By: Harshit Tokas, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Government of India’s strategic engagement with its neighboring countries, particularly those in the eastern region, reflects a proactive approach towards fostering both economic and political ties. At the center of this approach is the “Act East Policy,” aimed at establishing robust trade links with nations in the Far East. The Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project, a pivotal component of this policy, seeks to leverage the Kaladan River as a trade route, connecting Mizoram in India to the port city of Sittwe in Myanmar.

Economically, Mizoram, a state of India, has embarked on a transformative journey propelled by initiatives such as the New Land Use Policy (NLUP), strategically crafted to foster inclusive growth and alleviate poverty. The NLUP, gaining momentum with time, stands as a testament to the government’s commitment to strengthening monitoring systems, enhancing stakeholder training, and ensuring the efficient supply of inputs. Recognizing the pivotal role played by farmers and agricultural workers, the government has implemented various measures for their welfare, including the provision of agricultural machinery at subsidized rates. These efforts underscore Mizoram’s proactive stance in empowering its workforce and fostering sustainable economic development.

The Kaladan River, traversing along the Indo-Myanmar border in the northeastern region of India, presents a promising avenue for inland waterway transportation. Under this project, goods can be transported via inland waterway up to navigable points, with road transport filling in where navigation is impractical. This multimodal approach, integrating sea, inland water, road, and rail transport, is envisioned to facilitate efficient trade with eastern countries, particularly by easing the movement of goods to and from Mizoram and other northeastern states.

Recognizing the inadequacies in the transportation infrastructure and its crucial role in driving economic growth, the Government of India has accorded high priority to the development of the transportation sector. An agreement between the Governments of India and Myanmar underscores their commitment to developing a multimodal trade route, combining inland waterways and road transport, to enhance bilateral trade and regional connectivity.

The Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project encompasses two main segments: the inland waterway route from Sittwe to Kaletwa in Myanmar and the road link from Kaletwa to Lawngtlai town on NH-54 in Mizoram, India. The road segment within Mizoram, spanning approximately 99.830 kilometers, forms an integral part of this trade route. Notably, this project builds upon existing border trading points between India and Myanmar, facilitating the exchange of various commodities and contributing to the substantial growth in bilateral trade volumes.

Human resource development remains a key focus area for the government, as evidenced by initiatives such as the establishment of polytechnic institutes across various districts. By nurturing skilled talent and fostering a conducive learning environment, Mizoram is poised to harness its human capital effectively. Moreover, the Autonomous District Councils in Mizoram have played a pivotal role in resource mobilization and addressing the unique needs of their respective areas. The government’s sensitivity to these requirements underscores its commitment to inclusive development and decentralized governance.

Furthermore, India’s commitment to bolstering border trade with Myanmar is evidenced by its support for infrastructure development projects in Myanmar, including road communication, hydroelectric power, and hydrocarbon sector initiatives. These efforts underscore India’s broader objective of enhancing regional connectivity and fostering mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbors.

The feasibility study conducted by RITES Ltd. highlights the navigability of the Kaladan River up to Kaletwa in Myanmar, beyond which road transport becomes imperative due to shallow waters and frequent rapids. The proposed road link from Kaletwa to Lawngtlai in Mizoram is integral to the development of this multimodal trade route, serving as a vital artery for economic integration and regional trade facilitation.

Governor Purushothaman’s expression of gratitude to stakeholders for their contributions to peace, harmony, and development encapsulates Mizoram’s collective ethos. As the state marches forward, it remains cognizant of the need to integrate with the national mainstream while safeguarding its distinct identity and interests. The Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project, in particular, holds the promise of not only enhancing connectivity within Mizoram but also fostering regional integration and economic growth.

In conclusion, the Kaladan Multimodal Transport Project represents a significant milestone in India’s efforts to deepen its engagement with neighboring countries and tap into the economic potential of the region. By leveraging multimodal transportation infrastructure, India aims to enhance trade flows, promote socio-economic development, and strengthen regional cooperation, thereby contributing to overall peace and prosperity in the region.

By: Seetal Patra, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Munich Security Conference (MSC) saw its inception in the fall of 1963, then called, Internationale Wehrkunde-Begegnung. The MSC boasts Munich to be an independent venue for the purposes of policy makers and the experts to have a platform and discuss on important, pressing, and constructive decisions affecting the security diaspora of the world. The year of its inception, that is the era of the 1960s, saw a lot many world events apart from the ones that hampered and devastated the Western nations, or the Western driven narrative, perspective, and probably propaganda. But a basic google search about the world events in 1960s gives us the list of happenings including, JFK assassination, civil rights legislation, Vietnam War, construction of Berlin wall, and the moon landing. The era when the Western led discourse was busy latching onto the events of the Cold war era, numerous events did happen in other parts of the world too.

West Asia, has remained on fire since early 1900s, and continues till date too. India saw three major wars in 1947, 1962, and again in 1965. The 1965 war was playing out in our backyard, with massive humanitarian crisis, but the Westerners led MSC has dampened the discussion as a not so worthwhile security issue. While in Africa, the cold war had successfully knocked the doors of African continent, which has suffered in the hands of colonizers far more disproportionately and ruthlessly. Its famously, referred to as Cordier and the 1960 Congo crisis. But these issues have often remained a mere footnote in the research discourse of the Munich Conference. The Global South in the most millennial terms can be termed as a victim of nepotism. The global nepotism of well settled colonizers, who looted us, and then fended off their capitalistic goals via the tinted glass of rapid development.

In the first decades of the conference, the audience was relatively small, and this was on purpose and by design, not exceeding a few dozen people. It had started off as the venue where the German participants used to meet their counterparts, along with their allies including the USA, and the NATO member states. With this, the gathering has accorded itself the tag of “transatlantic family meeting.” As the dubbed name goes, the debates also concentrated on Western policy within the overarching framework of Cold War confrontations.

The Munich Security Conference is considered as one of the elite security gatherings, often referred to as the Davos of Security Discourse. In the recent decades, the discussions are no more huss about whether the world can still be boxed out into rigid cabinets of east and west. The world has transitioned from G2 to G7 to G20 (21). When the world had precarious terms to itself, and we were having conversations about the potential of a World War III can only be because of dearth of water, we have already seen and still toiling to the harsh realities of Russia-Ukraine war, and the Isarel-Palestine conflict. These are the security conflicts, but the UN seems to be in its waning potential to handle the world security and rules-based order getting slowly ripped apart, while MSC is proving to be nothing more than a mere sequela to the UN.

But the fact of the matter is, do we really have a rigid definition of rules-based world order to be followed anymore?

The MSC is a method of power getting represented by the way of a selected discourse. These power relations are maintained by the means of ideologies. And it is believed that, these are often one-sided perspectives or worldviews that are related to mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations. To put into perspective, Chilton has somewhere convincingly pointed out the three strategic functions of the political language. They are, coercion, legitimization or delegitimization and finally representation or misrepresentation. The levers of legitimization and delegitimization bring to the fore the discussions on positive and negative self-representation. While the nuances of representation and misrepresentation thrust upon the necessities of controlling the information and hence the control on the discourse.

One of the massive flaws of this MSC led discourse, is that the speakers choose on the speeches with a very thinly crafted agenda to be represented. It would not be wrong to compare the MSC with that of the obsolete campaigning that of the UNSC, which is barely successful in bringing any disruptive solutions to today’s turmoil laden world order. The approach of social constructivism, clearly posits that the social reality is partly what we try and make out of it. MSC being the partner of the NATO has mostly concentrated on the transatlantic security policy and European defence. To bring certain factors to the board showcasing certain world events which has changed the course of the world. And in all these NATO has been the frontrunner. Some of the most prominent events include the bombing of Yugoslavia, the invasion of Iraq, the ruined statehood of Libya, the unlawful military interference in Syria, and not forgetting the debacle in Afghanistan.

India has been able to push forward its agenda only now, with one of the most vociferous External Affairs Minister on duty. It has been decades that India has been reclaiming and making its voice heard as the nation is confidently grappling onto the most rapidly growing economy. Today India is denying to be bogged down by the West led narrative. But this does not signify that India is anti/non-West. We are the smart nationalists denying to be sitting on the fence. Our decision of buying oil from Russia, halting the exports of wheat, continuing to go with the decision of MSP for the crops, despite the pendency of disputes regarding the allegation of MSP being a trade distortive support (Amber Box Subsidy). It is always advised to make either or choices. It is always wise to not fall onto the trap of a third while standing imbedded to your stance. We choose to make choices that are in our self-interest. The frequent questioning of our stances in the forums like MSC, NATO, BBC, etc. is nothing, but the virtual bullying by these world forums to carry on with their age-old power discourses, balancing and rebalancing. Might as well I state, the bold decision of India purchasing Russian oil despite the sanctions has only helped keep the world trade in equilibrium and the Westerners definitely thankful, although within closed doors. So, the discourses like that of MSC are to be nothing but appreciative of India. It is India which is the pivot in balancing the world discourse. It is time for the redundant discussion panels to tilt a bit in all the four directions and figure out the realpolitik. How about MSC endorsing the values of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.” A food for thought for a renewed security discourse embracing the apathies of every stakeholder irrespective of Global South or North.

By: Aidamol Joseph, Research Analyst, GSDN

Argentina is a South American country located in the southern part of the continent. It is a federal republic with a presidential system of government. Argentina, officially the Argentine Republic, is one of Latin America’s largest economies and most stable democracies, but the country has struggled with political dysfunction and financial crisis in recent times. Far-right libertarian outsider Javier Milei has won presidential election on December 10, 2023. The presidential elections were deemed free and fair by domestic and international observers. Milei’s proposals, which included “blowing up” the central bank, won support with voters desperate for change amid an economy in crisis.

Riding the wave of voter anger with the political mainstream, Milei won by a larger margin than expected. He received approximately 44% for his rival, Peronist Economy Minister Sergio Masta. Mr. Milei’s victory is being seen as a victory for the far-right beyond Argentina. Significant political and economic changes is anticipated, and President Javier Milei has promised to refocus the nation’s foreign policy to prioritize closer ties with the West and the United States. This might also include Argentina cutting ties with China, it’s second largest trading partner, and downgrading the Mercosur trade union.

Argentina spent more than a century alternating between military and democratic administration following its independence from Spain in 1816. After a coup in 1943, army officer Juan Peron governed Argentina intermittently for the following thirty years. Since then, the nation’s politics have been controlled by his populist political theory, sometimes known as Peronism. Peron adopted a number of left-leaning measures while in government, nationalizing the central bank and a number of big businesses, increasing health and welfare benefits, and forging a partnership with organised labor unions. The military persisted in its intrusions despite Peron’s popularity, forcing him into exile in 1955 and outlawing the Peronist party for almost 20 years.

In an effort to rid the nation of potential left-wing dissidents, a new military junta known as the National Reorganization process came to power in 1976. Argentina’s political instability persisted into the 1990s, even after military control came to an end in 1983 with the election of president Raul Ricardo Alfonsin. Today the nation has achieved relative democratic stability. Argentina’s major political parties such as Justicialist party commonly known as Peronist’s founded in 1945 by Juan Domingo Peron, The Union Civica Radical (UCR) or Radical Civic Union, founded in 1891. New emerging political forces, like the Civic Coalition (CC) and the National Proposal (PRO) parties, are concentrated in the urban centers and are working to build national party structures.

Amid persistent economic and political instability, Argentina has sought to play a greater role on the international sphere, including in its relations with China, United states and Europe. Over the past 20 years, Beijing and Buenos Aires have greatly strengthened their trade relations; as a result, China is currently Argentina’s second-largest trading partner, behind Brazil. Argentina formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2022, a significant international infrastructure undertaking spearheaded by China. Chinese state-owned businesses have focused their foreign investment in Argentina’s infrastructure, telecoms and agriculture sectors in recent years. The state of domestic politics in Argentina has affected relations with the United States. Because of Peron’s socialist ideas and cold war neutrality, American authorities were frequently dissatisfied with him during the 20^th century and finally stopped providing help to Argentina. Additionally, Milei has made a point of being a staunch supporter of the United States and the West. As President, he turned down Fernandez’s request to join BRICS, the economic alliance that consists of China, South Africa, India, Brazil and Russia before it grew in early 2024. In terms of commerce, Argentina’s exports to the EU continue to be significant, with over $22.6 billion in goods exchanged in 2022. Additionally, European businesses make significant investments; as of 2022, they owned 44% of Argentina’s foreign investment stock.

When Javier Milei’s administration assumed power, the goal was to create a more market oriented, less government-controlled economy where economic growth would primarily come from private sector. His main goals for macroeconomic policy are to terminate monetary issuance to fund public spending by 2024 attain fiscal equilibrium. Milei has also called climate change a “socialist hoax”. Short term pain long term gain that was Milei’s motto that’s what he said he described himself as an anarcho-capitalist. Milei was upfront in his inaugural address on December 10, 2023, “Our country demands action-and immediate action” he said, saying that Argentina was at “the brink of its biggest crisis in history”.

At that time, annual inflation stood at 161 percent with 45 percent of the population living in poverty. Milei’s initial actions fulfilled his pledge to reduce the states size by implementing internal changes inside the executive branch. He reduced the number of ministers from eighteen to nine by executive order and decided not to extend the contracts of thousand public servants. In addition, Milei declared that by the end of 2023, public sector spending would have decreased by 5% GDP. He started implementing this target by reducing state fuel and transportation subsidies, postponing public work contracts, and doing away with regulations.

Luis Caputo, the minister of economy, declared that the Argentine currency would similarly devalue by 50%. On December 20, 2023, Milei declared an economic emergency. December also saw mass protests against the Milei’s government’s sprawling reforms, which included new restrictions on protests. Never before in modern Argentinian history has a mass strike been called less than seven weeks into a new presidency. The mass Confederation of Labor demanded a mass strike 45 days after the new government took office, against his “shock therapy”. Protestors held signs with the message “La patria no se vende” (the homeland is not for sale).

Argentina had already been suffering from record triple-digit-inflation when Milei took office on December 10. According to National Institute for Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), Argentina ended 2023 with annual inflation of 211.4 percent, the steepest rate in Latin America, surpassing even Venezuela. And Milei could face further challenges to his reforms. However, despite the heavy presence of security forces, the demonstrations which the Milei’s administration claimed were intended to “destabilize” the government generally proceeded peacefully. Milei has sacked thousands of public sector employees as part of his aggressive campaign to slash state spending.

The government on April 3, 2024, announced that it had cut 15,000 jobs, triggering massive protests in the capital Buenos Aires and nearby cities. The terminated workers say their dismissal from public institutions is “unfair”. Milei had previously slashed energy and transportation subsidies, announced tax hikes. The state new agency was shut so was the country’s anti-discrimination and funding for scientific research was cut down. 

As per the reports in Argentina, Javier Milei has completed more than 100 days of his presidency. He came with a promise to fix the economy with what he called a shock therapy and he faced a lot of backlashes for it as lot of protests. Argentina’s monthly inflation has cooled off in December, it was 25% in January 20.6% in February it was 13.2%. Trend looks positive cooling Argentina’s monthly inflation that is Milei calls it is the result of strong fiscal discipline.

The government also boosted of a budget surplus it’s the first in decade. Even the IMF approves so some success for President Milei there but it’s not all good, Milei has other problems like annual inflation looks like it is at the record 276 percent the highest in more than three decades. 57% of the country is living under poverty there are strikes people are protesting against the austerity.  Argentina’s international bonds railed by 7% that’s a reflection of investor confidence. So, it started off on a positive note. Milei achieved some success but he also faced political hurdles. Last week the senate rejected a proposal a decree to change 300 existing standards like rent caps regulations on Health care, labor laws, privatizing state-owned enterprises, reducing maternity leave pay. So, this was a radical austerity plan and it met with opposition people took to the streets in protest. The courts called it unconstitutional; lawmakers did not support it and Argentina senate then struck it down. It’s s setback for the President and he said to be working on another strategy firming up his numbers waiting for the mid term elections will be held next year in 2025. If he does, his party does well in in those elections, he may get the bill through. And while his policies are delivering for now, they do have their own set of problems.

More than half of the Argentina’s population living in poverty, food prices are soaring people cannot afford so when the government cuts food aid these people suffer, some of them are scavenging to survive. Critics believe Milei’s policies could lead to mass unemployment something that would wreck the economy. But Milei is convinced about his plan, he says it will get way worse before it gets better. Anyway, Argentina is looking up for a better future.

By: Yash Gajmal

In the realm of international relations, where stability is often considered paramount, the book “Volatility in International Politics” challenges conventional wisdom by focusing on a critical yet overlooked aspect: the inconsistency in states’ behaviours toward one another. Authored by Eleonora Mattiacci, the book seeks to unravel the complexities surrounding why certain countries exhibit more volatile behaviour in specific moments, introducing a nuanced perspective to the study of international relations.

Traditionally, international relations studies have predominantly explored consistent patterns of change, such as escalation or reconciliation. However, “Volatility in International Politics” ventures into uncharted territory by investigating the origins of inconsistencies, shedding light on instances when states become more unpredictable in their interactions. By doing so, the book prompts scholars to move beyond simplistic classifications of states’ relations as either conflictual or cooperative, stable or unstable.

The central premise of the book lies in understanding volatility as a unique form of change in states’ behaviours, with profound implications for the international arena. Volatility introduces uncertainty, making it challenging to predict future events based on historical behavior or major events. This unpredictability, the authors argue, induces fear and irrational behaviors among actors in the international system, ultimately impacting decision-making and strategies.

Volatility can provide an important missing piece of the puzzle when it comes to current explanations of states’ behaviours. It captures important nuances in behaviors within the international arena that are not well explored in present conceptualizations. In essence, “Volatility in International Politics” offers a compelling departure from the status quo, providing a fresh lens through which to examine the inconsistencies in states’ behaviors.

The author argued that the exploration of factors influencing increased volatility in states’ behaviors unfolds in a three-step argument. Firstly, the theory identifies the permissive condition for volatile behavior, positing that a country’s relative power in comparison to its counterpart is a critical determinant. As relative power increases, states gain more options, both cooperative and conflictual, enabling them to shift between behaviors more effectively.

The second step introduces the catalysing condition for volatile behavior: the presence of a diverse set of domestic interests competing for control over foreign policy definition. In a context of rising relative power, the involvement of competing domestic interests augments a state’s volatility towards its counterpart. This dynamic arises from the potential for each foreign policy decision to impact the distribution of material and symbolic resources among diverse domestic groups, leading to varying consequences.

The final step emphasizes the interaction between a heterogeneous set of domestic interests and an increase in relative power. The simultaneous presence of these factors enhances a country’s volatility in its behaviours toward others. As clashing domestic interests gain representation, a country with greater relative power possesses more options to satisfy these interests, thereby increasing volatility.

In contrast to episodic notions of foreign policy, where international relations are viewed as discrete events, this argument provides a comprehensive explanation for volatility, addressing gaps left by alternative theories centred on mixed signals, leaders, coalitions, and issue-based explanations. The chapter thus enriches the understanding of the intricate dynamics governing states’ behaviors on the international stage.

In chapter, ‘Measuring Volatility’ the author introduces a methodology for measuring volatility in states’ behaviors, challenging conventional approaches prevalent in other fields. Rather than adopting “one solution fits all” methods like standard deviation, the chapter advocates for the Box-Jenkins procedure. This approach, when applied to the time series of states’ behaviors, uniquely overcomes challenges associated with noise and inflation, consistently isolating volatility across diverse cases and time periods. Its flexibility allows for the derivation of patterns directly from empirical records, making it versatile. Moreover, this innovative procedure extends its applicability to studying volatility by other international actors. It highlights the potential of the Box-Jenkins procedure to enhance our comprehension of international politics by revealing the diversity within conventional classifications such as rivalries and alliances. The focus on transitions between cooperation and conflict, rather than merely examining conflict incidence, unveils rich facets of state behaviors. The recognition that volatility varies over time and across cases underscores the importance of explaining this variation and the unique contribution of volatility to the broader understanding of international relations. In recognizing volatility as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, the chapter underscores the necessity of adopting a comprehensive, diverse approach to its study. This involves combining various data sources and triangulating across different methodologies. Overall, the chapter lays the foundation for a well-rounded measurement of volatility.

In chapter, ‘Volatility and Rivals’ the author explores the relationship between power, interests, and the occurrence of volatile behavior in international rivalries. The findings suggest that having more power alone doesn’t necessarily lead to more volatility unless there are divided interests within a country. This challenges theories that solely rely on power to explain erratic behavior in foreign policy, like hedging strategies. The research indicates that when a country holds low relative power, having multiple and diverse domestic interests doesn’t significantly impact foreign policy volatility. However, as a country’s power superiority increases, the presence of varied domestic interests significantly boosts volatility.

In simpler terms, when a powerful country deals with diverse internal interests, it’s more likely to behave unpredictably in international relations. Both factors, power, and interests, are crucial and work together to increase volatility. The varying levels of volatility in how one rival behaves towards another highlight the complexity of these relationships, urging us to look beyond mere conflict. These results open new research avenues. Firstly, they question the assumption that states always act as unified entities in international politics. The chapter suggests that without considering a country’s internal dynamics, predicting volatile behaviour becomes challenging. This raises the question of when assuming states as unitary actors is a valid simplification. Secondly, the findings underscore the importance of delving into the role of leaders in international politics. The analysis hints that change in states’ behaviors might not solely be attributed to leaders, prompting further exploration of how leaders systematically influence these changes. Lastly, the chapter provides mixed results on the impact of contentious issues on volatility, inviting more investigation into this aspect. In essence, this chapter unveils the intricate dance between power, domestic interests, and volatile behavior, challenging conventional wisdom and paving the way for deeper exploration of these dynamics in international relations.

The author also focused how the dynamics of volatility played out in the alliance context, specifically between the United States and France from 1954 to 1966. Three key findings emerge. First, when France’s relative power increased, and a diverse set of interests influenced its foreign policy decisions, volatility between the allies rose. Second, despite relative power not reverting to pre-1954 levels, a decrease in diverse interests’ influence after 1961 led to a reduction in France’s volatility toward the US. Third, explanations cantered on leadership changes failed to account for the shifts in volatility during this period.

The chapter digs into the complexities of alliances, unlike previous studies, this research zeroes in on a shorter timeframe, offering a detailed analysis of how volatile behavior unfolded and its consequences. Notably, the chapter explores how decision-makers perceive and react to volatility in alliance interactions. Statistical tests comparing issues pre- and post-1962 reveal no significant difference in the number of present issues. The chapter emphasizes that issues like communism, European integration, the German question, nuclear weapons, NATO, and French colonialism persisted despite decreased volatility. France and the US dynamically created and reshaped issues, aligning with their political goals.

In 1966, US-France relations were described as reaching a low point, with some scholars even considering France a greater threat to Western unity than Communism during the Cold War. The chapter offers in-depth evidence on the evolution of volatility between allies. It highlights how an increase in relative power became a condition allowing volatility, and diverse interests catalysed it. Importantly, the chapter demonstrates how the proposed theory applies not only during crises but also in everyday foreign policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of various aspects in international relations.

The thing that I personally found interesting is that; this book breaks new ground by offering the first comprehensive exploration of volatility in how countries behave on the global stage. It not only puts forward a compelling explanation for why nations sometimes act inconsistently but also supports its claims with empirical evidence. Understanding volatility, as emphasized in this concluding chapter, carries multiple benefits. It can help mitigate the negative impacts of unpredictable behavior, fill gaps in existing international relations puzzles, and pave the way for further investigations into volatility across various aspects of global politics.

The study prompts a re-evaluation of our assumptions about international politics, urging a nuanced understanding of how change unfolds. By viewing cooperation and conflict as a continuum with diverse dynamics, the book challenges traditional perspectives. It highlights how the uncertainty bred by volatility often leads decision-makers to engage in counterproductive actions, emphasizing the need to break free from cyclic historical understandings. Instead of instinctively fearing volatility, the book argues that a proper understanding of its origins can prevent dangerous aversions, fostering a more informed approach to navigating the complexities of international relations. In essence, the book takes a crucial first step toward unravelling the complexities of volatility in global politics.

The author fails to explore the potential benefits of creative diplomacy, which prioritizes negotiation, compromise, and cooperation to counteract volatility in global relations. Diplomacy, an integral part of statecraft, works to minimize power politics, enabling nations to pursue their interests without resorting to force. It establishes a stable transaction network, reducing the inconsistent shifts in foreign policy linked to volatility. The author overlooks current research on the “security dilemma,” a key factor causing fear, uncertainty in cooperation, and a lack of trust in international relations. This dilemma is the primary, conflict-driven context, where volatility is just a symptom. Understanding the broader context is crucial to grasp the exact role of volatility in the cycle of power competition, escalation, and armed conflict.

Despite shortcomings; in essence, “Volatility in International Politics” provides a fresh perspective, urging scholars and policymakers to navigate the complexities of global interactions with a more nuanced understanding of volatility.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

‘’The United States must refrain from stirring up trouble or taking sides on the South China Sea issue after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a security deal with the Manila extended to attacks on the Philippine coast guard’’. – Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America 

The South China Sea has re-emerged as a region of contention after a cannon attack damaged a Philippine vessel and injured three navy personnel in March 2024. New Delhi has been supportive of the sovereignty and maritime interests of the Philippines amidst the skirmish following the territorial expansion of Beijing in the South China Sea. The maritime dispute has brought to the fore the relevance of the quasi-security architecture ‘QUAD – The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ in securing the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

QUAD was resurrected as a security grouping in 2017 by the United States, Japan, Australia, and India to uphold democratic values and respect for international law, which could counter the assertiveness exerted by China in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance has its roots in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami aimed at Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) assistance with the formation of a Tsunami Core Group. Formalized by Shinzo Abe – former Prime Minister of Japan in 2007 – QUAD undertook a maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal later in 2007, which also included Singapore, before getting dormant for a decade due to apprehensions by Australia, against antagonizing China.

Pivot to Indo-Pacific

A pivot to Indo-Pacific was observed in 2021– when the ‘March Declaration’ laid out the spirit of the QUAD – stating: ‘’We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.’’ 

The March 2021 declaration laid out the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with the inclusion of the Philippines towards the formation of QUAD 2.0 – an expansion sought by South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam. The alliance has meanwhile expanded from maritime security to economic and non-traditional security issues with working groups established on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and countering disinformation. There is no mutual defense pact in effect, thereby, the alliance works more as a strategic and diplomatic forum.

QUAD aims for defense cooperation by aligning armies together under the Indo-Pacific Framework, which can be backed by the US Secretary of Defence Llyod Austin outlining military plans in Asia, stating China as the main challenge. The US hosted the first Quad leaders’ summit in March 2021 underlining the importance it placed not only on the Indo-Pacific but on the QUAD. Beijing has been working as per expansionist policy with the militarization of islands and establishment of business hubs under the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Route; whilst China has attempted to represent the alliance as ‘Asian NATO’.

Maritime Security

The dispute between the Philippines and China has highlighted the importance of maritime security enabling adherence to a rule-based order as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS is regarded as the global constitution for the seas signed by 162 nations. The Philippines and Japan have been facing challenges with Beijing over the Senkaku Islands, East China Sea, and South China Sea, however, with the US as a non-signatory to the convention, Beijing has refused any interference by the third parties in the disputed region.

“UNCLOS 1982 is particularly important in that regard as the Constitution of the seas. All parties must adhere to it in its entirety, both in letter and in spirit. I take this opportunity to firmly reiterate India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty.” – Dr. S. Jaishankar

A critical view is made with the effectiveness of QUAD in safeguarding the freedom of navigation, however, with the US engaged in the Hamas-Israel War and the Ukraine Conflict, conflicts in the Indo-Pacific have taken a backseat. The US President Joseph Biden cancelled the trip to the QUAD Summit in Sydney in May 2023 due to impending debt default, following which the heads of government of Australia, India, Japan, and the US met on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan. There have been concerns regarding the escalation of conflict with China, in case of an increased presence of the US in the Indo-Pacific, skirmishes including the claims on Arunachal Pradesh, the Taiwan Conflict, South China Sea issue could pave the way for India to check the hegemonic actions of China.

With the elevation of the alliance to leader-level dialogue and improved cooperation, countries in ASEAN could help maintain stability and check illegal maritime activities. QUAD’s ‘Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness’ seeks to support states in the region in combating illegal maritime activities. Sharing information and satellite data on vessel movement based on the data obtained from automatic identification systems (AIS) provides opportunities to check vessel movements and combat the threat of surveillance by China.

‘’We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.’’ – QUAD March 2021 Declaration

Expansion of the QUAD

QUAD has emerged as a multilateral alliance with the dependency of Japan and Australia on the US for economic and security purposes, while South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand have shown interest in joining the QUAD alliance. ‘QUAD Plus’ or ‘QUAD 2.0’ pertains to addressing regional security challenges, enhancing maritime security, promoting economic stability, and counterbalancing the influence of other powers in the region. The inclusion of Israel, the USA, and the UAE marks the formation of  ‘I2U2’ also known as the ‘Middle Eastern QUAD’, which amongst the ongoing conflict in West Asia becomes imperative for strengthening regional security architecture.

Beijing has been scaling its presence in West Asia, while India has been acting on the ‘Look West’ Policy with the US already engaged in the region. India activating its presence in the QUAD could enable countering the incursions of Beijing on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Malacca Strait, and the Red Sea Region, based on cooperation in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The US presence remains focused on the South China Sea and the East China Sea, enabling India to secure the Indian Ocean Region.

‘’The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, announced by the Quad grouping, is a testament to our commitment to a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific’’; ‘’building networks and partnerships would be instrumental in ensuring the security and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)’’ – Indian Navy Chief Admiral R. Hari Kumar

Challenges & Way Forward

Challenges remain in securing cooperation especially after the Indo-Russian partnership and Indo-Iran partnership enabled New Delhi to build energy, defense, and economic security. QUAD 2.0 involves the inclusion of the Philippines, however, it excluded the involvement of India raising apprehensions regarding the division between members to expand an already existing alliance in the Indo-Pacific. Israel’s envoy to India – Naor Gilon – made a statement that the expansion of QUAD was not against any one country and the major factor for the countries to come together was due to the instability caused by Iran in the region.

The exclusion of India indicates that QUAD and QUAD 2.0 serve different purposes with the latter having a stronger military focus concerning the South China Sea region and the former emphasizing non-traditional security threats, disaster relief and humanitarian relief measures, climate change, protecting marine resources and fisheries with the formation of Quad Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Mechanism in the May 2022 Tokyo Summit.

The expansion of the QUAD grouping led the US and the Philippines to sign the Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, which provided an opportunity for India to build a defense partnership and enable the Philippines to procure more arms from it. India has been shifting from non-alignment to taking an active role in security dynamics, however, remains cautious against getting entrapped in the Sino-U.S. conflict.

‘’The QUAD also launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which will offer a near-real-time, integrated, and cost-effective maritime-domain-awareness picture. It will enhance the ability of partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and he Indian Ocean to fully monitor their waters’’ – QUAD Summit in Tokyo, May 2022

Security Cooperation & Containment of China

The US House of Representatives passed ‘Strengthening the QUAD Act’ on February 16, 2024 indicating the possibility of an active role the US could play in the Indo-Pacific. The act would enable the establishment of a ‘QUAD Intra-Parliamentary Working Group’ to facilitate closer cooperation between the US, Australia, India, and Japan. It also would establish guidelines for annual meetings and group leadership. Under the act, the group is required to submit an annual report to the congressional foreign affairs committees. The act stresses cooperation on pandemic preparedness, technological innovation, and economic integration, with security cooperation taking a backseat.

A shift in foreign policy has been observed, with Australia pivot to China ahead of the discontent from the grouping, which India is against turning into ‘Indo-Pacific NATO’. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to China despite unstable relations, New Delhi’s trade cooperation despite conflict over border regions, and cooperation by the US on containing Iran and enabling stability in the Middle East highlights the varied expectations and aims in dealing with China. Japan and India agreed to step up security and economic cooperation to boost their ties against the Chinese influence in the region.

Japan aims to improve security cooperation with developing countries, whilst enabling arms trade with India. With Japan standing as a security provider for countries facing the territorial expansion of China, India, and Japan could cooperate to institutionalize the QUAD. With Russia termed as a challenge in the National Security Strategy released by Japan, the division of interests could affect the coherent operations of QUAD. QUAD acts as a deterrent against coercion of any external powers and retains the position of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), however, the internal divide and an increasing military assertion remain a challenge as a grouping to contain China.

‘’The Quad is here to stay. The Quad is here to grow. The Quad is here to contribute.’’ – Dr. S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister, India.

By: Mahima Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) stands as a pivotal framework for cooperation in the Mekong subregion, encompassing Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. This initiative, launched in 2009 by the United States, aims to address shared challenges and promote sustainable development in the region. The geopolitical significance of the LMI lies in its role as a platform for fostering partnerships among key players like the United States and China, along with other regional partners. These countries play crucial roles in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia, with their interests intersecting in the Mekong subregion. The involvement of major powers like the United States and China underscores the strategic importance of the Mekong River basin, not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of security and influence. As such, understanding the dynamics of the LMI and the roles played by these key players is essential for comprehending the broader geopolitical implications within the Mekong subregion.

History and Objectives

The historical background leading to the establishment of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) is rooted in the geopolitical dynamics that have long shaped the Mekong region. The Mekong River, flowing through Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, has been a focal point for regional cooperation and competition among major powers. The strategic interests of countries like the United States and China in the Mekong subregion have been influenced by factors such as trade routes, access to natural resources, and geopolitical influence.

The establishment of the LMI in 2009 marked a significant milestone in regional cooperation, aiming to address shared challenges and promote sustainable development in the Mekong subregion. This initiative reflects a shift towards multilateral engagement and cooperation to tackle transboundary issues like water security, infrastructure development, and environmental sustainability. Major powers, including the United States and China, have recognized the strategic importance of the Mekong River basin, and have sought to leverage their influence through initiatives like the LMI.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Mekong region have been shaped by a complex interplay of economic interests, security concerns, and regional power struggles. The Mekong subregion serves as a critical geopolitical arena where major powers compete for influence and seek to advance their strategic objectives. Understanding these dynamics is essential to grasp the broader implications of initiatives like the LMI and how they intersect with the strategic interests of key players in the region.

The main objectives of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) encompass a comprehensive approach to promoting sustainable development, infrastructure building, water resource management, and regional economic integration in the Mekong subregion. The LMI, initiated by the United States in 2009, aims to foster integrated sub-regional cooperation and capacity building among countries like Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Burma. One of the key goals of the LMI is to facilitate an integrated water management scheme for the lower Mekong River, addressing the clash between plans for harnessing the river’s hydroelectric potential for economic development and traditional uses of the river. Infrastructure building is another crucial objective of the LMI, focusing on enhancing connectivity and developing regional infrastructure systems to support economic growth and development. This includes initiatives to improve transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and other key facilities to boost regional connectivity and trade. Water resource management is a significant area of focus within the LMI, aiming to address transboundary water challenges and promote sustainable use of water resources in the Mekong subregion Furthermore, the LMI seeks to advance regional economic integration by promoting equitable and inclusive economic growth in the Mekong region. By fostering cooperation in areas such as agriculture, food security, education, energy security, environment, and health, the initiative aims to narrow the development gap in ASEAN and support regional stability and prosperity. These objectives align with broader geopolitical goals by enhancing regional cohesion, promoting sustainable development, and countering the spread of influence from other major powers, particularly China.

Geopolitical Implications

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) has far-reaching geopolitical implications on various aspects such as regional security, economic development, and environmental sustainability within the Mekong subregion. In terms of regional security, the LMI serves as a platform for fostering cooperation among Mekong countries to address common security challenges and promote stability. By focusing on initiatives that enhance infrastructure development and sustainable growth, the LMI contributes to building trust and reducing tensions in the region. This collaborative approach helps mitigate potential conflicts over shared resources like water and supports peaceful relations among neighbouring countries.

Economically, the LMI’s emphasis on infrastructure building, water resource management, and regional economic integration plays a vital role in driving economic development in the Mekong subregion. By promoting connectivity, trade, and investment, the initiative creates opportunities for economic growth and diversification, ultimately leading to shared prosperity and development. However, power dynamics among major players like China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India can influence decision-making processes related to economic initiatives in the region. Competition for influence and strategic advantages may impact the implementation of projects and policies aimed at fostering economic development within the Mekong subregion.

Furthermore, the LMI’s commitment to environmental sustainability is crucial for addressing pressing environmental challenges in the Mekong region. Issues such as water pollution, deforestation, and climate change pose significant threats to the ecological integrity of the Mekong River basin and the well-being of local communities. Through promoting sustainable development practices and environmental conservation efforts, the LMI aims to safeguard natural resources and mitigate environmental degradation. However, power dynamics among major players can influence environmental decision-making processes by shaping priorities and approaches to addressing environmental issues within the region.

Challenges

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) faces challenges and controversies that revolve around concerns over dam-building activities, environmental degradation, and competition for influence among external partners. One of the primary issues surrounding the LMI is the contentious nature of dam-building activities along the Mekong River. Plans to harness the river’s hydroelectric potential for economic development have raised environmental concerns and sparked debates over the impact of these projects on the river’s ecosystem and downstream communities. The construction of dams can lead to disruptions in water flow, affecting fish migration, sediment transport, and the livelihoods of local populations that depend on the river for sustenance. Environmental degradation is another significant challenge associated with the LMI, as the Mekong region grapples with issues like water pollution, deforestation, and climate change. Rapid economic development and infrastructure projects can exacerbate environmental pressures, leading to habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, and threats to the region’s ecological balance. Balancing the need for economic growth with environmental sustainability remains a key challenge for the LMI and its member countries, as they navigate the complexities of development in the region while preserving natural resources and ecosystem. Moreover, competition for influence among external partners, particularly major powers like China, the United States, Japan, and others, shapes the geopolitical realities in the Mekong subregion. These external actors engage in various initiatives and investments in the region to advance their strategic interests, leading to a complex web of relationships and power dynamics. The competition for influence can impact decision-making processes related to development projects, infrastructure investments, and policy directions, influencing the geopolitical landscape of the Mekong region. The quest for strategic advantages and economic benefits can sometimes overshadow concerns for environmental sustainability and social well-being, highlighting the delicate balance between development aspirations and the preservation of the region’s natural resources.

The Future of LMI

The future prospects of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) hold significant implications for regional geopolitics, particularly in light of evolving dynamics between major powers in the Mekong subregion. As the LMI continues to play a pivotal role in fostering cooperation and addressing shared challenges among Mekong countries, its potential impact on regional geopolitics is likely to be influenced by the shifting power dynamics among key players like China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India.

One key aspect of the LMI’s future prospects lies in its ability to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia amidst increasing competition for influence among external partners. The intensifying rivalry between major powers, particularly China and the United States, has led to heightened engagement with riparian countries in the Mekong region. The LMI’s success in promoting regional cohesion and sustainable development will depend on how effectively member countries, including the United States and Southeast Asia’s riparian nations, can address differences and balance competing interests related to the use of the Mekong River.

Moreover, as major powers like China expand their presence and influence through initiatives like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the future trajectory of the LMI will be shaped by how these external partnerships evolve. The competition for strategic advantages and economic benefits in the Mekong subregion may lead to both cooperation and competition dynamics among major players, influencing decision-making processes related to infrastructure projects, environmental conservation efforts, and regional economic integration.

In conclusion, the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) stands as a significant framework for cooperation in the Mekong subregion, addressing challenges and promoting sustainable development. The geopolitical implications of the LMI on regional security, economic development, and environmental sustainability are shaped by power dynamics among major players like China, the United States, and others. Challenges such as dam-building activities, environmental degradation, and competition for influence among external partners underscore the complexities of navigating geopolitical realities in the Mekong region.

Looking ahead, the future prospects of the LMI hold potential for influencing regional geopolitics amidst evolving dynamics between major powers. The initiative’s ability to foster cooperation, address shared challenges, and navigate competing interests will be crucial in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. By balancing economic development with environmental sustainability and promoting inclusive partnerships, the LMI can contribute to a more stable and prosperous future for the Mekong subregion while navigating complex power dynamics and fostering regional stability.

By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

“India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present” is a book written by Shivshankar Menon has propounded the whole narrative of the book along the historical lines of geopolitical transitions in a timeline manner, therefore by narrating the story of how India’s journey took the steps of diplomatic interest. With the stalwart news headlines asserting that with the opening of economic doors, China’s share in the world’s GDP rose from about two percent in 1990 to about 18 percent in 2022. The stupendous economic rise has made the country permanently revolving on the global pyramid of South Asia. With the converging victories of the Sino-Pak alliance, the internal instability of both countries has wider implications for the decisive future of the growing turbulence of China in South Asia. China’s strategic involvement with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and India has brought tables of debt devious trap in the security domains for the said countries.

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China will deepen relations with its neighbours in accordance with the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and partnership with its neighbours.” However, the geopolitical relations between the nations can only be fostered when pseudo-mutual benefits clear the vision.

In India’s Way, a book authored by S. Jaishankar has blamed “legacy issues” for the growing scuffle between India and China’s problems. The recent developments of China’s longstanding profile to barging into South Asia strategically and engulfing them to burgeon its autonomy in the South Asian region has compelled regional countries to revamp their foreign policies towards China. The proclamation of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” or “Third Era” in the historical narratives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) constitutes a dictum of ‘striving for achievement’. However, in the second era, the policy was ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ as proposed by Deng Xiaoping was a fiasco that turned into the futility of the Chinese policy of sticking to the dictum.

The persistence of deep suspicion of China’s geostrategic movement in the South Asian region is a result of fulfilling its geopolitical interest through tailoring massive infrastructure development and investment programs as a catalyst of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route. The clarity of the posing narrative that China is stepping into this area for mutual benefit is a completely blurred vision primarily to gain support via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route.

This article endeavours to navigate China’s prospects and the weight that South Asian countries can take to renunciate the pseudo phrase of ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping to weave the rest of the world as a better community to perform state action in interlinked global affairs.’

In long term potential intentions of China’s policy towards South Asia might result in “perpetual oscillation” in foreign policy of South Asian countries where it will be defined through the national interest of concerned states. The proclivities of decision-makers in international opportunities are always dynamic and not static, therefore, it is reflected in domestic capabilities in the international environment.

Evolution of Chinese discourse in South Asia

Broadly, it can be said that China’s discourse in South Asia can be classified into four different kinds of categorization. The multifaceted nature of Chinese discourse has imperatively four watersheds in summarization to understand the larger footprints. The first watershed was through travelogues which resulted in administrative details along with the study of geography, society, and cultural practices of South Asia. Further, in the second watershed, the expansion of Chinese mercantile networks in the Indian Ocean, moreover, by the sixteenth century the focus was shifted toward coastal regions of South Asia through maritime routes. In the third and fourth watersheds, the implication of the dearth of knowledge that was comprehended in South Asia was invisible, henceforth, became distorted. An accurate understanding of Chinese discourse in South Asia was visible only in the late nineteenth century when travellers from Quing China began visiting British India to mark the periodization and caveats on the past discourse to amend them and remove the notion of distorted histories.

In November 2012, President Xi Jinping first mentioned the notion of the ‘Chinese Dream’ to resurrect the Chinese nation by making the armed forces strong. In October 2013, President Xi Jinping asserted ‘The strategic goal of China’s diplomacy with neighbouring countries is to serve the realization of the two “centenary goals” and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ Therefore, it discernible that China’s goal of economic development and geopolitical considerations in its neighbourhood policy expression is to become a hegemon in the region.

In a white paper titled, ‘China’s policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’ where China made a brutal warning statement to small and medium-sized countries to not take sides among big countries. While Xi Jinping’s goal of community to common destiny is a fiasco to believe in since the instances of Sri Lanka in the recent timeline has made it a funeral to accept the fact that China’s interest since the beginning was never for the mutual benefit in the enhancing line of ‘strategic confidence based on socialism which President Xi addressed in 2018 conference.

In the recent past, the combination of Chinese discourse amalgamated with the Chinese Dream as a strategic confidence to spell out BRI as an alternative geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic framework for China to fuel up the long-standing aspiration of taking the domination of the area to its fullest.

Navigating the future aspiration of China’s dreadful mystery in investing South Asian region

Vulnerabilities residing in the South Asian region are inviting China to involve its money and power through the region in receiving experiences from each other’s footprints. The intensity of Chinese activism can manage the neighbourhood political risk to face the special challenges. While people presume only China’s factor for shaping South Asian dissonance, however, internal, external, and most importantly regional factors are the fundamentals to the same. Where the cases of building grand infrastructure to fuelling up the small countries to deceiving with its strategy, one has to keep in mind about Chinese economy taking a troubled position on the global stage. Recently, a report published by IMF stated, that GDP growth for Asia’s largest economy will slow down to 4.6% in 2024 from 5.4% in 2023, and fall further to 3.4% by 2028. On one side, China’s real estate slump and growth of 0.5% in exports which is as good as nothing.

Interpretation of Cold War 2.0 between China and the US

The global and regional disintegration between China and the US can be evident through the trade war between the concerned countries. The analogies are made on the notion of the high dynamics of the Cold War. The contemporary tensions between China and the US are often termed Cold War 2.0, where the conflict which is evident in the Middle East- Israel and Hamas and Russia-Ukraine war is not a sudden event but the result of Cold War 2.0.

In the recent developments Indo-Pacific has emerged as the fundamental flashback while proceeding with Cold War 2.0, notably, China has made a bold step to deploy uniformed police officers to Kiribati. Kiribati is a small island nation in the Pacific with a population of 115,00 people. However, I have given the instances of Kiribati to anticipate the future serious dreadful steps are already being made in India’s neighbourhood. While giving the depth of analysis in India’s neighbourhood region, a Chinese military delegation visited the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to further accentuate cooperation in defense issues. While it is needless to say, the growing strategic inclination of China towards South Asia is a clear indication to counter its strategic rival India for influence in the region by consolidating diplomatic relations with India’s neighbourhood region through “military assistance.”

While making the configuration of Cold War 2.0 visible, the geoeconomic landscape of the bifurcated global system. Simply put, the increased polarised tendency of trade, technologies, and financial systems makes global shifts which shall be discernible in major economic blocs like G20 and BRICS. These major global blocs of economic architecture contribute to a deciding factor for the South Asian region’s economic viability.

India’s way forward in contemporary lens

Under Xi Jinping, China has become a rogue nation, where its closest friends are, North Korea to the east and Pakistan to the South. For Maldives, the recent visit of President Mohamed Muizzu to Beijing is being played by Xi Jinping where Muizzu called China a “valued ally and integral collaborator.” This majorly defines the incredulity of Maldives with the case of Sri Lanka where China blocked the country with its debt trap diplomacy under the weaponization of finance by China. The frame of realpolitik aligns with what Alfred Thayer Mahan, an Admiral in the US Navy, quoted in 1897, “whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia.” Henceforth, this ocean can be one of the deciding factors in the rising emergence of China’s policy of transgression strategically.

Notwithstanding, the recent development in Xi Jinping’s administration China is facing the economic global downscaling. Notably, a long-term, multifaceted challenge to India with China exists in the disputed border with the Line of Actual Control (LAC), along with it, India needs to heed its neighbourhood policy more ostensibly by giving strategic importance to the line of India’s maritime security. Thereafter, China’s military modernization is further escalating in the vision, to complement its BRI project in the prospects, therefore, inviting serious confrontation to be faced by India.

The apprehensive disposition of India has to be amended to sustain a geopolitical factor to transverse Chinese transgression into the South Asian territories. A trend of tense dispositions at the border is unlikely to reverse to its cordial position anytime soon. The three factors through which India’s strategic relation with China can be duly performed. First and foremost, China’s hegemonic rise in South Asia is an alarming stress for India’s security where Morgenthau’s six principles come into play in the pictures. Therefore, in the decisive factors of the disputed border with China (the Line of Actual Control or LAC), the unprecedented proactive and military modernization/expansion of China’s military is the second possibility of India to make a cautious approach with China as K Sibal mentioned ‘diplomacy as an imperative factor while deciding foreign policy.’

According to C. Raja Mohan, it seems a matter of grave concern that if India and China are unable to locate the changing structural shift in the global order then the relationship between the two will no longer be credible or sustainable. Since both are putting a substantial amount of focus on the Global South. The recently conducted NAM and G-77 summit is evidence of the frequency of both India and China leveraging their geopolitical interest in the location. Moreover, China’s pitch escalated on revisiting global economic form whereas India longs for Integration and representation of Global South countries while bridging the gap between Global North and Global South. What lay ahead is, diminishing China’s presence, and this can be substantiated by India’s neighbourhood countries to unite with India to make the region- demographically, economically, socially, and politically self-reliant to the level that India’s neighbourhood need not step in the grab of China’s brutal policy. If the shoulders of strategic actions are slouched by India, then repercussions might have an iota of blameworthiness.

In conclusion, the dynamic nature of international relations is left to be evaluated on the future outcomes of the global summit which underpin the re-alignment of major powers which shall lead through strategic competition, and geoeconomic transition, with hovering bees of military expansion, however, the road for India might be the case as Robert Frost suggests “The Road not taken.”

By: Aastha Agarwal

After the resounding success of his debut book ‘The India Way’ in 2020, S Jaishankar, a veteran diplomat, former Foreign Secretary and the incumbent External Affairs Minister of India (EAM) has brought out his second book called ‘Why Bharat Matters’.

At the outset, the book is pretty compact, a compendium of neatly organised 11 chapters spread across 219 pages. The book explores a series of closely interconnected themes pertinent to Indian foreign policy and its place on the global stage.

Beginning with the title, Why Bharat Matters, there is an evident ‘decolonial’ and ‘anti-colonial’ underpinning, that might have possibly stemmed from the cultural, Indic revival under way in India. Throughout the book, the author asserts that India matters to the world because and when it is more ‘Bharat’, when it sticks with its traditions, its roots, its sanskar, its sanskriti. There are analogous references to episodes from Ramayana to demonstrate India’s strategic culture.

The context of this volume has been set as the last decade which the author calls a ‘deeply transformational era’, both globally and in domestic Indian setting. The author gives an objective picture of current global landscape marked by its challenges and complications like Covid led disruption, sharpening polarisation and the prominence of AI. Coming to how India has significantly changed in its foreign policy approach – he talks of New India that has broken out of the Non Aligned mould and engages vigorously with old and new partners, guided solely by its national interests. Also, the G20 summit has underscored India’s ability to shape global agenda and to emerge as Vishwamitra.

There is an evident ‘hero worship’ tone whenever the EAM speaks of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi leading India’s civilizational resurgence and addressing India’s national concerns of socio-economic development. He holds PM’s grit of character as the most important factor in catalysing the image of New India, Bharat. Examples being – PM as trailblazer in India’s diaspora outreach starting with 2014 Madison Square event and a leader in climate change mitigation. His Neighbourhood approach, SAGAR vision, De-hyphenation of Israel and Palestine and serious messaging on China have been oft hailed by the author.

Thecontents of the book have been systematically organised where the first chapter presents an objective view of the current global landscape marked by sharp polarisation and explosive impacts of technology and suggests India to tell the world that it stands for rules based order, a Ram Rajya for the benefit of all. In the next chapter, the EAM asserts that foreign policy is not just for external national security but it is an exercise to meet citizen needs in routine and in crisis. The cited examples work effectively in instilling confidence of the people in its foreign affairs machinery. The author also touches upon the power of positive narratives to build coalitions over a protracted period to meet these needs.  There is some repetition in the theme of third chapter that says world is deeply interconnected but more fragile and that AI revolution comes with risks of data security.

The next chapter highlights current global challenges – backlash to globalisation, retreat of USA, increasing salience of China and the rise of mini-lateralism and regionalism to deal with challenges in a diplomatically frugal and localised manner.

The fifth chapter seemed the most interesting most informational to me. However, the tone appeared pretty partisan, pretty boastful of the ‘out of the box’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘visionary’ leadership of the prime minister in foreign policy domain.

He calls his tenure as ‘serious work in progress’ laying the foundation of Indian footprint globally – carefully cultivating SAARC, strengthening relations with major powers, tending adequately to middle powers and catering to every sub region Global south, Central Asia, Gulf and Indian Ocean states.

Again he appears as the mouth piece of the PM who has re-written India’s story on the global canvas making her the largest FDI destination. India’s feats in all areas have been underlined – space, diaspora, digital governance etc. PM has been projected as the foremost cultural ambassador of Bharat facilitating the exchange of best practices and championing fresh initiatives on climate change, counter terrorism and connectivity, and forging India’s entry into SCO, MTCR, Wassennar agreement etc.

Chapter 6 has a creative title and an important subtitle on why India should expand its political diplomatic capital to make friends everywhere. There is an exploration of India’s relations with three permanent members of the UNSC i.e. with UK with its colonial baggage, time tested relations with Russia and partnership with France. There’s a repetition of India’s neighbourhood relations, about India’s energised focus on sub regional engagements from the Nordic, and Central & East Europe, to Latin America and Caribbean, and even in the Pacific islands.

The next chapter explains the background of QUAD, and gives a succinct account of India’s bilateral relations with each of the QUAD members. A common thread appears in setback in relation due to India’s nuclear tests, later normalised though convergence in other areas like supply chain resilience, disaster resilient infrastructure etc.

A complete chapter dedicated to China, explains the importance India’s EAM attaches to this country. This chapter is themed on the constant dilemma on how China might be dealt with – realpolitik versus moralpolitik. It gives a systematic history of post-independence bilateral relations between the Himalayan neighbours highlighting points of conflict and confrontation and their little common space eg at WTO, UNFCCC. Previous dispensations have been blamed for their left wing romance with respect to China until recently when the present regime made a realistic assessment of Chinese capabilities and started to bridge this gap through infrastructure augmentation in border areas including tunnelling, road making.

“Corrosion is the new competition” is succinctly the premise of the next chapter. Borrowing from post modernism, author says ‘Knowledge is power’ and that Psy-ops are new forms of warfare. Here, the author comes up from my favourite analogy from Ramayana. He explains that in the present borderless politics, image and narratives, are key to legitimise and delegitimise. The author politely rebukes previous governments to have chosen the comfortable option of over leveraging of low cost options from outside and thus eroding domestic manufacturing.

Tenth chapter has been named creatively and highlights the divergences in the political, strategic understanding / calculations of the towering leaders post-independence. Nehru’s idealist choices have been sharply criticised and his ‘Asian Solidarity’ dismissed as delusion. He has been charged for harbouring false internationalism at the cost of national interest.

In contrast, Patel has been hailed for his strategic clarity on the intentions Pakistan and China. Similarly the concern of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee on Balkanisation of India have been vented. An interesting revelation comes on Mookerjee’s Cultural Diplomacy, specifically Buddhist Diplomacy with South East Asia. Coming to Dr. BR Ambedkar, it has been mentioned that in addition to his advocacy for social reform and inclusiveness, he was much concerned about India’s foreign policy that alienated most of the world; thus India lost support in UN even for its genuine cause and that non alignment jeopardized our prospects of technological advancement. Minoo Masani has been brought to say that NAM paralysed India to repel attack from China. The author thus cautions that ‘acceptance / prestige’ cannot trump national interests and hard power must come prior to soft positioning.

Thefinal chapter of the book makes a powerful assertion on why the world needs India. It begins by commending India’s multifaceted feats – the successful landing of the Chandrayaan, the diplomatic expansion of G20 to G21 through inclusion of African Union, and the Vaccine Maitri program of the pandemic era that established India as the ‘pharmacy of the world’.

The author brings precedents from history to argue that the global mental space is obsessed with India, beginning with the quest to discover sea routes to Bharat – a country with geographical and demographical weights and notable a cultural, civilisational influence.  

There are empirical evidences quoted on how India – its traditions and modern capabilities matters to the world as India advocates rules based world order (eg. UNCLOS) and champions the cause of global south, multi-polarity and decentralised globalisation.

Nationally, it is a testament of ‘democracy that delivers’ and that done efficiently through massive digitalisation of government services plugging leakages. It has focussed on enhancing the quality of its human resource through conscious efforts in health, education and skilling. Indian Diaspora is truly global and so are India’s capacities to help them in distress. India does treat world as a family and walks the extra mile often showing up as the ‘first responder’ in moments of crisis.

To conclude, despite certain repetition and partisan undertones, there seems no exaggeration. The book is a must read for all those interested in India’s story, students and teachers of politics and international relations. The language is scholarly yet accessible. A Hindi translation seems much warranted to reach wider audiences.