By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction
Beijing is exporting its way around a weak domestic economy, tightening its grip on a Party it no longer fully trusts, and extending its military reach from the Karakoram to the open ocean. Each of these developments helps explain the others.
Anyone trying to take the measure of China in the final weeks of 2026 faces an awkward problem: the evidence points in several directions at once. The economy is posting export numbers that would make any trade minister envious, yet ordinary Chinese households are spending barely more than a year ago. The Communist Party has just finished a plenum devoted to discipline, expelling dozens of senior officials, among them some of the most powerful generals in the country. And in the same few weeks, the People’s Liberation Army ran its first conventional ground exercise with Pakistan and flew a stealth combat drone off a new amphibious assault ship.
These are not unrelated headlines. Taken together, they describe a state under internal strain that is nonetheless projecting economic and military power outward with growing confidence. For India, which shares a contested border with China and a widening trade deficit, the combination is worth reading closely.
An Export Machine Running Hot
Start with the numbers, because they are striking. China’s customs data showed a trade surplus of US$105.28 billion in October 2026, which took the cumulative surplus for January to October to US$1.043 trillion. That is the second consecutive year the country has crossed the trillion-dollar mark, and it got there a month earlier than in 2025, when the full-year record of US$1.2 trillion was set. Exports rose 35.2 percent year on year to about US$412 billion, a touch slower than September’s 36.3 percent but ahead of what economists had forecast. Imports grew even faster, up 41.6 percent, which is why October’s monthly surplus was smaller than September’s.
What is driving this? Mostly the global artificial intelligence build-out. Chinese exports of semiconductors, data-centre servers and networking equipment have surged, with semiconductor exports alone up more than 137 percent by value in October. Automobiles and electric vehicles add to the total, with auto exports up 37.6 percent. Passenger vehicle exports rose 68.2 percent in October while domestic sales of cars fell 27.3 percent, which is perhaps the clearest single statistic of how lopsided the economy has become.
That lopsidedness shows up everywhere else. China’s economy grew 4.5 percent in the third quarter, a modest recovery from a multi-year low of 4.3 percent in the second, bringing average growth over the first nine months to 4.6 percent, inside Beijing’s 4.5 to 5 percent target, the lowest annual goal in decades. Industrial production grew 5.5 percent, powered by factories and AI-related hardware. Retail sales, by contrast, rose just 1.1 percent. Household consumption remains weak and property investment sluggish. Analysts widely agree that Beijing is leaning heavily on exports to hit its growth target because domestic demand is not doing the job.
The price data tells the same story in a different register. Producer prices rose 5.7 percent in October, the fastest pace since June 2022 and the end of nearly three years of factory-gate deflation. Yet consumer prices rose only 0.7 percent, with core inflation at 0.8 percent, its lowest this year. The gap is explained by where the pressure sits. Nine industries, led by coal mining, oil and gas extraction and fuel processing, accounted for over six percentage points of the producer price rise, and only 15 of China’s 30 major industrial sectors recorded increases. Automobiles, pharmaceuticals and general-purpose machinery were still in deflation. In plain terms, factories are facing higher input costs without the demand to pass them on. That is not a broad recovery. It is cost pressure.
When One Country’s Overcapacity Becomes Everyone’s Problem
The effect of this model on trading partners is where the politics begins. China’s surplus with the European Union reached US$310.7 billion in the first ten months of the year, up from about US$241.6 billion a year earlier. China has insisted it is not trying to widen its surplus and wants more balanced trade, but Brussels, like Washington, is under growing pressure to respond. A shaky US-China trade truce, extended again on 9 November, has kept the lid on tariff escalation for now, and exports to the United States rose almost 33 percent in October off a low base. The pressure points are building elsewhere.
Chemicals are a good example, because the pattern is so clear. Over 25 years, China has expanded its basic chemicals capacity roughly eighteen-fold and now controls over 45 percent of global capacity in basic chemicals and plastic resins. Since 2020 alone, its ethylene, polyethylene and polypropylene capacity has grown by 80, 75 and 71 percent respectively. Decades of subsidies, tax concessions, cheap financing and industrial parks have pushed production well beyond what the domestic market can absorb. Nearly a third of Chinese chemical producers are reportedly loss-making, which means the incentive to export is not just opportunistic but structural. The knock-on effects are being felt in Europe and Northeast Asia, where plants are closing, and the political backlash, calls for trade barriers and a broader industrial-policy rethink, is gathering pace.
India is not immune. China’s share of India’s polyvinyl chloride imports jumped from 3 percent in 2020 to 45 percent in 2025, a dependence that sits awkwardly with New Delhi’s stated aim of building domestic manufacturing capacity. It is one more data point in a bilateral trade relationship in which India’s deficit with China has been the largest it runs with any partner, and it complicates the already delicate effort to stabilise ties after the border crisis of 2020.
A Party Cleaning House
If the economy shows China looking outward for growth, the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, held in October, showed the leadership looking inward for control. The plenum reviewed 34 disciplinary cases, expelled 33 senior officials from the Party and removed one more from his post. Sixteen of those expelled came from the military, a figure that gives some sense of the scale of the purge inside the PLA. Among the names were Zhang Youxia, formerly the senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Ma Xingrui, a former Party secretary of Xinjiang.
The plenum went beyond individual cases. It adopted a resolution on persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance, an attempt to move the anti-corruption campaign away from periodic bursts of discipline and toward a standing framework of oversight, cadre management and accountability. Xi Jinping has made discipline a signature theme since taking power, but the shift towards institutionalising it suggests he expects the campaign to outlast any single wave of expulsions.
There is a generational dimension too. In an accompanying explainer, Xi voiced concern that the growing share of younger cadres, born after Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening, may lack the ideological commitment of earlier generations, and urged them to strengthen discipline to safeguard the Party’s long-term rule. That anxiety fits a wider pattern in which national security has been moving ahead of development as the organising priority of Chinese politics. It also fits the narrative the Party has been building around its 105th anniversary this year, which presents centralised one-party rule as the secret of China’s growth, stability and modernisation, with Xi at its core.
The timing matters. The Party’s 21st Congress is due in 2027, when Xi is widely expected to secure another term. Purging the armed forces and codifying discipline ahead of that meeting looks like an effort to ensure that no institution, least of all the military, is positioned to resist. It also, inevitably, exposes how deep the problems run. A leadership does not expel a former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission without having concluded that the rot reached high.
Reaching Outward: Karakoram, Satellites and a Stealth Drone
The internal tightening has not stopped the PLA from expanding what it does beyond China’s borders. Three developments from October are worth setting side by side.
The first is the Karakoram-2026 exercise. From 14 to 22 October, China and Pakistan held their first joint exercise involving regular army formations, at Korla in Xinjiang. Previous bilateral drills had focused on counter-terrorism and special forces. This one practised combined-arms operations, mixed-unit manoeuvres and joint command procedures, the sort of work that builds real interoperability between two armies. The training also covered high-altitude operations, addressing thin air, rugged terrain, degraded communications and logistical strain along the China-Pakistan frontier, where elevations exceed 5,000 metres. Chinese military commentators have anticipated deeper intelligence sharing and joint operational planning as a result. For India, the implications are hard to miss. A joint ground exercise at altitude between its two principal adversaries is a pointed signal, and capabilities developed for one frontier can be applied on the other.
The second is China’s growing preoccupation with low Earth orbit. After the US Space Force accepted the Meadowlands electronic warfare system for operational use, extending its ability to jam adversary satellite communications from the ground, the PLA Daily published three articles on 19 October examining the subject. One argued that LEO constellations are transforming warfare by fusing communications, reconnaissance, unmanned platforms and precision strike into faster, more decentralised kill networks, citing the Russia-Ukraine war. A second, written by experts at China’s Space Engineering University, argued that attacking ground stations, control centres and launch facilities is a more practical and cost-effective way to neutralise a constellation than destroying satellites in orbit. A third described Washington as moving from experimentation to operational deployment of an integrated anti-satellite capability, including the Bounty Hunter surveillance system, with the aim of degrading China’s access to space assets in a contingency. Read together, the articles show the PLA thinking about how to exploit satellite constellations, how to deny them to others and how to protect its own.
The third is hardware. On 30 October, during final sea trials of the Type 76 amphibious assault ship Sichuan, China’s first shipborne stealth reconnaissance-strike drone, the GJ-21, completed its maiden take-off and landing. The Sichuan displaces more than 40,000 tons when fully loaded and carries electromagnetic catapult and arrestor technology, which lets it operate as both an assault ship and a drone mothership. This was reportedly the first publicly reported catapult launch and arrested recovery of a jet combat drone from an amphibious assault ship. The GJ-21 is a naval variant of the GJ-11, a tailless, jet-powered flying-wing drone built by AVIC’s Hongdu group, with a potential internal payload of about two tonnes. It points toward a PLA Navy that can extend its reach, carry out high-risk missions in defended airspace and distribute long-range strike across more platforms.
What It Means for India
Put the economic, political and military pieces together and the picture for New Delhi is mixed rather than simple.
On the economy, the risk is dependence. An export-driven China, dumping surplus capacity into global markets, will keep pressing on sectors where India is trying to build its own industry, from chemicals to electronics, and the PVC numbers show how quickly dependence can build. India’s response is likely to lean on trade remedies and on its supply-chain diversification efforts, but both take time.
On politics, the picture is more ambiguous. A China consumed by purges and preparing for a major Party Congress may have less appetite for risk on its borders, which fits the cautious thaw in India-China relations since 2024. But a more centralised system also means decisions rest with a smaller circle, and a leadership focused on national security over development is not necessarily a more accommodating neighbour.
On the military front, the direction is clearer. Deeper China-Pakistan interoperability, a more capable naval aviation arm and sharper thinking about space warfare all point to a PLA that is modernising across domains. India’s own investments in drones, counter-drone systems, space-based surveillance and integrated battle groups reflect an awareness of the same trends, but the pace of Chinese change is a reminder that the gap will not close on its own.
Conclusion
The easy reading of China in late 2026 is that it is simply strong, or simply strained. The better reading is that it is both, and that the two conditions feed each other. Weak domestic demand pushes Beijing to export harder, which sharpens friction with trading partners. A Party anxious about discipline and loyalty tightens control at home, even as it commits to military modernisation abroad. A leadership convinced that rivals are preparing to contest every domain, from the sea to orbit, invests in capabilities that make those rivals more anxious in turn.
For India and others watching, the lesson is to resist the temptation of a single narrative. A China that posts a trillion-dollar surplus, expels two dozen generals and exercises with Pakistan at 5,000 metres is not collapsing and not unstoppable. It is a large, ambitious and anxious power, managing contradictions it has not resolved. How it handles them over the next year, through the Party Congress and beyond, will shape the strategic environment for its neighbours far more than any single export figure or exercise.
