By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

A significant paradigm shift is occurring in how Israelis view their enemies in the region, as the forces in the Middle East are yet to realign the balance of power. Since the past decades Iran has been holding the limelight as a threat to the Israel state; a tom open country with possibilities of attaining nuclear weapons whilst having a long track record of close associations to terrorists like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, in the new reality since 2023, the new player is gaining increasing importance: Türkiye. Türkiye was a good partner of W.T.E. that addressed many regional problems in the past, but is currently considered more as a potential adversary by Jerusalem’s defence-related circles. Is Türkiye the new big menace to Israel in the wake of Iran?

New Strategic Emphasis- The Post-Iran

In addition to the consequences of the catastrophic war that took place between Iran and Israel in the years 20232025, commonly referred to as the Second Shadow War, the region started losing a significant portion of the Iranian strength. Its economy was in a shambolic position due to sanctions, but it was even worse after sanctions, when it was isolated internationally. The war has not only disarmed Iran as far as the nuclear structure is concerned, but it has also reduced its operations in Syria and Lebanon in the region. This shift left a new geopolitical vacuum around, and with it, Türkiye quickly crowded into that vacuum.

Iran has been restricted about its direct attack on Israel, and this does not warrant Israel to reduce its defence. Instead, there is attention to the indiscreet yet violent encounter of Türkiye, the amassing of might, the vigorizing of diplomatic enterprise, and the enmity of the ideologies of Israel.

Military Expansion of Türkiye in Syria

The increasing presence of Turks in Syria in military terms has been one of the most disturbing tendencies to Israel. As the Assad regime crumbled, Türkiye was not afraid of establishing a presence in the northern part of the country. Türkiye gained influence in keeping the Syrian National Army (SNA) at its northern border, which consists of breakaway Syrian rebels who have allied with Türkiye.

Türkiye now has several military bases in Syria in the North. These include training and arming rebels and funding rebels, some of whom have strong anti-Israel ideology owing to their geographical region of operation. The presence of militias that are affiliated with Türkiye on its northern border is very problematic for Israel. By attempting to establish immediate order and dispatch its troops there, instead of Iran sending its proxies (Hezbollah, for example), Türkiye is not the same kind of threat, though perhaps more erratic.

Ideological War of Erdogan against Israel

President Erdogan is in the spotlight on various occasions over his provocative speeches against Israel. He has called Israeli leaders Nazis, the Gaza war a genocide, and Türkiye the protector of Jerusalem. He states not only politically expedient things, but there is more to the fact that there is an ideological divide.

By acting on this position under Erdogan, Türkiye will have become an Islamist populist and will have become the guardian of the Muslim identity and values. In this narration, Israel is depicted as a colonial distributor and an Islamic antagonist. This is not exclusive to speeches, as this attitude to the world can be seen in the way foreign policy is made and conducted in Türkiye with respect to foreign relations and policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, had been pursuing the option of working with Israel, whereas in Türkiye, the trend has been on heightening alliances against Israel.

Hamas: A Turkish Red Line to Israeli Dependence

The Hamas supported by Ankara is, perhaps, one of the most open spheres of the conflict between Türkiye and Israel. Whereas most other Sunni majority countries have distanced themselves from the Palestinian militant group, Türkiye has gone a step further and embraced the head of Hamas, providing him with refuge and financial support as well as Turkish citizenship in certain cases.

Hamas officials have been caught in photos with their high-end connections in Ankara. Türkiye has been reported to allow the operation of the financial network and the crowdfunding of Hamas in Turkish territory. This was a warning sign to Tel Aviv, especially following the 2024 rocket attacks from Gaza, which, they assert, were preplanned with the assistance of Turkish-based agents.

In the case of Türkiye, it holds deep affiliations with Hamas to Israel as the ultimate diplomatic insult that, in turn, constitutes a national security risk to the country. Cooperation in the region is a hard-hitting issue because although the U.S and the EU have categorized Hamas as a terrorist organization, Türkiye considers Hamas as a resistance movement and is not ready to declare it as a terrorist organization.

Binding the Horns of the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye Major Battle Groups: Türkiye is experiencing a naval building spree, which encompasses the acquisition of six large-scale battle ships, besides establishing a submarine factory.

Another area of serious conflict in the region has been the Eastern Mediterranean since Israel possesses a lot of natural gas. The hostile maritime policies of Türkiye, especially the Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan), pose a threat to Cyprus and Greece and have an impact on the rights of Israel regarding energy exploration.

Tight security in disputed seas has also seen Türkiye deploy warships and research vessels into exploration areas where it claims maritime rights that overlap with areas of interest claimed by Israel as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Israeli leaders fear that Tk could try to scuttle offshore-gas pipelines or drilling operations, most of which involve Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot players.

In 2025, there was a tense maritime showdown when a Turkish warship trailed an Israeli exploration vessel in the Leviathan gas field. This implication was followed with no shot; the message was clear: Türkiye is ready to apply its power over water even when it will aggravate the condition in the region by the use of regional war.

The Drone Force of Türkiye: An Increasing Menace

The air superiority in the region has remained that of Israel, but the defence industry of Türkiye is quickly catching up. The drone program, spearheaded by firms such as Baykar (owned by the family of Erdoğan), has resulted in the creation of highly capable drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci, which have found good success on battlefields in Libya, Syria, and the Caucasus.

Not only are these the combat-tested drones, but they are also massively exported. Türkiye has been exporting drones to some countries, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Qatar, gaining strategic goodwill and military profit. The Turkish drones in hypothetical future warfare are likely to compete with Israeli superiority in surveillance and precision targeting, especially in war-torn countries such as Syria and the Mediterranean.

Israel, considering this, has begun stepping up counter-drone technology and cyber-defences. Nevertheless, the gap in technology continues to become smaller, and Türkiye’s dreams of entering drone warfare are one of the crucial issues to be worried about.

The Global Islamist Diplomacy of Türkiye

In addition to military and energy conflicts, Türkiye is diplomatically on military and energy fronts to sabotage Israel in the world arena. It has been conducting militant initiatives in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), painting Israel as a rogue state accused of war crimes.

Since the United Nations and International Criminal Court are considered to be the halls of the Global North, Türkiye is also standing up for the rights of the Palestinians and other Global South issues. It employs religious diplomacy, creating mosques, Islamic schools, and investing in cultural institutions to create goodwill where Israel is unrepresented to a large degree.

Taking advantage of such ideology, Türkiye is also deploying its ideological scope to the Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia, and creating narratives that on many occasions present Israel as a plunderer. Such a hearts and minds strategy contributes another level of psychological and diplomatic warfare in the Turkish challenge to Israel.

NATO Paradox: The Western Shield of Türkiye

Türkiye, unlike Iran, is a member of the NATO, which complicates an altercation. The alliance technically requires Türkiye to operate in tandem with the Western powers; however, the acts of Erdoğan have been ones where he has done such actions individually by purchasing Russian S-400 missile systems, countering the U.S policies in Syria, and being a threat to the integrity of NATO.

In the case of Israel, this entails that a blatant confrontation with Türkiye may split the unity of NATO and potentially bring Türkiye closer to Russia or China. Though the West has been quiet about the regional action of Türkiye, it has never really imposed significant sanctions on it due to its strategic position and NATO member status.

Such geopolitical positioning is providing Türkiye with greater diplomatic agility than Iran has ever had, and one far more formidable in matters of grey-zone warfare, hybrid conflict, and geopolitical domination.

Internal Fragility: A Weak Point of Türkiye?

Declaring its bold steps, Türkiye does have its weak points. Its economy is shaky with high rates of inflation, a depreciating currency, and a debt burden. Erdoğan is increasingly challenged in Türkiye, where he is opposed by urban secular voters, as well as by the younger generation. Elections are still held, and at certain times, the opposition has gained substantial ground.

Israel can exploit this internal weakness to include in a non-military containment approach: building relationships with Turkish civil society, promoting moderate voices, and combating the anti-Israel propaganda, via media diplomacy.

Moreover, the Turkish desire to do more than they are doing can often take place. It occupies military bases in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Azerbaijan at a time when its military and treasury are strained. Israel is still able to isolate Türkiye on a diplomatic level without necessarily going to open conflict, without weakening its regional alliances.

Not an Existential Threat; however, it is a Competitive Threat

Türkiye is not Iran, at least not yet. It is neither nuclear nor aspirational, and its danger is ideological, regional, and hybrid but not existential. But it is proving to have strong strategic capabilities, the capabilities of a competitor that is attempting to challenge Israel on various levels, at military, at diplomatic, at economic, and even at ideological levels.

Israel needs to take a future path that requires a reshaping strategy. The development of more robust regional coalitions (particularly with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Gulf countries), as well as investments in naval and cyber capabilities and in controlling the influence of Türkiye through a policy towards it via soft power, are critical junctures.

The rise of Türkiye should not be ignored. However, maximum confrontation is put on it, as in the case of Iran, it can also backfire. The assignment is: to balance somewhere in between: to curb the aspirations of Türkiye, but also, on the other hand, not to run headlong with it end to end, destabilizing even further the region.

About the Author

Shreya Dabral is pursuing her Master’s in Mass Communication from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. She balances her academic journey with active roles in research and digital media. Her research paper on consumer repurchase behaviour in the skincare industry, published in the International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Trends (IJSRET), is a testament to her curiosity, clarity, and commitment to exploring audience-brand dynamics in a digital age.

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By: Prof. Bawa Singh & Vishnu Agrawal

As early 2025, the US and China’s trade war was reached to its inflicting point. In one step, the Trump administration has imposed a universal 10% tariff on most of  countries. China was the worst affected country, whereon Trump ratcheted tariffs on goods up to 145%. In reciprocation, China slapped tariffs as high as 125% on the US goods along with restricting rare-earth shipments vital to the latter’s tech and defense supply chains. Originally, Trump’s tariff blitz was started in 2018, whereby he targeted roughly $360 billion of Chinese imports at a 25% rate. It provoked  Beijing to retaliate against $110 billion of U.S. goods with duties averaging 20–25%. After a brief spell of downturn, China’s exports rebounded by late 2019, demonstrated  its ability to weather external shocks and sustain its export engine.

Given the US blockage of China in its largest market, the latter doubled down on what is being characterized as the “Southward Shift.” China started getting diversified market options and started getting engaged with the Asian, African and Latin American countries. Resultantly, its exports to ASEAN countries increased from 11% in 2017 to 16% in 2023. It was  reported by the World Bank, that the increment was propelled by preferential tariff schedules and the rise of regional manufacturing hubs. For the period of January -July, the trade between China and EU has reached 3.35 trillion yuan ($465.3 billion). It shows 3.9% year-on-year growth making up 13% of China’s total foreign trade. Increasing trade with Germany @ 4.3% ($119.7 billion); France @ 2.7% ($46.53 billion); the Netherlands @ 1.5% ($63.40 billion) has reflected the resilient economic ties amidst the ongoing trade war. On the other hand, engagements with Belt and Road Initiative partner countries in Africa and Eurasia have woven dozens of developing countries into China’s economic orbit.

Notwithstanding of the US liberal policies, the US stepped back from the multilateral trade deals. The geo-economic vacuum created by the US trade war, was seized by Beijing. In September 2021, China applied for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). It was a signal on part of China, of its  readiness to embrace high-standard rules of market access, labour rights, and environmental protections (New Zealand MFAT). Similarly, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in January 2022. The same created a tariff-free corridor among the 15 Asia-Pacific economies. It accounted for 30% of global GDP. It created geo-economic space for China  and cemented China’s leadership in regional commerce (ASEAN Secretariat).

In order to overcome the impacts of tariffs at the home front, President Xi Jinping implemented the strategy of “Dual Circulation Economy.” This strategy turbocharged the domestic demands to remain neutralized from the serious impacts by reducing reliance on changing and volatile geo-economic world. This strategy reduced taxes, provided rural credit facilities and hefty subsidies for green infrastructure and tech start-ups. It increased the  household consumption’s share of GDP that rose from 38% in 2017 to 44% in 2024 (National Bureau of Statistics). The services sector now accounts for over 53% of GDP, reflecting a structural pivot toward a consumer-led economy that can absorb external shocks.

China has been taking steps to protect its financial system to overcome the challenges on part of Trump’s regime. It has signed agreements with more than 40 central banks of other countries to swap currencies, providing them access to fund of about $600 billion (People’s Bank of China), if those countries needed. China has also been expanding its new digital yuan for international payments. The same was started with trials in Hong Kong and Thailand  (PBoC Digital Currency Research) along with Europe and Asia. By the mid of 2024, it had sold $80 billion worth of bonds in these regions.

In order to curb the Chinese capacity of manufacturing semiconductor, the US has imposed a very steep tariffs. Tech Insights has reported that notwithstanding these challenges, Chinese capacity is set to expand from 631 million square inches (MSI) in 2024 to 875 MSI by 2029. It was propelled by Chinese significant investment in 12-inch fabs for advanced chip production. China has prioritized internal demands while strategically directed the surplus to select export markets. China has encountered the impacts of the US tariffs, which was recently doubled from 25% to 50%. This approach enabled China to sustain its growth along with navigating the tariff challenges, and potentially maintaining a competitive influence in the global semiconductor supply chain.

At last, it is concluded that Trump’s trade war was aimed to cripple the Chinese economy, ironically the same had left catalyst impacts on the latter’s economy. By facing the steep tariffs, Chinese leadership has diversified its market outreach through the geo-economic strategy like “Southward Shift,” by deepening economic ties with regions like Asia, Africa, and the EU. The multilateral trade deal like RCEP has neutralized the impacts of steep tariffs. Concurrently, the “dual circulation” strategy at home front, further boosted production, consumption and services, insulating the economy from external economic shocks. Financially, it has expanded currency swaps along with digital yuan trials. These adaptive measures have transformed a punitive trade war into a Chinese strategic opportunity, positioned per se as a resilient, diversified, and increasingly influential player in the global economic order.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

The South China Sea, situated in the southern part of the Chinese mainland, is also bordered by countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The countries have bickered over territorial control in the sea for centuries, but in recent years tensions have soared to new heights. The South China Sea is one of the most strategically critical maritime areas and China eyes its control to assert more power over the region. In 1947, the country, under the rule of the nationalist Kuomintang party, issued a map with the so-called “nine-dash line”. The nine-dash line essentially encircles Beijing’s claimed waters and islands of the South China Sea — as much as 90% of the sea has been claimed by China. The line continued to appear in the official maps even after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power. In the past few years, the country has also tried to stop other nations from conducting any military or economic operation without its consent, saying the sea falls under its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China’s sweeping claims, however, have been widely contested by other countries. In response, China has physically increased the size of islands or created new islands altogether in the sea.

The South China Sea sometimes referred to as the “Asian Mediterranean” is a ‘marginal sea’ as it is largely surrounded by land area with access to those areas, for instance between Western Malaysia and Indonesia, the Karimata Straits in the Southwest and the Philippines and Taiwan, the Luzon Straits to the Northeast. The sea covers an area of 3.3 million-kilometer square excluding the Gulfs of Thailand and Tonkin but if they are included the area would increase to 3.8 million kilometer square.

India-Philippines joint strategy in the South China Sea

India and the Philippines launched a two-day naval drill near the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, overlapping with maritime zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The waterway is a strategic shipping route where $3 trillion of annual shipborne commerce takes place. China also prefers resolving bilateral disputes without the interference of any third party. The Philippines has conducted “maritime cooperative activities” with foreign navies since late 2023 as part of its push to counter China’s expansive claims in the waterway, including joint passages with treaty ally the United States, as well as Japan, Australia, France and Canada.

The dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea first emerged when Chinese fishing vessels fished in the West Philippines Sea, which the Philippines claims to be part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). With the presence of Chinese maritime militia, the Philippines felt that its sovereignty was threatened and accordingly raised diplomatic protests. However, such protests were ignored by China. Following this, the Philippines commenced maritime drills within the West Philippines Sea, which subsequently led China to demand such activity be stopped on the grounds of respect for its sovereignty.

India and the Philippines began the two-day “bilateral maritime cooperative activity” on 2nd of August in waters close to theScarborough Shoal, a focal point of the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines. There are several speculations behind India’s stance on this matter but it is obvious that India is joining these efforts owing to its shared concerns about China’s growing maritime power, including in the South China Sea. Indian Navy ships that took part included guided missile destroyer INS Delhi, tanker INS Shakti and corvette INS Kiltan. The Philippines deployed two frigates, BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Jose Rizal.

Bilateral talks and its significance

Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. is on a 5 day state visit to India and India and the Philippines jointly announced an upgraded strategic partnership on August 5, with utmost focus being on the deepening of defence and maritime cooperation, as both the countries are addressing their security concerns due to China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. The two nations signed 14 landmark agreements boosting defense, trade, digital tech, space, law, and tourism. PM Modi hailed the 75-year-old bond as a “partnership by destiny,” while President Marcos hailed India as Manila’s fifth strategic partner. India and Philippines thus celebrated their 75 years of diplomatic relations and both the countries also acknowledged the “long-standing friendship based on mutual respect, trust, civilizational contacts, shared values and culture.”

Both the countries have a long history of jointly signing several treaties like the Treaty of Friendship signed on 11 July 1952, the Memorandum of Understanding on Policy Consultation Talks signed on 28 November 2000, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007, and the Declaration on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation signed on 5 October 2007. Thus both the countries are seeking to impart a qualitative and strategic new dimension and long-term commitment to the bilateral partnership and to actively develop cooperation in political, defence and security, the maritime domain, science and technology, climate change, space cooperation, trade and investment, industry collaboration, connectivity, health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, digital technologies, emerging technologies, development cooperation, culture, creative industries, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and other fields in the years ahead.

In the political sphere both the countries are cooperating by strengthening engagement through high-level exchanges on a regular basis and dialogue on bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral issues of mutual interest. Such instances include the convening of the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), Policy Consultation Talks and Strategic Dialogue; Intensifying dialogue through the various bilateral institutional mechanisms, including the Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on Trade and Investment, Counter-terrorism, Tourism, Health and Medicine, Agriculture and Financial Technology; Encouraging interaction between the legislatures of the two countries, particularly exchanges between young leaders of both countries, to further strengthen mutual understanding;

In the sphere of Defence and Security cooperation, both the countries acknowledged the progress made under the Agreement on Defence Cooperation signed between India and the Philippines on 4 February 2006. To facilitate the regular convening of institutional mechanisms major steps have been taken like the establishment of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) and Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee (JDILC) for dialogue on defence cooperation, with emphasis on defence industrial collaboration, defence technology, research, training, exchanges, and capacity building. When we look at maritime cooperation between India and the Philippines, we see a further deepening of relations which includes the annual India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue, first held in Manila on 11-13 December 2024. India would host the next dialogue as a way to maintain the positive momentum of maritime engagement. Both the countries foster greater security cooperation through regular dialogues, engagements and exchanges of best practice on UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), supply chain management, military medicine, global and regional security environment, traditional and non-traditional security concerns such as maritime security, and cyber security and critical technology issues, as well as the protection of critical information infrastructure, and security-related concerns on economic matters;

Economic cooperation has also reached newer heights where both sides have shown a tendency of promoting business and commercial linkages as a key driver of the India-Philippines partnership. There has been a steady increase in bilateral trade, which reached approximately US$ 3.3 billion in 2024-25. There has been a common agreement of fostering partnerships in infrastructure development and in implementation of connectivity and transport projects, facilitating Joint Customs Cooperation Committee meetings for improved trade facilitation through simplified customs procedures.

Strengthening cooperation in the field of Information and Communication Technology including information sharing and exchange of best practices on Edu-tech and Med-tech; Enhancing all modes of connectivity between India and the Philippines, including physical, digital and financial linkages.

Conclusion

The South China Sea remains a strategic mess as far as China and various South-East Asian countries are concerned. There seems to be a never-ending brawl over maritime access and usage. The recent times have seen smaller powers like the Philippines protecting their maritime rights steadily by partnering with various other countries to give a befitting reply to Chinese domination in that area. The latest confrontations consist of dangerous maneuvers, physical interference, continued disputes over legal maritime boundaries, and growing international attention and involvement as both sides seek to assert their respective claims.

About the Author

Aishwarya Dutta is an independent researcher and academician and is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science SGGS College, Chandigarh.

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By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Eastern Mediterranean is no longer just a peripheral zone of Middle Eastern diplomacy; it has become a strategic epicenter of global energy, security, and geopolitical rivalry. In this rapidly evolving theater, the partnership between Cyprus and Israel has emerged as one of the most critical and complex bilateral relationships. Driven by shared energy ambitions, maritime security interests, and balancing against Turkish assertiveness, the two states have built a robust alliance. Yet beneath the surface, this alliance is being tested by maritime boundary disputes, diverging foreign policy alignments, and the lingering uncertainty of regional diplomacy.

The Cyprus–Israel relationship oscillates between deep strategic cooperation and geopolitical friction. While both nations benefit from collaboration on natural gas development and trilateral security cooperation with Greece, recent developments such as Israel’s rapprochement with Turkiye, unresolved Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) disputes, and diverging stances on regional conflicts have exposed latent vulnerabilities in their alignment. This article dissects the relationship with granular detail, focusing on the interplay of energy, security, diplomacy, and regional pressure.

Historical Underpinnings: From Distance to Alliance

Cyprus and Israel had historically distant relations for much of the 20th century. Cyprus, despite being geographically close, generally aligned itself with the Arab bloc on issues such as Palestinian statehood and maintained a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. This reflected both ideological concerns and practical diplomatic strategy, as Cyprus sought to maintain balanced ties with the Arab world, crucial for economic and political support. Meanwhile, Israel was closely aligned with Turkiye, particularly after the 1950s, which limited its incentive to engage with Cyprus, a country embroiled in the Cyprus problem, a complex geopolitical conflict that resulted in the division of the island after Turkiye’s military intervention in 1974.

The turning point came after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, where Israeli naval forces raided a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza, resulting in ten civilian deaths and a breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations. This pushed Israel to seek new strategic allies in the region, namely Cyprus and Greece, who shared concerns over Turkish maritime assertiveness.

Thus began a rapid normalization and expansion of ties, evolving into strategic cooperation encompassing energy, defense, intelligence sharing, and regional diplomacy.

Energy Diplomacy and EEZ Disputes

The discovery of major natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean was a key catalyst in strengthening Cyprus–Israel ties. Israel discovered the Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) gas fields, while Cyprus found the Aphrodite field (2011) in Block 12 of its declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

To coordinate exploration and exploitation, Israel and Cyprus signed an EEZ delimitation agreement in 2010, consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, Turkiye does not recognize UNCLOS or the Republic of Cyprus and has aggressively challenged the legitimacy of these EEZs.

A critical issue is the Aphrodite Yishai gas reservoir, which crosses the maritime boundary between Cyprus and Israel. Israel has argued that a portion of the field lies within its EEZ and that Israeli companies should be entitled to a share of revenues. The disagreement has stalled the development of Aphrodite, with negotiations ongoing since 2011.

Despite multiple rounds of talks, no unitization agreement has been finalized. This remains a lingering technical commercial dispute that has geopolitical overtones, as any mismanagement could sour the broader alliance.

The EastMed Gas Project: Promise and Politics

In 2016, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece proposed the EastMed Gas Pipeline, a €6 billion project to transport gas from the Levant Basin to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. The pipeline is designed to carry 10–12 billion cubic meters of gas annually to reduce EU dependence on Russian energy. While symbolically significant, the project has faced technical, financial, and political hurdles:

• The depth and complexity of the seabed route make construction expensive and logistically challenging.
• Turkiye has objected vehemently, claiming the pipeline infringes on its claimed continental shelf, particularly after its 2019 maritime delimitation deal with Libya.
• The U.S. withdrew support in 2022, calling the project “financially unviable” and pushing for electrification alternatives like the EuroAsia Interconnector.

Israel’s enthusiasm for EastMed has cooled recently. Talks with Turkiye about exporting gas via existing pipelines to Europe have raised fears in Cyprus that Israel could pivot away from the Greek Cypriot route in favor of economic expedience and Turkish normalization. This adds a strategic ambiguity to the Israel–Cyprus relationship.

Trilateral Security Cooperation with Greece

The trilateral partnership between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece has become one of the most active diplomatic formats in the region. Since its first summit in 2016, it has expanded to include annual high-level meetings, joint military drills, and infrastructure projects:

Key defense collaborations include:

• “Noble Dina” Naval Exercises: Annual drills involving anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and maritime interdiction scenarios.
• “INIOCHOS” Air Exercises: Coordinated by Greece, these involve multi-domain training and are often used for testing Israel’s F-35s and Cyprus’s air defense capacity.
• EuroAsia Interconnector: A 1,208 km undersea cable project aiming to link the three countries’ power grids, expected to be operational by 2028.

These initiatives are motivated by a shared perception of Turkish assertiveness as destabilizing. However, analyst Z. Tziarras likes to note that this is a “quasi alliance,” strategically useful but lacking treaty obligations or military guarantees, meaning cooperation remains conditional on current leadership preferences and external shocks.

Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement and Cypriot Unease

In recent years, Israel has worked to repair ties with Turkiye, culminating in the exchange of ambassadors in 2022 and increased energy dialogue. While these moves are welcomed by many international actors, they trigger anxiety in Nicosia. Turkiye has offered Israel the possibility of using its existing pipeline infrastructure to export gas to Europe cheaper and faster than the EastMed pipeline. For Cyprus, this poses a dual threat:

• Economic: It undermines the commercial value of Cyprus’s own energy strategy.
• Political: It risks marginalizing Cyprus in regional energy diplomacy.

Recent meetings between Israeli and Turkish energy ministers have signaled growing momentum for cooperation, though no formal agreement has been signed as of mid 2025. Still, Cyprus views these developments with strategic caution, concerned that its once exclusive partnership with Israel may become a regional triangle where Ankara reasserts influence.

Divergence on Palestine and the UN

Despite being a strategic partner to Israel, Cyprus maintains diplomatic symmetry with Arab states and has long supported Palestinian statehood. It was one of the first European states to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988 and often votes in favor of UN resolutions critical of Israeli actions, particularly those concerning settlement expansion and military operations in Gaza. Cyprus has historically sought to position itself as a bridge between Europe, the Arab world, and Israel. While this position has been largely respected by Israel, it can at times create diplomatic frictions, especially during periods of intense regional violence or sensitive UN resolutions.

Both states, however, have demonstrated an ability to compartmentalize differences, keeping strategic cooperation separate from their ideological divergences on the Palestinian issue.

External Actors and Regional Balancing

The Cyprus–Israel axis does not operate in isolation. It intersects with a wider constellation of regional powers and international institutions:

• European Union: Strongly supports Cyprus’s EEZ rights and opposes Turkish drilling. The EU has backed infrastructure like the EuroAsia Interconnector.
• United States: A close Israeli ally, the U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Cyprus in 2020, signaling support for its regional role. However, its withdrawal from East Med support indicates a preference for de-escalation over entrenchment.
• Egypt: A key player in the EMGF, it shares energy goals with Cyprus and Israel and maintains its own large gas infrastructure.
• Russia: Historically supported Cyprus diplomatically, but its regional role has been weakened by the war in Ukraine.
• Lebanon: Shares a maritime boundary dispute with Israel. Recent U.S.-brokered agreements on maritime boundaries have opened the door to future EMGF expansion, potentially including Lebanon in broader frameworks.

This growing web of energy diplomacy and overlapping claims underscores the need for structured, rules-based conflict management in the region.

Conclusion

As Cyprus and Israel continue to navigate the choppy waters of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics, their relationship stands as a test case for modern alliance building in contested regions. The strategic rationale remains solid: shared energy corridors, joint security interests, and a common stance against unilateral regional dominance, particularly by Turkiye. However, as the geopolitical chessboard shifts, the durability of this alliance depends on adaptability, trust, and mutual clarity of intent.

For Cyprus, the challenge lies in ensuring that its sovereignty and maritime claims are not sidelined in Israel’s broader regional recalibrations, especially if ties with Ankara deepen. For Israel, maintaining credibility as a dependable partner while pursuing diversified energy and diplomatic options will require a delicate balance of pragmatism and principle.

Ultimately, Cyprus–Israel tensions are not a sign of a failing alliance but of one grappling with the realities of multipolar diplomacy. If managed wisely, this relationship can serve as a cornerstone for regional energy stability, maritime order, and strategic cooperation in one of the world’s most volatile maritime zones.

About the Author

Drishti Gupta is a postgraduate in International Relations with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Delhi University. She brings a strong foundation in global affairs, diplomatic studies, and strategic policy analysis. Drishti has held multiple research positions with reputed organisations such as Global Strategic & Defence News, The Geostrata, and Defence Research and Studies India, where she has contributed to key research projects on cybersecurity, foreign policy, and India’s evolving defence posture. Her academic and professional journey is marked by a deep interest in international diplomacy, global governance, and national security. She has completed certified programs on Global Diplomacy (University of London), Power and Foreign Policy, and Political Economy of Institutions, alongside the McKinsey Forward Program for professional development.

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By: Aditi Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The rivalry between Greece and Turkey that has its roots in centuries-old conflicts and is marked by frequent crises that have influenced not only the geopolitical environment of the southeast European continent but also that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the larger regional security framework. Greece and Turkey have had a Cold War-style, protracted struggle for at least the past 40 years disrupted by shorter or longer détente pauses. Another way to characterise this situation is as a relationship of manageable tension.

Due to the bilateral relationship’s tumultuous past, competing nationalist narratives are frequently discussed in public. Both nations are regarded as each other’s “founding fathers,” according to their respective occupations before attaining independence that is Greece in 1829 and Turkey in 1923. On both sides, elite thought, public opinion, and national security doctrines are still influenced by these intersecting historical traumas.

The stakes are raised by the fact that both nations are strategically located to control important oil routes, maritime lanes and migrant corridors connecting three continents. The Greece-Turkey relationship is essential to peace and security in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean because of the unresolved maritime boundary disputes such as Cyprus’s partition, migratory pressures and a history of military brinkmanship.

Historical Background

From the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the fascinating coexistence of the progenitors of modern Greeks and Turks inside the Ottoman Empire the history of current-day Greeks and Turks is a case of entangled history.  The Greek-Turkish hostility has its origins in the Ottoman era when Greece was ruled by the Ottoman Empire till the Greek War of Independence in the 1800s.

There was even discussion to establish an Ottoman-Greek state during the last decade of the nineteenth century despite the existence of the Kingdom of Greece which was pursuing expansion. Just ten years after the terrible Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 a similar idea resurfaced in the 1930s that was of a Greek–Turkish confederation. Later, Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923 that put an end to hostilities and it attempted to settle territorial disputes while also redrawing country borders and requiring population transfers. However, there were several issues that remained unresolved particularly the ones that pertained to minority rights and Aegean Sea islands.

Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952 because of the Cold War with the goal of promoting collaboration against shared external threats. Both countries constantly pursued different strategic priorities rather than reducing their rivalry. The mistrust was also heightened by Cyprus – related divisions after the island gained independence in 1960 and after the Turkish military intervened on July 20, 1974. Further, there have been frequent crises in the Aegean and continuous disputes over air and maritime space and the bilateral relationship alternated between cautious détente and outright hostility on occasion.

Cyprus Conflict

At the geostrategic intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa is Cyprus. It was therefore historically considered an important strategic area for numerous empires and civilisations. Cyprus fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1571. Large numbers of settlers from all across the Empire were brought in by the Ottomans to create a Turkish presence in the local populace.

In exchange for helping the Ottoman Empire defend its eastern provinces from Russian threats, Britain assumed administrative authority of the island in 1878. The emerging Turkish Republic officially ceded its claim of Cyprus to Britain in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The island was officially proclaimed a crown colony by Britain in 1925, two years later.

When the island obtained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, certain Greek Cypriot elites started to demand that it be merged with the Kingdom of Greece before the end of the 19th century. Calls to merge the island with Greece grew among Greek Cypriot elites. Pro-enosis Greek nationalism played a major role in the bloody riots against the British government in 1931. The Greek Cypriots resumed their political involvement following World War II.

On July 15, 1974, a Greek-sponsored coup was carried out as a result of intercommunal violence and desires for enosis or unity with Greece. On July 20, 1974 Turkey responded by launching a military incursion that gave them control of the island’s northern part. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which is solely recognised by Turkey was proclaimed on November 15, 1983 as a result of the ensuing de facto division. Although decades of reunification negotiations have not produced a meaningful settlement, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping personnel have been maintaining a buffer zone since 1974.

In the wake of the Turkish invasion, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim established a new mission of good works. Serious talks about many humanitarian challenges took place during the next 10 months. The main political issues like territory, refugees and the structure of the government however, remained unresolved.

Migration and Refugee Crisis

Migration has become a geopolitical and humanitarian issue. Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers fled Turkey for Greek islands during the 2015 refugee crisis that placed a burden on resources and sparking disagreements over border control. When Turkish officials urged thousands of migrants to approach the Greek land border at Evros in March 2020 tensions reached a height and the Greek security forces responded with. The EU mediated aid packages and border assistance out of concern for its own stability but the underlying friction still exists.

Aegean Sea Dispute

Since the beginning of the twentieth century Greece and Turkey have been at odds over the Aegean islands. Both countries current borders were set by international treaties following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Many Aegean islands however, had no clear status which resulted in continuous ownership and control disputes. Due to competing claims to the region’s borders, Athens and Ankara have been at conflict over maritime matters in the Aegean Sea since the 1970s.

Historical hostility, the demilitarisation of Eastern Aegean islands, disagreements over the boundaries of national seas and the Continental Shelf and regular airspace breaches are the main causes of this protracted Aegean Sea problem. Tensions between the two countries have increased because of the incidents and military posture brought on by these divisive topics. The discovery of substantial natural gas reserves in the area and the 44-refugee crisis affecting Europe are two of the many reasons that have contributed to the recent escalation of tensions between the two nations. Natural gas has increased the stakes with Turkey claiming that because of their closeness to the gas resources islands like Kastellorizo should be under its jurisdiction.

While Turkey opposes the application of UNCLOS in the Aegean and claims concerns over its own coastal security, Greece on the other hand rests its claims on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which it is a signatory. Any Greek attempt to expand its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is viewed as a casus belli by Turkey. The discovery of new energy deposits in the area has intensified rivalry for access and rights to profitable hydrocarbons that makes these disputes more pressing. Frequent diplomatic and military conflicts are fuelled by such disagreements.

Recent Developments

Greece’s strategy to become the EU’s safeguards against Turkey was altered when it realised that closer ties between the EU and Turkey increased the likelihood that it could settle its bilateral issues with Turkey and the Cyprus issue in accordance with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. However, during the height of EU-Turkey relations historic potential were lost.

Prospects for resolving the Cyprus issue were scuttled in April 2004 when Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan. Furthermore, in December 2004 the Greek government did not exert pressure on Turkey to refer the unresolved maritime zone delimitation problems to the Hague’s International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Due to several structural and conceptual issues Greek-Turkish relations have become more tense after two decades of relative peace and lost chances to resolve their differences. The strategic decisions made by both nations were certain to have an impact on the future of their relations because Turkey’s EU membership was no longer a means of resolving bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey. The importance of interaction mechanisms which Greece had deemed crucial to advancing its concept of bilateral cooperation was diminished in Turkey as a result of Turkey’s move away from West institutions and pursuit of strategic autonomy. The nature of bilateral relations was unavoidably altered by this.

When Turkey sent the research vessel Oruc Reis along with warships and a Greek naval mobilisation to perform seismic investigations in disputed seas off the coast of Kastellorizo island on May 20, 2020 tensions significantly increased. Therefore, naval brinkmanship and diplomatic standoffs took place in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Concerned by these events and in solidarity with its member Greece, the EU urged for moderation and threatened sanctions on Turkey. To maintain balance the US called for talks while highlighting NATO unity. In October 2020, more EU sanctions were put in place because to Turkey’s ongoing drilling operations.

Despite multiple standoffs diplomatic channels have remained open. In January 2021 Greece and Turkey resumed exploratory talks after a five-year hiatus while United Nations-facilitated meetings in Geneva sought to revive Cyprus negotiations. NATO facilitated military de-confliction mechanisms by establishing a hotline. Despite these dialogues there were no fundamental breakthroughs were achieved by 2025 which left tensions unresolved but controlled.

Amongst various external powers, one important stakeholder has been the EU which has pushed Turkey with economic penalties and offered Greece diplomatic support. While energy interests and migrant cooperation complicate the EU’s balancing act France increased its naval presence to demonstrate support for Greece. The United States maintains strategic interests that underscore the importance of bilateral stability for NATO’s southern flank and serve as a check on the situation in times of crisis by maintaining military installations in both Greece and Turkey. through communication with Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. By applying its energy expertise Russia seeks to expand its influence and presence in the Mediterranean, further complicating an already complex web of rivalries and alliances.

Economic Interdependence and Strategic Realities

Throughout the 20th century, most peripheral economies have been influenced by the pursuit of economic growth. The years following 1949 established a somewhat stable climate in Greece that facilitated quick development. Growth rates during what became known as the Golden Age were roughly 6.5 percent in the 1950s and 7.4 percent from 1961 to 1979. A lot of this was dependent on fiscal and monetary restraint. However, when that equilibrium was thrown off in the 1970s especially during the oil crisis, inflation increased and foreign inflows decreased, which ultimately had a significant negative impact on employment and economy. As part of the EU’s Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) frameworks the country began to move towards privatisation and market reforms in the 1990s as a result of mounting domestic demands as well as pressure from the EU.

The economic trajectory of Turkey was rather more lopsided. Populist cycles continued and the nation had financial crises in 1994 and 2001. More domestic borrowing was made possible by financial liberalisation but it also increased interest rates and produced fiscal deficits that exposed more serious structural problems.

The 1999 reconciliation did however, inject some fresh vitality. In the early 2000s, trade and investment increased particularly in sectors like building and tourism. Both sides’ business communities appeared optimistic.

All of it, however was unable to keep politics out. Cyprus and Aegean tensions continued to resurface. Additionally, the political resolve to forge closer commercial links declined along with Turkey’s EU process. Large-scale initiatives like the EastMed pipeline might be beneficial but only if political trust is established beforehand.

Pathways to Resolution

The key to long-term de-escalation is diplomatic interaction which can be aided by impartial third parties. Although the UN and NATO offer platforms for communication, political will is necessary for them to be effective. Long-term fixes can be provided by impartial dispute resolution and confidence-building measures. Cooperation needs to be encouraged by economic collaboration, particularly in the areas of energy and regional infrastructure. The best chances for regional stability are supported by international law-based arbitration.

The ongoing disputes between Greece and Turkey over national identity, resources and sovereignty continue to pose a severe danger to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Euro-Atlantic region. Frequent crises indicate the potential for escalation, while initiatives to promote trust and regional diplomatic engagement suggest a path ahead. A successful resolution requires the political might of both Athens and Ankara, as well as the continuous support of international institutions and third-party mediators.

About the Author

Aditi Sharma has recently completed her Master’s in Geopolitics and International Relations, from Manipal Academy of Higher Education, building a strong academic foundation in global affairs. She has previously interned at the Vivekananda International Foundation and is passionate about International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Journalism. Her core interests lie in Indian National Security, Defence, Counterterrorism, and West Asian Studies. She is committed to continuous learning and aims to contribute meaningfully to public and academic discourse.

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By: Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

The Trump 2.0 Presidency, most in India thought, would be an easy one for India. After all, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the United States President Donald Trump called each other ‘good friends’ and seemed to share a great personal equation. Modi was also among the first of the world leaders who visited Washington DC soon after Trump took charge in January this year. Modi’s February visit to the United States seemed to then indicate that both leaders were picking up from where they had last left. But since then something seems to have gone amiss in this relationship with Trump’s almost daily tirades against India. It would be fair to say that at this point the India-US relationship seems to be at its lowest in the last two decades or more.

The recent announcement where the United States has slapped India with a 50 percent tariff, the highest among all countries so far, will ensure that the India-US relationship goes into a sharp nose-dive. Brazil is the only other country today facing tariffs as high as India’s. New Delhi responded sharply to this latest onslaught by Trump and pointed out that the tariffs are “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable” and said its imports of Russian oil is based on its objective of securing the energy needs of its nation of 1.4 billion people. But the damage to the relationship is now a done deal.

If one was to try and make sense of how it has all come to this, it would be fair to state that Trump seems irked with India. And there are many theories as to what has upset the US President. Many believe that not giving Trump credit for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan during Op Sindoor has upset him. India has been quite clear that no third country was involved in the ceasefire between India and Pakistan following four days of conflict in May this year. It is important to point out here that it was actually the US President who first announced the ceasefire in a post on social media and claimed credit for it. He has since then taken credit for it almost 28 times. Pakistan was quick to thank him and also went on to nominate Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. India diplomatically maintained that no third country was involved in this. Many have since argued that India should try and play up to Trump’s ego and maybe give him the headlines and attention he craves. But that is hard for India to do given the domestic sensitivities when it comes to Pakistan; and Pakistan-sponsored cross border terrorism.

Now Trump has decided to ‘weaponize’ tariffs against India and much of the world. And if that was not enough, Trump has now dragged Russia into the row by pointing out how India’s purchase of Russian oil has in a way funded the Ukraine war.

In his latest move, Trump has raised by 25 per cent the tariffs on India as a punishment over its purchases of cheap Russian oil, which today account for one-third of its imported oil. So in effect India today faces 50 per cent tariffs, one of the highest the US has imposed on any country so far.

“They don’t care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine,” he said in a post to his Truth Social network recently. He also accused India of selling Russian oil “on the Open Market for big profits”. In a previous social media post, he went on to refer to both Russia and India as ‘dead economies”.

These almost daily comments have of course upset many in India and there has been a fierce debate on how to deal with Trump and his constant and rather insulting remarks. Some have suggested that perhaps India can assuage his ego a little and give in to his demands to soften his stance. But the majority opinion in India seems to be clear that India must push back and Trump’s behaviour should not be tolerated.

After showing considerable restrain, India’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement 4 August that was clearly a push back against Trump and his various allegations. It was rather strongly worded and for once minced no words about the hypocrisy being displayed by both the US and the European Union with regards to Russia. “India has been targeted by the United States and the European Union for importing oil from Russia after the commencement of the Ukraine conflict. In fact, India began importing from Russia because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the outbreak of the conflict. The United States at that time actively encouraged such imports by India for strengthening global energy markets stability,” said the statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

The MEA statement also pointed out that, “In this background, the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable. Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security.”

In the end, what we are now looking at is a bilateral relationship that has hit its lowest. India has decided to stand up and push back at Trump, who is going overboard with his penalties in the form of tariffs. This will push India to seek conciliation with China even as the US moves closer to Pakistan. The coming weeks will now tell whether the India-US relationship is likely to worsen or start repairing.

About the Author

Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9

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