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June 24, 2025
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Indonesia–Malaysia Ties: Between Conflict and Concord

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By: C Shraddha

Indonesia & Malaysia: source Internet

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is one of historical richness. This can be mapped back to the 7th century when the archipelagos were indispensable parts of ancient kingdoms and empires of Majapahit, Johor-Riau, Aceh and Srivijaya. As the colonial powers spread their reign across continents, they carved up territories in Indonesia and Malaysia through different treaties. In 1641, Malaya fell into the reign of the Dutch, who were succeeded by the British Empire in 1824 through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. Under the treaty, Malaya was to be under the governance of the United Kingdom, while the East Indies was dominated by the Dutch.

The region witnessed shifting power dynamics throughout the war. During World War 2, Japanese forces had a stronghold over Malaya and the East Indies. However, this proved to be futile when the brutal defeat of the Japanese forces in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined with the rise of nationalism within the East Indies, led to the declaration of independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta. However, despite their efforts, the Dutch forces were fixated on recolonising the region. What followed was a violent four-year war from 1945 to 1949, which ended with the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia during the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference.

The life of the archipelago was navigated by the Malay way of life, which consisted of three primary elements- the language, the religion of Islam, and the notion of the Kingdom. Adhering to the structures of a kingdom, the dominant ethnic community in the archipelagic Southeast Asia spoke the Malay language and followed Islam. Because of their interlinked identities, leaders of newly independent Malaysia and Indonesia shared familiar strategic apprehensions of the regional order. The leaders viewed the region as a singular unit represented and protected by the Malay World. Nevertheless, this common outlook marked the extent of their strategic alignment.

The two nations differed widely on their strategic interests. Indonesia viewed itself as the superior nation due to its momentous independence struggle, its territorial vastness and population density. Malaysia faded further into the background as the Soekarno regime asserted its dominance in a bid to establish Indonesia’s strategic foothold over archipelagic Southeast Asia. In his eyes, the two countries lacked any common strategic interest. Indonesia did not consider Malaysia powerful or capable enough to be perceived as a reliable ally. So, instead, they aimed to overpower Malaysia.

Malayan leaders, however, opted for a contrary stance. They believed that the survival and security of the archipelagos depended on each other. In 1963, then-Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed the country’s interest “to forge the closest links with Indonesia.” Common identities and shared strategic interests became the pillars on which these imagined ties were placed. For the leaders, Indonesia was not only their nearest neighbour, rather they shared deep “sentimental and blood ties” with each other. However, their geographical proximity to Indonesia facilitated the realization of mutual strategic dependence. 

The sheer influence and power possessed by Indonesia could be observed in the way it unintentionally impacted Malaysia’s foreign policy. Their two common links inculcated an understanding of the necessity of the Malay Archipelago for the survival of the states, the geographical expanse of Indonesia necessitating Malaysia to establish itself closer. “As we were too small to stand alone, our only hope for security was to live in close association with Indonesia in particular, and other countries in Southeast Asia in general,” Tunku expressed. Their need to position themselves closer to Indonesia generated unified aspirations of peace.

To maintain and promote peace, cooperation, and stability in Southeast Asia, they established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, along with the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. This period in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was “marked by friendship, harmony and cooperation.” The newly established Suharto government aimed to reverse the old ways of political confrontation with Malaysia and actively engage in building regional cooperation. Considered to be the most influential player in Southeast Asia, the country’s involvement in the establishment of ASEAN undoubtedly ensured harmony and stability in the region.  

Despite their commitment to uphold ASEAN goals, the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship is not one without skirmishes. Sipadan and Ligitan, two islands in the Sulawesi Sea, became the epicentre of the territorial dispute between the two nations. Although territorially compact, the question regarding the ownership of these Islands and the continental shelf consequently led to the involvement of international bodies. The negotiations reached an impasse as both sides insisted on using maps that excluded each other’s claim to the two islands. Consequently, in 1969, all negotiations were suspended as Indonesians claimed that it was beyond their power to negotiate the sovereignty of the Islands. For the Indonesians, the questions regarding the ownership of the Islands were to be left unsettled while maintaining the status quo. However, as far as Malaysian negotiators were concerned, the Sipadan and Ligitan belonged to Malaysia.

In December 1979, the Malaysian government issued a new map that showed Sipadan and Ligitan as part of their territory, thus publicizing the dispute. By February of the following year, the Indonesian government “formally objected to the new map”. However, the resulting discussions between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Hussein Onn failed to resolve the territorial dispute. Subsequently, the usage of the Islands by private dive companies, rising ownership claims over the territory by Malaysia and violation of status-quo led the countries to consult the International Court of Justice in 2002. The sixteen-to-one ruling of the court under Judge Shigeru Oda favoured Malaysia’s claims to the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan.

The presence of undocumented Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia has emerged as another point of contention between the two countries. Conversely, the harsh treatment of Indonesian formal and informal sector labourers by Malaysian employers, combined with the inaction of the Malay government in protecting the exploited, has further aggravated this relationship. The labour movement of Indonesian workers to Malaysia accelerated in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as the country’s rapid modernisation and development during the 1980s and 1990s rendered it an attractive site for impoverished Indonesian workers. However, the influx of Indonesian workers coincided with an increase in crime rates in Malaysia, specifically in the 1990s. Indonesian migrants were convicted of various crimes, including petty theft, rape, robberies and murders. In 2001 alone, approximately 1,051 Indonesian workers were arrested for such offences. Additionally, Malaysian forces also discovered the smuggling of weapons in illegal migrant squatter camps throughout Peninsular and East Malaysia. Notably, an estimate showcases that up to 36 per cent of prison inmates throughout Malaysia are illegal Indonesian immigrants.

The rising workers, illegal and otherwise, seemingly altered the social fabric of the Malay way of life. The assimilation of Indonesian immigrants into the community and identity raised concerns amongst the Islam-following citizens as the former used shared ethnicity and language as a strategy to proselytise the Malay society. This was perceived as a substantial threat to the culture and identity of the nation, to the extent that a Malaysian Cabinet Minister described it as the “biggest threat facing Muslims in Malaysia today.” While both countries have undertaken several legislations to reduce the flow of illegal workers across the borders, the economic disparity and demand for cheap labour have rendered the efforts inadequate.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is historically intertwined. This interconnectedness has given birth to differential claims of ownership over certain cultures and traditions. The cultural disagreement started in 2007 when a Malaysian Ministry of Tourism ‘Malaysia Truly Asia’ campaign included the Indonesian Reog Ponorogo dance and the traditional Rasa Sayange song. This angered the Indonesian public, who accused Malaysia of appropriating and claiming their cultural heritage.

Another dispute arose in 2009 when a documentary on Malaysian cultural heritage titled ‘Enigmatic Malaysia’ showcased a clip of Pendet dance from Bali. Soon, protests erupted across Indonesia for misrepresenting and claiming unlawful ownership over their culture. Soon after, the Malaysian Minister of Culture and Tourism apologised to their Indonesian counterpart. However, the apology was criticised by certain members of the Indonesian government, who considered it to be insufficient in proportion to the actions committed.

However, the behaviour of the governments in dealing with matters of cultural heritage has shifted significantly over the years. In 2020, Indonesia and Malaysia jointly nominated Pantun, a traditional form of poetry, to UNESCO for its addition to the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) of Humanity at the ICH Intergovernmental Committee sessions in France and Jamaica. This was the first time both governments had jointly proposed a cultural heritage. Now, Pantun has officially become Indonesia and Malaysia’s first shared cultural heritage added to the ICH list.

Over the years, the relationship between the two archipelagos has become more amicable. On January 27, 2025, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was honoured with the Darjah Kerabat Johor Yang Amat Dihormati Pangkat Pertama or The Most Esteemed Royal Family Order of Johor award from the Johor Kingdom during a state visit. The award was presented by Malaysia’s King, the 17th Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Sultan Ibrahim, at the country’s national palace.

The state visit reflected the renewed interests of both countries to ensure strong bilateral relations. Ever since his inauguration, Prabowo has visited Malaysia multiple times, indicating the country’s need to maintain amicable relations with its neighbour. During a recent media briefing, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called Prabowo a “close friend”, while the latter expressed that he views the archipelagos as “strong regional partners with the same interests as the ASEAN founder.”

Economic cooperation has become a cornerstone in strengthening the peaceful ties between the two nations. In 2022, the countries surpassed US$ 27 billion in bilateral trade, with palm oil, electronics and petroleum products topping the list. From April 2024 to April 2025, the exports of Indonesia to Malaysia increased by 6.55 per cent, while imports increased by 17.2 per cent. The status of the two countries as renowned palm oil producers was reflected in the 2025 year-on-year growth in Indonesia’s export to Malaysia, with the export of Palm oil growing by 846 per cent. Regardless of past disputes in the palm oil sector, both countries have undertaken efforts to ensure sustainable palm oil practices, including the establishment of Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) and Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification programmes.

The Indonesia- Malaysia relationship is one rooted in centuries of shared history, community, geography and identity. While this relationship has witnessed its fair share of friction and competition, both nations have increasingly prioritised cooperation. They recognise each other’s importance in ensuring peace, stability, and security in the Southeast Asian region. In the ASEAN spirit of dialogue and non-confrontation, the nations have not only managed to address sensitive issues diplomatically but have also continued to ensure cooperation with each other on regional matters. While old tensions may not fully disappear, continued diplomatic measures, shared regional aspirations, economic interdependence, and a unique cultural identity shared between the two neighbours ensure the possibility of a prosperous and united future.

Bangladesh & Myanmar: The Escalating Border Crisis

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By: Chethana Enugula

Bangladesh & Myanmar: source Internet

The current Bangladesh-Myanmar tensions have become a matter of urgent regional concern, developing out of decades-long ethnic conflict, political unrest, and humanitarian disasters. Since 2023, these tensions have been simmering greatly as the internal conflict in Myanmar, most notably in Rakhine State, has gotten worse. In the case of Bangladesh, the stakes are high-border security risks, the increase in displaced populations, diplomatic challenges, and socio-political  pressure.

Coming together simultaneously, with both nations struggling to contain these complex challenges, the development is attracting global attention to the peace and stability in the region.

Historical Context of Bilateral Tensions

The origins of the present crisis lie deep in the region’s colonial and post-colonial history. Myanmar, Burma, has historically grappled with internal ethnicity, especially in the western Rakhine State that borders Bangladesh. Rohingya Muslims have been the minority group involved in this confrontation. The Rohingya are regarded as stateless under the Myanmar citizenship law of 1982; they have been the victims of systematic discrimination and regular military campaigns.

The latest and most intense of them took place in 2017, when a vicious campaign by the Myanmar military, Tatmadaw, displaced more than 700,000 Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar. This exodus formed one of the largest refugee camps in the world and tested the humanitarian capacity of Bangladesh. The situation has not been resolved yet despite multiple attempts at repatriation and international mediation. Myanmar has rejected assurances to take back the Rohingya refugees, who are stateless and reliant on aid, and are still in limbo.

Myanmar Civil War and The Emergence of the Arakan Army

In February 2021, the internal politics of Myanmar experienced a big shakeup as the military couped the democratically elected government. The result has since then seen the country sink into a full-scale civil conflict. The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the pro-democracy forces have stepped up the struggle against the junta.

One such group that has gathered momentum is the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group. They were initially established to seek more autonomy rights for the Rakhine people, but it has taken advantage of the mayhem to increase their territorial gains. Towards the end of 2024, the AA had seized the majority of Rakhine State, including regions adjacent to the Bangladesh border, which replaced the Myanmar military forces in these regions. Bangladesh has been experiencing both opportunities and risks because of this power shift, which has brought a new non-state actor to its southeastern border.

Recent Development along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border

The current escalation of the tension is due to the direct spillover of the Myanmar internal conflict onto Bangladeshi soil. Artillery shells, mortars, and stray bullets amid the confrontations between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army have been entering Bangladesh territory since late 2023. There were several reported cases in the border regions, such as Bandarban and Teknaf, where civilians were wounded and houses were destroyed. Landmines along the border have also led to the injury of Bangladeshi nationals, triggering concern about the security of the civilians.

The second important event was the infiltration of the Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) into Bangladesh. Hundreds of BGP officers crossed the border into Bangladesh and were arrested by the Bangladesh forces in early 2024, when the AA began a large offensive in Maungdaw. Most of them were eventually repatriated; however, the incident highlighted the unstable situation in the conflict and the susceptibility of Bangladesh to any instability of its neighbor.

The New Development with the Arakan Army

The Arakan Army has turned into a de facto authority over Rakhine. Realizing this fact, Bangladesh has started low-key, unofficial talks with the group. There have been reports that backchannel communication has taken place to maintain stability along the borders and the avoidance of additional shelling, and also the release of captured Bangladeshi soldiers.

The involvement of the AA has become a matter of official record in Bangladesh, where a National Security Advisor, Dr. Khalilur Rahman, and other officials, such as the Foreign Affairs Adviser, Md. Towhid Hossain has openly admitted that they must continue reaching out to the AA. According to them, the non-state actor is a necessity to the national interests of Bangladesh, judging by the fact that the central Myanmar government no longer has control of the entire border; therefore, border security and Rohingya repatriation are necessary.

Nevertheless, such involvement is not risk-free. The AA is alleged to violate human rights, especially of Rohingya civilians. In mid-2024, Human rights groups documented that AA forces killed hundreds of Rohingya in Buthidaung, by drone and artillery attacks. Such activities put Bangladesh in a difficult situation – any association with the AA has to be balanced with the ethical and diplomatic repercussions of involving itself with an entity that is allegedly involved in war crimes.

Humanitarian Impact and Refugee Crisis

Humanitarian impacts of such tensions are enormous. There are more than one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh living in overcrowded refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. As fresh violence has erupted in Rakhine, a greater number of Rohingya have tried to cross the border. Bangladesh, in its turn, has adopted a sterner position- its troops have repelled newcomers, arguing that they lack the capacity and are afraid of increasing lawlessness in the camps.

The situation in the camps has been getting worse, and now violence, drug trafficking, and the activities of armed Rohingya groups, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), are on the rise. In January 2025, Bangladesh security services detained ARSA chief Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi, dealt a major setback to militant circuits within the camps. However, the existence of these groups remains a major threat to the security of the camps and the stability of the region.

Diplomatic and Regional Responses

On the diplomatic front, Bangladesh has protested several times to the Myanmar government regarding cross-border shelling and failure to control refugees. There has been little substantive dialogue, though. Myanmar, preoccupied with its internal conflicts, is in a state of diplomatic isolation and has been incapable of, or perhaps unwilling to, address the concerns of Bangladesh.

India and China have taken a reserved stance in the region. India, which faces insurgency issues in the Northeast and has infrastructure stakes in the Kaladan projects, is closely monitoring the situation. China is an old partner of the Myanmar military and has profound interests in Rakhine, especially in the Kyaukphyu port. The territorial gains by the AA are now threatening these investments. Such has been the stake of both powers, though they have been reluctant to intervene or even mediate directly in the bilateral tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The United States and international bodies like the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have shown concern, especially on the humanitarian consequences. There has been some reported coordination of the intelligence services of Bangladesh and the U.S., and this hints at an increasing level of strategic interest in maintaining regional stability.

Security Measures and Border Management

Bangladesh has strongly enhanced its border security on the ground. Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has undertaken augmented patrolling and monitoring, especially in the vulnerable sectors. The Army has been carrying out army readiness drills, too, and the Navy has increased patrols of the Naf River, where the maritime clashes and the detention of Bangladeshi fishermen by AA forces have taken place.

Demining of civilian places is also being undertaken, with early warning signs being given to communities living along the borders. Nevertheless, the risk of violence, both unintentional and deliberate, is great. The absence of a proper ceasefire/ceasing or an agreement with the AA makes it difficult to establish peace along the border in a long-term perspective.

The Balancing Act of Bangladesh: Security, Sovereignty and Human Rights

Bangladesh is currently in a harsh balancing game. On the one side, it has to assert its territorial integrity and save its nationals against the consequences of the civil war in Myanmar. On the one hand, there is pressure to comply with international human rights standards, especially regarding the protection of refugees.

Bangladesh is trying to stabilize the situation pragmatically by coming into contact with the AA on an informal basis. There is, however, also the risk of legitimizing a non-state actor that is accused of serious abuses. In addition, the move to reject new refugees has led to criticism by humanitarian organizations claiming that it is leaving the vulnerable groups to die in war-torn regions.

Bangladesh should also take care that its internal stability is not jeopardized. Militant networks present in Rohingya camps, the increase in crime, and political opposition using the refugee issue on the domestic political agenda all present possible challenges to the national unity and security of Dhaka.

Looking Ahead: Possible Scenarios and Strategic Options

In the future, Bangladesh-Myanmar relations will heavily rely on the course of the internal conflict in Myanmar. In case the junta keeps losing its territory, the AA or some other ethnic armed organizations could become the leading forces in western Myanmar. In this instance, possibly amid international supervision, the goal is to stabilize the border and aim at Rohingya repatriation.

At the humanitarian level, the international community urgently needs to help give more aid to refugee camps in Bangladesh. More to the point, alternative repatriation or resettlement frameworks, including possible third countries or UN-controlled safe areas, are to be designed.

Bangladesh also needs to invest in long-term security relations with its neighbors and strategic partners. Sharing of intelligence, combined surveillance, and application of diplomatic pressure in unison on the stakeholders of Myanmar can assist in averting a full-scale crisis in the region. The present conflict is not merely a bilateral issue- It is a regional and international problem that needs to be solved with multilateral and international problem that needs to be solved with multilateral approaches.

Conclusion

The Bangladesh-Myanmar tensions demonstrate a highly sophisticated and developing crisis on the verge of war, and displacement, diplomacy, and defending its borders, but also on how to fulfil its humanitarian obligations without jeopardizing the security of the nation. The danger of failing to do so is becoming increasingly obvious as the Arakan Army gains more territory and the civil conflict in Myanmar shows no signs of stopping.

Bangladesh has been practical and strong in wading through these troubled waters. But the way ahead will be full of delicate diplomacy, prolonged humanitarian assistance, and renewed determination towards peace in the region. The stakes are high not only in the case of Bangladesh and Myanmar but also for the larger stability in South and Southeast Asia.

Balancing Necessity and Mistrust: A Geopolitical View of Pakistan–U.S. Relations

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By: Ahana Sarkar

USA & Pakistan’s flags: source Internet

The connection between Pakistan and the United States changed much over the decades; it had times of close partnership and periods of strained ties. This bond started during the Cold War. At that time, Pakistan stood with the U.S. against the spread of communism. Membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), in addition to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the 1950s, showed Pakistan’s part as a strategic ally. Over time, their connection grew. It came to include large economic help packages, military help, along with working together on counter-terrorism – this was especially true after September 11, 2001. These events showed how important their partnership was on regional plus global stages.

This close tie had its difficulties. The United States often saw Pakistan as its strategic goal. However, tried to balance its country’s interests, which included ties with India in addition to China. This situation caused questions about the type of their relationship.

The early years of Pakistan-USA relations were shaped by the Cold War. In the 1950s, Pakistan became a U.S. ally to counter Soviet influence in South Asia. Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. These alliances put Pakistan in the Western camp and gave it military and economic aid in return for its cooperation. For Pakistan, it was not only to strengthen its defence but also to counter its regional rival, India.

The partnership grew during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and access to key routes made it a must-have for the U.S. Under General Zia’s regime, Pakistan played a key role in supporting Afghan mujahideen fighters who were funded and armed by the Americans. This period cemented Pakistan’s image as a frontline state against Soviet expansion. But while the U.S. benefited from Pakistan’s geography, this partnership left Pakistan to deal with the long-term consequences – the proliferation of militant groups and the influx of Afghan refugees.

After September 11, 2001, the dynamics of Pakistan-U.S. relations changed overnight. Pakistan became a key player in the U.S.-led War on Terror, and its cooperation was seen as essential to uprooting terrorist networks in the region. The partnership was a mix of collaboration and strain as Pakistan got military and economic aid in return for its efforts against extremist groups. Despite common goals, tensions arose over allegations of Pakistan’s double-dealing; supporting counter-terrorism on one hand and allegedly maintaining ties with certain militant groups for strategic purposes.

These historical facts show a relationship built on strategic necessity and mutual benefit but one that has also been marked by mistrust and unintended consequences. Each phase of this partnership highlights the complex geopolitics that have defined Pakistan-U.S. relations over the years. Pakistan and the U.S. have had multiple areas of collaboration, often defined by shared interests and geopolitics. While transactional at times, these have also created opportunities for both countries. One of the most prominent has been military and strategic cooperation.

From joint military operations to intelligence sharing, the U.S. and Pakistan have worked together on security. During the War on Terror, Pakistan gave the U.S. access to its air bases and supply routes to support its military operations in Afghanistan. They have also done joint exercises and training programs to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities. While this has given strategic benefits, it has not been without its challenges, as different priorities and mutual suspicions have sometimes strained the relationship.

Economic aid and development are another key area of Pakistan-U.S.A. cooperation. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has played a big role in funding projects to improve Pakistan’s infrastructure, education and health systems. Over the years, USAID programs have supported building schools, enhancing teacher training and providing scholarships to under-served communities. In health, efforts to combat polio and improve maternal and child health have been notable. Large infrastructure projects like dams and roads have also been undertaken with U.S. assistance to contribute to Pakistan’s economic development. But the effectiveness of aid has often been questioned, as it is often tied to broader political objectives.

Cultural and academic exchanges have fostered people-to-people connections and enriched the relationship between the two countries. Programs like the Fulbright scholarship have allowed Pakistani students to study in the U.S., creating opportunities for cultural exchange and mutual understanding. Similarly, U.S.-funded initiatives like English language training and leadership programs have empowered Pakistani youth. The vibrant Pakistani diaspora in the U.S. has further strengthened this bond, contributing to American society while maintaining close ties to their heritage. Cultural programs and partnerships in the arts have also bridged gaps, showcasing the shared values and diverse traditions of both countries. These areas of cooperation show the multiple dimensions of Pakistan-U.S.A. relations. While driven by strategic goals, these have also contributed to development and understanding. Despite the complexities that underlie this relationship, these collaborative initiatives can help build a more stable and constructive relationship.

Despite decades of working together, Pakistan-U.S. relations are full of problems and tensions that often overshadow their commonalities. These issues stem from deep-seated mistrust, divergent national interests and economic dependency.

One of the biggest issues is the trust deficit between the two countries. Over the years, allegations of Pakistan’s support to militant groups like the Taliban and the Haqqani network have strained its relations with the U.S. Pakistan has consistently denied these charges, but its use of certain factions to maintain influence in Afghanistan has fed into Washington’s suspicions. High-profile incidents like the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, have further deepened this mistrust. For Pakistan, the U.S.’s transactional approach to the relationship, prioritising short-term goals over long-term partnership, has often made it feel undervalued or used.

Divergent priorities also pose a big challenge. While the U.S. has focused on counter-terrorism and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s regional priorities are centred around its rivalry with India. This was evident during the U.S. war in Afghanistan, where Pakistan was accused of playing a “double game” by supporting the U.S. while harbouring insurgents to counter Indian influence in the region. Similarly, the U.S.’s growing strategic partnership with India, especially in defence and trade, has heightened Pakistan’s anxieties. These conflicting interests make it hard to build a relationship based on trust and shared objectives.

Economic dependencies have also complicated the partnership. Aid has been tied to specific security objectives and has often been seen to serve U.S. interests more than Pakistan’s long-term development. Critics argue that this approach undermines Pakistan’s sovereignty and makes it dependent on external assistance rather than sustainable economic growth. Pakistan has failed to leverage this aid effectively, with some funds being diverted to non-developmental purposes or not reaching the intended beneficiaries.

These challenges highlight the complexity of Pakistan-U.S. relations, which are a mix of cooperation and competition. We need not only to talk but also to move beyond transactional interactions to a more equal and strategic partnership. Until these underlying issues are resolved, the relationship will be shaped as much by its challenges as by its achievements.

The relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. has always been a delicate balance of give and take. Both countries get a lot out of the partnership, even if the reasons for cooperation are often practical. For the U.S., Pakistan is a gateway to South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. It’s a key partner in counter-terrorism and a regional stabiliser. For Pakistan, U.S. military aid, economic support, and diplomatic backing have strengthened its defence and its standing on the global stage.

But the partnership is often seen as transactional, not sentimental. Each country prioritises its own interests and aligns with the other only when it serves its goals. For instance, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and later the War on Terror, the U.S. relied heavily on Pakistan’s cooperation, while Pakistan used these moments to get financial and military aid in U.S. dollars. But this pragmatic approach has sometimes left both sides feeling shortchanged as their broader expectations of loyalty and commitment are not met. The impact of this relationship goes beyond bilateral ties and affects regional politics in big ways. In South Asia, Pakistan’s alignment with the U.S. has fuelled its rivalry with India, especially as the U.S. has moved closer to India in recent years. This dynamic complicates regional peace efforts.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Pakistan’s strategic importance and its ties with countries like Saudi Arabia make it a valuable partner for the U.S. in managing conflicts and maintaining stability. Looking ahead, the future of Pakistan-U.S.A. relations is uncertain. Will their partnership deepen into a more stable and genuine alliance, or will it remain transactional and short-term? Much depends on the evolving global order, U.S. foreign policy priorities and Pakistan’s ability to redefine its role in the world. For now, their relationship seems to straddle the line between strategic alliance and transactional convenience, a balancing act that reflects the complexity of modern geopolitics.

Pakistan and the U.S. have been on a long and winding road, driven by history, strategic interests and global trends. From the Cold War alliances of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) to the cooperation during the Soviet-Afghan war and the War on Terror, their relationship has developed out of necessity and convenience. While areas like military cooperation, economic aid and cultural exchanges have brought them closer, mistrust, divergent priorities and economic dependence have often tested the relationship.

In my view, the closeness between Pakistan and the U.S. is a combination of pragmatism and strategy, not a deep and lasting alliance. The partnership has given benefits to both, but its transactional nature and lack of shared long-term goals are limiting its potential to become more cohesive. This is the reality of international relations where interests trump sentiment.

As the world is becoming more multipolar, the alliances like Pakistan-U.S. are under growing pressure. The rise of new global powers, regional realignments and internal political shifts in both countries make it harder to sustain a purely interest-driven partnership. But by having open dialogue and finding common ground on issues like economic development, counter-terrorism and regional stability, the two can move towards a more constructive relationship.

In the end the Pakistan-U.S. relationship is a reminder of the complexities of international partnerships. It may never become a perfect alliance but it can become a practical and respectful engagement, one that acknowledges differences and works towards shared goals in a changing world.

China out of Pakistan’s Shadow: China’s Great Gamble

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

China & Pakistan’s flags: source Internet

In the 1978 movie “Snake in the Eagle’s Shadow”, largely unaware to the opponents of the protagonist, secretly the actor Jackie Chan is being trained in martial arts. But the truth gets revealed eventually. Lord Buddha had remarked “Three things cannot be long hidden: the Sun, the Moon and the Truth”.

After four Pakistan-armed and trained terrorists killed 26 male tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir in India on April 22, 2025, it was clear that India would strike back militarily and this time, unlike the previous Indian responses to Pakistan’s terrorists attacks in India, the Indian response would be much harder.

With each passing day after the Pahalgam terrorist attack as the blood of 1.46 billion Indian citizens was boiling, China too was sensing that this time Pakistan had bitten more than it could chew and decided to step out of Pakistan’s shadow, as till this period China had not publicly supported Pakistan militarily, though it was pretty evident that China being in Pakistan’s shadow, in the context of the 78-year old India-Pakistan tensions, was providing military help.

On April 27, 2025, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in a telephonic call with the Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar communicated that China is Pakistan’s ironclad friend and all-weather strategic cooperative partner and will safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.

Signalling that Pakistan would be provided with all military help from China, the next few days saw frenzied military activities between the two nations.

Pakistan was the first Muslim-majority nation and the third non-communist country to recognize China. In 1950, the two nations established diplomatic relations. In 1963, both the nations signed a boundary agreement that saw Pakistan ceding a portion of the Karakoram region called the Shaksgam Valley, which became the foundation for the two nation’s stable geopolitical relationship.

While in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China supplied Pakistan military equipment worth US$ 250 million, but it never publicly acknowledged doing so. In the run-up to the 1971 India-Pakistan War, despite the US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, pressurising China to open a second front on India in case the two nations were go to war, China did not agree.

In 1986 China and Pakistan signed the nuclear cooperation agreement which catapulted Pakistan’s nuclear programme which had been moving slowly till then. This helped Pakistan in carrying out its first nuclear test on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai Hills of its Balochistan province, few days after India carried out its second nuclear test on May 11, 1998.

But after China became the world’s third largest economy in 2007, its military aspirations started increasing with its eyes now set firmly on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, in addition to Taiwan and few other military objectives.

Two events in the times ahead brought China and Pakistan in a tight embrace. One, Xi Jinping becoming the President of China in 2013. Two, India’s abrogation of Article 370 and 35A.

China-Pakistan relations after Xi Jinping becoming the Chinese President in 2013

To circumvent the “Malacca Dilemma” that bothered China for decades, Xi Jinping after becoming China’s President for the first time on March 14, 2013, a few months later, proposed the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project. Included in the CPEC is the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor which is a 3000-kilometer road linking China’s Xinjiang region to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which would obviate China’s “Malacca Dilemma”.

For China, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor is the jugular vein in case the Malacca Strait was to be ever blocked by the Indian Navy or the US Navy.

On April 20, 2015 Xi Jinping visited Pakistan on his first state visit as the President of China.

Before embarking on the two-day visit to Pakistan, Xi Jinping authored an op-ed in Pakistan’s Daily Times titled “Pak-China Dosti Zindabad” (Long Live the Pakistan-China Friendship), in which he wrote that “I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own Brother” and also wrote that “the friendship between the two nations was higher than mountains, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey”.

On April 20, 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to commence work on CPEC, on infrastructure projects worth US$ 45.6 billion during Xi Jinping’s maiden state visit to Pakistan, setting the foundation for a strong and robust Pakistani-Chinese friendship with underlying military overtones, which China would many times call this relation with Pakistan as “Iron Brothers” and “All Weather Friends”.

China-Pakistan’s relations post-India’s abrogation of Article 370 and 35A

On August 05, 2019 after India had abrogated Article 370 & 35A of the Constitution that related to Jammu & Kashmir, two countries did not take it lying down and as time would reveal these two countries – China & Pakistan, clearly irked by India’s move, would step up pressure on India in due course and move in a tighter embrace with each other.

Four days later on August 09, 2019 Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan dashed in a sudden two-day visit to China. In back-to-back meetings with the top Chinese leadership spread over two days on August 09-10, 2019, Pakistan and China decided that a strong response would be given to India’s move of abrogation of the two articles.

On August 11, 2019 the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar visited China to explain the abrogation of the two contentious articles of the Constitution that were for long perceived as the biggest hinderance in the growth and security of Jammu & Kashmir by an overwhelming majority of Indian citizens. But China had already made up its mind during its meetings with Shah Mehmood Qureshi, on the previous two days.

Pakistan eventually tasked its terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir since 1989 when terrorism broke out in India’s northern most state (now a Union Territory), and had been largely confined to the North of Pir Panjal Range (NPPR) which includes the Kashmir Valley, to shift their operations to the South of Pir Panjal Range (SPPR) which includes Jammu region.

But this wasn’t as easy as it seemed due to the heavy deployment of the Indian security forces on both the sides of the Pir Panjal Range, the mountainous range that roughly separates the Kashmir Valley from the Jammu region.

It was here that China came to the aid of its all-weather ally. Now, was the litmus test of China to show Pakistan that it meant each word that Xi Jinping had written in his op-ed of April 2015.

Just as all seemed well between China and India on the face of it, orders were given by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to plan an incursion in eastern Ladakh of India.

In early-April 2020, as the snow started melting in the higher reaches, the PLA started intruding in eastern Ladakh and the stand-off began between the PLA and the Indian Army that lasted over four years and included the bloody Galwan Valley Clash of June 15, 2020 which saw 20 soldiers of the Indian Army killed in action.

This resulted in the Indian Army redeploying its troops and about two divisions worth were moved from the Jammu region to eastern Ladakh to be deployed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) opposite China.

This was exactly what Pakistan needed. With a thinner Indian security forces deployment in the Jammu region, Pakistan stepped up terrorism in the Jammu region on the SPPR since early-2024. The relatively quiet Jammu region has become as volatile as the Kashmir Valley.

The year 2021 saw two important military developments between China and Pakistan. One, Pakistan Army Officers started being posted to the Western Theatre Command of China. Two, a direct Optical Fibre Cable was laid between the Western Theatre Command of China in Chengdu and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi for swift and uninterrupted communications.

The military cooperation between China and Pakistan intensified since 2019, particularly in terms of air force capabilities and increased conduct of joint military exercises to include all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.

The Era 2016-2024

Though before 2016, India had carried out cross-border raids across the Line of Control (LOC) in POJK, but they were confidential and never discussed in the public domain.

But, the two cross-border raids termed as Surgical Strikes in 2016 and 2019 by India, inside POJK were announced by India after their successful conduct. In response to the Pakistani terrorists attacking an Indian Army camp in Uri, Jammu & Kashmir on September 18, 2016, that resulted in 19 soldiers being killed in action, the Indian Army on September 29, 2016 crossed the LOC and killed 40 Pakistani terrorists in POJK.

On February 14, 2019 a Pakistan-trained suicide bomber attacked the convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force in Lethapora in Pulwama district, Jammu & Kashmir that resulted in the death of 40 soldiers. In the wee hours of February 26, 2019, the Indian Air Force struck in Balakot, POJK and killed 350 Pakistani terrorists.

The next day, on February 27, 2019 Pakistan retaliated with an air operation named Operation Swift Retort. In this operation, Pakistan used fighter aircrafts that included Dassault Mirage-IIIDA, Dassault Mirage-VPA armed with H-4 SOW and JF-17 Thunders armed with Mk 83 REKs, with Escort and EW support being rendered by F-16, Falcon DA-20EW/ECM/ESM and Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C fighter aircrafts.

For the first time the Chinese JF-17 fighter aircrafts or for that matter, any Chinese weapon system was used in a military operation by Pakistan against India overtly.

During the period 2009-14, Pakistan imported 51% of its defence requirements from China which increased to 73% in the duration 2015-19. But after Operation Swift Retort in 2019, Pakistan imported 81% of its weapon systems from China, with Netherlands contributing 5.5% and Turkey 3.8%.

During the period 2020-24, China generously gave Pakistan high-value defence systems that included 896 FN-6 portable air defence systems, 200 LY-80 medium-range SAMs, 30 CM-401 supersonic anti-ship missiles, 300 PL-12 and 420 PL-5E air-to-air missiles to arm the JF-17 fleet. Also given in this duration was 25 J-10C multirole fighters and 24 JF-17 Block-3 fighters to bolster the Pakistani air power.

For a cash-strapped Pakistan, certainly purchasing this huge bouquet of weapon systems from China would have been impossible. China was in no need of money, as it has deep pockets.

What China needed was a testbed for checking the efficacy of its weapon systems which till Operation Swift Retort in 2019 had been touted as ineffective and un-battle worthy. But Operation Swift Retort convinced China of the efficacy of their Military Industrial Complex, and hence their largesse to Pakistan.

China decided to gamble big time on Pakistan with the Made in China weapon systems. This Chinese Great Gamble was done with had the first military target of China in mind – Taiwan!

On February 03, 2023, William Burns, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA officially tasked with gathering, processing and analysing national security information from around the world, said in a statement that USA and China will go to war over Taiwan in 2027.

The next year, on March 21, 2024 Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command testified to the US House Armed Services Committee that China was on track to be ready for the invasion of Taiwan in 2027. The Admiral further added that China has increased its defence budget by over 16% in recent years to more than US$ 223 billion. Further, he went on to say that in the three years of him assuming command, the PLA has added more than 400 fighter aircrafts and 20 major warships.

And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

The Chinese weapon systems that Pakistan was going to use against India till 2027, would be in-effect testing for China under actual combat conditions.

With the experience of the 2016 and 2019 Surgical Strikes fresh in mind, both China and Pakistan knew with certainty that India would militarily avenge the Pahalgam terrorist attack.

A day after the Chinese Foreign Minister had the telephonic call with the Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister on April 27, 2025, China sent a large consignment of PL-15 missiles to Pakistan 0n April 28, 2025. Till this time, China had not given the advanced PL-15 missiles to any nation and were kept for its own use. It used to sell only the PL-15E missiles which is the export and watered-down version of the PL-15 missiles.

But as an exception, Pakistan was given the PL-15 missiles with the same aim in mind – testing under actual combat conditions.

China also gave uninterrupted utilisation of its BeiDou satellite constellation and its specialised Yaogan satellite. All these were networked in Pakistan’s Link-17 software for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO).

MDO is the digital ecosystem comprising satellites, all airborne and ground assets for quick and comprehensive situational awareness, electronic intelligence and signal intelligence with the final aim to reduce the time for Kill Chain.

China was keenly watching and integrating itself with every military move of Pakistan, as at stake was its multi-billion-dollar Military Industrial Complex. China was pretty sure of India’s strike and what better opportunity to test its MDO than in actual combat conditions.

China is the only nation in the world which in 2014 announced in its military strategy, the concept of Joint Integrated Operations that it is ready to fight in all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space. In other words, it is called the Multi-Domain Operations.

Interestingly, the USA had propounded the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001 which is quintessentially MDO. But no nation till date including USA, with the sole exception of China have declared their combat readiness in MDO.

China needed the testing of the MDO in actual combat conditions.

The India-Pakistan Conflict 2025, provided the opportunity that China had been so desperately waiting for in the run-up to its war for Taiwan in 2027.

India-Pakistan Conflict 2025

India and Pakistan’s 88-hour India-Pakistan Conflict that begin at 0105 hours on May 07, 2025 and ended at 1700 hours on May 10, 2025, called Operation Sindoor by India and Operation Bunyan um-Marsoos by Pakistan has been elaborately covered in a podcast by the author.

One important issue of the India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 that merits mentioning here is that the bulk of the Pakistani weaponry used against India was of Chinese origin. And it was those weapon systems that China had supplied Pakistan in the duration 2020-2024, the details of which have been mentioned earlier in the article.

While yet again, India scored a clear military victory over Pakistan in this military duel too, as earlier in 1947-49, 1965, 1971 and 1999, but the difference in the earlier four military confrontations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours of South Asia is that these four wars had negligible Chinese weapon systems.

But after the Kargil War of 1999, there has been an upswing in the sale of Chinese weapon systems to Pakistan. And ever since India has started publicising the surgical strikes on Pakistan commencing with the Uri surgical strike in 2016, the Chinese weapon systems that the Pakistan military is using in abundance, has come under extensive international glare.

And this has given China the perfect platform to evaluate the performance of its weapon systems in actual combat scenario, overcoming the much-discussed weakness of Chinese weapon systems not being used/tested in actual combat as China has not fought a war after its last war with Vietnam in 1979.

The US weapon systems had always an advantage over Chinese, as USA has taken part in almost every war/conflict the world has seen since the end of the World War II.

But the Balakot surgical strike and the India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 has placed the performance of the Chinese weapon systems in the open.

What next?

As the induction of the Chinese weapon systems has increased in the Pakistan military after 1999 and with the ascendancy of the Xi Jinping as China’s President in 2013, Pakistan’s big terror attacks have been happening with increased ferocity at regular intervals in India – Uri in 2016, Pulwama in 2019 and Pahalgam in 2025.

And in turn, India’s military responses have been getting tougher – Uri in 2016, Balakot in 2019 and Operation Sindoor in 2025.

In all the retaliation and counter-retaliation by India & Pakistan, China is testing its weapon systems in actual combat scenario.

The next big tranche of the Chinese weapon systems to Pakistan is to be supplied by end-August 2025 which will include HQ-19 long-range air defence missile system with combat range of 1000 kilometres, Super Y-20 AWACS with detection capabilities upto 10,000 kilometres, PL-21 ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles with a range of 300 kilometers and 40 J-35A fifth-generation fighter aircrafts with combat range between 1200-1500 kilometers.

After Pakistan receives this largesse of Chinese weapons systems and after it has trained its personnel on them, will it launch the next big terrorist attack on India.

China will then yet again get to test its latest bouquet of weapon systems in actual combat.

For, it will prove to be very helpful for China for its first military target which is Taiwan, which it is go to war for in 2027.

“What can bring in Peace in the Middle East?”

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By: Namya Sethi

Middle East: source Internet

The Middle East is one of the most important places in the world for culture and history. It is the birthplace of three major world religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is also where ancient civilizations like Mesopotamia and Egypt lived. Across the past thousand years, the area has had a big effect on art, science, philosophy, and ideas all across the world. But today, most people know it for war, instability, and pain. There is a lot of news about the war in Syria, the fighting in Iraq, the problems in Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the recent US strikes on Iran apart from the ongoing Israel-Hamas War and the Israel-Iran Conflict.

This makes it hard to understand how strong the people are in terms of art, literature, music, and culture. This focus on violence often ignores the daily lives, hopes, and successes of millions of people who continue to have a positive impact on world culture. To bring sustainable peace to the Middle East, we need more than simply political talks or short-term ceasefires. These steps are important, but they aren’t enough by themselves. For real peace, we need to fully commit to dealing with the core problems. Some of these are education, humanitarian aid, human rights, economic growth, respect for other cultures, and working together with other countries. To halt the bloodshed and sustain the peace, we need to build on these things.

Humanitarian Help in Palestine

The humanitarian crisis in Palestine, especially in Gaza, is one of the worst in the world right now. The area has been ruined by years of fighting, many military activities, and blockades. Gaza is one of the most populous locations on Earth, but its infrastructure is in bad shape, and there isn’t enough clean water or food. Bombings have made things considerably worse by damaging homes, schools, hospitals, and water systems. The kids have the most trouble.

The United Nations (UN) believes that bombings have caused 3,000 to 4,000 youngsters in Gaza to lose limbs. This is the most common place in the world for kids to have their limbs cut off. More than 70,000 children under five are at risk of death and stunted growth because of malnutrition. This is a question of respect and human rights. Rich countries and humanitarian groups need to give the world regular, equitable support. Medical supplies, prosthetics, mental health services, clean water, food aid, and shelter are all needed right away. Not doing anything makes trauma worse, makes people more frustrated, and makes peace less possible.

Because of the war, it has been challenging for students in Gaza to go to school. More than half of the people who live in the region are under 18, and a lot of kids and teens can’t go to school because the schools have been destroyed, damaged, or shuttered. Because of the constant fighting, it’s challenging for students to learn and acquire an education. Students have a tougher time doing well in school when there are too many people in the classroom, they are traumatized, and there aren’t enough resources. Education is highly vital for peace and safety. It gives young people the knowledge, skills, and ability to think critically that they need to make the world a better place. It offers people hope beyond merely getting by and gives the next generation the power to picture and create a better future.

The most important things to do are to rebuild schools, give teachers supplies, instruct them, and make sure everyone is secure. Cycles of violence and poverty will persist without education. Education also helps sustain the peace by teaching people about their rights, how to be involved in democracy, and how to not be a zealot. Girls, refugees, and other groups who are often left out can obtain the same treatment and be part of society through inclusive schools. Also, education encourages dialogue and understanding between different groups of people, which helps break down prejudices and build empathy. Education may change places of conflict into places of hope and strength. It can also help develop leaders who care about justice and getting along with others.

Protecting Creative Voices

The kidnapping of Palestinian director Hamdan Ballal on March 24, 2025 highlights how perilous it is for famous artists to reside in war zones. Ballal was an artist and a cultural ambassador whose work challenged victim tropes and celebrated Palestinian dignity. His kidnapping and reported abuse drew attention to efforts to stop people from expressing themselves culturally all over the world.

Artists play a big role in making peace. They help people understand each other better, make conflicts more human, and fight against oppression. Making them quiet makes the space between them wider. We need cultural freedom and safety from violence to keep the dialog going and people understanding each other.

Governments and international organizations should protect cultural rights and support festivals, exhibitions, and projects that bring people from diverse cultures together. This goes against stereotypes and promotes acceptance. To promote peace, the arts must be free and cultural heritage must be maintained. The region’s enormous diversity may bring people together if innovative voices are protected.

Syria’s Long-Term Growth

The long civil war in Syria has decimated its civilization and infrastructure. Homs and Aleppo are two cities that are in ruins. Many of them are still refugees or people who have been forced to leave their homes and can’t go to school, obtain medical care, or find work.

Most of the time, humanitarian aid has been focused on short-term help, which is vital but not adequate. Syria needs long-term, sustainable growth, which means fixing up homes, infrastructure, and healthcare, as well as creating jobs. Everyone should benefit from economic growth, especially those who are most at risk.

Donors, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and international financial institutions should work together to make communities stronger. They need employment training, business initiatives, and social services to keep young people from going back to violence or being forced to leave their homes. Good administration and political inclusion are crucial to bring back trust and sustain the peace. If systemic problems aren’t fixed, peace can’t last.

Justice and Accountability in Iraq

Iraq still has big difficulties with human rights, like killing people without trial, making people disappear, and violently breaking up protests. These actions violate international law and may constitute crimes against humanity. Putting down protests’ harms democracy and people’s faith in the government.

The UN Human Rights Council needs to investigate into violations and punish the people who did them. Laws need to alter to protect the media, activists, and civil society. Without justice, complaints get worse, which makes everything less stable. Two factors that make peace possible are following the law and respecting human rights.

Transitional justice measures like truth commissions and reparations can help individuals heal.

Promoting autonomous media and civic society helps individuals be honest and talk to one another. For Iraqis to enjoy peace, they need to believe in their government again.

Economic Cooperation as a Path to Peace

Countries that trade, invest, and share infrastructure grow increasingly dependent on each other, which makes it less likely that they will fight. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar’s developing economic ties have helped ease tensions and get people talking.

Trade deals, infrastructure projects, and other things that bring economies closer together are all ways to do this.

Everyone benefits from having the same rules. Putting money into energy, transportation, and technology produces jobs and links economies to stability. People are less likely to support extremism and more likely to embrace peace when they see real changes in their lives, such more jobs, better services, and a higher standard of living.

Economic cooperation must promote fair growth, reducing inequality that leads to conflict. Policies that include everyone, help small businesses, and get people ready for jobs make sure that people on the edges get the advantages. A Middle East that is rich and well-connected will be less likely to be violent.

People from all over the world come to the Middle East to see its world heritage sites, such as Egypt’s pyramids, Iran’s mosques, Jordan’s Petra, and extremely old cities. But violence has damaged tourism, costing the area billions of dollars and millions of jobs. Bringing in foreign money, creating jobs, and making public safety and infrastructure better are all ways that tourism can assist bring about peace and progress. Tourism does more than only benefit the economy; it also helps people from different cultures get to know each other better by exhibiting them the area’s rich, nuanced history and lively cultures that go beyond the stories of conflict.

To get more people to visit, governments should spend money on protecting cultural sites, making travel safer, and making it easier to get to locations. To protect cultural sites from being destroyed or stolen and to promote cultural exchange programs that build respect for each other’s cultures, countries need to work together. Tourism is a kind of “soft diplomacy” that helps people get along, changes their minds, and promotes peaceful communication. Supporting sustainable tourism also gives residents in the area a reason to maintain their cultural heritage and work toward social harmony.

Going to school in another country and studying abroad

Young people in the Middle East want to make the world a better place, but they can’t always study abroad because of things like visa restrictions, lack of money, and wars between countries. This makes it tougher for people to talk about their ideas, abilities, and points of view.

Young people can benefit from more scholarships, exchange programs, and links across colleges.

movement. When students return home, they bring back knowledge, problem-solving abilities, and connections that help the economy and society flourish. People from different cultures can learn about and accept each other through educational exchanges. Investing in international academic cooperation is a way to help future leaders and peacemakers in the region.

Changing How People See the Middle East

Most people throughout the world see the Middle East as a place of conflict, which hides its valuable contributions and the worth of its people. This place has been a center for medicine, arithmetic, astronomy, poetry, and philosophy. It has produced significant artists, scholars, and innovators who have profoundly influenced human culture.

Schools, the media, and people all throughout the world need to tell good, complicated stories. Cultural exchanges, film festivals, art shows, and academic conferences all highlight how strong, creative, and different people can be. People can understand each other better and Islamophobia goes down when they break down their own ideas.

Changing how people throughout the world see things helps them work together and stand up for each other. This is crucial for peace and respecting the rights and hopes of people in the Middle East.

Sustainable peace relies on regional ownership and leadership. Foreign interventions, sometimes driven by divergent interests, have intensified crises rather than alleviating them. Middle Eastern countries should be in charge of fair and open mediation efforts that include everyone.

Women, youth, and individuals from marginalized communities ought to participate in peace negotiations. Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Arab countries need to work together to fix problems that hurt their safety, economy, and society. Inclusive dialogue based on mutual regard helps reduce violence and distrust.

Setting up regional institutions to help people talk to each other, hash out their differences, and work together is really significant. When the region is in charge of peace, solutions last longer and more people agree with them.

What Global Institutions Do?

The United Nations and UNESCO are two groups from around the world that work to safeguard peace in the Middle East. But they need to do more than just talk bad about things or make promises. They need to work with local communities, artists, teachers, peace activists, and grassroots groups for a long time and in person. People should learn, cultures should stay alive, and issues should be solved on special missions. These groups have particular tools, information, and worldwide platforms that help them accomplish their duties well. They need to be consistent, kind, and focused on getting things done at work. They shouldn’t become engaged in politics and instead make sure that people who need help get it.

Global groups also watch for violations of human rights, fight for justice, and make sure that people are held accountable. They might help people trust one other and start conversations that are crucial for peace by being there without bias.

Conclusion

To have peace in the Middle East, we need to look at the whole picture, which involves helping people, education, culture, justice, economic growth, and working together at all levels. Short-term ceasefires or diplomatic talks won’t stop the violence unless they get to the heart of the problem and build strong foundations for living together and appreciating each other. To safeguard human dignity, it is highly crucial to uphold human rights, cultural freedom, and the right to an education for all. Working for peace and stability is a good idea since it will help the economy flourish and create jobs that will last.

To make sure that all communities’ needs are satisfied with solutions that are fair, open, and long-lasting, we need to promote regional leadership, international cooperation, and accountability. People all across the world will be more sympathetic and helpful if they talk about the region’s diversity, innovation, and strength instead of its problems. The road to peace is long and arduous, but the Middle East’s rich history, strong people, and great hopes give us a lot of optimism. If individuals from all over the world, including locals, regionals, and global players, work together, stay committed, and show real respect, the Middle East can finally become a peaceful, fair, and successful place.

Operation Sindoor: Road Ahead for South Asia

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By: Sofiqua Yesmin, Research Analyst, GSDN

Operation Sindoor press briefing: source Internet

In the early hours of May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a series of precision military strikes targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). This operation, a direct response to the brutal April 22, 2025, terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which claimed 26 civilian lives, marked a significant shift in India’s counterterrorism strategy. The operation not only dismantled key terror hubs but also redefined the security dynamics between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbors with a history of tense relations. As the dust settles, the road ahead for South Asia remains fraught with challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties. This article explores the context, execution, and outcomes of Operation Sindoor, and analyzes its broader implications for regional stability, diplomacy, and the future of South Asia.

The Context: A Deadly Trigger in Pahalgam

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, was one of the deadliest terrorist incidents in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Gunmen targeted tourists in the scenic Baisaran Valley, killing 25 Indian nationals and one Nepali citizen. The attackers’ method was particularly chilling: they segregated male tourists, identified non-Muslims, and executed them in cold blood, leaving their Hindu wives widowed. Indian intelligence agencies quickly traced the attack to operatives linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), two Pakistan-based militant groups with a long history of targeting India. The National Investigation Agency uncovered digital and testimonial evidence pointing to support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with operational bases in Muzaffarabad and Karachi.

The brutality of the attack, combined with its targeting of civilians and tourists, sparked outrage across India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while attending engagements in Saudi Arabia, swiftly decided that the incident demanded a decisive response. The choice of the name “Operation Sindoor” was symbolic: sindoor, the red vermilion powder worn by married Hindu women, represented the widows left behind by the attack and underscored India’s resolve to avenge the loss and protect its sovereignty. This emotional and cultural framing resonated deeply with the Indian public, particularly among supporters of the Hindu nationalist government, amplifying calls for retaliation.

Execution of Operation Sindoor: Precision and Restraint

Operation Sindoor was launched in the intervening night of May 6-7, 2025, between 1:05 and 1:30 AM, as a coordinated tri-service effort involving the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force. The operation targeted nine terrorist sites across Pakistan and PoJK, including key hubs linked to LeT, JeM, and Hizbul Mujahideen. These locations, identified as training and operational bases, included strongholds in Muridke, Bahawalpur, and areas in Pakistan’s Punjab province—regions previously considered off-limits for direct military action.

India employed a range of high-precision, standoff weapons to minimize risk and collateral damage. The Indian Air Force deployed SCALP cruise missiles, HAMMER precision-guided bombs, and loitering munitions, often called “kamikaze drones,” which hovered over targets to ensure accuracy before striking. Rafale jets, equipped with advanced weaponry, executed deep strikes without crossing into Pakistani airspace, a deliberate choice to avoid escalation. The 23-minute mission exposed gaps in Pakistan’s air defense network, which was either bypassed or neutralized, with no reported loss of Indian assets. The Indian Navy supported the operation by pinning Pakistan’s naval forces near the coast in the Arabian Sea, while the Army bolstered ground-based air defenses with systems like the indigenous Akash and the Russian S-400.

India’s official stance emphasized the operation’s focused, measured, and non-escalatory nature. No Pakistani military, civilian, or economic targets were hit, and the strikes claimed over 100 terrorists, including high-value operatives like JeM leader Abdul Rauf Azhar, implicated in the 1999 IC-814 hijacking and the killing of journalist Daniel Pearl. The operation showcased India’s military superiority, technological advancements, and seamless tri-service coordination, signaling a new era in its counterterrorism doctrine.

Pakistan’s Response and Escalation

Pakistan’s response was swift and escalatory. Islamabad claimed 26 civilians and 46 others were killed or injured in the Indian strikes, accusing New Delhi of an “act of war.” Pakistan’s military launched retaliatory drone and missile attacks on May 9-10, targeting military installations in northern and western India, including Srinagar, Jammu, and Punjab. India’s robust air defense systems, such as the Akashteer, intercepted many of these, and retaliatory strikes hit 11 Pakistani air bases, reportedly destroying 20% of its air force infrastructure. Pakistan claimed to have shot down Indian aircraft, including Rafale jets, but India has not confirmed these losses, and the claims remain unverified.

The tit-for-tat exchanges marked the worst fighting between the two nations in over two decades, raising fears of a wider conflict. Pakistan’s narrative portrayed India’s actions as aggressive, with officials like Defence Minister Khawaja Asif attempting to discredit India on international media, though such claims faltered under scrutiny. Domestically, voices like Pakistan People’s Party Chair Bilawal Bhutto Zardari condemned the strikes as cowardly and vowed a united response. However, a ceasefire, described by India as an “understanding,” was announced on May 10, 2025, following diplomatic efforts.

Strategic Shift: A New Doctrine

Operation Sindoor marked a paradigm shift in India’s national security strategy. Prime Minister Modi declared it a “new normal,” emphasizing that India would no longer tolerate nuclear blackmail or state-sponsored terrorism. The operation targeted not just terrorists but also challenged Pakistan’s perceived nuclear shield, with strikes near sensitive sites like the Kirana Hills and Noor Khan Airbase. This bold move signaled that nuclear capabilities would not deter India from responding to cross-border terrorism.

A significant long-term development was India’s decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. This 1960 agreement, a cornerstone of hydro-diplomacy, has constrained India’s ability to leverage its upper riparian position. By suspending obligations, India introduced a new geo-economic tool, particularly potent given Pakistan’s deepening water crisis. This move, combined with precision strikes, demonstrated India’s willingness to use both kinetic and non-kinetic measures to assert dominance.

The operation also redefined deterrence. India’s restraint avoiding civilian and military targets contrasted with Pakistan’s escalatory response, highlighting a stark asymmetry in capabilities and strategic maturity. West Point expert John Spencer called it an “objective victory,” praising India’s clarity and execution. The strikes dismantled terror networks, restored deterrence, and established a new red line: state-backed terrorism would be treated as an act of war.

Regional and Global Reactions

The global response was mixed but largely favorable to India. The U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Russia were briefed by India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, who emphasized the operation’s non-escalatory nature. The Wall Street Journal and BBC framed the strikes as a legitimate retaliation for the Pahalgam attack, while the UN Secretary-General urged restraint to avoid a military confrontation. U.S. President Donald Trump called the clashes “a shame” but expressed hope for a quick resolution, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio closely monitoring the situation.

Japan condemned the April 22 attack and urged dialogue, while China expressed concern over escalation, calling for adherence to international law. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the Malaysian Ulema Association echoed calls for peace, highlighting the broader regional stakes. Within India, the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee unanimously congratulated the armed forces, and traders in Delhi held a ‘Tiranga March’ in solidarity.

However, tensions led to unintended consequences. Pakistan closed its airspace, causing flight disruptions across South Asia and the UAE, with airlines like Emirates, Air France, and Lufthansa rerouting to avoid the region. Reports of harassment of Kashmiris in India raised concerns, with human rights groups calling for communal harmony.

The Road Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

Operation Sindoor has reshaped South Asia’s security landscape, but the future remains uncertain. Below are key considerations for the road ahead.

1. Security and Deterrence

India’s new doctrine of pre-emptive, decisive action has strengthened deterrence, but Pakistan’s vow of retaliation risks renewed escalation. The cat-and-mouse game between terrorists and Indian intelligence will intensify, as groups like LeT and JeM seek to rebuild and hide. India must enhance its targeting capabilities, drawing lessons from Israel and the U.S., to sustain pressure on terrorist networks. The emergency procurement powers granted to the armed forces, with a budget of approximately Rs 40,000 crore, will bolster readiness, but sustained investment in advanced weaponry, cyber defenses, and space capabilities is critical.

2. Diplomacy and De-escalation

The ceasefire, facilitated by U.S. communication, underscores the need for dialogue. India’s framing of Kashmir as a bilateral issue and its refusal to invite Pakistan to a UN Security Council briefing signal a hardline stance. However, suspending the Indus Waters Treaty could strain relations further, especially if India restricts water access. A balanced approach combining pressure with backchannel talks could prevent a full-scale conflict, though Pakistan’s internal instability and reliance on China and Turkey complicate matters.

3. Regional Stability

South Asia faces heightened instability. Pakistan’s economic and political fragility, exacerbated by military losses and potential credit downgrades, could fuel domestic unrest. India’s assertive posture may deter terrorism but risks alienating neighbors if perceived as hegemonic. The operation’s de-hyphenation of the Kashmir issue from counterterrorism offers a chance to reframe regional narratives, but success depends on India’s ability to maintain global support and avoid communal tensions at home.

4. Global Implications

Operation Sindoor has global resonance. Democratic states are rethinking deterrence in an era of gray-zone threats and nuclear brinkmanship. India’s use of indigenous systems like Akash and space-based monitoring via ISRO highlights its growing self-reliance, positioning it as a counterweight to China. However, China’s concern and Pakistan’s ties with Turkey and China could draw external powers into the conflict, complicating de-escalation.

5. Humanitarian and Economic Concerns

The human cost 12 civilians and one soldier killed in Pakistani shelling in Jammu and Kashmir underscores the need for civilian protection. Border residents in areas like Uri are stocking supplies and demanding bunkers, while flight disruptions and blackouts reflect economic strain. India’s enhanced cyber vigilance and protection of hydropower assets are positive steps, but long-term stability requires addressing these grassroots challenges.

A Path Forward

The road ahead for South Asia hinges on strategic restraint, rational policy, and mutual respect. India must balance its assertive doctrine with diplomatic outreach to prevent escalation. Pakistan must abandon adventurist policies, address internal fragmentation, and pursue reforms for stability. The international community, including the U.S., UN, and regional powers, can play a constructive role by encouraging dialogue and upholding international law.

Operation Sindoor has demonstrated India’s resolve, maturity, and military prowess, but it also exposed the fragility of regional peace. The operation’s success in dismantling terror hubs and redefining deterrence offers hope, but the risk of retaliation and miscalculation looms large. South Asia stands at a crossroads: a future of coexistence and stability is possible, but it demands careful navigation, robust communication, and a shared commitment to rooting out terrorism.

Conclusion

Operation Sindoor was a watershed moment in South Asia’s history, blending precision strikes with strategic restraint to address a long-standing threat. It marked a new chapter in India’s security doctrine, challenging Pakistan’s support for terrorism and reshaping regional dynamics. The road ahead is complex, with challenges in security, diplomacy, and stability, but also opportunities for dialogue and reform. As India and Pakistan navigate this tense period, the choices they make backed by global support will determine whether South Asia moves toward peace or further conflict.

Candid Conversation: Vedika Khanna on Mental Health in India

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Trump Says ‘We’ In Israel’s War With Iran. Netanyahu Pushes Trump To Drop The Bombs Iran Fears Most And Russia’s Calculated Distance From Tehran’s Crisis!

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Fears of a regional conflagration intensified on Tuesday as President Donald Trump escalated his rhetoric on Iran, calling for its “unconditional surrender,” implying potential action against Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and notably aligning himself with Israeli military efforts by referring to them using the pronoun “we.” The language, unusually direct, has raised concerns that the United States may be edging closer to direct involvement in the Israel-Iran confrontation.

As hostilities between Israel and Iran entered their sixth day, the situation on the ground remained volatile. Past midnight on Wednesday, air raid sirens were activated across multiple locations in Israel following what the Israeli military described as two successive missile launches from Iran.

Simultaneously, the Israeli Defense Forces issued an evacuation advisory targeting an industrial zone in Tehran, warning of imminent action against Iranian military infrastructure. Not long after, Israeli airstrikes were reported in the vicinity of the Iranian capital, signaling a significant intensification of cross-border military activity.

President Trump’s remarks came as Israeli leadership, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, continued to urge the United States to engage militarily to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat. Netanyahu is reportedly seeking American deployment of heavy-duty bunker-busting ordnance capable of reaching Iran’s deeply buried Fordo nuclear facility – munitions beyond Israel’s own operational capability. According to sources within the Trump administration, the two leaders spoke by phone on Tuesday, though specifics of their conversation remain undisclosed.

On his social media platform Truth Social, Mr. Trump claimed, “we know exactly where” Ayatollah Khamenei is hiding, while clarifying, “we are not going to take him out (kill!), at least for now.” He went on to emphasize Israeli air dominance, attributing it to U.S. military technology, and stated, “We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” effectively signaling political and strategic alignment with Israel’s military campaign.

Should the United States become an active participant in the conflict, Tehran is reportedly poised to retaliate. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that Iran has readied a range of ballistic and cruise missiles along with other military assets for potential strikes on American bases throughout the Middle East.

Iran, Israel, IDF: what are consequences of Operation Strength of a Lion for Russia - expert / The New Voice of Ukraine

Russia Holds Its Fire as Iran Faces Israeli Onslaught, Revealing Strategic Ambivalence

Meanwhile, despite a formal strategic partnership and deepening defense ties between Moscow and Tehran in recent years, Russia has chosen a posture of deliberate restraint as Israel mounts a sweeping military offensive against Iran. The silence from the Kremlin has been particularly striking given Iran’s recent contributions to Russia’s war in Ukraine – from providing vital drone technology to facilitating domestic drone production through a Russian-Iranian joint initiative. The two nations also signed a high-profile strategic treaty earlier this year, signaling an intent to bolster cooperation across military, economic, and political fronts.

Yet, barely five months after that agreement, Iran finds itself under sustained Israeli attack, its nuclear infrastructure targeted, top military figures eliminated, and key energy installations compromised. Notwithstanding rhetorical condemnations and diplomatic outreach, Russia has stopped short of offering any meaningful military or logistical support to Tehran.

Analysts suggest that Moscow’s inaction reflects a cold-eyed calculation. With its resources stretched in Ukraine and an urgent need to maintain cordial relations with regional power centers such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the Kremlin appears unwilling to jeopardize its broader Middle East balancing act for the sake of Tehran. “Russia, when it comes to Iran, must weigh the possibility of a clash with Israel and the United States, so saving Iran is obviously not worth it,” observes a leading voice on Russia-Iran relations. “For Russia, this is just a fact.”

Moscow’s reluctance also illustrates a more complex geopolitical reality. President Vladimir Putin remains cautious about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and, amid renewed U.S. engagement in the region under President Trump, may view mediation as a more pragmatic route than confrontation. The Kremlin stands to gain from both rising oil prices triggered by the conflict and improved diplomatic standing if it can position itself as a credible intermediary in future negotiations.

Still, the contrast with past Russian interventions is sharp. A decade ago, the Kremlin militarily intervened in Syria to preserve the Assad regime. That campaign ultimately ended in failure, with Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsing in late 2024. Now, with its clout in the region already eroded, Moscow’s response to Tehran’s crisis is limited to backchannel diplomacy and vague offers of mediation.

“There’s a limit to what Moscow can deliver militarily to Iran right now, especially as the Ukraine war continues to deplete its own defense reserves,” explains Thomas Graham, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Intelligence briefings suggest that President Putin has reached out to both Israeli and Iranian leaders, while maintaining communication with President Trump, potentially to present Russia as an indispensable player in any post-conflict negotiation framework.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry has hinted that Tehran should consider re-engaging in talks with Washington over its nuclear program, even suggesting that Moscow could assist by taking custody of Iran’s highly enriched uranium. This diplomatic overture, while measured, reveals Moscow’s desire to reassert its relevance on the global stage, albeit without making any meaningful concessions on its ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

“There is a desire to reset this relationship and present yourself to the Americans as an interlocutor on all things in global affairs, including the Iranian nuclear dossier, without actually talking about Ukraine with any kind of substance,” notes Hanna Notte, Director of the Eurasia Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Russia-Iran treaty raises the stakes for Trump's administration | CNN

However, this balancing act comes with its own risks. Tehran has long harbored suspicions about Russian intentions, fearing that Moscow may ultimately trade Iranian interests in a grand bargain with the West. These concerns are only amplified in the current moment of strategic vulnerability.

Meanwhile, Israel has broadened its offensive campaign. On Monday, it struck targets linked to Iran’s state media and elite Quds Force. Prime Minister Netanyahu, in a press briefing, did not rule out the possibility of a complete collapse of the Iranian regime, an outcome that would dramatically shift regional power dynamics and further complicate Russia’s long-term influence in the Middle East.

Although Russia remains Iran’s largest foreign investor and an important arms supplier, it has consistently withheld high-grade military systems, particularly aircraft and air defense platforms, that Tehran has repeatedly requested. The rationale has been clear: Putin’s parallel diplomatic ties with Israel and Gulf monarchies have limited how far Moscow is willing to go in arming Iran.

“Iran has been asking Russia for weapons for the last few years—aircraft, air defenses. But Russia has delivered practically nothing,” Smagin points out.

Now, with Iran under siege and international pressure mounting, that hesitancy may cost the Kremlin both strategic trust in Tehran and its already waning influence in the Middle East.

Trump says he sent a letter to Iran urging negotiations on nuclear weapons - ABC News

Why the United States May Be Edging Toward Direct Involvement

The drumbeat of war grows louder not just from Tel Aviv or Tehran, but now increasingly from Washington as well. President Trump’s recent remarks – calling for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” publicly hinting at the elimination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and aligning American military might with Israeli air dominance 0 are not idle provocations. They signal a potential inflection point: the gradual shedding of ambiguity around U.S. neutrality, and the unmistakable drift toward direct military involvement in a conflict that could redraw the architecture of the Middle East.

At the heart of Washington’s recalibration lies a convergence of long-standing American strategic objectives and short-term political calculus.

First, neutralizing Iran’s nuclear ambition has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the Islamic Republic’s inception. Israel’s recent demand for U.S. bunker-busting bombs to target the deeply buried Fordo nuclear facility presents Trump with a historic decision point. No other nation besides the United States has the weapons or delivery systems to accomplish such a mission. And no other ally has pressed as relentlessly as Israel to do so.

Second, Trump’s return to the global stage with an emboldened post-election mandate is reconfiguring his administration’s appetite for risk. The opportunity to cement a “decisive” foreign policy legacy, an end to the Iranian nuclear threat, a perceived victory for the West, and solidified ties with key regional allies—may prove too tempting to pass up. The optics of military strength could also resonate with his political base and offer a diversion from domestic political challenges.

Third, economic leverage plays a critical role. A war that disrupts Iranian oil exports, even while driving up global prices, would ultimately benefit American energy producers. U.S. shale and LNG markets stand to gain significantly, especially as Europe and Asia look to diversify energy sources away from conflict zones.

Fourth, Trump’s language – using “we” when referring to Israeli strikes and asserting “total control of the skies over Iran” – goes beyond rhetorical solidarity. It subtly frames the conflict as a shared strategic campaign rather than a bilateral Israeli-Iranian dispute. This linguistic shift is more than symbolic; it conditions the public and military apparatus for potential escalation.

Finally, there is a geopolitical deterrence objective. If the United States appears reluctant or constrained in backing Israel militarily, it could embolden not just Iran but also its broader axis – Russia, North Korea, and China – to test American resolve elsewhere. In the high-stakes arena of great power competition, perception is power, and hesitancy invites provocation.

Yet, U.S. involvement is not without risks. A full-scale war with Iran could ignite regional chaos, jeopardize American bases across the Gulf, and drag Washington into a protracted conflict with uncertain exit ramps. But from the Trump administration’s perspective, those risks may be weighed against the perceived rewards: regime decapitation in Tehran, strategic supremacy in the Middle East, and a domestically popular image of strength and resolve.

Would Donald Trump's Iran Crackdown Benefit Russia? - Newsweek

The Last Bit, The Silence That Speaks Volumes – Russia’s Calculated Distance from Tehran’s Crisis

As Israeli airstrikes continue to batter Iran’s military infrastructure, and the possibility of U.S. involvement with President Trump’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, Moscow’s strategic reticence indicates a shifting power equation in the Middle East, one where pragmatic restraint has replaced ideological allegiance.

Despite the optics of a deepening Russia-Iran partnership, the Kremlin’s current posture reveals the limits of that alliance when tested by a real-time geopolitical crisis. Russia’s decision to withhold military support is not a betrayal as much as it is a cold calculation driven by its own overstretched capabilities in Ukraine, its growing dependence on Gulf state goodwill, and its long-held skepticism about a nuclear-armed Iran. Moscow is not prepared to risk confrontation with Washington or Tel Aviv to shield Tehran.

In short, for Russia, Tehran is a strategic partner, but not a strategic priority.

Also, this crisis may mark the beginning of a new phase in Iran’s regional isolation.

Already encumbered by crippling sanctions, domestic unrest, and mounting battlefield losses, Tehran may soon find itself increasingly alone, with even its strongest backers adopting a posture of cautious disengagement. If Moscow, with all its transactional depth and history of regional maneuvering, declines to rise in Iran’s defense now, it signals a broader recalibration of Russia’s Middle East doctrine: flexible, opportunistic, and ultimately self-serving.

At the same time, by positioning itself as a potential mediator rather than a combatant, the Kremlin seeks to maintain its relevance in post-conflict diplomacy. It may well offer its services in the nuclear negotiation theatre or propose arms control concessions in exchange for sanctions relief, not for Iran’s benefit, but for its own leverage against the West.

But this diplomatic opportunism comes with diminishing returns. By refusing to act meaningfully in Iran’s hour of need, Russia risks alienating a key regional partner and diminishing its long-term credibility as a reliable counterweight to U.S. power.

Thus, while missiles rain over Tehran and nuclear sites smolder, the Kremlin watches, eyes on the oil market, ears tuned to Washington, and fingers crossed that its silence will buy it leverage, not irrelevance.

In the end, it is not only Iran’s military infrastructure that is under siege. So too is the illusion of a united Russia-Iran front – exposed by the thunderous quiet from Moscow.

Weaponizing Space: Militarization Trends and Global Security Implications

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By: Taha Ali

Satellite in space: source Internet

Once celebrated as the common heritage of mankind and an arena reserved for peaceful exploration, outer space is being transformed into a theater of geopolitical competition and strategic display. With contemporary militaries largely reliant upon satellite-based technologies for navigation, communication, surveillance, and guiding missiles, outer space became the indispensable enabler of terrestrial military operations. But a phased shift from space militarization, where space assets were aiding military operations, into weaponization, where governments are designing systems that can destroy or incapacitate space-based facilities, has severe consequences.

The article is about how weaponization trends transform the strategic calculations among great powers, what advances in technology are creating those changes, and what the long-term implications of preserving space as an arena for international peace and security are.

Militarization to Weaponization: Strategic Motivations and Great Power Rivalries

The shift from space as an ancillary domain to space as the possible battlefield is not a sudden one or an accident. Rather, it rests on longstanding strategic imperatives since the Cold War period, when the use of space-based reconnaissance and early warning came to be core components of nuclear deterrence. While the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 had tried to keep space available to peaceful uses, it created loopholes under which military applications were permitted on the condition that weapons of mass destruction were not deployed in orbit. The loopholes in the law permitted states to invest in space assets that were crucial to warfighting without actually breaking international law. These passive occupations of space throughout recent decades have become active and offensive in character, however. A case in point is the more and more reliance of the United States on satellites for its C4ISR capabilities, which provide these systems as enticing targets to enemies. This weakness created the impetus for the U.S. Space Force in 2019, formalizing the notion that space is a warfighting domain. The United States is actively pursuing doctrines of “space dominance” and “space superiority” today, reflecting a strategic shift from deterrence to being ready to fight in space.

China’s ambitions in space are equally aggressive. Its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, in which it shot down an old weather satellite and left behind thousands of pieces of debris, was an unambiguous demonstration of capability and intent. Thereafter, Beijing followed with a string of satellites with close proximity capabilities, indicating the development of co-orbital weapons. Beijing’s BeiDou navigation system, constructed as a substitute for the U.S. GPS, offers China autonomous positioning capabilities that can be utilized to facilitate precision strike missions.

Russia, as the inheritor of Soviet space heritage, has had an ongoing military space program. Moscow has development-tested its own direct-ascent ASATs, such as the Nudol missile, and installed suspicious maneuver capability satellites near Western space assets. The U.S. Space Command accused Russia of firing a projectile from one of its satellites in 2020—a reportedly test of an on-orbit weapon.

India’s Mission Shakti in 2019, in which a ground interceptor took out a satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), was its entry into the elite club of space powers with existing kinetic ASAT capability. India stressed the responsible conduct of the test—hitting a satellite at low altitude to keep debris to a minimum—the geopolitical message was anything but ambiguous: India is looking for strategic deterrence in space, against China and Pakistan. The reasons for these developments differ but meet at one point: space assets are now an integral part of contemporary warfare, and their defense—or destruction—is regarded as key to national security. In such an environment, the weaponization of space is a logical, albeit perilous, extension of competitive strategy.

Technological Drivers and Legal Ambiguities in Space Conflict

This technological leap in space war-fighting capability extends beyond kinetic ASAT systems. There is a new and emerging spectrum of technologies that alters strategy calculus and complicates arms control. These are directed energy systems in the form of lasers and high-power microwaves, cyber-attacks on satellite systems, and co-orbital platforms that can disrupt or destroy other satellites in insidious and deniable ways. These technologies are attractive because they are precise, reversible, and most importantly, deniable—a valuable asset in the shadowy realm of space war. For instance, DEWs can blind or incapacitate satellite sensors without creating orbital debris, thus avoiding long-term damage while achieving tactical objectives. Similarly, cyber action can take over satellite command systems or attack data streams, which enables adversaries to interfere with military operations without crossing the normal thresholds of armed conflict. Such “soft-kill” technologies give strategic leverage in the gray zone of operations, where attribution is challenging to create and legal consequences are minimal.

Adding to the complexity is the reality that virtually all space technologies are dual-use. A satellite put into space for civilian use—earth observation, meteorology, or communications—is readily adaptable for military applications. This dual-use ambiguity blurs the civilian-military distinction, making it harder to discern between legitimate activities and acts of aggression. Also, private space firms like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and OneWeb are deploying thousands of commercial satellites, some of which are leased to governments or integrated into national security missions. Military utilization of these resources, either intentionally or otherwise, would increase the scope of potential targets for a war. International legal frameworks remain antiquated even as threats are emerging. The Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly ban ASAT weapons or space military uses that are not nuclear. It has no enforcement mechanisms, verification, or even precise definitions of what is a “weapon in space.” Suggestions such as the PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) have been stymied for lack of consensus among major powers. Western countries emphasize behavioral norms and soft codes of conduct, while Russia and China favor legally binding treaties—though their own are still developing offensive capabilities.

The absence of a shared understanding or compliant regime leaves space security in a precarious position. Imagine, for example, that a proximity operation is unwittingly perceived as an attack. Or imagine a test debris from an ASAT test inadvertently disables a third-party satellite. These are not speculative problems—these are real-world problems in an increasingly congested and contested orbital environment. Besides, the threat of the Kessler Syndrome—a chain reaction of orbital crashes rendering regions of space unusable—overshadows the problem of space weaponization. The 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test and the Russian Nudol test in 2021 both generated immense quantities of debris, threatening not just military assets but also the globe’s commercial and civilian space infrastructure. Under worst-case circumstances, a pair of irresponsible incidents would seal entire orbital regimes for decades, if not centuries.

The broader strategic consequence is that space is no longer a sanctuary. The erosion of norms, combined with technology possibility and geopolitical distrust, is pushing the world toward a more perilous and volatile space environment. Space can become a catalyst for, rather than a stabilizer of, future conflict unless drastic and unified action occurs.

Conclusion

The path to space militarization has irresistibly moved in the direction of weaponization, motivated by the convergence of geopolitical competition, technological innovation, and strategic vision that regards space as an offshoot of ground warfare. As the technology underpinnings of contemporary life more and more depend on space assets, the weaponization of space threatens far more than war. It threatens economic stability, civilian infrastructure, and the long-term sustainability of the space environment itself. As yet, however, general acknowledgment has not been followed by matching efforts in arms control and law reform. The consequence has been an alarming vacuum—one of uncertainty, where deterrence is frail and escalation more probable and less contained. Our path, unchanged, will take us to the future in which space is not a realm of cooperation and progress, but an invisible battlefield where the seeds of war to come are planted.

In order to avoid this result, a multi-dimensional strategy has to be adopted. There has to be return and consolidation of international legal architecture to investment in confidence and trust-building measures and incorporation of new space powers and non-state actors into the global governance structure. Above all, the world needs to understand that it is not an option to keep outer space openness and stability—it is a sine qua non of peace on Earth.

Operation Sindoor: Lessons and Learnings

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By: C Shraddha

On April 22, 2025, the serene valleys of Pahalgam, a tourist destination 50 km from Srinagar, were jeopardized when a group of Pakistan-armed and trained men in camouflage clothing emerged from an adjacent forest and fired upon tourists. As per officials, “the attackers opened indiscriminate fire at Baisaran Meadow, a scenic uphill area accessible only by foot or pony rides.” 25 Indians and a Nepali citizen lost their lives, with several others sustaining injuries while running away from the vicious attack. Following the brutality, The Resistance Front, a subsidiary of the infamous Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility for the attack twice within a span of hours. 

While the Government of Pakistan refused to acknowledge the barbarity of the attack or the presence of terror networks within its territory, the Government of India promptly responded, showcasing its diplomatic, military and strategic prowess. On April 23, 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a high-stakes strategic meeting with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, National Security Advisor Ajith Doval, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, Air Force Chief Air Marshal AP Singh, and Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Tripathi. What followed was an onslaught of diplomatic measures isolating Pakistan, including the handing of persona non grata to Pakistani diplomats in India. Additionally, the visas of Pakistani nationals in India were cancelled, with Union Minister Amit Shah contacting Chief Ministers of the respective states to orchestrate the identification and removal process of these individuals from the Indian territory. Furthermore, India paused the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and closed the Attari-land transit point.

However, India’s response was not only limited to diplomatic avenues. In the early hours of May 7, 2025, the first phase of Operation Sindoor was afoot. The Indian Armed Forces targeted nine sites consisting of terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan as well as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed the gravity of the attack by stating, “Our actions have been focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted. India has demonstrated considerable restraint in selection of targets and methods of execution.” The deployment of BrahMos supersonic missiles and SCALP missiles ensured the death of 100 militants, including senior leaders of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. However, the following day, Pakistan showcased an escalated response by dispersing coordinated missile and drone strikes across military installations in Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Srinagar, Ludhiana, Bhuj and Bathinda. What followed was four days of aerial combat between the two countries. Continuous and unprovoked targeting of civilians by Pakistan through heavy-calibre artillery fire in the Line of Control further provoked the conflict when approximately sixteen innocent lives were taken. 

Finally, after the four-day-long military confrontation, the neighbouring nuclear states agreed to a ceasefire. However, within a few hours, as the bordering cities witnessed explosions, India accused Pakistan of violating the ceasefire. Mr Misri condemned Pakistani actions in a press briefing: “We call upon Pakistan to take appropriate steps to address these violations and deal with the situations with seriousness and responsibility.” In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Pakistan criticised India for violating the ceasefire. “Our forces are handling this situation with responsibility and restraint,” retorted MOFA. 

Although the actions of the Indian government and the defence forces were lauded by the citizens both at home and abroad, the operation and its reactions have elicited critical responses. Questions have arisen about the reasons behind the lapse in security measures in Pahalgam. The lack of preparedness and foresight of the security forces and the government proved to present the terrorists with an opportunity to attack Baisaran Meadow. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp was located 7 km away, while the camp of Rashtriya Rifles of the Army was 5 km away. Despite this, the heavily touristed area had no security forces present, letting the terrorists continue their savagery uninterrupted for approximately half an hour. Furthermore, it is shocking how neither the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) nor the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had any clue regarding the impending attack in Pahalgam. In an Union Territory that is heavily under the protection of armed forces, such a lapse in judgement and prescience unveils the gaps in Indian security. 

Despite claiming responsibility for the attack, TRF is not formally declared as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations (UN). While the UN condemned the attack in “the strongest terms”, it left out naming TRF as the perpetrator. The non-inclusion of the network in the list removes it from under the purview of UN counter-terrorism efforts, which include sanctions, travel bans and enhanced surveillance of funding efforts. Furthermore, this provides Pakistan with a degree of plausible deniability, making it more difficult for countries to block possible misuse of financial aid or to implement counter-terrorism measures. Thus, the efforts of the Indian delegates in securing the addition of the TRF to the UNSC 1267 Sanction list would strengthen counter-terrorism measures in the long run. 

The international responses to Operation Sindoor made one thing apparent- India is largely alone in matters of national security. While nations presented their support verbally, none of it altered India’s strategic position. This demonstrates the ability of India to chart its own course in the strategic and military domain and not fall in line with global power ambition. As retired Secretary to the Government of India, Guruchran Gollerkeri rightfully noted, “India’s conduct marks a departure from the reactive posture of the previous decades. It is a mature, independent stance- one that signals our refusal to be a geopolitical pawn.” It is important to acknowledge that while India has the capacity to maintain an independent stance, its nuclear neighbour has resorted to external support from states such as Turkey, Azerbaijan and China. As General Chauhan expressed during the Shangri-La dialogue, “India operated without foreign assistance during Operation Sindoor while Pakistan likely leaned on Chinese sources.” Though India has showcased its self-reliance capability, it is of utmost importance that the country maintains formidable international partnerships to ensure its readiness in the event of a broader military escalation.

Amongst international alliances, the discourse around the involvement of President Trump in stabilising the conflict has proved that India cannot perceive the US as a viable partner. Initially, the Trump administration feigned indifference. Vice President JD Vance made it clear that the US is “not going to get involved in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” The actions of the Trump administration and the subsequent credit-mongering pursuits undertaken by the administration depict a modern interpretation of the white man’s burden. The administration boasted about brokering the ceasefire while simultaneously supporting the IMF bailout package of US$ 2.3 billion to Pakistan. Indian National Congress MP Shashi Tharoor has repeatedly and vehemently opposed President Trump’s “helped settle” tensions claim. During the multi-party delegation on Operation Sindoor, Tharoor expressed, “Mediation is not a term that we are particularly willing to entertain. The fact is that this implies… an equivalence which simply doesn’t exist.”

Operation Sindoor and its retaliation witnessed the unrestricted usage of drones. On May 7, over 600 drones were deployed by Pakistani forces to overwhelm India’s AD radar network, obtain real-time intelligence, target civilians and deplete India’s ammunition. “Drones emerged as the primary weapon of choice for both sides,” writes expert Amoha Basrur. Founder of Johnnette Technologies, John Livingstone, agrees with Basrur when he predicts that “Swarm drones will be the future of warfare.” However, Livingstone argues that India needs to enhance its drone capabilities and scale up drone inventory, wherein “10 million swarm drones” may be required for modern-day conflicts. Furthermore, he notes the need for the development of multiple drone technologies in the immediate future. “It’s not just one type of swarm drone; we need multiple types,” he says. Livingstone has advocated for a balanced approach wherein drones complement fighter jets in aerial combat. 

Though military innovation is of paramount importance, it is economic development that enables such progress. It is sustained investments in technology, infrastructure, intelligence and military that enabled India to overpower Pakistan during Operation Sindoor. Furthermore, it must be noted that a better economic position not only enables military transformation, it amplifies the position of India on the global stage. Pakistan was able to secure the IMF bail package due to the support of stronger economies, as voting quotas of the executive board of the IMF are based upon the size of the individual economies. Currently, India’s voting share is a mere 2.5 per cent, which resulted in Pakistan procuring the bailout despite India’s strong disapproval. Economic competence, combined with military advancements, remains the predominant strategy for India to realise its aspirations of leading the Global South while ensuring self-reliance and measured alignment.

The swarm of drones was not the only weapon shot down by Indian forces. Disinformation was another ammunition used by Pakistan, which was promptly debunked through comprehensive media briefings. According to General Chauhan, 15 percent of the time of the armed forces went into combating disinformation during the Operation. Throughout the four days, Pakistan actively engaged in propagating false narratives through social media and news broadcasts. On May 7, 2025, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) expressed that “Pro-Pakistan social media handles and even influential political figures” were “spreading fake news, fabricating stories of military victories and heroic retaliation that simply did not exist.” As per the I&B Ministry, the Pakistan state-affiliated media houses and social media accounts invented evidence by using outdated images and purposefully misinterpreting past videos. Fake videos depicting the surrender of the Indian Army at Chora Post were “amplified By Pakistan’s Minister Attaullah Tarar, who publicly endorsed the claim without a shred of evidence”, stated the I&B ministry. 

While Pakistan was on a smear campaign against the Indian armed forces through social media, the Indian cyberspace and computer networks were also vulnerable to cyberattacks from Pakistani actors. This reiterates the transformation of traditional warfare, which is now leaving its marks over cyberspaces and social media. Pakistani hackers engaged in website defacements while primarily targeting Indian armed forces and local government portals. Computer Emergency Response Team-India (CERT-IN) warned critical sectors and financial institutions of impending cyber-attacks. Additionally, Tamil Nadu Police and Himachal Pradesh Police reported higher risks of “phishing attempts from Pakistan-linked threat actors.” As Pakistan utilised the modern-day battlefield, Indian authorities responded with gusto. The Press Information Bureaus (PIB) Fact Check Unit debunked the false claims while additional measures were undertaken to restore the sanctity of cyberspace.  

Although Operation Sindoor marks a pivotal moment in India’s national security doctrine, it also sheds light on those areas which require careful recalibration. Cybersecurity, economic development, strategic partnerships and calculated deployment of forces must remain at the top of the priority list for India, as long as the country faces spiteful nuclear-armed neighbours. Despite the vicious Pahalgam attack exposing the vulnerabilities of India’s domestic intelligence, the attempt of the Pakistani forces to polarise the country remained largely uneventful. India’s non-escalatory, precise, isolated, and targeted attacks illustrated the country’s vehement opposition to terrorism and its state sponsorship. As the country moves ahead in its aspirations to lead the Global South, it must ensure to adequately combat its existing military vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening its economy and diplomacy. India’s path forward lies in careful considerations, not just in neutralising threats but in alertness, aim and alliance. 

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