By: Barsha Hazarika, Research Analyst, GSDN

In geopolitics, the kind of neighbor one has can make a big difference. A good neighbor can mean beneficial security and trade relations. A bad neighbor can mean a border crisis, resource conflict, and war. Mexico, by most measures, is a good neighbor to the USA. It’s been long since the two nations had any military conflict. And Mexico is arguably the US’s most important trading partner. This closeness has allowed the United States to rely on peace in its neighborhood and to focus on other issues abroad. This US neighbor is an emerging country with the 15^th largest economy in the world. It is America’s most important trading partner ahead of China and Canada.

Today, some 11 million Mexicans and 35 million Mexican Americans are a big part of the US population. Mexico is also important regarding the USA’s shared environment along the border in terms of industries, waterways and overall security.

It is said that no other country in the world affects day-to-day life in the United States than Mexico. However, there are a few hot-button issues in the USA regarding Mexico, like trade, immigration, and drug trafficking.

Trade relations: in 2022, an estimated US$ 855 billion in trade was conducted between Mexico and the United States, affecting 5 billion jobs. Again, that’s higher than overall trade with China in the same year. So today, when we look at products in the US, Mexico and Canada are integral in making these products, and these countries are big buyers of US goods and services when they make products. So, for instance, a product that comes in from Mexico, on average, about 40 % of the product is made in the US. So, US workers put things together that are then sent to Mexico to be assembled. If you look at a product from China, it’s less than 4% made in the US, so almost everything is made on the other side of the ocean. Hence, Mexico and the US are essential to each other because they make things together.

However, there is a downside in this trade relation for the US in the form of NAFTA. It is because there was the loss of United States manufacturing jobs. As higher-paying factory jobs relocated to more cost-effective countries, many jobs went from the United States to Mexico. This was especially true in lower-skilled industries like automotive and textiles. Between 1994 and 2010, the US trade deficit with Mexico totaled US$ 97.2 billion. In the same period, 682,900 U.S. jobs were displaced.

Almost 80% of losses were in manufacturing. California, New York, Michigan, and Texas were the hardest-hit states. They had a high concentration of industries that moved plants to Mexico.

There was a trade deficit of US$ 131.1 billion with Mexico in 2022, which is estimated to increase. US exports mainly raw materials and other parts that return to the US as finished goods. For instance, US auto parts export of US$13 billion returned in the US$ 30 billion worth of cars and trucks imported from Mexico each year. Unlike Canada and Chile, the US’ other established free trade partners, Mexico isn’t developing into a major consumer market for American products. 

Peter Navarro, a former senior adviser to the US President on trade and industry, stated that a deficit threatens national security because the United States depends on foreign debt and investment to finance it.  In terms of trade, USA is clearly at a disadvantage with Mexico.

On July 01, 2020 USMCA came into force, substituting NAFTA in the hope of a more mutually beneficial trade agreement between all the partners- USA, Canada, and Mexico.

Illegal immigration: Immigration that is most talked about in USA. Former US President Donald J Trump has declared constantly that the presence of immigrants on US soil has eroded the security of the country, both historically and in present times. The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the 45^th federal administration of the United States places the immigration policy as a top priority in order to protect the homeland, its nationals, and the “American way of life.” That is why the former President has raised the need to build a physical wall at the southern border and to reshape the immigration policy, which has sparked major controversy.

However, it is not about Mexican migration as much but about migration from other places that come through Mexico. Since 2014 and 2015, the USA has seen waves of Central Americans coming through Mexico’s border to the United States. This migration is mainly driven by violence, poverty, bad governance, corruption, etc. Many Central Americans are looking for a life elsewhere, and many have pulled into the United States. The most significant spike of migrants was from Central America, particularly from the northern triangle. In this sense, Mexico is not only an export country; it is also a transit country and is becoming a receiving country. Recent cases of migration include lots of Haitians coming, tens of thousands. So, Mexico has become a gateway for migration to the United States.

In 2016, nearly 44 million immigrants living in the United States, representing 13.5% of the total population. The National security strategy, states that “illegal immigration [….] burdens the economy, hurts American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals.”

This poses a huge problem for the USA to deal with, as Mexico doesn’t have the capacities or the resources even close to what is required to deal with this problem professionally or humanely.

Organized crime: it is one problem that has been persistent for decades. The 2023 Mexico Peace Index finds that the national organized crime rate has risen by 64.2 percent in the past eight years. The rate has climbed every year since 2016, with the exception of a slight decrease in 2020. According to Al Jazeera, “Today Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America. Since the late ’80s and ’90s, Mexico has become one of the most significant sources of drugs imported into the US, starting with marijuana and cocaine and then moving into 2010 to meth. Today, much of the fentanyl that comes into the States from abroad comes through Mexico. Due to illegal drugs, particularly in recent years, the rise of fentanyl, about 70,000 Americans died last year from fentanyl and opioid overdose. Mexico supplies almost the entire US drug market.

Security is a massive issue in the US-Mexico relations and goes both ways. The US has not been able to curb the sale of guns to the Mexican cartels, which has become an irritant. Mexican cartel has become all-powerful and is even a threat to the state.

It impacts American businesses, tourism, and border-area security, and its effect is predicted to grow. In one survey, nearly half of American companies in Mexico said fear over drug violence was affecting their expansion plans. For 20 years, Columbia endured of chaos, terrorism, and warfare with its neighbor due to drug gangs.

Democratic backsliding: Mexico has operated as an electoral democracy for nearly three decades, despite corruption, violence, and inequality, with political competition and a thriving civil society. But in recent years, Mexico’s autonomous institutions are gradually losing their ability to serve as a counterweight to the executive under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a pugnacious and popular leader who stormed to power in 2018. Many people on both sides of the border are concerned that recent reforms to Mexico’s National Electoral Institute may erode the country’s ability to assure the quality and integrity of elections and significantly influence the quality of Mexico’s democracy.

Mexico is embroiled in a heated debate over the future of its democracy. The United States should pay close attention, maybe even more so given the ongoing dispute over the functioning of American democracy.

These are major challenges that directly affect the United States in terms of security and prosperity. That is why the USA needs a stable Mexico at its border, but these are some huge issues that hit deep political, social, and economic nerves that the USA needs to deal with.  However, these challenges are being addressed through cooperation between the two governments. But this has been the most challenging part of the relationship because it is hard to know what to do in complex issues like building capacity to manage tens of thousands of people flowing through. And one of the more significant challenges is that Mexico needs more capacity to do that. Misunderstanding about the shared problem has emerged as a theme over and over again in US-Mexico relations.

What happens in Mexico will continue to affect the lives of Americans every day. So, if Mexico does well, America will do well. If Mexico is doing poorly, it will be a massive problem for the United States.

Both have a history of long partnerships, and there would be an enormous problem if the relationship deteriorates.

By: Aishwarya Dutta and Chaitanya Deshpande

History of Five Eyes

Recent events in Canada which led to the straining of bilateral relations between India and Canada have sparked a controversy in the international political scenario. The killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Khalistani terrorist on June 18, 2023 has caused major disruptions. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is allegedly suspecting the role and involvement of the Indian government behind the killing. Though India has rejected the allegations as “absurd”, it is also aware that these events would affect the talks regarding India’s inclusion in the Five Eyes.  The Five Eyes (FVEY) is an intelligence alliance created for cooperation in signals intelligence, i.e., intelligence gathering through the interception of signals. The formal foundation of the organization took place in the aftermath of the World War II, through the Multilateral Agreement for Co-operation in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), known as the UK-USA Agreement, on March 05, 1946. There is an exchange of a wide range of intelligence within the grouping. It is one of the most secretive and powerful intelligence-sharing alliances in the world.

Informal secret meetings that took place during the World War II between USA and UK, the then Allied powers who were fighting to counter the Axis uprising in the world, served as the base for the Five Eyes alliance. While the origins of the alliance date back to World War I, it wasn’t until the early 1940s that the alliance started taking formal shape. It was formally signed on March 05, 1946 between the US and UK. Canada joined in 1949 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956. Together it came to be known as the Five Eyes. However, it was not until 2010 that the alliance was fully made public. Until the 1990s, the member states were mostly bound by a common goal of defeating the Soviet Union in every aspect. Post the Cold War, the Five Eyes were also responsible for some of the most egregious human rights abuses carried out by the Anglosphere.

Relation between the Anglosphere and five eyes

The Five Eyes has been hailed as the ‘Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere.’ ‘Anglosphere’ is one of the salient terms we come across in International Relations. It is a shorthand for the Anglo-American sphere of influence, representing a major transnational community. The Anglosphere has been the architect and a staunch proponent of international norms. It has incubated and hatched the institutional norms and philosophies that continue to dominate the international security architecture.

The FVEY has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and it remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in the history of the world. Each and every member of the alliance is equally responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis over specific regions of the world. The states comprising the Anglosphere share several convergent aspects: common language and principles, liberal democratic values, similar national interests and strategic cultures. These characteristics foster mutual understanding, trust and respect. The alliance is thus the ‘gold standard’ of intelligence alliances. It is an enormous asset to keep the citizens of the ‘English-speaking World’ safer and maintain mutual trust and partnership among them.

The debate around India’s Possible Inclusion into the Alliance

The proposal of reforms and expansion of the Alliance consisting of Anglo-Saxon countries has been in discussion since 2020. US Congress Subcommittee on Intelligence and Operations had suggested that “in light of Great Power Competition, Five Eyes Countries must work closer together, as well as expand the circle of trust to other like-minded democracies.” It mentioned the names of Japan, Germany, India and South Korea as proposed members.

Out of these four, India is the only country which doesn’t have a formal alliance with the USA or Anglo-Saxon world. Also, India is undoubtedly not an Anglo-Saxon country which will fit into an inherently Anglo-Saxon Intelligent alliance. Despite these facts, India’s increasing strategic convergence with the US, Australia and the UK allowed the possibility of including India in FVEY. With India’s concerns about cross-border terrorism and other security threats, inclusion in FVEY had generated the possibility of having unparalleled state of art of intelligence from countries like the USA and the UK.

Also, the proposed expansion was more or less focused on countering China using intelligence agencies of India, Japan and South Korea. Though this proposal is politically attractive when the USA is trying to build many alliances in the Indo-Pacific Region like QUAD and AUKUS in light of increasing Chinese assertiveness, the question is whether there is a deep trust between the intelligence agencies of Five Eyes and the proposed members.

Similarly, members apart from the USA and the UK had expressed concerns over the ‘expansion’ of the Five Eyes Alliance. It is also pointed out that India and the other three proposed members don’t have common worldviews on global threats such as terrorism which the existing members of the FYEY have.

Anglosphere, Five Eyes and Nijjar Case

The talks of the inclusion of India in the Five Eyes have vanished in the air. The current diplomatic standoff between India and Canada has brought the Five Eyes Alliance back into the limelight. US Ambassador to Canada, David Cohen, said during the CTV interview that there was ‘shared intelligence amongst Five Eyes partners’ before the Canadian PM accused India of involvement in the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar. He also said that ‘this was a matter of shared intelligence information.’

The Five Eyes providing intelligence pointing out towards possible hand of Indian intelligence agencies in the killing of a Khalistani separatist and a ‘Canadian Citizen’ has many implications.  Despite the close relations between the US and India, Anglospheric Five Eyes could encircle India with doubts and insist on cooperation with Canada in the investigation as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken asserted the same. This shows that The Five Eyes as an alliance don’t consider India as a close and trustful partner to be a member of the Anglosphere Intelligence Alliance.

Though the US might be willing to cooperate on a range of issues including QUAD and other issues especially when the US has become India’s largest trading partner, the other members of the Five Eyes especially Canada and New Zealand have a history of roller coaster relationships with India. Given the tough diplomatic situation, the hopes of optimists who were seeing India as a member of Five Eyes have been smoked out.

Thus, the situation between India and Canada has shadowed any possibility of expansion of Five Eyes. The talks of expansion in 2020 have disappeared with time. Also, there are fundamental disagreements about the expansion within the Five Eyes. The Five Eyes institutionalize the conception of Anglosphere in a very tightly knit security alliance. The recent India-Canada standoff made the alliance closer and tighter, ruling out any possibility of expansion at least in the near future.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Smaller but strategically significant states are sometimes used as a stage for a battle between larger powers aiming for regional domination. The Maldives, also known as the Republic of Maldives, is no exception. The Indian Ocean archipelago has a population of fewer than 500,000 people and a total land area of less than 300 square kilometres. However, the Maldives’ closeness to crucial internal marine trade lines, as well as its participation in the Sino-Indian competition, has long put it in the geopolitical spotlight. In addition to being closely observed for their potential regional ramifications, the recent Maldivian elections were also closely observed for their internal politics.

However, the Maldives’ closeness to crucial internal maritime trade lines, as well as its participation in the Sino-Indian competition, has long put it in the geopolitical spotlight. The outcome of the recently finished presidential elections, and the success of pro-China candidate Mohamed Muizzu, has once again thrust the Maldives into the global spotlight, causing foreign policymakers throughout the globe to turn heads and take note.

The Maldives, a tourist destination known for its exquisite tropical beaches, has long been considered to be within India’s sphere of influence. It is just 70 nautical miles from Minicoy Island in India and 300 nautical miles from India’s Western Coast.

The Maldives’ location in the northern Indian Ocean places it near seas patrolled and even controlled by Indian Navy vessels. India has long had cultural, ethnic, and political relations with the Maldives. India is well aware of this, and it is virtually always represented in speeches and official papers. In a document dated June 03, 2023 India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) asserts that “India has a pre-eminent position in the Maldives,” having relationships in “virtually most areas.”

India, via its naval forces, has often been the first to respond to natural catastrophes such as the 2004 Tsunami and the 2014 water crisis in the Maldives. India has also displayed its military strength in the Maldives, assisting the government in repelling an attempted military coup in 1988. India maintains little military presence on the island. India has given the Maldives defense-related facilities and equipment in recent decades, in addition to the regular military presence. These include a military hospital, a coastal surveillance radar system, and the $500 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project, which will connect Malé with several neighbouring islands.

The Maldives’ presidential election was won by pro-Beijing candidate Mohamed Muizzu, who defeated incumbent President Ibrahim Solih in the runoff round. This change may cause concern in New Delhi since there are fears of China gaining more sway in the historically Indian-friendly Maldives.

Through the “India First” strategy, Solih advocated for better connections with New Delhi. Several agreements were reached as a consequence of the endeavour, including authorization for India to establish minor military detachments.

Implications for India and China

The Maldivian Democratic Party is headed by outgoing President Ibrahim Solih, while President-elect Mohamed Muizzu leads a coalition of opposition parties. Solih, who has been president since 2018, was running for re-election. Muizzu, on the other hand, won a run-off election with little more than 54% of the vote. Muizzu was the mayor of Male, the national capital, before campaigning for president. He was also a cabinet minister under previous President Abdulla Yameen, whose term witnessed an increase in hostilities between India and the Maldives.

The anticipated shift in Maldivian politics advantages China more than anybody else and would upset the geopolitical balance in India’s vicinity, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. This election was a first for the area since it was framed as a contest between the slogans “India First” and “India Out.” This postulation was avoidable. Some called the elections a virtual referendum on India or China. The opposition party did not mask its pro-China leaning and staked its claim to power on the sovereignty plank of no foreign troops on Maldivian soil.

Muizzu built his campaign on the “India Out” platform, and he ended up with 54% of the vote in the runoff election on September 30, 2023. Viewed as a supporter of pro-China former president Abdulla Yameen of the Maldives, Muizzu has opted to characterize the Indian military’s deployment in the Maldives as an assault on the nation’s sovereignty. It won’t be exaggerated to say that China is expected to gain the goodwill that India has had under President Solih for the last five years.

In recent years, President Solih had adopted a strategy that is sceptical of China. China is eager to have free commerce with the Maldives. A ‘free-trade’ agreement between the two countries defies logic as it would blatantly and significantly favor China, an economic giant with a GDP of USD 18 trillion compared to the Maldives’ USD 5 billion. Solih had managed to stave off the Chinese by putting the agreement in virtual cold storage.

Talks on the deal are likely to pick up steam with Muizzu leading the team in the not-too-distant future. Muizzu said that his administration would not compromise the Maldives’ sovereignty and would not be close to any nation. There seems to be a small lean towards China, but Maldives’ internal dynamics will lead the government towards a balanced foreign policy.

India has shown the Maldives great generosity since 2018, giving billions of dollars to help the nation pay off enormous debts left by the previous administration, giving vaccinations during the COVID-19 outbreak and making its own planned infrastructure initiatives.

While India has increased its collaboration with the Maldives in the previous five years, China has been increasing its footprint in the Indian Ocean archipelago since 2010. China constructed infrastructure in the Maldives, including bridges, resorts, buildings, museums, and housing projects, as well as investing in renewable energy, tourism, and telecommunications.

Under the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing sponsored various infrastructure projects, forcing the Maldives to owe $935 million in sovereign guarantees to Chinese enterprises and another $600 million to the Chinese government. 

A pro-China president returns to office after a protracted absence, and he plans to enact more pro-China measures. However, the recent election of Muizzu will also throw in a need to maintain a careful balance between Beijing and New Delhi due to India’s significant participation in the Indian Ocean archipelago.

Despite the Maldives’ rising mistrust of India, Muizzu will need to take other aspects into account, such as Indian-sponsored infrastructural initiatives. In diplomacy, there are no everlasting allies or adversaries. The global landscape is evolving, and Muizzu’s anti-Indian policies may be detrimental to the Maldives as well as the economy of the region. The Maldives and India have very synergistic relationships, making it impossible for one to exist without the other. Strategic, socioeconomic, and most critically, security interests are shared by both.

Conclusion

New Delhi must evade the perception of endorsing certain groups within the political landscape of the Maldives. President-elect Muizzu now must keep the promise to sustain close relations between India and the Maldives.

Notably, he has not condemned India in the same way that his party has. President-elect Muizzu may need to find a balance between India, its nearest neighbor, and engagement with China and the United States, both of whom are keenly monitoring regional events. Both Delhi and Male must address these concerns without resorting to the ‘zero-sum’ game, which has damaged their ties in the past.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Introduction

As the British decided to exit India in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, aspiring to keep the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as an independent nation, did not accede to either India and Pakistan. Pakistan laid claim on Kashmir since it is a Muslim majority region. It ignored the fact that the criterion of division along religious majority applied only to the regions directly colonized by the British and not to princely states like Jammu & Kashmir.

Operation Gulmarg was launched by Pakistan on the intervening night of October 21-22, 1947 with Srinagar as the main target. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India on October 26, 1947 thereby acceding to the Indian Union. While the whole of the erstwhile J&K State acceded to India, portions of it came to be illegally occupied by Pakistan and has been under Pakistan’s unlawful control ever since. The area of Gilgit-Baltistan is of great strategic importance and plays an increasingly important role in the security calculus of nations in the region.

Over the decades, Pakistan has repeatedly ceded parts of Gilgit-Baltistan to China in return for Beijing’s help in infrastructure development and support in international forums. Under the pretext of “liberating” the region from India, Pakistan has not only turned Gilgit-Baltistan into a colonial-inspired administrative entity, but also excluded the region from its constitution, deprived the people of their political, legislative, and judicial rights, and subjected them to demographic

Sectarian Divide & Identity Crisis

Gilgit-Baltistan is made up of ethnic and sectarian groups that are considered minorities in Pakistan. Shia Muslims, Ismailis, and Noor Bakshis have been the most populous communities, and they have mostly coexisted peacefully in this region. Despite the fact that the region’s indigenous peoples have common ethnic, linguistic, social, and cultural ties, the Pakistani state has incited and fuelled interethnic strife in order to achieve its own security goals.

In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, abolished the State Subjects Rule, which prohibited outsiders from obtaining land in the area, as part of his efforts to Islamize the area. The action was taken in an attempt to confront the Shia population, who made up the majority in Gilgit-Baltistan, and their developing sense of sectarianism. In addition, he supported and enabled Sunni immigrants from other regions of the nation to relocate to the Northern Areas. Centuries of peaceful coexistence between the Shia and Sunni populations in the Northern Areas were progressively destroyed by the inflow of non-natives.

In May 1988, groups of Sunni zealots from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), supported by locals, raided Shia villages on the outskirts of Gilgit, killing many. These attacks were followed by other violent incidents against Shias in 1990, 1992, 1993, 2001, and 2005. These events and the violence have created a sectarian divide between the small parts of Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan, with a majority Sunni population in PoJK and a majority Shia population in Gilgit-Baltistan. While the parties in POJK want to merge Gilgit Baltistan with them, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan want to reunite with India because of its fraternal treatment in Pakistan.

In 2009, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under President Asif Zardari issued the Gilgit-Baltistan Order, which stated that the region would remain part of the Northern Areas as Gilgit-Baltistan. The Order was later revoked and replaced by the 2018 Order when the government led by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi introduced the Order after the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in December 2013, which abolished the legislative powers of the elected assembly in Gilgit-Baltistan. The 2018 ordinance ensured that real authority rested with none other than the country’s prime minister. The earlier assertion that the council, headed by the prime minister, had primary authority was abandoned. The 2018 decree ensured that the region has no control over roads or highways, as it is the starting point of CPEC, and that highways remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the government. It also removed taxation powers, which increased the region’s financial dependence on Islamabad.

According to reports, since January 2001, the traditional population ratio of 1:4 (non-natives to natives) has shifted to 3:4. Non-Shia populations continue to grow in regions historically controlled by Shia, such as Skardu and Gilgit. The Pakistani government has attempted to alter the demographic character of Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making the indigenous population a minority. Non-natives have been allocated significant swaths of land in the Gilgit and Skardu districts. Other strangers have purchased large tracts of property because they are better off economically than the locals. The increased settlement of Punjabi and Pashtun outsiders has instilled fear among the locals.

Way Forward

Pakistan’s fixation with Kashmir reflects its goal for territorial acquisition rather than meeting the aspirations of its people. The fact that it chose to invade Kashmir rather than wait for the people to decide its future proves that its reasoning about “respecting the will of the people” was not very valid to begin with. Its seven-decade-long efforts to dilute the population and extract maximum benefits from the land of Gilgit-Baltistan are proof of its nefarious intentions.

It is imperative for India to engage with the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan and the nationalist groups that expect moral support from India, so that the downward spiral in the life and living of the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan is put to an end. If India reaches out to these groups, it is likely that more voices will rise in support of Gilgit-Baltistan’s reunification with India, a viewpoint that has gained traction recently despite Pakistan’s efforts to suppress the voices. It is also important that New Delhi works to draw international attention to the atrocities in Gilgit-Baltistan in every possible international forum. By highlighting the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan, India will not only give a voice to the people of the region, but also shine a light on that region of Jammu & Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan, which seems to have been forgotten by everyone.

By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The QSD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), commonly known as the QUAD, and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) are two important alliances which have a direct bearing on the Indo-Pacific Region. The beginning of QUAD in 2007 with the strategic interest of the US, India, Australia, and Japan to balance the natural calamity of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and its catastrophic aftermath. One of the deadliest natural disasters in history took more than two lakh lives along with the destruction of the economies creating a havoc situation around the affected countries. A number of programs and humanitarian responses were launched by the navies of Australia, Japan, and India along with the US providing the base for the operation from Indonesia to Madagascar. With the dynamic coupling of freedom and prosperity, the idea of QUAD was resurrected by the former Prime Minister of Japan Abe when he visited India in 2007 with picturesque boundaries of ‘broader Asia.’

In the continuation of security cooperation with swirling activities, the QUAD in 2008 was relinquished in itself with the blurry face of extremely negative reaction from China in the aftermath of the reaction against the inclusion of regional countries to sign up for their vision and approach. However, the reactivation of QUAD, in 2017, brought a series of strategic meetings with the vision of structural realism as brought by Kenneth Waltz vide areas of cooperation ranging from diplomatic ties, maritime connectivity and developmental assistance to infrastructure, cyber security, and people-to-people connect. With the tangible objective of QUAD to advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, the identity is strengthening with discernible challenges of China’s geopolitical interests along with negation of letting other countries become the geographical hegemon of the Indo-pacific cum South East Asian region. 

Whereas, in the twentieth century, after the two world wars when the world was divided into two halves of capitalism and communism backed by the US and USSR respectively, Asia had little role to play in world politics, despite various dimensions of groupings like Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which was the voice of global south. It was the culmination of this process, Asia did not offer much, nor did the West heeded it, where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came into existence in 1967 with ten founding members. The promotion of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the spirit of equality, partnership, and prosperity was envisioned and culminated in the Bangkok declaration of August 08, 1967 to achieve considerable results in the economic field, for instance, high economic growth, poverty alleviation, substantial trade facilitation and two-way investment flows keeping liberalization measures intact in. 

Since the beginning, the ASEAN states strived for a “balance” between China and India. Although member states were aware of the Chinese presence in their vicinity, they never showcased this point openly and gave due recognition and importance to China, while simultaneously engaging with India pragmatically. This is often called as “ASEAN way” of dealing with the two most powerful nations in its backyard. Over the years, the gradual expansion of the organization was recognizable, as other countries of the region (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) became members of it. Southeast Asia represents the world’s third-largest population market along with fifth-largest economy. Since, Southeast Asia is the heart of the Indo-Pacific, geographically, between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, all major players (the United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia) engaged in shaping the strategic contestation in a vast region stretching from East Africa to the South Pacific. ASEAN seeks to encourage multilateralism by playing a central role as ASEAN-led mechanisms. Nonetheless, while achieving the goals there exists a myriad of obstacles and impediments to ASEAN’s regional strategic trajectories. 

Recognizing the statement of amalgamation as a consequence of external factors and internal disturbances

The most serious charge of failure pertains to the weakening of institutions and politicization of intelligence. The shifting of regional supply chains, the fulcrum of ASEAN’s vision, is a further matter of concern that could do more harm to ASEAN countries to do any good. China has always been ASEAN’s imperative economic partner. 

Logistic infrastructure and skilled labor give a compelling advantage to ASEAN countries which renders a profound opportunity to the domestic market of ASEAN countries. For instance, if QUAD countries established their secondary sector bases in ASEAN countries, the basic requirements of manufacturing, still, will be coming from none other than China. Even though small economic assistance can be provided by other non-member states as well to a larger extent it is non-undependable to China. Likewise, QUAD countries cannot make assumptions about the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) without recognizing ASEAN’s position and role as outlined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Without unity, the ASEAN’s centrality loses much of its credibility, a dynamic regional grouping that aims to promote economic and security cooperation among its ten members is losing its credibility due to an ongoing geopolitical shift in the unity among the members due to an underlying not-to-ignore China and USA proxy war factor. Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia are not in favor of the US offering nuclear submarines to Australia. The presence of various developments led by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) is equally alarming for many ASEAN member states due to strategic interests. The recent ASEAN nine-member summit started without Myanmar’s presence, is again an internal complication that this grouping is facing which might flip the possible geopolitical interests.

Today, ASEAN is divided where seven out of ten members incline towards China’s plate to eradicate their starving disposition according to their requirements. It will be very difficult to define which side ASEAN is going to take either China or the US but as we discussed earlier the ‘balancing’ factor is what ASEAN member states strategic interest lies in. 

Vision and Challenges 

Collision between QUAD members and China, in and around Southeast Asia, is a concern for ASEAN nations. Therefore, there are numerous challenges for ASEAN and QUAD in securing a conducive environment for integrated measures. The first and foremost is the rising power factor in the region, which is none other than China, as how to get China engaged with Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific grouping QUAD for the advancement of logistic supply chains in the region.

Another challenge is the increasing nature of institutionalisation of the QUAD which might take a u-turn to unbalance ASEAN centrality. Earlier, Indonesia saw QUAD as a potential threat coalition as an ‘outsider’ power to hinder sides of ASEAN member states. “Formalisation of structure” as proposed by US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in a diplomatic summit posed an invitation for the confluence of ASEAN and QUAD architecture. Again, it’s a complete 180-flipping position. However, with the magnitude of the future prospects, there lies another challenge as to how to avoid regional technological fragmentation of so-called “choosing sides” with major powers along the narrow lines of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). 

The escalation of trade and geopolitical tension across the region plays a critical function in the Indo-Pacific region. Whereas soft balancing of ASEAN’s strategy brings forth the presence of the US in the region, while the continuation of engagement with China at various levels.

ASEAN has fundamental niches to attract the support of both, China and QUAD members for reaffirmation of ASEAN centrality. William TR Fox’s vision of a superpower lies in their wish to act in their own way but China as a major power cannot envision a BRI project without the involvement of Southeast Asia. On the same terms, QUAD cannot realize IPS without executing reaffirming terms with ASEAN. Therefore, to access BRI and IPS, ASEAN’s active presence is much required through which it can sail the boat without compromising its geopolitical interests. 

Synonymity of ASEAN and QUAD with Indian lens 

India recognized the importance of ASEAN in Asia in terms of trade and diplomacy and in world politics. This was substantiated by the fact that the economies of ASEAN countries along with China, Japan, and India played a dominant role in the 1990s and the trend continues to this day as well. The recent QUAD summit held in Japan on 22nd May, put forth productive dialogue in the development of the Indo-Pacific with shared democratic values and strategic interests. However, the execution of realistic principles is what these dialogues depend upon, nonetheless, reiteration of principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

But, India has to be very cautious of every step otherwise her geopolitical position can be an advantage for the US and China backed as a sandwich between two proxies. On the other side of diplomatic relations India and ASEAN hold a significant relationship since their participation in various forms of summits. In the recent stagnant ocean of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) where bilateral issues are much discernible among the member states, India has potential opportunities to explore in Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, India as a QUAD member renders a balanced vision which was inculcated in the recent ASEAN-India Summit held in Jakarta of a 12-point proposal from promoting multi-modal connectivity, mission LiFE to cyber security, and digital public infrastructure. Over the years, India has navigated the dynamicity of QUAD and ASEAN with the strategic presence of its rival China and its ruthless aggression. While rectifying internal differences and developing common programs for India and ASEAN, newer areas have been recognized such as cyber, financial, and maritime security domains. To build on the comprehensive strategic partnership between India and ASEAN, the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, convergence between the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”(AOIP), and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative have to make their practical footing.

Way Forward

In the furtherance of peaceful coexistence, while maintaining diplomatic relations with other states without compromising on the national interest of their nations, there is a queue of connections that can be discussed here. ASEAN and QUAD had various options to consider without giving a thought to the pseudo-realistic idea of the amalgamation of two groupings. First, ASEAN and QUAD can try to limit the impact of political issues on the economic front while realizing the inner strength of their respective groupings. ASEAN community to strengthen ASEAN Economic Community to boost intra-regional trade and investment. Whereas, QUAD to reduce China’s domination in the region while focusing on intra-regional connectivity. Second, to avoid being caught between the QUAD and with dwindling position of the US and China in any dispute is imperative for ASEAN to seize the stability and prosperity of the region. In the Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN holds a central position both politically and geographically, therefore, inclusiveness and consensus building among the member states is highly crucial at this juncture of geopolitical uncertainty. This shared outlook also leans strongly towards a strong voice on critical issues related to diplomatic, and security concerns.

This map of navigating varied and complex relationships between QUAD and ASEAN is basically the rational choice approach by the actors of major powers as well as rising major powers among the region and across the globe. Lastly, the contextualization of geopolitical competition among state powers should be non-unbridled in nature to make a shift from repressing action towards active participation with wearing lens of ‘3S’ principles of statism, survival, and self-help. 

By: Prashant Singh Parihar, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Chinese President Xi Jinping and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have solidified their diplomatic relationship by upgrading it to a “strategic partnership.” This significant announcement came after President Assad’s first official visit to China on September 22, 2023 nearly two decades after his last visit, highlighting his reemergence on the international stage after years of isolation. President Xi made the declaration in Hangzhou, coinciding with the opening ceremony of the Asian Games, where President Assad was an honored guest. This decision follows a broader trend of China extending its diplomatic hand to leaders who have faced Western ostracism, including Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, Iran’s Ebrahim Raisi, and high-ranking Afghan and Russian officials.

 In a press statement, President Xi Jinping expressed strong support for President Assad. He stated, “Today, we proudly announce the establishment of the China-Syria strategic partnership, which marks a crucial milestone in the history of our bilateral relations.” In the face of a global situation fraught with instability and uncertainty, China is committed to continued collaboration with Syria, offering unwavering support, promoting friendly cooperation, and jointly defending international fairness. President Xi emphasized that the relations between the two nations have endured the trials of international changes and that the friendship between the two countries has grown stronger over time. China supports Syria’s opposition to foreign interference, unilateral bullying, and stands ready to aid Syria in its reconstruction efforts.

Connecting dots from Arab spring

The significance of this engagement as a milestone for Assad lies in the backdrop of Syria’s prolonged civil war, which originated from the 2011 Arab Spring. The anti-government protests faced a harsh crackdown, leading to a multifaceted conflict. President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is supported by Russia, China, Iran, and Hezbollah, while the USA and its allies back the Kurdish force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The conflict also involves rebel groups like the Islamic Front and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra Front, alongside the presence of ISIS. This intricate network of alliances and hostilities has sustained chaos and instability in Syria up to the present.

Assad – Authoritarian Leader Domestically, Outcast Globally

Al Assad’s authoritarian response to dissent sparked a brutal civil war that has ravaged Syria for over a decade, resulting in the deaths of approximately 250,000 civilians, with over 150,000 individuals disappearing, and a staggering 14 million people displaced. These actions, in clear violation of fundamental human rights, led to Syria’s suspension from the Arab League and the imposition of stringent Western sanctions. Consequently, Assad has become an international outcast, excluded from key diplomatic forums and shunned by the global community.

Syria’s re-entry into the Arab League: A win for Assad

In May of this year, the influential regional power, Saudi Arabia, took a significant step towards finding a political resolution to the Syrian crisis. The initiative focused on various critical aspects, including the safe return of Syrian refugees, combating drug trafficking and addressing Syria’s urgent needs for political and economic reconstruction. The Saudi regime orchestrated a pivotal meeting in Jeddah, gathering Foreign Ministers from Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). During this meeting, the Foreign Ministers collectively established a comprehensive framework known as the “Jordanian Initiative.” This innovative proposal aimed to reintegrate Syria into the Arab League and actively address the political turmoil that has tragically claimed the lives of over half a million people.

The process of politically reintegrating Syria sends a resounding global signal that the Arab states have shifted away from pursuing a military solution to the Syrian crisis and isolation to Assad regime is not a long-term solution. Instead, it underscores the regional acceptance of President Assad’s regime as a responsible member within the Arab League, with a shared commitment to finding a political resolution. Syria’s prospective membership within the League opens the door for member countries to engage directly with the Assad regime on a range of critical fronts, including economic, political, security, and geo-strategic matters. This development can indeed be viewed as a symbolic triumph for the Assad regime, marking its transition from an international pariah to a key player in regional diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts.

China’s Footprint in the Arab World A Leader on the Rise

Engaging with Syria presents a bigger picture that China’s ambitions in the Middle East extend beyond trade and commerce. China is increasingly positioning itself as a formidable player in the region, a role previously dominated by the United States. China’s recent diplomatic mediation, successfully facilitating the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, exemplifies its growing influence. Furthermore, its pivotal role in extending invitations to Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join BRICS reflects China’s leadership in this transformative geopolitical shift, reshaping the Middle East’s political landscape.

Syria’s Shifting Alliances: China’s Diplomatic Gambit Against the West

China’s strategic partnership with Syria, extended during times of international isolation, reflects a far-sighted geopolitical move. By supporting Syria when other major powers distanced themselves, China has solidified a lasting ally in the Middle East and crafted its path for economic investment in the “Shia Crescent” region, which includes Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. China anticipates Syria will become an invaluable asset in the future against USA and its allies. By including Syria in the Belt and Road Initiative in 2022, China has signaled a long-term commitment to boost Syria’s economic presence and a diplomatic snub to the United States, eroding the US and European efforts to isolate the Assad regime on the international stage

China: A Beacon of Hope to Assad

The economic crisis in Syria has driven President Bashar al-Assad to seek stronger ties with China, a partnership he deems crucial on diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic fronts. Syria’s dire economic situation, characterized by record currency depreciation and soaring hyperinflation, has pushed approximately 90 percent of the population into poverty, while US and European sanctions continue to cripple the country. The estimated cost of the Syrian Civil War is over US$ 1.2 trillion. In this context, Assad sees China as a lifeline and a means to secure much-needed investments.

Despite not having full control of Syrian territory and facing recent protests, Assad is using his diplomatic engagement with China to project an image of defiance against the West and bolster his legitimacy both at home and on the international stage. Syria’s past positive actions in support of China, such as like Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, using this stance to challenge Western accusations of human rights abuses, underscore the depth of their partnership. Assad’s outreach to China comes at a time when China is increasingly interested in Middle East diplomacy, positioning itself as a potential superpower.

Obstacles on the Path to Strategic Engagement

Chinas long-term interest in Syria is seen primarily due to the country’s strategic location in the Middle East and its positioning on the eastern Mediterranean, and the geopolitical significance of its two ports, Tartus and Latakia, in the Levant. despite the progress made by Damascus in clawing its way back onto the world stage, there has been no mention of concrete deals or projects funded by China in Syria and  there  currently no indication of immediate involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Syria. analysts doubt that China will make any concrete commitments towards helping Syria, as any Chinese or other investment in the country risks entangling an investor in U.S. sanctions under the 2020 Caesar Act that can freeze the assets of anyone dealing with what remains effectively a pariah state. Given the current gloomy economic outlook for China, there is uncertainty about whether substantial investments will flow into Syria in the near future. Chinese investors will also have to consider the country’s poor security and parlous financial situation.

Way forward

 The recent meeting with the Syrian President indeed adds another diplomatic tool to China’s arsenal, positioning itself as a potential peacemaker in the Middle East. However, the true measure of this strategic engagement will depend on how effectively Beijing can offer reconstruction assistance to a nation torn apart by war, all while grappling with mounting economic constraints at home. Ongoing protests in the Druze region of Suwayda, which have now extended for over a month and briefly spilled over to other parts of Syria, reveal that the already fragile legitimacy of the Assad government is once again under scrutiny.

If the Sino-Syrian strategic partnership is to carry real weight and meaning, Beijing may have to go beyond mere diplomatic statements. It might need to commit substantial investments, both in terms of words and perhaps even capital, to secure economic stakes and positive outcomes in Syria. In doing so, China can play a more influential role in the complex political landscape of the Middle East, not just as a peacemaker but as an active participant in rebuilding a war-torn nation while ensuring stability and economic prosperity. This undertaking, while challenging, could signify a pivotal shift in China’s role in regional geopolitics.

By: Harshit Tokas, Research Analyst, GSDN

The complex and historically fraught relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been characterized by a strategy of strategic ambiguity aimed at maintaining regional stability. This approach, marked by deliberate vagueness in the USA’s official stance on Taiwan’s status, has allowed both countries to coexist without direct conflict. However, recent developments, particularly Chinese President Xi Jinping’s assertive stance on Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, have elevated the Taiwan issue to the forefront of international politics, necessitating a more detailed analysis.

To understand the current dynamics, it is essential to delve into the historical context. Taiwan’s status traces its roots to the tumultuous history of China in the early 20th century, marked by civil wars. Following these conflicts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), while the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. This led to the persistent “One China” policy, championed by the CCP, even as Taiwan’s internal political landscape shifted, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) taking a stance contrary to the 1992 Consensus.

The trajectory of US-Taiwan relations has evolved over time. During the Nixon administration, the U.S. established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, severing official ties with Taiwan and terminating their mutual defense treaty. Nevertheless, the US maintained an unofficial relationship with Taiwan, continuing to supply defensive weaponry and support. Key agreements, such as the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 and the Six Assurances in 1982, underscored America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security.

Recent years have witnessed mounting concerns and challenges regarding the Taiwan issue. China’s assertive foreign policy, coupled with its military modernization efforts, has raised doubts about the sustainability of the US’s strategic ambiguity approach. Three principal concerns emerge.

Firstly, is the Military Dominance. China’s absorption of Taiwan would potentially enable it to project military dominance in the region, given Taiwan’s strategic geographical position. Controlling Taiwan would enhance China’s naval capabilities and bolster its anti-access/area-denial (AS/AD) capabilities, including the deployment of advanced missile systems.

Next is the Alliance Shifts: The failure to defend Taiwan could undermine the USA’s system of regional alliances, potentially leading to shifts in regional dynamics. There is also a risk of nuclear proliferation if countries in the region perceive a reduced US commitment to their security.

Lastly is the Semiconductor Security. Taiwan plays a pivotal role in semiconductor manufacturing, posing a significant national security threat to the US Control over semiconductor technology is essential for both civilian and military applications, making Taiwan’s status crucial to America’s interests.

In response to these challenges, there is a proposal for a refined approach to strategic ambiguity, maintaining inherent ambiguity while incorporating specific tactical directives. This refined strategy would include:

1. Reinforcing Defenses: Substantial trade agreements and increased support for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, encompassing advanced weaponry, cybersecurity enhancements, and technological cooperation, would bolster its ability to resist occupation.

2. Support for Resistance: In the event of an invasion, the US would ensure continued support for Taiwan’s resistance. This support serves as both a deterrent to Chinese aggression and a means of buying time for a robust response. Elements of support may involve intelligence sharing, logistical assistance, and potentially limited military presence.

3. International Isolation: Following a Taiwan invasion, China would likely face international isolation. The US and its allies would strategically position themselves to exert economic and military pressure on China. This could involve coordinated sanctions, trade restrictions, and diplomatic isolation.

A critical aspect of the Taiwan issue is its impact on global high-tech manufacturing, particularly semiconductor production. Taiwan, through companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), holds a dominant position in the semiconductor industry. Semiconductor chips are indispensable for modern electronics, serving civilian and military purposes alike.

A potential Chinese takeover of Taiwan would grant Beijing control over this critical industry, posing significant national security concerns for the United States. To mitigate this risk, the U.S. must adopt a multifaceted approach, including investing in domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, strengthening international partnerships to diversify supply chains, and ensuring the resilience of critical industries.

In conclusion, the US-Taiwan relationship is at a critical juncture, necessitating a nuanced analysis of the evolving dynamics. While strategic ambiguity remains a cornerstone, a refined approach that incorporates specific tactical directives is crucial to safeguard regional stability and protect American interests. Taiwan’s significance in the global supply chain, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, adds another layer of complexity to this multifaceted issue, making it imperative for the United States to adopt a proactive and comprehensive strategy to navigate the challenges ahead.