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November 19, 2026

Fifty to Twelve Thousand: India’s Biotech Boom and the Last-Mile Problem

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

India’s Biotech Boom: Source Internet

Introduction

A country that had fewer than fifty biotech startups in 2014 now counts nearly twelve thousand. The story of how it got there is a lesson in institution-building, and its final chapter has not yet been written. In 2014, anyone trying to start a biotechnology company in India would have found a thin and lonely landscape. There were fewer than fifty startups in the entire country, almost no incubators, and a bioeconomy worth less than US$10 billion. Scientists with promising ideas largely stayed in their academic laboratories, partly because there was nowhere else to take them. In research institutions, the job was to publish papers, not to build products, and the vocabulary of translation, incubation and entrepreneurship was unfamiliar.

Move forward a dozen years and the picture is unrecognisable. India’s bioeconomy reached about US$195.3 billion in 2025, according to the India BioEconomy Report 2026, growing at roughly 18 percent a year and accounting for around 4.8 percent of GDP. The number of registered biotech startups stands at 11,855, up from 10,075 a year earlier. The government has set a target of US$300 billion by 2030 and, further out, US$1 trillion by 2047. Figures like these tempt a simple explanation: that a large, talented country finally woke up to biology.

The real story is more interesting, and it is about institutions. Growth of this kind rarely happens by market forces alone. In India’s case, it was set in motion by a series of deliberate decisions, spread over four decades, about how the state should fund science and, crucially, how it should fund the people who turn science into products. Understanding those decisions matters, because the next one, which the ecosystem now needs to make, is arguably the hardest.

A Slow Start, Built Inward

India began taking biotechnology seriously in the early 1980s, when the field itself was barely taking shape. Advances in recombinant DNA technology during the 1970s had shown that living cells could be engineered to manufacture useful products, and in 1982 the first genetically engineered human insulin was approved. For a country that had spent earlier decades focused on food security and building a generic pharmaceutical base, this looked like the next frontier.

The government’s first move was modest. In 1982 it set up the National Biotechnology Board, a coordinating body drawing together the Department of Science and Technology, the Indian Council of Medical Research, the University Grants Commission and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Its job was to identify priority areas in a field that hardly existed in India. Within four years, the arrangement had been outgrown. In February 1986, the Board became a full government department, the Department of Biotechnology (DBT), under the Ministry of Science and Technology.

For its first two decades, DBT looked inward. India at the time was a recipient of technology rather than a producer, dependent on foreign expertise and restricted in its access to some technologies by international sanctions. So the department did the basic things: it built research institutes, trained scientists and put up laboratory infrastructure capable of world-class work at home. It often absorbed and strengthened what already existed rather than starting from scratch. The National Institute of Immunology in New Delhi, founded in 1981 and beginning with leprosy research, became one of DBT’s first autonomous institutions and grew into a significant centre for immunology and vaccine science. The scientific base that grew in places like this helped seed India’s vaccine and pharmaceutical industry, including firms such as Bharat Biotech and Shantha Biotech.

The Vaccine That Proved the Model

By the early 2000s, this groundwork produced a clear success: an Indian rotavirus vaccine. Rotavirus is a leading cause of severe diarrhoea among young children, and a vaccine suited to Indian conditions had long been a public health priority. The effort grew out of research by Dr M.K. Bhan at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences and was carried forward by DBT once Dr Bhan became its Secretary, in partnership with Bharat Biotech and with support from the Indo-US Vaccine Action Programme.

The vaccine was licensed in 2014 and entered India’s national immunisation programme in 2016. In 2018 it received WHO prequalification, which made it eligible for procurement by United Nations agencies and by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, for use in other low-resource countries. What made the episode significant was its full arc: a discovery made in an Indian laboratory had travelled all the way to a product delivered to Indian children, with public research and private manufacturing working together at every stage. It was proof that public-private partnership could turn a finding into a real product.

It also showed how long and difficult that road can be, and it exposed a gap that the rotavirus project itself could not close.

The Missing Rung

Even as the rotavirus work matured, a new kind of actor was appearing in India and around the world: young scientists and first-time founders with novel but unproven ideas. These ideas were too small and too early for large companies to fund, and they did not fit DBT’s existing grant schemes, which were built for established laboratories and institutions. This was a different gap from the one the vaccine partnership had bridged. It was not between a finished discovery and a manufacturer, but between an idea and its first proof.

DBT’s first attempt to address it came around 2006. Under Dr Bhan, the department designed a public-private scheme modelled on the United States’ Small Business Innovation Research programme, which since 1982 has directed a share of federal research funding to small firms. The Indian version, the Small Business Innovation Research Initiative (SBIRI), was a real first step, but it ran into the limits of its structure. A government department dealing directly with private companies could not offer the speed and flexibility industry needed, because decisions moved at the pace of government. The scheme was also cautious by design: support came as loans rather than grants, and only to established companies able to offer collateral. It could not reach a young researcher with nothing but an idea and a laboratory result.

The lesson DBT drew was that another scheme would not solve the problem. The department needed an institution that sat outside its own formal structure.

Designing BIRAC

To work out what that institution should look like, DBT studied how other countries had approached the question. The United States’ DARPA showed how a public agency could fund high-risk, high-reward research. Canada’s Industrial Research Assistance Program showed how a government body could work directly with small and medium enterprises. Israel offered a model of strong state backing for medical device innovation, and the United Kingdom had built research and innovation clusters operating at arm’s length from ministries. Each taught a different lesson about how much risk a public funder should take, how closely it should work with industry and how much independence it needed to do either.

The arm’s-length idea proved most influential, but the lesson of SBIRI was that copying a foreign programme was not enough. The new body had to be built for India’s ecosystem as it stood. Wide consultation with researchers, universities, startups and industry, held while DBT was finalising its first National Biotechnology Development Strategy, pointed to a clear conclusion: DBT could not remain only a granting authority. It had to become a partner in the products it funded, sharing risk and staying involved from research to market.

The result was the Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC). Three choices set it apart from anything DBT had done before. It was a separate legal entity, registered as a public sector enterprise, rather than a departmental scheme. It could fund individuals and early-stage entrepreneurs directly, not only established companies, which meant government money could for the first time go straight to a founder with an idea. And it could offer grants, loans or equity depending on what a company or a stage of research required, a flexibility that was uncommon in Indian public finance at the time.

Getting it approved took nearly five years. The proposal moved through DBT’s processes and then through roughly twenty ministries and departments, from the Ministry of Finance to the then Planning Commission. The Cabinet cleared it on 11 December 2011, and BIRAC was registered on 20 March 2012.

A Small Institution With a Wide Reach

BIRAC began in a small ecosystem with around fifty startups and almost no incubation infrastructure, and it chose to stay lean. It kept a single office in Delhi and avoided building a large bureaucracy. Instead it assembled what came to be called the BIRAC family: a network of partner institutions across the country that would carry its programmes into their regions. The network started with five incubators and grew alongside BIRAC’s own schemes, beginning with the Biotechnology Ignition Grant, an early-stage award for individuals and young startups.

Regional partners did more than host companies. Bengaluru’s Centre for Cellular and Molecular Platforms (C-CAMP) and Hyderabad’s IKP Knowledge Park ran components of national schemes and studied their regional ecosystems on BIRAC’s behalf. DBT’s own clusters, including one built around the Translational Health Science and Technology Institute near Delhi and others in Bengaluru and Pune, were mandated to work closely with industry and startups to move technologies through the translational stages. Putting research institutions, incubators, startups and funding in one place meant a technology could move from laboratory to company without leaving the campus.

BIRAC’s method was to respond to identified gaps rather than follow a fixed blueprint. Where there was a shortage of infrastructure, it built infrastructure. Where there was a policy gap, it helped shape policy. Where there was a shortage of skilled people, it created training pathways. Each scheme grew out of direct conversations with the people who would use it.

What the Numbers Show, and What They Do Not

The record, more than a decade on, is striking. BIRAC has provided over INR 42 billion in direct funding and helped catalyse roughly INR 70 billion in total investment, which has translated into more than 900 products reaching the market and over 35,000 high-skilled jobs. India now ranks among the top dozen biotech economies in the world.

The COVID-19 pandemic became an unplanned stress test. Through the National Biopharma Mission, BIRAC supported vaccine and diagnostic work at companies such as Bharat Biotech, Cadila Healthcare, Serum Institute of India and Gennova Biopharmaceuticals, spanning vaccine candidates to testing capacity. The episode showed that the ecosystem built over the previous decade could deliver at speed and scale. The policy framework has since widened. The BioE3 policy, approved in 2024 and standing for Biotechnology for Economy, Environment and Employment, aims to push India beyond vaccines and generics into areas such as biomanufacturing, bio-based materials and precision fermentation, and its funding arm, the Bio-RIDE scheme, was cleared with an outlay of INR 9,197 crore. BIRAC has also been named a second-level fund manager under the government’s Research, Development and Innovation framework, with INR 20 billion earmarked over five years for high-risk biotech ventures.

It would be a mistake to credit all this to two institutions. India’s established pharmaceutical industry, its large pool of trained scientists and a deepening private capital market all contributed. But DBT and BIRAC did what markets, left alone, would not have done: they took the first risk on unproven ideas, built the incubators and clusters where those ideas could be tested, and made public research a working partner of private manufacturing.

The headline numbers also hide uncomfortable details. The India BioEconomy Report shows that bio-based industrial products, the very category BioE3 was designed to promote, accounted for only about US$0.48 billion, a mere 0.25 percent of the bioeconomy. Investment is concentrated: five cities received roughly 71 percent of total biotech investment, while eastern India attracted just US$2 million from three deals despite producing 183 new startups in 2025. And in the same year, exits totalled US$6.15 billion against US$4.61 billion invested, a sign that capital is being taken out of the sector faster than it is going in.

The Last-Mile Problem

These figures point to the real question facing India’s biotech ecosystem. Building a pipeline of startups was the visible, and in hindsight the easier, achievement of the past decade. Sustaining what comes out of that pipeline is harder. What happens to a company after its first grant? Does the ecosystem carry it to a scaled, durable business, or only to the next milestone?

The answer is not yet encouraging. Venture capital remains hesitant about biotech, whose long development cycles, regulatory uncertainty and high failure rates do not suit investors accustomed to quicker returns in software. Where private money does flow, it tends to chase safer, lower-risk opportunities rather than the harder, higher-value ones. Startups that survive the early years often find themselves in a gap: too large for grants, too risky for banks and too early for the growth-stage capital they need. Manufacturing capacity, regulatory pathways and market access add further hurdles, especially for novel products with no established reimbursement route.

That is the next institutional challenge. Where the department of 1986 built the scientific base, and the council of 2012 funded the first mile from idea to prototype, the next change has to address the last mile: patient, risk-bearing capital and the market access that turn a funded startup into a lasting company. Whether that means a new instrument within BIRAC, a dedicated growth-stage fund or an entirely new institution is an open question. The new RDI fund is a step in this direction, but its design and deployment will determine whether it fills the gap or simply adds another layer.

Conclusion

India’s biotech journey offers a useful corrective to the idea that economic transformation is simply a matter of money or market forces. At each stage, progress came from a specific institutional decision: a board in 1982, a department in 1986, a scheme in 2006 that taught its designers what not to repeat, and an arm’s-length council in 2012 that could fund founders directly. Each solved the problem of its time, and each revealed the problem that came next.

That sequence is the most useful lesson for what lies ahead. BIRAC’s own history shows the method: keep identifying what the ecosystem needs next, and keep adapting the framework quickly enough to keep pace with the people it serves. An institution that stops questioning its own relevance risks becoming irrelevant. India has shown it can build the beginning of a biotech industry. Whether it can build the patient capital, the manufacturing depth and the market access that turn twelve thousand startups into a durable industrial base is the test of the next decade, and the answer will depend less on the size of the target than on the quality of the institutions designed to reach it.

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