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July 1, 2025
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North Korea’s War Machine Is Getting Scarier, Fast. Giant Warship Spotted, Hypersonic Missiles In Sight, U.S. Command Warns

New satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is constructing what appears to be its largest and most sophisticated warship to date at the Nampo shipyard on its western coast, potentially doubling the size of any current vessel in the DPRK’s naval fleet.

Imagery captured on April 6 by Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs reveals continued work on a guided-missile frigate (FFG) estimated to measure approximately 140 meters (459 feet) in length. This marks a significant advancement in North Korean naval architecture and force projection capability.

The analysis, conducted by Joseph Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), notes the vessel is likely designed to accommodate vertical launch systems (VLS) for deploying missiles against both land and maritime targets. Such a configuration suggests North Korea may be seeking to emulate modern blue-water naval capabilities, which are typically seen in more advanced navies.

For context, the FFG under construction is approaching the dimensions of the U.S. Navy’s new Constellation-class frigates (496 feet) and not far behind the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (505 feet), though its operational capabilities remain speculative.

This development aligns with Pyongyang’s ongoing military modernization program. Despite enduring sanctions under multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, North Korea has tested a range of advanced systems in recent years – including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and what it claims are hypersonic glide vehicles.

The Nampo frigate’s design appears to incorporate vertical launch cells and phased-array radar systems, according to analysts, suggesting a leap in both offensive and defensive capabilities. Such features, if operationalized, would represent a significant upgrade over North Korea’s existing fleet, which has largely consisted of aging Soviet-era vessels and domestically produced corvettes and patrol boats.

Still, experts advise caution in assessing the platform’s future readiness. “Modern warships represent an integration challenge of communications, electronics, weapons, and both electronic and acoustic sensor technologies,” said Carl Schuster, a former U.S. Navy captain and maritime analyst based in Hawaii. “Almost any shipbuilder can construct the hull. The real challenge is the integration of systems.”

The cost of building and sustaining such a platform is also under scrutiny. South Korean lawmaker Kim Byung-kee, a member of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, recently questioned whether Pyongyang possesses the fiscal or logistical capacity to support the vessel post-launch, particularly in areas such as fuel, maintenance, and crew training.

Yet analysts warn against complacency. Retired ROK Navy Admiral Kim Duk-ki noted that North Korea’s strengthened ties with Russia – especially since the onset of the Ukraine war – may be providing Pyongyang with advanced missile technologies and integration expertise. He further cautioned that if the vessel is ultimately equipped with the hypersonic ballistic missile reportedly tested in January, it could be a “game changer” in the region’s naval power balance.

Schuster, after reviewing the latest imagery, estimates that the ship remains at least a year away from sea trials, citing the absence of superstructure elements, sensor arrays, and weapons systems.

While uncertainties remain about the vessel’s operational timeline and capabilities, it is clear that North Korea intends to join the ranks of nations capable of fielding larger, more versatile surface combatants, signaling a potential evolution in both strategy and posture in the Indo-Pacific.

North Korea, warship

North Korea Accelerates Naval Modernization Amid Hypersonic Ambitions, U.S. Command Warns
While North Korea’s naval fleet remains numerically significant, its qualitative shortcomings are drawing renewed attention amid Pyongyang’s escalating modernization efforts, spanning from new surface warships to advanced missile technologies, including hypersonic systems.

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2021 assessment, the Korean People’s Navy maintains an inventory of approximately 400 patrol combatants and 70 submarines. However, the bulk of these assets are considered outdated and limited in capability. Most vessels are small, aging platforms ill-suited for modern warfare beyond coastal defense roles.

Defense analyst Joseph Dempsey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes that North Korea’s fleet of principal surface combatants is essentially restricted to two Najin-class frigates, 1,600-ton platforms originating from the early 1970s. In a January analysis, Dempsey described the frigates as “obsolete,” illustrating the widening capability gap between North Korea’s surface forces and those of regional adversaries such as South Korea and the United States.

Nevertheless, under Kim Jong Un’s directive, Pyongyang is pressing forward with an aggressive naval modernization strategy. In addition to the under-construction 140-meter guided-missile frigate at Nampo shipyard (believed to be the largest surface combatant ever developed by North Korea) new assets are reportedly in progress at multiple shipyards.

South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-won confirmed that work is also underway on a nuclear-powered submarine in Sinpo and a possible second frigate or destroyer in Chongjin. These developments signal a strategic pivot toward expanding blue-water operational potential and deterrence posture beyond North Korea’s traditional littoral constraints.

Kim has also overseen preparations for a new naval port to accommodate these larger warships.

Simultaneously, U.S. military officials are voicing growing concern over Pyongyang’s accelerating missile programs. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing this week, U.S. Forces Korea commander General Xavier T. Brunson stated that North Korea is likely to develop both hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) within the next year.

“In the coming year, we expect [North Korea] to further develop hypersonic and multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle capabilities to complete their government’s goals,” Gen. Brunson told lawmakers, underscoring the regime’s ongoing commitment to expanding its strategic strike options despite increasing international isolation.

To date, North Korea has launched over 47 ballistic missiles while intensifying research and development on both cruise and hypersonic glide vehicle technologies. This rapid progress is believed to be supported, in part, by renewed military-industrial cooperation with Russia, as Pyongyang shifts its strategic doctrine away from unification and toward permanent sovereignty.

He further emphasized the strategic deterrence role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK): “What USFK provides is the potential to impose cost in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to impose cost in the West Sea to China, and to continue to deter against North Korea as it currently stands.”

Latest North Korean ship can carry dozens of missiles: Analysts
North Korea’s Military Behavior

At the dawn of 2024, Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing doctrine of peaceful reunification rooted in Korean nationalism and instead introduced a two-state theory – effectively signaling a strategic and ideological rupture with South Korea. This shift laid the groundwork for a more aggressive military posture. Throughout the year, North Korea continued its belligerent approach, blending high-profile strategic provocations with lower-intensity hostilities. Yet, despite expectations of a heightened military campaign, the intensity of provocations remained relatively restrained.

In the first half of the year, Pyongyang carried out a series of strategic weapon tests. However, as the year progressed, its focus pivoted to low-intensity activities targeting South Korea, while simultaneously deepening its military involvement in the Ukraine war. This transition suggests that from mid-2024 onwards, North Korea has strategically opted to maintain a calibrated level of tension through persistent, low-level provocations, rather than triggering outright escalation.

In total, North Korea conducted 22 tests and training launches involving strategic weapons in 2024. Of these, a striking 81% were centered on tactical nuclear delivery systems – underscoring a persistent focus on enhancing battlefield nuclear capabilities. Key developments included the unveiling of two hypersonic medium-range ballistic missiles, notably the Hwasong-16n, and the Hwasong-19, a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, Pyongyang’s effort to validate its ICBM capabilities through a satellite reconnaissance launch faltered, particularly following a failed launch in May 2024.

Compared to 2023, the frequency of strategic provocations dropped, but North Korea pivoted toward the operational deployment of nuclear systems and actively demonstrated its capacity for nuclear weapon mass production. Missile launch vehicles and uranium enrichment facilities were deployed in a way that showcased not just technological advancement but battlefield readiness.

The regime continued to weaponize the gray zone – executing provocations that stop short of conventional warfare. From dispersing “sewage balloons” across the border to jamming GPS signals and broadcasting propaganda, North Korea sustained a campaign of asymmetric disruption. Infrastructure sabotage, including the destruction of inter-Korean roads, railways, and power lines, further heightened tensions along the border. These acts, while aggressive, appear to reflect a broader strategy of reinforcing domestic defenses rather than triggering full-scale conflict.

This deliberate use of low-intensity measures appears to be a calculated effort to conserve resources while maintaining adversarial pressure, setting the stage for a potential escalation in 2025. This strategic buildup has been buoyed by deepening North Korea-Russia relations.

On June 19, 2024, Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a sweeping strategic partnership agreement. By October, the alliance had evolved into a full-fledged military partnership, with Pyongyang dispatching an estimated 11,000 troops to support Russian operations in Ukraine. In return, North Korea is believed to have received advanced weapons, as well as nuclear and missile technologies, which could serve as the foundation for more audacious provocations in the near future.

Kim Jong Un calls for war readiness as North Korea tests more missiles | AP  News

Policy Implications for South Korea

As 2025 marks the final year of North Korea’s current five-year defense development plan, the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party, and the beginning of the second term for Donald Trump, it is widely anticipated that Pyongyang will escalate its military activities against both South Korea and the United States.

This potential for heightened tensions mirrors the volatile climate of 2017, which ultimately transitioned into diplomatic engagement in 2018. It is likely that North Korea aims to replicate this tension-escalation-to-negotiation cycle to its advantage.

For the South Korean government, this scenario amid Trump administration presents layered challenges, although the current military posture remains stable, there is concern about the strength of the command structure during this transitional period.

Trump’s transactional approach to alliances suggests that demands for greater defense cost-sharing or a reduction in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could be a challenge. Should South Korean leadership hesitate in making swift and strategic decisions, the cohesion and effectiveness of the ROK-U.S. alliance could be undermined.

In light of this, it is imperative for Seoul and Washington to maintain a united and consistent front. North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine war introduces additional complexity that could factor into broader geopolitical negotiations, particularly as the Trump administration seeks a grand bargain to resolve the conflict.

Should this resolve falter, 2025 could end up being a strategic triumph for North Korea, one that shifts the regional balance and emboldens further authoritarian assertiveness.

The Canadian Army Is Falling Apart And Money Alone Can’t Fix It

If there’s one point of agreement across Canada, and increasingly among its concerned allies, it’s the dismal state of the Canadian Army. But despite growing global threats and rising expectations, the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF biggest problem is not a shortage of money; in fact, as a recent Radio-Canada investigation reveals, it’s the inability to spend what it already has that’s dragging the military into deeper dysfunction.

Defence Minister Bill Blair in strong words described the CAF as being in a “death spiral” during the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence in March. It’s not hard to see why. The forces are currently short about 16,000 personnel. Critical procurement programs are behind schedule or indefinitely stalled. NATO continues to pressure Canada to meet the 2 percent of GDP defense spending target, but spending alone isn’t the cure.

From 2017 to 2026, Canada’s defense budget has surged by 70 percent, yet capability and preparedness have lagged dramatically behind.

Canadian Armed Forces, CAF

A Procurement Machine That Moves at a Glacial Pace
Peel back the layers, and what emerges is a pattern of procurement paralysis. Programs stretch out over decades, with costs ballooning and deliverables shrinking. Frigates, submarines, and even basic tactical vehicles have all become sorry tales of bureaucratic overreach and poor execution.

The Canadian Army’s artillery acquisition is a particularly sobering example: it took two decades to acquire just over 100 artillery pieces – while Russia lost over 1,500 in just two and a half years in Ukraine!

Thus, this reflects a deeply embedded dysfunction in how Canada plans, funds, and executes its defense strategy.

Billions Left Unused, Year After Year
More funding may sound like a solution, but according to Radio-Canada, “if tomorrow morning the Canadian government were to allocate $15 billion more annually to the Department of National Defence to meet its NATO commitments, the Canadian Forces wouldn’t know what to do with it.”

Unspent defense funds have surged. Since 2018-2019, annual underspending has ballooned from $500 million to $2.5 billion by 2021-2022, roughly 9.4% of the total defense budget. Go back further, and the numbers are even more confounding: in the decade before Trudeau came to power, nearly a quarter of the Department of National Defence’s procurement budget, over $7 billion, went untouched.

The 2017 defense policy paper, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” had promised a bold new chapter with $553 billion in additional spending over 20 years. But seven years later, many of those promises remain unfulfilled, and the gap between rhetoric and reality is only widening.

Why Can’t Canada Spend Its Defense Money?
Officially, the Department of National Defence says it adopts a “flexible funding model,” allowing for fluctuations in how projects are financed across years. But insiders paint a different picture. Chronic project mismanagement, an inability to meet timelines, and a shortfall of skilled personnel – both civilian and military – have created a toxic cycle. As a result, funds go unspent, projects go unfulfilled, and Canada falls further behind its allies in strategic readiness.

A Department Stagnant While the World Moves Forward
Between 2010 and 2023, Canada’s federal public service workforce grew by 26%, yet the Department of National Defence (DND) experienced almost no growth in staffing, only a marginal 0.2% increase. This comes despite an overwhelming surge in the scope of projects aimed at modernizing Canada’s defense capabilities, including the acquisition of planes, helicopters, tanks, and ships. As one source close to the department’s budget process bluntly stated to Radio-Canada, “We don’t lack projects or ideas for spending money; we’re just incapable of doing it.”

Canadian Army Training March Conducted in Cornwall

Procurement Problems, An Ongoing Struggle
The challenges surrounding defense procurement are not new, and they have become a point of contention across the political spectrum. Figures like federal ministers Jean-Yves Duclos and Bill Blair, opposition MPs such as James Bezan, and DND’s own annual plans all indicate the same issue – systemic inefficiencies that continue to plague the department.

Critics, including Bezan, argue that the Trudeau government’s defense policies have failed to deliver on their promises. He pointed out that the “Strong, Secure, Engaged” defense policy document, released under the Liberals’ leadership, was little more than a series of unfulfilled promises. According to Bezan, “They missed every marker set out in the original defense policy for defense spending, resulting in massive gaps in equipment and readiness. Trudeau has overspent in every department except our military, yet his government promised to cut almost $1 billion annually from the defense budget and allowed over $10 billion more to lapse over eight years.”

The Cost of Delays, A Decade of Inaction
Perhaps the most glaring example of the DND’s failure to meet its own deadlines is the delayed replacement of the Royal Navy’s destroyers and frigates. Announced in 2011 by the Harper government, this project was supposed to deliver 15 new combat ships, but thirteen years later, not a single ship has been built. Instead, Defense Minister Bill Blair’s recent visit to the Irving shipyard in Halifax to mark the “first steel cut” felt like a long-forgotten milestone. What was originally slated to cost $26 billion is now projected to run up a staggering $60 billion. And the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Yves Giroux, has estimated that the final price could balloon to over $80 billion, approximately $5.3 billion per ship.

Despite these massive cost overruns, the Trudeau government insisted that efforts to improve defense procurement were underway. In his speech at CANSEC 2024, Minister of Public Services and Procurement Jean-Yves Duclos stressed the government’s commitment to reforming the system. “Defense procurement can be a long and arduous process. We are undertaking a review of defense procurement to determine how we can accelerate the process. To achieve this transformation, we will need to challenge the status quo,” Duclos said.

The Army’s Struggles. Recruitment and Readiness
Meanwhile, the Canadian Army faces an array of challenges that further undermine its operational readiness. With a shortfall of over 16,000 personnel, compounded by poor living conditions and outdated recruitment efforts, the Army is struggling to maintain its strength. Its equipment gaps, including inadequate air defense systems and artillery, prevent Canada from integrating effectively with NATO allies or responding to emerging global threats.

Moreover, deficiencies in training and subpar infrastructure have compounded these challenges, damaging both morale and operational capacity. The need for systemic reform and significant political will has never been more urgent.

The Canadian Army is struggling with a series of interconnected crises that threaten its ability to recruit, retain, equip, and train personnel capable of addressing the evolving nature of warfare in the 2020s.

These challenges go beyond logistical and administrative inefficiencies; they strike at the very heart of the Army’s operational capacity, endangering Canada’s ability to defend itself and to contribute effectively to collective security alongside its allies.

Retention is a growing issue that adds to the problem. Many soldiers leave the service due to poor living conditions, limited opportunities for career progression, and the constant stress that comes with burnout. Housing shortages at major military bases, such as Petawawa and Edmonton, add to the financial strain felt by service members and their families.

For example, soldiers stationed at Petawawa report having to contend with rising local rent prices, forcing some to commute long distances or accept substandard on-base housing. These challenges not only contribute to high attrition but also damage morale, leaving the remaining personnel overburdened and demoralized.

Canadian Armed Forces to increase its ranks to 86,000 | Ottawa Citizen

Cultural and Societal Shifts Impacting Recruitment
Beyond these logistical challenges, changing societal attitudes towards military service present a growing hurdle. The military is increasingly viewed as out of touch by younger generations, and concerns over instability and insufficient support for veterans deter many from considering a career in the Armed Forces. Canada’s current recruitment strategies are struggling to connect with the aspirations of today’s youth, who often perceive military service as disconnected from their career goals.

In contrast to countries like the United States and Australia, which have built successful recruitment campaigns that illustrate military service as a path to career development—particularly in fields like science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)—Canada’s messaging lacks a clear, compelling narrative.

The country’s defense forces fail to promote their role in shaping national security and contributing to global peace in a way that resonates with modern priorities. If Canada hopes to reverse the decline in recruitment, it must reconsider its approach and craft a message that aligns more closely with the interests and values of younger Canadians.

Deficiencies in Equipment and Training
The Canadian Army’s challenges extend far beyond recruitment and retention issues only, encompassing critical deficiencies in equipment and training that render it increasingly ill-prepared for modern warfare. The military’s procurement system, burdened by persistent delays and budget overruns, has struggled to provide the tools required to meet evolving threats.

While Canada has made some upgrades to its fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles, these vehicles remain inadequate against adversaries armed with sophisticated technologies like drones and precision-guided munitions.

The Army’s arsenal also lacks crucial systems such as long-range artillery, advanced air defense systems, and unmanned aerial systems. These gaps are particularly concerning given the rapid pace of technological advancements in warfare. NATO allies, including Poland, have made substantial investments in modernizing their forces, including acquiring HIMARS artillery systems. Canada’s delays in procuring similar equipment underscore a dangerous complacency and a failure to keep pace with the threats of the 21st century.

During recent NATO exercises, Canadian forces struggled to integrate with allies equipped with advanced electronic warfare and drone systems, showing the operational risks posed by these technological shortcomings. While Canada’s contributions to NATO operations, such as the deployment of 800 troops to Latvia, are symbolically important, they lack the scale and sophistication needed to present a credible deterrent to Russian aggression. In contrast, Germany’s expanded deployment to Lithuania, which included cutting-edge combat vehicles and integrated air defense systems, illustrates the kind of technological commitment that Canada must strive to match.

The Unmet Promises of ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’
The Liberal government’s defense policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, was hailed as a transformative strategy that promised significant investments in defense. However, many of its key commitments remain unrealized. For instance, the procurement of new logistics trucks, which has been a pressing need for years, has faced continued delays. As a result, Canadian soldiers are still relying on aging vehicles ill-suited for modern operations. While acquisitions like Leopard 2 tanks are steps in the right direction, they do not compensate for decades of underinvestment in the Army’s capabilities.

Southerners' help Canadian soldiers maintain readiness | Article | The  United States Army

Training Gaps and Modern Warfare
The Army’s training infrastructure has also failed to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of warfare. In modern conflicts, success increasingly depends on the integration of advanced technologies such as cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, and electronic warfare. Unfortunately, Canada’s training exercises remain focused on outdated paradigms that emphasize conventional warfare rather than adaptability and technological integration.

For example, while nations like the United Kingdom and the United States have already incorporated joint multi-domain operations into their training regimens, Canada’s approach remains rooted in traditional tactics. The recent Maple Resolve training exercise, though valuable for basic readiness, revealed significant gaps in Canada’s ability to simulate electronic warfare scenarios or counter-drone operations – domains that are becoming critical in high-intensity conflicts.

Substandard Living Conditions and Infrastructure
The Army’s operational challenges are compounded by inadequate housing and infrastructure, which further hinder its readiness and morale. Many soldiers are forced to live in substandard housing or face exorbitant rental prices near bases, placing unnecessary strain on their financial and emotional well-being. The lack of adequate facilities for training and medical care only adds to these burdens, creating an environment in which morale continues to deteriorate.

This neglect is more than just an oversight – it represents a breach of the social contract between the state and the service members it asks to defend the country. For example, reports from bases like CFB Edmonton highlight deteriorating barracks, plagued by issues such as mold and insufficient heating, symbolizing the government’s disregard for the welfare of its military personnel.

A Scattershot Deployment and Strategic Incoherence
The Canadian Army’s approach to deployment exemplifies its broader strategic incoherence. The decision to stretch limited resources across numerous missions dilutes their effectiveness and places undue strain on already overstretched personnel. A prime example of this is the deployment in Latvia, where a small contingent of troops, without the necessary logistical or technological support, highlights the perils of prioritizing quantity over quality. A more focused and strategic approach, such as reinforcing the Latvia deployment or reallocating resources to Arctic security, would better align with Canada’s strategic priorities.

The Arctic is a critical domain for Canadian sovereignty and national security, yet the lack of investment in key capabilities, such as icebreakers, surveillance systems, and mobility platforms, has left Canada vulnerable. As competitors like Russia and China increasingly eye the Arctic for resource development, Canada’s absence of a robust security presence in the region puts its interests at risk. The recent announcement of Chinese interest in Arctic resource development underscores the urgency of strengthening Canada’s presence and capabilities in this domain.

Canadian Armed Forces website temporarily disabled by 'Indian' hackers:  Report - Canadian Armed Forces website temporarily disabled by 'Indian'  hackers: Report BusinessToday

Political Will. A Key Ingredient for Change
None of these reforms can succeed without strong political will. The Trudeau government demonstrated little inclination to tackle these challenges, favoring symbolic gestures over real change. The present government might provide the political leadership required to confront these issues head-on, assuming that defense becomes a core policy priority. However, even under new leadership, the path to recovery will be difficult. The depth of the systemic problems within the Army demands long-term planning, consistent investment, and a cultural shift within the military to embrace innovation and adaptability.

While recent speeches suggest the possibility of reform, action must follow words to revitalize the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and fulfill its national and international commitments. These include contributions to NATO and ensuring that Canadian forces are ready for high-intensity conflicts. The war in Ukraine has shown the need for decisive national leadership and a unified commitment to defense, qualities that have often been lacking in Canadian governance, bureaucracy, and public opinion.

The conflict in Ukraine also indicates the importance of military equipment suited to high-intensity, mobile warfare, and the need for such equipment in substantial quantities. The war of attrition is back, as evidenced by the staggering losses of Russian military equipment – nearly 9,900 pieces of military gear, including 2,400 trucks, 2,200 infantry fighting vehicles, and 1,900 tanks. Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations have also resulted in significant equipment losses. The human cost of this conflict has been staggering, with estimates of over 500,000 dead and wounded on the Ukrainian side alone.

Steve Saideman, Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, points to one of the critical issues in this modern conflict: how can Canada prioritize quantity in an era where procurement strategies have focused on acquiring top-tier equipment capable of serving multiple roles? This shift, Saideman argues, may be incompatible with the high-intensity warfare Canada would face in a conflict with China or Russia. In his words, “I just don’t see Canada having that capacity. If we got into a serious shooting match with either China or Russia, we’d lose ships, and that would require replacement faster than the replacement ships that we’ve been doing right now.”

The Last Bit, A National Will to Adapt
For Canada to meet the challenges of the 21st century, there must be a firm national will and political conviction to adapt to these new realities. Military historian Sean Maloney asserts that this will is critical: “It is absolutely fundamental to any effort that you’re talking about. And it does not exist in this country, either at the elected political level, in the bureaucracy, or the population.” The Canadian military possesses resources, but it lacks the ability to deploy them effectively. The road to recovery will not be easy, it will require reforming processes, fostering innovation, and rebuilding national resolve.

Whether Canada can make these changes in time to meet the rapidly evolving security challenges of the 21st century remains uncertain, but the need for decisive action has never been clearer.

Saudi Arabia’s Careful Stance On The Syrian Kurds. Walking The Tightrope Between Strategy And Stability

Saudi Arabia has never been one to embrace uprisings or revolutions – it prefers order, predictability, and a conservative political approach. But the mess in Syria has turned into a geopolitical puzzle that Riyadh can’t afford to ignore. And when it comes to the Syrian Kurds, the kingdom finds itself treading a fine line between seizing an opportunity and steering clear of potential chaos.

Backing Kurdish autonomy might give Saudi Arabia a useful card to play against Iran, whose influence in Syria remains strong. But there’s a catch, such support could fracture Syria further. If the Kurds push for federalism, it could weaken Syria’s Arab identity and open the door to broader regional instability. In short, what looks like a smart move on the chessboard could quickly spiral into a diplomatic headache.

As of early 2025, things in Syria are still far from calm. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has taken control of Damascus and about a third of the country. Saudi Arabia is now dealing with an interim Syrian government led by Ahmed Al Shara – an administration that’s under sanctions from the EU, U.S., and UN, and one that hasn’t exactly united the opposition forces under one flag.

To make matters worse, the temporary constitution, which puts Islamic law at the heart of legislation, has stirred unrest among minorities. HTS’s violent crackdown on Alawites and Druze, leaving hundreds dead, has only deepened the divides. Syria, already devastated by over a decade of conflict, is now also battling extreme poverty. Around 16.5 million Syrians are dependent on humanitarian aid this year.

Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze groups have been protesting the interim government’s failure to address minority rights. Turkish military operations and strikes from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army have also targeted Kurdish areas, displacing over a million people and causing significant casualties among civilians and fighters alike.

Saudi Arabia, Syrian Kurds

This all paints a grim picture for Syria’s future – and complicates things for Saudi Arabia. With clashes erupting between the interim government, the Kurds, opposition factions, Alawites, and even the occasional Israeli strike in the south, Riyadh is approaching the situation with measured caution.

Rather than rushing into alliances or bold political statements, Saudi Arabia is keeping a close eye on how things unfold, especially regarding the Kurds. It’s a watch-and-wait strategy, one that seeks to maintain regional balance without getting dragged into Syria’s internal storm.

Saudi Arabia’s Policy Towards Syria,  Stability First, Politics Later

When it comes to the new Syria, Saudi Arabia is playing it safe and smart. Its approach is all about promoting stability, ensuring security, and keeping Islamist groups at bay. Riyadh isn’t interested in ideological experiments or revolutions, it wants a Syria that’s functional, Arab, and no longer a launchpad for anti-Israel rhetoric.

Riyadh is also keeping a close eye on Türkiye and Qatar – two regional players with deep stakes in Syria’s future. For Saudi Arabia, bringing Syria back into the Arab fold is a top priority. This includes nudging Damascus away from its past nationalist, anti-Israel stance and toward a more pragmatic, Arab-centered identity.

One thing Saudi Arabia is definitely happy about?

Iran losing its grip on Syrian politics. The idea of a Syria without Iranian boots on the ground is music to Riyadh’s ears. Going forward, Saudi policy will likely focus on three main pillars: ensuring Syria stays Arab, promoting an inclusive government (with space for Kurds and other minorities), and solving the thorny issue of Captagon smuggling, which has become a serious concern for Saudi society and national security.

Cautious Engagement with the Kurds
On the Kurdish question, Saudi Arabia is cautiously watching from the sidelines. It hasn’t taken a firm position yet, and for good reason.

Three big concerns are driving this wait-and-see approach –

Political Islam: Saudi Arabia is strongly opposed to political Islam, and groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—now controlling a third of Syria—are seen as potential destabilizers.

Rivalries with Türkiye: Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria directly threatens Saudi Arabia’s interests in the region. Ankara’s hostility toward the Kurds complicates things even further.

Fragmentation Fears: With so many players involved and so much ground already fractured, Saudi Arabia worries that Kurdish autonomy could deepen the divide and make a united Syria a pipe dream.

Interestingly, Saudi Arabia doesn’t have a Kurdish minority of its own, so it doesn’t carry any internal baggage around Kurdish rights. Its overall stance is to respect minority rights but keep national unity intact. When clashes arise between regional powers and the Kurds, Saudi Arabia usually opts for quiet diplomacy rather than dramatic interventions.

Syrian Kurdish officials have contacted Israel to establish line of  communication | The Times of Israel

The Israel Factor-  Complicating the Kurdish Equation
Then there’s Israel – a wildcard in the Syrian drama. After Assad’s fall, Israel wasted no time ramping up its activities in Syria. Tel Aviv occupied buffer zones in the Golan Heights and launched hundreds of airstrikes, crippling 70–80% of Syria’s strategic military assets. On top of that, Netanyahu pledged to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights – a move that sent a clear signal about Israel’s long-term plans.

Israel has also shown consistent support for Kurdish autonomy, having backed the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. It sees the Kurds and other minorities like the Druze as potential partners in keeping Syria weak, fragmented, and non-threatening to Israeli interests. This strategy echoes Israel’s old “Alliance of the Periphery” doctrine from the 1950s, building relationships with non-Arab or minority groups to counterbalance surrounding Arab nations.

Saudi Arabia isn’t thrilled about this. Israeli support for Kurdish autonomy could encourage more fragmentation in Syria, making it harder for Riyadh to push its vision of an Arab, stable, and united Syrian state. The Kingdom fears that Israel’s influence – especially its recent moves to defend Druze communities like in the Jaramana incident – could disrupt the regional balance and indirectly empower minority-led separatism.

A month before Assad’s fall, Israeli Minister Gideon Sa’ar openly said that Israel should build ties with the Kurds and Druze, calling them “natural allies.” For Riyadh, this kind of rhetoric is a red flag. It complicates Saudi goals in Syria and adds yet another layer to the already tangled web of alliances and rivalries in the region.

Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Kurdish-Israeli Equation, A Delicate Balance of Power
While Israel promotes the idea of a demilitarized buffer zone in southern Syria, there are whispers in regional policy circles about a more ambitious plan – what some call a potential “David’s Corridor.” This hypothetical corridor would link the Druze communities in southern Syria with the Kurdish forces in the northeast, creating a chain of minority alliances under quiet Israeli patronage. But geopolitical reality is rarely that neat.

A recent peace agreement between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara, leader of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has effectively derailed any plans for such a corridor, at least for now. Even so, Kurdish opposition to the temporary Syrian constitution, which significantly limits their hopes for autonomy or independence, means that cooperation with Israel, or other external actors, remains very much on the table in the future.

Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, Amichai Chikli, made Tel Aviv’s intentions clear when he posted on X:

“Israel will act to protect the Druze minority in areas near its border, and efforts must be made to defend all minority populations in Syria, with an emphasis on the Kurds, from the jihadist genocide of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.”

This statement illustrates Israel’s evolving strategy –  build influence by projecting itself as a protector of vulnerable minorities within Syria’s fractured society.

UAWire - Israel officially confirms its support for Syrian Kurds

Riyadh’s Calculated Watch on Kurdish-Israeli Relations
For Saudi Arabia, this emerging triangle between Israel, the Kurds, and the Druze is a strategic puzzle. While Riyadh wants stability in Syria, it remains deeply wary of the Kurds’ historical affinity with Israel, an alliance that has earned the Kurds the reputation of being a “second Israel” in the region.

Saudi Arabia will be watching closely how the Kurds engage with foreign powers, particularly Israel. The fear isn’t just about Kurdish aspirations; it’s about the potential of a precedent, a model of minority-led governance backed by Western powers that could inspire other fragmentation in Arab nations. Riyadh’s skepticism stems from a deep concern: that Kurdish-Israeli cooperation could give rise to a more permanent political and military alignment, one which Saudi Arabia does not control and that might challenge its influence in the Levant.

Israel, meanwhile, is already extending support to the Druze in southern Syria, through publicized aid programs for the 50,000 Druze near the Israeli border and the half-million residents in the Jabal al-Druze region in As-Suwayda. Reports suggest that Druze are being allowed to work in Israel, a move with significant long-term implications. Such initiatives not only strengthen Israel’s soft power but could be replicated with the Kurds, laying the groundwork for deeper strategic ties.

The concern in Riyadh is that these social and economic overtures could eventually translate into a formalized political relationship between Israel and the Syrian Kurds – complete with intelligence sharing, military training, and even advanced technology transfers, either directly or through Western intermediaries. Saudi Arabia is under no illusion about Israel’s ability to quietly shape regional dynamics and Tel Aviv’s growing comfort with backchannel diplomacy makes this prospect all the more plausible.

The United States
The American military footprint in Syria, especially its roughly 2,000 troops based in Al-Tanf and other eastern strongholds, remains a cornerstone of the anti-ISIS strategy. U.S. forces continue to work closely with Kurdish militias like the SDF and AANES, providing them not only military hardware and training but also international legitimacy.

For Saudi Arabia, this presence is both a blessing and a curse.

On the one hand, the U.S. acts as a powerful counterweight to Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, a web of proxies stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean. The American presence helps disrupt the infamous “Shiite Crescent” and prevents Iran from consolidating control over Syria’s strategic infrastructure.

But on the other hand, this alignment complicates Riyadh’s long-term interests. The Saudi objective is to maintain Syria’s Arab identity and territorial unity. Yet the U.S. backing of Kurdish semi-autonomy, however informal, risks institutionalizing Syria’s fragmentation. That’s a dangerous precedent, not just for Syria, but for the broader Arab world.

US pullback from northern Syria: Key questions answered

Türkiye, The Spoiler in the Room
More complexity comes from Türkiye. Ankara views the SDF and YPG as affiliates of the PKK, a designated terrorist organization in Türkiye and the U.S. Despite that designation, the U.S. continues to support these groups due to their effectiveness in fighting ISIS.

This puts Washington in an awkward position – caught between its NATO ally Türkiye and its local Kurdish partners. For Saudi Arabia, this U.S.-Türkiye tension is a double-edged sword. While it curbs Ankara’s ambition to dominate northern Syria, it also injects more uncertainty into an already volatile region.

Türkiye’s aggression toward Kurdish groups means that Riyadh must tread carefully. While the Kingdom doesn’t oppose Kurdish rights, it strongly opposes a scenario where Kurdish empowerment leads to the Balkanization of Syria – a scenario that could embolden other minority-led secessionist movements across the region.

Oil, Gas, and the Real Stakes
Much of this geopolitical tug-of-war comes down to resources. About 70% of Syria’s oil and gas fields lie in Kurdish-controlled areas. Former President Donald Trump was unusually blunt when he declared that the U.S. was staying in Syria “for the oil.” This open admission raised eyebrows in Riyadh, where energy geopolitics are always high on the agenda.

Saudi Arabia’s interest isn’t to control Syrian oil, but to ensure that it benefits a unified Syrian state, not splinter factions or separatist governments. A U.S. policy that prioritizes Kurdish autonomy, especially if backed by Israel, could push Saudi Arabia to reassess its alignment, perhaps even tolerating Türkiye’s growing influence as the lesser evil.

In fact, Trump’s rhetoric suggested a certain sympathy for Ankara’s moves in Syria, even when they came at the Kurds’ expense. Should the U.S. scale back its engagement under an “America First” doctrine, Türkiye may step in to fill the vacuum. For Riyadh, the choice may come down to accepting Turkish dominance over the Kurdish northeast or watching Syria slide into further division.

The Kurds as a Tool to Pressure Rivals

The Kurds have pursued an active and inclusive foreign policy, engaging with a broad range of actors, including Israel. This strategic openness has increasingly made Kurdish groups a useful geopolitical lever for regional powers. Among those, Saudi Arabia has sought to capitalize on Kurdish influence to pressure its primary rivals, particularly Iran and Türkiye.

Following setbacks in Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon on October 7, Iran has been attempting to regain its foothold in Syria. Turkish media has claimed that Tehran made a failed attempt to supply drones to Syrian Kurds — a move that was criticized by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during a February 26 interview.

Interestingly, the very tools Iran uses to gain influence in Syria can also be employed against it. Saudi Arabia has increasingly used soft power, financial aid, and investment to build leverage in Kurdish regions. Its involvement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) 2017 independence referendum raised eyebrows, suggesting Riyadh was maneuvering to counter both Iranian and Turkish ambitions.

Retired Saudi General Anwar Eshki once advocated for the creation of a “Greater Kurdistan” through peaceful means, arguing that such a development would curtail the expansionist aspirations of Türkiye, Iran, and Iraq. This drew sharp reactions from Tehran. In November 2016, General Rahim Safavi, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, accused the Saudi consulate in the KRI of providing arms to “counter-revolutionary groups.”

Such actions reflect Riyadh’s calculated approach: if Iran expands its influence among Syrian Kurds, Saudi Arabia is ready to clip its wings through diplomatic and financial channels.

This same strategic lens also applies to Türkiye. During Türkiye’s third military operation in northern Syria – “Operation Peace Spring” launched on October 9, 2019 – Saudi Arabia and the Arab League condemned Ankara’s actions and reiterated support for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Erdogan sharply responded, stating, “Saudi Arabia should look in the mirror,” alluding to its intervention in Yemen.

Throughout Türkiye’s military campaigns in northern Syria, Saudi Arabia has been quietly supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), composed largely of Kurdish fighters, and building ties with Arab tribes in the region. In 2019, Riyadh reportedly provided $100 million to the SDF and affiliated Arab groups to maintain cohesion and resist Turkish advances. Saudi Minister of State Thamer Al-Sabhan visited SDF-controlled areas in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa in June 2019, followed by an SDF delegation’s trip to Saudi Arabia later that November.

Through this outreach, Riyadh sought to entrench itself as a stakeholder in northern Syria, bolster local resistance against Turkish incursions, and assert influence over the future of Syrian Kurdish autonomy.

Syrian Kurdish fighters 'pulling back' from Turkey border

The Last Bit

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the Syrian Kurds presents both strategic opportunities and risks. Riyadh views the U.S. military presence in Syria as a bulwark against Iran’s regional network, the so-called “Shiite Crescent” — stretching from Tehran to Beirut. The U.S. role also helps offset Turkish attempts to sideline the Kurds from Syria’s political future, providing Riyadh an avenue to shape the post-Assad landscape.

Beyond geopolitics, Kurdish-held territories, particularly in oil-rich northeastern Syria, offer economic incentives. Gaining influence there could give Saudi Arabia a stake in Syria’s reconstruction and energy wealth.

However, Riyadh must tread carefully. Supporting Kurdish autonomy risks igniting nationalist sentiments closer to home, particularly among Saudi Arabia’s own marginalized communities. Additionally, Riyadh’s tightrope walk is complicated by its ties with Israel and the U.S., both of whom have their own interests in Kurdish regions.

Israeli support for Kurdish independence, while strategically aligned with Saudi aims to weaken Iran, could inadvertently trigger broader regional fragmentation – undermining Saudi Arabia’s long-term goals.

Furthermore, the U.S. presence in Kurdish-controlled zones, though advantageous, forces Saudi Arabia into a complex game of balancing alliances — aiding the Kurds without provoking Ankara too aggressively or appearing overly aligned with Israeli agendas.

In this chessboard of shifting loyalties and tactical alignments, Saudi Arabia’s use of the Kurds as a geopolitical tool might yield short-term dividends but it is a delicate strategy that risks blowback if not managed with subtlety and foresight.

 

The Battle For Panama, Again! As US-China Tensions Flare, The Canal Becomes A Geopolitical Flashpoint

The Panama Canal, one of the world’s most strategic waterways is becoming a battleground for superpower rivalry. As Washington and Beijing engage in an increasingly fierce geopolitical tug-of-war, Panama finds itself caught in the middle.

In recent weeks, accusations have flown thick and fast. US President Donald Trump declared that “China controls the Panama Canal,” a claim that has sparked anger in Panama and concern across Latin America. China, for its part, has categorically denied the allegations, calling them part of a “disinformation campaign” by the United States.

“We Built It, But They Run It”, Trump’s Canal Takeover Talk
Trump’s remarks have added fuel to an already volatile situation. In March, during a campaign event, he told supporters:

“We gave it away, and now China controls the Panama Canal. That’s one of the most strategic locations in the world, and they run it. We should take it back.”

His words stirred up old wounds and fears that the U.S. may be looking to assert control once again over a canal it handed back to Panama in 1999 under the Torrijos-Carter Treaties.

These comments weren’t dismissed as political bluster by all. In Panama and other parts of Latin America, many saw it as a veiled threat, particularly coming from a U.S. president who returned to power.

BlackRock, Panama,

BlackRock, Ports, and Shadows of Influence
While the U.S. has not formally accused China of controlling the canal, it has raised concerns over Beijing’s commercial presence in the country. Chief among them is Chinese conglomerate CK Hutchison, which operates ports at both entrances of the canal, Balboa on the Pacific side and Colón on the Atlantic.

In March, U.S. investment behemoth BlackRock struck a $22.8 billion deal to acquire 43 ports globally from CK Hutchison, including the two in Panama. The deal raised eyebrows in both Washington and Beijing, as it shifts control of these key terminals from a Hong Kong-based firm – long alleged to be under China’s sway – to a U.S.-linked financial giant.

The Panamanian government responded by announcing an audit into the original 25-year lease signed with Hutchison, citing “irregularities,” although the sale to BlackRock appears to be proceeding.

Panama’s Balancing Act And Walking the Diplomatic Tightrope
Panama’s government, under President Laurentino Cortizo and now President-elect José Raúl Mulino, has attempted to walk a delicate line. In December, Panama formally withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a move that was seen in Washington as a win.

But Panama is also eager not to be perceived as choosing sides. During a joint visit in March by Republican Congressman Pete Hegseth and Senator Marco Rubio, tensions surfaced when U.S. officials claimed Panama had agreed to waive tolls for U.S. Navy ships. Mulino denied any such deal had been struck.

Panama’s Minister for Canal Affairs, José Ramón Icaza, later said that toll concessions would only be possible in exchange for full U.S. recognition of Panama’s sovereignty over the canal. However, this crucial clause was mysteriously missing from the English-language version of his statement, adding to the diplomatic confusion.

China Responds, “We Are Not the Villain Here”
China has pushed back strongly against Trump’s comments and U.S. insinuations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said:

“The remarks are baseless and part of a broader U.S. attempt to smear China’s cooperation with Latin America.”

Indeed, many in Latin America view the U.S. posture as hypocritical. After years of neglect, Washington is now suddenly alarmed by China’s presence in the region, despite China being a top trading partner and infrastructure investor across much of Central and South America.

In a direct rebuke, Congressman Pete Hegseth said:

“China did not build the canal, does not own the canal, and should not weaponize the canal.”

Panama casts doubt on BlackRock canal ports deal touted by Trump | Today  News

A Strategic Chokepoint and a Sovereignty Struggle
The Panama Canal is more than a shipping lane – roughly 5% of global trade passes through its locks, and any disruption could have major ripple effects on supply chains and military logistics.

For Panama, the fear is twofold: first, that the canal will become militarized under external pressure; and second, that it will lose its hard-won sovereignty. President-elect Mulino has tried to assert that “Panama will not allow itself to become a battlefield for global powers,” but with U.S. warships increasing their regional presence and Chinese economic interests deeply entrenched, that neutrality may be hard to maintain.

A New Cold War in the Tropics?
While there are no Chinese warships stationed in the canal, and no evidence of direct Chinese control over the waterway, the perception battle has already begun.

Trump’s threat to “take it back,” the BlackRock port acquisitions, and the toll waiver tug-of-war are not isolated events. They are part of a broader reassertion of U.S. influence in Latin America, just as China attempts to deepen its own ties. And Panama, strategically vital, historically scarred, and economically dependent, may once again be forced to choose a side.

Netanyahu Sought Gains From Trump, He Got None. Returns Empty-Handed From Washington, Unexpected Gaps Surface. A Changed Washington And A Humbled Visit?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu landed in Washington for a hastily arranged White House visit, carrying a heavy briefcase of geopolitical anxieties, chief among them: Iran’s nuclear ambitions, President Donald Trump’s surprise tariffs, Turkey’s rising clout in Syria, and the ongoing 18-month war in Gaza.

If Netanyahu had hoped for the easy political windfalls he once enjoyed during Trump’s first term, he was in for a rude awakening.

The meeting’s central focus was supposed to be the 17% tariff the Trump administration had abruptly slapped on Israeli exports just a week earlier. In a bid to preempt damage, Israel had zeroed out its own limited tariffs on U.S. goods a day prior. But the gesture fell flat.

Seated beside Trump in the Oval Office, Netanyahu, in typical form, lavished praise on the American president, pledging to swiftly remove trade barriers and deficits. “We are going to eliminate the tariffs and rapidly,” he said.

Trump, however, was unmoved. “Israel gets $4 billion a year from the United States—congratulations, by the way. That’s pretty good,” he quipped, refusing to commit to rolling back the tariffs. “Maybe not, maybe not,” he added when pressed.

It was a far cry from the days of unilateral U.S. concessions: moving the American embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and brokering normalization deals with Gulf states. Netanyahu, once the beneficiary of a cascade of political gifts from Trump, now left Washington without a single clear win.

His efforts to spin the visit – illustrating that he was the first foreign leader to meet Trump in his second term, and the first to raise the issue of tariffs, did little to mask the lack of substance. No deliverables. No promises. No headlines to take home.

And then came the Iran bombshell, but not the one Netanyahu expected.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, Iran, Turkey

The Iran Letdown

In the lead-up to the Washington meeting, the Israeli media had been humming with speculation: Would this be the moment Netanyahu secures U.S. backing for a strike on Iran? The signals, at least on the surface, looked promising. Six U.S. B-2 stealth bombers were reportedly stationed in the Indian Ocean. A second American aircraft carrier had quietly arrived in the Middle East. And the Sunday headline in Israel’s popular Yedioth Ahronoth shouted confidently: “IRAN FIRST.” The tone was clear – if Tehran was ever going to feel a “heavy blow,” this was the moment.

But the much-anticipated discussion on Iran turned out to be a political fizzle.

Rather than endorsing Israeli military action, or even hinting at coordinated pressure, Trump offered only vague remarks and no assurance of support. Sources familiar with the talks said the president steered the conversation toward negotiation and deterrence, rather than escalation.

For Netanyahu, who had built much of his recent foreign policy on portraying Iran as an existential threat requiring immediate confrontation, this was both disappointing and deflating. The bold narrative of imminent action crumbled within hours.

What stung more was the optics. Netanyahu had framed the visit as urgent, strategically timed, and potentially historic. But in Washington, Iran didn’t dominate the agenda, it barely made a dent.

Hence, with no joint statement, no new red lines drawn, and certainly no green light for Israeli military action, the Iran chapter of this visit ended with a whisper, not a bang.

Turkey’s Growing Shadow

While Iran may have dominated Israeli headlines, another rising force in the region is giving Netanyahu sleepless nights is Turkey.

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has expanded its footprint in northern Syria, leveraging both military operations and soft-power tactics to establish de facto control over large swathes of territory once held by Kurdish and ISIS forces. What began as a counterinsurgency campaign has morphed into a broader regional ambition, one that’s increasingly clashing with Israeli interests.

For Netanyahu, Erdoğan’s ambitions are doubly troubling. Not only is Turkey a NATO member with growing ties to Russia and Iran, it’s also positioning itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause—a direct challenge to Israel’s narrative on Gaza and Jerusalem.

During the White House meeting, Netanyahu raised concerns about Turkish-backed militias operating close to Israeli-aligned Kurdish areas and intelligence suggesting Turkey is helping facilitate arms transfers that could eventually find their way to Hamas or Hezbollah. But here too, Trump remained noncommittal.

Unlike his earlier years in office, Trump now views Erdoğan as a necessary ally in the complex chessboard of Syria—someone who can counterbalance both Assad and Iranian militias without demanding too much in return. Netanyahu, by contrast, sees a rival exploiting chaos to stir anti-Israel sentiment and bolster Islamist movements across the region.

“We’re watching Turkish moves very closely,” Netanyahu told reporters after the meeting. “This isn’t 2010. The dynamics have changed.”

But despite those words, there was no evidence that the U.S. would be recalibrating its Syria policy to factor in Israeli discomfort. For Netanyahu, this growing shadow from Ankara is a strategic dilemma, one he’s now being forced to confront largely alone.

Updates: Netanyahu meets Trump as Israeli attacks continue in Gaza | Israel- Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera

The War in Gaza – The Elephant in the Room
Overshadowing every other issue was the grinding 18-month-long war in Gaza, which has tested Israel’s military might, strained its global image, and drawn widespread condemnation. Yet in the Oval Office, it was the topic least directly addressed.

Netanyahu arrived in Washington hoping for a firm public endorsement of his Gaza campaign from Trump but that moment never came.

Instead, Trump, who once gave Netanyahu the diplomatic equivalent of a red carpet, remained vague. He offered boilerplate support for Israel’s “right to defend itself” but stopped short of committing to any fresh aid or military backing. In fact, he seemed more interested in the strategic cost of a prolonged war than its ideological justification.

For Netanyahu, this was another sign that the old Trump magic may be fading. The war in Gaza, which was supposed to be swift and decisive, has instead dragged into one of Israel’s most complex and controversial military engagements. Civilian casualties have mounted. International calls for restraint have grown louder. And even Israel’s closest allies are beginning to question the endgame.

Netanyahu, known for his ability to leverage global forums to rally support, found little in Washington this time to take home as a political win. No promises of expedited weapons shipments. No resolution condemning Hamas. No dramatic joint declaration.

Behind the pleasantries and rehearsed soundbites, there was an unspoken truth – the Gaza war, once seen by Netanyahu as a means to consolidate domestic support, has become an international liability. And even Trump, his most reliable political partner in the past, is keeping some distance.

A Changed Washington and a Humbled Visit
This was probably the Washington Netanyahu once knew, the one that gave him standing ovations in Congress, the one that gave without asking much in return, the one where he was treated as a statesman with veto power over U.S. Middle East policy. The Washington he walked into this time was colder, more transactional, and far less enchanted.

For Netanyahu, the symbolism cut deep as no wins to bring home to a weary Israeli public increasingly divided over the government’s domestic and military policies.

Trump, in his second term and facing his own storm of controversies, appeared disinterested in staging nostalgia. It appears he does not need Netanyahu in the same way anymore, not as a foreign policy trophy, not as a campaign prop. In fact, the Israeli leader’s visit looked more like a footnote than a headline. A flicker of the past, not a partner for the future.

Perhaps most telling was the shift in tone. Gone were the grandiose promises of peace deals and embassy moves. In their place, hedged language, awkward smiles, and vague gestures. The power dynamic has definitely shifted –  not just between the two men, but between their countries. The leash shorter, the indulgence gone.

Netanyahu horror last-ditch show

The Last Bit, A Visit Full of Optics, Empty on Outcomes
In the end, Netanyahu’s hastily arranged White House visit was heavy on symbolism but light on substance. No breakthrough on tariffs. No new commitment on Iran. No strategic shift in U.S. policy toward Gaza or Syria. The handshake photo op was captured, the flags were in place, the praise was exchanged but the deliverables were missing.

The meeting, in many ways, a portrait of changing times. The days of political freebies from Washington are over, even for old allies like Israel. And Netanyahu, once a master of leveraging U.S. support for domestic gains, left with little more than polite nods and a few vague assurances.

Back home, he faces mounting criticism, economic strain, and a prolonged military engagement in Gaza that has exhausted both global patience and Israeli morale. The visit, which might once have been seen as a diplomatic triumph, was instead viewed by many as a missed opportunity or worse, a misread of Washington’s evolving mood.

For Netanyahu, this trip was not the victory lap he may have envisioned, but rather a reminder that geopolitical winds shift quickly. And when they do, even the strongest alliances can feel the chill.

 

“Gaza A ‘Killing Field’, Warns UN Chief As Humanitarian Crisis Deepens; Indonesia Offers Refuge To 1,000 Displaced

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has described Gaza as a “killing field” where civilians are trapped in an “endless death loop,” as humanitarian conditions worsen under Israel’s continued blockade and renewed military offensive.

“Aid has dried up, and the floodgates of horror have re-opened,” Guterres said on Tuesday, urging immediate global intervention. His remarks came shortly after six UN agencies issued a joint plea to world leaders to act swiftly to ensure the flow of food and essential supplies into Gaza.

Since Israel imposed a full blockade on March 2, following the collapse of a temporary ceasefire, the situation has deteriorated rapidly. Hamas had refused to extend the truce, accusing Israel of failing to uphold its commitments. On March 18, Israel resumed airstrikes and ground operations, which the Hamas-run health ministry says have killed 1,449 Palestinians since then. The Israeli military maintains that it targets Hamas fighters, not civilians.

Guterres reminded the international community that Israel, as the occupying power, is obligated under international law to allow the entry of humanitarian aid. “The current path is a dead end—totally intolerable in the eyes of international law and history,” he said.

Israel has rejected the UN’s characterisation. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oren Marmorstein accused Guterres of “spreading slander against Israel,” stating that over 25,000 aid trucks had entered Gaza during the 42-day ceasefire period. “There is no shortage of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip,” he claimed.

However, the reality on the ground tells a different story. UN agencies report that Gaza’s bakeries supported by aid groups have shut down, markets lack fresh produce, and hospitals are rationing painkillers and antibiotics.

The agencies warned that Gaza’s health system is barely functioning and that supplies are critically low. “With the tightened Israeli blockade now in its second month, we appeal to world leaders to act—firmly, urgently and decisively,” the statement read.

Their call concludes: “Protect civilians. Facilitate aid. Release hostages. Renew a ceasefire.”

UN

Aid Halted, Ceasefire Broken, Death Toll Rises

The two-month ceasefire saw an increase in humanitarian aid and a high-profile prisoner exchange: Hamas released 33 hostages (eight of them dead) in exchange for approximately 1,900 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. However, since fighting resumed, Gaza’s health ministry, run by Hamas, reports over 50,810 Palestinian deaths, including at least 58 people killed in the last 24 hours alone.

Israeli airstrikes overnight reportedly killed 19 people, including five children, when a home in Deir al-Balah was struck. Additional casualties were reported in Beit Lahia and areas near Gaza City.

Meanwhile, journalists have also come under fire. The Palestinian Journalists Syndicate confirmed that Ahmed Mansour, a journalist injured during an Israeli strike on a media tent in Khan Younis, succumbed to his injuries. The strike also killed fellow journalist Helmi al-Faqaawi. The Israeli military claims the intended target was another journalist, Hassan Eslaih, whom it accuses of being affiliated with Hamas.

Indonesia Steps Forward to Shelter Refugees

Amid the unfolding crisis, Indonesia has offered to temporarily house 1,000 refugees from Gaza, marking one of the first large-scale offers of refuge for Palestinians displaced by the war. President Prabowo Subianto announced the plan as he began a diplomatic trip to the Middle East, including visits to Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar.

“We are ready to evacuate the wounded, the traumatized, and the orphans,” Prabowo said, emphasizing that the evacuees would stay in Indonesia only until they recover and it is safe to return to Gaza.

The move aligns with Indonesia’s long-standing support for the Palestinian cause. While Jakarta has rejected past proposals to permanently relocate Palestinians out of Gaza, it now appears willing to accommodate those affected, at least temporarily, indicating a shift in Indonesia’s humanitarian outreach.

Diplomatic Overtures and a Fraying Peace

Though Indonesia and Israel have no formal diplomatic ties, reports last month indicated a special communication channel had been established to explore a pilot work program for Gazans in Indonesia. That plan remains unrealized, but Indonesia’s latest offer may signal a broader willingness to engage constructively with the international community amid the spiraling conflict.

Indonesia, under President Prabowo Subianto’s leadership, continues to assert itself as a rare Muslim-majority voice not only for peace but for practical humanitarian intervention. Even before officially assuming office, Prabowo expressed willingness to send peacekeeping forces to Gaza if needed, an offer that set him apart from many world leaders who have stuck to diplomatic condemnation.

Now, with his recent commitment to temporarily house 1,000 Palestinians, Prabowo is positioning Jakarta as an active participant in shaping Gaza’s humanitarian recovery, not just a bystander.

Trump posts bizarre AI video of a rebuilt Gaza with Netanyahu, Musk

Trump’s ‘Riviera’ Vision and the Relocation Controversy

In contrast, U.S. President Donald Trump sparked a firestorm of criticism in February with his suggestion that the U.S. “take over” Gaza and turn it into a “Middle East Riviera.” Trump’s initial comments proposed the relocation of Gazans to Egypt, Jordan, or other countries, a plan widely seen as both politically inflammatory and morally indefensible.

Although Trump has since backtracked, saying no Gazans would be forcibly expelled, his comments exposed a deeper debate brewing within certain global and regional corridors of power: whether Gaza’s population should stay or be encouraged to leave.

Far-Right Factions and Secret Deals

Some far-right elements within Israel’s governing coalition openly support using the war to reestablish settlements in Gaza and consider depopulation of the Strip a strategic goal. The Israeli government, while not officially endorsing mass displacement, has reportedly been involved in covert discussions with African nations such as Congo to facilitate emigration of thousands of Gazans. These secret contacts, first revealed by Zman Israel, have sparked alarm and criticism, even within parts of the international community aligned with Israel.

Arab Nations Push Back—But With Nuance

Publicly, Arab nations have firmly rejected any efforts to forcibly displace Palestinians. Egypt, in particular, has repeatedly affirmed its “absolute and final rejection” of such proposals. When a Lebanese report in March claimed that President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi was open to temporarily housing half a million Gazans in northern Sinai, Cairo denied it outright.

Instead, key Arab organizations have backed a counterproposal, advocating for Palestinians to remain in Gaza while an independent technocratic committee governs the territory for six months, after which control would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. This alternative plan puts the emphasis squarely on rehabilitation without population displacement.

Where Does the U.S. Stand?

The U.S. has appeared non-committal. While Trump’s initial statements alarmed many, current efforts led by Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff are more focused on brokering a new ceasefire and a hostage-release deal. According to reports by Axios, there is no active push from the U.S. administration to advance the Gaza relocation plan. However, the ambiguity has only fueled speculation and distrust in Arab and international circles.

Israel-Hamas war: Aid agencies sound the alarm as Gaza blockade enters a  second month | CNN

Human Cost of War Continues to Climb
Since the war began on October 7, 2023, after a Hamas-led attack on southern Israel that killed 1,200 people and saw 251 kidnapped, more than 50,000 people have died in Gaza according to the enclave’s Hamas-run health authorities. Over 115,000 have been wounded, with entire neighborhoods reduced to rubble. The staggering toll, while difficult to independently verify, has only increased the urgency for a comprehensive and just rehabilitation plan.

The Last Bit
As regional and global powers jockey for influence over Gaza’s post-war future, Indonesia’s voice stands out, not just for its moral clarity but also for its willingness to act. While relocation proposals and forced migration remain controversial and largely rejected, the window for genuine reconstruction, centered on Palestinian rights and participation – is rapidly narrowing.

The question that remains is whether the world will follow Jakarta’s lead, or continue down a path of geopolitical calculations that leave Gaza’s people as pawns in a game they never asked to play.

Beijing’s Next-Gen Warbirds Exposed, J-36, J-50 Sightings Stir U.S. F-47 Urgency. Why Does China’s Secret Next-Gen Stealth Plane Have Three Engines?

A dramatic new video showing China’s futuristic, tailless, triple-engine fighter jet, likely the J-36, flying low over a busy highway has reignited global discussion about the intensifying sixth-generation arms race between the U.S. and China. The aircraft was spotted near the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s facility in Sichuan, where it is believed to have been developed.

Inside the J-36. Trijet, Stealth, and a Bold New Design

Military analysts have dubbed the aircraft the J-36, a sixth-generation stealth jet featuring a flying wing design with no vertical stabilizers. The standout feature is its rare trijet configuration –  two intakes under the wings and a third mounted dorsally behind the cockpit – breaking away from the more conventional twin-engine setups seen in most modern fighters.

According to defense expert David Cenciotti, the aircraft’s configuration suggests enhanced thrust and redundancy, and its belly appears to house internal weapons bays for long-range missiles. Other key design elements include a streamlined canopy, diverterless supersonic inlets (DSI), and split ruddervators, an unusual aerodynamic feature that implies a focus on stealth, range, and speed.

The latest footage reveals a closer-than-ever view of the aircraft in flight, showcasing its heavy-duty landing gear and what some believe is a side-by-side seating configuration, contrary to earlier assumptions of tandem seating.

J-36, F-47, Sixth generation arm race

Across the Pacific, U.S. Pushes Forward with F-47 and NGAD

While China’s J-36 dominates aviation chatter, the U.S. has not been idle. Last month, President Donald Trump announced that Boeing had secured the contract to build America’s sixth-generation fighter, dubbed the F-47, under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. According to Trump, the prototype has been flying for about five years, though the Pentagon has yet to confirm specifics due to the program’s classified nature.

Multiple prototypes from defense giants Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are believed to have flown already, but the timeline for deployment remains unclear. The F-47 contract, awarded on March 21, only covers the engineering and development phase along with a few test aircraft for evaluation.

China’s Broader Sixth-Gen Ambitions – J-36 and J-50 Emerge

China’s ambitions go beyond just one aircraft. On the same day the J-36 first surfaced in December, images also appeared of another stealthy, tailless jet, believed to be the J-50, developed by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. Unlike the J-36’s trijet build, the J-50 is a twin-engine aircraft with a sleeker, more compact frame and appears to use a lambda wing design.

The PLA has not officially acknowledged either aircraft, but China’s state-run Global Times ran a story citing experts who said the sightings suggest significant progress in sixth-generation aviation technology.

April 8 Sighting of J-50 Offers New Clues

The clearest footage yet of the J-50 emerged on April 8, showing the aircraft in flight, its third public appearance. Observers noted several distinctive features – twin engines, 2D thrust vectoring nozzles, tricycle landing gear with a dual nose wheel, diverterless inlets, and possibly an electro-optical sensor bulge beneath the cockpit.

Despite its smaller size compared to the J-36, the J-50’s stealthy shaping, large nose (possibly housing next-gen avionics), and movable wingtips suggest it’s designed for networked, air-dominance missions in contested environments. The design strongly echoes the PLAAF’s J-20 in terms of stealth characteristics.

Visibility by Design?

The emergence of multiple high-quality images and videos, particularly of the J-36 flying low over public roads, has led some observers to speculate that China wants the world to see its progress. While military programs in China have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy, the power of social media, especially as these jets fly over populated areas, has made it nearly impossible to keep things under wraps.

Some compare this to the U.S. advantage of having remote and restricted areas like Area 51 for testing, whereas China’s prototypes often take off from more visible locations.

A New Era of Aerial Dominance”: the NGAD F-47, this groundbreaking sixth- generation fighter, redefines military aviation with unparalleled  innovations

Who’s Winning the Sixth-Gen Race, Neck-and-Neck or Not Quite?

While the U.S. claims to be ahead, China’s public testing of two separate sixth-gen prototypes, J-36 and J-50, suggests it is rapidly catching up. Some analysts believe Trump’s recent push to accelerate the F-47 program may have been spurred by China’s recent reveals.

That said, the F-47 and NGAD programs remain deeply classified, and the true extent of American progress may not be fully visible. Meanwhile, China’s accelerated public testing of its prototypes creates the impression that it might be in the lead.

Why Does China’s Secret Next-Gen Stealth Plane Have Three Engines? The Answer May Lie in Power Needs, Not Just Thrust

When it comes to stealth fighters, the global design philosophy has been fairly consistent – one or two engines are considered sufficient. That’s why the emergence of China’s newly spotted sixth-generation stealth aircraft, reportedly called the J-36, with a striking three-engine configuration, has stirred considerable curiosity among defense analysts and aviation watchers alike.

The aircraft was seen on December 27 flying over the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s airfield (the same firm that produces the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter) with a sleek, tailless triangular design optimized for radar evasion, the J-36 bears all the hallmarks of cutting-edge stealth tech. Yet, it’s those three engine nozzles that defy conventional logic.

Why three? There are two prevailing schools of thought.

One view attributes the design to China’s ongoing engine development struggles. While countries like the U.S. rely on incredibly powerful single engines, such as the Pratt & Whitney F135, which delivers 20 tons of thrust for the F-35 – China’s WS-10 engines still trail behind, producing around 15 tons at full throttle. To match the performance of Western fighters, engineers may simply have added a third engine to compensate for lower individual output. If true, this would be less a bold innovation and more a workaround rooted in technological gaps.

But there’s another, more compelling possibility: this design may be purpose-built for power, not just propulsion. Modern combat aircraft increasingly serve as flying sensor hubs, command posts, and potentially even energy weapons platforms. As the Chinese military pushes toward manned-unmanned teaming (where a human pilot orchestrates a swarm of loyal wingman drones) airborne data management, communications, and AI systems demand serious onboard power. Add in the possibility of future integration of directed energy weapons like high-energy lasers or microwave-based systems, and the need for robust power generation becomes clear.

Two engines might offer the thrust needed to fly, but three could ensure the J-36 has the electrical muscle for battlefield dominance.

Tactical shift: China's heavy stealth jet emerges while USAF's 6th-gen  program stalls

China’s Sixth-Generation Warfare Doctrine
The J-36 may be a critical chess piece in China’s overarching sixth-generation military doctrine. Beijing’s defense strategy is increasingly shaped by two priorities: developing asymmetric capabilities to counter U.S. superiority, and leapfrogging legacy systems to seize technological leadership in future conflicts.

Unlike earlier eras where China was content with incremental advancements, the sixth-gen race is being approached with a sense of urgency. Manned-unmanned teaming, AI integration, stealth-first designs, and energy-based weaponry are no longer theoretical—they’re rapidly becoming operational imperatives. In this context, the J-36 appears as a platform built not just for air dominance, but for digital and electromagnetic dominance as well.

Its three engines may support more than just energy-intensive weapons or drone coordination. They could power sophisticated jamming suites, advanced sensor fusion, or even satellite uplinks to support long-range command-and-control functions. China is aiming not just for a fighter jet, it’s aiming for a flying battlefield brain.

And with tensions escalating in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific turning into a strategic tinderbox, time may be pushing China to test bold, unconventional configurations like the J-36 to gain a decisive edge before the next global paradigm shift.

J-36 vs. The West: NGAD, FCAS, and the Diverging Paths of Sixth-Gen Evolution
If China’s J-36 is the dragon’s wing, the U.S. and its allies are forging their own predators in the sky – each unique in approach, but unified by similar end goals: survivability, connectivity, and lethality in the most contested environments.

United States –  NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance)
The U.S. Air Force’s NGAD program remains highly classified, but confirmed reports suggest the demonstrator has already flown. Key takeaways include a tailless stealth design, hyper-connectivity, and a focus on teaming with autonomous drones known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). NGAD is likely powered by a single or twin advanced adaptive engine, offering variable cycle capabilities to balance thrust, speed, and fuel economy. Notably, the U.S. continues to lean on its unrivaled engine tech to avoid multi-engine complexity.

Europe: FCAS (Future Combat Air System)
Led by France, Germany, and Spain, FCAS aims to field a sixth-gen platform around 2040. The design philosophy shares a lot with NGAD, stealth, drone swarming, sensor fusion, and DEW integration. But FCAS is heavily focused on a “system of systems” architecture, where the fighter is just one node in a larger, interconnected web of UAVs, satellites, and ground assets.

Where J-36 Differs
While NGAD and FCAS appear to bet on next-gen propulsion and high-tech sensors, China’s J-36 seems to hedge its bets with brute-force power output. The triple-engine setup may be a necessary move due to current engine limitations, but it also reflects a different risk calculus: prioritize systems integration and operational viability now, even if it means a heavier, more complex platform.

Hence, while the West builds for refinement, China seems to be building for readiness.

Air Force rolls out 13-year, $455,000 bonuses for fighter pilots

The Last Bit, A Glimpse Into the Future of Aerial Warfare
The J-36 may look like an enigma now, tailless, triple-engined, and shrouded in mystery, but it offers a revealing glimpse into China’s strategic mindset. China is willing to bypass traditional design conventions and take technological leaps, even if those leaps come with complexity and risk.

Its three-engine configuration may very well be born out of necessity, compensating for engine power deficits or limited miniaturization, but it also serves a deeper purpose. It signals a desire to power more than just flight: radar systems, energy weapons, electronic warfare, and the nerve center for drone swarms.

In comparison, the U.S. and its allies are walking a different path, leaning on mature propulsion tech, modularity, and long-range planning to produce sleek, highly refined sixth-gen fighters. But refinement takes time. And time, in the volatile calculus of geopolitical rivalry, can often be the rarest commodity.

As the next-gen arms race accelerates, the J-36 stands as a potent symbol of ambition colliding with urgency. Whether it soars or stumbles, the skies of the 2030s will not be ruled by pilots alone, but by the nations that best blend man, machine, and raw power into the ultimate warfighting symphony.

 

Trump Warns Of Consequences If Nuclear Deal Collapses, Tehran Rejects Direct Talks, Eyes On Israel

U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Monday that the United States and Iran were set to begin direct talks concerning Tehran’s nuclear program. However, Iran quickly contradicted the claim, with its Foreign Minister clarifying that any discussions taking place in Oman would remain indirect.

The conflicting narratives are indicative of the deep mistrust and complex diplomatic discourse that continues to shape U.S.-Iran relations.

Trump, speaking from the Oval Office alongside visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asserted: “We’re having direct talks with Iran, and they’ve started. It’ll go on Saturday. We have a very big meeting, and we’ll see what can happen.” Without specifying the location, Trump hinted that the talks would be held at a high level and could potentially yield a breakthrough, though he also issued a warning: “If the talks aren’t successful, I actually think it will be a very bad day for Iran.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, however, countered Trump’s assertion, posting on X that high-level indirect talks would be held in Oman, facilitated by Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi. “It is as much an opportunity as it is a test. The ball is in America’s court,” Araqchi stated.

The talks are expected to involve Araqchi and U.S. Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff. While no immediate agenda has been shared, the discussions will likely center around curbing Iran’s nuclear advancements and easing tensions that have spiked across the Middle East in recent months.

This latest diplomatic overture comes amid a highly volatile regional backdrop – open conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, ongoing military operations in Yemen, a reshuffling of power in Syria, and escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran. Trump, who has significantly ramped up the U.S. military presence in the region since taking office in January, has emphasized that he prefers diplomacy over military confrontation.

Yet, his rhetoric remains sharp. In recent weeks, Trump warned Tehran against defying calls for direct negotiations, even suggesting the possibility of bombing if Iran remained non-compliant. “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,” Trump reiterated on Monday, hinting that failure to reach an agreement would bring “great danger” to the Islamic Republic.

Iranian leadership, meanwhile, appears steadfast in its resistance. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who ultimately holds sway over foreign policy decisions, has consistently dismissed direct engagement with the United States as “not smart, wise, or honorable.”

The U.S. and Iran last held direct nuclear negotiations during the Obama administration, which resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—a multilateral accord that Trump unilaterally withdrew from in 2018. Efforts at indirect engagement under President Joe Biden’s tenure yielded little progress, leaving the fate of any new agreement uncertain.

As talks, whether direct or indirect, prepare to resume under Omani mediation, the world watches closely. With heightened tensions and the shadow of military escalation looming large, the potential outcomes carry significant implications for regional stability and global nuclear diplomacy.

Tehran

Tehran Rebuffs Trump’s Claim of Direct Talks, Insists on Indirect Path Via Oman Amid Tensions and Diplomatic Chess

Just hours before U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that direct negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program were imminent, Iranian officials reiterated their stance that any forthcoming dialogue would remain indirect – and strictly mediated by Oman.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated that Tehran was awaiting Washington’s response to a proposal for indirect engagement, framing the offer as “generous, responsible, and honorable.” The comments were echoed by a senior Iranian official speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, who confirmed, “The talks will not be direct… It will be with Oman’s mediation.”

Oman, which has historically played a discreet yet pivotal role in facilitating backchannel communications between Tehran and Washington, is once again positioned at the center of this delicate diplomatic dance.

In Tehran, skepticism about Trump’s public overtures ran high. Nournews, a media outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, dismissed the claim of direct talks as part of a “psychological operation aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion.”

A second Iranian official hinted at a rapidly closing window of opportunity, suggesting that there may be as little as two months to reach a deal, warning that delays could trigger unilateral military action from Israel. That concern underscores the increasingly high-stakes nature of any negotiations.

Visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a vocal critic of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy, offered a rare note of conditional support, saying that a diplomatic solution that permanently denies Iran nuclear weapons – akin to the disarmament approach taken with Libya – would be a “good thing.”

During his presidency, Trump unilaterally exited the landmark 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had curtailed Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. He later reimposed sweeping sanctions, leading Iran to accelerate its uranium enrichment well beyond the JCPOA’s prescribed limits.

While Western powers accuse Iran of covertly seeking nuclear weapons capability, citing enrichment levels beyond civilian needs, Tehran continues to assert that its nuclear ambitions are strictly for peaceful energy purposes.

The White House National Security Council declined to comment on the nature of the talks.

This renewed diplomatic maneuvering comes at a moment of severe geopolitical fragility for Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” – a regional alliance built over decades to counter Israeli and U.S. influence. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel, the region has been plunged into instability. Key Iranian allies, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, have faced coordinated Israeli and U.S. military strikes. Last year, Israel also severely weakened Iran’s domestic air defenses, adding to Tehran’s sense of strategic vulnerability.

Meanwhile, the potential collapse of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, another Iranian linchpin in the region, further erodes Iran’s regional clout.

Trump claims US held direct nuclear talks with Iran

Trump Warns of Consequences if Nuclear Talks with Iran Fail; Reaffirms Strategic Unity with Israel

Amid heightened regional tensions and nuclear brinkmanship, U.S. President Donald Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss the escalating Iran nuclear issue. Both leaders reaffirmed a unified stance: Iran must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.

While Trump emphasized that diplomacy remains the preferred path, drawing comparisons to the denuclearization process in Libya, he issued a firm warning that failure to reach a deal could trigger serious consequences for Tehran. “Iran cannot have nuclear weapons under any circumstances,” Trump said, hinting at potential military action if negotiations collapse.

The two leaders met in Washington ahead of a high-level meeting with Iranian officials scheduled for Saturday. Trump described the upcoming dialogue as critical, expressing cautious optimism about a breakthrough. “We’re hopeful,” he said, while acknowledging skepticism among observers who believe Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

Netanyahu, a long-time opponent of Iran’s nuclear program and an advocate for hardline measures, echoed Trump’s sentiments, stating that while diplomacy is the preferred route, it must lead to a comprehensive and irreversible dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. He pointed to the Libyan precedent as a potential model for success, provided Iran cooperates.

The conversation between Trump and Netanyahu extended beyond Iran, touching on broader issues of trade, regional security, and strategic cooperation. Trump lauded Netanyahu as “a special person and a true friend of the United States,” reiterating his belief that no U.S. administration has done more for Israel than his own.

This renewed display of alignment between Washington and Tel Aviv comes at a delicate juncture. Iran’s regional influence has been tested in the aftermath of the October 2023 Hamas-Israel conflict, with its proxy network—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—facing intensified military pressure. The instability has reshaped regional alliances and brought the specter of a broader conflict ever closer.

The forthcoming talks, which Trump characterized as being held at a “very high level,” are seen as a litmus test for whether diplomacy can still deliver results in a region teetering on the edge. While Iran maintains its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, Western powers continue to accuse Tehran of advancing toward weapons-grade enrichment, well beyond what is needed for civilian use.

As both Trump and Netanyahu reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful resolution, their statements also reflect a calibrated message: while negotiations are ongoing, time is limited and alternatives are being weighed. With military escalation looming and diplomatic timelines tightening, the latest developments illustrate the fragility of the current geopolitical order. Whether these indirect talks can arrest the spiral toward conflict, or merely delay the inevitable, remains to be seen.

Modi’s Three-Day Visit To Sri Lanka, A Strategic Signal To Maldives—And A Clear Message To China?

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi lands anywhere on an official visit, the script is often familiar –  tight schedules, brief stopovers, and precision diplomacy. So, when Modi recently spent three days in Sri Lanka, his fourth visit to the island nation since 2019, it raised more than a few eyebrows. Why Sri Lanka, and why now?

To understand the significance, one must look beyond bilateral bonhomie and into the wider geopolitical chessboard, especially the rapidly intensifying great power competition in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where China has been steadily tightening its grip.

A Visit Laden With Strategic Subtext
Modi’s extended stay was not merely ceremonial; it was deeply strategic. The visit culminated in a host of high-impact Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) across defense, energy, infrastructure, education, and maritime security. While the headlines focused on trade and cooperation, the subtext was unmistakable –  India is reasserting its influence in its traditional backyard, and it’s doing so with clarity and purpose.

Among the most pivotal agreements was the inaugural defense pact between India and Sri Lanka. This agreement includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and enhanced maritime security coordination, pillars of what many call “military diplomacy,” a critical tool in India’s Indo-Pacific doctrine.

These are not just friendly naval drills. In the Indian defense establishment, joint exercises are treated as an extension of real war strategy. Coordinated training with Sri Lankan forces enables New Delhi to keep a keener eye on Chinese movements in the Indian Ocean, where Beijing has already invested heavily in ports, logistics, and influence operations.

Modi, Sri Lanka, Maldives

A Coded Message to Maldives?
The timing also aligns with India’s deteriorated relations with Maldives, a country that has increasingly pivoted towards China over the past two years. While diplomatic silence now prevails between Malé and New Delhi, Modi’s warm embrace of Colombo sends a subtle but unmistakable signal – India has options, and it is prepared to recalibrate its alliances in the region.

As Maldives flirts with Beijing’s orbit, Sri Lanka seems to be anchoring itself closer to India, not just militarily, but economically and energetically as well.

Energy Diplomacy: Powering Influence
India’s energy collaboration with Sri Lanka could become the foundation for a new era of regional energy diplomacy. A joint venture between India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Sri Lanka’s Ceylon Electricity Board aims to establish a 120-megawatt solar power plant in Trincomalee—a strategically located area in eastern Sri Lanka where India has long-standing interests.

Additionally, India has committed to supplying LNG to Sri Lankan power plants, despite itself being a net importer, sourcing gas from Qatar, the Gulf, and the U.S.

So why subsidize Sri Lanka’s energy needs?

The answer lies in strategic utility – just as India bought electricity from Nepal and rerouted it to Bangladesh, these actions are geopolitical investments, not commercial transactions. They’re designed to bind regional partners into India’s influence network and reduce China’s strategic elbow room.

Furthermore, plans to establish an electricity grid connectivity system between the two nations will deepen this interdependence and bolster regional energy security – an area where China has also been making significant overtures, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Infrastructure, Capacity Building, and Education: Winning Hearts and Minds
India’s support for rehabilitating Sri Lanka’s railway signaling systems and offering scholarships to 200 students from Jaffna and the Eastern Province are not just goodwill gestures. They are part of a long-term strategy to build people-to-people linkages and soft power. Similarly, training 1,500 Sri Lankan civil servants over five years enhances administrative interdependence and trust.

These may seem like developmental footnotes, but in geopolitics, capacity-building initiatives often yield the most enduring loyalties.

China's Indian Ocean Region strategy: Soft power, strong gains – Firstpost

China Looms Large
Modi’s visit cannot be de-hyphenated from China’s expanding role in the region. With over 400 MoUs signed with Iran, Chinese access to ports in Gwadar (Pakistan) and potential ambitions in Chabahar (Iran) signal that the Indo-Pacific is becoming a crowded strategic theater. Moreover, with China underwriting Sri Lankan infrastructure – especially the Hambantota Port, now essentially leased to China for 99 years – India is making a calculated counter-move.

China’s increasing sway over Iran also has knock-on effects. Iran, in many ways, is becoming an economic satellite of China. Beijing’s money fuels Iranian projects, its oil supplies China’s growing demand, and its ports offer logistical alternatives to Pakistan. With the Russia–Ukraine war likely to wind down by 2025, and U.S. attention expected to pivot fully towards containing China, India’s moves in Sri Lanka are not just tactical – they are anticipatory.

A Region in Flux, and India’s Game of Chess
Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka was not about headlines. It was about red lines, and making them clear. With China tightening its strategic noose around South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India is shoring up its partnerships, offering not just trade, but trust, not just aid, but agency.

And in the Indian Ocean, where maritime routes are the arteries of global commerce and security, trust and agency might just be the most valuable currencies.

The message to Maldives is clear. The signal to China, even clearer: The Indian Ocean is not open for encroachment without contest. And New Delhi, under Modi, is not watching silently from the sidelines – it’s making its move.

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