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GSDN’s maiden Seminar on Legacy of Relations in the evolving India-Bangladesh Milieu: New Geopolitical Reality & Implications for Regional Stability

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Global Strategic & Defence News organised its maiden seminar on the theme “Legacy of Relations in the evolving India-Bangladesh Milieu: New Geopolitical Reality & Implications for Regional Stability” on September 06, 2025 in the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, India.

The seminar started with a welcome address by the anchor of the seminar, Dr. Radhika Singh who graciously welcomed all and gave a gist of the seminar proceedings. This was followed by a short movie on India-Bangladesh Relations which was very well received. The voice-over for the movie was done by Dr. Manisha Bose and Ms. Ananya Das did the content editing.

The Keynote address of the seminar was delivered by Major General Manraj Singh Mann, SM**, Additional Director General Equipment Management, Indian Army and Corps Commander-designate. The General Officer appreciated the theme of the seminar while emphasising that the theme is of concern and needs addressing.

The General Officer stated that India has played a pivotal role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and India and Bangladesh have shared a time-tested relationship based on trust and cooperation and issues between both the nations have always been resolved through dialogue and mutual understanding.

Major General Manraj Singh Mann, SM** delivering the Keynote Address

Major General Manraj Singh Mann, SM** stated that in the recent times Bangladesh has seen evolving dynamics that have influenced the regional environment and these developments present both challenges and opportunities, underscoring the need for continued cooperation for stability in the shared neighbourhood. He further stated that India and Bangladesh with their intertwined destinies can contribute a lot to a peaceful and prosperous South Asia which in turn can contribute significantly to the global growth and stability.

The General Officer applauded the eminence of the Speakers of the seminar and appreciated the topics allotted to each Speaker terming them as thought provoking. Major General Manraj Singh Mann, SM** expressed optimism that the seminar would bring forth pragmatic solutions and the constructive way forward.

The opening address was given by Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retired), Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News who brought out that two statements in the last two months made him conceptualise the seminar. One, on July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, Chief of Defence Staff, Indian Armed Forces stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics. Two, on August 04, 2025, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhary, the DG ISPR of the Pakistan Army remarked “We’ll start from East”. A veiled message that the next war on India by Pakistan will start from Bangladesh.

During the course of the seminar, the Speakers which included Veterans, Academia, Ambassadors, Lawyers and Journalists, discussed and deliberated on various topics. The seminar had two sessions, pre-lunch and post-lunch.

The Speakers in the seminar were Lt Gen Sanjiv Langer, Lt Gen PC Nair, Maj Gen Sudhakar Jee, Brig VP Singh, Brig Neelesh Bhanot, Ambassador Manju Seth, Dr. Nagalaxmi Raman and Ms Simran Sodhi from India while Mr Syed Badrul Ahsan, Barrister Tania Amir, Ambassador Harun Al Rashid and Dr. Abul Hasnat Milton were from Bangladesh.

The first session commenced with Major General Sudhakar Jee, VSM (Retired) as the first speaker who spoke on the historical perspective of India-Bangladesh relations, giving a deep insight into the strong historical ties between the two nations.

Brigadier Neelesh Bhanot, SM (Retired) dwelt on the silence of the international media on the atrocities of minorities in Bangladesh which was an eye-opener the way the international media has neglected the critical issue of the suffering of the minorities in Bangladesh that comprise Hindus, Christians and Buddhists.

Dr. Nagalaxmi Raman gave an insightful talk on the importance of counter-terrorism and strong border management in the internal stability of Bangladesh, stressing the need of these two critical factors that will ensure a stronger and peaceful Bangladesh.

Session I in progress

Dr. Abul Hasnat Milton explained in detail the persecution of the marginalised and minorities in Bangladesh in the last one year, leaving the audience shocked and stunned of the large-scale attacks on the marginalised and minorities in Bangladesh since August 05, 2024.

Lieutenant General Sanjiv Langer, PVSM, AVSM (Retired) gave an excellent talk the importance of Bangladesh in regional stability that included interesting anecdotes of his two visits to Bangladesh, driving home the crucial point that Bangladesh is the key to regional stability.

The last speaker of the first session was Ambassador Manju Seth who lucidly brough out the measures India needs to adopt for stability in Bangladesh and for better ties between India and Bangladesh.

The first session was moderated by Ms. Suman Sharma who conducted the session splendidly ensuring that all the timelines were met.

The second session started with Lieutenant General PC Nair, PVSM, AVSM, YSM (Retired) who finely explained the external factors that played a role in the August 05, 2024 incident of Bangladesh that saw the government changing in a matter of few hours. Clearly, the external factors had a huge role in displacing the Bangladesh government.

Mr. Syed Badrul Ahsan reasoned in depth as to why democracy and stability in South Asia rests on stronger, deeper and people-oriented Bangladesh-India ties which showcased the importance of strong relation between the two neighbours with a deep cultural and historical past, for the region’s stability.

Ms. Simran Sodhi brought out well the challenges confronting India in the wake of the instability in Bangladesh which are very enormous and need to be tackled on an urgent basis by India.

Session II in progress

Brigadier VP Singh (Retired) explained with deep research the military challenges that India faces due to the convergence of China, Pakistan and Bangladesh and the points made during the talk made great impact.

Ambassador Harun Al Rashid brought to fore the important issue of radicalization in Bangladesh and deliberated the future of India-Bangladesh relations and after the talk showed a grim video of the grave of a Sufi saint being exhumed in Bangladesh and the mortal remains being set on fire. The video numbed the audience with despair.

The last speaker of the session as well the seminar was Barrister Tania Amir who spoke well and in great detail the importance of Bangladesh’s secular constitution and regional stability, emphasising the need for maintaining Bangladesh’s secular constitution that has played a pivotal role in Bangladesh’s progress and prosperity.

The second session saw excellent moderating by Major General BK Sharma, AVSM, SM** (Retired).

The audience asked pertinent questions after both the sessions and the allotted time of 30 minutes for the questions & answers after each session was fully utilised with thought provoking questions asked by the attendees that included ex-Captain GD Sharma and Ms. Isha Jaiswal amongst others.

The Plenary Address of the seminar was delivered by Major General Sudhakar Jee, VSM (Retd) who brought out the high-quality of the deliberations and discussions in the seminar. He expressed the urgent need for a framework for ensuring continuity in the India-Bangladesh relations and the need for creating permanent institutional mechanisms between India and Bangladesh that would strengthen the relations between the two nations.

Major General Sudhakar Jee, VSM (Retired) giving the Plenary Address

The maiden seminar of the Global Strategic & Defence News successfully concluded after the Vote of Thanks by the gracious Dr. Radhika Singh.

Vote of Thanks by Dr. Radhika Singh

The entire seminar proceeding was live-streamed and is available on the YouTube channel of the Global Strategic & Defence News as well as the X (formerly Twitter) handle of the publication.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

Why Pakistan-Bangladesh closeness should worry India?

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By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

Pakistan & Bangladesh’s flags: source Internet

South Asia has never been an example of simple geopolitics, in which the bitterness of history, the hostility of the region, and international strategic interests intersect. The warming of relationships between Pakistan and Bangladesh is one of the more recent changes that are transforming the strategic environment of the region. These two countries, which fought and were bitter foes in the past, linked through culture, language, and geography, and are separated by a bloody past-are starting to consider a path of diplomatic, economic, and security partnership.

This newfound intimacy poses numerous problems to India, which has hitherto enjoyed great leverage in Bangladesh and has a strained but a tactically indispensable relationship with Pakistan. To go with the diplomatic adjustments are regional security ramifications, economic impact and overall Indian orientation to its geopolitical strategy. It is important to understand such developments, drivers of these developments and the possible effects of such developments to assess the strategic posture of India in South Asia.

History: Common Ground to Division

The history of the present geopolitical situation has its origins in South Asia. The division of British India in 1947 gave birth to Pakistan, a country with separated wings (geographically) West Pakistan (modern-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh). Since its formation, Pakistan had struggled with integrating East Pakistan politically, economically, and culturally. East Pakistanis believed they had been politically sidelined, exploited economically, and inherently neglected in terms of cultural practices and governance as West Pakistan prevailed within national institutions, commerce and administration.

In 1971, this situation came to a breaking point. The autonomy requested by East Pakistan triggered a military crackdown by West Pakistan that caused many atrocities and humanitarian crisis. Strategic, humanitarian, and political interests made India intervene and thus created Bangladesh. The Bangladesh population was profoundly scarred psychologically by the war with a legacy of mistrust of Pakistan that continues to date.

Bangladesh adopted an Indian-friendly foreign policy to a great extent after independence and began cooperating with India economically and in security matters. Meanwhile, Pakistan was diplomatically isolated in the subcontinent, and it had a limited and mostly ceremonial relationship with Bangladesh. It is against this historical background that India had a long history of influence in Bangladesh, owing to a joint struggle, similarity of culture and strategic interests.

The Political Change of Direction and Foreign Policy Reorganization in Bangladesh

Political change took place in Bangladesh in August 2024. When the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was ousted after a mix of civil unrest, student movement, and extraneous factors, an interim government was formed under the leadership of Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus which started having an anti-India stance and started gravitating towards China & Pakistan. This was a break of the conventional India-focused foreign policy in Bangladesh.

The strategic pivot in Bangladesh has several reasons behind it:

  • Economic Diversification: Bangladesh has also been pursuing a solution to excessive reliance on India in trade and investment. Interaction with Pakistan will provide access to new markets, joint ventures, and export opportunities especially in the textile industry, farm produce and technologies.
  • Strategic Autonomy: Bangladesh presents its independence at the regional level, by balancing its relations with India and Pakistan. An attitude like that makes Bangladesh seem less of a satellite of one power, giving it a greater diplomatic advantage.
  • Security Concerns: Overlapping areas of common interest in defensive cooperation have been established in counterterrorism, maritime security and calamity control. The willingness to cooperate is demonstrated by the fact that Bangladesh has been part of the military drills organized by Pakistan, such as AMAN-2025.
  • Domestic Political Signalling: The new administration wants to demonstrate itself as a decisive force in foreign affairs, exercising agency to its audiences back home and projecting experience abroad.
  • Historical and Cultural Interactions: The culture and language that binds Pakistan and Bangladesh together is gradually re-discovered with uneven speed due to the historical wrong and as a new platform to build another partnership.

Strategic Motivation in Pakistan

With its past diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation, Pakistan is particularly happy about the prospect of renewed interaction with Bangladesh:

  • Diplomatic Bait: Co-operative Bangladesh would increase the influence of Pakistan in the region, and Islamabad would be able to offset the traditional influence of India in Dhaka.
  • Economic Cooperation: Bangladeshi markets and trade access would provide Pakistan, opportunities to augment exports, share investments and strengthen its economic position within South Asia.
  • Strategic Signalling: As long as Pakistan balances its strategic interests and can project a vision that involves reconciling the region, it should be perceived as malleable and as reflecting a wish to resolve historical animosities.
  • Regional Deals: Greater integration with Bangladesh will open opportunities to do coordinated business with China, which will enhance the strategic position of Pakistan through India.

Economic Cooperation and Implications

Pakistan and Bangladesh are going through nascent economic cooperation:

  • Trade Agreements: The two countries have started negotiating to lower trade barriers, consider tariff concessions, and promote joint ventures in the industrial sphere. This may involve joint ventures in textiles, pharmaceuticals and agriculture.
  • Investment Opportunities: Pakistan is looking at investing in Bangladeshi industries (especially the energy and infrastructure) which might have been earlier on, attracted Indian investment.
  • Dynamics of Regional Markets: Regional level economic initiatives would alter the flow of trade, slightly weakening the old-standing economic advantage of India in Bangladesh. An example is the re-placing of regional supply chains to garments or raw materials with Pakistan, which would impact the market share of India.
  • Long-term Economic Realignment: The sustained collaboration can stimulate other area participants to consider multilateral initiatives with Pakistan-Bangladesh, which will form a new economic bloc in the eastern region of South Asia.

Defense and Security Cooperation

The most delicate aspect of the rapprochement between Pakistan and Bangladesh is perhaps defense cooperation:

  • Military Exercises: The involvement of Bangladesh in drills organized by Pakistan especially the maritime security exercises show the coordination of operations and common interests.
  • Intelligence Sharing: There have been talks of counterterrorism intelligence exchange, which is a reflection of common apprehensions with regard to transnational security threats.
  • Strategic Posture: Although not blatant, this type of cooperation will require the recalibration of India in the eastern border and in the Bay of Bengal. Even a restricted version of a joint strategy between Bangladesh and Pakistan will have a shaping impact on the Indian regional strategic decisions.
  • Counterterrorism Dynamics: Pakistan has been accused in the past of leveraging regional networks to spread extremism. Further cooperation with Bangladesh may make it difficult to track cross-border terrorist activities even inadvertently, by India.

Diplomatic and Regional Implications

The developing Pakistan-Bangladesh alliance should also be considered in the context of the geopolitics of the region:

  • China and its influence: China is a strategic partner to Pakistan, and a potential investor to Bangladesh, meaning that improved Bangladesh-Pakistan relations will advantage China. Planned programs in line with Chinese infrastructure projects have the potential to support a further strategic presence of Beijing in South Asia.
  • The Role of the United States: U.S involvement in South Asia, policy changes in relation to Pakistan, Bangladesh and India will determine the future of bilateral relations. A change in American strategic priorities can change the cost-benefit calculus of both Dhaka and Islamabad.
  • Regional Forums: Regional blocs like SAARC and BIMSTEC can be used as the platforms of increased Pakistan-Bangladesh collaboration, which can leave India behind unless New Delhi takes the initiative.
  • Geopolitical Message: New relationships indicate to the world that old animosity can be put aside in a practical way and the relationships in the South Asian region redefined. India has to read these signals and alter its regional diplomacy.

Implications for India

This changing partnership poses a complex environment to India:

  • Strategic Enforcement: Greater cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh has the potential to impact the eastern security dynamics of India, thereby putting a strain on strategic choices in the Bay of Bengal and frontier areas.
  • Economic Competition: Dislocation of investment and markets out of India by the joint trade and industrial projects would affect the regional economic competition and commercial interests of India.
  • Security Dilemmas: Intelligence and maritime coordination between Bangladesh and Pakistan may require re-alignment of the Indian defense planning.
  • Diplomatic Constraints: A shift in favour of Pakistan lowers the bargaining power of India in Bangladesh and may lessen its influence in the regional forums and multilateral bargaining.
  • Historical Sensitivities: Unresolved issues of the 1971 war, such as unresolved grievances, can have a latent effect on the foreign policy of Bangladesh and this makes the task of India to have a strategic presence in Bangladesh difficult.

Indian Strategic Options

India needs to take a multi-pronged approach to offset such developments:

  • Firm Bilateral Relationships: The relationship with Bangladesh should be reinforced through trade, investment, cultural exchange and infrastructure cooperation, which is also imperative to reestablish authority.
  • Economic Incentives: There are specific economic packages, joint ventures and technology alliances that can be applied to counter the increasing attractiveness of Pakistan.
  • Defense Cooperation: Joint security drills, maritime cooperation, and counterterrorism cooperation will aid in ensuring that India has a strategic advantage.
  • Cultural Diplomacy: Education, media and people-to-people exchanges: imports and exports build a sense of goodwill and enhance historical bonds.
  • Regional Leadership: Active involvement and membership in SAARC, BIMSTEC and other regional groups will mean that the interest of India is represented and the Bangladesh-Pakistan axis does not turn its back on New Delhi.
  • Strategic Communication: The articulation of the vision of regional stability, economic development and security of India will be clear and will help to sway the perceptions of international interests.

Case Studies and Hypothetical Scenarios

  • Maritime Security in Bay of Bengal: Imagine that Pakistan and Bangladesh are co-operating in conducting naval patrol. India would require a greater level of surveillance and may even plan with the other regional allies to have free navigation and ensure strategic balance.
  • Economic cooperation in Textile: A hypothetical joint venture in the production of garments between Pakistan and Bangladesh may compete directly with the Indian exports, forcing India to innovate or give incentives to keep business.
  • Sharing of Intelligence on Counterterrorism: In case Pakistan and Bangladesh liaise on intelligence, India has to come up with similar systems of ensuring that it is in the know on the possible cross border threats.

These situations depict practical challenges India has to look forward to in order to retain security and influence.

Conclusion

The increasing intimacy between Pakistan and Bangladesh is a radical change in the geopolitical situation in South Asia. In the case of India, the consequences are diverse- in security, economic, and diplomatic terms. Although the rapprochement presents possible risks, it also offers an opportunity to India to re-strategize its policy and increase bilateral involvement and re-establish its status as a regional leader.

India can overcome these changes by taking a proactive, subtle, and strategic course of action, including diplomacies, economic incentives, defense partnership, and cultural interaction. The Bangladesh Pakistan axis can redefine the regional dynamics however with the site and proper planning, India can preserve its interests, keep the region stable and remain in an influential position in South Asia.

About the Author

Shreya Dabral is pursuing her Master’s in Mass Communication from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. She balances her academic journey with active roles in research and digital media. Her research paper on consumer repurchase behaviour in the skincare industry, published in the International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Trends (IJSRET), is a testament to her curiosity, clarity, and commitment to exploring audience-brand dynamics in a digital age.

Will the Middle East ever see Peace?

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By: Sanjay Mummana, Research Analyst, GSDN

Middle East & North Africa region: source Internet

The Middle East is never just a desert between Asia and Africa; it is the place of the birth of empires, of religions, and of civilizations in conflict. Yet, when the world today thinks of this land, one word comes to mind: war. From the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the wars going now, the Middle East has seldom been a peaceful place. One conflict ends another begins, as if the region is trapped in an endless cycle. Peace in Middle East isa question shaped by both politics and history. Let us first examine the history of the Middle East, to understand the roots of its persistent conflicts.

The 1910s and 1920s: Promises and Betrayals:

The first decade of the twentieth century changed the history of the Middle East. At that time, Britain was still very dependent on oil from the United States (U.S.), and the American position on anti-colonialism made the British nervous. To reduce dependence, they turned to the oil-rich Middle East and chose to break the Ottoman Empire’s hold on the region. Arabs who had rebelled against the Ottomans thought that Britain promised them independence through the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence but their fate had already been sealed. On May 16, 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the land between Britain and France, and on November 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration called for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, without regard to the Arab majority living there. The Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) ended the Ottoman Empire and divided its territories among the European powers. By the 1920s, instead of actual independence, Arabs were given artificial states under foreign rule, sowing mistrust and conflicts that continue to this day as well.

The 1930s and 1940s: Rising Nationalism and the Birth of Israel:

In the 1930s, anger grew in Arab lands under European control, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. Jewish migration to Palestine increased, and pushed further by Nazi persecution, which led to clashes with local Arabs. After the Holocaust, pressure rose to create a Jewish homeland, and on November 29, 1947, the United Nations voted to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. On May 14, 1948, Israel declared unilateral independence, and the very next day Arab countries attacked, starting the first Arab-Israeli War. Jews lost millions of lives in the Holocaust, finally got a place to live, and when others tried to take it away, they fought till the last drop of blood and won. For Arabs, it was the opposite. They saw it as their land unfairly given to others. For Palestinians, it was the Nakba (“catastrophe”), when many were killed and hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes.

The 1950s and 1960s: The Age of Coups and Wars:

Arab nationalism grew stronger in the 1950s and 1960s. Leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt wanted to unite Arabs under socialism and reduce Western control. This came to a head during the Suez Crisis on October 29, 1956, when Egypt took control of the Suez Canal. Britain, France, and Israel attacked, but they were forced to withdraw under pressure from the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Arab-Israeli conflict rose again on June 05, 1967, in the Six Day War, when Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and Golan Heights, causing more Palestinian displacement.

The 1970s and 1980s: Oil, Peace, and Proxy Wars:

The 1970s were transformative. On October 06, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War against Israel to regain territories. Israel pushed back, the Arab oil producers then used the “oil weapon,” cutting supplies to the West and quadrupling the prices. This showed the world the power of Middle Eastern oil. At the same time, there were efforts for peace. On September 17, 1978, the Camp David Accord between Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin, led by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, resulted in Egypt officially recognizing Israel. While Sadat was praised abroad, at home he was assassinated on October 6, 1981, by extremists who saw peace with Israel as betrayal. The February 11, 1979 Iranian Revolution also reshaped the region. Iran removed U.S. backed Shah and became an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, opposing Western influence and encouraging Islamist movements across the Middle East.

The 1980s were violent. The Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988) took the lives of more than a million people. Saddam Hussein, with the help of the West and Arab countries, attempted to prevent Iran, but the war did not conclude with a victory. From 1975 to 1990, Lebanon was during a civil war involving Israel, Syria, and numerous local militias. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 6, 1982 to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which only led to more fighting. It was also the period in which the Shiite militant organization Hezbollah was born, backed by Iran. The First Intifada started in December 9, 1987 with mass protests, boycotts against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.

The 1990s and 2000s: Hope, Terror, and Occupation:

In August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, shocking the Arab world. On January 17, 1991, a U.S.-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm. Soon, Saddam’s army was defeated and Kuwait was freed. But U.S. troops stayed in Saudi, which angered many Arabs. This presence became one of the reasons extremists like Osama bin Laden later turned their anger against the West.

Even in this tense time, the 1990s gave some hope for peace. On September 13, 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat shook hands. Later Jordan also signed peace with Israel. For a short while, it seemed peace might be possible. But this hope was shaken when, Rabin was killed by an Israeli extremist. His death showed that peace could be destroyed not only by enemies but also from within one’s own side.

The first decade of the 21st century was even more turbulent. On September 11, 2001, the U.S. was attacked by al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, in the 9/11 attacks. This resulted in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to remove the Taliban who were sheltering al-Qaeda. Two years later March 20, 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction. Saddam was captured and executed on December 30, 2006, but such weapons were not found. The war left Iraq unstable with bombings, sectarian violence, and the rise of new extremist groups that would later become ISIS.

The 2010s and 2020s: The Arab Spring and Continuing Struggles:

The Arab Spring (2010-2011) originated in Tunisia and spread throughout the Arab world. Ordinary people took to the streets demanding freedom and dignity, revolting against rulers. Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in Egypt. Muammar Gaddafi was killed in Libya. But in Syria, the protests lead into a civil war that drew in world powers and produced the worst refugee crisis.

The 2020s began with some hope for peace. On September 15, 2020, the Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and later a few other Arab states. However, this peace did not include the Palestinians. Later, the Israel–Gaza conflict broke out on October 07, 2023, leaving Gaza in ruins. Syria is still stuck in war, Yemen faces one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, and Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to compete for power.

Recently U.S. and Israel launched attacks on Iran because they feared that if Iran built nuclear weapons, it would threaten the whole region. Their worry was also linked to the groups Iran supports. Hezbollah in Lebanon is a powerful militia and political force that has fought many times with Israel. Hamas in Gaza is the group leading the fight against Israel and is behind many rocket attacks. The Houthis in Yemen are fighting a long war against the Saudi-backed government and have targeted ships and cities in Saudi. Because of these ties, many countries see these groups as terrorist organizations. Iran’s backing of them, along with its nuclear ambitions, made it a key target of U.S. and Israeli action.


Looking back at the past century, several factors have kept the Middle East locked in a cycle of conflict. In my view, some of these are as follows:

  • The Middle East is a mix of ethnic groups (Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Copts, etc.) and religious groups (Sunni and Shia Islam, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, and Judaism). These identities have been used historically and politically to divide people even more. The Sunni–Shia divide has been one of the deepest tensions. Saudi, as the leading Sunni power, is strongly backed by the U.S., while Iran, the main Shia power, supports Shia-linked groups in different countries. To spread its influence, Iran relies on proxy groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. The goal of these proxies is not only to weaken Iran’s rivals but also to spread Shia dominance in the region. Whenever these groups gain more ground, Iran’s influence grows, creating constant friction with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and their allies.
  • After World War I, Britain and France drew borders without any regard to existing tribal, ethnic, or religious realities. This produced states with internally divided populations. As a result, in many countries, certain groups became minorities and were denied equal rights. Many conflicts, such as those between Israel and its neighbours, the Kurdish, and tensions in Iraq and Syria, have their origins in these colonial era decisions.
  • Large oil, gas, and mineral reserves have been both a blessing and a curse. Wealth creation has been accompanied by internal power struggles, wars, and foreign interventions as control over resources is constantly contested. Often, competing claims have worsened tensions within countries and across borders.
  • Decades of authoritarian rule, corruption, and fragile institutions have left many states incapable of providing for the basic needs of their populations. This failure has led to public anger, revolutions, and extremist movements, as seen in the Arab Spring and the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen.
  • Middle Eastern oil has made the region a playground for global powers. The U.S. relies on Saudi Arabia not just for oil but also to maintain a strong Sunni front against Iran. On the other hand, Russia and China lean towards Iran. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil and pays using its own currency, giving China a strong economic lifeline and leverage against U.S. sanctions. For Russia, Iran is strategically important because it acts as a barrier against NATO expansion and holds key gas pipeline routes that connect to Europe and Asia. This great power rivalry means that local conflicts are often turned into proxy wars between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.
  • One of the biggest dangers comes from the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons. Israel sees this as an existential threat, as it fears that if Iran gets nukes, they could be passed down to proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis. If such groups were ever to gain nuclear capability, the region could face uncontrollable chaos. This fear drives constant strikes, sanctions, and political pressure to stop Iran’s nuclear program.

Although there have been peace treaties, like the Oslo and the Abraham Accords, the Middle East is still full of conflicts. Real peace does not come just from signing agreements. It needs solving deeper problems. History shows that change is possible. Europe, once torn apart by many wars, rebuilt itself by talking and working together. This led to the European Union, where countries cooperate for shared goals. The Middle East can also move toward lasting peace if its nations focus on working together instead of fighting.

At this moment each nation and organization pursue its own interests, and the interests are not similar very often. And this is why peace operations cannot work. Imagine the fight as a tree – the top branches can be cut away but the roots of religion, identity, and history run deep. Without resolving the issue at root level, violence will continue to reappear. According to Mahabharata, in war there are no winners or losers but only widows and orphans. In the Middle East, this is particularly so where the common people bear the brunt. Leaders should prefer knowledge over vengeance, hope over fear, and long-term peace rather than immediate benefits. Then only peace will cease being a dream, and become a reality.

Resilient Under Sanctions: Russia’s Economic Survival amid the prolonged Ukraine War

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By: Aditi Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Ruble & Dollar pictorial representation: source Internet

Beginning on February 24, 2022, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine swiftly altered the course of European history. The fiercest conflict the continent had witnessed since World War II began as a full-scale invasion. Millions of Ukrainians had to flee, leaving everything behind, while thousands of people had been killed and entire cities destroyed.

The roots of this war go back to 2014 when Russia took Crimea and fighting started in Donbas. That set the stage for what exploded in 2022. After the invasion Western countries brought in sanctions that were described as the harshest in history. The war also forced millions of Ukrainians to run to other countries, while the United Nations counted thousands of civilian deaths. As time went on Russia still kept around one fifth of Ukraine’s land and the costs, human and economic and political, spread not just in Europe but also around the wider world.

The West was swift. Perhaps the most severe sanctions ever applied to a major state were imposed on Russia by the US, the EU, and its allies. In order to isolate Russia from the global monetary system, they sought to destabilise its economy. According to numerous early reports, Russia was supposed to fall apart in a few of months. At first, it appeared likely since markets were in disarray and the currency was declining, but Moscow intervened swiftly and somehow kept the economy intact.

Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia’s Economy

After the invasion, Russia’s financial system, technology sector, oil exports, military industries and even well-known figures quickly became the focus of Western sanctions. A broad coalition of the US, the EU, the UK, Japan and others introduced over 18,000 measures. These created sweeping limits on trade, investment and financial transactions. Major Russian banks were cut off from the SWIFT system, which made cross border transfers very difficult. At the same time imports of modern electronics and semiconductors, vital for defence and manufacturing, were heavily restricted.

The impact came fast. Inflation shot up as imported goods vanished from stores. The ruble lost more than half its value. Ordinary Russians rushed to turn their savings into hard currency, pushing capital out of the country. Western firms pulled back in huge numbers, some selling their assets at heavy losses while others simply walked away. To contain the shock, the Central Bank raised interest rates sharply and imposed tight capital controls. Exporters were ordered to exchange much of their foreign income into rubles. These moves, combined with fiscal support from the government, calmed markets and stopped a full panic in the currency and banking system.

Still, the war has exposed Russia’s deep economic weaknesses. The country depends too much on selling natural resources abroad, and now faces shortages of both funds and workers. Long term investment programs needed for growth are being stalled by the fighting. If sanctions continue, especially those aimed at advanced technology for mining and arms, rebuilding the economy will become even harder. In that case Moscow may find itself forced to channel more and more of its resources into militarisation instead of development.

Russia’s rapid economic progress is mostly driven by its war expenditures rather than continuous output. Meanwhile, the Central Bank has struggled to keep inflation under control as a result of increased salaries. Food costs are growing and business operations are becoming less profitable, which is placing pressure on both citizens and industrialists. Russia may be slowly heading towards stagflation, a dangerous confluence of high inflation and economic stagnation, according to some observers, rather than just surviving.

Following the implementation of extraordinary economic sanctions, restricted capital flows and significant state engagement, the Russian economy is increasingly dominated by extremely atypical commercial ties with the rest of the world. Russia’s economy is undergoing a considerable economic reorganisation, and the distribution of wealth and income across its many population groups is changing significantly.

The Russian economy has adjusted and important industries have discovered methods to obtain the components and items they require from other vendors or through more devious trade routes. Production was not permanently halted by logistical issues and Russia’s foreign exchange profits are currently on pace with those of the years prior to the conflict. The economy has undergone significant restructuring in order to accommodate the demands of the military. The manufacturing of military products has increased, encompassing both more sophisticated technologies like Il-76 cargo planes and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as more basic things like artillery ammunition.

However, there are still serious underlying vulnerabilities. Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on energy exports, which leaves it vulnerable to regulations and shifting demand worldwide. Nowadays, a large portion of Russia’s GDP growth is driven by war expenditures rather than profitable investments. Living standards have been weakened by inflation driven by growing wages, labour shortages, and logistical stress while the cost of food and consumer items has increased by double digits. Despite the significant contraction of the civilian sectors, high defence spending created the illusion of growth by distorting macroeconomic metrics.

The civilian sector is deteriorating due to persistent underemployment and high credit rates and a large portion of economic activity is shifting towards military-industrial production, according to analysts who warn of stagnation. Independent reports reveal notable recessionary trends concealed by short-term fiscal stimulus, while official statistics have become less open, making it challenging for outsiders to evaluate actual conditions. Russia’s current course is unsustainable, and the resilience mentioned in official reports may be exaggerated, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics warned.

Energy Exports as a Lifeline

Russia’s enormous energy reserves are the foundation of its capacity to resist sanctions. For a long time, natural gas and oil have supported government activities and kept the ruble stable, serving as the foundation of the Russian budget. Russia shifted a large portion of its natural gas and crude exports from Europe to Asia, particularly to China and India, following the implementation of G7 price ceilings and Western sanctions. Despite efforts to impose a price restriction, Russia’s energy sales generated tens of billions of dollars in 2023 and 2024. According to analyses by the BBC and Al Jazeera, oil exports to India have increased to around US$ 140 billion since the beginning of the war, while China acquired more than 100 million tonnes of Russian crude in 2024.

Russia has implemented alternate payment methods, such as settlements in Indian rupees and Chinese yuan and increased the use of a “shadow fleet” vessels that operate outside of official channels in order to get around Western prohibitions. Because of this, Russian oil has been able to reach international markets even as Western regulations on energy infrastructure and insurance have become more stringent.

In the first seven months of 2025, Russia’s crude oil exports increased by 64% year over year, with the Jamnagar refinery in India alone buying 18.3 million tonnes of Russian crude. By utilising creative strategies like converting payment settlements into local currencies and taking use of LNG’s adaptability, which permitted exports to the EU to continue even as pipeline volumes decreased, Russia is continuing to adjust to global dynamics. Energy analysts noted that full enforcement could have cut Russia’s export earnings by about 28% in June 2025, while the price of Urals crude actually climbed above the G7 cap. Even so, Russia pulled in close to US$ 235 billion from oil and gas in 2024, supported by steady export flows, workaround shipping methods and alternative payment deals. How long this can continue is uncertain as stricter controls and global price swings keep shifting the ground.

Still, such a heavy reliance on oil exports brings real risks of its own. Some sectors already lost about half their revenue, and earnings could easily fall further during periods of oversupply or shifts in international politics. Analysts caution that if this level of reliance continues, and if investment at home and progress in technology keep falling behind, Russia’s long-term development may be seriously undermined.

Pivot to Asian and Non-Western Markets

Because of sanctions, Russia had to rethink where it trades. Europe was mostly closed off, so Moscow started looking harder at Asia, Turkey, the Gulf states and parts of Africa too. By 2023, the trade between China, India and Russia was reported at about US$ 452 billion. Out of that, China alone bought close to US$ 129 billion, mostly fuel and raw materials. Turkey and a few others stepped in as well, selling Russia things it suddenly could not buy from the West and helping with shipping routes that were cut off.

Settlements are now happening more often in yuan and rupees, which has given Russia some breathing space from US dollar pressure. That shift ties in with its long-running talk of “de-dollarization,” even if in practice it only partly works. To back this up, Russia leans more on groupings like BRICS or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). They are not perfect replacements for Western markets, but they do offer at least some space for trade and maybe technology.

After the first slump right after the invasion, Chinese exports to Russia bounced back in a big way. Cars, electronics, heavy machinery, all of it began flowing again. By 2022 and especially 2023 the trade levels were actually higher than before, despite Western pressure. Russian officials keep pointing to this rebound as proof that sanctions are not working. For them, this partnership is not just a shield, it is also a story they use to show that Russia still has friends and options.

Domestic Economic Adaptations

Russia increased import substitution and support for indigenous production in response to supply chain disruptions and a declining number of international partners. In an effort to lessen reliance on imported components and technology, state-driven investments have focused on industries ranging from food processing and agricultural to automotive and aerospace. Between 2022 and 2023, the proportion of imported inputs from sanctioning nations decreased by about half, a significant reorganisation made possible by forced innovation and regulatory improvements.

With increased spending in R&D particularly for dual-use civilian and military technology, technological self-reliance has become state policy. The military-industrial sector had a boom throughout the war producing more artillery, aeroplanes, drones, and transport vehicles to support activities on the battlefield.

Grey markets and parallel imports which accounted for $20 billion in imports in 2022 alone and helped sustain retail inventories and some industrial supplies, were officially legalised as short-term ways to get over Western regulations. As domestic industry grows stronger, Russia has recently tightened regulations on parallel imports reducing their scope. The government demonstrated a long-term commitment to this policy by allocating 27.6 billion rubles for the aerospace sector’s maximum import substitution for 2025–2027.

Socio-Economic Pressures and Challenges

Behind the official talk of resilience, daily life in Russia is getting harder. Inflation climbed to nearly 10% a year, pushed up by higher wages, labour shortages and constant war spending. Prices of basic food and household items jumped in double digits. Borrowing also got more costly when the Central Bank raised rates to try and keep inflation down. Both ordinary people and policymakers worry that the economy may slide into stagflation, that mix of high prices with weak growth.

The labour crunch has only deepened. Mobilisation, battlefield deaths, and the flight of young professionals have left serious gaps. By 2024 businesses were hiring more retirees and even teenagers just to keep running. Births fell to a record low while deaths went up. Estimates suggest close to a million people left the country in the year after the invasion, many of them young and skilled, which only makes it harder for Russia to innovate or grow in the long term.

At the same time inequality has widened. Wealthy elites, thanks to government contracts and the takeover of assets left by Western firms, managed to protect or even expand their fortunes. The middle class instead faces shrinking incomes and more uncertainty. Official media keeps stressing nationalism and stability, which does help maintain some public morale. But surveys show that as costs keep rising, more Russians are quietly doubtful about the future.

Conclusion

The war with Ukraine has a significant impact on Russia’s economic policy, even though it is not totally subservient to the continuing military action. Due to the oligarchic system, corruption, delays in state investment programs, lack of reform, and years of reliance on hydrocarbon sales for state funding, the war has also made Russia’s structural economic issues worse.

In addition to attempting to maintain its war effort by controlling internal imbalances, Russia is stepping up its communication campaigns to present the country’s economy as robust in spite of sanctions. However, is Russia’s economy really as robust as its authorities say, or are growing problems starting to seriously threaten the government?

While Russia’s adaptation has forestalled outright collapse enabled by the reorientation toward Asia, legalization of parallel imports, aggressive import substitution, and fiscal stimulus, these are measures of survival, not transformative growth. Resilience may be real in the short term, but as Western sanctions tighten, military spending strains the budget, and brain drain divests the future fundamental problems increasingly threaten Russia’s long-term prosperity and stability.

About the Author

Aditi Sharma has recently completed her Master’s in Geopolitics and International Relations, from Manipal Academy of Higher Education, building a strong academic foundation in global affairs. She has previously interned at the Vivekananda International Foundation and is passionate about International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Journalism. Her core interests lie in Indian National Security, Defence, Counterterrorism, and West Asian Studies. She is committed to continuous learning and aims to contribute meaningfully to public and academic discourse.

Link-17 of the Pakistan Air Force

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By: Sanskriti Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Representation of Link-17: source Author

When we think about air power we may think about fighter aircraft, missiles, advanced air warfare technologies or systems. But one of the most important contributors to an air force’s operational capability is not something readily visible as a weapon or otherwise, but information. The capability to produce, process, and disseminate information quickly, efficiently, and in near-real time will usually be the determining factor on an air operation’s success. And this is often done via data link. It was with this in mind that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) understands its data link system, Link-17.

Sometimes characterized as the “digital backbone” of the PAF, Link-17 is not a fighter, or a weapon system, but an invisible link to connect all the elements of the air combat systems and their environments. Understanding what Link-17 is, the rationale for its development, and how it enhances the military defense capability of Pakistan gives us a greater perspective of warfare as it relates to modern South Asia.

What is Link-17?

Link-17 is an indigenous data link designed by Pakistan with specifications that cater to its unique operational needs. It is fundamentally a secure communication system that connects various platforms – fighter aircraft, airborne early warning systems, ground stations, and naval, in a manner that they can communicate with each other in real time.

To illustrate this concept, think of a cricket game in which players are present on the field but cannot listen to the captain. In a cricket game, every player may have talent, but without being ‘captained’ and coordinated, run as a functioning team.  Link-17 is the voice of the captain and ensures that all the “players” in the air battle – the pilots, the command centre, the radars and the ground and support units, know what’s going on and execute their next moves together in the moment.

Before Link-17, Pakistan used to depend partly on imported data link systems and partly on less integrated communication strategies. However, modern day warfare prompted Pakistan to develop a secure, bespoke solution that was uniquely thwarts development and minimized chances of jamming or interception. Link-17 was to be that solution.

How Does Link-17 work in the PAF?

Link-17 connects all significant aerial assets of the Pakistan Air Force into one network. This article will describe the role of Link-17 in simple terms.

Fighter Jets: Fighter jets like the JF-17 Thunder, F-16s, and Mirage III/5 (upgraded) can instantly transition information to each other about enemy aircraft whereabouts, or where newly reported radar coverage, and missile threats are located. Where the fighter jets might be limited to talking on a radio (which can be slow, and intercepted), Link-17 would be able to pass data produced from the fighter jets in a digital environment, and securely.

Airborne Early Warning and Control: The Pakistan Air Force has the majority of airborne vigilance in terms of airborne early warning on the Saab Erieye and ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle. Unlike traditional airborne radars, these advanced technologies assimilate data while they are providing airborne address recognition, staying well out of reach of ground-based radar systems. With Link-17 if the situational awareness picture of these airborne positions is sent directly and instantaneously into the cockpits of fighter jets, they will be able to have increased awareness of the air battle.

Ground Command and Control: With Link-17, ground command and control (ground-based operations rooms) will be able to track the entire air battle, share inputs for pilots and make new strategies mid-air.

Joint Operations: Thinking more futuristically, Link-17 could standardize for naval assets, and army units which should allow for future joint mission pre-planning, where all of Pakistan’s military branches communicated in real time.

Technical Features in Simple Language

So, in summary, here are the main features that make Link-17 such a potent system without getting lost in unnecessary jargon.

Secure Messaging: Whatever you say over Link-17 is encrypted, so it is extremely difficult for a potential enemy to listen in or deny your ability to use the link.

Real-Time Data Sharing: Any information from the enemy aircraft position, speed, altitude, and movement is forwarded in real-time.

Scalable: Link-17 can expand to add new platforms as they enter service into Pakistan’s inventory.

Interoperable: Link-17 was specifically designed to be used, for the first time, in both Western-exchange aircraft and Chinese-origin aircraft, especially important given the diversity of the PAF.

Comparison: Link-17 vs. Link-16

It is understandable to look to comparison: how does Pakistan’s Link-17 stack up against the more well-known NATO network, Link-16?

Link-16 is older, in common use by US and allies, and tested in literally millions of operations. Link-16 is one of the purported gold standards of tactical data links.

Link-17 as a newer and untested system, is developed in consideration of Pakistan’s geography, strategic requirements, and mix of aircraft.

One main benefit for Pakistan is that independence is an option. In the event of a falling out of relations with NATO, NATO countries could deny access to Link-16, or withhold upgrades and added features. Link-17 is self-reliant and thus will not be vulnerable to this (albeit unlikely) scenario. Let it be noted that Link-17 may not (yet) have the extent of the worldwide exchange that Link-16 allows, but for regional assessments, it should provide more than adequate capability.

Strategic Importance in South Asia

The incorporation of Link-17 is more than a technological advancement—it carries strategic significance in the security environment of South Asia. In the event of warfare with India, information dominance would be key—the side that is able to “see first, decide first, act first” will be the side which prevails. Link-17 provides for Pakistan to close that gap.

It enhances Pakistan’s ability to wage Beyond Visual Range (BVR) engagements, where pilots may not even see the enemy aircraft with their eyes—but have data and radars to direct munitions from much greater distances.

It also increases survivability, as multiple assets can warn each other of threats such as enemy missiles and offers an increased potential to avoid surprise. Put simply, Link-17 magnifies the value of each aircraft in the PAF, allowing for the effective coordinated use of even older jets.

Challenges and Limitations

No system is without imperfections, and Link-17 has similar issues:

Cyber Security Risks: This includes the risk of adversaries hacking, or operations in the space of electronic warfare or hacking.

Dependency on integration: Each platform in the PAF must inter-operate for Link-17 to reach its potential. This is progressively more difficult as there may be older aircraft, that need enhancements costing significant resources.

Continuous Modernization: Technology is changing daily, and Link-17 must change. It can’t stand still while its adversaries keep improving capabilities.

The Road Ahead: Future of Link-17

Link-17 will undoubtedly have increased relevance in the coming years, as Pakistan moves towards 5th generation warfare. Future developments could include:

Integration with drones and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), greater integration with naval and ground forces for true joint operations and enhanced integration of artificial intelligence to filter and organize vast quantities of data emanating from the battlefield.

It is clear that as we learn more about Pakistan’s current work on next-generation fighter projects and the growth and expansion of its drone fleet, Link-17 will be the invisible glue that connects these capabilities into an enormous operational force.

Conclusion

Air power has moved beyond just the fastest jet or a lethal missile. Information is power in the modern battlefield. The Pakistan Air Force’s Link-17 system proves this. By creating a secure, indigenous data link with the Chinese help, it has given its pilots and commanders a tool that could matter greatly in any future conflict.

Despite Pakistan Air Force possessing Link-17, during the 88-hour India-Pakistan Conflict in May 2025, about 20% of the PAF infrastructure was destroyed by the Indian Air Force. Pakistan needs to have a relook into its much-touted Link-17.

Role of Electronic Warfare in India-Pakistan Conflict 2025

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By: Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

India-Pakistan Conflict 2025: source Internet

The recent confrontation between India and Pakistan in May 2025 marked a watershed moment in South Asian military doctrine, demonstrating how Electronic Warfare (EW) has fundamentally transformed conventional conflict dynamics between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Operation Sindoor, launched by India on May 7, 2025, in response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack of April 22, 2025, which claimed 26 civilian lives, showcased the critical role of electromagnetic spectrum control in modern warfare. This conflict represented the first major deployment of sophisticated electronic warfare systems by both nations, establishing new paradigms for regional military engagement and revealing the growing importance of EW capabilities in determining battlefield outcomes.

 Electronic Warfare Systems Deployment

The escalation preceding the May 2025 conflict witnessed unprecedented deployment of electronic warfare assets along the India-Pakistan border. India positioned its flagship Samyukta electronic warfare system, a mobile integrated platform comprising 145 vehicles capable of covering an operational area of 150 kilometres by 70 kilometres. Developed jointly by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Bharat Electronics Limited, and the Indian Army’s Corps of Signals since 1994, the Samyukta system operates across the 1.5 megahertz to 40 gigahertz bandwidth, providing comprehensive surveillance, interception, direction finding, and jamming capabilities for both communication and radar signals.

Complementing the Samyukta deployment, India activated its Himshakti system, specifically designed for mountainous terrain operations along the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian Air Force’s Rafale squadrons brought additional electronic warfare capabilities through their integrated Système de Protection et d’Évitement des Conduites de Tir du Rafale (SPECTRA) systems, developed jointly by Thales Group and MBDA France. The SPECTRA suite provides comprehensive threat detection across infrared, radio frequency, and laser spectrums, incorporating phased array radar jammers and automated countermeasure deployment systems.

Pakistan responded by deploying Chinese-supplied electronic warfare systems along the border, including passive detection technologies and commercial-grade Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers designed to disrupt Indian precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial systems. The Pakistan Air Force’s J-10C fighter aircraft, equipped with advanced electronic warfare suites, represented a significant technological advancement in Pakistan’s EW capabilities, reportedly interfering with Indian Rafale control systems during pre-conflict positioning on April 29, 2025.

 Global Positioning System Jamming Operations

The electromagnetic warfare campaign intensified with extensive GPS jamming operations targeting critical navigation infrastructure. Indian electronic warfare units deployed high-frequency jammers along the western border, creating GPS-denied airspace affecting areas near Amritsar, Chandigarh, and Srinagar. These jammers demonstrated capability to interfere with multiple satellite navigation platforms, including the United States’ GPS, Russia’s GLONASS, and China’s Beidou systems, significantly degrading Pakistani military aircraft navigation and precision-strike capabilities.

The jamming operations forced Pakistani aircraft to rely on alternative navigation methods, reducing operational effectiveness of their precision-guided munitions, including the Babur cruise missile system. Commercial aviation also experienced significant disruption, with Pakistan International Airlines and other carriers reporting extended flight times due to GPS signal degradation, forcing route modifications that increased operational costs and fuel consumption by one to two hours per flight.

Cyber Electronic Warfare Integration

The May 2025 conflict marked the first instance where cyber warfare operations ran parallel to conventional military engagement between India and Pakistan. Pakistan launched comprehensive cyber operations targeting Indian digital infrastructure, with Indian assessments recording over 1.5 million cyberattacks since the Pahalgam incident, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, malware infiltrations, and GPS spoofing operations. Advanced Persistent Threat group APT-36, linked to Pakistani intelligence services, employed Crimson Remote Access Trojan malware specifically targeting Indian defense personnel and critical infrastructure.

Pakistan’s cyber operations successfully breached approximately 150 Indian networks, targeting government organizations, public sector companies, and military facilities. The attacks affected entities including the Bharatiya Janata Party website, Crime Research Investigation Agency systems, and databases belonging to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and the Indian Air Force. Pakistani operatives reportedly gained control of over 2,500 surveillance cameras across India and compromised sensitive databases including the Maharashtra Election Commission systems.

Indian cyber retaliation involved patriotic hacker groups conducting coordinated attacks against Pakistani digital infrastructure, targeting the Oil & Gas Development Company Limited, Federal Board of Revenue, and major banking institutions. However, India’s cyber response remained primarily defensive, focusing on network hardening and resilience rather than large-scale offensive operations, demonstrating a more restrained approach to cyber warfare engagement.

Precision Strike Electronic Countermeasures

The effectiveness of electronic warfare systems became evident during India’s precision strike operations targeting Pakistani airbases on May 10, 2025. Indian forces successfully employed Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations, utilizing Israeli-built Harop loitering munitions equipped with electronic support measures to identify and neutralize Pakistani air defense radar systems. The Harop systems, immune to GNSS jamming due to their autonomous target acquisition capabilities, successfully destroyed air defense installations in Lahore and other strategic locations.

Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defense systems, including HQ-9 and LY-80 platforms, demonstrated limited effectiveness against India’s electronic warfare-supported strikes. The air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles employed during Operation Sindoor utilized sophisticated hybrid guidance systems, briefly activating radio frequency seekers for target acquisition before switching to inertial navigation to maintain stealth and avoid electronic countermeasures. Former BrahMos Aerospace Chief Executive Officer Dr. Sudhir Kumar Mishra confirmed that the missile’s design renders soft-jamming attempts ineffective due to the extremely narrow window for electronic interference.

The BrahMos missiles’ advanced Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) capabilities, combined with their Mach 2.8 to 3.0 speed and terrain-hugging flight profiles, proved highly resistant to Pakistani electronic warfare systems. Satellite imagery confirmed successful strikes on six major Pakistani airbases, including PAF Base Mushaf in Sargodha, Nur Khan Airbase, and facilities in Karachi, demonstrating the limitations of Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied electronic warfare countermeasures against India’s precision-guided munitions.

Air Combat Electronic Warfare Dynamics

The aerial engagement phase of the conflict revealed sophisticated electronic warfare tactics employed by both air forces. Pakistan’s J-10C aircraft, equipped with KLJ-10A Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars and Data Link 17 communications systems, demonstrated effective use of electronic attack capabilities against Indian aircraft. Pakistani sources claimed successful jamming of Indian communication systems and sensor degradation, utilizing radar-off tactics and jam-resistant voice and data sharing capabilities.

The Pakistan Air Force’s integration of Chinese PL-15E air-to-air missiles with advanced electronic warfare systems reportedly achieved tactical success against Indian platforms. However, disputed claims regarding the downing of Indian Rafale aircraft highlight the challenges in accurately assessing electronic warfare effectiveness during high-intensity combat operations. French parliamentary inquiries into alleged SPECTRA system failures during the conflict underscore the evolving challenges facing Western electronic warfare systems against Chinese-developed countermeasures.

India’s multi-layered air defense systems, including S-400 Triumf, Barak 8 Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MRSAM), and indigenous Akash systems, successfully intercepted Pakistani drone and missile attacks on May 8, 2025. The integrated Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems grid employed jamming and spoofing techniques to neutralize 77 Pakistani drones during the conflict, demonstrating the effectiveness of coordinated electronic warfare defense systems.

Strategic Implications and Future Developments

The May 2025 conflict established electronic warfare as a critical domain for future India-Pakistan military engagements. Both nations demonstrated significant investment in indigenous and imported EW capabilities, with China’s role in supporting Pakistan’s electronic warfare modernization becoming increasingly apparent. The conflict validated the importance of electromagnetic spectrum control in enabling precision strikes while degrading enemy capabilities.

India’s Defense Acquisition Council approved procurement worth US$ 8.0 billion in August 2025, including 110 additional BrahMos missiles and 87 indigenous Medium Altitude Long Endurance armed drones, reflecting lessons learned from the electronic warfare-intensive conflict. Pakistan’s reported negotiations for 40 fifth-generation J-35 stealth aircraft and HQ-19 surface-to-air missile systems indicate continued reliance on Chinese electronic warfare technology to counter Indian advantages. The conflict demonstrated that electronic warfare systems have become force multipliers equivalent to traditional military assets, with the ability to determine engagement outcomes through spectrum control rather than numerical superiority. The integration of cyber operations with electronic warfare created new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, requiring comprehensive defensive strategies addressing both domains simultaneously.

Conclusion

The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict marked a paradigm shift toward electronic warfare-centric military operations, where control of the electromagnetic spectrum proved as decisive as conventional firepower. Both nations’ deployment of sophisticated jamming systems, precision-guided munitions with electronic countermeasures, and integrated cyber-electronic warfare capabilities demonstrated the evolution of South Asian military doctrine. The conflict highlighted the critical importance of indigenous electronic warfare development, as foreign-supplied systems faced significant operational limitations during high-intensity engagements. Future military planning in the region must prioritize electronic warfare capabilities, spectrum management, and cyber-electronic integration to maintain operational effectiveness in increasingly complex electromagnetic environments. The lessons learned from this conflict will likely influence global military procurement decisions and electronic warfare system development for years to come.

The Xi’an Consensus? China’s Blueprint for a new Eurasian Order

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By: Prof. Bawa Singh, Anjana VS and Jay Koche

President Xi Jinping: source Internat

China and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have signed the Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation in June 2025. The treaty is considered as a landmark agreement that formalized Beijing’s strategic depth across Eurasia. Literally and linguistically, the treaty emphasized harmony and mutual respect for each other, but its subtext has concealed a deeper ambition i.e., institutionalization of China’s leadership in a region that was long dominated by Russia and contested by the West.

The evolving regional framework that is being dubbed as the “Xi’an Consensus” soon after the inaugural 2023 summit in Xi’an. It marks a shift from transactional diplomacy to a rules-based, multilateral architecture covering infrastructure, security, and soft power. It is being perceived as China’s most ambitious attempt, yet to reshape the regional norms and embed its influence through legal, economic, and cultural means.

Strategic Depth

China has been emerging as hegemon in in the economic region architecture. The  China–Central Asia trade had reached to a phenomenal record level to the amount of US$ 94.8 billion in 2024, from just US$ 460 million in 1992. In the just first five months of 2025 alone, China and Central Asia trade surged to the amount of US$ 39.8 billion, with Kazakhstan accounting for nearly half. Concomitantly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed the region from a post-Soviet periphery into a Chinese backyard and logistical artery, linking China to Europe. Chinese  direct investment stock in Central Asia reached to the amount of  US$ 17 billion in 2024. The investment is growing with a focus on critical minerals and green energy. The same further strengthened by projects like the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which broke ground in December 2024 and anticipated that it would cut freight time to Europe by 10 days.

The Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation (2025) has institutionalized s the BRI through the legally binding multilateralism. The treaty has offered to China a regulatory anchor and geopolitical firewall. It includes clauses on non-interference, dispute resolution, and security cooperation, reducing risks of instability that could derail infrastructure corridors. China has expanded its geostrategic footprints by some measures like joint counterterrorism drills with Tajikistan and security assistance to Kyrgyzstan. These measures signal a quiet entrenchment   into domains, which were once dominated by Russia. The establishment of China–Central Asia Secretariat in 2023, now the same has been coordinating the  regional multilateral engagements with China covering the trade, education, and climate resilience.

Debt, Distrust, and Strategic Exclusivity

Without an iota of doubt, geostrategic footprints of China have been phenomenally growing in the Central Asian region. On the contrary, yet the Xi’an Consensus is not without challenges, contradictions and criticism. The critics have been highlighting the Chinese  debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In these countries, the Chinese debt accounts for 40% and 27% of GDP respectively. Concurrently, the environmental concerns are spreading their tentacles. The  BRI projects often bypassing and ignoring the environmental safeguards and exacerbating ecological stresses. Public discontentment is also growing. The protests against the Chinese investment and projects are frequent, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan due to  local distrust stemming from land loss, labour practices, and opaque governance. Critics argue that Article 3 of the China–Central Asia Treaty may strategically exclude  Central Asian states from alliances like Westerns Alliances  limiting their foreign policy flexibility. While this framed as non-alignment, but the analysts warned it as a China-centric regional framework.

Moreover, compared to other external powers, China has emerged as the dominant external actor in Central Asia, with trade reaching a record US$ 94.8 billion in 2024, as compared to Russia (US$ 18–20 billion) the EU (US$ 15–17 billion) and the US (US$ 5–6 billion).  Similarly, China is sharing strong connectivity through projects like the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Khorgos dry port. China’s strategic influence has institutionalized through the China–Central Asia Secretariat and the Xi’an Consensus.  Although,Moscow retaining the cultural and linguistic influences, but its economic and strategic primacy have been shrinking. Some analysts at CEPA and CNAS highlighted that  that Russia has learned to accept and accommodate China’s rise in the region.

Realizing the geopolitical and geostrategic concerns, the Central Asian countries also have not been remained passive. The CARs are pursuing multi-vector diplomacy, engaging with major external powers such as the India, US, EU, Japan etc.

At last, it is argued that the Xi’an Consensus is not a formal alliance, rather it’s a blueprint. China has been expanding its geostrategic tentacles through the connectivity, diplomacy, debt, infrastructure, and soft power means. China has embedded into the multi-dimensional fabric of Central Asia. China’s these strengths proving to be hedges against Russian security, historical and cultural influences.   On the other hand, it’s a mix of opportunities and constraints for the CARs. Concomitantly, it is a reminder for Russia that its multilateral influences and CARs as backyard, once for always cannot be taken for granted, rather, now it must be revisited and reframed. Thus, new Eurasian order is emerging with the Chinese influence gaining and waning Russian with zero sum and positive sum game, being built, bargained, and quietly signed into permanence.

The US-China Tango: Rise of G3 and Trouble for Taiwan

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

USA, Russia & China’s flags: source Internet

Two contrasting statements by the Donald Trump Administration in just a span of over five years, pretty much explains the tough position Taiwan finds itself in, as China’s war for Taiwan is clearly visible on the horizon.

One, as the Covid-19 pandemic was unleashing its full force and fury globally in 2020 with deaths being reported by the dime and dozen every second, the 45th US President Donald Trump posted on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) on March 17, 2020 terming the Corona virus causing this deadly pandemic as the “Chinese Virus”. China took strong objection to this statement and the relations between the USA and China nose-dived for the balance of Trump’s Presidential tenure that ended in January 2021.

Two, on April 12, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the Defence Secretary of the 47th US President Donald Trump’s administration shocked the world when in a candid statement he admitted that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy the 11 US Navy aircraft carriers in just 20 minutes. He further added that in every war game conducted in the US Military, the Americans always loose to the Chinese. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios.

No wonder as Donald Trump after getting elected as the US President on November 05, 2024, was briefed on various operational and security aspects of America including the military capabilities of USA’s main adversary China, before being inaugurated as the 47th US President on January 20, 2025, invited the Chinese President Xi Jinping for his inauguration ceremony in Washington D.C. This Presidential invite was amongst the few extended to world leaders known as strong allies of Donald Trump that included the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and the Argentinian President Javier Milei amongst the specially selected.

Though Xi Jinping did not attend the inauguration but he sent China’s Vice President Han Zheng for the inauguration. The Presidential invite for Xi Jinping marked a turning point in Donald Trump’s change in attitude towards China in just five years from calling out China as culpable for the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic to inviting the Chinese President for his inauguration.

The US-China tango had just started and as time would reveal, Donald Trump would have a soft attitude towards China as he spared no other nation, apart from Russia, in the pursuit of “Making America Great Again”.

“Making America Great Again” also called MAGA, the slogan that caught the American voter’s fancy in the run-up to the US Presidential elections last year, gave Donald Trump resounding victory in the elections though almost every media house, think-tank and political analyst in the USA had predicted Donald Trump’s defeat to Kamala Harris, the Democrat Presidential nominee. After Donald Trump refused to have his next Presidential Debate with Kamala Harris as the solitary Presidential Debate with her had ended as a disaster for Trump, it was a forgone conclusion that Donald Trump would never return to the White House as America’s President.

But the American voter saw merit in MAGA as it entailed getting back manufacturing to the USA and Trump’s promise on not taking part in any war/conflict in the world, and elected Donald Trump as the USA’s 47th President with a thumping majority.

Within a few weeks of settling down as America’s 47th President, Donald Trump unleashed the Tariff War on April 09, 2025. And each day the world would wake up to new set of tariffs being announced by President Trump. So much so, that within a few weeks, one lost count of what tariffs were imposed on which nation. The media and social media were in a frenzy discussing Trump’s Tariff War.

But two nations remained unfazed – Russia & China. The messaging was clear as events would unravel soon.

China struck back at the USA by imposing tariffs on American imports. The Chinese Embassy in the USA retorted that China was prepared for any war with the USA, be it a tariff war, a trade war or any other type of war and that China was ready to fight till the end.

Russia too struck back on August 05, 2025 by calling the American tariffs as ‘neocolonial’ and accused Washington of attempting to maintain its hegemony.

But beneath these strong statements, neither China nor Russia were affected by the US tariffs as Donald Trump had exempted major trading commodities of Russia and China from tariffs.

The bonhomie visible between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin during the Alaska summit in Anchorage on August 15, 2025 and the US President’s statement that he was planning to visit China later this year, brings to fore that there is nothing amiss between the three Superpowers.

The USA, Russia & China have in an unwritten pact decided not to meddle in each other’s domain. The world has been unofficially divided into three regions with each Superpower deciding not to transgress in the other’s domain.

The first loser of this unofficial pact between the three Superpowers will be Taiwan as the next major war the world is going to witness is China’s war on Taiwan.

On February 03, 2023, William Burns, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA officially tasked with gathering, processing and analysing national security information from around the world, said in a statement that USA and China will go to war over Taiwan in 2027.

And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

In March 2025, the American Portrait Survey found that 59.6% Taiwanese citizens do not consider the United States trustworthy. The Brookings Institution Report released on April 25, 2025 noted that 60.9% of the Taiwanese disagreed with the statement that “Taiwan is safer than before with Trump as President”.

The Taiwanese are absolutely correct. On July 27, 2025, Donald Trump’s administration denied permission to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te to stop in New York enroute to Central America after Beijing raised objections with Washington about the visit.

Incidentally, in 2023 the Joe Biden administration had allowed the then-Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to stop in New York on her way to Belize and Guatemala in South America.

Reminiscences of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

Perhaps the reason behind the Donald Trump administration not allowing the Taiwanese President for the stopover in New York was The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis which began in a rather unmilitary background when President Lee Teng-hui, the then President of Taiwan during whose currency as the Taiwanese President, the martial law ended and Taiwan became a democracy, decided to accept an invitation in 1995 from his alma mater, the Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, USA, to deliver a speech on “Taiwan’s Democratisation Experience”.

China vehemently opposed USA giving a visa to President Lee Teng-hui as by that time USA in accordance with the One China principle was diplomatically recognising China and not Taiwan.

However, the US Congress passed a concurrent resolution, allowing the issuance of visa to President Lee Teng-hui and the Taiwanese President visited USA on June 09-10, 1995 to deliver the speech. China was infuriated and branded the Taiwanese president as a traitor attempting to “split China”.

Jiang Zemin, the Third Paramount Leader of China, extremely furious and angry over the Taiwanese President’s visit to USA, ordered the mobilisation of PLA and directed PLA to conduct missiles tests on July 07, 1995. The missile tests began on July 21, 1995 and lasted a few days with the sole aim of intimidating Taiwan.

Live ammunition military exercises were conducted by China from August 15-25, 1995, followed by naval amphibious assault exercises. USA immediately responded to China’s military overtures by sending two aircraft carrier groups in the vicinity of Taiwan – the USS McClusky and USS Nimitz in December 1995. On March 08, 1996 US President Bill Clinton announced that the Carrier Strike Group 5, would deploy in international waters near Taiwan. However, undeterred by all these American naval deployments, China continued its live ammunition firing exercises.

On March 11, 1996 USA despatched its Carrier Strike Group 7 from the Persian Gulf to the international waters near Taiwan. With two US Navy Carrier Strike Groups stationed near Taiwan, China had no option and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis ended on March 23, 1996 in a whimper with no combat taking place between China and Taiwan.

But militarily China has expanded manifold since 1996. Being the global leader today in 57 out of the 64 critical technologies that exist today and boasting of the world’s biggest navy apart from the distinction of being the only military in the world to have declared its capacity and capability to fight any war in the world in all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space in 2014, America knows that militarily the odds favour China exponentially.

The statement of Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary on April 12, 2025 mentioned earlier in the article, needs no over-emphasis.

In the event of China attacking Taiwan, the island nation will have no ally to bank upon as clearly the military support of the USA is no longer assured. The other littoral nations of the South China Sea be it Japan, South Korea or the Philippines have very small militaries to assist Taiwan in the face of the Chinese aggression.

G3: An idea whose time has come

After China became the world’s third biggest economy in 2007, American intelligence agencies started sensing that China was slowly becoming assertive. Going by the current rate of the economic progress that China was experiencing, it was clear that in a couple of years China would become the world’s second biggest economy, which it eventually did in 2010.

As China’s economic rise would increase, so would its military prowess. On June 01, 2008, C. Fred Bergsten, the noted American economist in an article in Foreign Affairs proposed a grouping of three nations/organisations which at that time were economically & militarily powerful – the USA, European Union and China. Though, no name was mentioned for the proposed grouping.

Russia was not included in this grouping as the erstwhile USSR had broken up into 15 nations in 1991 and in the intervening period till 2008, Russia, the biggest nation to emerge after the breakup of the USSR, was not seen as the successor of the erstwhile USSR as the claimant to the Superpower status. However, exactly two months after the article had been published, Russia invaded Georgia on August 01, 2008 and thereby started Russia’s accession as a Superpower and with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia had firmly established herself as a Superpower.

The three Superpowers of the contemporary times seem to have informally constituted the G3 or the Group of Three, wherein no Superpower is at crossroads with the other two. The Russian-Chinese strong friendship is well known and after Donald Trump has been inaugurated as America’s 47th President, the US too isn’t at crossroads with Russia & China. Thus, the formal date for the informal G3 grouping can be assumed as January 20, 2025, the day of inauguration of Donald Trump’s second Presidency.

The world is now in a precarious position where all the three Superpowers have their own domains of operations and influence and will not interfere in the domains of the other two.

A case in point is India. After President Barack Obama announced the East Asia Strategy also known as the Pivot to Asia strategy on December 21, 2011, the relations between the USA and India grew closer. In the Indo-Pacific region, only two countries ie the USA and India are in a position to check the growing aggressiveness of China, if the two nations combine militarily. As the Indian-American friendship was deepening, so were the Chinese concerns of India’s rise increasing.

But with the way President Trump has called out India since his inauguration in January this year, the US-Indian strategic partnership to counter China is over. In his 100-minute speech on January 20, 2025, President Trump praised Pakistan but did not mention India even once.

During the February 12-13, 2025 visit of Prime Minster Narendra Modi to the USA, when the topic of persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh was broached upon, Trump left it onto India to handle. Ideally, the US President words in calling out Bangladesh for the persecution of Hindus since August 05, 2024 would have had great weight, but it didn’t happen this way.

On July 30, 2025, Donald Trump called India a “dead economy” and on August 27, 2025, India had been tariffed the maximum in the world with 50% tariffs imposed.

Clearly, the US has stepped back from the American-Indian strategic friendship that has been so solidly built in the last 14 years. And with Trump having three and half years in office left, it is unlikely that the US-Indian partnership will come back to the pre-January 2025 levels.

And this is exactly what China wanted. China is set to wage the war on Taiwan in 2027. With the strong Indian-American strategic friendship that existed till January this year, China knew that it is no position to counter the two-front war scenario with Taiwan on its eastern borders and India on its western borders.

Now, with the US weaning away from India, China is confident that its western borders will be safe when it attacks Taiwan in 2027 as India doesn’t have an aggressive defence policy, and the Indo-American strategic relationship is over.

USA has offered Taiwan on a platter to China. The US-China tango that is no longer under wraps any more, is sure trouble for Taiwan. Russia will be a mute spectator when China invades Taiwan in 2027 as the depth of Russian-Chinese partnership has increased exponentially after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General cautioned the world on June 25, 2025 about the massive Chinese military buildup and potential for Taiwan invasion. Last year, Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command on October 28, 2024 stated that China is conducting the largest military buildup in world history.

Lyndon B Johnson’s quote “Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or lose” holds a deep meaning for Taiwan in specific and the World in general, as the fall of Taiwan will be disaster for democracy and rules-based world order.

After Taiwan, the next big military target for China will be the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh for which China will wage the two-front war jointly with Pakistan on India any time after 2030.

Taiwan has to be protected at all costs.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

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