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Make The West Great Again, Meloni And Trump Just Lit A Fire That’s Giving Globalists Nightmares. But What Does This Mean Geopolitically?

Flashpoints

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April 18, 2025

Make The West Great Again, Meloni And Trump Just Lit A Fire That’s Giving Globalists Nightmares. But What Does This Mean Geopolitically?

The recent meeting between Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Donald Trump resulted in an unexpected alliance that is sending shockwaves. With one firm handshake and a now-iconic line, Meloni did not only introduce a populist slogan but she declared war on globalist orthodoxy. And make no mistake, the elites in Brussels, Davos, and D.C. heard it loud and clear.

Before the formalities of an Oval Office photo-op, Meloni sat down with President Donald Trump and key members of his cabinet, not to play games or pose for cameras, but to do what diplomats rarely do these days – talk substance. Trade, investment, and sovereign strength topped the agenda.

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However, the media, ever the hungry hyenas sniffing for conflict, came bracing for fireworks, thinking – a tariff tussle, a transatlantic feud, something they could spin into headlines like “Trump vs. Europe, Round 27.” But what they got instead was a diplomatic curveball – clarity, calm, and confidence from Italy’s iron lady!

Here are the questions posed in the neat little meeting and an analysis of geopolitical implications –

When one reporter tried baiting her with the usual EU hysteria, asking if retaliatory tariffs were back on the table if no deal with Trump materialized—Meloni didn’t flinch. No hesitation, no spin.

“I am sure we can make a deal. I’m here to help on that. I cannot, look, deal in the name of the European Union.”

Not only did she defuse the question like a seasoned stateswoman, she subtly drew a line between her and the bureaucratic beast in Brussels. Meaning – don’t confuse me with the EU’s technocrats – I’m here to lead, not obey. Then came the diplomatic judo move that made headlines for all the right reasons – “My goal would be, invite President Trump to pay a visit to Italy and understand if there’s a possibility when he comes to organize also such a meeting with Europe.”

Was this just an invite, yes, but also an invitation with a warning – the old Europe of timid consensus is crumbling, and a new Western nationalism is rising from Rome to Washington.

Meloni’s strategy was refreshingly simple- ditch the posturing, skip the ideological traps, and speak directly about mutual interests. No double-speak. No bureaucratic babble. Just straight talk. “I think the best way is that we simply speak frankly about the needs that every one of us has, and find ourselves in the middle—that’s useful for all.”

And when asked to define her politics, she didn’t take the bait of political labels or left-right tribalism. “Somebody calls me such a ‘Western nationalism,’ I don’t know if it is the right words, but I’m sure that together we are stronger.” Together. Not in submission to some bloated EU dream, but through sovereign unity between allies who still believe in the foundational values of the West.

“I’m here to find the best way to make us both stronger on both sides of the Atlantic.”

And just like that, the mood shifted. The media smelled smoke, but couldn’t find the fire. Meloni had outmaneuvered them.

Trump In Awe

When the two leaders finally emerged from their working lunch for the traditional Oval Office appearance, something rare happened, Trump, never known for doling out hollow praise, went full throttle in admiration.

“She has taken Europe by storm. It’s an honor to have the prime minister of Italy with us. Prime Minister Meloni, who’s doing a fantastic job. Everybody loves her and respects her, and I can’t say that about many people. She’s become a friend, and we really have a great relationship between Italy and ourselves.”

This wasn’t empty flattery. It was recognition of a fellow disruptor, a kindred spirit in a world obsessed with uniformity and control. No teleprompter. No rehearsed lines. Just raw, unfiltered respect, suggesting this wasn’t politics as usual. This was strength meeting strength – two leaders on a mission to restore power back where it belongs- with the people.

“Make the West Great Again”

What we saw in Washington was neither diplomacy, performative press statements nor another round of lifeless protocol. It was raw political chemistry and it was the moment Giorgia Meloni blew up the media’s favorite headline – that Trump is some isolationist renegade turning his back on Europe and torching old alliances.

Seated beside him, in the symbolic heart of American power, Meloni calmly and unapologetically aligned herself with Trump, on everything from migration to energy, sovereignty to cultural preservation. If the European technocrats back home were watching, they must have felt the floor shift beneath them.

“We both share another fight, which is the fight against woke and DEI ideology that would like to erase our history.”

One sentence. One cultural grenade lobbed right into the globalist agenda. And she wasn’t done.

“We share lots of things on tackling illegal migration. On fighting against synthetic drugs. You know Italy has been one of the nations that made a plan against fentanyl, for example.”

Could this be a policy pact? Unofficial but unmistakably real; from fentanyl to border control, from defending Western values to defying left-wing orthodoxy, Meloni and Trump were locking arms in a common cause. And crucially, she made it clear: this isn’t a flirtation. This is a movement.

Trade Partners

“We have been talking about many bilateral topics and things that we can do together—about defense, about the economy, about space, about energy. Italian enterprises will invest, as they’ve been doing for many years… in the next year, I think around $10 billion.”

Even on trade and investment, the plans weren’t theoretical but already in motion. Two sovereign nations, one shared vision and then came the mic drop – the moment that will likely define not only their alliance, but an entire ideological realignment.

“The goal for me is to ‘Make the West Great Again. When I speak about West, mainly I don’t speak about a geographical space,” she explained. “I speak about a civilization. And I want to make that civilization stronger.”

Yes, she said it. Clearly. Deliberately. Echoing Trump’s most iconic slogan, but scaling it beyond borders, past walls, past parties, past political tribes.

You could almost hear the squirming in Brussels, in Berlin, and in the op-ed desks of The New York Times. Because Meloni wasn’t just endorsing Trump, she was doubling down on the very thing global elites have spent the past decade trying to dismantle – Western pride, Western unity, and the unapologetic defense of Western civilization.

She didn’t paper over the growing rift between the U.S. and Europe. She acknowledged it. And she offered a bridge. It was a diplomatic carrot dangled with perfect populist poise. You want in? Then start acting like you’re part of the team again.

But of course, the media couldn’t let the moment breathe. They pounced.

A reporter threw out a baited question, accusing Trump of once calling Europeans “parasites.” It was a desperate attempt to inject scandal into a moment of unity.

Meloni didn’t flinch. “He’s never said that.” Game Over!

It was a textbook tag-team takedown of media spin in real time. A leader deflecting falsehoods. Another leader backing him up without blinking. No script. No handlers. Just brutal political instinct.

And just like that, the meeting ended not in scandal, not in friction, but in a quiet, confident optimism. The message was clear, and it couldn’t have been more sharply drawn – the pendulum is swinging back.

On immigration.
On sovereignty.
On Western identity.

She came to reframe the West.

So what does the meeting mean geopolitically?

The meeting between Donald Trump and Giorgia Meloni – what unfolded, was a redrawing of the Western map.

For decades, the political center of gravity in the West has been pulled by two poles – Washington and Brussels. But now, a third force is emerging – a sovereignist axis anchored by unapologetically nationalist leaders who are done being managed, lectured, or compromised.

Meloni has become the unexpected linchpin between Trump-style populism and European discontent. She is carving out a space where conservative values, border control, energy independence, and cultural preservation are not sins, but strategic imperatives.

Together, Trump and Meloni are writing the doctrine for what may become a broader transatlantic realignment. And here’s what that future might look like –

On Immigration: No more quotas. No more blind acceptance. The border is back. Sovereignty matters. And countries that refuse to protect their citizens’ security and identity will find themselves on the wrong side of history.

On Globalism: The age of unelected elites dictating domestic policy is coming to an end. Brussels-style bureaucracy and technocratic overreach are now open targets, not sacred institutions.

On Energy & Trade: Expect a pivot away from dependence on unstable regimes and a renewed focus on bilateral energy partnerships built not on carbon virtue-signaling but on hard security and mutual benefit.

On Cultural Identity: Western civilization is no longer something to apologize for. It’s something to defend. And that defense doesn’t mean war, it means rejecting the ideological project that seeks to erase history, religion, tradition, and borders.

Their message is simple – the West is not dying. But if it wants to survive, it has to fight to live. And that fight has now begun!

Unexploded Ordnance in Azerbaijan: An Analysis

GSDN

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April 18, 2025

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Unexploded Ordnance in Azerbaijan: An Analysis

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

Mine clearance in Azerbaijan: source Internet

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Azerbaijan, a persistent and hazardous legacy of armed conflict, demands urgent attention and international cooperation. The aftermath of the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has left these remnants of war posing an immediate danger to civilian life and severely hindering socio-economic development, the safe return of displaced populations, and post-conflict reconstruction. This analysis delves into the nature, scope, and implications of UXO in Azerbaijan, highlighting the systemic challenges associated with their clearance and the broader geopolitical context that continues to shape the UXO landscape in the region. The presence of UXO in Azerbaijan is intricately tied to the historical and political tensions surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which have led to a clear victory for Azerbaijan.

The armed confrontations between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, particularly during the intense periods of conflict in the early 1990s and again in 2020, resulted in widespread deployment of various forms of military ordnance, including cluster munitions, artillery shells, landmines, and rockets. Many of these devices failed to detonate upon impact and remain buried or hidden across extensive areas, particularly in formerly occupied territories that have since returned to Azerbaijani control. The resurgence of conflict in 2020 significantly expanded the geographic scope of UXO contamination, extending the risk into new zones and complicating the already daunting task of clearance, which had a direct effect on the lives of civilians. These military piles and stocks are very hazardous for humans and the environment. UXOs are particularly insidious.

These include bombs, grenades, and munitions that failed to detonate as intended. Some are found years later, still lethal and hazardous. In one instance in Mardakert in the early 2000s, a downed helicopter left behind air-to-surface missiles and operational guns lying scattered in an open field. In another tragic case, a young boy named Artak Beglaryan—who would later become a prominent public figure—lost his sight after mistaking an unexploded bomblet for a toy. These stories are not rare; they are the reality of life in formerly contested areas. Since the 2020 ceasefire, reports of civilian casualties have persisted. The International Crisis Group recently noted that over 50 Azerbaijanis have been killed and nearly 300 injured due to mines and UXO. Often unaware of the risks, children are particularly vulnerable, prompting governments and international organizations to ramp up educational campaigns in schools near contaminated zones. The scale of UXO contamination is both vast and multifaceted. In many liberated districts such as Fuzuli, Jabrayil, and Aghdam, entire areas remain inaccessible due to the threat of unexploded ordnance. This widespread presence obstructs resettlement programs and delays critical infrastructure projects such as rebuilding roads, schools, and utilities. Moreover, the contamination of agricultural lands with UXO is particularly devastating for Azerbaijan, a country where agriculture plays a crucial role in local livelihoods and national economic output. Farmers cannot cultivate land without risking their lives, and the resulting economic paralysis affects food security and the broader process of rural revitalization.

The scale of problems in Azerbaijan

The human cost of unexploded ordnance is beyond stating. According to Landmine Monitor, Azerbaijan remains one of the most heavily mine-contaminated countries, with an estimated 1.5 million landmines posing a threat to over 13% of its territory. Since 1991, Armenian military forces have extensively planted mines within Azerbaijani territory—including Karabakh, a region now an integral part of Azerbaijan, and seven adjacent districts—both during the occupation and aftermath of the Second Karabakh War in September-November 2020, throughout the post-conflict period. Since the end of the war in November 2020, 392 Azerbaijani civilians have been killed or seriously injured, despite the country immediately launching extensive humanitarian demining operations. Dozens of civilians, including children, have been killed or maimed since the end of active hostilities, often while returning to inspect or reclaim their homes. In total, over 3,400 Azerbaijanis have been victims of mines since the conflict began in 1991 – including 359 children and 38 women. UXO-related incidents have also affected demining personnel, underscoring the extreme risks faced even by trained professionals. This continuing toll on human life reflects the enduring threat that UXOs pose, even in the absence of active conflict. It also points to immediate and sustained investment in public education campaigns to raise awareness among returning residents and continued international funding and expertise to support clearance and victim assistance programs.

The issue of UXO in Azerbaijan has become a deeply entrenched humanitarian concern, particularly as thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) make their way back to their former homes in regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. These lands, once ravaged by war, now hold hidden dangers beneath their surface—remnants of decades of conflict in the form of landmines and UXO that continue to claim lives and limbs. The problem is not new, but the urgency is heightened by the sheer number of people returning to rebuild their lives. In the years since the 2020 ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan has undertaken significant efforts to address this threat. Vugar Suleymanov, who heads the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), reported that over 111,000 hectares of contaminated land had been cleared in just three years. These efforts have uncovered and safely removed more than 30,000 anti-personnel mines, around 18,000 anti-tank mines, and over 60,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance. While these numbers reflect impressive progress, they also hint at the scale of the problem—it is immense, and the road ahead remains long and dangerous. The mine contamination is not just a recent by-product of the latest war. Mines and UXO have been buried across the region since the first Karabakh conflict in the early 1990s. Their placement records are often missing, inaccurate, or deliberately withheld, and their after-effects remain.

Recently, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) warned Azerbaijani citizens, urging them to be extremely cautious when encountering mines, unexploded military ordinances, or unknown objects. According to Azernews, the Ministry’s statement emphasizes avoiding contact with potentially dangerous items. The public is advised not to touch or handle mines, unexploded ordnance, or any unfamiliar objects that may pose a threat. The warning advises against entering dangerous areas and urges people not to intervene with discarded munitions. The statement further advises, “Do not touch mines, unexploded military ordnance, or unknown objects, and do not pick them up. Never attempt to interfere with them to protect your life.” While the international spotlight often focuses on political developments, the human cost of landmines and unexploded ordnance continues to mount quietly. For example, thousands of hectares of farmland remain unusable in the Tavush region of Armenia due to mines. Efforts to address the problem have included establishing a U.S.-funded demining center in Etchmiadzin, which focused on training local teams, though border-adjacent defensive minefields were notably excluded from clearance plans. Unfortunately, mine action has often been politicized. Accusations have been levelled against demining organizations, including the HALO Trust, not necessarily for what they have done but because of how politically sensitive mine clearance has become. This underscores the need for international cooperation and the importance of global solidarity in dealing with the legacy of war.

Given the devastating impact and widespread presence of landmines, Azerbaijan has prioritized humanitarian demining efforts in the Karabakh and East Zangezur regions. Although international partners support these efforts, more assistance is urgently needed. To date, approximately 185,707 hectares of land have been cleared by the Mine Action Agency of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) and other operators. These operations have led to the successful detection and neutralization of 181,148 explosive devices, including 36,103 anti-personnel mines, 21,457 anti-tank mines, and 123,376 unexploded ordnances (UXOs). Landmine clearance is an inherently complex and lengthy process. However, Azerbaijan has mobilized its national resources and invested in modern technologies to improve the efficiency of mine action. Despite these significant efforts, international support remains insufficient. Currently, the Azerbaijani government finances approximately 95% of all demining operations. While contributions from international organizations and partner countries such as KS relief, NSPA, MLI, Roots of Peace, ARMAC, and MAG are valuable, they fall short of meeting the full scale of the challenge. Azerbaijan continues to call for more substantial political and practical support from the international community to address the humanitarian consequences of landmines and accelerate the clearance of affected areas.

Landmines also continue to serve as a significant impediment to the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the reconstruction of infrastructure. Despite Azerbaijan’s repeated appeals to Armenia, both before and after the 44-day Patriotic War, to provide accurate landmine maps, Armenia initially denied the existence of such maps. Only under international pressure did Armenia eventually provide limited information, which covered only a tiny portion of the mined areas and proved to be only 25% accurate. Over 55% of recent landmine incidents have occurred in areas not covered by these maps. Furthermore, while Armenia’s maps claimed that approximately 400,000 landmines had been planted in Azerbaijani territory, the actual number is believed to be closer to 1.5 million. The provision of accurate and comprehensive maps of all landmine-contaminated sites is essential to ensuring the safe return of IDPs and facilitating reconstruction in the affected regions. Since 2022, more than 10,000 former IDPs have returned to 10 settlements in the Karabakh and East Zangezur regions. Around 30,000 people live and work in these areas, contributing to key sectors such as construction, governance, and industry. By the end of 2025, the number of resettled communities is expected to increase to 30. The Azerbaijani government has undertaken significant initiatives to support the development of these regions, with a focus on creating employment opportunities, fostering sustainable regional development, and ensuring dignified living conditions.

The government is constructing modern housing, developing infrastructure, and providing essential services to support these goals. Economic programs are also being launched to stimulate local business development and agriculture. These comprehensive efforts aim to ensure that the people returning to Karabakh and East Zangezur can live in a safe, stable, and prosperous environment. Additionally, Karabakh and East Zangezur have been designated green energy zones. Since the end of the 44-day Patriotic War in 2020, Azerbaijan has made substantial investments in hydro energy, with 270 megawatts of hydroelectric power already operational within four years. The continued presence of landmines in Azerbaijan poses a serious security threat and remains a significant obstacle to peace, reconciliation, and sustainable development. On the international front, Azerbaijan has actively raised awareness about the serious landmine threat in Karabakh and East Zangezur.

In 2023, the country formally recognized humanitarian demining as its 18th National Sustainable Development Goal and began advocating for its adoption as the 18th Global Sustainable Development Goal by the United Nations. Azerbaijan also proposed the establishment of a Special Contact Group on Humanitarian Demining within the Non-Aligned Movement, which became operational in September 2023. That same year, Azerbaijan led a resolution at the 15th meeting of the state’s parties to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The resolution, titled “The Impact of Mines on Cultural Heritage,” addressed the devastating effects of landmines on cultural sites. In another significant step forward, in May 2024, the Mine Action Agency of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) and the United Nations Development Programme signed a letter of intent to establish a “Centre of Excellence” focused on mine action education. This new centre will enable Azerbaijan to share its expertise with other countries facing similar challenges. Most recently, on April 4, 2025, the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations and the Centre of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Centre), a leading Baku-based think tank on foreign and security policy, co-organized a high-level discussion at the UN Headquarters in New York. The event, “Saving Lives Through Humanitarian Mine Action in Azerbaijan,” was held in observance of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. It brought together key stakeholders in the field to address the humanitarian impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war in Azerbaijan, reaffirming the country’s commitment to tackling the global landmine crisis.

Azerbaijan’s global outreach activities

Beyond the humanitarian and developmental dimensions, the UXO issue in Azerbaijan also carries strategic and political implications. The extent to which the Azerbaijani government can effectively manage UXO clearance operations is closely tied to its broader goals of consolidating control over recaptured territories and projecting an image of stability and state capacity. At the same time, failing to clear these areas fully or do so quickly could fuel domestic frustration or undermine efforts at reconciliation and reintegration. The region is not an easy task; moreover, the presence of UXOs can be used as a political tool in narratives of victimhood and legitimacy, with both Armenia and Azerbaijan accusing each other of deploying prohibited weapons or failing to cooperate in humanitarian demining. More recently, even the exchange of minefield maps has been caught up in political bargaining, such as when Armenia reportedly traded such data to release detained individuals. However, it was not always this way. In the early 2000s, efforts were made to bridge divides through joint mine clearance training programs involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia under U.S.-led initiatives. These Confidence and Security Building Measures were a testament to what could be achieved with cooperation. There is hope that such cooperation might return.

Experts like Hafiz Safikhanov in Baku have suggested that similar initiatives are still possible. However, meaningful collaboration likely hinges on the resolution of deeper political disputes. Perhaps most critically, the region could consider joining the Ottawa Treaty, which seeks to eliminate the use of anti-personnel mines. For that to happen, however, the war of words must end and be replaced by a commitment to saving lives and ensuring a safer future. Until then, the fields of Azerbaijan—silent, green, and often deadly—will continue to bear witness to a past that refuses to be buried.

International law also intersects with the UXO challenge in significant ways. The use of certain types of ordnance, such as cluster munitions, has drawn criticism from human rights organizations and may contravene international humanitarian norms, particularly when such weapons are used in civilian-populated areas. While neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the growing global consensus against the use of such weapons places moral and diplomatic pressure on both sides.

In this context, Azerbaijan’s UXO clearance efforts are not just technical operations but also carry implications for its international image and relationships, especially with donor countries and institutions concerned with post-conflict rehabilitation. Efforts to address the UXO problem in Azerbaijan have been both concerted and ongoing, yet remain challenged by the scale of the issue and the complexity of the terrain. The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been at the forefront of clearance operations, supported by international partners, including the United Nations Development Programme and various NGOs. Despite significant progress, the sheer density of contamination and the lack of accurate mapping from previous decades of conflict make the task extremely arduous. Additionally, the use of cluster munitions during the 2020 conflict — which scatter multiple smaller sub-munitions over a wide area — has introduced a more unpredictable pattern of UXO dispersal, complicating the technical and logistical aspects of demining operations.

The future trajectory of UXO management in Azerbaijan will depend on several interrelated factors. These include the sustained commitment of government resources, the availability of international support, technological innovation in demining practices, and the overall political climate between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Advances in remote sensing, artificial intelligence, and drone-based surveying hold promise for enhancing the efficiency of clearance operations, but such technologies require significant investment and training. Additionally, peacebuilding and regional diplomacy progress could open new avenues for collaborative approaches to UXO clearance, although mutual distrust and unresolved grievances continue to pose serious obstacles.

In conclusion, unexploded ordnance in Azerbaijan represents a multifaceted challenge with far-reaching implications for human security, economic recovery, and political stability. While efforts at clearance and risk mitigation are ongoing, the problem remains deeply embedded in the region’s historical, technical, and geopolitical fabric. Addressing this issue comprehensively will require continued operational focus and a broader strategy that integrates humanitarian, developmental, and diplomatic dimensions. Until then, UXO will continue to cast a long shadow over Azerbaijan’s post-conflict recovery and its aspirations for lasting peace and development.

From Battlefield To Orbit In 2025, Why Europe’s Defence Sector Is Betting Big On Space?

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 17, 2025

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From Battlefield To Orbit In 2025, Why Europe’s Defence Sector Is Betting Big On Space?

In a world where wars are no longer just fought on land, sea, or in the air, Europe’s defence sector is beginning to see the final frontier – space – as the next strategic battleground. With the return of war to European soil, a rising tide of anti-satellite threats, and the increasing militarisation of space by global superpowers, traditional defence companies are now aggressively venturing into orbital territory.

This is not just a symbolic shift. What was once a domain dominated by civilian projects, communications satellites, Earth observation, GPS, has now become critical for strategic autonomy and national security. From Austria to France, from Sweden to Italy, defence players are launching space divisions, dusting off legacy aerospace ambitions, and aligning with broader geopolitical imperatives.

From Civilian to Defence Sector In Space

While the relationship between space and defence is not new, the lines between civilian and military applications were, until recently, clearly drawn. That distinction is now blurring. As the Vienna-based European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) notes, many of today’s leading European space companies are either offshoots of defence conglomerates or embedded within them. But after a lull in the early 2000s, the last three years have witnessed a sharp uptick in defence-led space activities.

According to Matija Rencelj, research manager at ESPI, this shift began accelerating post-2022, with the war in Ukraine serving as a wake-up call. Space, once considered a domain of peaceful exploration, is now being reassessed as a pillar of Europe’s strategic autonomy. And yet, the gap between ambition and action remains painfully wide.

Investment Lag and Capability Gap
The EU currently spends just 0.07% of its GDP, approximately €14 billion annually, on space activities. Contrast that with the United States, China, or even India, and the disparity becomes sharp. Only 15% of Europe’s public space budget is allocated toward defence applications, compared to the global average of about 50%.

To close this capability gap, Rencelj estimates that Europe needs to ramp up investment to at least 0.15–0.25% of its GDP by 2040. But money alone won’t solve the problem. Fragmented national strategies and a lack of cohesive governance at the EU level have long hampered progress.

Christophe Grudler, French MEP and co-chair of the European Parliament’s intergroup on Sky and Space, stresses the need for a unified European approach. “Too many member states are currently working on separate national plans,” he says. “We need programmes designed, funded, and governed at the EU level.” In other words, without integration, Europe risks being outpaced and outclassed in the militarisation of space.

ESA, The Sleeping Giant?
Enter the European Space Agency (ESA), a 23-member consortium with the technical might to compete on a global scale but not yet the financial muscle. ESA’s Director General Josef Aschbacher has been sounding the alarm: Europe can do it, but only if it chooses to. “We have some of the best space engineers and scientists,” Aschbacher said, “and excellent companies of world standard.”

Currently operating on an €8 billion annual budget, roughly one-third of NASA’s and barely rivalling the U.S. Space Force’s spending, ESA has still managed impressive feats. In 2024 alone, ESA launched a record 13 satellites, inaugurated the Ariane 6 rocket, returned VEGA-C to flight, and trained a new batch of astronauts. But these achievements only scratch the surface of what’s needed if Europe wants to stand shoulder to shoulder with the world’s space superpowers.

There’s hope that the upcoming ESA Ministerial Conference in Bremen in November 2025 will mark a turning point. Budgets are expected to rise from €16.9 billion in 2022 to potentially €21 billion. But as Aschbacher points out, money is not the only concern but also about political will, long-term strategy, and vision.

Beyond Rockets. The Economic Case for Space
Critics often see space investment as wasteful, a playground for billionaire adventurers like Musk, Bezos, or Branson. But Aschbacher is quick to dispel the myth. “One euro invested in space brings back five euros to the economy,” he argues. That return manifests in job creation, technology spin-offs, private sector engagement, and even medical innovation.

Take Earth observation and weather forecasting satellites, for example. ESA’s Arctic Weather Satellite, launched recently, is expected to generate economic value fifty times its initial cost. And then there’s Vigil, an ambitious mission aimed at monitoring solar flares that threaten both satellites and Earth-based electrical grids. With a launch targeted for 2031 and a price tag of a few hundred million euros, Vigil is looking to safeguarding Europe’s digital infrastructure.

Time for a Unified Industrial Strategy
Grudler believes the time for fragmented ambition is over. He envisions space being placed on equal footing with semiconductors, energy, and artificial intelligence in Europe’s industrial policy. “We don’t need to copy the United States line by line,” he said, “but we do need political vision, unity, and continuity.”

That includes developing a true European procurement system for space, pooling resources across member states, and embedding space into the EU’s long-term industrial and defence strategy. Otherwise, Europe risks becoming a junior player in a domain where dominance translates directly to geopolitical leverage.

The Last Bit, Space Is Not Optional

Space is no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. As Aschbacher puts it: “You cannot live without space in 20 years.” Just as the internet transformed every aspect of modern life, space technology, from satellite communications and Earth observation to missile tracking and cybersecurity, will underpin the next era of global competition.

And Europe must decide – will it lead, or will it follow?

As ESA and EU institutions prepare for a pivotal 2025, the clock is ticking. The message from industry, policymakers, and scientists- the stars are calling, and Europe’s defence sector must rise to meet the challenge. Because in today’s geopolitical climate, space is not the final frontier, it is the next frontline.

China Denies, Ukraine Reveals. Why Ukraine Paraded Chinese POWs, The Hidden Message To Beijing And The Fear Gripping Young Russian Men As Russia Calls Largest Draft In Years

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 17, 2025

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China Denies, Ukraine Reveals. Why Ukraine Paraded Chinese POWs, The Hidden Message To Beijing And The Fear Gripping Young Russian Men As Russia Calls Largest Draft In Years

Ukraine seemed to be running out of diplomatic cards to play – with Donald Trump’s support on the global stage steadily declining and Russia ramping up its offensive, bolstered quietly by Beijing’s nod-and-wink diplomacy, and just then, Kyiv made its move.

After China flatly denied that any of its citizens were fighting alongside Russian forces in the ongoing war, Ukraine decided to up the ante. In a rare and controversial move, the Ukrainian military, with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s nod, paraded two Chinese nationals captured as prisoners of war before a sea of reporters and camera crews.

It was a direct and deliberate breach of international humanitarian law, which strictly prohibits exposing POWs to public curiosity or media attention. But Kyiv clearly felt the risk was worth the message – Beijing was lying, and Ukraine had the proof.

Just last week, Zelensky publicly claimed that at least 155 Chinese nationals were actively fighting on Ukrainian soil, trained and deployed by Russia. He accused Moscow of dragging China into the conflict and slammed Beijing for staying conveniently silent. Two of those fighters, he said, had been captured in Donetsk. China, of course, rubbished the claims as fiction.

But the visual counterpunch from Ukraine was hard to ignore.

Flanked by Ukrainian security forces, the two POWs, dressed in combat fatigues and speaking Mandarin, were seated before journalists, with a translator by their side. Their stories clearly painted a picture of desperation and deception.

One of the captured men recounted how he lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic and was lured by the promise of 250,000 rubles a month (roughly $3,000) or more than double what he could earn back home. With a background in medical rehabilitation, he claimed he offered to assist Russia’s military in that capacity. But once in Moscow, the script flipped, he was forced into combat training with no clear understanding of what he’d signed up for.

Documents were all in Russian. Neither of the two said they spoke the language. Communication was reduced to gestures and guesswork. One of them said he often relied on hand signals to follow orders.

A separate military contract, allegedly signed by another Chinese volunteer and shown by Ukrainian intelligence, revealed the fine print: a one-year commitment to full combat duties, support during martial law, and participation in military activities, including those beyond Russian borders.

Once deployed to the battlefield, confusion reigned.

Recounting his final moments in the field, one of the Chinese fighters described the chaos that led to their capture in Donetsk.

“When we reached a forest, my captain just kept saying ‘Da, da, da’—yes, yes, yes in Russian—telling me to attack,” he said. “But I didn’t even know where the target was. We passed many Russian positions. I thought we were heading to our own bunker. I thought he was joking. So I hid. Then another Russian unit captain threw a grenade, and suddenly drones were everywhere.”

They surrendered shortly after. They had been on the battlefield for just three days.

China Faces The Sting

In response to Ukraine’s revelation of captured Chinese nationals fighting for Russia, China’s foreign ministry tried to save face with a quick rebuttal. “We would like to reiterate that China is not the initiator of the Ukrainian crisis, nor is China a participating party,” the statement read. “We urge the relevant parties to correctly and soberly understand China’s role and to refrain from releasing irresponsible remarks.”

But while Beijing deflects and distances itself from the war, Kyiv is taking the gloves off. While China continues to claim neutrality, its actions tell a different story. From the outset of the war, Beijing has provided Moscow with a steady stream of economic and diplomatic support. Now, with Chinese nationals confirmed to be on the frontlines, Kyiv is focused on how China is involved beyond the rhetoric and whether Beijing’s government might be complicit.

When asked whether this involvement could be part of China’s official policy, Zelensky was candid. “I don’t have an answer yet. The Security Service of Ukraine will investigate,” he said. However, he added, “We do believe Beijing is aware of what’s happening.”

The Role of Foreign Fighters in the War

Foreign fighters have become a significant part of this conflict, with volunteers from all corners of the world joining both sides. In 2024, a list reviewed revealed six Sri Lankans, seven Nepalese, and individuals from Somalia, Egypt, and Syria, among others, held by Ukraine as prisoners of war.

Even North Korea has sent an estimated 14,000 troops to aid Russia’s cause, with Kyiv capturing two North Korean soldiers in January alone.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence sources explain Russia’s reliance on these foreign recruits. “Russia is now stuck in a war of attrition,” said an intelligence source. “It can’t sustain the front lines with its own forces alone and has no choice but to recruit from everywhere.”

The Chinese prisoners were adamant, however, that their decision was personal. They claimed that slick recruitment videos on TikTok- circulating in China for over a year – were their main motivator. One of these videos shows Russian soldiers training in combat gear, alongside messages in both Russian and Chinese, detailing the financial incentives of joining Russia’s army.

The video, originally aimed at a domestic Russian audience, included Chinese subtitles, which seemed to appeal directly to young Chinese men. The footage, showing soldiers in action, emphasizing “manliness” and financial rewards, resonated in a country where military service is venerated but direct combat experience is often elusive.

Whether these videos were sanctioned by the Russian government or created by social media users remains unclear, but the allure of combat experience in exchange for money is undeniable, especially when advertised on platforms like TikTok, which is wildly popular among Chinese youth.

Why the Timing of Kyiv’s Move Matters

Kyiv has shown POWs to the press before – soldiers from Nepal, fighters from Africa – but its decision to spotlight captured Chinese nationals is a dramatic deviation from the norm. This wasn’t a random move. The timing is strategic, and the audience far beyond just the Ukrainian public.

At the heart of this move is Ukraine’s battle for relevance in Washington, particularly with President Donald Trump back in the Oval Office. His administration has so far struggled to rein in Moscow, with ceasefire talks hitting a dead end. And while Ukraine bleeds on the frontlines, Washington’s eyes seem fixated elsewhere, on China.

From Zelensky’s perspective, nothing is more potent than illustrating the possibility that China’s support for Russia may go beyond yuan and lip service. The optics of Chinese soldiers fighting alongside Russian troops is a message tailor-made for Trump’s administration, which has been slapping Beijing with escalating tariffs and treating it as America’s top global rival.

According to Anders Puck Nielsen of the Royal Danish Defence College, Kyiv is increasingly uneasy about the European Union’s warming overtures to China – as both global powers seek to find common ground amid a worsening trade climate fueled by U.S. tariffs.

“Suddenly it seems there might be potential for the Europeans and the Chinese to find common ground on other questions as well,” Nielsen said. Ukraine’s move, he added, is “clearly political,” aimed at ensuring China’s entanglement with Russia doesn’t get swept under Europe’s diplomatic carpet.

Beijing, predictably, was not amused. “We urge the relevant parties concerned to correctly and soberly understand the role of China and to not release irresponsible remarks,” snapped Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian – delivering a warning that didn’t name Kyiv, but left little ambiguity.

Russia’s Military Call-Up Raises Alarm Bells

Meanwhile, Moscow is quietly prepping for a long, grinding war, and it’s starting by replenishing its troops.

On April 1, Russia launched its largest conscription drive since 2011, aiming to draft 160,000 men between the ages of 18 and 30. The campaign is part of President Putin’s broader military expansion plan, targeting a 2.5 million-strong armed force.

The reaction was a wave of panic among Russian youth.

With more than 100,000 Russian soldiers already killed since 2022, according to an open-source tally by BBC and Mediazona, and the prospect of being sent to the front lines has terrified thousands of draft-eligible men. The widening age bracket hasn’t helped either: once capped at 27, the upper age limit for conscription now reaches 30.

And unlike the early months of the war, there are fewer cracks to slip through. Legal loopholes and exemptions still exist (on health grounds, through court appeals, by pursuing higher education, citing family responsibilities, or even applying for alternative civil service) but they are increasingly difficult to leverage. Those in certain sectors, such as the military-industrial complex, or high-ranking politicians, are usually spared. For everyone else it is fair game.

The tightening net has driven many to desperate measures – from feigning illness to leaving the country altogether.

For now, the Kremlin maintains that this is just a regular draft. But as the war drags on and losses mount, it’s clear this is a last-ditch attempt to keep the machine running.

And it’s happening just as Ukraine’s campaign to expose foreign fighters, especially from China, is heating up. As both sides fight their battles on and off the battlefield, the propaganda war is just as critical as the one being fought with bullets and drones.

In today’s hybrid war, optics matter as much as artillery, and Ukraine understands this all too well. Hence, by showcasing captured Chinese fighters, Kyiv isn’t just documenting the battlefield – it’s weaponizing perception, sending a calculated message to both Washington and Brussels: Russia’s war is not just Putin’s, and China’s fingerprints might be deeper than they claim.

The Last Bit

As Ukraine tries to shore up global support and prevent geopolitical realignments that could weaken its standing, Russia is digging in for a long haul, arming itself not just with missiles, but with the bodies of frightened young conscripts.

From Washington’s shifting priorities to the EU’s careful diplomatic dance with Beijing, the global chessboard is moving rapidly.

Battle For The Blue North, The Arctic Heats Up As The New Frontline Of Global Power And Cold War Between China, Russia, And The U.S.

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 16, 2025

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Battle For The Blue North, The Arctic Heats Up As The New Frontline Of Global Power And Cold War Between China, Russia, And The U.S.

The Arctic region is undergoing a profound transformation, sadly driven primarily by the accelerating effects of climate change. Rising global temperatures over recent decades have led to the seasonal thawing of the Arctic Ocean, a phenomenon with far-reaching geopolitical ramifications. If current warming trends persist, the Arctic is projected to become seasonally navigable for several months annually, and by some scientific projections, it could become nearly ice-free by the end of the 21st century.

This emerging accessibility is not only reshaping the physical aspect but is also redefining strategic calculations for major global powers, most notably China, Russia, and the United States, by opening new avenues for commercial shipping, energy exploration, and military posturing.

China’s Strategic Calculus in the Arctic
Although geographically distant from the Arctic, China has actively positioned itself as a “near-Arctic state,” a designation it uses to justify its growing presence and interests in the region. While Chinese involvement in Arctic affairs dates back to the 1980s, initially limited to scientific research and polar expeditions, its engagement has evolved significantly over the past decade.

A turning point came in 2013 when China obtained observer status in the Arctic Council, despite not being a littoral Arctic state. This status allowed Beijing to deepen diplomatic ties with Arctic nations and expand its influence within key multilateral forums.

In 2017, China unveiled its Polar Silk Road initiative as part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formally articulating its vision for Arctic engagement. This was further consolidated with the publication of its 2018 white paper titled China’s Arctic Policy, which framed the region as integral to China’s long-term strategic and economic planning.

According to Chinese assessments, segments of the Arctic Ocean may become reliably navigable as early as 2030. In anticipation of this shift, Beijing has actively pursued bilateral agreements with Arctic stakeholders, including Russia, Iceland, and Greenland, to secure infrastructure development and logistical access. These partnerships reflect China’s intent to integrate the Arctic into its global supply chain network and to reduce its dependency on traditional maritime routes.

Beijing’s strategic rationale is anchored in the interplay between its economic structure and geostrategic vulnerabilities. China’s economy is heavily reliant on global trade, especially in energy imports (notably oil and natural gas) and the export of manufactured goods. Maritime shipping accounts for over 80% of global trade by volume, and China’s commercial shipping routes currently depend on transit through geopolitically sensitive and heavily monitored waterways in the Southern Hemisphere, including the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean, and Suez Canal – all areas where the United States and its allies maintain considerable influence.

The Arctic, by contrast, offers a northern alternative that could reduce travel distances between China and Europe by up to 40%. Moreover, with an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas reserves located in the Arctic, the region presents Beijing with an opportunity to diversify its energy sources while potentially lowering transportation and production costs. From a geopolitical standpoint, the Arctic route presents a less-contested maritime corridor, at least for now, where U.S. naval dominance is comparatively limited.

In essence, China’s Arctic strategy is not merely an economic gambit but a deliberate effort to recalibrate its global trade dependencies, enhance energy security, and establish strategic footholds in an emerging geopolitical theatre that is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation.Russia’s Arctic Imperative
Among all Arctic stakeholders, Russia holds the most expansive territorial claim and physical presence in the region, encompassing nearly half of the Arctic coastline. The Arctic has long been central to Russia’s national identity, economic strategy, and military doctrine. In recent years, Moscow has accelerated its activities in the region, driven by a combination of geopolitical ambition, economic necessity, and climate-enabled opportunity.

The melting Arctic ice has created a renewed strategic relevance for Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) – a maritime passage along its northern coast that links Europe to Asia. The NSR offers a significantly shorter alternative to the Suez Canal route, potentially reducing shipping times between major ports in Asia and Europe by approximately two weeks. Russia sees this as an opportunity not only to monetize transit fees but also to position itself as a critical node in global trade logistics. To that end, it has been investing heavily in port infrastructure, icebreaker fleets, and navigational capabilities to render the NSR viable for commercial use.

Economically, the Arctic represents a cornerstone of Russia’s future energy strategy. An estimated 80–90% of Russia’s gas and oil reserves in the Arctic remain untapped, and with Western sanctions constraining other economic sectors, Moscow has turned increasingly to Arctic energy development to sustain state revenues. Projects like Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2—developed in partnership with countries such as China and India, demonstrate how Russia is leveraging Arctic resources to deepen strategic ties with non-Western powers while bypassing Western financial systems and technologies where possible.

Militarily, the Kremlin views the Arctic as an extension of its national security perimeter. It has significantly expanded its military footprint in the High North, reactivating Soviet-era bases, establishing new Arctic brigades, and deploying advanced missile systems and radar networks. The Arctic is also home to the Northern Fleet, which plays a critical role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture through its deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In this context, the Arctic serves as both a strategic buffer zone and a forward-operating theater, particularly amid deteriorating relations with NATO.

For Russia, therefore, the Arctic is not merely a zone of economic promise, it is a platform for strategic autonomy, great-power assertion, and regime stability. As the region becomes more accessible, Moscow will likely continue to militarize and commercialize the Arctic, asserting its sovereignty and seeking to shape emerging Arctic governance frameworks to align with its interests.

The United States
The United States, as one of the five Arctic coastal states, maintains a complex posture in the region, one that balances environmental stewardship, economic interest, and great-power competition. Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. has historically approached Arctic policy with a degree of strategic caution and bureaucratic inertia. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by increased Sino-Russian collaboration and climate-induced accessibility, is prompting a recalibration of American Arctic policy.

Alaska provides the United States with direct access to the Arctic, positioning it geographically to engage in the region’s economic and security affairs. Yet, compared to Russia’s robust infrastructure or China’s strategic planning, the U.S. Arctic presence remains relatively underdeveloped. The U.S. operates only a limited fleet of icebreakers, far fewer than Russia, and lacks the deep-water ports and logistical capabilities required to project sustained influence in the High North. Recognizing this strategic gap, Washington has begun investing in Arctic domain awareness, increasing Coast Guard funding, and enhancing military exercises under the U.S. Northern Command and NATO umbrella.

From an energy standpoint, Alaska holds substantial reserves of oil and gas, and Arctic development is viewed by some in Washington as essential to energy independence and economic revitalization. However, environmental concerns and legal restrictions have often hampered large-scale extraction projects, leading to a cautious and sometimes contradictory approach to resource exploitation.

Strategically, the U.S. perceives the Arctic through the prism of great-power rivalry. As China seeks to normalize its presence and Russia intensifies its military activities, the Pentagon has acknowledged the Arctic as an emerging domain of strategic competition. U.S. Arctic strategies released in recent years, by the Department of Defense, Navy, and Coast Guard, emphasize the need to maintain a rules-based order, ensure freedom of navigation, and counter malign influence, particularly from China and Russia.

Washington also seeks to strengthen Arctic governance institutions, such as the Arctic Council, and to deepen coordination with key allies including Canada, Norway, and Denmark. These efforts aim not only to preserve regional stability but also to prevent the Arctic from becoming a zone of unchecked militarization and unilateral economic exploitation.

The Last Bit,
As the Arctic transitions from a frozen frontier to a navigable and resource-rich expanse, it is rapidly becoming a central arena for 21st-century geopolitics. For China, it is a strategic corridor and energy diversification opportunity. For Russia, it is a theater of national strength, economic survival, and military leverage. For the United States, it is a space requiring urgent strategic attention, lest it fall behind in shaping the future of Arctic governance and balance-of-power dynamics.

The interplay of environmental transformation, strategic ambition, and economic interest ensures that the Arctic will no longer remain peripheral to global affairs. Rather, it is set to become a defining space in the evolving multipolar order, where cooperation, competition, and confrontation are likely to coexist.

Is Bangladesh’s Yunus Planning A Coup Against The Bangladeshi Army Chief? What Is The Real Game That Yunus Is Playing?

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 16, 2025

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Is Bangladesh’s Yunus Planning A Coup Against The Bangladeshi Army Chief? What Is The Real Game That Yunus Is Playing?

First, let’s address a basic but widely overlooked fact – never mistake Bangladesh for a homogeneous, monolithic society. Much like its neighbor India, Bangladesh is layered, diverse, and politically complex. Religion, language, dialect, and political ideology don’t exist in binary forms here; rather, they overlap, clash, and co-exist in often paradoxical ways.

Yet, in the current political climate, the loudest voices coming from Bangladesh, whether on television panels, social media platforms, or diplomatic corridors, seem to carry a distinctly anti-India tone. But should we allow this dominant voice to blind us to the subtler truths beneath? Absolutely not. Because beneath this cacophony lie many pro-India voices, still present, still concerned, and still trying to reason. The tragedy is, they are being systematically silenced.

And this silencing, it appears, isn’t a byproduct of organic public sentiment, but a calculated political strategy.

Which brings us to a crucial and controversial question:- Why is Muhammad Yunus, once hailed as a savior of the poor, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, seemingly aiding and abetting this silencing?

To answer that, we must look beyond just the headlines and look deeper into the political messaging at play. The destruction of Hindu temples, the persecution of Bangladeshi Hindus, the abductions, the mob violence, these are not isolated acts of communal frenzy.

They are increasingly being seen as tools of signaling. Signaling to India, and to the world, that Bangladesh is pivoting. Away from a secular-democratic leaning, towards a more radical, authoritarian one, led by figures like Yunus and allegedly bolstered by groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami.

One may ask. why Hindus? Why target this already vulnerable minority?

Because in the politics of polarization, minorities become the canvas on which majoritarian agendas are painted, and the pain of one community becomes a lever to provoke another. What we are witnessing in Bangladesh today is not just domestic upheaval, it’s geopolitical game, playing out on the fragile backs of minorities.

So how did a microfinance icon become a geopolitical actor accused of endangering regional ties?

Because power, once tasted, reshapes many stories. And since being ushered into the highest office (allegedly with quiet backing from external sympathizers and ideological allies) Yunus appears to be rewriting Bangladesh’s long-standing diplomatic posture.

A large part of this rewriting is focused on India.

A Calculated Shift in Allegiance?
The façade cracked during Yunus’s visit to China, a trip that sent more than a few diplomatic eyebrows arching in New Delhi. It wasn’t just the optics of cozy handshakes and glowing statements about “deepening strategic ties” that drew attention. What truly sent shockwaves was his barely veiled reference to India’s northeastern states – the ‘Seven Sisters’.

Addressing a discussion in Beijing on March 28, Yunus had tried to convince Chinese businesses to set up industries in Bangladesh and export to the rest of the world and even China by taking advantage of the country’s seaway.

“Seven Sisters of India are a landlocked region — they have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. This opens up a huge possibility,” he told the roundtable.

To call it a diplomatic blunder would be too generous. It was a bold, deliberate provocation – one that many in Indian strategic circles view as a red flag, signalling a drastic shift in Bangladesh’s geopolitical orientation.

And what followed didn’t help. In March 2025, Bangladesh abruptly halted yarn imports from India via land ports, a move that baffled trade experts and enraged Bangladesh’s own business chambers. The textile industry( the very backbone of Bangladesh’s economy) depends on Indian raw materials. Indian ports also serve as essential trade routes to ship Bangladeshi finished goods globally.

Why, then, would Yunus bite the very hand that fuels his country’s most vital export sector?

The answer lies not in economics but in political symbolism.

By favouring Pakistani yarn imports, costlier and logistically burdensome, over Indian ones, Yunus is not strengthening Bangladesh’s economy. He’s sending a message. A message that old alliances can be undone, that Bangladesh can pivot eastward – toward Beijing – and even flirt with Islamabad, however impractical that may seem.

India, for its part, responded swiftly. The Modi government revoked a key transshipment facility for Bangladesh, sparing only Bhutan and Nepal. For a landlocked country that heavily depends on Indian logistical corridors, this move was both strategic and surgical.

But again — what leader willingly risks their own country’s economic stability just to provoke a neighbor?

Unless that very provocation is part of a larger agenda — an agenda that involves re-aligning Bangladesh away from India’s orbit, and into a new ideological and economic axis, possibly backed by powerful benefactors in Beijing and Riyadh.

And this is where the questions get darker.

From Hasina’s Balance to Yunus’s Tilt
Until Sheikh Hasina was at the helm, India never had to second-guess Bangladesh’s loyalty in matters of national security. Even when the terrain got rough, the underlying diplomatic spine between the two countries held. India, for its part, invested heavily not just in diplomacy, but in business too. Consider Adani Power, one of India’s largest private enterprises, was awarded a major electricity supply contract to power the cities of Bangladesh.

Now comes the twist. Enter Mohammed Yunus and the equilibrium vanishes.

The moment Yunus steps in, the very first tremors are felt not in speeches, but in trade. Imports from India are halted. Business with Adani is put under review. More crucially, Jamaat-e-Islami constituencies suddenly seem emboldened, as if waiting for a signal and Yunus just gave it.

Let’s not forget – Jamaat-e-Islami isn’t just a Bangladeshi force. It’s a shared thread linking radical Islamist groups across India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. But of the three, its roots run deepest in Bangladesh.

So what message was Yunus really sending when he publicly challenged India’s position? Why stir the hornet’s nest?

Perhaps the answer lies in his backchannel connections, particularly with the Pakistani Army and the ISI. The ideological transmission line, the one that keeps these regimes talking in hushed tones and coded gestures, is Jamaat-e-Islami. In this matrix, Yunus becomes the conduit. A tool being calibrated for a larger endgame.

And the timing is everything.

Let’s not forget, Yunus is not an elected leader. His presence at the top of the Bangladeshi power structure was pitched as temporary, a bridge until elections were held. That was the promise. That was the premise.

But elections? Now branded a “waste of time” by Yunus himself.

Instead, he positions himself as the caretaker of Bangladesh’s “greater stability”, while slowly making sure that his foothold becomes permanent. And for that to happen, he needs a support system. Not the one that comes from the people, but one that comes from power brokers radical groups at home, and influential friends abroad.

So why align with Pakistan, a country sinking in debt and disorder? What can Pakistan offer?

The answer is: China.

Pakistan today is not a power center; it’s a front office for Beijing’s South Asia desk. And through Islamabad, Yunus is knocking on Beijing’s door, offering something even China doesn’t currently have a strategic outpost bang on India’s underbelly. He’s waving a flag that says: “Use me.”

Use Bangladesh as a gateway to India’s northeastern corridor. Use it to stir unrest, to build roadways, to float debt, to offer “aid.” And in exchange, all Yunus wants is the power to stay where he is unelected, unquestioned.

How do we know this isn’t conjecture?

Look at the sequence of decisions. Bangladesh under Yunus closed three land ports and suspended another with India, citing “infrastructure issues.” Curious timing, isn’t it?

Even more ironic is this, despite publicly escalating tensions with India, Bangladesh still went ahead and imported 50,000 tons of rice from India, costing over $21 million. What does this tell us?

It tells us that this isn’t strategy rooted in economics, it’s a political signaling exercise. He’s playing a game. And now the question becomes – What is Yunus truly plotting, and what plotlines is he rewriting?

One thread runs through Meghna Alam’s sudden arrest, a story that hints at how deep this rot goes.

Meghna Alam, a former Miss Earth Bangladesh, dared to expose the extramarital involvement of the Saudi ambassador, a scandal made worse by the deeply conservative Islamic values both nations claim to uphold. But rather than defend her freedom of speech, the Yunus-led government sent the police in the dead of night to abduct her, a moment she streamed on Facebook Live. She was jailed under a draconian law, while the real scandal was buried under diplomatic protocol.

Why? Because upsetting Saudi Arabia isn’t on the cards – oil flows through influence, and influence must be protected.

So what does this entire episode tell us?

That Yunus is not just consolidating power internally, he’s dancing to an external symphony, composed in Beijing, arranged in Islamabad, and sponsored by Riyadh.

Now let us come to geopolitics – key politics, power politics.

The recent appointment of Khalilur Rahman as Bangladesh’s National Security Advisor on 9th April 2025 was no small administrative reshuffle, it was a power play, loaded with signals, layered motives, and strategic implications. He was already Yunus’s point man on the Rohingya issue and Priority Affairs. With this new role, he now oversees both human rights diplomacy and national security.

Table of Contents

But this appointment was made when Bangladesh’s Army Chief, Waker-Uz-Zaman, was away on a diplomatic visit to Russia and Croatia. It’s worth pausing right here. In countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan, the military doesn’t just guard borders, it holds significant sway in internal politics, sometimes more than the civilian government itself.

So, was Yunus trying to bypass the Army Chief? Undercut his authority? Sneak in his loyalist when the General wasn’t looking? That’s the question.

And the signals don’t stop there. Yunus has been openly flirting with China, while America, predictably, isn’t too thrilled. The US questions democracy, transparency, equal rights – China doesn’t care. China’s playbook is cold, hard, and transactional. So for Yunus, China is money, America is migration. And that’s exactly the game he seems to be playing.

Let’s dig deeper. Mohammed Yunus, in many ways, hails from a tradition of civil power-seekers with dictatorial leanings. Think of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a man who wanted to be the head of a country, even if it meant breaking up another. Sound familiar?

Yunus too seems willing to burn the house down as long as he’s the one holding the fire extinguisher.

Now, here’s where it gets even more intriguing, Khalilur Rahman holds a US passport. That means the National Security Advisor of Bangladesh is technically an American citizen. Let that sink in. And not just him, 7 to 8 key people in the interim setup have foreign passports, mostly American or European.

So, is this a case of deep state influence from the US? Are these appointees strategically placed proxies meant to steer Bangladesh’s future? But if that’s true, why are they still hobnobbing with China?

The answer lies in dual strategy, the very same strategy that is now institutionalized in Pakistan.

Take Chinese money.
Blame America.
Send your children to study in America.
Buy property in London.
Settle in New Jersey.
Rinse and repeat.

None of these power players hold Chinese passports. So it’s clear, America is where they want to go, but China is where the money flows from.

Now back to the army. The Bangladesh Army is a proud, structured, and disciplined institution. It follows its Chief. But here’s the danger, if Yunus manages to topple Waker-Uz-Zaman, he gets to insert a loyalist, either a Chinese stooge or an American asset. And once that happens, he controls both the civilian narrative and the military doctrine.

In fact, a video has surfaced where the Chief of the National Citizen Party openly alleges that General Waker-Uz-Zaman did not support Yunus’s elevation as Chief Advisor. That one line tells us everything about the power struggle under the surface.

The Last Bit, The Game of Thrones in Dhaka
Md Yunus is playing a complex geopolitical game, part survival, part ambition, part ideological war. He wants to be the indispensable man. The interim head of state, who turns temporary power into a permanent seat. A man who bypasses elections, co-opts radical forces like Jamaat-e-Islami, and now surrounds himself with foreign-passport-holding advisors, all while balancing between Beijing’s cheque book and Washington’s lecture notes.

He’s not just redefining Bangladesh’s internal politics.
He’s repositioning Bangladesh in the great global game of influence.
India must now watch Dhaka not just with interest, but with caution.
Because if Yunus succeeds, Bangladesh may become a frontline state, not for democracy, but for a new era of foreign-controlled proxy politics right on India’s eastern flank.

Hence, by the looks of it –

The stage is set.
The actors are in place.
And the drama in Dhaka has only just begun!

How Bay Of Bengal Could Be The Next Major Geopolitical Flashpoint. The Brewing Turbulence On India’s Eastern Flank

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 14, 2025

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How Bay Of Bengal Could Be The Next Major Geopolitical Flashpoint. The Brewing Turbulence On India’s Eastern Flank

All is not well along India’s eastern seaboard – The Bay Of Bengal. The political reshuffle in Dhaka during August last year, marked by the sidelining of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, many opine bore the unmistakable fingerprints of American strategic orchestration. The rapid elevation of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government only reinforced the perception of external influence, particularly given Yunus’ long-standing proximity to U.S. policymakers.

This arrangement, however, strayed from constitutional norms. Bangladesh’s caretaker governance mechanism mandates the appointment of a former Supreme Court judge, not a civilian appointee with no judicial standing. Yet, the Bangladeshi military extended its institutional endorsement, raising further eyebrows. Yunus’ subsequent trip to Washington, accompanied by the student leader who had spearheaded the anti-Hasina agitation, and his reported interactions with figures such as Bill Clinton, and possibly even President Joe Biden, lent credence to the view that the U.S. deep state was closely managing the transition.

From New Delhi’s standpoint, Yunus’ early public remarks and the positions taken by his advisers have exhibited a troubling shift away from the traditionally cooperative posture towards India. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s recent visit to Dhaka, during which he engaged with Yunus, was likely a signal of Indian concerns being conveyed at the highest levels.

The geopolitical recalibration became even more evident when Yunus travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

At a business forum, he provocatively stated,

“The seven sisters of India are landlocked—they have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. From Bangladesh, you can go anywhere you want. The ocean is in our backyard.”

Such a statement either betrays a profound lack of geographical and strategic comprehension or is a deliberate attempt to recast the regional maritime narrative. With over 7,500 km of coastline – 6,100 km on the eastern seaboard alone – and a formidable naval presence including two operational SSBNs (with a third on the horizon), India remains the preeminent maritime power in the Bay of Bengal. To imagine Bangladesh as the “guardian of the ocean” is a gross misreading of regional naval realities.

Moreover, India and Bangladesh share deep military-to-military linkages. The two navies engage in regular joint exercises, and a significant number of Bangladeshi officers continue to receive training in Indian institutions, promoting professional camaraderie and interoperability.

Yunus’ overtures to Chinese investors, therefore, are not only diplomatically provocative but also geopolitically puzzling – particularly for someone viewed as a U.S.-endorsed transitional figure. Notably, his China visit coincided with that of two senior U.S. generals to Bangladesh, while the Bangladeshi Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, also made a visit to Beijing soon after Yunus’ return.

In the final months of her tenure, Sheikh Hasina had publicly stated that Washington had expressed interest in accessing St. Martin’s Island, a strategic outpost merely 9 km from the Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula and 8 km from the Myanmar coastline. Her decision to deny this request possibly contributed to the erosion of U.S. support.

The situation in Myanmar, with its spiraling internal instability and Beijing’s expanding influence, continues to draw intense scrutiny from Washington. In parallel, China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh through political, economic, and now military inroads is creating a complex matrix of alignments that New Delhi must monitor closely.

Strategic Realignments in the Bay of Bengal

India’s eastern flank is entering a period of renewed turbulence and countering the evolving theater will require strategic clarity, enhanced regional diplomacy, and robust maritime preparedness to ensure that the Bay of Bengal does not become an arena for great power contestation at the expense of regional stability.

The Bay of Bengal remains the last major quadrant of the Indian Ocean where the United States does not maintain a direct physical military presence – a strategic void that is becoming increasingly consequential.

Against this backdrop, the Biden administration had earmarked $167 million for Myanmar, including $75 million for cross-border humanitarian assistance. Of this, $25 million was allocated for non-lethal aid to ethnic armed organizations, signaling a renewed American interest in the unfolding dynamics along the Indo-Myanmar frontier.

China, for its part, has entrenched itself deeply in Myanmar’s strategic calculus. Beijing continues to support the ruling junta while simultaneously maintaining covert ties with several ethnic armed groups operating along its border. This dual strategy is driven by the imperative to secure the energy and logistics corridor running from Kyaukphyu port to Kunming. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, developed by China under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a critical node for offloading Saudi and Iranian crude, which is then transported inland via pipelines. This corridor offers China a vital alternative to the congested and potentially vulnerable Malacca Strait, reducing its exposure to U.S. naval interdiction in a crisis scenario.

To balance Chinese influence and maintain equidistance between its two powerful neighbors, the Myanmar government awarded the development and operational contract of the Sittwe Port to India’s Inland Waterways and Port Logistics (IPGL). This port is a cornerstone of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, aimed at enhancing connectivity between India’s Northeast and the Bay of Bengal, bypassing dependence on transit through Bangladesh. Once fully operational, this corridor could integrate India’s landlocked northeastern states with the economies of Southeast Asia – Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam – ultimately linking into the Pacific via the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh remains another critical node in this Indo-Pacific jigsaw. China has made significant inroads in Dhaka, emerging as the country’s largest import partner and a key defense supplier. Eleven major Chinese infrastructure projects are currently underway, many falling under the ambit of the BRI. These ventures are said to support over 55,000 Bangladeshi jobs, cementing Beijing’s economic leverage. Reports have previously surfaced suggesting Chinese proposals for regular People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployments from Bangladeshi ports. However, under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, such proposals were firmly declined, likely to avoid transforming the Bay of Bengal into another theater of major power rivalry.

The U.S., too, has been assertive in re-engaging the region, spurred by concerns over China’s deepening presence in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. The situation in Rakhine State has become increasingly complex. The Arakan Army now controls vast swathes of the region, including almost the entire border with Bangladesh—barring the crucial ports of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Their ascendancy has triggered serious humanitarian concerns, including reported atrocities against the Rohingya population. These developments have strategic implications for both New Delhi and Washington, given the proximity to the Indian border and the refugee pressure it could intensify.

President Trump’s suspension of USAID funding, which had been supporting basic food and medical relief for Burmese refugees in India, Bangladesh, and Thailand, has created a dangerous vacuum. The withdrawal of this lifeline raises the specter of worsening malnutrition, disease, and potential radicalization.

Compounding these concerns is the emerging role of Muhammad Yunus. Reports suggest that the interim Bangladeshi leadership under Yunus is considering inviting Chinese investment for the development of Mongla Port, a project previously awarded to India during the Hasina administration.

Even more concerning are reports of overtures made to Pakistan to develop an airbase at Lalmonirhat, near India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor (Chicken’s Neck). The strategic consequences of such developments could be profound, destabilizing the delicate regional equilibrium and inviting external power projection into a sensitive tri-junction of South Asia.

As geopolitical currents intensify, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the littoral infrastructure surrounding this basin are becoming central to great-power rivalries playing out far beyond South Asia’s traditional spheres.

The Biden administration’s $167 million assistance package for Myanmar, of which $75 million was allocated for cross-border humanitarian aid and $25 million for non-lethal support to ethnic armed organizations, reflects Washington’s attempt to remain engaged in a region dominated by Chinese infrastructure and influence. Yet, American presence remains symbolic, more diplomatic than decisive, especially in the face of expanding Chinese economic and military footprints.

China’s Strategic Dualism in Myanmar
China’s engagement in Myanmar is layered with tactical ambiguity. On one hand, Beijing continues to support the ruling military junta; on the other, it nurtures ties with several ethnic armed groups. This dual policy is not ideological, it is logistical.

At the heart of this balancing act lies the strategic port of Kyaukphyu, developed by China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Crude oil from the Gulf, particularly Saudi and Iranian supplies, is offloaded here before being transported through pipelines across Myanmar into China’s Yunnan province, terminating at the Kunming refinery. This overland corridor serves as a vital alternative to the Malacca Strait, which, in times of military tension with the U.S., remains vulnerable to naval blockades or chokepoint disruptions.

To ensure the corridor’s stability, Beijing has also backed rebel groups near its borders, using influence and funding to prevent any disruption to the oil pipeline. This delicate arrangement secures Chinese energy flows and deepens its long-term economic entrenchment in Myanmar.

India’s Counterbalance: Sittwe and Kaladan
In an effort to maintain a balance of power between China and India, Myanmar awarded India’s Inland Waterways and Port Logistics (IPGL) the development and operational contract of Sittwe Port. Strategically located, the port is a crucial node in the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which aims to provide India’s landlocked Northeastern states with a direct corridor to the Bay of Bengal, bypassing Bangladesh entirely.

More importantly, once fully functional, this corridor will enable India to connect its Northeast with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, offering access to the broader ASEAN region and the Pacific via the South China Sea. It is both a connectivity lifeline and a geopolitical statement.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh, meanwhile, sits at the center of this evolving strategic triangle. China has invested heavily in its infrastructure and defense capabilities, with 11 ongoing projects under the BRI. It has become Dhaka’s largest import partner, and Chinese ventures now support over 55,000 local jobs.

While there were reports that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had sought to operate from Bangladeshi ports, the Sheikh Hasina government rejected such proposals. The intent was clear: Dhaka sought to avoid transforming the Bay of Bengal into a battleground of major power rivalries.

The U.S., concerned about China’s increasing maritime influence and entrenched leverage in both Bangladesh and Myanmar, has also tried to remain engaged, though largely through diplomatic and humanitarian channels.

The Arakan Army and the Rakhine Flashpoint
Recent developments in Myanmar’s Rakhine State have further destabilized the region. The Arakan Army, a powerful ethnic armed group, has reportedly taken control of large swathes of territory along the Bangladesh border, excluding only the crucial ports of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Their growing influence has intensified fears of human rights abuses, especially against the persecuted Rohingya population, who now face yet another round of displacement and violence.

The Last Bit

With competing corridors, contested ports, and fluid allegiances, the Bay of Bengal is fast emerging as a maritime pressure point.

The intersection of U.S., Chinese, and Indian interests – overlaid with regional instability and shifting leadership in Bangladesh and Myanmar – necessitates vigilant monitoring. For India, securing the eastern seaboard and safeguarding its maritime and continental flanks will be central to sustaining strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

In this unfolding contest, Myanmar and Bangladesh will remain the geopolitical swing states. What they choose – or are forced – to become, may well decide the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

North Korea’s War Machine Is Getting Scarier, Fast. Giant Warship Spotted, Hypersonic Missiles In Sight, U.S. Command Warns

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 14, 2025

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North Korea’s War Machine Is Getting Scarier, Fast. Giant Warship Spotted, Hypersonic Missiles In Sight, U.S. Command Warns

New satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is constructing what appears to be its largest and most sophisticated warship to date at the Nampo shipyard on its western coast, potentially doubling the size of any current vessel in the DPRK’s naval fleet.

Imagery captured on April 6 by Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs reveals continued work on a guided-missile frigate (FFG) estimated to measure approximately 140 meters (459 feet) in length. This marks a significant advancement in North Korean naval architecture and force projection capability.

The analysis, conducted by Joseph Bermudez Jr. and Jennifer Jun of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), notes the vessel is likely designed to accommodate vertical launch systems (VLS) for deploying missiles against both land and maritime targets. Such a configuration suggests North Korea may be seeking to emulate modern blue-water naval capabilities, which are typically seen in more advanced navies.

For context, the FFG under construction is approaching the dimensions of the U.S. Navy’s new Constellation-class frigates (496 feet) and not far behind the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (505 feet), though its operational capabilities remain speculative.

This development aligns with Pyongyang’s ongoing military modernization program. Despite enduring sanctions under multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, North Korea has tested a range of advanced systems in recent years – including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and what it claims are hypersonic glide vehicles.

The Nampo frigate’s design appears to incorporate vertical launch cells and phased-array radar systems, according to analysts, suggesting a leap in both offensive and defensive capabilities. Such features, if operationalized, would represent a significant upgrade over North Korea’s existing fleet, which has largely consisted of aging Soviet-era vessels and domestically produced corvettes and patrol boats.

Still, experts advise caution in assessing the platform’s future readiness. “Modern warships represent an integration challenge of communications, electronics, weapons, and both electronic and acoustic sensor technologies,” said Carl Schuster, a former U.S. Navy captain and maritime analyst based in Hawaii. “Almost any shipbuilder can construct the hull. The real challenge is the integration of systems.”

The cost of building and sustaining such a platform is also under scrutiny. South Korean lawmaker Kim Byung-kee, a member of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, recently questioned whether Pyongyang possesses the fiscal or logistical capacity to support the vessel post-launch, particularly in areas such as fuel, maintenance, and crew training.

Yet analysts warn against complacency. Retired ROK Navy Admiral Kim Duk-ki noted that North Korea’s strengthened ties with Russia – especially since the onset of the Ukraine war – may be providing Pyongyang with advanced missile technologies and integration expertise. He further cautioned that if the vessel is ultimately equipped with the hypersonic ballistic missile reportedly tested in January, it could be a “game changer” in the region’s naval power balance.

Schuster, after reviewing the latest imagery, estimates that the ship remains at least a year away from sea trials, citing the absence of superstructure elements, sensor arrays, and weapons systems.

While uncertainties remain about the vessel’s operational timeline and capabilities, it is clear that North Korea intends to join the ranks of nations capable of fielding larger, more versatile surface combatants, signaling a potential evolution in both strategy and posture in the Indo-Pacific.

North Korea Accelerates Naval Modernization Amid Hypersonic Ambitions, U.S. Command Warns
While North Korea’s naval fleet remains numerically significant, its qualitative shortcomings are drawing renewed attention amid Pyongyang’s escalating modernization efforts, spanning from new surface warships to advanced missile technologies, including hypersonic systems.

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2021 assessment, the Korean People’s Navy maintains an inventory of approximately 400 patrol combatants and 70 submarines. However, the bulk of these assets are considered outdated and limited in capability. Most vessels are small, aging platforms ill-suited for modern warfare beyond coastal defense roles.

Defense analyst Joseph Dempsey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes that North Korea’s fleet of principal surface combatants is essentially restricted to two Najin-class frigates, 1,600-ton platforms originating from the early 1970s. In a January analysis, Dempsey described the frigates as “obsolete,” illustrating the widening capability gap between North Korea’s surface forces and those of regional adversaries such as South Korea and the United States.

Nevertheless, under Kim Jong Un’s directive, Pyongyang is pressing forward with an aggressive naval modernization strategy. In addition to the under-construction 140-meter guided-missile frigate at Nampo shipyard (believed to be the largest surface combatant ever developed by North Korea) new assets are reportedly in progress at multiple shipyards.

South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-won confirmed that work is also underway on a nuclear-powered submarine in Sinpo and a possible second frigate or destroyer in Chongjin. These developments signal a strategic pivot toward expanding blue-water operational potential and deterrence posture beyond North Korea’s traditional littoral constraints.

Kim has also overseen preparations for a new naval port to accommodate these larger warships.

Simultaneously, U.S. military officials are voicing growing concern over Pyongyang’s accelerating missile programs. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing this week, U.S. Forces Korea commander General Xavier T. Brunson stated that North Korea is likely to develop both hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) within the next year.

“In the coming year, we expect [North Korea] to further develop hypersonic and multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle capabilities to complete their government’s goals,” Gen. Brunson told lawmakers, underscoring the regime’s ongoing commitment to expanding its strategic strike options despite increasing international isolation.

To date, North Korea has launched over 47 ballistic missiles while intensifying research and development on both cruise and hypersonic glide vehicle technologies. This rapid progress is believed to be supported, in part, by renewed military-industrial cooperation with Russia, as Pyongyang shifts its strategic doctrine away from unification and toward permanent sovereignty.

He further emphasized the strategic deterrence role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK): “What USFK provides is the potential to impose cost in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to impose cost in the West Sea to China, and to continue to deter against North Korea as it currently stands.”

North Korea’s Military Behavior

At the dawn of 2024, Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing doctrine of peaceful reunification rooted in Korean nationalism and instead introduced a two-state theory – effectively signaling a strategic and ideological rupture with South Korea. This shift laid the groundwork for a more aggressive military posture. Throughout the year, North Korea continued its belligerent approach, blending high-profile strategic provocations with lower-intensity hostilities. Yet, despite expectations of a heightened military campaign, the intensity of provocations remained relatively restrained.

In the first half of the year, Pyongyang carried out a series of strategic weapon tests. However, as the year progressed, its focus pivoted to low-intensity activities targeting South Korea, while simultaneously deepening its military involvement in the Ukraine war. This transition suggests that from mid-2024 onwards, North Korea has strategically opted to maintain a calibrated level of tension through persistent, low-level provocations, rather than triggering outright escalation.

In total, North Korea conducted 22 tests and training launches involving strategic weapons in 2024. Of these, a striking 81% were centered on tactical nuclear delivery systems – underscoring a persistent focus on enhancing battlefield nuclear capabilities. Key developments included the unveiling of two hypersonic medium-range ballistic missiles, notably the Hwasong-16n, and the Hwasong-19, a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, Pyongyang’s effort to validate its ICBM capabilities through a satellite reconnaissance launch faltered, particularly following a failed launch in May 2024.

Compared to 2023, the frequency of strategic provocations dropped, but North Korea pivoted toward the operational deployment of nuclear systems and actively demonstrated its capacity for nuclear weapon mass production. Missile launch vehicles and uranium enrichment facilities were deployed in a way that showcased not just technological advancement but battlefield readiness.

The regime continued to weaponize the gray zone – executing provocations that stop short of conventional warfare. From dispersing “sewage balloons” across the border to jamming GPS signals and broadcasting propaganda, North Korea sustained a campaign of asymmetric disruption. Infrastructure sabotage, including the destruction of inter-Korean roads, railways, and power lines, further heightened tensions along the border. These acts, while aggressive, appear to reflect a broader strategy of reinforcing domestic defenses rather than triggering full-scale conflict.

This deliberate use of low-intensity measures appears to be a calculated effort to conserve resources while maintaining adversarial pressure, setting the stage for a potential escalation in 2025. This strategic buildup has been buoyed by deepening North Korea-Russia relations.

On June 19, 2024, Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a sweeping strategic partnership agreement. By October, the alliance had evolved into a full-fledged military partnership, with Pyongyang dispatching an estimated 11,000 troops to support Russian operations in Ukraine. In return, North Korea is believed to have received advanced weapons, as well as nuclear and missile technologies, which could serve as the foundation for more audacious provocations in the near future.

Policy Implications for South Korea

As 2025 marks the final year of North Korea’s current five-year defense development plan, the 80th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party, and the beginning of the second term for Donald Trump, it is widely anticipated that Pyongyang will escalate its military activities against both South Korea and the United States.

This potential for heightened tensions mirrors the volatile climate of 2017, which ultimately transitioned into diplomatic engagement in 2018. It is likely that North Korea aims to replicate this tension-escalation-to-negotiation cycle to its advantage.

For the South Korean government, this scenario amid Trump administration presents layered challenges, although the current military posture remains stable, there is concern about the strength of the command structure during this transitional period.

Trump’s transactional approach to alliances suggests that demands for greater defense cost-sharing or a reduction in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could be a challenge. Should South Korean leadership hesitate in making swift and strategic decisions, the cohesion and effectiveness of the ROK-U.S. alliance could be undermined.

In light of this, it is imperative for Seoul and Washington to maintain a united and consistent front. North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine war introduces additional complexity that could factor into broader geopolitical negotiations, particularly as the Trump administration seeks a grand bargain to resolve the conflict.

Should this resolve falter, 2025 could end up being a strategic triumph for North Korea, one that shifts the regional balance and emboldens further authoritarian assertiveness.

The Canadian Army Is Falling Apart And Money Alone Can’t Fix It

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 12, 2025

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The Canadian Army Is Falling Apart And Money Alone Can’t Fix It

If there’s one point of agreement across Canada, and increasingly among its concerned allies, it’s the dismal state of the Canadian Army. But despite growing global threats and rising expectations, the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF biggest problem is not a shortage of money; in fact, as a recent Radio-Canada investigation reveals, it’s the inability to spend what it already has that’s dragging the military into deeper dysfunction.

Defence Minister Bill Blair in strong words described the CAF as being in a “death spiral” during the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence in March. It’s not hard to see why. The forces are currently short about 16,000 personnel. Critical procurement programs are behind schedule or indefinitely stalled. NATO continues to pressure Canada to meet the 2 percent of GDP defense spending target, but spending alone isn’t the cure.

From 2017 to 2026, Canada’s defense budget has surged by 70 percent, yet capability and preparedness have lagged dramatically behind.

A Procurement Machine That Moves at a Glacial Pace
Peel back the layers, and what emerges is a pattern of procurement paralysis. Programs stretch out over decades, with costs ballooning and deliverables shrinking. Frigates, submarines, and even basic tactical vehicles have all become sorry tales of bureaucratic overreach and poor execution.

Table of Contents

The Canadian Army’s artillery acquisition is a particularly sobering example: it took two decades to acquire just over 100 artillery pieces – while Russia lost over 1,500 in just two and a half years in Ukraine!

Thus, this reflects a deeply embedded dysfunction in how Canada plans, funds, and executes its defense strategy.

Billions Left Unused, Year After Year
More funding may sound like a solution, but according to Radio-Canada, “if tomorrow morning the Canadian government were to allocate $15 billion more annually to the Department of National Defence to meet its NATO commitments, the Canadian Forces wouldn’t know what to do with it.”

Unspent defense funds have surged. Since 2018-2019, annual underspending has ballooned from $500 million to $2.5 billion by 2021-2022, roughly 9.4% of the total defense budget. Go back further, and the numbers are even more confounding: in the decade before Trudeau came to power, nearly a quarter of the Department of National Defence’s procurement budget, over $7 billion, went untouched.

The 2017 defense policy paper, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” had promised a bold new chapter with $553 billion in additional spending over 20 years. But seven years later, many of those promises remain unfulfilled, and the gap between rhetoric and reality is only widening.

Why Can’t Canada Spend Its Defense Money?
Officially, the Department of National Defence says it adopts a “flexible funding model,” allowing for fluctuations in how projects are financed across years. But insiders paint a different picture. Chronic project mismanagement, an inability to meet timelines, and a shortfall of skilled personnel – both civilian and military – have created a toxic cycle. As a result, funds go unspent, projects go unfulfilled, and Canada falls further behind its allies in strategic readiness.

A Department Stagnant While the World Moves Forward
Between 2010 and 2023, Canada’s federal public service workforce grew by 26%, yet the Department of National Defence (DND) experienced almost no growth in staffing, only a marginal 0.2% increase. This comes despite an overwhelming surge in the scope of projects aimed at modernizing Canada’s defense capabilities, including the acquisition of planes, helicopters, tanks, and ships. As one source close to the department’s budget process bluntly stated to Radio-Canada, “We don’t lack projects or ideas for spending money; we’re just incapable of doing it.”

Procurement Problems, An Ongoing Struggle
The challenges surrounding defense procurement are not new, and they have become a point of contention across the political spectrum. Figures like federal ministers Jean-Yves Duclos and Bill Blair, opposition MPs such as James Bezan, and DND’s own annual plans all indicate the same issue – systemic inefficiencies that continue to plague the department.

Critics, including Bezan, argue that the Trudeau government’s defense policies have failed to deliver on their promises. He pointed out that the “Strong, Secure, Engaged” defense policy document, released under the Liberals’ leadership, was little more than a series of unfulfilled promises. According to Bezan, “They missed every marker set out in the original defense policy for defense spending, resulting in massive gaps in equipment and readiness. Trudeau has overspent in every department except our military, yet his government promised to cut almost $1 billion annually from the defense budget and allowed over $10 billion more to lapse over eight years.”

The Cost of Delays, A Decade of Inaction
Perhaps the most glaring example of the DND’s failure to meet its own deadlines is the delayed replacement of the Royal Navy’s destroyers and frigates. Announced in 2011 by the Harper government, this project was supposed to deliver 15 new combat ships, but thirteen years later, not a single ship has been built. Instead, Defense Minister Bill Blair’s recent visit to the Irving shipyard in Halifax to mark the “first steel cut” felt like a long-forgotten milestone. What was originally slated to cost $26 billion is now projected to run up a staggering $60 billion. And the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Yves Giroux, has estimated that the final price could balloon to over $80 billion, approximately $5.3 billion per ship.

Despite these massive cost overruns, the Trudeau government insisted that efforts to improve defense procurement were underway. In his speech at CANSEC 2024, Minister of Public Services and Procurement Jean-Yves Duclos stressed the government’s commitment to reforming the system. “Defense procurement can be a long and arduous process. We are undertaking a review of defense procurement to determine how we can accelerate the process. To achieve this transformation, we will need to challenge the status quo,” Duclos said.

The Army’s Struggles. Recruitment and Readiness
Meanwhile, the Canadian Army faces an array of challenges that further undermine its operational readiness. With a shortfall of over 16,000 personnel, compounded by poor living conditions and outdated recruitment efforts, the Army is struggling to maintain its strength. Its equipment gaps, including inadequate air defense systems and artillery, prevent Canada from integrating effectively with NATO allies or responding to emerging global threats.

Moreover, deficiencies in training and subpar infrastructure have compounded these challenges, damaging both morale and operational capacity. The need for systemic reform and significant political will has never been more urgent.

The Canadian Army is struggling with a series of interconnected crises that threaten its ability to recruit, retain, equip, and train personnel capable of addressing the evolving nature of warfare in the 2020s.

These challenges go beyond logistical and administrative inefficiencies; they strike at the very heart of the Army’s operational capacity, endangering Canada’s ability to defend itself and to contribute effectively to collective security alongside its allies.

Retention is a growing issue that adds to the problem. Many soldiers leave the service due to poor living conditions, limited opportunities for career progression, and the constant stress that comes with burnout. Housing shortages at major military bases, such as Petawawa and Edmonton, add to the financial strain felt by service members and their families.

For example, soldiers stationed at Petawawa report having to contend with rising local rent prices, forcing some to commute long distances or accept substandard on-base housing. These challenges not only contribute to high attrition but also damage morale, leaving the remaining personnel overburdened and demoralized.

Cultural and Societal Shifts Impacting Recruitment
Beyond these logistical challenges, changing societal attitudes towards military service present a growing hurdle. The military is increasingly viewed as out of touch by younger generations, and concerns over instability and insufficient support for veterans deter many from considering a career in the Armed Forces. Canada’s current recruitment strategies are struggling to connect with the aspirations of today’s youth, who often perceive military service as disconnected from their career goals.

In contrast to countries like the United States and Australia, which have built successful recruitment campaigns that illustrate military service as a path to career development—particularly in fields like science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)—Canada’s messaging lacks a clear, compelling narrative.

The country’s defense forces fail to promote their role in shaping national security and contributing to global peace in a way that resonates with modern priorities. If Canada hopes to reverse the decline in recruitment, it must reconsider its approach and craft a message that aligns more closely with the interests and values of younger Canadians.

Deficiencies in Equipment and Training
The Canadian Army’s challenges extend far beyond recruitment and retention issues only, encompassing critical deficiencies in equipment and training that render it increasingly ill-prepared for modern warfare. The military’s procurement system, burdened by persistent delays and budget overruns, has struggled to provide the tools required to meet evolving threats.

While Canada has made some upgrades to its fleet of Light Armoured Vehicles, these vehicles remain inadequate against adversaries armed with sophisticated technologies like drones and precision-guided munitions.

The Army’s arsenal also lacks crucial systems such as long-range artillery, advanced air defense systems, and unmanned aerial systems. These gaps are particularly concerning given the rapid pace of technological advancements in warfare. NATO allies, including Poland, have made substantial investments in modernizing their forces, including acquiring HIMARS artillery systems. Canada’s delays in procuring similar equipment underscore a dangerous complacency and a failure to keep pace with the threats of the 21st century.

During recent NATO exercises, Canadian forces struggled to integrate with allies equipped with advanced electronic warfare and drone systems, showing the operational risks posed by these technological shortcomings. While Canada’s contributions to NATO operations, such as the deployment of 800 troops to Latvia, are symbolically important, they lack the scale and sophistication needed to present a credible deterrent to Russian aggression. In contrast, Germany’s expanded deployment to Lithuania, which included cutting-edge combat vehicles and integrated air defense systems, illustrates the kind of technological commitment that Canada must strive to match.

The Unmet Promises of ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’
The Liberal government’s defense policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, was hailed as a transformative strategy that promised significant investments in defense. However, many of its key commitments remain unrealized. For instance, the procurement of new logistics trucks, which has been a pressing need for years, has faced continued delays. As a result, Canadian soldiers are still relying on aging vehicles ill-suited for modern operations. While acquisitions like Leopard 2 tanks are steps in the right direction, they do not compensate for decades of underinvestment in the Army’s capabilities.

Training Gaps and Modern Warfare
The Army’s training infrastructure has also failed to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of warfare. In modern conflicts, success increasingly depends on the integration of advanced technologies such as cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, and electronic warfare. Unfortunately, Canada’s training exercises remain focused on outdated paradigms that emphasize conventional warfare rather than adaptability and technological integration.

For example, while nations like the United Kingdom and the United States have already incorporated joint multi-domain operations into their training regimens, Canada’s approach remains rooted in traditional tactics. The recent Maple Resolve training exercise, though valuable for basic readiness, revealed significant gaps in Canada’s ability to simulate electronic warfare scenarios or counter-drone operations – domains that are becoming critical in high-intensity conflicts.

Substandard Living Conditions and Infrastructure
The Army’s operational challenges are compounded by inadequate housing and infrastructure, which further hinder its readiness and morale. Many soldiers are forced to live in substandard housing or face exorbitant rental prices near bases, placing unnecessary strain on their financial and emotional well-being. The lack of adequate facilities for training and medical care only adds to these burdens, creating an environment in which morale continues to deteriorate.

This neglect is more than just an oversight – it represents a breach of the social contract between the state and the service members it asks to defend the country. For example, reports from bases like CFB Edmonton highlight deteriorating barracks, plagued by issues such as mold and insufficient heating, symbolizing the government’s disregard for the welfare of its military personnel.

A Scattershot Deployment and Strategic Incoherence
The Canadian Army’s approach to deployment exemplifies its broader strategic incoherence. The decision to stretch limited resources across numerous missions dilutes their effectiveness and places undue strain on already overstretched personnel. A prime example of this is the deployment in Latvia, where a small contingent of troops, without the necessary logistical or technological support, highlights the perils of prioritizing quantity over quality. A more focused and strategic approach, such as reinforcing the Latvia deployment or reallocating resources to Arctic security, would better align with Canada’s strategic priorities.

The Arctic is a critical domain for Canadian sovereignty and national security, yet the lack of investment in key capabilities, such as icebreakers, surveillance systems, and mobility platforms, has left Canada vulnerable. As competitors like Russia and China increasingly eye the Arctic for resource development, Canada’s absence of a robust security presence in the region puts its interests at risk. The recent announcement of Chinese interest in Arctic resource development underscores the urgency of strengthening Canada’s presence and capabilities in this domain.

Political Will. A Key Ingredient for Change
None of these reforms can succeed without strong political will. The Trudeau government demonstrated little inclination to tackle these challenges, favoring symbolic gestures over real change. The present government might provide the political leadership required to confront these issues head-on, assuming that defense becomes a core policy priority. However, even under new leadership, the path to recovery will be difficult. The depth of the systemic problems within the Army demands long-term planning, consistent investment, and a cultural shift within the military to embrace innovation and adaptability.

While recent speeches suggest the possibility of reform, action must follow words to revitalize the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and fulfill its national and international commitments. These include contributions to NATO and ensuring that Canadian forces are ready for high-intensity conflicts. The war in Ukraine has shown the need for decisive national leadership and a unified commitment to defense, qualities that have often been lacking in Canadian governance, bureaucracy, and public opinion.

The conflict in Ukraine also indicates the importance of military equipment suited to high-intensity, mobile warfare, and the need for such equipment in substantial quantities. The war of attrition is back, as evidenced by the staggering losses of Russian military equipment – nearly 9,900 pieces of military gear, including 2,400 trucks, 2,200 infantry fighting vehicles, and 1,900 tanks. Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations have also resulted in significant equipment losses. The human cost of this conflict has been staggering, with estimates of over 500,000 dead and wounded on the Ukrainian side alone.

Steve Saideman, Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, points to one of the critical issues in this modern conflict: how can Canada prioritize quantity in an era where procurement strategies have focused on acquiring top-tier equipment capable of serving multiple roles? This shift, Saideman argues, may be incompatible with the high-intensity warfare Canada would face in a conflict with China or Russia. In his words, “I just don’t see Canada having that capacity. If we got into a serious shooting match with either China or Russia, we’d lose ships, and that would require replacement faster than the replacement ships that we’ve been doing right now.”

The Last Bit, A National Will to Adapt
For Canada to meet the challenges of the 21st century, there must be a firm national will and political conviction to adapt to these new realities. Military historian Sean Maloney asserts that this will is critical: “It is absolutely fundamental to any effort that you’re talking about. And it does not exist in this country, either at the elected political level, in the bureaucracy, or the population.” The Canadian military possesses resources, but it lacks the ability to deploy them effectively. The road to recovery will not be easy, it will require reforming processes, fostering innovation, and rebuilding national resolve.

Whether Canada can make these changes in time to meet the rapidly evolving security challenges of the 21st century remains uncertain, but the need for decisive action has never been clearer.

Saudi Arabia’s Careful Stance On The Syrian Kurds. Walking The Tightrope Between Strategy And Stability

Flashpoints

Consulting Editor

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April 11, 2025

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Saudi Arabia’s Careful Stance On The Syrian Kurds. Walking The Tightrope Between Strategy And Stability

Saudi Arabia has never been one to embrace uprisings or revolutions – it prefers order, predictability, and a conservative political approach. But the mess in Syria has turned into a geopolitical puzzle that Riyadh can’t afford to ignore. And when it comes to the Syrian Kurds, the kingdom finds itself treading a fine line between seizing an opportunity and steering clear of potential chaos.

Backing Kurdish autonomy might give Saudi Arabia a useful card to play against Iran, whose influence in Syria remains strong. But there’s a catch, such support could fracture Syria further. If the Kurds push for federalism, it could weaken Syria’s Arab identity and open the door to broader regional instability. In short, what looks like a smart move on the chessboard could quickly spiral into a diplomatic headache.

As of early 2025, things in Syria are still far from calm. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has taken control of Damascus and about a third of the country. Saudi Arabia is now dealing with an interim Syrian government led by Ahmed Al Shara – an administration that’s under sanctions from the EU, U.S., and UN, and one that hasn’t exactly united the opposition forces under one flag.

To make matters worse, the temporary constitution, which puts Islamic law at the heart of legislation, has stirred unrest among minorities. HTS’s violent crackdown on Alawites and Druze, leaving hundreds dead, has only deepened the divides. Syria, already devastated by over a decade of conflict, is now also battling extreme poverty. Around 16.5 million Syrians are dependent on humanitarian aid this year.

Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze groups have been protesting the interim government’s failure to address minority rights. Turkish military operations and strikes from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army have also targeted Kurdish areas, displacing over a million people and causing significant casualties among civilians and fighters alike.

This all paints a grim picture for Syria’s future – and complicates things for Saudi Arabia. With clashes erupting between the interim government, the Kurds, opposition factions, Alawites, and even the occasional Israeli strike in the south, Riyadh is approaching the situation with measured caution.

Rather than rushing into alliances or bold political statements, Saudi Arabia is keeping a close eye on how things unfold, especially regarding the Kurds. It’s a watch-and-wait strategy, one that seeks to maintain regional balance without getting dragged into Syria’s internal storm.

Saudi Arabia’s Policy Towards Syria, Stability First, Politics Later

When it comes to the new Syria, Saudi Arabia is playing it safe and smart. Its approach is all about promoting stability, ensuring security, and keeping Islamist groups at bay. Riyadh isn’t interested in ideological experiments or revolutions, it wants a Syria that’s functional, Arab, and no longer a launchpad for anti-Israel rhetoric.

Riyadh is also keeping a close eye on Türkiye and Qatar – two regional players with deep stakes in Syria’s future. For Saudi Arabia, bringing Syria back into the Arab fold is a top priority. This includes nudging Damascus away from its past nationalist, anti-Israel stance and toward a more pragmatic, Arab-centered identity.

One thing Saudi Arabia is definitely happy about?

Iran losing its grip on Syrian politics. The idea of a Syria without Iranian boots on the ground is music to Riyadh’s ears. Going forward, Saudi policy will likely focus on three main pillars: ensuring Syria stays Arab, promoting an inclusive government (with space for Kurds and other minorities), and solving the thorny issue of Captagon smuggling, which has become a serious concern for Saudi society and national security.

Cautious Engagement with the Kurds
On the Kurdish question, Saudi Arabia is cautiously watching from the sidelines. It hasn’t taken a firm position yet, and for good reason.

Three big concerns are driving this wait-and-see approach –

Political Islam: Saudi Arabia is strongly opposed to political Islam, and groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—now controlling a third of Syria—are seen as potential destabilizers.

Rivalries with Türkiye: Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria directly threatens Saudi Arabia’s interests in the region. Ankara’s hostility toward the Kurds complicates things even further.

Fragmentation Fears: With so many players involved and so much ground already fractured, Saudi Arabia worries that Kurdish autonomy could deepen the divide and make a united Syria a pipe dream.

Interestingly, Saudi Arabia doesn’t have a Kurdish minority of its own, so it doesn’t carry any internal baggage around Kurdish rights. Its overall stance is to respect minority rights but keep national unity intact. When clashes arise between regional powers and the Kurds, Saudi Arabia usually opts for quiet diplomacy rather than dramatic interventions.

The Israel Factor- Complicating the Kurdish Equation
Then there’s Israel – a wildcard in the Syrian drama. After Assad’s fall, Israel wasted no time ramping up its activities in Syria. Tel Aviv occupied buffer zones in the Golan Heights and launched hundreds of airstrikes, crippling 70–80% of Syria’s strategic military assets. On top of that, Netanyahu pledged to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights – a move that sent a clear signal about Israel’s long-term plans.

Israel has also shown consistent support for Kurdish autonomy, having backed the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. It sees the Kurds and other minorities like the Druze as potential partners in keeping Syria weak, fragmented, and non-threatening to Israeli interests. This strategy echoes Israel’s old “Alliance of the Periphery” doctrine from the 1950s, building relationships with non-Arab or minority groups to counterbalance surrounding Arab nations.

Saudi Arabia isn’t thrilled about this. Israeli support for Kurdish autonomy could encourage more fragmentation in Syria, making it harder for Riyadh to push its vision of an Arab, stable, and united Syrian state. The Kingdom fears that Israel’s influence – especially its recent moves to defend Druze communities like in the Jaramana incident – could disrupt the regional balance and indirectly empower minority-led separatism.

A month before Assad’s fall, Israeli Minister Gideon Sa’ar openly said that Israel should build ties with the Kurds and Druze, calling them “natural allies.” For Riyadh, this kind of rhetoric is a red flag. It complicates Saudi goals in Syria and adds yet another layer to the already tangled web of alliances and rivalries in the region.

Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Kurdish-Israeli Equation, A Delicate Balance of Power
While Israel promotes the idea of a demilitarized buffer zone in southern Syria, there are whispers in regional policy circles about a more ambitious plan – what some call a potential “David’s Corridor.” This hypothetical corridor would link the Druze communities in southern Syria with the Kurdish forces in the northeast, creating a chain of minority alliances under quiet Israeli patronage. But geopolitical reality is rarely that neat.

A recent peace agreement between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Shara, leader of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has effectively derailed any plans for such a corridor, at least for now. Even so, Kurdish opposition to the temporary Syrian constitution, which significantly limits their hopes for autonomy or independence, means that cooperation with Israel, or other external actors, remains very much on the table in the future.

Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, Amichai Chikli, made Tel Aviv’s intentions clear when he posted on X:

“Israel will act to protect the Druze minority in areas near its border, and efforts must be made to defend all minority populations in Syria, with an emphasis on the Kurds, from the jihadist genocide of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.”

This statement illustrates Israel’s evolving strategy – build influence by projecting itself as a protector of vulnerable minorities within Syria’s fractured society.

Riyadh’s Calculated Watch on Kurdish-Israeli Relations
For Saudi Arabia, this emerging triangle between Israel, the Kurds, and the Druze is a strategic puzzle. While Riyadh wants stability in Syria, it remains deeply wary of the Kurds’ historical affinity with Israel, an alliance that has earned the Kurds the reputation of being a “second Israel” in the region.

Saudi Arabia will be watching closely how the Kurds engage with foreign powers, particularly Israel. The fear isn’t just about Kurdish aspirations; it’s about the potential of a precedent, a model of minority-led governance backed by Western powers that could inspire other fragmentation in Arab nations. Riyadh’s skepticism stems from a deep concern: that Kurdish-Israeli cooperation could give rise to a more permanent political and military alignment, one which Saudi Arabia does not control and that might challenge its influence in the Levant.

Israel, meanwhile, is already extending support to the Druze in southern Syria, through publicized aid programs for the 50,000 Druze near the Israeli border and the half-million residents in the Jabal al-Druze region in As-Suwayda. Reports suggest that Druze are being allowed to work in Israel, a move with significant long-term implications. Such initiatives not only strengthen Israel’s soft power but could be replicated with the Kurds, laying the groundwork for deeper strategic ties.

The concern in Riyadh is that these social and economic overtures could eventually translate into a formalized political relationship between Israel and the Syrian Kurds – complete with intelligence sharing, military training, and even advanced technology transfers, either directly or through Western intermediaries. Saudi Arabia is under no illusion about Israel’s ability to quietly shape regional dynamics and Tel Aviv’s growing comfort with backchannel diplomacy makes this prospect all the more plausible.

The United States
The American military footprint in Syria, especially its roughly 2,000 troops based in Al-Tanf and other eastern strongholds, remains a cornerstone of the anti-ISIS strategy. U.S. forces continue to work closely with Kurdish militias like the SDF and AANES, providing them not only military hardware and training but also international legitimacy.

For Saudi Arabia, this presence is both a blessing and a curse.

On the one hand, the U.S. acts as a powerful counterweight to Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, a web of proxies stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean. The American presence helps disrupt the infamous “Shiite Crescent” and prevents Iran from consolidating control over Syria’s strategic infrastructure.

But on the other hand, this alignment complicates Riyadh’s long-term interests. The Saudi objective is to maintain Syria’s Arab identity and territorial unity. Yet the U.S. backing of Kurdish semi-autonomy, however informal, risks institutionalizing Syria’s fragmentation. That’s a dangerous precedent, not just for Syria, but for the broader Arab world.

Türkiye, The Spoiler in the Room
More complexity comes from Türkiye. Ankara views the SDF and YPG as affiliates of the PKK, a designated terrorist organization in Türkiye and the U.S. Despite that designation, the U.S. continues to support these groups due to their effectiveness in fighting ISIS.

This puts Washington in an awkward position – caught between its NATO ally Türkiye and its local Kurdish partners. For Saudi Arabia, this U.S.-Türkiye tension is a double-edged sword. While it curbs Ankara’s ambition to dominate northern Syria, it also injects more uncertainty into an already volatile region.

Türkiye’s aggression toward Kurdish groups means that Riyadh must tread carefully. While the Kingdom doesn’t oppose Kurdish rights, it strongly opposes a scenario where Kurdish empowerment leads to the Balkanization of Syria – a scenario that could embolden other minority-led secessionist movements across the region.

Oil, Gas, and the Real Stakes
Much of this geopolitical tug-of-war comes down to resources. About 70% of Syria’s oil and gas fields lie in Kurdish-controlled areas. Former President Donald Trump was unusually blunt when he declared that the U.S. was staying in Syria “for the oil.” This open admission raised eyebrows in Riyadh, where energy geopolitics are always high on the agenda.

Saudi Arabia’s interest isn’t to control Syrian oil, but to ensure that it benefits a unified Syrian state, not splinter factions or separatist governments. A U.S. policy that prioritizes Kurdish autonomy, especially if backed by Israel, could push Saudi Arabia to reassess its alignment, perhaps even tolerating Türkiye’s growing influence as the lesser evil.

In fact, Trump’s rhetoric suggested a certain sympathy for Ankara’s moves in Syria, even when they came at the Kurds’ expense. Should the U.S. scale back its engagement under an “America First” doctrine, Türkiye may step in to fill the vacuum. For Riyadh, the choice may come down to accepting Turkish dominance over the Kurdish northeast or watching Syria slide into further division.

The Kurds as a Tool to Pressure Rivals

The Kurds have pursued an active and inclusive foreign policy, engaging with a broad range of actors, including Israel. This strategic openness has increasingly made Kurdish groups a useful geopolitical lever for regional powers. Among those, Saudi Arabia has sought to capitalize on Kurdish influence to pressure its primary rivals, particularly Iran and Türkiye.

Following setbacks in Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon on October 7, Iran has been attempting to regain its foothold in Syria. Turkish media has claimed that Tehran made a failed attempt to supply drones to Syrian Kurds — a move that was criticized by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during a February 26 interview.

Interestingly, the very tools Iran uses to gain influence in Syria can also be employed against it. Saudi Arabia has increasingly used soft power, financial aid, and investment to build leverage in Kurdish regions. Its involvement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) 2017 independence referendum raised eyebrows, suggesting Riyadh was maneuvering to counter both Iranian and Turkish ambitions.

Retired Saudi General Anwar Eshki once advocated for the creation of a “Greater Kurdistan” through peaceful means, arguing that such a development would curtail the expansionist aspirations of Türkiye, Iran, and Iraq. This drew sharp reactions from Tehran. In November 2016, General Rahim Safavi, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, accused the Saudi consulate in the KRI of providing arms to “counter-revolutionary groups.”

Such actions reflect Riyadh’s calculated approach: if Iran expands its influence among Syrian Kurds, Saudi Arabia is ready to clip its wings through diplomatic and financial channels.

This same strategic lens also applies to Türkiye. During Türkiye’s third military operation in northern Syria – “Operation Peace Spring” launched on October 9, 2019 – Saudi Arabia and the Arab League condemned Ankara’s actions and reiterated support for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. President Erdogan sharply responded, stating, “Saudi Arabia should look in the mirror,” alluding to its intervention in Yemen.

Throughout Türkiye’s military campaigns in northern Syria, Saudi Arabia has been quietly supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), composed largely of Kurdish fighters, and building ties with Arab tribes in the region. In 2019, Riyadh reportedly provided $100 million to the SDF and affiliated Arab groups to maintain cohesion and resist Turkish advances. Saudi Minister of State Thamer Al-Sabhan visited SDF-controlled areas in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa in June 2019, followed by an SDF delegation’s trip to Saudi Arabia later that November.

Through this outreach, Riyadh sought to entrench itself as a stakeholder in northern Syria, bolster local resistance against Turkish incursions, and assert influence over the future of Syrian Kurdish autonomy.

The Last Bit

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the Syrian Kurds presents both strategic opportunities and risks. Riyadh views the U.S. military presence in Syria as a bulwark against Iran’s regional network, the so-called “Shiite Crescent” — stretching from Tehran to Beirut. The U.S. role also helps offset Turkish attempts to sideline the Kurds from Syria’s political future, providing Riyadh an avenue to shape the post-Assad landscape.

Beyond geopolitics, Kurdish-held territories, particularly in oil-rich northeastern Syria, offer economic incentives. Gaining influence there could give Saudi Arabia a stake in Syria’s reconstruction and energy wealth.

However, Riyadh must tread carefully. Supporting Kurdish autonomy risks igniting nationalist sentiments closer to home, particularly among Saudi Arabia’s own marginalized communities. Additionally, Riyadh’s tightrope walk is complicated by its ties with Israel and the U.S., both of whom have their own interests in Kurdish regions.

Israeli support for Kurdish independence, while strategically aligned with Saudi aims to weaken Iran, could inadvertently trigger broader regional fragmentation – undermining Saudi Arabia’s long-term goals.

Furthermore, the U.S. presence in Kurdish-controlled zones, though advantageous, forces Saudi Arabia into a complex game of balancing alliances — aiding the Kurds without provoking Ankara too aggressively or appearing overly aligned with Israeli agendas.

In this chessboard of shifting loyalties and tactical alignments, Saudi Arabia’s use of the Kurds as a geopolitical tool might yield short-term dividends but it is a delicate strategy that risks blowback if not managed with subtlety and foresight.

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