The date was June 07, 2025. I don’t know what cracked open inside me today, but I can’t put it back. And I don’t want to.
It’s strange how we walk through life with working legs and closed eyes. I’ve had better days than today, more eventful, glitterier. But not one of them made me feel this loud inside. Not one made me this aware of the silence I had been swallowing for years. I’ve never had this kind of urge to post online before, not because I didn’t want to, but because I didn’t think I had something real to say.
There was this book, just lying there in my shelf like a ghost of responsibility I never claimed. For years. I’d walk past it, feel a little guilty maybe, and forget again. Today, I don’t know what god or demon twisted my gut, but I picked it up and started reading. And then I had to stop. The words weren’t just ink anymore. They were truth bullets. They got under my skin. They forced me to bleed.
We’re taught the same damn moral line since childhood — “Respect everyone equally.” What a joke. Schools shove it down our throats, parents pretend to live by it, and then we all grow up and become the kind of people who don’t even look at a waiter’s face while accepting service. You think saying “thank you” without eye contact makes you a decent person? You think handing someone a tip without treating them like a human being makes it okay? That book described it. The quiet violence of being treated like a tool. Security guards, waiters, nail artists, people who feel dehumanized every single day by the very people who pretend they “respect everyone.” And it’s true. It’s all true. We’re not humans, we’re walking scripts. Robots trying to remember how to sound polite while actively ignoring souls.
Even the teachers preaching these things in class aren’t exempt. Most of them are just saying words like empty envelopes. They don’t even believe what they’re teaching. They want their salary, their off-time, their life back. And we just eat it up, recite the same values, and become part of the same disease.
That hit me like a truck today.
And then, as if the universe wasn’t done dragging me through the mud, another thought slammed into my chest: what about those who can’t even read this book? What about those who don’t speak English? What about those who’ll never access this pain, this clarity, because privilege never kissed their doorstep?
And even for people like me, people who can read, who do have access – we let things rot. I had that book for years. Just lying there. Like most of us do with our potential. We ignore it. Because we can. Because nothing forces us to care until something inside us is dead enough to finally notice the funeral.
Later today, in the evening, my brain said, “Let’s watch a film.” No reason. Just… because I can. And that sentence alone made me flinch. The privilege in that. I have had a Netflix subscription for over two years. The film I chose? “Mona Lisa Smile.” My friend recommended it to me five years ago. I didn’t watch it. I wasn’t interested. I was busy being empty.
But today I did. And it gutted me. Because it tied everything together, that book, that thought, this generation, this broken system we pretend to thrive in. It all came full circle. That film screamed what I was already hearing in my head.
I realized I’ve had the platform all along. I’ve had the language. I’ve had the space. I’ve had this blog sitting here like an open mouth, waiting for me to say something real. For months, my to-do lists have said: “Write the blog. Write the goddamn blog.” And I didn’t. Not once. I had all the time, outside work. I had words boiling in my throat. But I didn’t write.
Why?
Because I was too damn used to wasting myself.
Even my Latin classes. I started like a star. The outperformer. The overachiever. And then? Flatline. I kept showing up like a shell of that version. I told myself it’s okay to be normal. But it’s not. Not when you know you’re meant to be more. Not when you’ve tasted more.
Today I killed that version of me. The one that made peace with shrinking.
And it made me see just how lucky we are. We, who get to speak. Who get to write. Who gets to read in languages that others never got the chance to learn. We are living in an age where women can share their minds, where broken people can scream into the internet and someone, somewhere, will listen. We are living the dreams of those who died screaming into pillows. And still, we scroll. We numb. We wait for some “right moment” that never arrives.
This era isn’t perfect. People are cruel. The world is unkind. But you know what else is true?
If you ask for help, you’ll get it. If your pain is honest, someone will hear it. If your voice is real, someone will read it. But you have to use it. You have to stop wasting your one damn chance at being heard.
So here I am. Writing what I should have written months ago. Screaming what I should’ve said out loud. Because I finally remembered that no one was holding me back. It was me.
Use your privilege. Use your voice. Use your time.
Because somewhere, someone died without ever having the chance.
In 1994 after emerging from the Apartheid regime, South Africa has been considered the most advanced economy in sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting its modernized industrial initiatives, well-maintained infrastructure and pace of GDP growth. As the leading voice of the Global South in the African continent, it holds more strategic importance in global geopolitics, having membership in pivotal regional and international alliances, such as BRICS+ (a cornerstone of its foreign policy), the G20, the African Union, SADC, SACU, and the Commonwealth of Nations.
As a founding member of the United Nations, it has spent it has contributed in UN-backed peacekeeping missions in conflict-ridden areas. As a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it has played a key role as a mediator and a peace facilitator in the regional crisis, aiming for Peace and Development, such as in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc. Reshaping the international order, Pretoria’s growing role in regional and global diplomatic trends, multilateral forums, and economic alliances has anchored it as a middle power.
This article examines the relevance of South Africa, which often goes underappreciated in global geopolitics: its strategic location, regional leadership and mediation, hunger for global governance reforms, role in maritime security and resource diplomacy, and its unprecedented ability to balance diplomacy amidst great power rivalries.
Strategic and Geopolitical Relevance
South Africa sits at a unique geographical location, the Cape of Good Hope, a breakthrough in European exploration connecting Europe and Asia and controls the maritime routes of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This maritime corridor is among the main and busiest shipping routes essential for global trade.
The Ports of South Africa, Durban and Cape Town, and Saldanha Bay hold great importance for maritime activities related to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as they facilitate sea trade connectivity to global markets, support maritime security and increase naval cooperation, promote fuel-driven economic diplomacy and most importantly, support South Africa’s larger goal of sustainable industrial and green energy growth.
Durban Harbour, situated on the east coast of South Africa, handles more than 30 million tons of cargo annually and is visited by 4500 commercial vessels every year, making it the busiest shipping terminal. It links sea trade with the Far East, the Middle East, Australia, South America, North America and Europe. Additionally, it serves as a transhipment hub for East Africa and the Indian Ocean islands.
Despite performance issues, the Port of Cape Town handles 1035896 million tons of Dry Bulk cargo, 459118 million tons of Break Bulk cargo and 4933587 million tons of Liquid cargo. It is the second-largest cargo terminal exporting fruits, fish and frozen products to South America and the Far East.
Strategically, it also hosts the country’s warships and foreign navies to enhance diplomatic ties and naval cooperation. For example, on August 21, 2023, INS Sunayna entered the port to engage in a passage exercise with South African Navy Ship SAS King Sekhukhune I. This exercise not only warmed the diplomatic partnership between India and South Africa but also aimed at increasing interoperability, cooperation and sharing best practices between both navies.
Any shifts around these ports do not concern South Africa alone; they go beyond its borders, impacting regional and international maritime trade and security dynamics.
Resource Diplomacy and Clean Energy
South Africa has a variety of natural resources, holding the world’s largest reserves of Gold, Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), Chrome Ore and Manganese Ore. In addition to this, it also has reserves of zirconium, vanadium and titanium. It has the world’s fifth-largest mining sector, making it a key player in the green energy and green tech race. The major players, the U.S. and China, are competing to gain access to these critical minerals. The U.S. has partnered with South Africa under the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), while China is using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to secure critical mineral supply chains.
Apparently, South Africa contributes more than any developing nation to clean energy and carbon footprint reduction. The reason why South Africa seems a key supplier in the global energy transition is particularly green technology metals like Manganese, Nickel, Cobalt, Copper, Lithium, Vanadium and other rare earth elements (REEs). South Africa has a large number of these metals and a skilled workforce to accommodate the international demands for critical minerals used for clean energy generation, particularly the making of electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce the dependence on fuel-driven technologies for transport and other purposes.
Statistically, 36% of manganese is produced by South Africa, which contributes to global production of critical minerals, adding US$ 2.5 billion to the country’s foreign exchange and employing thousands of people in 2022. Additionally, in the past few years, due to the drastic growth of the EV sector, the need for manganese has increased to manufacture lithium-ion batteries. In fact, Aqora, an energy company in South Africa, has unveiled its plan to set up the continent’s first lithium-ion battery cell manufacturing facility in 2023. This makes South Africa geopolitically significant and shows potential for renewable energy and tech innovation leadership in Africa, making it a regional hub for critical mineral and battery manufacturing and a wise destination for investment in green energy projects to meet the needs of a sustainable future and growth.
However, in the context of energy transition, it faces a dilemma of decarbonizing its heavy coal industry (a major energy source contributing around 77% to the country’s energy) without economic meltdown and unemployment. Under the Just Energy Transition Partnership announced during COP26, the United States has pledged an US$ 8.5 billion package to support the country’s energy transition from coal to a low-carbon economy.
Meanwhile, in August 2024, Pretoria concluded an energy sector agreement with Mozambique to use its natural gas for the transition from coal and diesel. In an interview with Mozambican journalists, South African Minister of Energy and Electricity Kgosientso Ramokgopa spoke of mutual gains that the agreement would bring to both countries. The agreement would be used to address the supply crisis.
Regionally, as a member of the South African Customs Union (SACU), on January 31, 2024, South Africa became the first country to initiate exporting goods from Durban Harbour to Ghana and Kenya under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) framework. This marks the beginning of duty-free intra-Africa trade, providing opportunities for business entities beyond the borders and integrating markets. This is a milestone in the history of Africa, giving employment to millions of people around the continent and affecting global economic growth. Similarly, it would encourage the other countries of the continent to initiate the duty-free trade, opening other avenues of cooperation, especially green energy projects and mindful use of critical minerals across the whole of Africa.
BRICS and Global South Unity
A small nation, South Africa joined Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) in 2010, becoming the only country representing the African continent and their needs and also broadening the voice of the Global South on the international stage. Since then, from this platform, South Africa has consistently pushed for democratization of international institutions, especially in the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank, where developing nations of the Global South remain unheard and underrepresented. Through BRICS, South Africa not only embraces the economic benefits from the grouping but also steps into the U.S.-China rivalry. While the BRICS is considered a threat to Western institutions, challenging their hegemonic role in the global order and providing a financial alternative to the countries.
At the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the BRICS, marking the expansion of the grouping and a great leap for a multipolar world. On this expansion, Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “It shows the determination of BRICS countries for unity and cooperation with the broader developing countries.”
While adhering to Nelson Mandela’s legacy and the non-alignment movement, South Africa is playing a crucial diplomatic role by advocating for multipolarity and bridging Africa and developing nations of Asia while also doing a balancing act—getting benefits from China’s economic investments in the country while also maintaining relations with the West, especially with the U.S. and India.
Balancing Great Power Rivalries
Since its independence, South Africa’s foreign policy has been quite clear: to maintain non-alignment in the great power struggle while putting the country’s national interest at the forefront. In this new cold war, the U.S. tries to destroy the tech giants of China. South Africa holds on to its strategic autonomy, maintaining economic ties with China and the U.S., indicating the country’s vision of securing a large market by not joining any particular bloc or taking sides with a country.
Looking at the figures, with US$ 52.4 billion of trade in goods, Beijing is the largest trading partner of South Africa, while the US also has a sizable amount of trade in goods worth US$ 20.5 billion in 2024 with duty-free access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Recently, the Trump Administration cancelled US foreign aid to South Africa with immediate effect—a great upside-down in the diplomatic relations of both countries. The aid was cancelled in light of the alleged racial discrimination against the white Afrikaners. Although the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa denied such claims, in his weekly message to the country, he said South Africans “should not allow events beyond our shores to divide us or turn us against each other.” While not naming anybody, he continues and says, “In particular, we should challenge the completely false narrative that our country is a place in which people of a certain race or culture are being targeted for persecution.” This diplomatic storm should serve as a reminder for South Africa to design domestic policies that conform to its economic trade partners.
While South Africa’s strategic autonomy is questioned on matters like the Russia-Ukraine war and naval exercises with Russia and China, South Africa has refused to side with the West against Russia on any Ukraine-related resolution in the United Nations. In fact, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries, including South Africa, remain neutral on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Instead of taking sides, South Africa decided to walk on the path of dialogue and de-escalation. In 2023, for the first time, President Cyril Ramaphosa led a peace mission beyond the continent with African leaders to Kyiv and Moscow to end the Russia-Ukraine war—unfortunately, it remained inconsequential. In the Same year, South Africa conducted joint naval drills with Russia and China off the east coast, to which the White House has expressed its concerns.
Challenges to Its Geopolitical Role
Beyond the African continent, South Africa has shown its geopolitical influence, demonstrating its significance in multilateral organizations. But it remains surrounded by domestic and diplomatic issues undermining its credibility on the global stage.
According to the World Bank, “South Africa is the most unequal country in the world,” holding rank 1 out of 164 countries in the World Bank’s global database of Gini coefficients. After so many years of independence, the majority of blacks are still the victims of unequal wealth distribution and access to basic amenities such as education, food and employment.
Economically, one of the major domestic issues and structural problems is overwhelming unemployment in the country, with 31.9% in the last quarter of 2024 and the highest among the youths between the age groups 15 and 24, at 59.6%. The government should work on reducing unemployment and inequality while adhering to the World Bank guidelines and recommendations to avoid civil unrest like the Zuma riots in 2021. The pre-election survey of 2024 also highlighted the major challenges the South Africans are facing, listing unemployment on top, followed by load-shedding and corruption.
In the 2024 elections, for the first time, the African National Congress (ANC)—once led by Nelson Mandela—lost its majority and clung to the coalition, reflecting the changing political landscape and public mood in the country. South Africa is in political turmoil due to problems like corruption, increasing unemployment and growing dissatisfaction among the voters. This unstable political climate in the country is problematic for the foreign commitments, making the state unfocused on external strategic issues.
Lastly, as of February 2025, Eskom, the state company of the most industrialized nation on the continent, South Africa, is in heavy debt of approximately R395.3 billion (US$ 22.1 billion). For decades, the frequent power cuts or load-shedding have disrupted the economic potential, leading to a decline in confidence among investors and weakening the position of the country in leading the regional energy corridors or clean energy transition. Recently, the government unveiled the plans to support Eskom, while it lacks the investment needed to recover loans.
Conclusion
South Africa may not be a great power, but its geopolitical importance is unmatched and undeniable, sitting on multiple strategic domains, including African leadership, mineral wealth, the voice of the Global South, maritime positioning and multilateral diplomacy. In this unjust and competitive world, it carries the voice of developing nations, seeking fair space and recognition and their participation in the international institutions.
Pretoria’s ability to negotiate with great powers and its contribution to the global governance reforms position it as a middle power. Whether through platforms like BRICS, the African Union and the UN, South Africa continues to shape the geopolitics of the 21st century.
Over the past two centuries, technology has not merely advanced but transformed the very fabric of human life. The first Industrial Revolution (late 18th century) brought mechanical production powered by steam and water. It took over a century for the second Industrial Revolution to emerge ushering in electricity, assembly lines, and mass production. By the 1970s, the third Revolution had arrived in form of automation, electronics, and computers which began to reshape manufacturing and communication. Around the turn of the 21st century, Fourth Industrial Revolution came in fuelled by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML), and ubiquitous connectivity. The pace of change of technology, which once measured in centuries, then by decades, now evolves year to year, sometimes even month to month.
Living in the Digital World
Modern technology has enabled faster problem-solving, greater global connectivity, and easier access to vital services, empowering individuals, communities and countries to thrive in ways that were once unimaginable. Technology is seamlessly integrating into almost every aspect of human activity. shaping our routines, choices, and interactions. Smartphones have become extensions of our identity and constant companion. Today India has over 1.2 billion mobile phone users, with 750 million smartphone users who spend almost 5 hours per day on their devices. From smartphones to smart homes, wearable devices to cloud-based assistants/chatbots, we have adopted technology to such an extent that it has blurred the line between the physical and digital worlds so much so that machines are becoming more like humans, and humans are becoming more like machines.
Technology Risks
This deep integration of technology in our lives also brings risks. Constant use of technology can lead to physical stress and mental health concerns like anxiety, reduced attention span, and digital addiction. Misuse of technology like generative AI for spread of misinformation and deepfakes can influence elections, damage reputations, and fuel social divisions. While AI boosts efficiency, it also threatens to displace millions of low and mid-skill jobs across industries which could lead to widespread unemployment and economic insecurity.
The more interconnected our lives become, the more vulnerable we are to breaches not just of data, but of safety and life itself. The safety dimension is no longer hypothetical. In 2018 in Arizona, there was a fatal crash involving a self-driving Uber test vehicle. In 2020, a hacked insulin pump in the U.S. reportedly contributed to a diabetic patient’s death. Use of technology in asymmetric warfare is on the rise. In Sep 2023, thousands of pagers simultaneously exploded across Lebanon, followed by walkie-talkies exploding the next day, killing and injuring hundreds. Advanced technologies were utilised by Isreal to systematically target military leaders and nuclear scientists of Iran in the Iran Isreal conflict turning personal devices into weapons.
With infusion of AI into gadgets, devices and appliances of daily use, any disruption by design or default could endanger human lives. In May 2025, one of the AI safety firms reported that the OpenAI’s o3 and o4-mini models refused to shut down and rewrote the code to keep working on tasks. While no harm was recorded, the incident underlined a new paradigm: we are creating systems that may one day act independent of human control.
The New Triad: Security, Privacy, and Safety
Technology can no longer be assessed on basis of functionality alone. We must now assess and adopt technology with three inseparable parameters: security, privacy, and safety. Security ensures that systems and data are protected from malicious intent. Privacy safeguards individuals’ rights to control their personal information. Safety addresses the physical and psychological well-being of users ensuring that technology does not cause harm, intentionally or otherwise. Each of these is increasingly difficult to guarantee in a hyper-connected world. Yet without them, trust in technology will erode and with it, the progress we have so painstakingly achieved.
Toward Technology with Conscience
The big question is that how we ensure that rapid technological advancements serve humanity’s best interests without compromising security, privacy and safety. We need to embed ethics into every stage of technology development, from design to deployment. Regulatory frameworks must evolve, not to stifle innovation, but to channel it responsibly. Public-private partnerships can help establish global standards for technology use, transparency, and accountability. Education is equally vital. A digitally literate society is better equipped to demand and safeguard ethical technology. On a broader scale, there is a growing need for global governance of emerging technologies. Multilateral cooperation, led by international bodies, is essential to establish norms for responsible innovation and prevent technological misuse across borders.
Way Forward: Building a Safe and Secure Digital World
Technology has undoubtedly made our lives more connected, efficient, and intelligent. But as we continue to innovate in our quest for frontier technologies, we must pause to ask if we are building a future that serves humanity or one that eventually controls it. The answers lie not in abandoning technology, but in steering it with wisdom. Through deliberate policies, inclusive design, and ethical consciousness, we can ensure that technology remains a tool for human progress and not a force of unintended consequence.
The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has evolved into a prolonged economic confrontation with significant global implications. As of mid-2025, both nations have experienced economic challenges due to the ongoing trade tensions. This section delves into the tariff war’s origins, progression, and current state, setting the stage for a detailed analysis of its impacts on both economies. The trade dispute between the United States and China began with the U.S. imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, citing unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. China retaliated with its tariffs, leading to a tit-for-tat escalation. Over the years, this conflict has affected global supply chains, market dynamics, and economic growth trajectories. Since its inception, the tariff war has seen multiple rounds of tariff impositions, negotiations, and temporary truces. Key milestones include the implementation of significant tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods, affecting various sectors such as technology, agriculture, and manufacturing. Despite several negotiation attempts, a comprehensive resolution remains elusive, with both nations maintaining substantial tariffs as of 2025. As of mid-2025, the tariff war continues to exert pressure on both economies. The U.S. has experienced a slowdown in economic growth, with the OECD projecting a decrease from 2.8% in 2024 to 1.6% in 2025, attributing this decline primarily to the trade war and associated tariffs. On the other hand, China faces challenges such as a decline in exports to the U.S. and a slowdown in its manufacturing sector, with the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) indicating reduced factory activity.
Economic Impact on China
The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has profoundly affected China’s economy. As of 2025, the ramifications are evident across various sectors, including exports, manufacturing, and domestic consumption. This section provides a comprehensive examination of these impacts. China’s exports to the U.S. have experienced a significant downturn due to the imposition of tariffs. The ongoing trade tensions have decreased demand for Chinese goods in the American market, compelling Chinese exporters to seek alternative markets and adjust their strategies.
The manufacturing sector, a cornerstone of China’s economy, has been adversely affected. The Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for China’s manufacturing industry has shown fluctuations, indicating instability in the sector. For instance, in January 2025, the PMI stood at 49.1%, suggesting a contraction in manufacturing activity. This contraction is significant as it indicates a decrease in production and potential job losses. However, by February 2025, it rebounded to 50.2%, indicating a slight expansion. Despite these fluctuations, the overall trend points to a slowdown, with small and medium-sized enterprises facing more significant challenges than larger firms.
Beyond external trade pressures, China faces internal economic challenges that the tariff war has exacerbated. The property sector, for instance, has seen a decline, with home prices dropping and developers struggling with debt. This downturn has decreased consumer confidence and spending, further slowing economic growth. Additionally, the rise of unlicensed “home bars” in Beijing reflects the broader economic strain on consumers, particularly among younger demographics. These informal establishments have emerged as cost-effective alternatives to traditional bars, highlighting shifts in consumer behaviour amid economic uncertainty.
Strategic Responses and Adaptations
China has implemented several strategic measures to mitigate its economic impact in response to the tariff war. One notable action is the imposition of export bans on critical minerals and rare earth magnets, which are essential components in various industries, including automotive and technology. This move has disrupted global supply chains and is seen as a strategic countermeasure in the ongoing trade tensions. Furthermore, China’s leadership has adopted a more assertive stance in trade negotiations. Vice Premier He Lifeng, known for his hard-line approach, has replaced the more conciliatory Liu He as the chief trade negotiator. This shift indicates China’s intent to protect its economic interests and resist external pressures to alter its economic structure.
The prolonged tariff war poses risks to China’s long-term economic stability. Persistent trade tensions can lead to structural changes in global supply chains, with companies seeking to diversify away from Chinese markets. This shift could result in a permanent loss of market share for Chinese exporters. Moreover, the erosion of multilateral trade relationships and the undermining of international trade institutions could have lasting effects on global economic stability and China’s role. The U.S.-China tariff war, initiated in 2018, has prompted both nations to implement strategic measures to mitigate economic impacts and assert their positions in the global trade landscape. As of 2025, these strategies have evolved, reflecting the dynamic nature of international trade relations. This section comprehensively examines the strategic responses and adaptations the United States and China undertake.
United States Strategic Measures
The United States has undertaken strategic measures to reassert its economic position and protect domestic industries in response to the ongoing trade tensions and growing concerns over chronic trade imbalances. One of the central initiatives of the U.S. administration has been the introduction of ‘reciprocal’ tariffs—tariff rates designed to match those imposed by foreign trading partners. These tariffs are designed to create a more level playing field for American producers by making imported goods more expensive. This strategy was formalized through a Presidential Memorandum signed on February 13, 2025, which mandated a comprehensive review of non-reciprocal trade practices believed to be contributing to the U.S. trade deficit. The move reflects a broader protectionist shift in U.S. trade policy, aiming to reduce dependence on imports and level the playing field for American producers. However, the implementation of these tariffs has been far from smooth. Legal uncertainty arose when a federal court issued an injunction freezing the tariffs shortly after they were announced. The situation evolved rapidly when an appeals court overturned the decision, reinstating the tariffs and creating a climate of ambiguity for businesses and investors attempting to plan amid a constantly shifting regulatory environment.
In parallel, the U.S. Commerce Department advanced a separate set of tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a provision allowing for the imposition of tariffs on national security grounds. These new levies targeted various imported goods, including copper, lumber, and prescription drugs. Unlike the reciprocal tariffs, Section 232 involves a more detailed protocol: a public comment period, an investigation by the Commerce Department, and a subsequent report to the President recommending action if a national security threat is identified. These tariffs are part of a broader strategy to bolster domestic manufacturing capacity in critical national defence and economic security sectors. However, they have also sparked concerns about rising input costs for U.S. manufacturers and the potential for escalating trade disputes with key allies.
A particularly notable development occurred concerning tariffs on metals. Seeking to provide further relief to struggling domestic metal producers, the U.S. government announced a sharp increase in tariffs on steel and aluminium imports—from 25% to 50%. This decision was framed as a necessary intervention to revitalize domestic production capabilities and reduce strategic dependence on foreign suppliers. While it was welcomed by some segments of the U.S. steel and aluminium industry, it also prompted backlash from downstream manufacturers who rely on competitively priced raw materials. Many of these firms voiced concerns that the increased costs would hamper their global competitiveness, squeeze profit margins, and lead to job losses in sectors beyond metal production. Additionally, there are fears of retaliatory tariffs from major trade partners, which could further strain diplomatic and economic relations.
Amid mounting global scrutiny and the approach of a critical tariff deadline, the White House intensified efforts to negotiate favourable trade deals. U.S. trade officials issued urgent requests to foreign governments, calling on them to submit their most comprehensive and competitive trade offers. The goal was to secure agreements that could pre-empt the implementation of further tariffs. These discussions encompassed a wide range of trade elements, including the establishment of quotas for U.S. product purchases, reductions in tariffs on American goods, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, and reforms to digital trade policies. The administration also emphasized the importance of incorporating provisions that promote economic security and safeguard intellectual property, reflecting growing concerns over the strategic dimensions of international commerce. This aggressive negotiating posture signalled the U.S. government’s intention to leverage tariffs as a protective mechanism and a bargaining chip in a broader effort to reshape the global trade landscape in its favour. These strategic measures underscore a significant shift in U.S. trade policy toward a more assertive and unilateral approach. While they aim to address longstanding issues such as trade deficits, foreign subsidies, and unfair trade practices, their long-term efficacy remains uncertain. The risk of retaliatory actions, legal challenges, and disruption to global supply chains poses a complex challenge, leaving U.S. policymakers to balance short-term political gains with potential long-term economic consequences.
China’s Strategic Measures
In the face of escalating U.S. tariffs, China implemented carefully calculated strategic measures to protect its economic interests, maintain global trade relevance, and assert its geopolitical standing. One of the most significant moves was the imposition of export controls on critical minerals and rare earth magnets—materials indispensable to a wide range of high-tech and defence-related industries, including automotive manufacturing, aerospace, semiconductors, and advanced electronics. These restrictions, announced during the peak of trade tensions, had a pronounced ripple effect across global supply chains. By limiting the export of these strategically vital resources, China sent a strong signal about its ability to wield economic leverage, particularly in areas with near-monopoly control over production and processing. The policy was widely interpreted as an economic countermeasure designed to retaliate against U.S. tariffs and underscore China’s essential role in the global industrial ecosystem.
Simultaneously, China accelerated its efforts to diversify trade partnerships to reduce its economic dependence on the United States. By deepening its engagement with emerging and established markets across Asia, Europe, and Africa, China sought to establish a more resilient and multipolar trade network. This strategy involved negotiating bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, investing in infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, and strengthening economic diplomacy with regions less influenced by U.S. foreign policy. These initiatives enabled China to open new export channels and mitigate the adverse effects of American tariffs. By redirecting trade flows and expanding its influence across the Global South, Beijing positioned itself as an alternative economic partner to countries looking to escape the binary pressures of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry.
China also imposed tariffs on various American goods, focusing on politically sensitive sectors such as agriculture as part of its retaliatory strategy. These counter-tariffs targeted products like soybeans, pork, and corn—key exports from states that form part of the U.S. electoral heartland. By directly impacting the livelihoods of American farmers and agribusinesses, China aimed to exert domestic political pressure on the U.S. administration, leveraging economic interdependence as a tactical advantage. This move was not merely reactive but strategically designed to highlight the global interconnectedness of trade and the potential consequences of unilateral protectionist policies.
China also focused heavily on strengthening domestic industries, especially high-technology and advanced manufacturing sectors, to bolster its long-term economic resilience. Aware of its vulnerabilities due to reliance on foreign—often American—technology, the Chinese government launched initiatives to foster homegrown innovation and technological self-sufficiency. Substantial investments were funnelled into research and development alongside policy incentives to promote industrial upgrading, artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and semiconductor production. Although downplayed in public discourse, the Made in China 2025 strategy continued to serve as a guiding framework for this transformation. These efforts underscored China’s determination to insulate itself from external pressures and to shift from being the “world’s factory” to a global leader in innovation.
Despite the hardline measures from both sides, there were intermittent attempts to de-escalate the trade war through diplomatic negotiations. One of the more significant milestones occurred in Geneva, where representatives from both countries temporarily agreed to scale back some of the more severe tariff measures. According to the terms of this accord, the United States agreed to reduce its average tariff rate from 145% to 30%, while China committed to cutting its rate from 125% to 10%. This breakthrough was welcomed by global markets and interpreted as a signal of possible reconciliation between the two largest economies in the world. However, the optimism proved to be short-lived. Subsequent actions by both parties—ranging from renewed tariff threats to accusations of non-compliance—highlighted the fragility of the truce. These developments made it clear that while temporary compromises might be reached, the underlying structural and ideological conflicts between the two nations continued to pose significant barriers to lasting resolution.
Taken as a whole, China’s strategic measures reveal a multidimensional approach to the trade war, balancing immediate retaliation with long-term planning. From weaponizing control over essential resources to reengineering its role in global trade, China has not only responded forcefully to U.S. tariffs but also laid the groundwork for a more independent and diversified economic future. Nevertheless, the enduring nature of U.S.-China tensions underscores the reality that global trade has entered a more fragmented, politicized, and unpredictable era—one in which economic policy increasingly serves as a tool of geopolitical strategy.
The U.S.-China tariff war has profoundly impacted global trade dynamics, prompting significant shifts in supply chains and economic strategies worldwide. This section examines the multifaceted consequences of the trade conflict, highlighting key developments and adaptations across various regions and industries. Imposing tariffs between the U.S. and China has disrupted established supply chains, particularly in sectors heavily reliant on cross-border trade. Electronics, automotive, and semiconductors have faced increased costs and logistical challenges, leading companies to reassess their sourcing and manufacturing strategies. For instance, with its intricate network of suppliers and manufacturers across Asia, the electronics sector has experienced significant upheaval due to tariff-induced cost escalations. In response to supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the trade war, businesses are increasingly adopting regionalization and near-shoring strategies. By relocating production closer to end markets, companies aim to mitigate risks associated with long-distance trade and geopolitical tensions. This trend is evident in the automotive industry, where manufacturers are expanding operations in Mexico and other parts of Latin America to serve the North American market more efficiently. Countries actively seek to diversify their trade partnerships to reduce dependency on any single nation. For example, Vietnam has emerged as a key manufacturing hub, attracting investments from companies looking to circumvent tariffs on Chinese goods. The U.S. has engaged in trade talks with Vietnam, presenting a list of demands to reduce the country’s reliance on Chinese imports. The trade war has contributed to a slowdown in global economic growth. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has revised its global growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 to 2.9%, citing the adverse effects of increased tariffs and trade uncertainties. The U.S. economy is projected to grow by only 1.6% in 2025, a significant decrease from previous estimates. Asian economies are adjusting their strategies in light of the shifting trade landscape. China is focusing on expanding its domestic market and investing in high-tech industries to reduce reliance on exports. Simultaneously, countries like India and Indonesia are positioning themselves as alternative manufacturing destinations, offering incentives to attract foreign investment and capitalize on the realignment of global supply chains.
Technological Advancements and Automation
The trade war has accelerated the adoption of automation and advanced manufacturing technologies. Companies are investing in robotics and artificial intelligence to enhance efficiency and reduce dependence on human labour, particularly in regions where labour costs are rising. This shift addresses immediate challenges posed by tariffs and positions businesses for long-term competitiveness in a rapidly evolving global market. The ongoing U.S.-China trade war has significantly impacted global diplomacy, reshaped alliances and influencing the geopolitical landscape. China has responded to U.S. tariffs by imposing countermeasures, including tariffs on $20 billion worth of U.S. imports such as coal, gas, and key minerals. Additionally, China has initiated antitrust investigations into major U.S. technology companies like Google, signalling a broader strategy to assert its position in the tech sector and respond to U.S. economic policies.
The trade conflict has also led to a fragmentation of the global technology sector. The U.S. has imposed restrictions on Chinese tech firms, aiming to sever access to critical technologies, including semiconductor chips and software. In response, China has increased its investment in domestic innovation, particularly in semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, and green technologies. These decoupling places Asian tech leaders—such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—in a precarious position as they navigate between adhering to U.S. policies and maintaining critical supply chains in China.
Furthermore, the trade war has accelerated shifts in Global Supply Chains. Companies are seeking alternatives to Chinese manufacturing hubs, with countries like Vietnam, India, and Mexico emerging as potential beneficiaries. However, replicating China’s efficiency remains challenging due to bureaucratic hurdles, insufficient infrastructure, and political instability in these alternative hubs. In the realm of diplomacy, China’s approach has evolved. Facing turbulence in its relationship with the United States, China aims to shore up diplomatic capital with other countries. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has indicated a preference for constructive negotiations with the United States to stabilize ties while also expressing readiness to retaliate if Washington takes further trade or economic actions. The trade war’s impact extends to the Middle East, where countries navigate uncertainty between two economic giants. The region’s unique vulnerabilities to economic tremors are exacerbated by the U.S.-China rivalry, affecting supply chains, manufacturing costs, and diplomatic alliances. The U.S.-China trade war has evolved into a defining geopolitical conflict encompassing broader technological, economic, and military dimensions. This rivalry tests the resilience of global diplomacy as nations are compelled to navigate the conflictual environment created by the two countries. However, the deep-rooted structural differences between the two economies and a legacy of mutual distrust make the success of these diplomatic overtures uncertain. The path toward a sustainable resolution remains fraught with challenges, requiring careful negotiation and concessions.
Conclusion
Determining who won the tariff war between the United States and China is far from straightforward. The prolonged trade conflict, which began in 2018 and continues into the present, has significantly altered global economic patterns, strained political relations, and forced both countries to recalibrate their strategies. When looking solely at economic performance, both nations suffered considerable setbacks. American consumers and businesses faced higher prices on many goods due to tariffs, while China’s retaliatory measures struck U.S. farmers and exporters. The overall growth of the U.S. economy slowed, with forecasts for 2025 revised downward and inflationary pressures increased. China, too, saw its export-driven industries disrupted, causing slower growth and uncertainty among investors. While Beijing took measures to stabilize its economy, both countries ultimately endured economic losses without gaining a clear advantage. However, China seemed to gain the upper hand in its ability to adapt strategically to the challenges posed by the tariff war. China accelerated investments in technology and innovation, expanding its capabilities in critical sectors like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Its leadership also skilfully leveraged new trade partnerships, particularly within Asia and through initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Belt and Road Initiative, to diversify its economic relationships.
Additionally, China’s targeted export controls on rare earth minerals and other critical supplies underscored its ability to use trade as a strategic tool without provoking widespread backlash. In contrast, the United States faced challenges coordinating a cohesive response, grappling with domestic political divisions and legal uncertainties around tariffs, diluting its overall effectiveness. On the international stage, the trade war caused many countries to rethink their alliances and trade dependencies. While the United States’ unilateral tariff policies appeared increasingly protectionist and unpredictable, China strengthened its role as a reliable trading partner to many nations. This shift enabled China to enhance its global influence and expand its network of trade relationships. The U.S., meanwhile, faced scepticism from traditional allies and missed opportunities to re-engage with multilateral trade frameworks, which further diminished its standing.
Domestically, the political consequences were more pronounced in the United States. Many American industries and consumers bore the brunt of tariff-related cost increases, fuelling criticism of the government’s approach and sparking political debates. This internal friction influenced public opinion and added complexity to the country’s broader political landscape. With its centralized governance and state-controlled media, China was better positioned to manage public sentiment and maintain political stability despite economic challenges. Looking ahead, China appears better poised to emerge stronger from the trade war over the next decade. Its efforts to build self-reliance in technology, diversify trade, and solidify its position in emerging markets provide it with a strategic advantage.
Nevertheless, China faces hurdles, including demographic shifts and economic vulnerabilities. The United States, despite some setbacks, retains significant strengths in innovation, financial dominance, and a robust network of potential allies, provided it chooses to reengage more constructively on the global stage. Ultimately, the Tariff War has not produced a clear winner. Instead, it has exposed vulnerabilities, accelerated shifts in global economic structures, and realigned political and trade relationships. While China may hold a slight strategic edge, both countries have paid substantial costs, and the broader international community has felt the repercussions. By their very nature, trade wars tend to result in mutual losses rather than outright victories, reshaping the world in complex and unpredictable ways. Hence, in International Politics, there are no permanent enemies or friends. Only interest matters the most.
Garry Kasparov, the Russian chess grandmaster famously quoted “At the end of the day, it’s all about money”. This quote holds quite good in any war/conflict as economics plays a pivotal role in military confrontations since wars and conflicts are a pretty expensive business.
Ending years of speculation whether Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear installations to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Israel launched “Operation Rising Lion” in the wee hours of June 13, 2025 on Iran’s two nuclear installations in Natanz and Isfahan apart from targeting advanced missile manufacturing sites and dismantling command structures by killing the top Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.
Though Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, USA had testified to the US Congress on March 26, 2025 that Iran did not have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. Similar views were expressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in May 2025. And yet, Israel went ahead with Operation Rising Lion.
Also, part of Operation Rising Lion was to affect the regime change in Iran by removing its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei who has been Iran’s head of state since August 06, 1989 and long perceived by Israel as its biggest threat.
It was hoped by Israel that with the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities and extensive damage that Operation Rising Lion would cause to the Iranian infrastructure and top military leadership, the Iranians would in an uprising, remove Ayatollah Khamenei from power. In the event of the Iranian uprising not happening, the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei was not ruled out by Israel.
At 12.01 am Israel Standard Time, 200 Israeli fighter jets comprising F-15, F-16 and F-35, took from various air bases of the Israeli Air Force and after flying for over two hours which included mid-air refuelling by Boeing 707 aerial refuelling tankers in the Syrian air space, they reached the border of western Iran over Iraq and positioned themselves for the mission.
At 3.30 am Iran Time, the fighter aircrafts began firing at their allotted targets and by 4.00 am Iran Time, these fighter jets were heading back home. Two hours later another wave of the Israeli fighter jets pounded their objectives in Iran. That day morning total of five waves carried out their missions in Iran. At the same time, Mossad operatives carried out drone and other covert operations in Iran.
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister’s seven-minute video was released at 7.17 am Israel Standard Time in which he informed the world of Operation Rising Lion adding that the operation could last “as many days as it takes”.
Iran was hit badly and pulverised. It seemed that Iran’s collapse was imminent. But Israel had under-estimated the Iranian resilience having the 5000-year Persian Civilizational legacy and its military capacity and capability.
At 11.35 am Iran Time, “Operation True Promise 3” was launched by Iran as the retaliation to the Israeli strikes. The initial counter-attack with 100 drones comprising HESA Shahed-136 and Shahed-138 drones aimed at various Israeli cities soon to be followed by waves of ballistic missiles comprising Fattah-110, Zolfaghar and Kheibar Shekan missiles.
Soon Israel’s famed sir defence system comprising David’s Sling, Iron Dome, Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 and THAAD swung into action. Despite Israel having the world’s best known air defence system and total air superiority over Iran, for the first time since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel started getting pounded.
As the Iranian missiles started proving effective and Israel’s air defence system started getting saturated, death and destruction started setting in Israel.
Though the number of Israelis dying due to the Iranian onslaught was much lesser than on the Iranian side, primarily because it is mandatory in Israel since 1951 to have a bunker in all buildings, but each death of an Israeli citizen due to the Iranian missiles was a severe loss of pride and prestige for Israel.
The Israeli air defence system was having a success rate of 90% in intercepting the incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, but the 10% getting through was giving Israel nightmares.
Tel Aviv, the capital of Israel had been destroyed one-third. So much so, on June 18, 2025 just five days into Operation Rising Lion, Israel imposed strict media restrictions on both foreign and domestic journalists including approval from the Israeli Military Censor, a wing of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to publish any news related to the Iran-Israel War 2025.
Adding to Israel’s worry was that its interceptor missiles were being used faster than they could be replaced. On June 17, 2025 Wahington Post reported that with the current rate of combat, Israel could maintain its air defence for only 10-12 more days.
With Iran having an estimated arsenal of over 4000 missiles and firing about 60 missiles on an average daily, it could target Israel for more than two months comfortably.
Israel would have to replenish its missile interceptor missiles from the USA. But for how long? Iran too would replenish its ballistic missiles domestically as well as from allies like Russia, China & North Korea. Hence, this issue of expending and replenishing the interceptor & ballistic missiles wasn’t going in Israel’s favour anytime in the future.
Israel was faced with the prospect of being in a Ukraine-like situation where it would have to depend heavily on the US replenishments to fight the prolonged war with Iran. The US-located Boeing Corporation supplies Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 air defence interceptor missiles to Israel but it was having problems in manufacturing as it required rare earth minerals and magnets from China for their production. China had stopped exports of rare earth minerals and magnets to the US military contractors since April 2025 after Donald Trump had started the Tariff War.
Adding to the interceptor missiles replenishment issues was the battering the Israeli economy was getting.
Interceptor missiles were costing Israel US$ 200 million a day and building repairs estimated at US$ 400 million. For a month’s war with Iran, it would have costed Israel US$ 12 billion. The Bank of Israel has already forecast that Israel’s war with Hamas since October 07, 2023 for a two-year period till October 2025, would cost Israel US$ 55.6 billion, which is 10.81% of the Israeli economy pegged at US$ 514 billion.
Israel war with Hezbollah that lasted from October 01, 2024 to November 27, 2024 costed Israel US$ 6.67 billion.
Israel was in no economic position to continue a prolonged war with Iran and Iran was in no mood to end its war with Israel soon, despite suffering more casualties and destruction as at stake was its reputation and regional dominance.
On June 20, 2025 Iran started using Fattah-2 hypersonic missiles on Israel which has a speed of Mach 15. Hypersonic missiles can’t be intercepted by any air defence system. Only five countries in the world have hypersonic missiles – USA, Russia, China, North Korea & Iran.
Seeing the war with Iran entering the dangerous phase with the induction of hypersonic missiles, Israel turned to the US for help.
President Donald Trump wasn’t willing the enter the Iran-Israel War as he has promised the Americans in his election rallies in the 2024 US Presidential Elections that USA would not take part in any global conflict during his Presidency.
Despite the leading American think-tanks, personalities and media-houses predicting defeat for Donald Trump, the Americans voted for him overwhelmingly.
With Israel now in existential danger at the hands of its bête noire Iran and the pulls and pressures of the rich American Jews who generously contribute to both the Republicans & Democrats in any US Presidential Election, President Donald Trump gave the go-ahead to carry out military strikes on Iran.
On June 21, 2025 at 2.10 am Iran Time, the US Air Force struck at the three Iranian nuclear installations at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan under Operation Midnight Hammer. USA claimed to have totally destroyed the nuclear weapon capabilities of Iran.
But early US intelligence assessment on June 24, 2025 stated otherwise. Iran’s nuclear capabilities stood intact.
On June 23, 2025 Iran struck at the US military bases in Qatar and Iraq.
No loss of life was reported either in the US attack on Iran and the Iranian attack on the US military bases, thus giving credence to the fact that both the sides had informed each other well in advance.
From Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu calling for the Iranian regime change a few days earlier, after the Iranian attack on the US military bases in the Middle East, Donald Trump started posting “God bless Iran” and “Peace and Prosperity to both Iran & Israel” on the social media!
At 6.02 pm EST, Donald Trump announced ceasefire to be effective in various stages between Iran and Israel, bringing to an end the 12-day war between the two bitterest enemies in the Middle East on June 25, 2025.
Iran had 974 killed and 4000 injured in this war while Israel suffered 30 killed and 3238 injured with Iran suffering more material damage than Israel.
The 12-day war between Iran and Israel with a special appearance by the US failed to meet the two primary aims of the Americans and Israelis – destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapon capabilities and the regime change in Iran. Thereby, signalling the clear Pyrrhic Victory for Iran.
Iran has not only emerged stronger after its 12-day war with Israel as both the main aims of the US and Israel couldn’t be achieved, but also as the undisputed leader of the Middle East and the Islamic World.
Having pulled out from the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 22, 2025, a day after the US struck Iran, it is matter of time before Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon. Russia & China having pledged full nuclear support to Iran in the last few days, Iran possessing a nuclear weapon is not a possibility anymore, but a reality which will soon be fructified.
And the day Iran possesses the nuclear weapon, the two-state solution will too see the light of the day with Palestine emerging as an independent nation.
In the times ahead, Operation Rising Lion will badly boomerang on Israel.
India’s defense R&D ecosystem has recently indicated that quantum science is a national priority now. In late May 2025, DRDO Chairman Dr. Samir Kamat formally opened a new Quantum Technology Research Centre (QTRC) in Delhi. The center has state-of-the-art labs for secure quantum communications, high-precision quantum sensing and quantum-enhanced navigation. DRDO specifically mentions Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) as being its main focus area – its mission statement demands ultra-reliable military communications in accordance with quantum physics. Such measures highlight the realisation that quantum technologies – previously the domain of long-term research – have tangible application to contemporary warfare and national security.
This Indian drive is a part of the quantum race globally. The United States has committed enormous efforts: the National Quantum Initiative Act (2018) aligns civilian R&D, and defense initiatives such as DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative seek to deploy a useful quantum computer by the early 2030s. U.S. studies also emphasize quantum sensing: atomic interferometer sensors might provide “unmatched” navigation accuracy even when GPS is denied. China also considers quantum strategic. In 2020 President Xi Jinping was said to have informed officials that quantum technology is “another front” in international high-tech competition. Beijing sponsored the Micius quantum communications satellite (launched in 2016) – the first in the world – and now has thousands of kilometers of quantum key distribution links running. Observers estimate Chinese public expenditures on quantum to be approximately four times the U.S. level, ATEP’s data claimed, and undertake more than half the world’s public spending in quantum. These innovations demonstrate that prominent powers already see quantum technology as crucial for future military superiority – an imperative India cannot afford to overlook.
India’s Quantum Initiatives
India has initiated a multi-faceted initiative to establish its quantum strength. In April 2023, the Cabinet sanctioned a National Quantum Mission (NQM) (2023–24 to 2030–31) with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore (about US$750 million). The objectives of the NQM are to construct intermediate-scale quantum computers and facilitate satellite-based quantum communication. For instance, the goal focuses on quantum processors of 20–50 qubits in three years and expands to 50–1000 qubits in eight years. It also targets setting up quantum-secured links of more than 2000 km between ground stations, paving the way for a future QKD network.
Concurrent with the civilian program, DRDO’s new QTRC gives a specific defense R&D platform. As mentioned earlier, it will create QKD systems and other technologies for ultra-secure military communications. Concurrently, top research universities have established quantum centers. For instance, the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) recently initiated a Centre for Quantum Technologies to work on qubit processors, single-photon sources/detectors, photonic quantum networks and sensors. Several startups (frequently spun out of IITs and IISc) are also surfacing to commoditize quantum devices and networks. In the telecommunication sector, industry consortia are working out how to embed quantum key distribution into India’s 5G/6G backbones and defense networks. Combined, these activities seek to provide India with a quantum communication, computing and sensing footprint of its own before the technologies pervade.
Strategic Imperatives
The focus on quantum in defence policy is motivated by unambiguous strategic imperatives. Second, quantum communications can fundamentally enhance security. QKD-based connections are theoretically provably secure against any eavesdropper and would guarantee that even sophisticated adversaries cannot intercept encrypted military communication without being detected. Without domestic QKD capability, Indian troops could be left open to cyber interception or have to be dependent on international vendors for essential encryption. Second, sophisticated quantum sensing would be able to surmount current weaknesses. The U.S. analysis points out that atomic clocks and quantum inertial sensors can give “resilient” navigation and timing when GPS is jammed. For India, this is significant: its enemies might try to blind the navigation systems of Indian forces. Quantum gravimeters, magnetometers or accelerometers would make it possible for submarines, missiles and jets to travel stealthily, or find hidden underground or underwater structures, with far greater precision than available today. Gaining such technological advantage would be strategically valuable in any war. Third, quantum computing itself holds both peril and opportunity. A quantum computer sufficiently potent could model complicated processes (such as optimizing new materials or logistics) much more quickly than traditional machines. There are potential military R&D uses for this. Conversely, quantum computers pose a threat to current cryptography. U.S. GAO reports that a machine capable of compromising common encryption methods might come in 10–20 years’ time. If only other nations acquire such capability first, they may be able to decrypt Indian military communication and business secrets. The strategic need for India is thus twofold: to create quantum tech for itself, and to prepare (through post-quantum cryptography, secure networks, etc.) for the threat of quantum.
Potential Military Applications
Quantum technologies have the potential to revolutionize much of contemporary warfare. In computing, highly efficient quantum processors would allow defence planners to execute massive simulations of force deployments and enemy activity, improving strategic planning. They would also solve difficult optimization problems in logistics — for instance, calculating the best routes, resource apportionments, and supply chain solutions much more quickly than classical computers. Outside of computing, quantum abilities will revolutionize sensing and communications. Future advanced quantum sensors will significantly enhance navigation, imaging, and surveillance; as one military analyst noted, “advanced quantum sensors will revolutionize navigation, imaging, and surveillance” and may even make existing stealth technologies obsolete. In the air and sea environments, quantum radar research portends the ability to detect stealth aircraft or submarines by taking advantage of quantum effects, giving a significant advantage in monitoring concealed threats. Secure communications is also an important application. Quantum key distribution (QKD) makes it possible to generate cryptographic keys that are guaranteed secure; Indian military forces have already tested early QKD links to create communication channels that are impervious to hack attacks. A quantum computer advanced enough could decrypt today’s encryptions “in minutes,” defence officials cautioned, but quantum cryptography flips the script by requiring any eavesdropping to destroy the information itself. Likewise, quantum-enabled atomic clocks and gyroscopes can deliver accurate timing and navigation under GPS jammed or denial conditions. For example, ultra-small atomic clocks being developed would enable Indian troops to continue synchronized operations even in GPS-denied environments. Similarly, atomic magnetometers — based on quantum effects in alkali vapor cells — can detect very small magnetic anomalies, which can be exploited to detect concealed submarines or buried infrastructure. Overall, the convergence of quantum computing, sensing, and communications gives India the potential to secure military networks, accelerate ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), and achieve optimized operations not currently feasible with classical technologies.
Challenges Ahead
Even with these possibilities, daunting challenges need to be overcome before quantum technologies can be trusted in the field. Technically, functional quantum computers do not yet exist. As one analyst points out, all machines currently in use are intermediate, delicate products and have to perform in conjunction with traditional computers always. The establishment of a strong quantum computer involves years of research, cryogenic infrastructure stability, and significant investment; India still does not have a locally-manufactured quantum computer and relies on foreign hardware. This is structurally vulnerable, since supply chains for main components globally are increasingly under export controls by leaders in the world’s quantum race. Essentially, India’s plans could be curbed by the fact that it cannot get advanced qubit chips and systems without foreign licenses.
Resource and procedural barriers also hang over it. Quantum laboratories are expensive to set up: one old physicist remembers that beginning a superconducting qubit laboratory from scratch now would probably take on the order of five million dollars. Government procurement and funding processes have at times been sluggish or disjoined, resulting in delays in obtaining equipment. As a defence analyst has contended, “full financial approvals are still pending” on a good number of quantum projects, and bureaucratic blockages can slow the pace. Human capital is another key issue that needs to be addressed: India requires an ongoing supply of quantum-trained scientists and engineers, but numerous top graduates are enticed overseas by more remunerative alternatives. Even in India, the academic establishment places draconian salary ceilings, making it difficult to hold on to talent. As one head of a laboratory said, if the researcher becomes “invaluable in a year’s time, institutions from across the world will offer them better pay packages.” Closing this talent deficit will need concerted efforts in education, incentive, and career advancement. Strategically, the speeding-up worldwide quantum race heightens the stakes and complexity. Adversaries such as China and the United States are already using quantum technologies in space and defense; for instance, China’s Micius satellite showcased secure quantum communication thousands of kilometers apart, and it is suspected to be developing quantum radars and cryptanalysis. The future battlefield might include adversaries who “decrypt military communications” or “counter this threat” using superior quantum decryption capabilities. Indian response to this will have to be ready for a new type of warfare with encryption and sensing as the linchpins. Nevertheless, incorporating quantum systems into current military doctrine will not be easy. Quantum computers are not silver bullets, experts warn—their role is that of expert tools supporting but not substituting traditional systems. It will be a long-term endeavor to develop new doctrines, train people, and harmonize quantum-safe technologies. In general, the technical underdevelopment, resource and cost limitations, shortage of skills, and rapid external developments all combined make the future way pretty difficult.
Policy Recommendations
Overcoming these challenges and capturing the military potential of quantum technology will necessitate an across-the-board policy approach. To start with, India must continue and increase its budgetary support to the National Quantum Mission (NQM) and allied defence R&D initiatives. This entails not just sustaining the budgetary support (of over ₹6,000 crore as recently increased) but also expediting the disbursement and procurement processes to prevent bureaucratic hold-ups. Specific funding needs to be allocated for developing indigenous hardware competency — e.g., by backing domestic companies and research labs to produce superconducting qubit chips, photonic devices, and cryogenic facilities. Along these lines, India’s defence setup has already set up a new Quantum Technology Research Centre capable of QKD, atomic clocks, and magnetometers; similar programs must be taken forward. Managing the supply chain — through efforts such as the DRDO’s drive for indigenous quantum devices — will make India not vulnerable to export controls or foreign technology deficits.
Second, India needs to develop its human capital and innovation ecosystem. The government, academia, and industry should strengthen collaborations to develop distinct career paths in quantum science and engineering. For example, exclusive scholarship and fellowship schemes may entice students into quantum research, while start-ups and private companies may be incentivized (for example, by grants or equity) to employ and retain top talent. Defence agencies need to cooperate with private quantum companies and foreign partners (the recent report of ORF proposes to look into cooperation with Taiwan, for instance) to speed up know-how transfer. Public-private partnerships have been emphasized as being important; as a commentator remarks, industry and startups “are more flexible” to hold onto talented researchers, so government seed money has to be complemented by private investment to establish a sustainable quantum economy.
Third, there must be an integrated approach to cryptography and standards. Policymakers need to make quantum-safe encryption standards a priority for development and incorporate them into military and civilian communications. India’s defence and telecom departments have already commenced developing post-quantum cryptographic protocols; these initiatives need to be expedited to “future-proof” command-and-control networks. Concurrently, India must use its convening power (e.g. through international conclaves and groupings) to contribute towards global quantum security standards. There is a need for tight coordination among government, private industry, and academia for policy to evolve as the technology continues to evolve. Since top officials have stressed, India possesses the intellectual capability and determination to dominate quantum technology, but “we must act with urgency”.
Lastly, tangible actions should facilitate quick deployment of promising tech. Military and DRDO should perform war-gaming and field-testing of quantum devices (like mobile QKD terminals or quantum inertial navigation units) under realistic environments. What they learn from experiments can be fed into doctrine and acquisition specifications. Simultaneously, India needs to secure its key infrastructure from nascent quantum threats. This means, among other things, investment in post-quantum cryptography to defend networks against future code-breaking attempts (something the US is already embarking upon through its Quantum Computing Preparedness Act). By integrating persistent investment, human-resource development, supply-chain robustness, and global collaboration, India can realize the promise of quantum into tangible defence capability and ensure strategic autonomy in the emerging era of technologies.
Conclusion
Quantum information technology could transform a lot of military life – from secure communications and reliable navigation to robust computing. India has recognised this by launching a National Quantum Mission and by setting up specialist research centres (e.g. DRDO’s QTRC). These are important steps towards future capability assurance. Nevertheless, current resources, infrastructure and manpower are still limited compared to international standards. India in the future will need consistent strategic focus: augmenting finance, cultivating expertise, and carefully linking R&D to defense needs. India can constrain the vulnerabilities of quantum and leverage these technologies to drive its defense profile in the coming decades through prudent policy and cooperation.
The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is one of historical richness. This can be mapped back to the 7th century when the archipelagos were indispensable parts of ancient kingdoms and empires of Majapahit, Johor-Riau, Aceh and Srivijaya. As the colonial powers spread their reign across continents, they carved up territories in Indonesia and Malaysia through different treaties. In 1641, Malaya fell into the reign of the Dutch, who were succeeded by the British Empire in 1824 through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. Under the treaty, Malaya was to be under the governance of the United Kingdom, while the East Indies was dominated by the Dutch.
The region witnessed shifting power dynamics throughout the war. During World War 2, Japanese forces had a stronghold over Malaya and the East Indies. However, this proved to be futile when the brutal defeat of the Japanese forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined with the rise of nationalism within the East Indies, led to the declaration of independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta. However, despite their efforts, the Dutch forces were fixated on recolonising the region. What followed was a violent four-year war from 1945 to 1949, which ended with the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia during the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference.
The life of the archipelago was navigated by the Malay way of life, which consisted of three primary elements- the language, the religion of Islam, and the notion of the Kingdom. Adhering to the structures of a kingdom, the dominant ethnic community in the archipelagic Southeast Asia spoke the Malay language and followed Islam. Because of their interlinked identities, leaders of newly independent Malaysia and Indonesia shared familiar strategic apprehensions of the regional order. The leaders viewed the region as a singular unit represented and protected by the Malay World. Nevertheless, this common outlook marked the extent of their strategic alignment.
The two nations differed widely on their strategic interests. Indonesia viewed itself as the superior nation due to its momentous independence struggle, its territorial vastness and population density. Malaysia faded further into the background as the Soekarno regime asserted its dominance in a bid to establish Indonesia’s strategic foothold over archipelagic Southeast Asia. In his eyes, the two countries lacked any common strategic interest. Indonesia did not consider Malaysia powerful or capable enough to be perceived as a reliable ally. So, instead, they aimed to overpower Malaysia.
Malayan leaders, however, opted for a contrary stance. They believed that the survival and security of the archipelagos depended on each other. In 1963, then-Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed the country’s interest “to forge the closest links with Indonesia.” Common identities and shared strategic interests became the pillars on which these imagined ties were placed. For the leaders, Indonesia was not only their nearest neighbour, rather they shared deep “sentimental and blood ties” with each other. However, their geographical proximity to Indonesia facilitated the realization of mutual strategic dependence.
The sheer influence and power possessed by Indonesia could be observed in the way it unintentionally impacted Malaysia’s foreign policy. Their two common links inculcated an understanding of the necessity of the Malay Archipelago for the survival of the states, the geographical expanse of Indonesia necessitating Malaysia to establish itself closer. “As we were too small to stand alone, our only hope for security was to live in close association with Indonesia in particular, and other countries in Southeast Asia in general,” Tunku expressed. Their need to position themselves closer to Indonesia generated unified aspirations of peace.
To maintain and promote peace, cooperation, and stability in Southeast Asia, they established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, along with the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. This period in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was “marked by friendship, harmony and cooperation.” The newly established Suharto government aimed to reverse the old ways of political confrontation with Malaysia and actively engage in building regional cooperation. Considered to be the most influential player in Southeast Asia, the country’s involvement in the establishment of ASEAN undoubtedly ensured harmony and stability in the region.
Despite their commitment to uphold ASEAN goals, the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship is not one without skirmishes. Sipadan and Ligitan, two islands in the Sulawesi Sea, became the epicentre of the territorial dispute between the two nations. Although territorially compact, the question regarding the ownership of these Islands and the continental shelf consequently led to the involvement of international bodies. The negotiations reached an impasse as both sides insisted on using maps that excluded each other’s claim to the two islands. Consequently, in 1969, all negotiations were suspended as Indonesians claimed that it was beyond their power to negotiate the sovereignty of the Islands. For the Indonesians, the questions regarding the ownership of the Islands were to be left unsettled while maintaining the status quo. However, as far as Malaysian negotiators were concerned, the Sipadan and Ligitan belonged to Malaysia.
In December 1979, the Malaysian government issued a new map that showed Sipadan and Ligitan as part of their territory, thus publicizing the dispute. By February of the following year, the Indonesian government “formally objected to the new map”. However, the resulting discussions between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Hussein Onn failed to resolve the territorial dispute. Subsequently, the usage of the Islands by private dive companies, rising ownership claims over the territory by Malaysia and violation of status-quo led the countries to consult the International Court of Justice in 2002. The sixteen-to-one ruling of the court under Judge Shigeru Oda favoured Malaysia’s claims to the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan.
The presence of undocumented Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia has emerged as another point of contention between the two countries. Conversely, the harsh treatment of Indonesian formal and informal sector labourers by Malaysian employers, combined with the inaction of the Malay government in protecting the exploited, has further aggravated this relationship. The labour movement of Indonesian workers to Malaysia accelerated in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as the country’s rapid modernisation and development during the 1980s and 1990s rendered it an attractive site for impoverished Indonesian workers. However, the influx of Indonesian workers coincided with an increase in crime rates in Malaysia, specifically in the 1990s. Indonesian migrants were convicted of various crimes, including petty theft, rape, robberies and murders. In 2001 alone, approximately 1,051 Indonesian workers were arrested for such offences. Additionally, Malaysian forces also discovered the smuggling of weapons in illegal migrant squatter camps throughout Peninsular and East Malaysia. Notably, an estimate showcases that up to 36 per cent of prison inmates throughout Malaysia are illegal Indonesian immigrants.
The rising workers, illegal and otherwise, seemingly altered the social fabric of the Malay way of life. The assimilation of Indonesian immigrants into the community and identity raised concerns amongst the Islam-following citizens as the former used shared ethnicity and language as a strategy to proselytise the Malay society. This was perceived as a substantial threat to the culture and identity of the nation, to the extent that a Malaysian Cabinet Minister described it as the “biggest threat facing Muslims in Malaysia today.” While both countries have undertaken several legislations to reduce the flow of illegal workers across the borders, the economic disparity and demand for cheap labour have rendered the efforts inadequate.
The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is historically intertwined. This interconnectedness has given birth to differential claims of ownership over certain cultures and traditions. The cultural disagreement started in 2007 when a Malaysian Ministry of Tourism ‘Malaysia Truly Asia’ campaign included the Indonesian Reog Ponorogo dance and the traditional Rasa Sayange song. This angered the Indonesian public, who accused Malaysia of appropriating and claiming their cultural heritage.
Another dispute arose in 2009 when a documentary on Malaysian cultural heritage titled ‘Enigmatic Malaysia’ showcased a clip of Pendet dance from Bali. Soon, protests erupted across Indonesia for misrepresenting and claiming unlawful ownership over their culture. Soon after, the Malaysian Minister of Culture and Tourism apologised to their Indonesian counterpart. However, the apology was criticised by certain members of the Indonesian government, who considered it to be insufficient in proportion to the actions committed.
However, the behaviour of the governments in dealing with matters of cultural heritage has shifted significantly over the years. In 2020, Indonesia and Malaysia jointly nominated Pantun, a traditional form of poetry, to UNESCO for its addition to the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) of Humanity at the ICH Intergovernmental Committee sessions in France and Jamaica. This was the first time both governments had jointly proposed a cultural heritage. Now, Pantun has officially become Indonesia and Malaysia’s first shared cultural heritage added to the ICH list.
Over the years, the relationship between the two archipelagos has become more amicable. On January 27, 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was honoured with the Darjah Kerabat Johor Yang Amat Dihormati Pangkat Pertama or The Most Esteemed Royal Family Order of Johor award from the Johor Kingdom during a state visit. The award was presented by Malaysia’s King, the 17th Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Sultan Ibrahim, at the country’s national palace.
The state visit reflected the renewed interests of both countries to ensure strong bilateral relations. Ever since his inauguration, Prabowo has visited Malaysia multiple times, indicating the country’s need to maintain amicable relations with its neighbour. During a recent media briefing, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called Prabowo a “close friend”, while the latter expressed that he views the archipelagos as “strong regional partners with the same interests as the ASEAN founder.”
Economic cooperation has become a cornerstone in strengthening the peaceful ties between the two nations. In 2022, the countries surpassed US$ 27 billion in bilateral trade, with palm oil, electronics and petroleum products topping the list. From April 2024 to April 2025, the exports of Indonesia to Malaysia increased by 6.55 per cent, while imports increased by 17.2 per cent. The status of the two countries as renowned palm oil producers was reflected in the 2025 year-on-year growth in Indonesia’s export to Malaysia, with the export of Palm oil growing by 846 per cent. Regardless of past disputes in the palm oil sector, both countries have undertaken efforts to ensure sustainable palm oil practices, including the establishment of Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) and Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification programmes.
The Indonesia- Malaysia relationship is one rooted in centuries of shared history, community, geography and identity. While this relationship has witnessed its fair share of friction and competition, both nations have increasingly prioritised cooperation. They recognise each other’s importance in ensuring peace, stability, and security in the Southeast Asian region. In the ASEAN spirit of dialogue and non-confrontation, the nations have not only managed to address sensitive issues diplomatically but have also continued to ensure cooperation with each other on regional matters. While old tensions may not fully disappear, continued diplomatic measures, shared regional aspirations, economic interdependence, and a unique cultural identity shared between the two neighbours ensure the possibility of a prosperous and united future.
The current Bangladesh-Myanmar tensions have become a matter of urgent regional concern, developing out of decades-long ethnic conflict, political unrest, and humanitarian disasters. Since 2023, these tensions have been simmering greatly as the internal conflict in Myanmar, most notably in Rakhine State, has gotten worse. In the case of Bangladesh, the stakes are high-border security risks, the increase in displaced populations, diplomatic challenges, and socio-political pressure.
Coming together simultaneously, with both nations struggling to contain these complex challenges, the development is attracting global attention to the peace and stability in the region.
Historical Context of Bilateral Tensions
The origins of the present crisis lie deep in the region’s colonial and post-colonial history. Myanmar, Burma, has historically grappled with internal ethnicity, especially in the western Rakhine State that borders Bangladesh. Rohingya Muslims have been the minority group involved in this confrontation. The Rohingya are regarded as stateless under the Myanmar citizenship law of 1982; they have been the victims of systematic discrimination and regular military campaigns.
The latest and most intense of them took place in 2017, when a vicious campaign by the Myanmar military, Tatmadaw, displaced more than 700,000 Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar. This exodus formed one of the largest refugee camps in the world and tested the humanitarian capacity of Bangladesh. The situation has not been resolved yet despite multiple attempts at repatriation and international mediation. Myanmar has rejected assurances to take back the Rohingya refugees, who are stateless and reliant on aid, and are still in limbo.
Myanmar Civil War and The Emergence of the Arakan Army
In February 2021, the internal politics of Myanmar experienced a big shakeup as the military couped the democratically elected government. The result has since then seen the country sink into a full-scale civil conflict. The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the pro-democracy forces have stepped up the struggle against the junta.
One such group that has gathered momentum is the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group. They were initially established to seek more autonomy rights for the Rakhine people, but it has taken advantage of the mayhem to increase their territorial gains. Towards the end of 2024, the AA had seized the majority of Rakhine State, including regions adjacent to the Bangladesh border, which replaced the Myanmar military forces in these regions. Bangladesh has been experiencing both opportunities and risks because of this power shift, which has brought a new non-state actor to its southeastern border.
Recent Development along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border
The current escalation of the tension is due to the direct spillover of the Myanmar internal conflict onto Bangladeshi soil. Artillery shells, mortars, and stray bullets amid the confrontations between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army have been entering Bangladesh territory since late 2023. There were several reported cases in the border regions, such as Bandarban and Teknaf, where civilians were wounded and houses were destroyed. Landmines along the border have also led to the injury of Bangladeshi nationals, triggering concern about the security of the civilians.
The second important event was the infiltration of the Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) into Bangladesh. Hundreds of BGP officers crossed the border into Bangladesh and were arrested by the Bangladesh forces in early 2024, when the AA began a large offensive in Maungdaw. Most of them were eventually repatriated; however, the incident highlighted the unstable situation in the conflict and the susceptibility of Bangladesh to any instability of its neighbor.
The New Development with the Arakan Army
The Arakan Army has turned into a de facto authority over Rakhine. Realizing this fact, Bangladesh has started low-key, unofficial talks with the group. There have been reports that backchannel communication has taken place to maintain stability along the borders and the avoidance of additional shelling, and also the release of captured Bangladeshi soldiers.
The involvement of the AA has become a matter of official record in Bangladesh, where a National Security Advisor, Dr. Khalilur Rahman, and other officials, such as the Foreign Affairs Adviser, Md. Towhid Hossain has openly admitted that they must continue reaching out to the AA. According to them, the non-state actor is a necessity to the national interests of Bangladesh, judging by the fact that the central Myanmar government no longer has control of the entire border; therefore, border security and Rohingya repatriation are necessary.
Nevertheless, such involvement is not risk-free. The AA is alleged to violate human rights, especially of Rohingya civilians. In mid-2024, Human rights groups documented that AA forces killed hundreds of Rohingya in Buthidaung, by drone and artillery attacks. Such activities put Bangladesh in a difficult situation – any association with the AA has to be balanced with the ethical and diplomatic repercussions of involving itself with an entity that is allegedly involved in war crimes.
Humanitarian Impact and Refugee Crisis
Humanitarian impacts of such tensions are enormous. There are more than one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh living in overcrowded refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. As fresh violence has erupted in Rakhine, a greater number of Rohingya have tried to cross the border. Bangladesh, in its turn, has adopted a sterner position- its troops have repelled newcomers, arguing that they lack the capacity and are afraid of increasing lawlessness in the camps.
The situation in the camps has been getting worse, and now violence, drug trafficking, and the activities of armed Rohingya groups, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), are on the rise. In January 2025, Bangladesh security services detained ARSA chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi, dealt a major setback to militant circuits within the camps. However, the existence of these groups remains a major threat to the security of the camps and the stability of the region.
Diplomatic and Regional Responses
On the diplomatic front, Bangladesh has protested several times to the Myanmar government regarding cross-border shelling and failure to control refugees. There has been little substantive dialogue, though. Myanmar, preoccupied with its internal conflicts, is in a state of diplomatic isolation and has been incapable of, or perhaps unwilling to, address the concerns of Bangladesh.
India and China have taken a reserved stance in the region. India, which faces insurgency issues in the Northeast and has infrastructure stakes in the Kaladan projects, is closely monitoring the situation. China is an old partner of the Myanmar military and has profound interests in Rakhine, especially in the Kyaukphyu port. The territorial gains by the AA are now threatening these investments. Such has been the stake of both powers, though they have been reluctant to intervene or even mediate directly in the bilateral tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The United States and international bodies like the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have shown concern, especially on the humanitarian consequences. There has been some reported coordination of the intelligence services of Bangladesh and the U.S., and this hints at an increasing level of strategic interest in maintaining regional stability.
Security Measures and Border Management
Bangladesh has strongly enhanced its border security on the ground. Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has undertaken augmented patrolling and monitoring, especially in the vulnerable sectors. The Army has been carrying out army readiness drills, too, and the Navy has increased patrols of the Naf River, where the maritime clashes and the detention of Bangladeshi fishermen by AA forces have taken place.
Demining of civilian places is also being undertaken, with early warning signs being given to communities living along the borders. Nevertheless, the risk of violence, both unintentional and deliberate, is great. The absence of a proper ceasefire/ceasing or an agreement with the AA makes it difficult to establish peace along the border in a long-term perspective.
The Balancing Act of Bangladesh: Security, Sovereignty and Human Rights
Bangladesh is currently in a harsh balancing game. On the one side, it has to assert its territorial integrity and save its nationals against the consequences of the civil war in Myanmar. On the one hand, there is pressure to comply with international human rights standards, especially regarding the protection of refugees.
Bangladesh is trying to stabilize the situation pragmatically by coming into contact with the AA on an informal basis. There is, however, also the risk of legitimizing a non-state actor that is accused of serious abuses. In addition, the move to reject new refugees has led to criticism by humanitarian organizations claiming that it is leaving the vulnerable groups to die in war-torn regions.
Bangladesh should also take care that its internal stability is not jeopardized. Militant networks present in Rohingya camps, the increase in crime, and political opposition using the refugee issue on the domestic political agenda all present possible challenges to the national unity and security of Dhaka.
Looking Ahead: Possible Scenarios and Strategic Options
In the future, Bangladesh-Myanmar relations will heavily rely on the course of the internal conflict in Myanmar. In case the junta keeps losing its territory, the AA or some other ethnic armed organizations could become the leading forces in western Myanmar. In this instance, possibly amid international supervision, the goal is to stabilize the border and aim at Rohingya repatriation.
At the humanitarian level, the international community urgently needs to help give more aid to refugee camps in Bangladesh. More to the point, alternative repatriation or resettlement frameworks, including possible third countries or UN-controlled safe areas, are to be designed.
Bangladesh also needs to invest in long-term security relations with its neighbors and strategic partners. Sharing of intelligence, combined surveillance, and application of diplomatic pressure in unison on the stakeholders of Myanmar can assist in averting a full-scale crisis in the region. The present conflict is not merely a bilateral issue- It is a regional and international problem that needs to be solved with multilateral and international problem that needs to be solved with multilateral approaches.
Conclusion
The Bangladesh-Myanmar tensions demonstrate a highly sophisticated and developing crisis on the verge of war, and displacement, diplomacy, and defending its borders, but also on how to fulfil its humanitarian obligations without jeopardizing the security of the nation. The danger of failing to do so is becoming increasingly obvious as the Arakan Army gains more territory and the civil conflict in Myanmar shows no signs of stopping.
Bangladesh has been practical and strong in wading through these troubled waters. But the way ahead will be full of delicate diplomacy, prolonged humanitarian assistance, and renewed determination towards peace in the region. The stakes are high not only in the case of Bangladesh and Myanmar but also for the larger stability in South and Southeast Asia.
The connection between Pakistan and the United States changed much over the decades; it had times of close partnership and periods of strained ties. This bond started during the Cold War. At that time, Pakistan stood with the U.S. against the spread of communism. Membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), in addition to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the 1950s, showed Pakistan’s part as a strategic ally. Over time, their connection grew. It came to include large economic help packages, military help, along with working together on counter-terrorism – this was especially true after September 11, 2001. These events showed how important their partnership was on regional plus global stages.
This close tie had its difficulties. The United States often saw Pakistan as its strategic goal. However, tried to balance its country’s interests, which included ties with India in addition to China. This situation caused questions about the type of their relationship.
The early years of Pakistan-USA relations were shaped by the Cold War. In the 1950s, Pakistan became a U.S. ally to counter Soviet influence in South Asia. Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. These alliances put Pakistan in the Western camp and gave it military and economic aid in return for its cooperation. For Pakistan, it was not only to strengthen its defence but also to counter its regional rival, India.
The partnership grew during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and access to key routes made it a must-have for the U.S. Under General Zia’s regime, Pakistan played a key role in supporting Afghan mujahideen fighters who were funded and armed by the Americans. This period cemented Pakistan’s image as a frontline state against Soviet expansion. But while the U.S. benefited from Pakistan’s geography, this partnership left Pakistan to deal with the long-term consequences – the proliferation of militant groups and the influx of Afghan refugees.
After September 11, 2001, the dynamics of Pakistan-U.S. relations changed overnight. Pakistan became a key player in the U.S.-led War on Terror, and its cooperation was seen as essential to uprooting terrorist networks in the region. The partnership was a mix of collaboration and strain as Pakistan got military and economic aid in return for its efforts against extremist groups. Despite common goals, tensions arose over allegations of Pakistan’s double-dealing; supporting counter-terrorism on one hand and allegedly maintaining ties with certain militant groups for strategic purposes.
These historical facts show a relationship built on strategic necessity and mutual benefit but one that has also been marked by mistrust and unintended consequences. Each phase of this partnership highlights the complex geopolitics that have defined Pakistan-U.S. relations over the years. Pakistan and the U.S. have had multiple areas of collaboration, often defined by shared interests and geopolitics. While transactional at times, these have also created opportunities for both countries. One of the most prominent has been military and strategic cooperation.
From joint military operations to intelligence sharing, the U.S. and Pakistan have worked together on security. During the War on Terror, Pakistan gave the U.S. access to its air bases and supply routes to support its military operations in Afghanistan. They have also done joint exercises and training programs to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities. While this has given strategic benefits, it has not been without its challenges, as different priorities and mutual suspicions have sometimes strained the relationship.
Economic aid and development are another key area of Pakistan-U.S.A. cooperation. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has played a big role in funding projects to improve Pakistan’s infrastructure, education and health systems. Over the years, USAID programs have supported building schools, enhancing teacher training and providing scholarships to under-served communities. In health, efforts to combat polio and improve maternal and child health have been notable. Large infrastructure projects like dams and roads have also been undertaken with U.S. assistance to contribute to Pakistan’s economic development. But the effectiveness of aid has often been questioned, as it is often tied to broader political objectives.
Cultural and academic exchanges have fostered people-to-people connections and enriched the relationship between the two countries. Programs like the Fulbright scholarship have allowed Pakistani students to study in the U.S., creating opportunities for cultural exchange and mutual understanding. Similarly, U.S.-funded initiatives like English language training and leadership programs have empowered Pakistani youth. The vibrant Pakistani diaspora in the U.S. has further strengthened this bond, contributing to American society while maintaining close ties to their heritage. Cultural programs and partnerships in the arts have also bridged gaps, showcasing the shared values and diverse traditions of both countries. These areas of cooperation show the multiple dimensions of Pakistan-U.S.A. relations. While driven by strategic goals, these have also contributed to development and understanding. Despite the complexities that underlie this relationship, these collaborative initiatives can help build a more stable and constructive relationship.
Despite decades of working together, Pakistan-U.S. relations are full of problems and tensions that often overshadow their commonalities. These issues stem from deep-seated mistrust, divergent national interests and economic dependency.
One of the biggest issues is the trust deficit between the two countries. Over the years, allegations of Pakistan’s support to militant groups like the Taliban and the Haqqani network have strained its relations with the U.S. Pakistan has consistently denied these charges, but its use of certain factions to maintain influence in Afghanistan has fed into Washington’s suspicions. High-profile incidents like the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, have further deepened this mistrust. For Pakistan, the U.S.’s transactional approach to the relationship, prioritising short-term goals over long-term partnership, has often made it feel undervalued or used.
Divergent priorities also pose a big challenge. While the U.S. has focused on counter-terrorism and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s regional priorities are centred around its rivalry with India. This was evident during the U.S. war in Afghanistan, where Pakistan was accused of playing a “double game” by supporting the U.S. while harbouring insurgents to counter Indian influence in the region. Similarly, the U.S.’s growing strategic partnership with India, especially in defence and trade, has heightened Pakistan’s anxieties. These conflicting interests make it hard to build a relationship based on trust and shared objectives.
Economic dependencies have also complicated the partnership. Aid has been tied to specific security objectives and has often been seen to serve U.S. interests more than Pakistan’s long-term development. Critics argue that this approach undermines Pakistan’s sovereignty and makes it dependent on external assistance rather than sustainable economic growth. Pakistan has failed to leverage this aid effectively, with some funds being diverted to non-developmental purposes or not reaching the intended beneficiaries.
These challenges highlight the complexity of Pakistan-U.S. relations, which are a mix of cooperation and competition. We need not only to talk but also to move beyond transactional interactions to a more equal and strategic partnership. Until these underlying issues are resolved, the relationship will be shaped as much by its challenges as by its achievements.
The relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. has always been a delicate balance of give and take. Both countries get a lot out of the partnership, even if the reasons for cooperation are often practical. For the U.S., Pakistan is a gateway to South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. It’s a key partner in counter-terrorism and a regional stabiliser. For Pakistan, U.S. military aid, economic support, and diplomatic backing have strengthened its defence and its standing on the global stage.
But the partnership is often seen as transactional, not sentimental. Each country prioritises its own interests and aligns with the other only when it serves its goals. For instance, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and later the War on Terror, the U.S. relied heavily on Pakistan’s cooperation, while Pakistan used these moments to get financial and military aid in U.S. dollars. But this pragmatic approach has sometimes left both sides feeling shortchanged as their broader expectations of loyalty and commitment are not met. The impact of this relationship goes beyond bilateral ties and affects regional politics in big ways. In South Asia, Pakistan’s alignment with the U.S. has fuelled its rivalry with India, especially as the U.S. has moved closer to India in recent years. This dynamic complicates regional peace efforts.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Pakistan’s strategic importance and its ties with countries like Saudi Arabia make it a valuable partner for the U.S. in managing conflicts and maintaining stability. Looking ahead, the future of Pakistan-U.S.A. relations is uncertain. Will their partnership deepen into a more stable and genuine alliance, or will it remain transactional and short-term? Much depends on the evolving global order, U.S. foreign policy priorities and Pakistan’s ability to redefine its role in the world. For now, their relationship seems to straddle the line between strategic alliance and transactional convenience, a balancing act that reflects the complexity of modern geopolitics.
Pakistan and the U.S. have been on a long and winding road, driven by history, strategic interests and global trends. From the Cold War alliances of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to the cooperation during the Soviet-Afghan war and the War on Terror, their relationship has developed out of necessity and convenience. While areas like military cooperation, economic aid and cultural exchanges have brought them closer, mistrust, divergent priorities and economic dependence have often tested the relationship.
In my view, the closeness between Pakistan and the U.S. is a combination of pragmatism and strategy, not a deep and lasting alliance. The partnership has given benefits to both, but its transactional nature and lack of shared long-term goals are limiting its potential to become more cohesive. This is the reality of international relations where interests trump sentiment.
As the world is becoming more multipolar, the alliances like Pakistan-U.S. are under growing pressure. The rise of new global powers, regional realignments and internal political shifts in both countries make it harder to sustain a purely interest-driven partnership. But by having open dialogue and finding common ground on issues like economic development, counter-terrorism and regional stability, the two can move towards a more constructive relationship.
In the end the Pakistan-U.S. relationship is a reminder of the complexities of international partnerships. It may never become a perfect alliance but it can become a practical and respectful engagement, one that acknowledges differences and works towards shared goals in a changing world.
In the 1978 movie “Snake in the Eagle’s Shadow”, largely unaware to the opponents of the protagonist, secretly the actor Jackie Chan is being trained in martial arts. But the truth gets revealed eventually. Lord Buddha had remarked “Three things cannot be long hidden: the Sun, the Moon and the Truth”.
After four Pakistan-armed and trained terrorists killed 26 male tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir in India on April 22, 2025, it was clear that India would strike back militarily and this time, unlike the previous Indian responses to Pakistan’s terrorists attacks in India, the Indian response would be much harder.
With each passing day after the Pahalgam terrorist attack as the blood of 1.46 billion Indian citizens was boiling, China too was sensing that this time Pakistan had bitten more than it could chew and decided to step out of Pakistan’s shadow, as till this period China had not publicly supported Pakistan militarily, though it was pretty evident that China being in Pakistan’s shadow, in the context of the 78-year old India-Pakistan tensions, was providing military help.
On April 27, 2025, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a telephonic call with the Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar communicated that China is Pakistan’s ironclad friend and all-weather strategic cooperative partner and will safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.
Signalling that Pakistan would be provided with all military help from China, the next few days saw frenzied military activities between the two nations.
Pakistan was the first Muslim-majority nation and the third non-communist country to recognize China. In 1950, the two nations established diplomatic relations. In 1963, both the nations signed a boundary agreement that saw Pakistan ceding a portion of the Karakoram region called the Shaksgam Valley, which became the foundation for the two nation’s stable geopolitical relationship.
While in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China supplied Pakistan military equipment worth US$ 250 million, but it never publicly acknowledged doing so. In the run-up to the 1971 India-Pakistan War, despite the US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, pressurising China to open a second front on India in case the two nations were go to war, China did not agree.
In 1986 China and Pakistan signed the nuclear cooperation agreement which catapulted Pakistan’s nuclear programme which had been moving slowly till then. This helped Pakistan in carrying out its first nuclear test on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai Hills of its Balochistan province, few days after India carried out its second nuclear test on May 11, 1998.
But after China became the world’s third largest economy in 2007, its military aspirations started increasing with its eyes now set firmly on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, in addition to Taiwan and few other military objectives.
Two events in the times ahead brought China and Pakistan in a tight embrace. One, Xi Jinping becoming the President of China in 2013. Two, India’s abrogation of Article 370 and 35A.
China-Pakistan relations after Xi Jinping becoming the Chinese President in 2013
To circumvent the “Malacca Dilemma” that bothered China for decades, Xi Jinping after becoming China’s President for the first time on March 14, 2013, a few months later, proposed the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project. Included in the CPEC is the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor which is a 3000-kilometer road linking China’s Xinjiang region to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which would obviate China’s “Malacca Dilemma”.
For China, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor is the jugular vein in case the Malacca Strait was to be ever blocked by the Indian Navy or the US Navy.
On April 20, 2015 Xi Jinping visited Pakistan on his first state visit as the President of China.
Before embarking on the two-day visit to Pakistan, Xi Jinping authored an op-ed in Pakistan’s Daily Times titled “Pak-China Dosti Zindabad” (Long Live the Pakistan-China Friendship), in which he wrote that “I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own Brother” and also wrote that “the friendship between the two nations was higher than mountains, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey”.
On April 20, 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to commence work on CPEC, on infrastructure projects worth US$ 45.6 billion during Xi Jinping’s maiden state visit to Pakistan, setting the foundation for a strong and robust Pakistani-Chinese friendship with underlying military overtones, which China would many times call this relation with Pakistan as “Iron Brothers” and “All Weather Friends”.
China-Pakistan’s relations post-India’s abrogation of Article 370 and 35A
On August 05, 2019 after India had abrogated Article 370 & 35A of the Constitution that related to Jammu & Kashmir, two countries did not take it lying down and as time would reveal these two countries – China & Pakistan, clearly irked by India’s move, would step up pressure on India in due course and move in a tighter embrace with each other.
Four days later on August 09, 2019 Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan dashed in a sudden two-day visit to China. In back-to-back meetings with the top Chinese leadership spread over two days on August 09-10, 2019, Pakistan and China decided that a strong response would be given to India’s move of abrogation of the two articles.
On August 11, 2019 the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar visited China to explain the abrogation of the two contentious articles of the Constitution that were for long perceived as the biggest hinderance in the growth and security of Jammu & Kashmir by an overwhelming majority of Indian citizens. But China had already made up its mind during its meetings with Shah Mehmood Qureshi, on the previous two days.
Pakistan eventually tasked its terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir since 1989 when terrorism broke out in India’s northern most state (now a Union Territory), and had been largely confined to the North of Pir Panjal Range (NPPR) which includes the Kashmir Valley, to shift their operations to the South of Pir Panjal Range (SPPR) which includes Jammu region.
But this wasn’t as easy as it seemed due to the heavy deployment of the Indian security forces on both the sides of the Pir Panjal Range, the mountainous range that roughly separates the Kashmir Valley from the Jammu region.
It was here that China came to the aid of its all-weather ally. Now, was the litmus test of China to show Pakistan that it meant each word that Xi Jinping had written in his op-ed of April 2015.
Just as all seemed well between China and India on the face of it, orders were given by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to plan an incursion in eastern Ladakh of India.
In early-April 2020, as the snow started melting in the higher reaches, the PLA started intruding in eastern Ladakh and the stand-off began between the PLA and the Indian Army that lasted over four years and included the bloody Galwan Valley Clash of June 15, 2020 which saw 20 soldiers of the Indian Army killed in action.
This resulted in the Indian Army redeploying its troops and about two divisions worth were moved from the Jammu region to eastern Ladakh to be deployed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) opposite China.
This was exactly what Pakistan needed. With a thinner Indian security forces deployment in the Jammu region, Pakistan stepped up terrorism in the Jammu region on the SPPR since early-2024. The relatively quiet Jammu region has become as volatile as the Kashmir Valley.
The year 2021 saw two important military developments between China and Pakistan. One, Pakistan Army Officers started being posted to the Western Theatre Command of China. Two, a direct Optical Fibre Cable was laid between the Western Theatre Command of China in Chengdu and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi for swift and uninterrupted communications.
The military cooperation between China and Pakistan intensified since 2019, particularly in terms of air force capabilities and increased conduct of joint military exercises to include all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.
The Era 2016-2024
Though before 2016, India had carried out cross-border raids across the Line of Control (LOC) in POJK, but they were confidential and never discussed in the public domain.
But, the two cross-border raids termed as Surgical Strikes in 2016 and 2019 by India, inside POJK were announced by India after their successful conduct. In response to the Pakistani terrorists attacking an Indian Army camp in Uri, Jammu & Kashmir on September 18, 2016, that resulted in 19 soldiers being killed in action, the Indian Army on September 29, 2016 crossed the LOC and killed 40 Pakistani terrorists in POJK.
On February 14, 2019 a Pakistan-trained suicide bomber attacked the convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force in Lethapora in Pulwama district, Jammu & Kashmir that resulted in the death of 40 soldiers. In the wee hours of February 26, 2019, the Indian Air Force struck in Balakot, POJK and killed 350 Pakistani terrorists.
The next day, on February 27, 2019 Pakistan retaliated with an air operation named Operation Swift Retort. In this operation, Pakistan used fighter aircrafts that included Dassault Mirage-IIIDA, Dassault Mirage-VPA armed with H-4 SOW and JF-17 Thunders armed with Mk 83 REKs, with Escort and EW support being rendered by F-16, Falcon DA-20EW/ECM/ESM and Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C fighter aircrafts.
For the first time the Chinese JF-17 fighter aircrafts or for that matter, any Chinese weapon system was used in a military operation by Pakistan against India overtly.
During the period 2009-14, Pakistan imported 51% of its defence requirements from China which increased to 73% in the duration 2015-19. But after Operation Swift Retort in 2019, Pakistan imported 81% of its weapon systems from China, with Netherlands contributing 5.5% and Turkey 3.8%.
During the period 2020-24, China generously gave Pakistan high-value defence systems that included 896 FN-6 portable air defence systems, 200 LY-80 medium-range SAMs, 30 CM-401 supersonic anti-ship missiles, 300 PL-12 and 420 PL-5E air-to-air missiles to arm the JF-17 fleet. Also given in this duration was 25 J-10C multirole fighters and 24 JF-17 Block-3 fighters to bolster the Pakistani air power.
For a cash-strapped Pakistan, certainly purchasing this huge bouquet of weapon systems from China would have been impossible. China was in no need of money, as it has deep pockets.
What China needed was a testbed for checking the efficacy of its weapon systems which till Operation Swift Retort in 2019 had been touted as ineffective and un-battle worthy. But Operation Swift Retort convinced China of the efficacy of their Military Industrial Complex, and hence their largesse to Pakistan.
China decided to gamble big time on Pakistan with the Made in China weapon systems. This Chinese Great Gamble was done with had the first military target of China in mind – Taiwan!
On February 03, 2023, William Burns, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA officially tasked with gathering, processing and analysing national security information from around the world, said in a statement that USA and China will go to war over Taiwan in 2027.
The next year, on March 21, 2024 Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command testified to the US House Armed Services Committee that China was on track to be ready for the invasion of Taiwan in 2027. The Admiral further added that China has increased its defence budget by over 16% in recent years to more than US$ 223 billion. Further, he went on to say that in the three years of him assuming command, the PLA has added more than 400 fighter aircrafts and 20 major warships.
And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.
The Chinese weapon systems that Pakistan was going to use against India till 2027, would be in-effect testing for China under actual combat conditions.
With the experience of the 2016 and 2019 Surgical Strikes fresh in mind, both China and Pakistan knew with certainty that India would militarily avenge the Pahalgam terrorist attack.
A day after the Chinese Foreign Minister had the telephonic call with the Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister on April 27, 2025, China sent a large consignment of PL-15 missiles to Pakistan 0n April 28, 2025. Till this time, China had not given the advanced PL-15 missiles to any nation and were kept for its own use. It used to sell only the PL-15E missiles which is the export and watered-down version of the PL-15 missiles.
But as an exception, Pakistan was given the PL-15 missiles with the same aim in mind – testing under actual combat conditions.
China also gave uninterrupted utilisation of its BeiDou satellite constellation and its specialised Yaogan satellite. All these were networked in Pakistan’s Link-17 software for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).
MDO is the digital ecosystem comprising satellites, all airborne and ground assets for quick and comprehensive situational awareness, electronic intelligence and signal intelligence with the final aim to reduce the time for Kill Chain.
China was keenly watching and integrating itself with every military move of Pakistan, as at stake was its multi-billion-dollar Military Industrial Complex. China was pretty sure of India’s strike and what better opportunity to test its MDO than in actual combat conditions.
China is the only nation in the world which in 2014 announced in its military strategy, the concept of Joint Integrated Operations that it is ready to fight in all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space. In other words, it is called the Multi-Domain Operations.
Interestingly, the USA had propounded the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001 which is quintessentially MDO. But no nation till date including USA, with the sole exception of China have declared their combat readiness in MDO.
China needed the testing of the MDO in actual combat conditions.
The India-Pakistan Conflict 2025, provided the opportunity that China had been so desperately waiting for in the run-up to its war for Taiwan in 2027.
India-Pakistan Conflict 2025
India and Pakistan’s 88-hour India-Pakistan Conflict that begin at 0105 hours on May 07, 2025 and ended at 1700 hours on May 10, 2025, called Operation Sindoor by India and Operation Bunyan um-Marsoos by Pakistan has been elaborately covered in a podcast by the author.
One important issue of the India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 that merits mentioning here is that the bulk of the Pakistani weaponry used against India was of Chinese origin. And it was those weapon systems that China had supplied Pakistan in the duration 2020-2024, the details of which have been mentioned earlier in the article.
While yet again, India scored a clear military victory over Pakistan in this military duel too, as earlier in 1947-49, 1965, 1971 and 1999, but the difference in the earlier four military confrontations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours of South Asia is that these four wars had negligible Chinese weapon systems.
But after the Kargil War of 1999, there has been an upswing in the sale of Chinese weapon systems to Pakistan. And ever since India has started publicising the surgical strikes on Pakistan commencing with the Uri surgical strike in 2016, the Chinese weapon systems that the Pakistan military is using in abundance, has come under extensive international glare.
And this has given China the perfect platform to evaluate the performance of its weapon systems in actual combat scenario, overcoming the much-discussed weakness of Chinese weapon systems not being used/tested in actual combat as China has not fought a war after its last war with Vietnam in 1979.
The US weapon systems had always an advantage over Chinese, as USA has taken part in almost every war/conflict the world has seen since the end of the World War II.
But the Balakot surgical strike and the India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 has placed the performance of the Chinese weapon systems in the open.
What next?
As the induction of the Chinese weapon systems has increased in the Pakistan military after 1999 and with the ascendancy of the Xi Jinping as China’s President in 2013, Pakistan’s big terror attacks have been happening with increased ferocity at regular intervals in India – Uri in 2016, Pulwama in 2019 and Pahalgam in 2025.
And in turn, India’s military responses have been getting tougher – Uri in 2016, Balakot in 2019 and Operation Sindoor in 2025.
In all the retaliation and counter-retaliation by India & Pakistan, China is testing its weapon systems in actual combat scenario.
The next big tranche of the Chinese weapon systems to Pakistan is to be supplied by end-August 2025 which will include HQ-19 long-range air defence missile system with combat range of 1000 kilometres, Super Y-20 AWACS with detection capabilities upto 10,000 kilometres, PL-21 ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles with a range of 300 kilometers and 40 J-35A fifth-generation fighter aircrafts with combat range between 1200-1500 kilometers.
After Pakistan receives this largesse of Chinese weapons systems and after it has trained its personnel on them, will it launch the next big terrorist attack on India.
China will then yet again get to test its latest bouquet of weapon systems in actual combat.
For, it will prove to be very helpful for China for its first military target which is Taiwan, which it is go to war for in 2027.