local population.
The absence of regular high-level visits between both the nations has been a barrier to strengthening the relationship. While Azerbaijan is an important partner for India both geographically and economically in the Caucasus region, high-level political visits are essential to further advancing the bilateral relationship. The Indian Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Sridharan Madhusudhanan, emphasized the importance of holding a dialogue between the two countries to address and resolve any problematic issues in their bilateral relations.
For India, enhancing its strategic ties with Azerbaijan is essential in ensuring its security and maintaining influence in the broader Eurasian region. India’s “Act East” policy and its increasing engagement with Central Asia and the South Caucasus align well with Azerbaijan’s geopolitical interests. Both countries are keen to expand their influence in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Enhanced defence and strategic cooperation could also pave the way for greater collaboration in peacekeeping missions and multilateral security initiatives.
India and Azerbaijan share a long history of cultural and economic ties, yet there remain numerous untapped opportunities for further cooperation between the two nations. Azerbaijan is India’s largest trading partner in the Caucasus region, and New Delhi stands as one of the biggest investors in Baku. Through sustained diplomatic efforts, investment in people-to-people connections, and strategic cooperation, India and Azerbaijan can build a future of prosperity, security, and mutual benefit. The next chapter in this dynamic partnership promises substantial rewards for both nations as they collaborate to address common challenges and seize new opportunities.
Greece has become the first EU nation to tap into relaxed defence spending rules, rolling out a massive €25 billion ($27 billion) multi-year rearmament programme. At the heart of this overhaul is the Shield of Achilles, a cutting-edge multi-layered defence system designed to protect against missiles, aircraft, warships, submarines, and drones.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis called the shift the “most drastic transformation in the history of the country’s armed forces,” emphasizing that modern warfare demands new strategies. The programme is a key part of Agenda 2030, a broader effort to revamp Greece’s military capabilities.
This comes as the EU ramps up its own defence commitments amid growing geopolitical tensions. Last month, the bloc approved plans to raise up to €650 billion ($705 billion) in additional defence funding and set aside €150 billion ($163 billion) in low-interest loans to boost Europe’s defence industry.
Mitsotakis argues that Europe should eventually move towards a shared defence fund, similar to how the EU handled pandemic recovery funds. For now, though, Greece is taking the lead in preparing for an uncertain future.
From Crisis to Comeback, How Greece Pivoted to European Defence Autonomy?
Once a major buyer of U.S. weapons, Greece’s post-2008 financial meltdown forced a rethink of its defence strategy. Years of austerity slashed its military budget, even as Turkiye ramped up its own defence spending. Unable to match its regional rival in sheer numbers, Greece opted for quality over quantity, shifting towards advanced European weaponry.
The shift became clear in 2019, when Greece ordered 18 French Rafale fighter jets for $2.5 billion, later increasing the order to 24. Then in 2021, it signed a landmark defence pact with France, securing three state-of-the-art Belharra frigates from Group Naval, with an option for a fourth. These frigates—armed with hypersonic Aster-30 missiles, Exocet anti-ship weapons, and Thales radar systems—are set to bolster Greece’s naval power.
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis hailed the partnership as a game-changer, arguing that it solidifies Europe’s independent defence posture in the Mediterranean. With France, the EU’s only nuclear power, as an ally, Greece’s military strategy is no longer bound by outdated 7:10 proportionality rules that once governed U.S. arms supplies to Greece and Turkiye.
Looking ahead, Greece aims to expand its domestic defence industry, securing a 12% stake in the Belharra frigate contracts for Greek firms. Defence Minister Nikos Dendias has also set his sights on involving Greek companies in the European Patrol Corvette programme, further cementing the country’s role in shaping Europe’s future military capabilities.
Greece’s Defence Strategy, Striking a Balance Between Europe and the U.S.
While Greece has leaned heavily towards European defence autonomy in recent years, it’s far from turning its back on the U.S. In fact, Athens has carefully balanced its ties between Washington and Brussels, ensuring it remains a key player in both camps.
In 2018, Greece signed a $1.3 billion deal with Lockheed Martin to upgrade 85 F-16s to Viper level, enhancing their radar and weapons systems. Then, in 2023, it ordered 20 F-35 fighter jets, joining the exclusive club of nations operating the world’s most advanced stealth aircraft.
But Greece’s ambitions don’t stop at purchases—it wants a seat at the table. Athens is actively pushing for Greek companies to co-develop the next-generation U.S. Constellation-class frigate, aiming to integrate itself into the future of American naval technology.
According to Konstantinos Filis, a professor of international relations at the American College of Greece, this balancing act isn’t just strategic—it’s essential. “Greece is obliged to balance between the U.S. and Europe in defence because that better consolidates its position. It cannot be one-track. And the EU and U.S. also need Greece because it’s in an area of strategic interest to both.”
By maintaining strong defence ties with both Washington and Brussels, Greece ensures it remains a key pillar of Western security, while securing the best of both worlds for its military modernization.
As India completes over 77 years of Independence, though every policy and plan including the most important of all ie the Constitution has been formulated for every important facet that is needed to administer the nation, but an important aspect of the National Security Strategy (NSS) has not been formulated since 1947 for India, which will clearly spell out the external and internal security threats that confront India.
What is of grave importance of the need of NSS for India is a two-front war that is on the horizon on India which is slated in 2035. With exactly a decade to go, the NSS needs to be spelt out in public domain so that there is whole-of-nation approach in dealing with external threats.
In probably what was the earliest indication of a two-front war threat on India jointly from China and Pakistan, India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat on March 04, 2021 stated the need to study transformational concepts and to be prepared for threats for military primarily arising from China and Pakistan. The CDS further went on to remark in his address in the College of Defence Management, Secunderabad that India is facing complex security and a challenging environment and included defining the NSS amongst other important steps that India needs to take.
According to the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment released on February 05, 2024 by the Director of National Intelligence, USA, since the relations of India with both China and Pakistan are fragile, it is likely to result in a war between these three nations.
The Presidential tenure of Xi Jinping of China will see the Chinese waging three wars in the next one decade with the war for Taiwan in the near horizon in 2027, the war for Spratly Islands in the middle distance in 2029 and a joint two-front war with Pakistan on India after a decade in 2035.
A nation going to war, whether in offense or defense is a whole-of-the-nation approach and not singularly the responsibility of a nation’s military. And to prepare a nation for an impending war requires one document that will act as a beacon for the whole-of-the-nation approach and it is here that the importance of NSS needs no over-emphasis.
The India-China trade too has been increasing YoY. In 2020 the India-China trade was worth US$ 87.65 billion. The Galwan Valley Clash happen on June 15, 2020 in which 20 soldiers of the Indian Army were killed in action fighting the PLA. Despite this, India’s trade with China soared to US$ 125 billion in 2021 and US$ 135.98 billion in 2022. In 2023 the India-China trade stood at an all-time high of US$ 136.2 billion. In 2024 the trade between India and China decreased slightly to US$ 118.4 billion.
Part of every dollar traded with China is helping in strengthening the PLA. With such enormous global trade figures of China, it is no surprise that China has increased its defence budget by 7.2% in 2024 for the tenth consecutive time and doubling it since 2015.
On the other hand, India’s defence budget has reduced from 2.5% of GDP in 2019 to 1.9% of GDP in 2025.
China as a credible military threat is rarely discussed in public discussions and debates organised by most Indian mainstream electronic media channels and leading think-tanks and academia of the country. Rather, the only military threat discussed vastly in India is Pakistan.
The real threat to India is China and Pakistan is only a subset of this main threat.
The NSS framed should spell out clearly what are the external and internal threats of India. This would greatly help in the whole-of-the-nation to deal with the adversarial situation that is just a decade away. After all, fighting a war isn’t the sole responsibility of a nation’s military only. Every ministry, organisation and individual have to contribute in war preparedness according to its capacity and capability.
Gen MM Naravane (Retd), the 28th Chief of Staff of the Indian Army who retired in 2022, in an article in The Print a well-known Indian publication, on August 07, 2023 has written that a two-front war would mean disaster for India.
US Undersecretary of Defence for Policy nominee Elbridge Colby during a hearing with the US Senate Armed Service Committee on March 04, 2025 stated that China is using its economic and military power to tear down the US. Elbridge Colby in his previous stint in the US Government in 2018 played a pivotal role in the formulation of the 2018 National Defence Strategy, admitted that the US military was unprepared to take on China’s military might.
The danger of China is now being admitted by the US officials publicly. Till how long can India afford to not discuss and deliberate the Chinese threats publicly. And there can no better start than the formulation of the National Security Strategy for India so as to put every Indian citizen and organisation on an even keel about the threat that is just a decade away and China’s aggressive and assertive military posturing that is troubling a superpower USA too.
The closest that India has come in the formulation of the National Security Strategy was in 2007 when the Integrated Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces prepared a draft National Security Strategy, but it was not approved by the Cabinet Committee of Security.
On March 04, 2021 India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat while speaking at the College of Defence Management, Secunderabad stated the need of defining the national security strategy.
The Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas War have clearly brought to fore that conventional war threats will always remain. The next big war on the horizon is China’s war for Taiwan in 2027 and thereafter the two-front war on India in 2035.
The global geopolitical scenario has vastly changed in the last three years and is only set to get more turbulent in the decade ahead. The words of the Greek philosopher Thucydides in 481 BC “The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” is as relevant today as it was centuries ago, with the ever-increasing China’s economic and military might.
The China challenge can no longer be ignored by India, despite all diplomacy and discussions with China. For, China has very clear economic and military aims which are enshrined in its national security strategy termed as “Comprehensive National Security”, which was first used by the Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 15, 2014 at the founding session of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China.
Though China is yet to make the Comprehensive National Security document public, the methodical manner in which China has risen as an economic and military power, clearly points to a well-written document whose access is only with a miniscule few, though parts of it are often released as policy and plans to various ministries and organisations of China.
No success of the magnitude that China has witnessed in all possible realms of national power is possible without a document existing in the hands of the miniscule few Chinese government officials who are implementing every plan and policy with blitzkrieg speed. On October 28, 2024, Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command said that China is conducting the largest military buildup in world’s history.
On January 14, 2022, Pakistan released its first National Security Policy (2022-2026), which is also the nation’s first national security policy document.
On March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.
Clearly, the war clouds have started darkening on India.
The future wars of China will be waged in all the six domains ie land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space, with China being the sole nation in the world to have declared in its PLA military doctrine in 2014 that it is ready to fight any nation in any part of the world in all the six domains of war. Such a statement has not been given by any other nation’s military including USA which ironically formulated the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001 after its success in the 1991 Gulf War.
The future war to be waged by China will have to be met by enhanced technological, economic and of course military power, for which one document has to clearly spell out the path ahead so that all public and private sectors contribute with total clarity.
Notwithstanding the past, the best time for India to formulate the National Security Strategy is in 2025, as the two-front war to be waged on India is exactly a decade away.
A famous Chinese proverb says “The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second-best time is now”.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says the military is “switching gears” in Gaza, seizing more territory and tightening control over key areas. Observers believe this could signal a deeper and longer-term Israeli presence in the Strip.
Israel has vowed to escalate its offensive against Hamas until it agrees to new ceasefire terms. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has pledged to seize “large areas” of Gaza. The territory has faced relentless bombardment, with at least 100 people killed in the last 24 hours, according to Gaza’s health ministry. Since Israel resumed military operations on March 18, the death toll has risen to 1,163.
While it’s unclear how much land Israel plans to take or whether permanent annexation is on the table, Netanyahu hinted at further expansion, particularly with the seizure of another strategic strip of land.
“Last night in the Gaza Strip, we switched gears. The IDF is seizing territory, striking terrorists, and destroying infrastructure,” Netanyahu said in a video address Wednesday.”We are now dividing the Strip and increasing the pressure step by step so that they will return our hostages. As long as they don’t, the pressure will keep increasing,” he added.
Netanyahu also announced the military’s seizure of the Morag Corridor, referring to an area near the former Morag settlement between Khan Younis and Rafah. He compared it to the Philadelphi Corridor, a key 14-kilometer strip along Gaza’s border with Egypt, which remains a major sticking point in ceasefire talks. If fully controlled by Israel, the Morag Corridor could become a dividing line between southern Gaza’s major cities.
Gisha, an Israeli human rights group, reports that even before this latest offensive, Israel had already expanded its buffer zone, now covering around 52 square kilometers—17% of Gaza’s total land area.
According to Col. (Res.) Grisha Yakubovich, former head of COGAT’s Civil Department, Israel may now push for the evacuation of Rafah’s population and extend its hold over the southern border. By securing these buffer zones, he argues, Israel is applying pressure on Hamas while strengthening security for its own communities.
The focus on the Morag Corridor is not just military, Dangot noted but also political. Seizing the area could be a signal to right-wing hardliners in Israel’s government who advocate for resettlement in former Jewish settlements within Gaza.
“When you say ‘Morag’ out loud, it brings back the memory of the disengagement from Gush Katif,” Dangot said, referring to the cluster of Israeli settlements, including Morag, that were dismantled in 2005 under then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s withdrawal plan.
Since October 7, some Israeli settlers and right-wing politicians have been pushing for a return to Gaza, openly calling for the expulsion of Palestinians and the re-establishment of Jewish settlements in the Strip.
A War With No End in Sight
Israel’s renewed military campaign has brought devastation across Gaza since March 18, with Netanyahu vowing to use “increasing military strength” until all hostages are freed.
In one of the latest deadly strikes, at least 31 people were killed and dozens wounded when an Israeli airstrike hit Dar al-Arqam School in Gaza City’s Tuffah neighborhood, according to Gaza’s Civil Defense. The school had been sheltering displaced Palestinians. The Israeli military claimed it was targeting a Hamas “command and control center” in the area but did not confirm if it was the same location.
Meanwhile, hostage negotiations remain deadlocked.Hamas has rejected Israel’s latest ceasefire proposal, which offered a 40-day truce in exchange for 11 hostages—a counter to an earlier Egyptian-mediated deal. According to Israeli authorities, 24 hostages are believed to be alive in Gaza, while the bodies of 35 others are still being held.
Israel has also blocked humanitarian aid from entering Gaza, insisting that Hamas must first agree to a ceasefire extension. Hamas, in turn, has accused Israel of backtracking on commitments made in previous negotiations.
Desperation and Hunger
Since Israel launched its war on Hamas following the group’s October 7 attack, which killed 1,200 people in Israel and saw 251 taken hostage, the humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated rapidly. According to the enclave’s health ministry, more than 50,000 Palestinians have died since the war began.
With a weeks-long blockade cutting off food supplies, hunger has reached critical levels. On Wednesday, desperate civilians broke into a UN warehouse in Gaza’s Al-Tuffah neighborhood, looting bags of flour meant for humanitarian relief.
Hungary to Exit ICC as Orban Hosts Netanyahu
Meanwhile, Hungary has announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC), a move revealed on Wednesday as Prime Minister Viktor Orban welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—who is currently wanted by the court—to Budapest.
Standing alongside Netanyahu, Orban justified the decision by calling the ICC a “political tool.”
“This very important court has been diminished to a political tool, and Hungary wishes to play no role in it,” Orban declared during a joint press conference.
Netanyahu praised the move, calling it “bold and principled,” and suggesting that Hungary may be the first of many countries to follow suit.
The two leaders delivered brief remarks but did not take any questions from the press.
Netanyahu’s First European Visit Since Arrest Warrant
Netanyahu’s visit to Hungary marks the first time he has set foot on European soil since the ICC issued an arrest warrant against him, former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and three senior Hamas officials in May 2024.
The court alleges there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that Netanyahu is criminally responsible for war crimes, including “starvation as a method of warfare” and “crimes against humanity, murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts.”
Netanyahu dismissed the accusations as “absurd and antisemitic.”
“Israel utterly rejects the absurd and false actions and accusations against it by the International Criminal Court, which is a politically biased and discriminatory body,” his office said in response.
As a signatory to the Rome Statute, Hungary is technically obliged to arrest Netanyahu. Instead, Orban’s government gave him a red-carpet welcome at Budapest’s Buda Castle, complete with a formal ceremony at the Lion’s Court.
Hungary, A Lone Voice in Europe?
Hungary’s decision to leave the ICC places it on a collision course with other European Union members. If the withdrawal goes through, Hungary will become the only EU nation not part of the ICC.
Hungary’s State Secretary for International Communication and Relations, Zoltan Kovacs, confirmed that the withdrawal process would begin on Thursday, stating that it would be done “in line with Hungary’s constitutional and international legal obligations.”
The ICC has yet to issue a formal response to Hungary’s decision.
Reactions across the EU remain divided. Ireland and Spain have openly stated they would arrest Netanyahu if he entered their territory. France and Germany, on the other hand, have taken a more cautious stance, questioning whether the ICC has jurisdiction over Israel, since Israel is not a member of the court.
More than 120 countries are signatories to the Rome Statute, but several major powers—including the United States, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—are not members.
Netanyahu and the ICC
The ICC’s arrest warrant against Netanyahu is historic, marking the first time the court has targeted the leader of a key U.S. ally. It places Netanyahu in the same category as Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom the ICC has charged over Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, who was facing ICC charges before his capture and execution in 2011.
Both Donald Trump and Joe Biden have criticized the ICC’s decision to issue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant. Under Trump, the U.S. went as far as imposing economic and travel sanctions on ICC officials investigating American citizens and allies.
At the same time, the ICC issued arrest warrants for three top Hamas leaders:
Yahya Sinwar (Hamas leader in Gaza)
Mohammed Deif (Commander of Al-Qassam Brigades)
Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas political chief)
Since then, all three have been killed by Israeli forces during the ongoing war.
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is in Thailand to attend the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand, his very presence underscores a profound transformation in India’s foreign policy priorities, a deliberate recalibration from the once-central SAARC to the ascendant BIMSTEC. This summit in Thailand serves as a vibrant testament to BIMSTEC’s on-going vitality and sustained momentum in stark contrast to SAARC which languishes in a state of suspended animation, its summit-level engagements frozen since 2014. BIMSTEC’s recent adoption and enforcement of its charter further epitomizes its institutional invigoration, a stark counterpoint to SAARC, whose charter, dating back to 1985, presides over an organization mired in inertia. Thus, the Thailand summit solidifies BIMSTEC’s prominence as the preferred vehicle for Bay of Bengal regional cooperation, while SAARC’s relevance recedes amidst a lack of engagement.
Donald Trump’s resurgence in the US has weakened globalization, elevating regionalization as the new dominant paradigm. In South Asia, while SAARC was created to foster regional integration and development, its progress has been hampered. Consequently, India increasingly favours BIMSTEC as a more viable platform for regional cooperation. This paper will analyse India’s strategic shift by examining SAARC’s decline, the factors driving India’s focus on BIMSTEC, and SAARC’s current relevance.
The Decline of SAARC: A Victim of Geopolitical Rivalry
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985 with the efforts of Zia-ur-Rehman, was founded with the noble aim of fostering economic and social development, cultural exchange, and regional stability among eight South Asian nations. However, SAARC’s trajectory has been marred by persistent challenges, primarily stemming from the complex and often antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan.
The India-Pakistan rivalry has been the most significant impediment to SAARC’s effectiveness. Deep-seated mistrust and conflicting strategic interests have prevented meaningful cooperation on key issues. Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism has further strained relations with India, leading to heightened tensions and a breakdown of dialogue. The 2016 terror attack in Uri and the subsequent cancellation of the SAARC summit in Islamabad epitomize the extent to which the India-Pakistan conflict has paralysed the organization.
Beyond the India-Pakistan dynamic, SAARC has also suffered from a lack of institutional capacity, inadequate resources and varying levels of commitment from member states. Key initiatives, such as the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) signed in 2004, have made slow progress, and connectivity projects have faced significant delays. This has contributed to a perception of SAARC as an ineffective and dysfunctional grouping. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has characterized it as a “jammed vehicle”, aptly capturing the organization’s inability to convene a summit after the Uri attack in 2016.”
The Rise of BIMSTEC: A Strategic Imperative for India
In contrast to SAARC’s stagnation, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), founded in 1997 and comprising five South Asian and two South-east Asian countries, has emerged as a more promising platform for India’s regional aspirations in 21st century. BIMSTEC’s growing importance in India’s foreign policy calculus is driven by a combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors.
BIMSTEC is located in a strategic location i.e. Bay of Bengal which connects South Asia with south-east Asia. The Bay of Bengal is a crucial maritime space and part of wider Indo-Pacific region, and BIMSTEC allows India to enhance its maritime security, promote connectivity, and expand its trade links with South-east Asia and East Asia. At the 2017 BIMSTEC summit meeting, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had said, “It is a natural platform to fulfil our key foreign policy priorities of Neighbourhood First and Act East”, as it connects not only South and South-east Asia, but also the ecologies of the Great Himalayas and the Bay of Bengal.
Moreover, BIMSTEC offers India a way to foster regional cooperation while circumventing the obstacles posed by Pakistan within SAARC. Since SAARC has been internally fraught, with the Indo-Pak rivalry at the heart of the organization proving to be a paralyzing deadlock. For New Delhi, the hopes of an India led model of regionalism will never be possible with Pakistan in the same grouping. Thus, the logic of convenience dictates that “SAARC minus Pakistan” is the road ahead if India wants to be a regional leader in its neighbourhood. This does not mean that BIMSTEC stands in opposition to SAARC. In fact, the Bay of Bengal community could complement SAARC efforts in promoting a South Asian free trade area. However, South Asia is incomplete without Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus, India’s shift from SAARC to BIMSTEC is imagining its neighbourhood not from a continental, South Asian frame of reference but a maritime one, which is a corollary to its advances in the east over the years.
A point to be noted that BIMSTEC had not been on the top of Modi’s agenda until September 2016, when Pakistan based terrorists targeted the Uri base camp of the army. This terror attack jolted the government’s trust in the Pakistani leadership’s fight against terror. India then renewed its push for BIMSTEC, which had existed for almost two decades but been somewhat neglected. At the BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa) summit in Goa, Modi also hosted an outreach summit with BIMSTEC leaders in October 2016. This gave a big push to the India–BIMSTEC relationship.
The recent India’s growing engagement with BIMSTEC is also shaped by the evolving geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. The rise of China and its increasing assertiveness have created new challenges and opportunities for India.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has entrenched itself in BIMSTEC economies by financing ports, highways, and power projects. In Myanmar, China’s investment in the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port gives it strategic access to the Bay of Bengal. In Sri Lanka, the Hambantota port, leased to China for 99 years, exemplifies Beijing’s debt diplomacy. If India does not take decisive action, the region could gradually fall under China’s strategic influence.
Thus, having deeper ties with the littoral states and a supportive and cooperative neighbourhood as well as offering greater commitments to the region in terms of being a net-security provider would help India counter the advances that China has been making. BIMSTEC provides India with a platform to offer alternative connectivity and development initiatives, fostering a more balanced regional order and countering China’s growing influence.
Since Pakistan is not a part of BIMSTEC, India has used the organisation to isolate its neighbour diplomatically within South Asia. However, such an approach is restrictive in nature. According to a recent World Bank report, South Asia is one of the most densely populated but poorly integrated regions in the world. Its intraregional trade is less than five per cent of the total trade of South Asian countries. The report adds that although there is potential to double this figure, it will not be achieved through SAARC, as the organisation has fallen victim to the bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan. Herein lies the opportunity that BIMSTEC provides and to leverage the organisation India should focus on the connectivity projects in and around the Bay of Bengal region. This could help unleash the potential of its seven Northeast states—Myanmar’s Sittwe Port is closer to the Northeast than Kolkata. Furthermore, physical connectivity would also help India integrate with ASEAN’s Master Plan of Connectivity 2025. India has already invested in the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement.
This does not mean that BIMSTEC stands in opposition to SAARC. In fact, the Bay of Bengal community could complement SAARC efforts in promoting a South Asian free trade area.
Challenges and Opportunities
While BIMSTEC presents significant opportunities for India, it also faces challenges that need to be addressed. The constraints that India faces in terms of prioritizing BIMSTEC over SAARC are two-fold.
First, India’s prioritization of BIMSTEC has often been seen by analysts as a “rebound relationship”, which only resurfaces every time if there is talk of the need for a replacement for SAARC. The idea of BIMSTEC has generated scepticism even among leaders of member states, like Nepalese Prime Minister KP Oli and Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena, who have said that the grouping should not replace SAARC. In simple terms, BIMSTEC should have a rationale of its own along with a clear vision and actionable goals that appeal to all its members. Advancing BIMSTEC as a replacement of SAARC would only breed resistance, which could result in lack of political will on the part of member states with stakes in both groupings
The second constraint is more logistical and conceptual. BIMSTEC’s own record has been dismal in terms of concrete achievements. In over 25 years, it has only five summits to its name. Until 2014, it did not even have a Secretariat and even at present, the secretariat is severely understaffed with a paltry budget. India has to overcome the tag of underperforming in this grouping and if it has to champion regionalism with this new cartography, it has to walk the talk on its commitments.
While the shift from SAARC to BIMSTEC is a shift of convenience and necessity, its success would depend on New Delhi’s political will and its ability to deliver on its promises to its neighbours. Also, the political instability in Bangladesh and Myanmar further adds uncertainty in the region.
SAARC’s Relevance in Present Times: Potential Amidst Challenges
Despite India’s shift towards BIMSTEC, the question of SAARC’s relevance in the current geopolitical landscape remains. While SAARC has been plagued by challenges, there are arguments for its potential importance.
Scholars argues that SAARC still provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation among South Asian countries, addressing common challenges such as poverty, climate change, and disaster management. Reviving SAARC could potentially foster greater regional economic integration and connectivity, unlocking the region’s economic potential.
As former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “success of SAARC lies in the eyes of beholder.” SAARC’s success is like a half-filledglass, it depends on our perception how we see it. For instance, since its inception SAARC has its own Charter, even it has signed SAFTA early in 2004 whereas BIMSTEC still lags in it and other initiatives includes South Asian University, South Asia satellite, SAARC food Bank , SAARC milk grid etc.
Umran Chowdhury, Research Associate at the Cosmos Foundation and the Bay of Bengal Institute in Bangladesh contrasts SAARC and BIMSTEC: “SAARC was supposed to be our version of the EU or ASEAN, whereas BIMSTEC is like a sub-regional organisation on the sidelines—like the Council of Europe or Union for the Mediterranean.” This distinction is critical. SAARC sought to integrate South Asia in a way that mirrored the European Union’s success. However, its internal dysfunction, primarily caused by Indo-Pakistani tensions, rendered it ineffective. BIMSTEC, by contrast, has a more focused economic and strategic role, less free from SAARC’s political baggage.
Recently The Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunus, head of Bangladesh’s interim government, has signalled a desire to revive SAARC. Even Pakistan has consistently pushed for SAARC’s revival. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif emphasised Pakistan’s readiness to play its part in rejuvenating the organisation, highlighting the vast untapped potential for regional development, connectivity, and cooperation among South Asian countries.
As Atal Bihari Vajpayee said, “we can change our friends, but we can’t change our neighbours.” South Asia is a basket case of all non-conventional security threats- terrorism, drug trafficking, extremism, climate change impacts. In this scenario importance of SAARC as regional organisation increases because it is the only organisation which includes all the South Asian countries. As SD Muni says “SAARC is not a history, it has to be future.” For which there is need to think regionally on the issues that impact the subcontinent as whole. India’s global ambitions depend on its capacity to convince its neighbours that India’s rise is an opportunity for them, not a threat.
However, the persistent challenges that SAARC is facing, particularly the India-Pakistan rivalry, continue to undermine its effectiveness. The lack of progress on key initiatives and the absence of regular summits raise serious questions about SAARC’s ability to deliver meaningful outcomes. Furthermore, the rise of alternative regional platforms, such as BIMSTEC, and the growing focus on bilateral and sub-regional cooperation initiatives like Bangladesh–China–India Myanmar Forum, with the proactive membership of China and BBIN have further diminished SAARC’s centrality.
Further, we still do not know if Afghanistan will be part of SAARC further complicating matters. Having the brutal Taliban regime as a SAARC member would severely tarnish the brand.
Conclusion
India’s strategic pivot from SAARC to BIMSTEC reflects the changing geopolitical landscape of South Asia and India’s evolving regional priorities. SAARC’s decline, hampered by the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan, has created a vacuum that BIMSTEC is increasingly filling. BIMSTEC offers India a more effective platform to pursue its economic, strategic, and geopolitical interests, enhancing its connectivity, promoting regional integration, and countering the growing influence of China.
While challenges remain, BIMSTEC has the potential to play a vital role in shaping a stable, prosperous, and India-centric regional order in the Indo-Pacific. SAARC, in the meantime, faces an uncertain future, with its relevance contingent on overcoming persistent challenges and demonstrating a renewed commitment to regional cooperation. Reviving SAARC will take a lot of political capital.
As C. Rajamohan says “a nation’s destiny is linked to its neighbours”. India’s ambitions to become global power depend on its capacity to convince its neighbours that its rise is an opportunity for them, not a threat. For this, The Gujral doctrine and Neighbourhood First policy can be a way forward.
Conscription isn’t new for Russia, it happens twice a year, but the numbers are steadily rising as Putin pushes to expand the military. Three years ago, Russia had around 1 million military personnel; now, it’s closer to 1.5 million.
Officially, Russia doesn’t send fresh conscripts straight into combat zones. But reports suggest that many are pressured or tricked into signing contracts that send them straight to the front lines. Others have ended up in the crosshairs, like during Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Kursk last August.
While Russian forces continue heavy attacks in Donetsk and bombard Ukrainian cities, diplomacy is also in motion. Senior Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev is heading to Washington this week to meet Trump’s top aide Steve Witkoff. This marks the first time a high-ranking Russian official has visited the U.S. since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, signaling a shift in U.S.-Russia relations since Trump returned to office in January.
Trump himself recently admitted in a interview that Russia might be “dragging their feet” in negotiations. Putin, for his part, outright rejected Trump’s latest ceasefire proposal – unless, of course, U.S. sanctions are lifted. Talks continue, but so do the airstrikes and military maneuvers.
Trump Spares Russia from Tariffs as Putin’s Top Negotiator Visits Washington, Ukraine Left in the Cold
Donald Trump’s latest round of tariffs kicks in today, hitting multiple countries with major new trade barriers – but Russia is nowhere on the list. And that’s raising eyebrows, especially as war-torn Ukraine faces a 10% tariff from the U.S.
The White House has offered no explanation for why Russia is getting a free pass, but the timing is telling. Putin’s investment envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, one of the most U.S.-savvy figures in Russia’s elite, was in Washington yesterday, meeting with top Trump officials. Dmitriev, the highest-ranking Russian official to visit the U.S. since the 2022 invasion, was invited by Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff.
His visit comes as the Trump administration continues pushing for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. While unveiling the tariffs on Wednesday, Trump spoke of “good cooperation” between the two countries and reiterated his desire to end the war.
That message didn’t sit well in Kyiv. Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called out Trump’s repeated praise of Russia, suggesting that Ukraine is being sidelined. With Washington warming up to Moscow while slapping Ukraine with new tariffs, the power dynamics in this war just got even more complicated.
Russia-Ukraine, The Long Road to “Peace”
Putin’s strategy has been clear – grind Ukraine down militarily, fracture Western support, and push Kyiv into accepting a settlement on his terms. Russia has steadily gained ground in eastern Ukraine, leveraged support from countries like North Korea and China, and waited for political shifts in the West to work in its favor.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has been holding on with Western aid, but with US out of the picture, cracks are showing. The U.S. and Europe are struggling with war fatigue, economic pressures, and shifting political ecosystem. If Ukraine keeps losing territory it may have to consider some form of negotiation – though Zelensky will resist any deal that cedes Ukrainian land.
A potential scenario? A frozen conflict, like Korea, no real peace, but a heavily militarized stalemate with periodic skirmishes. Another possibility – a Ukraine-Russia deal brokered by the U.S. that forces Kyiv to accept unfavorable conditions in exchange for Western security guarantees.
Russia-US. A New Era of “Transactional” Diplomacy
Trump’s return changes the game completely. His foreign policy isn’t about ideology; it’s about deals. He sees Putin not as an enemy, but as a player he can negotiate with. By exempting Russia from tariffs and engaging in backchannel talks, Trump is signaling that he’s open to “resetting” relations – possibly in exchange for concessions in Ukraine, the Middle East, or even trade agreements.
But this doesn’t mean a full-on U.S.-Russia alliance. The American deep state (Pentagon, CIA, Congress) remains deeply anti-Russia. If Trump pushes too hard for reconciliation, he’ll face massive pushback domestically. And if Russia gets too aggressive – say, by escalating in NATO-adjacent regions – Trump might be forced to take a tougher stance.
What’s the Likely Outcome?
A shaky ceasefire in Ukraine, likely imposed under U.S. pressure, leaving Russia with some territorial gains while Ukraine gets military and economic guarantees from the West.
A temporary US-Russia thaw under Trump, more about tactical cooperation than true alliance, with Russia potentially giving something in return (nuclear arms control talks, Middle East cooperation, etc.).
A return to tensions if Trump loses in 2028, because any future U.S. administration will likely revert to a hardline stance on Russia.
One wild card is China. If Russia gets too close to the U.S., it might strain its deepening ties with Beijing, which has been a crucial economic and political ally. A balancing act for Putin, no doubt.
The war won’t end in a clean victory for either side, and U.S.-Russia relations will remain fluid – transactional under Trump, hostile under anyone else. But for Ukraine? The future looks increasingly like a compromise, not a triumph.
