By: Aqib Rehman, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Maldives, an enchanting archipelago of coral islands nestled in the Indian Ocean, has garnered significant attention from world powers in recent years. Despite its small size, the Maldives holds geopolitical importance due to its strategic location, natural resources, and economic potential. This article delves into the reasons why major global players are keenly interested in the Maldives and how their engagements shape the geopolitical landscape in the region.

1. Strategic Location

The Maldives’ strategic location at the heart of the Indian Ocean makes it a highly attractive asset for world powers. Situated along vital sea routes that connect Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the Maldives serves as a maritime crossroads for trade and energy flows. Controlling or influencing this area allows nations to project their naval power, secure access to key shipping lanes, and safeguard their interests in the Indian Ocean region.

Furthermore, the Maldives’ proximity to other strategically significant areas, such as the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, enhances its value as a potential base for military operations or intelligence gathering. World powers seek to establish alliances and partnerships with the Maldives to enhance their geopolitical reach and influence in the Indian Ocean.

• Maritime Security and Anti-Piracy Efforts

As a nation surrounded by vast stretches of ocean, the Maldives has experienced challenges related to piracy and maritime security. Global powers are eager to collaborate with the Maldives in anti-piracy efforts to safeguard critical sea lanes and ensure the free flow of trade. By joining forces with the Maldives, world powers can demonstrate their commitment to ensuring stability in the Indian Ocean, which directly impacts global trade and energy supplies.

• Resource and Energy Potential

The Maldives holds promising potential in terms of natural resources, particularly in the area of offshore energy reserves. As global energy demands continue to rise, major powers are eyeing the Indian Ocean as a new frontier for oil and gas exploration. The Maldives, with its extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), offers opportunities for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, attracting the interest of resource-hungry nations.

Additionally, the Maldives boasts a rich marine ecosystem and abundant fisheries, which are vital for food security. World powers seek to engage with the Maldives to secure access to these valuable resources, strengthening their economic ties with the nation and potentially establishing long-term trade partnerships.

• Geopolitical Competition

The Indian Ocean region has witnessed increasing geopolitical competition among major powers seeking to assert their influence and dominance. China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has driven its engagement in the region, including significant investments in Maldivian infrastructure projects. India, traditionally the Maldives’ close ally, views these developments with caution and has sought to reassert its presence in the archipelago.

The United States and other Western nations are also keen to maintain their influence in the region, ensuring that it remains open and free from undue external pressure. The Maldives, being a part of this complex geopolitical landscape, becomes a focal point for strategic manoeuvring and diplomatic engagement.

World powers’ engagement with the Maldives is also driven by geopolitical posturing and influence in the Indian Ocean. A stable and cooperative relationship with the Maldives can provide strategic advantages, such as access to forward operating bases, intelligence gathering posts, and the projection of influence in regional affairs.

Given the Maldives’ status as a member of regional organizations like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), world powers seek to leverage their engagement to shape diplomatic outcomes and enhance their geopolitical position in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

• Climate Change and Environmental Concerns

As a low-lying island nation, the Maldives is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including rising sea levels, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events. The potential submergence of these islands makes the Maldives a symbol of the urgent need for global action on climate change.

World powers with a commitment to environmental stewardship seek to engage with the Maldives in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. By offering support for sustainable development projects and renewable energy initiatives, these nations aim to build positive relationships and influence Maldivian policies on environmental protection.

• Economic Interests and Soft Power Diplomacy

The Maldives’ economy heavily relies on tourism, making it an attractive destination for investment from world powers seeking to gain economic advantages and expand their global influence. Foreign direct investment in tourism infrastructure, hospitality, and real estate projects allows world powers to strengthen economic ties with the Maldives and boost their soft power in the region.

Moreover, cultural and educational exchanges, humanitarian aid, and developmental projects provide avenues for world powers to project their soft power and foster goodwill among the Maldivian population and government.

Interests of different countries

China’s ambitious belt and road initiative is one of the primary interests of China in Maldives. It will help China to achieve its goal of connectivity with other parts of the world. For China, the Maldives serves as an important gateway for maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. The development of ports and maritime infrastructure aligns with China’s broader goal of enhancing its connectivity and expanding its maritime presence in the region. Additionally, Chinese investment in the Maldives has been viewed as a means to secure access to the country’s natural resources and foster long-term economic ties.

India has historically considered the Indian Ocean region, including the Maldives, as part of its strategic sphere of influence. The “Neighbourhood First” policy, pursued by India, emphasizes strengthening ties with neighbouring countries and deepening regional cooperation.

India’s engagement in the Maldives aims to promote stability, security, and economic development in the region. India has invested in various projects, including infrastructure, health, and education, to support the Maldives’ socio-economic growth.

However, India’s influence in the Maldives has faced challenges, particularly during periods of political instability and leadership changes in the country. The Maldives’ delicate balancing act between major powers can lead to fluctuations in its relationship with India.

The United States has expressed its commitment to maintaining a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. sees the Indian Ocean as a critical area for ensuring maritime security, safeguarding freedom of navigation, and countering the influence of China in the region.

As part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. has engaged with countries in the Indian Ocean, including the Maldives, to promote shared democratic values, enhance security cooperation, and advance economic development. The U.S. provides support for capacity-building initiatives in areas such as counterterrorism, disaster response, and maritime security.

The Trilateral Dynamics

The competition between the United States, China, and India in the Maldives creates a dynamic interplay that impacts the archipelago’s domestic politics and regional relations. While the Maldives seeks to maintain friendly ties with all major powers, it must navigate carefully to prevent overreliance on any one nation and avoid being drawn into geopolitical rivalries.

The involvement of world powers in the Maldives has raised concerns over issues like sovereignty, debt-trap diplomacy, and potential military presence in the region. Some critics argue that increased dependence on China for infrastructure development may expose the Maldives to debt risks and reduce its ability to assert its sovereignty.

On the other hand, the competition between the U.S., China, and India also offers opportunities for the Maldives. The country can leverage its geopolitical importance to attract foreign investments, negotiate favourable deals, and secure developmental assistance from different sources.

Conclusion

The Maldives’ strategic location, resource potential, and geopolitical significance have placed it firmly on the radar of world powers vying for influence in the Indian Ocean region. The nation’s allure as a maritime crossroads, its wealth of natural resources, and its vulnerability to climate change have attracted global players seeking to secure their interests, expand their economic foothold, and exercise soft power in the region.

While the Maldives is the subject of intense geopolitical competition, it also presents opportunities for constructive engagement and cooperation among world powers. Striking a balance between fostering economic development, safeguarding maritime security, addressing environmental challenges, and respecting the Maldives’ sovereignty will be crucial in shaping a sustainable and peaceful future for the island nation and the broader Indian Ocean region.

By: Vaibhav Borude, Research Analyst, GSDN

Japan and South Korea established diplomatic relations in December 1965 under the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. In this treaty, Japan recognized South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. Both of these countries are in close proximity to each other and are major non-NATO allies of the USA; however, the colonial history of Japanese occupation and the turbulent political ties still haunt their relationship.

History of South Korea-Japan relations

Between 1961 and 1979, South Korea’s head of state was dictator Park Chung-hee, who had served in the Imperial Japanese military during World War II.Park took a strong interest in Japanese modernization since he witnessed development policies in Manchukuo firsthand. Under Park’s government, the two countries pursued the 1965 reconciliation treaty, which normalized relations despite considerable public opposition. Park was able to force normalization through the National Assembly and shut down demonstrations through martial law.

As a result, Tokyo provided US$ 300 million as compensation to comfort women, forced laborers, and other victims and extended an additional US$ 200 million credit to Seoul. Prime Minister Sato attended official functions in July, the first visit of a Japanese premier to postwar Korea. Nevertheless, Seoul objected strongly to occasional visits by Japanese politicians to North Korea, to the continuation of Red Cross repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea, and to the proposal of Tokyo Governor Minobe to permit a pro-North Korean university in Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Ministry opposed Minobe on this issue in order to prove its loyalty to South Korea. Meanwhile, contacts between Japan and South Korea increased through new air routes, tourism, and trade.

In 1975, South Korean-Japanese relations improved following the end of a two-year-old feud that began when South Korean agents abducted Kim Dae-jung, an opposition leader (and future President of South Korea), from a Tokyo hotel. As a result of the settlement, a long-delayed ministerial conference was held in Seoul in September to discuss economic cooperation between the two countries. Japan joined the United States in providing assurances for South Korea’s security. In a joint statement by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki and U.S. President Ford, they declared: “The security of the Republic of Korea is necessary for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan.”

Thaws in Relationships

• Sea of Japan naming dispute: Japan claims that the Sea of Japan name has been used by western countries since 1860, i.e., before Japan’s colonialism. South Korea claims that the name of the water body is “East Sea”, and it has been used in South Korea for 2000 years.
• The Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo (“solitary island”) in Korean and Takeshima (“bamboo island”) in Japanese, are a group of islets in the Sea of Japan that are occupied by South Korea. There are valuable fishing grounds around the islets and potentially large reserves of methane hydrates. The territorial dispute is a major source of nationalist tensions between the two nations. Currently, South Korea occupies the island, which has its Korean Coast Guard stationed there as well as two elderly Korean residents.
• Comfort Women’s For Japanese Military: Korea has been demanding official acknowledgement with a sincere apology and compensation for the sex slaves or comfort women issue, referring to the women and girls who were forced to have sex with Imperial Japanese military soldiers during World War II.
• Forced labor of Koreans during World War II
• Discharge of radioactive water from the Fukuchima Daichi nuclear power plant.

Present status and Road ahead

The bilateral trade between South Korea and Japan in 2022 was US$ 85 billion, with South Korea’s export to Japan being US$ 30.6 billion and its import from Japan being US$ 54.7 billion.

The high-level bilateral visit shows the warmth of relations between both countries. The corresponding figure below shows a lack of mutual relations between both of them due to a number of issues, including domestic compulsions.

High-level bilateral visits between Japan and the ROK

Timeline	Number of visits by the ROK’s President to Japan	Number of visits by Japan’s Prime Minister to the ROK	Number of visits by the ROK’s Foreign Ministers to Japan	Number of visits by Japan’s Foreign Minister to the ROK
2003-2008	5	6	7	4
2008-2013	3	5	5	5
2013-2018	0	0	4	3
2018-2023	1	0	1	0

The recent summit in March 2023 marked the first meeting between the two nations’ leaders in 12 years and was focused on addressing the shared threat posed by North Korea and growing concerns over China. Post-summit, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida emphasized opening a new chapter in their bilateral relationship with frequent visits by leaders from both countries that are not bound by formalities. Kishida added that Japan and South Korea have sought to resume bilateral security talks against the backdrop of rising threats from North Korea and have concluded the significance of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP).

Meanwhile, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol expressed his willingness to fully restore the military intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan, which was terminated in 2019 due to an ongoing disagreement regarding forced labor. He added that sharing information regarding North Korea’s nuclear missile launches and trajectories is necessary and that both countries should be capable of responding to them appropriately. Moreover, prior to the summit, Seoul and Tokyo resolved a protracted trade disagreement, with Japan agreeing to remove export controls on advanced materials employed in the manufacturing of semiconductors and display panels to South Korea, while Seoul agreed to withdraw its complaint concerning the limitations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, the meeting between Yoon and Kishida represents a significant milestone in the efforts to reconcile the long-standing issues and distrust that have plagued the relationship between these two key US allies in Asia.

The Biden administration has been actively pushing for reconciliation and has maintained a steady pace of senior-level trilateral meetings since South Korean President Yoon took charge in May 2022. However, according to the US State Department spokesperson, the recent arrangements between Japan and South Korea were the result of bilateral discussions rather than pressure from the United States. The recent reconciliation between Japan and South Korea has largely been driven by growing security concerns, including North Korea’s blitzkrieg of missile tests, Beijing’s increasingly aggressive military stance, rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, weak economic growth, inflationary pressure, supply chain resilience, and climate change. There is a significant incentive for the two to work together. Both countries have identified the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific as critical areas for their security, further highlighting the importance of closer cooperation between them. While dealing separately with North Korea, South Korea has rigorously participated in military drills with the US. Similarly, Japan has hinted at its intentions through the adoption of aggressive policies such as the revised National Security Strategy.

The recent bilateral deal attempts to mend relations and restore cooperation by compensating South Korean forced labor victims through a foundation made up of funds from South Korean companies rather than Japanese ones. This is meant to ease tensions over the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court cases and allow Japan to maintain its argument that all claims have been settled by the 1965 treaty and therefore Japanese companies do not need to provide compensation.

While the agreement might be working for the Yoon government, multiple polls also show that about 60 percent of the South Korean public opposes the agreement, suggesting that it may not provide the closure that both governments are seeking. While Japanese Prime Minister Kishida reaffirmed the 1998 declaration in which Japan expressed remorse for its colonial rule, critics have complained that the Japanese side didn’t provide a sincere apology. One victim, Kim Seong-joo, said, “We can forgive; if Japan tells us one word, we are sorry and we did wrong. But there’s no such word.” Claims by Japanese politicians that Japan is “a victim caught up in the [lawsuit]” or that the deal was a “total victory for Japan” because “we didn’t have to concede anything” have only rankled South Korean critics further.

The role ahead for both South Korea and Japan is to forget the past and work towards a prosperous Indo-Pacific region for peace, security, and harmony for all. The political class has taken a step forward with the recent summit; the role of civil society and the media is now important to increase trust between the countries and promote people-to-people contacts to reduce the trust deficit.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan was established after the 1962 border conflict between China and India. Given the limited prospects for reconciliation between China and India regarding their border dispute, India has emerged as a significant strategic consideration for both nations. In 1963, Pakistan relinquished control of the Shaksgam Valley to China, a territory that was also claimed by India. Subsequently, China extended military support, furnished the necessary resources for the establishment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and allocated substantial economic assistance to the country. However, it did not fully embrace the relationship with utmost sincerity. There existed a multitude of factors contributing to this phenomenon.

Firstly, it can be argued that China has historically not regarded India as an equal or significant strategic threat. The United States was bestowed with the dubious honor. Therefore, during the armed conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1961 and 1971, China refrained from engaging in military intervention in support of Pakistan. Although there was a public display of support for Pakistan in 1965, the same level of support was not extended in 1971, despite Pakistan’s involvement in facilitating the reconciliation between China and the United States. Moreover, China developed significant apprehension regarding Pakistan’s standing, partly due to its classification as a nuclear-outcast state following the global condemnation of AQ Khan, and primarily due to its role in providing refuge and assistance to Islamist extremists. The ethnic Uighur Muslim community resides in China’s Xinjiang province.

China has demonstrated a longstanding preoccupation with Islamist militancy within the Uighur population, with particular apprehension regarding their alleged connections to militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Significantly, China exhibited a degree of detachment from Pakistan both during the Kargil conflict in 1999 and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008.

Nevertheless, during the mid-2000s, two significant factors emerged as crucial. One significant development was the transformation observed in the bilateral relationship between the United States and India. The United States had previously engaged in discussions regarding India as a potential counterweight to China. However, it was the subsequent advancement of their military and economic alliance following the disintegration of the Soviet Union that solidified this notion among Chinese elites. And the occurrence of the Galwan Valley clash might have been influenced by Beijing’s apprehensions regarding Delhi’s growing alliance with Washington at a time when China’s relations with the United States were deteriorating. Consequently, Beijing may have felt compelled to adopt a cautious approach toward addressing the border issue with Delhi. China’s aspirations concerning the global order constituted the second factor. In 2013, President Xi unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a substantial multilateral endeavor focused on infrastructure and investment, aimed at demonstrating China’s unique trajectory of growth and development.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) served as the fundamental basis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China had been providing Pakistan with assistance and support for infrastructure development for a considerable period. However, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) marked a distinct departure from previous initiatives. The plan encompassed a diverse range of endeavors, such as infrastructure development, energy projects, the establishment of economic zones, and the enhancement of the strategic port, Gwadar. Its total value amounted to an impressive $62 billion. Significantly, the primary purpose of this initiative was to establish a strategic and economic linkage between the southwestern region of China and Pakistan.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) presents a viable alternative route to circumvent the Strait of Malacca, which is currently heavily influenced by American military presence and entangled with geopolitical and regional complexities. The economic corridor comprises a comprehensive infrastructure system that encompasses interconnected networks of roads, railways, gas, and oil pipelines as well as designated areas for specific economic activities. The establishment of economic zones throughout Pakistan aims to facilitate economic development. Once completed, this initiative will establish a connection between Kashgar, a city located in the Xinjiang region of China, and Gwadar, a port city situated in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. The Chinese region of Xinjiang is geographically connected to the port city of Gwadar, located in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is expected to significantly reduce the transportation distance for Middle Eastern oil supplies. This development will enable China to have the most efficient shipping route available. The success and ambition of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a prominent initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), played a crucial role in determining the overall success of the BRI. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, was initiated during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Islamabad in May 2013. During that period, Pakistan was experiencing frequent bomb blasts, persistent power shortages, and sluggish economic growth. China has expressed its dedication to actively participating in Pakistan’s economy, as Li urged both nations to concentrate on implementing crucial initiatives in areas such as connectivity, energy development, power generation, and the advancement of the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

The capacity of China to exert influence on the economy of Pakistan has experienced significant growth in recent years, primarily attributable to Beijing’s status as the largest creditor to Islamabad. Based on the documentation disclosed by the finance ministry of Pakistan, the aggregate amount of Pakistan’s external debt, including both public and publicly guaranteed debt, was recorded at $44.35 billion as of June 2013. Notably, a mere 9.3 percent of this debt was attributed to China. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as of April 2021, the external debt of Pakistan had increased significantly to reach $90.12 billion. Out of this total, China held a substantial portion, with Pakistan owing 27.4 percent, equivalent to $24.7 billion, of its overall external debt to China.

CPEC (China- Pakistan Economic Corridor)

The “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) was formally initiated during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015. The focal point has transitioned towards the augmentation of power generation in Pakistan, with projected expenses experiencing a significant escalation to a staggering sum of 46 billion USD. Subsequently, the two governing bodies meticulously devised a comprehensive “Long Term Plan,” commencing in the year 2017 and significantly elongating the envisaged timeframe for execution, extending it until the year 2030. The anticipated expenditures have experienced an upward trajectory, reaching a staggering sum of 62 billion USD, with Pakistani authorities subsequently alluding to even more elevated figures.

COMPONENTS OF CPEC

1. Potential Growth Prospects in the Power Sector of Pakistan

Pakistan’s economy is confronted with a substantial obstacle in the form of a severe energy shortage. The occurrence of frequent blackouts has harmed both the domestic and industrial sectors. The crisis precipitated a significant cessation of industrial operations on a broad scale. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) presents a significant opportunity to address the issue of excessive load shedding and mitigate the disparity between energy supply and demand. According to the Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform, the energy sector is one of the corridor’s primary focuses. The early harvest program is anticipated to generate a total of 10,400 megawatts. The early harvest initiative includes nine coal, seven wind, three hydro, and one HDVC transmission line project. Timeline-wise, most early harvest initiatives are done. Electricity production and availability to households and businesses have increased.

In 2013, Pakistan experienced a daily load-shedding duration exceeding ten hours. By the year 2018, a substantial decrease had been observed in the majority of regions across the country. The Sindh province in Pakistan possesses significant coal reserves, particularly in the Thar region. Presently, there are several projects underway in Thar aimed at generating a total capacity of 4000 MW. These projects are currently in the construction phase. An additional amount of US$ 33 billion, which comprises a significant portion of the total. More than 70% of the total investment is allocated to the power sector, which includes the fuel, power, and coal sectors. An additional allocation of $2.5 billion has been made for the establishment of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipelines to facilitate transportation from Iran to Nawabshah in Sindh and Gwadar in Baluchistan.

• Infrastructure for transportation

The transport and communication sector of Pakistan represents a significant domain of investment. Pakistan has been allocated a substantial amount of $11 billion to enhance its transportation infrastructure. The development in question pertains to the construction of a 1,100-kilometer motorway within the urban area of Karachi, situated along the coast. The proposed transportation link from the province of Sindh to the city of Lahore in Punjab is anticipated to facilitate economic expansion and enhance internal connectivity. The implementation of contemporary transportation systems, including the renovation of existing ones such as the Karakorum Thruway connecting Rawalpindi and Kashgar, as well as the Karachi-Peshawar railroad line, is underway. 820 KM a lengthy fiber optic cable will be installed to connect Rawalpindi and Khunjerab. A dry port is planned to be established in Havelian, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Other transit-related CPEC initiatives include the Orange Line Lahore, the Quetta Mass Transit system, and the Karachi Circular Railway. CPEC aims to establish connectivity between Pakistan and other regions of Asia, Europe, and Africa. This initiative envisions Pakistan playing a pivotal role as a hub for service and manufacturing activities within the region.

• Economic Zones

The expansion of territorial networks holds great significance within the overall project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The expansion of the territorial network will be achieved through the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) aimed at fostering industrial development in key financial centers and strategically important regions in Pakistan. The initiation of work on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is planned for the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). During the initial phase of the project, a total of forty-six Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were initially planned. However, as the project progressed, the number of planned SEZs was subsequently reduced to nine. The proposed initiatives encompass the creation of the Bolan industrial zone, Allama Iqbal Industrial City M3, ICT Model Industrial Zone, and Rashakai Economic Zone.

And recently China has provided Pakistan, which is facing financial difficulties, with a significant financial support of US$700 million. This aid comes at a crucial time as Pakistan engages in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Additionally, there is a possibility of an additional US$ 1.3 billion in loans from China, which could serve to enhance Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves.

BENEFITS OF CPEC TO PAKISTAN

CPEC provides the opportunity to integrate economies to end the region’s protracted conflicts. Additionally, it would provide employment and prosperity for millions of people in both nations.

• CPEC offers a stable commercial transit route for Pakistan and China, boosts regional economic growth, and counterbalances Indian influence.
• By becoming a transit trade route for international commerce, Pakistan would increase employment, reduce poverty, and create stability and prosperity by occupying people in economic and commercial activity.
• Furthermore, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to attract significant foreign investment, which could contribute to the growth of Pakistan’s export sector and lead to an increase in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The expansion of trade and business opportunities in Pakistan will be facilitated.
• As the corridor traverses Pakistan, the construction of CPEC offers Pakistan the opportunity for infrastructure development and economic growth throughout the entire province.
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, which are far behind in development, would get infrastructure and economic boosts. Pakistan’s Gilgit Baltistan province has this socio-economic development potential. Pakistan relies on marine commerce. Gwadar port development and connection will relieve Karachi and Bin Qasim ports.

GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The increased rift in US-Pakistan relations provides Beijing with an opportunity to promote a new model of international development to replace the predominant US model, which is founded on the “carrot and stick” doctrine. China introduced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a geo-economically ambitious model, based on the principles of “wide consultation, joint development, and mutual benefits,” to promote regional development. This approach appears to be more comprehensive and inclusive. The alternative model is more practical and logical compared to the US model. CPEC has garnered widespread support across various regions of Pakistan as a component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In recent times, China has successfully organized the inaugural trilateral summit involving China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to facilitate diplomatic discussions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Russia is significantly concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project due to its implications for China’s growing influence and presence in the Central Asian region. The region has long been considered to fall within the sphere of influence of Moscow. Presently, there is an observed escalation in the competition between Moscow and Beijing in their efforts to cultivate amicable relations with neighboring nations. Another area of concern pertains to multiple countries.

There is a sense of concern among individuals in Asia and other regions, such as the United States, regarding the geostrategic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nevertheless, China has recently made efforts to address these concerns by emphasizing the “win-win” paradigm of the initiative. The endeavors of this initiative will yield noteworthy foreign policy ramifications for several prominent regional stakeholders, including India the countries of Russia, and Japan.

The rapid ascent of China is also perceived to evoke feelings of insecurity within Western nations. The Western nations persist in perceiving China through the lens of the historical “Qing Dynasty Era,” thereby demonstrating a disregard for China’s maritime capabilities. China’s foreign relations are founded upon principles of engagement, dialogue, accommodation, reconciliation, the promotion of peaceful coexistence, mutual trust, security, balance, and harmony.

The United States perceives the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a significant undertaking that will contribute to the concept of regional connectivity and collective economic growth. Additionally, the US foresees the potential for Afghanistan’s future participation in CPEC. The United States is cognizant of the ongoing progress of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which may result in China acquiring a prospective naval challenge within the Indian Ocean region. The United States is providing strategic leverage to India to enable India to uphold its regional dominance.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also exhibits a vested interest in the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Ports play a crucial role in facilitating economic growth in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The full operationalization of the Gwadar port is expected to have a direct economic impact on the volume of business conducted at the Dubai port.

By: Varshitha Eddula, Research Analyst, GSDN

SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Council of Heads of State meeting, hosted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marked the first time India chaired the summit of regional countries. India became a full SCO member in 2017, along with Pakistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation focuses on cooperation with international and regional organisations. The strengths of the Shanghai Corporation Organization are that it covers 40% of the global population, nearly 20% of the global GDP and 22% of the world’s land mass. The SCO has a strategically important role in Asia due to its geographical significance, this enables it to control Central Asia and limit the American influence in the region.

BRICS

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is an important grouping bringing together the major emerging economies of the world. According to World Bank data of 2019, it comprises of 41% of the world population, having 24% of the world GDP and over 16% share in the world trade. BRICS countries have been the main engines of global economic growth over the years.

Over some time, BRICS countries have come together to deliberate on important issues under the three pillars of political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people. 

The central objective of BRICS is the reformation of global governance institutions (UNSC, IMF, World Bank) reflecting the changing nature of the global financial order. It is also an advocate of multipolarity and involves in various activities, including counter-terrorism and developmental activities. It was in this regard that BRICS formed the New Development Bank (NDB) to finance the infrastructure development in emerging economies.

China and SCO

China is one of the six founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which was established in 2001 as a regional organisation for non-traditional security cooperation between China, Russia and four Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Although the SCO Charter sets out a broad array of objectives and potential areas of cooperation, the SCO has so far focused on, and gained most visibility through, its fight against regional terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism.

For China, as for the other members, the SCO represents a new and unique cooperation model, reflecting its vision of a multipolar world order as opposed to cooperation models based on US hegemony and unilateralism. Since the SCO’s inception, China has pushed its agenda and has successfully pursued its national security, geopolitical and economic interests. It has used the SCO umbrella as a multilateral platform to address external threats posed by non-state actors on its vulnerable western border; to gain a strong economic and political foothold in Central Asia without putting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership at risk; and to enhance its energy security through large-scale infrastructure investment in, and trade with, the Central Asian member states.

China and BRICS

China sees natural common ground with emerging economies, especially in the pursuit of a new international economic order and the democratization of international relations.

For China, since the BRICS countries’ share and importance in the world economy has been growing but has not yet surpassed the developed countries’, the next step, naturally, would be for them to act as one group to increase their collective voice and bargaining power against traditional developed countries. In China’s view, this momentum would democratize international relations by offering developing countries more voice and rights.

In Chinese strategic thinking, the BRI and BRICS are deeply interconnected. BRICS, comprising the world’s best performing emerging economies, is a less controversial platform and more appealing to the developing world. It is often seen as the key international mechanism that can act as the second front or as the “leading geese”, aiding and advancing China’s BRI objectives. As China-US rivalry intensifies and the BRI faces a plethora of challenges, BRICS is increasingly gaining significance for China.

Within the grouping, China sees itself as the ‘core’ of BRICS, while India as its weakest link. Brazil and South Africa are often dismissed as “free-riders”, while Russia is considered the main tool to advance Chinese interests within the BRICS framework. China is aiming to undercut the role and agency of India, Brazil and South Africa—if possible, winning over the last two using its financial heft—while utilising China-Russia ties as the bedrock for further developing BRICS in a direction that suits their interests.

It is not always easy for China to implement such a strategy. Brazil and South Africa, with their deteriorating economic performance and unstable domestic political situations, are unwilling to commit much to China and thereby compromise on their foreign policy flexibility. On the other hand, there is a constant game between China and Russia over who will use whom, to further its self-interest.

It is against this backdrop that China is proposing a BRICS expansion. Economic strength and development potential are not the sole criteria for China while considering potential BRICS members. Political and identity commonality in the context of China-US competition, geographic and locational advantages, willingness to support the BRI, are seen as important points. India needs to accurately grasp the geopolitical shifts taking place within BRICS and deftly navigate the complex dynamics between the member states to safeguard its own interests within the grouping and avoid being drawn passively into China’s Great Game.

India and SCO

India’s association with the SCO began in 2005 as an Observer country, and it became a full Member State at the Astana Summit in 2017.The government has held that joining the originally Eurasian group was important as it focuses on regional security and connectivity — areas key to India’s growth and making up its challenges, such as terrorism in Pakistan, and Chinese aggressions as well as the Belt and Road Initiative. Being “inside the tent” is important, especially as Pakistan is a member, even if that means conducting joint exercises under the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. SCO gives India an interface with Central Asian markets and resources. India-Central Asia Dialogue is a platform to engage with Central Asian Region. But SCO far outweighs India Central Asia Dialogue. Finally, joining the SCO was a key part of India’s stated ambitions on “multi-alignment” and “strategic autonomy” while becoming a “balancing power” in the world.

It was expected that India’s turn to chair the SCO this year would be a major event, rivalling the expected pomp around the G-20 meet in September. In addition, given Russia’s and China’s blocks on the G-20 joint communiqué that India is keen to find consensus on, the SCO summit would have been a convenient venue for Mr. Modi to negotiate a resolution with his counterparts. However, India’s decision to postpone the SCO summit due to the Prime Minister’s U.S. State visit, and then to turn it into a virtual summit may have been a dampener on the SCO outcomes.

India’s concerns with hosting Xi Jinping given the LAC hostilities, or Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif’s possible ‘grandstanding’, or even the optics of welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin may have been factors. Whatever the reason, while the members hammered out a New Delhi declaration and joint statements on radicalisation and digital transformation, the government was unable to forge consensus on other agreements including one on making English a formal SCO language, while India, despite being Chair, did not endorse a road map on economic cooperation, presumably due to concerns over China’s imprint.

India and BRICS

BRICS’s development-focused diplomacy resonates strongly with India’s core interests – energy security, combating terrorism, and climate change financing. At the same time, its wider and deeper issue items and agenda separate BRICS from other strategic forums that India currently participates in. BRICS constantly emphasizes themes ranging from “promoting economic recovery,” “expediting implementation of 2030 agenda on sustainable development,” and “strengthening and reforming multilateral governance.” These further reflect the socioeconomic realities that developing countries face. India’s global aspirations and interests, such as on reforms in multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund, WTO, United Nations, and U.N. Security Council are also backed by BRICS.

BRICS gives India the opportunity to voice its developmental interests in a way that no other grouping can match. In addition, BRICS members are playing a greater role in shaping the global political landscape, an area where India finds itself standing against the likes of the United States, Japan, and Australia – fellow members of Quad. In the contemporary world, BRICS represents global socioeconomic realities that are often relegated to the periphery of international politics. Indian strategic circles recognize BRICS’s primary role in shaping the international trade order, climate change policies, financing, and reformed multilateralism. New Delhi aims to play a larger role in international politics and negotiations, which would further emphasize the critical role of BRICS.

To ensure a multi-polar Asia, it is imperative for India to prevent China from increasing its area of influence through organizations like SCO and BRICS. It is also in the interest of Washington since it does not want these groupings to be echo chambers of Sino Russian axis.

The biggest challenge that India faces as a member of BRICS is China. China is actively trying to use BRICS to further its sphere of influence and to make it an anti-west group which is evident from the Chinese push for expansion of membership as well as from its stance on common currency for BRICS nations. While India, with its strategy of issue-based alignment or multi-alignment, requires BRICS for active engagement with emerging economies and for furthering its interests. While there is a call for India to come out of BRICS, it seems better for India to create a room in BRICS rather than give it away for China to further its interest. It should ensure that it does not become an anti-west grouping by making sure that new membership to the group does not take place in such a way that ensure China’s dominance. A common BRICS currency is not in the interest of India since it may affect its engagement with the West.

SCO-CHINA-BRICS-INDIA

BRICS should have balanced itself against Chinese hegemony by reviving the spirit of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) grouping, which predated BRICS. Had the IBSA spirit worked, then China and Russia would not have held sway over BRICS. Instead of the IBSA spirit, divergent reactions from South Africa and Brazil have emerged.

China will use these institutions for disseminating President Xi Jinping’s vision of international order like the Global Security Initiative and Global Development Initiative. China is trying to have a domination in these groupings and make them anti-USA and G7. China floated the idea of a common currency at BRICS. But India disapproved. China wants to expand the groupings through giving membership to countries, which are inherently pro-China. Many SCO and BRICS members are recipients of China’s investments through BRI. China will always aim to have greater influence over members in these organisations. But decisions in BRICS and SCO are taken on a consensus. Trying to ease out India from these groupings is difficult for China. As India has significant friendly relations with other member countries. Secondly, India is an important trading partner with China. Therefore, India and China are tangled up multilaterally and bilaterally.

By: Sanoop Suresh, Research Analyst, GSDN

After Narendra Modi took the oath of office in 2014, India started a journey towards deeper ties with the United Arab Emirates, and the Indian Prime Minister visited the UAE five times in the eight years afterwards. When he made his maiden trip to the UAE in 2015, Modi became the country’s first prime minister to do so in 34 years. Modi’s visit to Abu Dhabi was well received, and the following year, the ruler of the UAE, HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, paid a visit to India and later served as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebration in 2017. Over the past nine years, India and the UAE’s diplomatic and economic ties have expanded. According to official figures from the UAE, there are close to 3.5 million Indian nationals living there, making them the country’s largest ethnic group with almost 30% of the total population. As a result, the UAE is a significant player that India cannot afford to risk losing. Despite the hurdles that still lie ahead, Narendra Modi’s recent day-long visit to Abu Dhabi on July 15, 2023 offers signs of a win-win situation for both India and the UAE.

What is the outcome of this visit?

The Indian Prime Minister concluded his tour after attending various discussions on subjects ranging from economics to climate change by writing on his Twitter account, “India and UAE will keep working closely to further global good.” The main objective of the talks, according to the PMO’s official statement, was to further solidify the trade and economic ties between the two countries. In these discussions, both countries underlined their commitment to the promotion of robust and resilient food supply chains, and sought the possibilities of cooperation and diversification in the health sector. The discussion between the Indian Prime Minister and HH Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, also emphasized bilateral cooperation in the energy sector, including oil, gas, and renewable energy.  Additionally, both parties agreed to enhance investments across the board in the energy sector, including the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Programme of India. Both leaders called on the international community to preserve the long term goals of the Paris agreement and display their solidarity on “the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, considering the diverse national circumstances of each nation”, as outlined in the agreement. However, the highlight of this trip was the signing of three MoUs between India and the UAE.

The tripartite Memorandum of Understanding agreed for establishing the first-ever IIT Delhi international campus in Abu Dhabi is a significant development of Modi’s visit to the UAE. In order to operationalize IIT Delhi-Abu Dhabi by January 2024 with a Master’s programme in Energy Transition and Sustainability, the Indian Institute of Technology (Delhi), Ministry of Education, and Abu Dhabi Department of Education & Knowledge (ADEK) signed the MoU. This is a follow up to the Virtual Summit between the two leaders, which occurred in February last year, when they agreed to establish the Indian Institute of Technology in the UAE. The Reserve Bank of India and the Central Bank of the UAE also signed two other Memoranda of Understanding on the same day, and it is expected that these agreements would fundamentally alter commerce between India and the UAE.

Why will these MoUs become a game changer?

Owing to the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed on 18 February 2022, the UAE emerged as the third biggest trade partner in terms of USD $85 billion for the fiscal year 2022–2023 and the second largest export destination. With this deal, India was granted preferential market access for 97% of its tariff line in a number of industries, including pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, automobiles, jewelry and gemstones. The newly signed MoUs sought to better simplify business relations between the two nations. One among them calls for the collaboration of the Fast Payment Systems (FPSs) of the two nations, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) of India and the Instant Payment Platform (IPP) of the UAE. It also seeks to connect their payment messaging systems as well as card switches (UNSWITCH and RuPay switches).

The second MoU pushes forward for greater cooperation in trade through establishing a mechanism to promote local currencies, which is Rupees and Dirham, for Cross-border Transactions by creating a Local Currency Settlement System (LCSS). According to this, exporters and importers would be able to invoice and pay in their respective home currencies, which would promote the growth of a foreign exchange market for the INR and AED. As transaction costs and settlement times are lowered, it is anticipated that a greater usage of local currencies will benefit Indians residing in the UAE in general and low-wage employees in particular. It should be noted that these initiatives coincide with India’s efforts to reduce its reliance on the US Dollar through extending the use of the INR.

At the Micro level, Banks from 18 countries, including the UK, Germany, Malaysia, Israel, and Russia, approved to open Vostro accounts for rupee trade, and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia showed interest in local currency trade. India expects that such agreements will increase currency stability and minimize the volatility in international commerce relative to the value of the US dollar. On a macro level, the US dollar’s dominance is occasionally questioned, and more nations are attempting to trade in their own currencies to protect bilateral commerce from external fluctuations. Despite the fact that India and the UAE assert that there is no plan to “de-dollarize” the world economy by citing the bilateral character of this agreement, this initiative drives the efforts in that direction. Although this visit and the associated agreements can be seen as a step forward in India and the UAE’s relationship, it is also under the shadow of uncertainties and challenges.

Why isn’t it a straight road for India and UAE?

Although there is a leap in the India-UAE trade share as a result of the CEPA of 2022, the disparity in the Import-Export rate is considerably huge and these statistics raise some questions regarding the future of the India-UAE agreement on the use of local currency in bilateral trade. According to data released by the Indian Embassy in the United Arab Emirates, the value of bilateral commerce between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi surged by 68.3% in the fiscal year 2021–2022 compared to the prior year, totaling USD 72878.31 million. However, there is a 16,788.55 million USD deficit in Indian exports to the UAE. According to their most recent estimate, this disparity persisted in 2022–2023 between April and September with an imbalance of $12,341.51 million USD. This disparity leaves Abu Dhabi with an excess of INR and raises the question of whether this agreement will take the same trajectory as the debate over trade in rupees and rubles. To get around all of these concerns, India has to increase its share of bilateral trade, and New Delhi expects the CEPA will make that possible.

Another hurdle in their usually cordial relationship is the deadlock in their negotiations to revise the 2014 Air Service Agreement (ASA). The UAE ambassador to India noted that “it would be difficult to accommodate the new demands for travel between the two countries” unless India agreed to find common ground in modifying ASA. The Ministry of Civil Aviation expressed reluctance to expand the number of seats between UAE cities and around 15 Indian cities due to worries that it may hurt Indian airlines’ business, which led to a 45–50% spike in airfare in the nation’s major cities. Breaking through these impasses and locating a common ground is crucial to enhancing the connection between the two nations when we take into account the significance of India-UAE ties and the recent developments signal a more promising future for both countries.

By: Aqib Rehman, Research Analyst, GSDN

There is little doubt that China has been rising since last 40 years and now is presenting a formidable challenge to the United States of America with its rising economic power. Whether in the West Asia or in the Central Asia, America is facing significant challenge to its hegemony from the Peoples Republic of China.

In this case Afghanistan which is considered of great importance in the regions of South and Central Asia becomes more important for China to increase its presence in both the regions. After America withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, China found a window to promote its interests and started not only backdoor communication with the Taliban but also invited their leaders to China. Therefore, it becomes important to understand the China’s interests in Afghanistan and examine the geopolitical implications of China’s increased presence in Afghanistan. However, it is important to first look at the historical connections between the two countries.

History of the Relations

The ancient relations between China and Afghanistan were closely tied to the historic Silk Road, an extensive network of trade routes that facilitated the exchange of goods, culture, and ideas between the East and the West. The Silk Road was not a single route but a web of interconnected trade paths that spanned from China through Central Asia, the Middle East, and into Europe.

Taking advantage of this rute China exported silk, porcelain, tea, spices, and other luxury goods to the West, while Afghanistan and the surrounding areas provided valuable commodities like precious stones, metals, textiles, and agricultural products. This route also facilitated the exchange of culture, art, religion and knowledge. The spread of Buddhism in China from India was an important contribution of the Silk-Route. This route also provided the means of communication and diplomatic interactions between China and Afghanistan. This gave a strategic importance to this route.

After the successful liberation of China in 1949, Afghanistan was among the first countries to recognise China’s new government under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Both the countries established formal relations in the year 1955. Under the non-alignment ideology, both rejected the interference by major powers in the internal affairs of third-world countries.

The Sino-Soviet split during 1960s as a result of ideological differences posed a significant challenge to the Afghan rulers and they first sort to balance the relations between the two. However, as the tensions deepened, Afghans gravitated towards USSR. The communist coup of April 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a decade-long war known as Soviet-Afghan war.

China strongly opposed the Soviet invasion and provided support to various Afghan resistance groups, including the mujahideen, through arms and other means.

China was deeply concerned about the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan for several reasons like Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was perceived as a direct threat to China’s security interests. Afghanistan’s proximity to China’s western Xinjiang region raised concerns about potential spillover effects of the conflict. China feared that instability in Afghanistan could spill over into its own territory, possibly inspiring separatist movements among its Muslim minority population in Xinjiang.

the Soviet Union’s military presence in Afghanistan also raised concerns about its expanding influence in the region. China viewed the invasion as part of a broader Soviet strategy to gain greater control in South Asia and the Middle East, which would have ramifications for China’s strategic interests.

After the fall of Taliban in 2001, China Afghan relations continued to evolve influenced by the regional developments and the global shifts in the international order. During the first two decades China focused its energy in the areas of security, economic engagement and regional stability.

Chinese companies were interested in the natural resources of Afghanistan and they invested heavily during this period in Afghanistan. Most notable investment was by the China national petroleum corporation in the exploration of oil resources in the Northern Afghanistan. China was also concerned about the regional stability and the spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan to the Xinjiang province. To counter this, China cooperated with the regional players.

Apart from engaging with the Afghan leaders, China during this period provided humanitarian, infrastructural and economic aid to Afghanistan. It also participated in the Afghan peace process and favoured the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

As the U.S. announced its plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in 2014, China adopted a more pragmatic approach towards the Taliban. With the prospect of a potential power vacuum and concerns about regional security, China engaged with the group to safeguard its interests. However, it did not explicitly endorse the Taliban as a legitimate government in Afghanistan.

China in Afghanistan: Geopolitical implications

The first important geopolitical implication of Afghanistan is its location. It is located at a place where it connects two regions of Asia with each other. Afghanistan’s location makes it potentially important for China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure and trade project connecting China with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Afghanistan’s inclusion in BRI could facilitate better connectivity and trade routes for China.

Second geopolitical or geoeconomic importance of Afghanistan is its abundance in natural resources. It has rear-earth metals such as lanthanum, cerium, neodymium and veins of gold, silver and zinc. China, who’s economy is hungry of raw materials had maintained backdoor connections with the Taliban leaders is now seeking the exploration of these resources. The abundance of natural resources is of great geopolitical significance not only for the Chinese but some neighbouring countries are also concerned about the China’s growing influence in this region.

Third important geopolitical implication of China in Afghanistan is related to the regional stability and the counterterrorism. China is constantly worried about the spillover effect of Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. It does not want the separatists of Xinjiang province to be emboldened by this situation. Therefore, it is important for China to cooperate with the Taliban government to ensure stability in the Xinjiang province.

Another significant geopolitical implication of China’s involvement in Afghanistan is related to its dream of becoming a global leader. By engaging in Afghanistan’s affairs and actively supporting the country’s development and peace efforts, China seeks to present itself as a reliable partner and mediator in resolving international conflicts. China is aware of the fact that in order to become a global leader it first needs to be a regional leader.

By engaging with Afghanistan, China can demonstrate its willingness to take on a more proactive role in addressing regional challenges and conflicts. This engagement can also strengthen China’s ties with other neighbouring countries and enhance its influence in Central Asia. China also provides humanitarian aid to Afghans. This is considered as a tool to project country’s soft-power. By employing such steps China seeks to improve its global image of a benign and a responsible power.

One of the important geopolitical implications of China’s involvement in Afghanistan is that countries like India who have strategic interests in Afghanistan are witnessing significant decline in the kind of influence which they once enjoyed. China, which is seeking a global leadership will not allow any other regional country to exert influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important for the countries like India to find suitable ways to engage with the Afghan government in order to protect their strategic interests.

China from the ancient times has had a cordial relation with Afghanistan. Silk-Route had been a primary means of communication between the two countries which is now being revived through the Belt and Road Initiative. China never involved itself in the Afghanistan by using its army. Therefore, it enjoys favourable conditions within the Taliban government and has been allowed to explore the natural resources of Afghanistan. This is of great geopolitical significance not only for the Chinese but also for the other regional players like India. Only the time will tell whether China will be able to sustain itself in Afghanistan or it will face the same fate as the previous global powers. After-all, Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires.

By: Khushboo Agrahari

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has experienced significant transformations in its domestic and international standing. This note examines India’s role in the new world order and the impact of Prime Minister Modi’s leadership on shaping India’s global engagement, economic policies, and strategic initiatives.

Economic Reforms and Global Integration

Under his tenure we have witnessed a strong focus on economic reforms and attracting foreign investments. Initiatives like “Make in India” and “Digital India” have aimed to boost manufacturing, promote entrepreneurship, and harness India’s demographic dividend. The introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) have streamlined India’s business environment, making it more attractive to investors. These efforts have positioned India as a global economic player and improved its ease of doing business ranking.

Act East Policy and Regional Integration

Prime Minister Modi’s Act East Policy has emphasized India’s commitment to strengthening its ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s engagement with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations, Japan, Australia, and other regional powers has deepened economic cooperation, strategic partnerships, and people-to-people ties. The expansion of India’s Look East Policy to an Act East Policy reflects a proactive approach in leveraging regional integration and advancing India’s interests in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Diplomatic Outreach and Soft Power

Prime Minister Modi’s leadership has invigorated India’s diplomatic engagements and enhanced its soft power globally. Frequent high-level visits, including to countries that were previously neglected, have bolstered bilateral relations and opened new avenues for collaboration. The personal rapport Prime Minister has cultivated with world leaders has elevated India’s international standing. Furthermore, initiatives like the International Day of Yoga and the International Solar Alliance have projected India’s cultural and technological prowess, further enhancing its soft power.

Security and Counterterrorism Efforts

We saw how the Prime Minister has prioritized national security and counterterrorism measures to safeguard India’s interests in the new world order. The “Neighborhood First” policy aims to strengthen India’s relationships with its immediate neighbors, promoting stability and economic cooperation. Under his leadership, India has taken a strong stance against terrorism, particularly in the context of cross-border attacks, and has advocated for global cooperation in combating the scourge of terrorism.

Geopolitical Shifts and Strategic Partnerships

He has pursued strategic partnerships with key global powers to address regional and global challenges. Strengthening ties with the United States, Japan, and Israel has resulted in deepened defense cooperation, technology transfers, and joint military exercises. These partnerships have not only bolstered India’s security capabilities but have also contributed to a more multipolar world order.

His leadership has played a significant role in positioning India in the new world order. Through economic reforms, regional integration efforts, diplomatic outreach, and security initiatives, India has emerged as a major global player under his stewardship. As India continues to navigate the complexities and opportunities of the new world order, Prime Minister Modi’s vision and strategic approach will undoubtedly shape the trajectory of India’s engagement on the global stage.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Background of Indian-African Relations

The historical relationship between Africa and India can be traced back to ancient times, specifically the Bronze Age in the Indus Valley Civilization and interactions between India and ancient Egypt. During the medieval period, there was an increase in commercial routes between the Mediterranean and Asia through Arabia, which facilitated contact between India and Africa. This period also witnessed the presence of Hindu traders along the southeastern coast of Mozambique in Africa.

The historical dimension of African-Indian relations is imbued with political implications. Both Africa and India experienced the intrusion of colonialism and its subsequent consequences, as the British colonial administration exerted control over the Indian Subcontinent and significant portions of Africa. The aforementioned concept was further strengthened by India’s endorsement of anti-colonial liberation movements and the attainment of independence by African nations, along with India’s display of solidarity during the Cold War in the 1960s.

Upon observing various regions in Africa, particularly East, and Southern Africa, one can discern the presence of significant cultural connections between the continent and India. According to a report from 2014, the Indian diaspora in Africa holds significant economic and cultural significance. The report indicates that Indian communities can be found in 46 African nations, constituting approximately 12.37% of the total Indian Diaspora. During the tenure of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Indian government demonstrated its “resource diplomacy” in Africa by organizing the inaugural India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008. This summit brought together leaders from 14 African nations, who collectively pledged $ 5 billion in credit and provided substantial amounts of aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, in the year 2010, Singh founded the Indian Overseas Facilitation Centre to enhance economic relations and commemorate the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Indian indentured laborers in South Africa.

Importance of Africa

Geostrategic

The geographical proximity between India and Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa region, renders Africa of utmost significance to India’s security. This region is characterized by the emergence of threats such as radicalism, piracy, and organized crime.

Economic

• Africa has the potential to contribute significantly to the diversification of our energy sources, aligning with the stated objective of our Integrated Energy Policy.
• Africa is home to a significant abundance of valuable minerals and metals, such as gold and diamonds.
• Africa offers a favourable environment for Indian investment.
• Africa possesses a substantial amount of agricultural land that has the potential to contribute significantly to India’s food security. India is considering the possibility of leasing land in Africa as a potential solution to address the scarcity of arable land that we currently encounter.

Geopolitical

The endorsement of African nations holds significant importance for India’s pursuit of securing a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Africa serves as a platform for showcasing both India’s soft and hard power capabilities.

India has demonstrated a proactive engagement in fostering peace and stability within African nations by actively participating in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. India is actively engaged in the process of enhancing the capabilities and skills of African nations through capacity building initiatives. Africa is the primary recipient of India’s ITEC program, which is the largest in terms of beneficiaries.

The Current Areas of Collaboration between India and Africa

The Conclave of India-Africa Project Partnership was formed in 2005, with the primary objective of fostering economic collaboration between India and Africa. The project has played a crucial role in fostering the establishment of Indian enterprises in Africa. Furthermore, the establishment of the India-Africa Summit played a crucial role in institutionalizing and formalizing India’s diplomatic ties with its African counterparts, representing a significant landmark in the realm of Indian- African relations. In recent times, there has been a notable focus on economic engagement between India and Africa, characterized by an increasing trade volume and a growing portfolio of investments. India exhibits a proclivity towards the private sector when it comes to skill and capacity-building initiatives in domains such as health care, agriculture, the digital revolution, and educational collaboration. Moreover, it is worth noting that the significance of marine security cannot be understood in the context of India’s diplomatic ties with countries such as Kenya, South Africa, and other coastal nations and islands.

Areas of collaboration:

1. Economic Involvement: Africa’s rich resources, growing middle class, and big working-age population attract international competitors and global powers. India’s consumer-driven goods in agriculture, clothes, pharmaceuticals, and automotive components have enhanced the continent’s significance thanks to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). India launched concessional lines of credit (LOC) in 2003 to boost development collaborations. From 2008 to 2011, India pledged about US$8 billion in LoCs to African states.

Despite the difference between promised funds and actual lines of Credit (LoCs) provided to Africa, recent reports have positioned India as one of the continent’s main funders. India is one of Africa’s top five investors with $74 billion invested in oil and gas, mining, banking, pharmaceuticals, textiles, automotive, and agriculture. The Ministry of External Affairs of India said that under LoCs with Africa in different sectors, 193 projects have been completed, 66 are under execution, and 88 are under pre-execution.

Bilateral trade between India and Africa has grown consistently year after year. For example, in 2020, India exported 5.2% of the continent’s global exports and imported 7%, India has made a substantial investment of $7 billion in a gas field located in Mozambique. Simultaneously, he also asserted that India serves as the third-largest export destination for Africa. Petroleum products accounted for the majority of India’s exports, followed by pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and grains. Moreover, India’s primary African export destinations encompass South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania Conversely, India predominantly imports mineral fuels, crude oil, natural or cultivated pearls, and precious stones from South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt and Morocco among other countries.

• Medical Tourism: India’s involvement and development cooperation with Africa includes health care delivery, as shown by the US$10 million India-Africa Health Fund created during the 2015 third India- Africa Forum Summit. Africans traveling to India for medical treatment increased from 5.4% of total tourist visits in 2010 to 15.4% in 2019, Indian and African healthcare professionals work together on hospital construction and capacity development. India offered food help to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea and 150 metric tonnes of medical supplies to 25 African countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. While some African authorities have condemned the West’s attitude to the continent’s COVID-19 immunization efforts, India kept its vaccine supply lines open throughout the pandemic.

• Education and Information Technology: In recent times, there has been a growing interest among individuals from African nations in Indian universities and research institutions. As of the year 2022, the Indian government has disbursed more than 30,000 scholarships to students from Africa, to the commitment made by the country in 2015 to provide a total of 50,000 scholarships over ten years.

The Indian technological and economic partnership program helps Africa research and build capacity via training and scientific and technological partnerships. Considering the significance of the information and communication technology (ICT) industry in the progress of Africa and the endeavours of various African nations to expedite their technological infrastructure and digital identification, as well as optimize the trade advantages offered by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), India has emerged as a prominent suggestion for collaboration and cooperation. The flagship ICT project Pan African e-Network, proposed in 2004 and launched in 2009 by India and the African Union, connects African countries through a seamless and integrated satellite, fiber optics, and wireless network and uses Indian IT skills to improve healthcare and education in their institutions.

         The first international campus of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) in Tanzania represents a milestone in India’s Global South initiative and highlights the commitment to develop educational relations between India and Africa. The digital transformation in India has played a significant role in enhancing education and healthcare in Africa through the implementation of e-VidyaBharti, a tele-education platform, and e-ArogyaBharti, a telemedicine platform. 

• Security and Defence: The aspect in question is frequently disregarded in scholarly discourse concerning the relations between India and Africa. While there is a perception that India’s increased focus on Africa is a response to China’s growing influence on the continent, encompassing trade, business, and maritime activities, PM Modi addressed the issue of collaboration with Africa during his visit to Uganda in 2018.

He emphasized India’s commitment to combat terrorism, promote peacekeeping efforts, and enhance cyber security as fundamental principles guiding India’s engagement with Africa. India’s historical assistance, which established military academics and trained national cadres and military personalities in African countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria and sent UN missions to Congo and Liberia, may be its greatest asset in this regard. India cooperates with Mauritius, Seychelles, and numerous African coastal nations on maritime security. The Africa-India field Training Exercise-2019 and numerous Indian institutes have promoted Indian-made weaponry to African nations facing instability. 

Can India Effectively Compete with China in Africa?

India and China are pursuing their interests in Africa in numerous ways. Despite the Indian government’s claim that its cooperation with Africa is a blend of India’s development goals and the African Union’s long-term vision, most of India’s policies and trade patterns with Africa remain constrained. India’s ties with the African Union, capacity and skills development, education and research, healthcare, and information technology demonstrate its people-centered approach to the continent. The Indian government also prioritizes cultural contacts with Eastern and Southern Africa, which some experts see as a chance to reestablish historical ties. 

Nevertheless, China’s dominant economic influence and significance in Africa remain unparalleled, surpassing not only India but also numerous other contenders. In 2021, Beijing’s total bilateral trade with Africa surged by 35.3% to reach USD 254.3 billion. China’s strategic focus primarily lies in the implementation of ambitious infrastructural projects, which serve the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and establish partnerships encompassing resource extraction and high-level government agreements.

These large-scale endeavours are aimed at bolstering China’s economy, expanding its global influence, and safeguarding its strategic objectives. China has a plan to promote its interests among regional blocs and geostrategic African states, unlike India’s limited outreach and penetration. India’s security and military collaboration with Africa is limited, the private sector doesn’t properly grasp Africa’s investment climate. China, on the other hand, has helped military reform in Africa by providing weapons, technology, and independent capacity-building. Since the West sanctioned Russia, China has increased its military outposts, maritime activity, and arms sales to African governments.

Potential Strategies for Progress

a) It is imperative to assert direct authority over our development programme rather than delegating the allocation of funds to intermediaries whose objectives may diverge from those of India.

b) Our assistance should be bilateral and linked with the recipient state’s interests, which should be a major stakeholder and co-investor in plans and projects from start to finish.

c)Second, India should prioritize developing nations with major interests, both current and future. Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Angola, and Algeria are India’s top six commercial partners in Africa, accounting for about two-thirds of its commerce and half of its exports to the continent, although they are not prioritized in India’s growth.

d)The consideration of India’s domestic requirements for raw materials, commodities, and markets should be taken into account when determining its aid strategy.

e) In addition, it is advisable to prioritize assisting nations that demonstrate a willingness to collaborate with us by granting access to their natural resources, rather than relying solely on our generic alternatives.

f) The assisted project should meet local needs. Cost-effective, scalable, future-proof, and commercially repeatable.

g) India should favor public sector assistance initiatives for transparency.

Conclusion

Historically, India’s diplomatic ties with Africa have been rooted in their shared endeavours to combat colonialism, apartheid, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and hunger. There have been modifications in policy, strategy, and implementation. The profound reflection of this sentiment is most evident in the two outcome documents of the India-Africa Forum Summit Ⅲ (IAFS-Ⅲ), namely the Delhi Declaration 2015 and the India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation. India’s leadership’s effectiveness in calming Africa’s concerns will be shown in the following months and years. It’s crucial to show Africa that India’s foreign policy prioritizes it. A white paper on Africa might solidify India’s African strategy.

By: Rahul Wankhede

Introduction

After a period of inactivity following the Balakot airstrikes carried out by the Indian Air Force, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terror group, headquartered in Bahawalpur, seems to have revitalized its tactics to regain prominence in the terrorism landscape of Kashmir. In April 2023, the group claimed responsibility for the Poonch terror attack, where Indian Army soldiers were ambushed by Jaish terrorists. Additionally, the group has issued threats to target mines and industries in the region. Given the group’s renewed focus on Kashmir, it becomes crucial to examine its origins and journey up until 2019.

How the group was formed

JeM, meaning the ‘Army of Mohammed,’ is a relatively new organization founded on December 31, 2000. It is a Sunni Islamic group with its headquarters in Bahawalpur, located in the Pakistani Punjab province. The founder of JeM is Maulana Masood Azhar, who was previously associated with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and shares ideological alignment with the Deobandi school of thought. Masood Azhar received training at the same religious seminary in Karachi as the Taliban founder Mullah Omar.

After gaining experience in Afghanistan, Masood Azhar established alliances with Harkat affiliates in Chechnya, Central Asia, and Somalia. He also established connections with Osama bin Laden during his fundraising mission in the United Kingdom. Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested by security forces on February 11, 1994, in Anantnag, Jammu and Kashmir, while serving as the General Secretary of the now-defunct Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in December 1999 was orchestrated to secure Masood Azhar’s release from prison. His younger brother, Mufti Abdul Rauf, and brother-in-law, Yusuf Azhar, were among the hijackers. Following his release, Azhar travelled to Bahawalpur, Pakistan, and announced the formation of a new outfit called JeM at the Binori mosque in Karachi, which received significant participation from existing terror groups. JeM has been officially banned in Pakistan since 2002.

Objectives of Jaish-e-Mohammed

 JeM shares similar objectives with other terrorist organizations operating in the Kashmir region, primarily aiming to secede Kashmir from India and merge it with Pakistan. Once Kashmir is liberated, the group intends to expand its jihad to other parts of India, with the goal of driving out Hindus and non-Muslims from the Indian subcontinent. JeM also seeks to expel United States and Western forces from Afghanistan. Masood Azhar, in 1994 after his arrest in Kashmir, expressed his intention to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule and establish Islamic rule. He also voiced his opposition to Israel and what he perceived as “anti-Muslim” forces worldwide. Masood Azhar, in a speech in Karachi, was reported to have said, “Marry for jihad, give birth for jihad, and earn money only for jihad until the cruelty of America and India ends.”

Ideological Foundations

 The Binori mosque serves as a significant source of ideological foundations for JeM, adhering to the Deobandi Sunni school of thought. Extremist leaders such as Fazlur Rahman Khalil of HuM and Maulana Azam Tariq, a leader of Siaph-e-Sahiba, are alumni of this mosque. Masood Azhar himself was a student of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the founder of Sipah-e-Sahaba. JeM also had a website that published articles written by Masood Azhar, which often focused on the so-called “Jewish conspiracy to incite America for the invasion of Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

Leadership & Organizational Structure

 JeM operates through several departments overseen by a 12-member consultative committee called Markaz-e-majilis-e-Shura. The organization consists of departments such as the Military Department, Department of Prisoners, Department of Dawat and Irshad, Martyrs Department, Department of Grievance Redressal, Department of Matrimony, and Department of Broadcasting and Publication. The Military Department further comprises four sub-units: Madrasa Syed Ahmed Shaheed in Balakot, Camp Muzaffarabad, Camp Hajera, and Camp Mansehra. The Balakot Madrasa serves as an advanced training ground for JeM fighters and hosts annual conferences. Family members of Masood Azhar actively participate in the functioning of JeM. His brother, Abdul Rauf Asghar, holds a senior leadership position within JeM and serves as its intelligence coordinator. He was involved in the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 and directed the terrorists during the 2016 Pathankot attack through telephone communication. Abdul Rauf Asghar has been designated as a “global terrorist” by the US Treasury Department.

Areas of Operations & Strategy

 JeM primarily focuses on carrying out attacks within India. They have conducted suicide bombings, targeted state authorities, army bases, camps, convoys, and other significant establishments. Their weapons of choice include machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, IEDs, and rocket-propelled grenades. JeM has also engaged in activities like abductions, hijackings, and targeted bombings. The group exhibits sophisticated communication methods, meticulous attack planning, and effective utilization of local human intelligence, making them deadlier than other militant groups in Kashmir. Simultaneously planning multiple high-profile attacks has become a recent trend for JeM, as seen after the CRPF convoy attack, where a suspect from Bathinda was arrested in a car bomb blast case, reportedly intended to replicate the Pulwama attack.

Outside of India, JeM carried out an attack on the Indian Mission in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, in 2016. The group has operational ties with other militant organizations like HuM, Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, conducting joint operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. JeM has engaged in suicide missions targeting Pakistani officials in cities such as Islamabad, Karachi, Murree, Taxila, and Bahawalpur.

Capabilities (military and finance)

 JeM receives funding primarily through charitable front trusts like Al-Rasheed and Al-Akhtar, which operate as social welfare organizations but are involved in raising funds for various terror groups. The group has also allegedly received financial support from Al Qaeda. Donations are raised through propaganda, distribution of pamphlets, posters, and write-ups in religious and political magazines. The JeM has reportedly invested funds in commodity markets, real estate, and the production of commodity goods. Pakistan seized JeM’s bank accounts in the country, but the group had already withdrawn its funds. JeM has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Support Bases

JeM witnessed rapid advancement after its establishment in 2000, and its launch in Karachi attracted around 10,000 attendees. The group has bases in various locations, ranging from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Doda in South Kashmir. JeM benefits from ground support and sheltering provided by the Pakistani ISI. A significant portion of JeM’s membership is from Punjab in Pakistan, particularly from Multan, Bahawalpur, and Rahim Khan districts. The shared ethnicity with the Pakistani military corps (Punjabis) was expected to align JeM with the military’s strategic goals. JeM also has members from Afghanistan and Arab countries. Ahmed Omar Sheikh, convicted of murdering American journalist Daniel Pearl, has close associations with JeM leaders. The group maintains connections with its ancestor organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, as well as operational ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba. JeM is part of the ISI-sponsored United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization of militant groups operating in Kashmir.

Current Status, Emerging Trends, Scope for Growth

While senior leader Ghazi Baba was killed in an operation by the Indian Army in August 2003, JeM still poses an active threat due to its global networks. The earthquake of 2005 destroyed many of its training camps, but the group quickly recovered. JeM is now considered one of the deadliest terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, with a broader agenda of Pan-Islamism and anti-Americanism due to its international connections. The Pakistani government’s detention and subsequent release of Masood Azhar on multiple occasions, often under external pressure, represent a futile exercise in showcasing justice. JeM exemplifies the complex network of cross-border terrorism faced by India and indicates the trend of decentralization in the new era of international terrorism, where self-inspired lateral networks are proving to be more dangerous than the original group itself.

The February 2019 Balakot strike by the Indian Air Force is said to have done a significant damage to JeM, as the chosen target area was sealed off for almost a month by Pakistan and access to outside people was cut off. Since then, JeM has not been able to carry out any kinds of anti-India activity. This is not to say that all future attacks have been prevented or the group is now defunct. This period is being used as a breathing time by the outfit to regroup and plan future attacks, obvious in which, the help of Pakistani deep state will be instrumental. A tinge of this was felt in 2022 when a Jaish terrorist recruited from Pulwama, came to Nagpur for conducting a reconnaissance of the RSS Headquarters and other prospective targets. He was subsequently arrested and is currently lodged in a jail.

A change of tactic that has been adopted by Jaish is to create affiliate groups and operate through them. One such group goes around by the name of PAFF – People’s Anti-Fascist Front. The wording of this name is different and ‘secular’ from the religious toning of the previous name of ‘Jaish-e-Mohammed’. The name also gives out a false impression that its target is ‘fascist forces within India’. This will be later on used to selectively portray the Indian state as a ‘fascist force’. This change of names and tactics is due to severe international pressure on Pakistan to act against terror groups. While Jaish is located inside Pakistan, PAFF claims to have originated in Kashmir itself – another change of tactic to give legitimacy to their cause. A third visible change of tactic is moving away from spectacular and high-value attacks to ambushes and localized attacks with an added aspect of marketing and publicity.

While the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack were quite big in terms of the ‘target value’ and the location, the attack in Poonch was a commando style operation – carried out by a small team of terrorists who came in to attack, carried out the killings and fled the spot. They did not come there to wait and hold ground and to ‘die like a shaheed’. The Poonch attack was very well planned and coordinated by them, obviously not without local support. The target selection and the location of attack was also selected in way that would benefit the terrorists. As a result, the army vehicle was completely destroyed in the attack, and all soldiers occupying the army truck died on the spot, except one who is battling for his life in a hospital. The terrorists also recorded some clips of the attack as was visible from some of the clips shared by PAFF online, with complementary propaganda of more attacks to be done, just a few days after the attack. This is a strategy used to earn media coverage and signal to the government that ‘we are still capable of hurting you’.

It now remains for the security agencies to be on their high alert and work towards preventing further attacks, a long-term strategy for which would be to try for complete elimination of this problem from its very roots, that includes conducting overt and covert operations against all the terror groups, especially in areas where they are mainly located (outside and inside the Indian borders). This demands policy and perspective changes at the highest levels of national security management and decision making that needs to evolve as per the dynamic contemporary security scenarios.