By: Priya Naik. Research Analyst, GSDN

The 21st century has witnessed a profound transformation in global power dynamics, marked by China’s economic dominance and Russia’s assertive resurgence. These shifts have disrupted the post-Cold War unipolar order dominated by United States (hereafter, US), creating a strategic triangle where Western Europe must navigate competing pressures from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. While maintaining its traditional transatlantic security alliance through NATO, Europe now faces dual challenges that are to manage Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics and territorial ambitions, particularly in Eastern Europe region, while addressing China’s expanding economic footprint through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative.

This complex landscape forces Western Europe to balance its liberal democratic values with pragmatic economic interests. China’s investments in critical infrastructure and technology sectors have exposed its vulnerabilities, encouraging EU wide screening mechanisms for foreign acquisitions. Simultaneously, Russia’s energy leverage and disinformation campaigns test European cohesion. The region’s response reflects a cautious, multifaceted strategy reinforcing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) deterrence against Russian aggression while pursuing selective economic engagement with China, albeit with heightened scrutiny of strategic dependencies.

Historical Background and Strategic Context

NATO, established in 1949, represented the cornerstone of Western Europe’s security framework against Soviet expansionism in the region. This alliance formalised US protection of Western Europe during the Cold War and beyond. Consecutively, Western European nations developed significant energy dependencies on Russia, which by 2021 supplied 25% of the EU’s oil and 45% of its gas imports. Despite pledges to sever these ties following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe continues to maintain energy connections with Russia in 2025, with countries like France, Hungary, Austria and Spain still purchasing Russian fossil fuels.

EU-China relations, formalised in 1975, entered their diplomatic stage between 2000-2004, with mutual recognition as strategic partners in 2003. China’s economic presence in Europe expanded dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis in Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative has evolved in Europe, shifting from infrastructure projects toward financial and monetary connectivity in Western Europe, while Eastern European nations continue to embrace Chinese investment, creating a “two-speed Europe” regarding China engagement. EU policy now characterises its relationship with China as a mixture of “partnership, competition and systemic rivalry“.

The EU simultaneously favours multilateralism while adhering to American “de-risking” methods toward China, seeks economic revitalisation while hesitating to expand technological cooperation with China, and seeks strategic autonomy while maintaining its reliance on the US. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has contributed to this problem, sparking discussions about NATO’s modern mission and producing a paradoxical scenario in which actions taken to reassure Eastern partners exacerbate rather than lessen tensions with Russia.

Western Europe and Russia: Confrontation and Containment

The relationship between Western Europe and Russia has deteriorated significantly since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, evolving into a complex pattern of containment strategies, economic sanctions, energy politics, and information warfare. This confrontation has reshaped European security architecture, energy policies and diplomatic relations simultaneously exposing internal divisions within the European Union and NATO regarding how to effectively counter Russian aggression.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the European Union implemented comprehensive sanctions targeting the country. These economic restrictions included import bans on Crimean products, prohibitions on EU based companies investing in the region and export restrictions on goods related to transport, telecommunications and energy sectors. The sanctions have repeatedly been extended since their implementation, aimed at imposing economic costs on Russia for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

NATO was brought together by Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, which led to the bolstering of defences along its eastern flank. To show the “allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate allied response to any aggression,” NATO built an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In January 2017, the United States demonstrated its presence in Central Europe and commitment to collective defence by sending M1A2 Abrams tanks to Poland further solidifying this commitment.

Russia has deployed sophisticated hybrid warfare tactics against Europe, blending conventional military threats with non-kinetic methods targeting political, social and economic vulnerabilities. With Russia using its position as a major supplier as a weapon to influence European countries that rely on its resources, the energy sector has turned into a vital battlefield. State owned businesses like Gazprom have been carefully employed by the Kremlin to further its foreign policy goals and keep influence over neighbouring nations.

Disinformation campaigns represent another pillar of Russia’s hybrid strategy. France, Germany and Poland have become “permanent” targets for Russian disinformation attacks, with narratives tailored to each country’s specific sensitivities. In France, these operations focused on the Olympic Games; in Germany, they exploited concerns over migration and security; while in Poland, they promoted narratives portraying Ukrainian refugees as burdensome. These tactics seek to undermine European resolve against Russian aggression, promote division, and weaken faith in institutions.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a watershed moment in European security. The war prompted unprecedented European unity in supporting Ukraine and implementing sanctions against Russia. Just two days after Germany suspended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, Russia launched its invasion demonstrating the interconnection between energy policy and security concerns.

The war accelerated Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Nord Stream 2, once a symbol of Germany’s policy of building “political bridges through trade,” became emblematic of a failed strategy that had driven the country into “fatal dependence on Russian oil and gas“. Russia’s subsequent attacks on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in February 2024 further highlighted its willingness to weaponise energy to weaken Europe’s supply during its transition away from Russian resources.

There are still major differences over Russia policy within the European Union and NATO, despite greater cooperation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Different member nations still have different opinions about the Russian threat, especially when it comes to whether Russia will attack NATO countries in the Baltic. Developing a cohesive, long term plan is made more difficult by these conflicting threat perceptions.

Southern NATO members have expressed concerns that the alliance focuses disproportionately on Eastern security challenges while neglecting threats from the South, weakening overall solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, logistical challenges in moving troops and equipment across Europe to the Eastern flank demonstrate practical limitations in NATO’s defensive capabilities. These divisions reflect varied historical experiences, geographic positions and economic ties with Russia, creating persistent fault lines in European policy coordination.

Western Europe and China: Cooperation and Caution

Western Europe’s relationship with China has evolved into a complex dynamic of economic interdependence tempered by growing strategic caution. While trade and investment remain central pillars, geopolitical tensions, human rights concerns, and competing visions of global order have led Europe to adopt a more guarded approach.

China is the EU’s largest import partner ($588.86 billion in 2024) and third largest export market ($242.57 billion), creating a record $346.28 billion trade deficit. The proposed EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), concluded in principle in 2020, seeks to remove barriers like joint venture requirements and technology transfer mandates in the manufacturing sector representing 50% of EU foreign direct investment in China. However, ratification remains stalled due to political tensions.

The EU has increasingly criticised China’s policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, with the European Parliament urging targeted sanctions against Chinese officials and restrictions on dual use technology exports. This aligns with the bloc’s “de-risking” strategy, which aims to diversify supply chains and reduce critical dependencies without full decoupling. The approach reflects tensions between economic pragmatism and values-based diplomacy.

Initiatives like Italy’s 2019 entry to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy in Central Europe, which revealed the EU’s coordination flaws during the pandemic, were significant victories for China. These initiatives have encountered increasing doubts, though, as forceful diplomacy and human rights issues have caused China’s soft power in Europe to decrease.

The EU has strengthened security and tech partnerships with Indo Pacific democracies like Japan and India while aligning more closely with U.S. positions on technology controls and maritime security. This balancing act seeks to counter Chinese influence without fully mirroring Washington’s confrontational stance.

The EU-China partnership currently functions within more constrained boundaries, combining increased competition in technology and governance models with selective collaboration in trade and climate. Europe faces a tightrope walk that calls for constant cooperation among its frequently disparate member states in order to preserve economic involvement while upholding democratic norms and fostering resilience against coercive techniques.

Strategic Dilemmas for Western Europe

Western Europe faces compounding strategic dilemmas as it navigates competing pressures from global powers, internal divisions, and the urgent need to secure critical supply chains. The EU’s attempt to balance economic pragmatism with geopolitical resilience has exposed vulnerabilities in its approach to the US-China-Russia triangle.

The US push for alignment against China and Russia clashes with Europe’s economic realities. While 66% of EU-China trade involves Chinese imports ($588.86 billion in 2024), distancing a risk of disrupting green transition industries dependent on Chinese rare earths and EV components. Simultaneously, Trump’s trade policies and demands to reduce Chinese reliance exacerbate transatlantic tensions, with the Euro depreciating 12% since October 2024 due to growth concerns. Russia’s energy coercion evident in its 2024 attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure has accelerated Europe’s shift to renewables, though complete gas independence by 2025 requires tripling clean energy deployment rates.

There are serious vulnerabilities because China controls 90% of the world’s solar panel output and 98% of EU imports of rare earth elements. Given current rates below 1%, the EU’s ambition to get 25% of essential minerals through recycling by 2030 is viewed with scepticism. As evidenced by recent trade restrictions impacting $22.7 billion in bilateral trade, this reliance makes it more difficult to implement tariffs to stop Chinese EV dumping.

Diverging threat perceptions persist:

• Eastern members prioritise containing Russia through NATO
• Southern states focus on Mediterranean migration and energy security
• Germany and France clash over defence spending (2.1% vs 1.9% of GDP)
  These divisions hinder consensus on China policy, with Italy maintaining BRI ties despite EU de-risking directives.

Macron’s vision of “European sovereignty” faces implementation challenges:

• Only 11 EU states meet NATO’s 2% defence spending target
• The European Defence Fund accounts for just 0.5% of EU’s 2025 budget
  While von der Leyen’s “de-risking” strategy aims for 40% clean tech self-sufficiency, China’s control of pharmaceutical precursors (79%) and renewable supply chains undermines these goals.

The strategic future of the EU depends on balancing effective deterrence with economic interdependence, a challenge made more difficult by China’s systemic rivalry and US unpredictability. Though there are still many trade-offs between security and prosperity, success necessitates overcoming internal fragmentation while speeding up energy transitions and supply chain diversity.

Future Outlook: Scenarios and Recommendations

As of 2025, Western Europe finds itself at a critical geopolitical crossroads, forced to redefine its position between an increasingly assertive China and a confrontational Russia alongside the dwindling trust on USA. This complex landscape requires careful strategic consideration as Europe navigates its future in a rapidly evolving multipolar world. The following scenarios and recommendations outline potential pathways forward for European policymakers.

Scenario 1: Continued Alignment with U.S.

In this situation, Western European nations prioritise their traditional transatlantic alliance, reinforcing NATO commitments and maintaining firm positions against Russian aggression while adopting increasingly cautious stances toward China. This approach builds on historical security frameworks but presents significant challenges. The strengthened military posture provides security reassurance for Eastern European members feeling threatened by Russian activities. However, economic backlash from China could severely impact European economies dependent on Chinese markets and investment. Additionally, this alignment reduces Europe’s diplomatic leverage as an independent mediator in global conflicts.

Scenario 2: Strategic Autonomy and Middle Path

Under this scenario, Europe pursues its “strategic autonomy” by reducing vulnerabilities and increasing its capacity to act independently. This approach involves pragmatic economic engagement with China while maintaining vigilance against Russian hybrid threats. Europe positions itself as an independent power pole in a multipolar world, pursuing its interests rather than automatically aligning with American positions. This path requires significant investment in European defence capabilities, technological independence, and energy self-sufficiency. The EU has already made steps toward this direction by placing strategic autonomy at the heart of its foreign policy.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation and Policy Paralysis

The most concerning scenario involves increasing fragmentation of European policy positions, creating an incoherent stance that weakens collective influence. This “Single Market Fatigue” is already evident in many policy areas. Internal divisions between Eastern and Western Europe on Russia policy and Northern and Southern Europe on economic approaches to China could paralyse decision-making. This fragmentation would allow both Russia and China to exploit divisions, practising “divide and rule” diplomacy that undermines European cohesion and sovereignty.

To successfully manage these obstacles, Europe should:

1. Boost investments in green energy transformation and technological independence, which will cost about $159 billion a year by 2030 to establish a self-sustainable energy sector by 2040.
2. To avoid fragmentation, strengthen diplomatic coordination channels at the EU level, especially when creating cogent strategies for China and Russia.
3. Develop strategic alliances with other regional actors, such as Japan, ASEAN, and India, to increase balancing choices and diversify reliance.
4. Boost resistance to hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns by enhancing inter-institutional collaboration and expanding on current frameworks such as the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats.

Western Europe would be able to navigate the increasingly complicated geopolitical terrain between China and Russia while upholding its principles and interests with the support of these concerted efforts.

By: Sonalika Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) stands as a testament to the collaborative spirit of South and Southeast Asia. Established in 1997, BIMSTEC comprises seven member states: India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. With a combined population of over 1.8 billion people and a significant share of the global GDP, BIMSTEC represents a dynamic and diverse region. The year 2025 marks a pivotal moment for this regional organization, with the 6th BIMSTEC Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand, from April 2 to 4. This summit not only underscores the organization’s commitment to regional integration but also sets the stage for future cooperation across various sectors.

It brought together the leaders of seven neighboring countries amid a period of global uncertainty. This summit served as a much-needed opportunity to revitalize the regional grouping, which had long remained stagnant. Originally envisioned as a bridge between South Asia’s SAARC and Southeast Asia’s ASEAN, BIMSTEC has struggled in recent years due to a lack of direction and political challenges.

The diminishing relevance of SAARC, especially after the deterioration of India-Pakistan relations post-2014, has prompted India to shift focus toward BIMSTEC. Meanwhile, sub-regional efforts like the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative lost momentum when Bhutan’s Parliament rejected the proposed Motor Vehicles Agreement. In this context, New Delhi has invested fresh energy into BIMSTEC, viewing it as a platform to enhance regional cooperation.

Although the pandemic disrupted the planned biennial summit cycle, the very fact that this summit was held despite recent natural disasters, including an earthquake in Myanmar and Thailand is a positive development. The summit resulted in several notable outcomes. Among them was the formation of a BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce, and progress on the long-delayed India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which aims to connect India’s North-East to Southeast Asia, potentially transforming it into a regional hub. Given the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, the summit also underscored the urgent need for a joint disaster management mechanism.

Beyond multilateral engagements, the summit also enabled important bilateral interactions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus used the opportunity to address lingering tensions over issues such as minority rights, border killings, and the presence of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in India. Mr. Modi’s call to avoid inflammatory rhetoric between neighbors was timely and necessary, though it will require mutual commitment from both Dhaka and New Delhi.

Another key meeting was between Mr. Modi and Nepali leader K.P. Sharma Oli, following months of diplomatic strain over the absence of an official invite to Mr. Oli. Their exchange signaled a potential thaw and could pave the way for an early visit and progress on unresolved bilateral issues.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the summit was the inclusion of Myanmar’s Prime Minister, General Min Aung Hlaing. The invitation was seen as a deliberate move by the BIMSTEC grouping to maintain diplomatic engagement with Myanmar. Mr. Modi’s reported counsel to both Gen. Min and Mr. Yunus emphasized the importance of restoring democratic processes in their respective countries, highlighting India’s continued support for democratic values in the region.

While the summit was certainly productive, it is important to note that many of the initiatives echo earlier SAARC agreements. For BIMSTEC to avoid the same fate as SAARC which has largely become inactive member states must commit to ensuring institutional cohesion, policy implementation, and long-term sustainability. Without a clear vision and political will, BIMSTEC risks slipping into the same state of inertia that has hampered other regional efforts in South Asia.

Under the chairmanship of Thailand, the summit was guided by the vision of a “Prosperous, Resilient, and Open” region, an aspiration formally encapsulated in the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030. One of the major outcomes of the summit was the adoption of this vision document, a comprehensive roadmap that outlines the strategic direction for the next decade, focusing on sustainable development, economic integration, and improved connectivity. Alongside it, the Report of the Eminent Persons’ Group on the Future Direction of BIMSTEC offered critical recommendations for strengthening the organization’s structure, operations, and efficiency. Another key takeaway was the BIMSTEC Summit Declaration, in which all member nations reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation in areas such as trade, security, and disaster management.

The summit also witnessed several major agreements and forward-looking initiatives. Substantial progress was made on the long-anticipated BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a move that aims to boost intra-regional trade and economic cooperation. A new Maritime Transport Agreement was also signed, enhancing maritime connectivity among member nations and facilitating smoother trade routes across the Bay of Bengal. In response to the devastating earthquake in Myanmar and other recent natural disasters, BIMSTEC leaders emphasized stronger collaborative frameworks for disaster response and humanitarian aid. Additionally, recognizing the growing role of digital infrastructure in development, the member states pledged to work closely on cyber security and digital governance, with the goal of building secure and inclusive digital ecosystems across the region.

India, as a founding member and major regional power, played a central role in shaping the summit’s outcomes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation underscored India’s ongoing commitment to regional stability and growth. India strongly advocated for the swift implementation of the BIMSTEC FTA and emphasized the need for greater trade and investment flows within the grouping. In terms of physical and digital connectivity, India proposed several infrastructure projects to ease the movement of goods, services, and people across borders. Responding to the humanitarian crises brought about by natural disasters in the region, India also pledged technical assistance, financial support, and logistical coordination to bolster disaster preparedness and response.

India further highlighted its focus on youth empowerment through initiatives aligned with the Skill India Mission and the National Education Policy. These efforts aim to promote innovation, entrepreneurial development, and skill-building among the youth of the region. India’s emphasis on human capital reflects a broader understanding that sustainable development cannot be achieved without investing in the capabilities of the next generation.

The BIMSTEC Summit also functioned as a diplomatic platform for bilateral interactions among its members. A noteworthy development was the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s interim leader, Muhammad Yunus. The dialogue emphasized avoiding divisive rhetoric and focusing on constructive cooperation, particularly considering recent political changes in Bangladesh. Similarly, the presence of Myanmar’s military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, facilitated much-needed discussions around disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and regional infrastructure development, even as Myanmar continues to grapple with internal political unrest.

Youth engagement emerged as a major theme in 2025, with the inaugural BIMSTEC Youth Summit hosted in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, in February. As an initiative to foster the spirit of regional cooperation among the youth of the Bay of Bengal region, India hosted the 1st BIMSTEC Youth Summit in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, from February 7 to 11, 2025. The summit is a follow-up to the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s announcement at the 4th BIMSTEC Summit and is jointly organized by the Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports and the Ministry of External Affairs, with the Confederation of Indian Industry’s Young Indians (CII YI) serving as the knowledge partner.

The summit was officially inaugurated on February 8 by Dr. Mansukh Mandaviya, Minister of Youth Affairs & Sports of India, in the presence of Shri Bhupendrabhai Patel, Chief Minister of Gujarat, Minister of State for Youth Affairs & Sports Smt. Raksha Khadse, and Shri Jaideep Mazumdar, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs. The inauguration marked the beginning of a three-day congregation of young leaders from BIMSTEC countries, focusing on discussions around challenges and opportunities in entrepreneurship, emerging technologies, digital connectivity, cyberspace, sustainable development, and the importance of forging ties that transcend borders.

India proposed the establishment of a BIMSTEC-wide startup network aimed at fostering innovation and entrepreneurship among young people. There was also a strong focus on expanding educational and vocational training to ensure that the youth are equipped with the skills necessary for the jobs of tomorrow. The summit additionally emphasized the importance of cultural exchange initiatives, which can strengthen people-to-people connections and build mutual understanding among future leaders of the region.

The summit is thematically centered on “Youth as a Bridge for Intra-BIMSTEC Exchange” and aims to reinforce the shared cultural and civilizational heritage of the region. It reaffirms India’s commitment to regional cooperation in alignment with its ‘Neighborhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies, along with the vision of ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR).

More than seventy youth delegates from all seven BIMSTEC member countries are participating in the summit. The delegates include Ministers, Members of Parliament, Mayors, entrepreneurs, tech developers, cultural figures, social media influencers, and civil society leaders. The key objectives of the summit are to encourage young leaders from member nations to engage actively with pressing regional challenges, economic and social issues, and the broader development agenda; to facilitate the constructive exchange of views on strategic issues empowering youth; and to collectively build innovative ideas for a brighter and more connected future.

A key highlight of the event was the “Viksit Bharat Young Leaders Dialogue X BIMSTEC”, which provided a platform for delegates to showcase impactful youth development initiatives from their respective countries. Another important feature of the summit was the session on “Mera Yuva Bharat (MY Bharat),” a flagship initiative announced by the Hon’ble Prime Minister. MY Bharat represented a forward-looking, tech-enabled institutional framework for youth development and engagement, aimed at providing equitable opportunities for young people to achieve their aspirations and contribute meaningfully to India’s vision of Amrit Bharat by 2047. The session illustrated how technology was being leveraged by the Government of India to enhance youth welfare, offering valuable learning experiences for delegates from across the BIMSTEC region.

In addition to the policy and thematic sessions, delegates had the opportunity to experience India’s rich cultural heritage and modern innovations. Site visits included Dandi Kutir, India’s largest museum dedicated to the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi; Sabarmati Ashram, his former residence and a symbol of India’s non-violent resistance; and the Sabarmati Riverfront, a major urban revitalization project. Delegates also toured GIFT City (Gujarat International Finance Tec-City) India’s first operational smart city and International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) which offered insights into the country’s vision of becoming a global hub for financial services, technology, and innovation. Through these visits, delegates witnessed firsthand the development of cutting-edge infrastructure and sustainable urban planning, inspiring them to envision similar advancements in their own countries.

Through this landmark initiative, the BIMSTEC Youth Summit is expected to provide greater momentum to youth engagement and youth-led development in the region, strengthening bonds and laying the foundation for long-term collaboration among the future leaders of South and Southeast Asia.

Despite the progress achieved, BIMSTEC faces several challenges. Political instability remains a concern, particularly in countries like Myanmar, where internal unrest hampers effective regional cooperation. Infrastructure gaps also persist, limiting the full potential of trade and connectivity goals. Additionally, environmental vulnerabilities, particularly due to climate change and natural disasters, pose ongoing threats to the stability and sustainability of development efforts in the region.

Nevertheless, these challenges offer opportunities for transformation and renewed commitment. BIMSTEC, as a regional organization, has the potential to lead in areas where collective action is needed most—from climate resilience to technological innovation, and from youth development to sustainable trade. The organization’s unique positioning, bridging South and Southeast Asia, gives it both the strategic leverage and responsibility to shape the future of one of the most populous and promising regions in the world.

The 2025 BIMSTEC Summit marks a transformative phase in the organization’s evolution. With strategic agreements, forward-looking policies, and renewed political will, BIMSTEC is increasingly asserting itself as a vital forum for regional cooperation. The summit laid the foundation for a more interconnected, resilient, and prosperous Bay of Bengal region. As member states work in unison toward the goals of the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, there is ample reason to be optimistic about the future. With a shared commitment to peace, development, and solidarity, BIMSTEC is not only redefining regionalism but also offering a compelling model for international cooperation in the 21st century.