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Low Approval, Strong Support: Is Donald Trump Leading America on the Right Path?

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By: Tushar Jain, Research Analyst, GSDN

President Donald Trump: source Internet

Approval ratings are one of the simplest ways to understand how people feel about a President. They do not tell the full story of governance, but they show whether the public believes the President is doing a good job. When approval is high, it usually means people feel confident about leadership and the country’s direction. When approval is low, it often signals worry, anger, or disappointment.

Donald Trump has always been a unique figure in American politics. His leadership style, communication methods, and political ideas have divided the country more sharply than most presidents in modern history. Because of this, his approval ratings have been closely watched, debated, and argued over since his first term.

Now, as Trump serves another term as President of the United States, his approval ratings once again raise an important question: Is the President of the United States (POTUS) on the right track? To answer this, we must look carefully at the numbers, understand what drives them, and explore what they say about the country’s mood and direction.

What Are Approval Ratings and Why Do They Matter?

Approval ratings measure how many people approve or disapprove of the job a president is doing. Polling organizations regularly ask a simple question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the president is handling his job? The answers are then presented as percentages.

These ratings matter for several reasons. First, they show public trust. A president with high approval usually has more political strength to pass laws and push policies. Members of Congress are more willing to support a president who is popular with voters. Second, approval ratings influence elections. Low presidential approval often hurts the president’s party in midterm elections. Third, approval ratings shape how history remembers a president.

However, approval ratings are not perfect. They are influenced by emotions, party loyalty, media coverage, and current events. They do not always reflect careful judgment of policy details. Still, they remain one of the best tools to understand public opinion.

A Brief Look at Trump’s Approval History

Donald Trump’s approval ratings have been unusual compared to other presidents. During his first term, his approval rarely crossed 50 percent. From the beginning, the country was deeply divided about him. Supporters strongly approved of his leadership, while critics strongly disapproved. There were fewer undecided people than usual.

This pattern has continued into his current term. His approval ratings tend to stay in the high 30s or low 40s. Disapproval is usually higher than approval. What is striking is not just that the numbers are low, but that they do not change much. Big events, major speeches, or policy announcements often cause only small shifts.

This stability suggests that many Americans have already made up their minds about Trump. For many people, opinions about him are fixed and unlikely to change.

The Role of Political Division

One of the biggest reasons for Trump’s approval pattern is political division. The United States is more polarized than it has been in decades. People increasingly identify strongly with political parties, and this shapes how they view leaders.

Republican voters mostly approve of Trump. Their approval often stays very high, sometimes above 80 percent. Democratic voters almost always disapprove of him at similar levels. Independent voters, who do not belong to either party, usually lean toward disapproval, though less strongly.

Because of this, Trump’s approval ratings say more about party loyalty than performance alone. Supporters see him as fighting for their values. Critics see him as harmful to democracy and social unity. This divide makes it very hard for Trump to gain broad national approval, even if some policies succeed.

The Economy and Public Opinion

The economy is usually the most important factor in approval ratings. When people feel financially secure, they tend to approve of the president. When prices rise or jobs feel uncertain, approval falls.

During Trump’s current term, many Americans have expressed concern about the economy. Issues such as inflation, cost of living, housing prices, and healthcare expenses affect daily life. Even if economic indicators show mixed or moderate performance, what matters most is how people feel in their own lives.

Polls show that Trump’s approval on economic handling is lower than on some other issues. Many voters feel that prices are still too high and that their wages are not keeping up. These feeling hurts approval, especially among middle-class and working-class families.

Economic dissatisfaction also affects independent voters more than party loyalists. While Trump’s supporters may defend his economic policies, many independents judge based on personal experience, and this has pushed approval down.

Immigration and Border Policy

Immigration is one area where Trump performs relatively better in approval ratings. His strong stance on border security has long been central to his political identity. Many supporters believe he is addressing a serious national issue that previous administrations ignored.

Polls often show higher approval for Trump’s handling of immigration compared to his overall job rating. Some independents also support stricter border controls, which gives Trump some broader backing on this issue.

However, this support is limited. Critics argue that his immigration policies are too harsh and create humanitarian problems. As a result, while immigration boosts his standing among supporters, it does not significantly raise his overall approval nationwide.

Foreign Policy and America’s Image

Foreign policy also influences approval ratings, though less directly than the economy. Americans usually pay less attention to foreign affairs unless there is a crisis. Still, leadership on the global stage affects how people view a president.

Trump’s foreign policy style is direct and often confrontational. He emphasizes national interest, strong borders, and fair trade. Supporters see this as strength. Critics see it as damaging to alliances and global trust.

International surveys show that confidence in U.S. leadership has declined in many countries during Trump’s leadership. While this does not directly affect domestic approval for all voters, it shapes the overall picture of American leadership and influences how history may judge his presidency.

Leadership Style and Personal Image

A president’s personality matters. Trump’s communication style is very different from most presidents. He speaks directly, often emotionally, and frequently uses social media. This approach excites supporters but frustrates critics.

Many people who disapprove of Trump point not only to policies but also to tone and behaviour. They express concerns about respect for institutions, political norms, and democratic traditions. These concerns affect approval ratings, especially among educated voters and moderates.

At the same time, supporters admire his willingness to challenge political elites and speak plainly. For them, his style feels honest and refreshing. This contrast shows why approval ratings remain divided and stable.

The Media’s Influence

Media coverage plays a major role in shaping public opinion. The modern media environment is highly fragmented. Different news outlets present very different views of the same events.

Supportive media highlight Trump’s achievements and defend his decisions. Critical media focus on controversies, legal issues, and political conflicts. Because many Americans consume news that matches their beliefs, opinions are reinforced rather than challenged.

This media division helps explain why approval ratings do not move much. People see different versions of reality, and approval reflects those separate narratives.

Comparing Trump to Other Presidents

When comparing Trump’s approval ratings to past presidents, a clear difference appears. Most presidents since World War II have enjoyed periods of majority approval, especially early in their terms. Trump has rarely reached that level.

This does not mean he is the least effective president, but it does mean he governs without broad national support. Historically, presidents with low approval often face more resistance in Congress and weaker influence over national debate.

Trump’s situation is unusual because his base support remains strong even when overall approval is low. This allows him to continue leading his party effectively, even if national approval is limited.

Does Low Approval Mean Failure?

Low approval does not automatically mean a president is failing. Some presidents have passed major reforms despite low popularity. Others were popular but ineffective.

For Trump, low approval reflects division more than complete rejection. He has achieved policy goals that matter deeply to his supporters. At the same time, he has not convinced a majority of Americans that his leadership benefits the whole country.

This creates a presidency that is strong in one direction and weak in another. Strong among loyal supporters, weak in building national unity.

Is the Country on the Right Track?

When people are asked whether the country is on the right track, responses often mirror approval ratings. Many Americans say the country is headed in the wrong direction. Reasons include economic stress, political conflict, and social tension.

Supporters of Trump often say the country is improving, especially in areas like border control and national pride. Critics believe division and uncertainty have increased.

These mixed views show that there is no shared national agreement on progress. Approval ratings reflect this lack of consensus.

What Approval Ratings Mean for the Future

Approval ratings shape the political future. Low presidential approval can hurt the president’s party in elections. It can also affect long-term legacy.

If approval remains low, Trump may struggle to gain support for large new initiatives. However, strong base loyalty ensures he remains influential within his party.

Future historians will likely view Trump’s presidency as one defined by division rather than consensus.

Final Assessment

So, is POTUS on the right track? The answer depends on perspective.

From the viewpoint of Trump’s supporters, he is doing what he promised. They see approval ratings as biased or irrelevant. From the viewpoint of the broader population, approval ratings suggest dissatisfaction, concern, and division.

Factually, Trump’s approval ratings remain low compared to historical norms. They show limited national support but strong partisan backing. They reflect a country deeply divided in values, priorities, and trust.

In the end, Trump’s approval ratings tell us less about short-term success and more about the long-term state of American democracy: polarized, emotional, and struggling to find common ground.

Terror Strikes Australia: The Bondi Beach Attack & Why Australia Needs to Curb Radicalism

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By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Memorial post the Bondi Beach terror attack: source Internet

Bondi Beach has been considered one of the most iconic and symbolically Australian public areas. Lying on Sydney’s eastern coastline, the beach signifies much more than natural beauty; it is also a manifestation of social openness, multicultural coexistence, and easy public life that characterizes modern Australia. Decades on, Bondi has turned into a shared civic space in which locals, migrants, and tourists interact amongst themselves without anything getting in the way, hence signifying a national identity tied to trust, availability, and democratic principles. It was this very symbolism that made the impact of the terrorist attack near Bondi Beach last December 14, 2025, all the more profound.

In recent years, Australia has not been immune to any of the pressures common throughout most liberal democracies around the world: growing political polarization, rapid digital transformation, social isolation further exacerbated by online environments, and the spread of violent ideologies through global networks. Against this backdrop of tensions, Australia nonetheless enjoyed a pervasive sense of safety underpinned by strong institutions, effective policing, and an extensive counter-terrorism framework. The Bondi Beach attack brought this feeling of security to an abrupt end.

The attack was as much a psychological rupture as one of violence. It showed that radicalization can be homegrown, without large terrorist networks or foreign structures of command, and it can use the most mundane forms of public space to generate maximum fear and disruption. The incident made Australians confront some tough questions regarding radicalisation, the failure of prevention, and whether existing approaches were adequate to deal with current security challenges. Understanding the full context of the attack is what will enable them to prevent such tragedies in the times to come.

The Bondi Beach Attack: A Detailed Account

On December 14, 2025, Bondi Beach and its environs were teeming with people enjoying the peak of the Australian summer. The promenade along the beachfront was packed with families, joggers, surfers, and tourists, as were the nearby cafés, public walkways, and access roads. This typical setting was a holiday season afternoon filled with leisure and motion rather than tension or alertness.

Calls started rolling in about violent incidents near pedestrian zones adjacent to the beach around 4:30 p.m. Witnesses, out of breath, described two attackers making their way through crowded public spaces, targeting civilians with bladed weapons. In addition to blade-carrying individuals, there were improvised incendiary devices used to generally create widespread panic and disorientation. The attackers seemed to act together and with purpose, targeting areas where many people usually converge on foot.

Chaos spread quickly in seconds, with civilians running in all directions, some toward the open beach, others into nearby buildings or side streets. Scores of people were injured in the first few minutes while onlookers attempted to help in a scenario of confusion and terror. Fire only raised panic levels, complicating the evacuation process and making access for the emergency services difficult.

In minutes, police units from New South Wales arrived, joined by ambulance services and counter-terrorism officers of the police. Authorities went into exclusion zones, evacuated areas within proximity, and initiated mass-casualty response protocols. The attackers were neutralized shortly after a short pursuit and confrontation in a violent standoff.

There was little time to dwell upon the speed and professionalism of the response since the human cost was terrible: several civilians had been killed, and scores were suffering from serious injuries. All the hospitals in Sydney were put on emergency footing; trauma counselling services were activated for victims, eyewitnesses, and first responders. Evening fell with Bondi Beach being completely sealed off, the venue having turned from a symbol of fun and frolic to a scene of national tragedy.

Who were the perpetrators?

Further investigations showed that the attackers were a father-son duo from New South Wales. The fact that the perpetrators were related made it all the more disturbing for the public and debunked many conceptions regarding terrorism. Whereas other terrorist cells involve members unrelated to each other, this attack was the result of a personal, home-based network where ideological views had been propagated and strengthened by close personal ties.

Background checks revealed nothing significant as a criminal element tied to violent crimes. On the other hand, intelligence agencies verified that both of them previously drawn attention due to online activities related to extremist material. Digital forensic examination showed continued access to propaganda videos, ideological texts, and extremist forums. The use of encrypted messaging platforms was consistent with exchanging radical content and reinforcing ideological commitment.

The formal charge sheet listed terrorism-related offenses, murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to intimidate the public. Authorities emphasized that the Bondi case underlined the evolving phenomenon of micro-radicalisation in which the conventional structures of organization give way to small family units or intimate networks. It allows the development of radical ideas behind closed doors, well hidden from early detection.

The perpetrators showed how extremism can breed in quiet privacy before exploding into public violence. Their actions challenged the existing intelligence models, which mainly focus on large networks rather than small self-enclosed extremist units.

Motives and Radicalisation

Preliminary investigations have established that the attackers were ideologically driven under the influence of the Islamic State, commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Although there was no direct operational or financial linkage, it was a case of ideological allegiance through materials recovered, symbolism, and even online activities. This is in line with global trends where the influence of extremist organizations is mainly through ideologies other than by command structure.

In this case, the process of radicalization was gradual and cumulative: long-term exposure to radicalizing digital ecosystems normalized violence, and continually reinforced grievance-based narratives that framed Western societies as corrupt and hostile, and violent action was morally justified and necessary. Over time, a narrative of this kind lowers psychological barriers to committing acts of terror.

The authorities also looked into the attackers’ travel patterns. In the absence of any confirmed attendance at training camps overseas, short international trips in turn point to the potential for exposure to transnational extremist ideas. The Bondi case underlines the trend of growing radicalization devoid of any direct physical contact with terrorist organizations and often based merely on ideological indoctrination amplified by online platforms.

Security and Counterterrorism Response

Australia boasts one of the best-developed systems of counterterrorism in the Indo-Pacific: federal and state coordination, mechanisms for intelligence sharing, preventive detention laws, financial monitoring mechanisms, and community-based prevention programs. Following the attack at Bondi Beach, national threat assessments were reviewed, with security stepped up for a period at major public venues.

The security and anti-terror response to the Bondi Beach assault was rapid, coordinated, and reflective of Australia’s established crisis-handling system. Immediately after the eruption of violence on December 14, 2025, officers from the New South Wales Police Force arrived at the location within minutes. Their swift intervention subdued one assailant and captured the other, effectively shortening the attack and averting additional casualties. Emergency medical teams simultaneously initiated mass-injury protocols, ensuring quick treatment and evacuation of the wounded.

Within hours, Australian officials officially classified the event as a terrorist strike, activating the national counter-terrorism apparatus. This enabled federal bodies, notably the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, to collaborate with state police in a joint inquiry. Specialized task forces carried out synchronized raids, confiscated electronic devices, and launched comprehensive forensic and intelligence reviews to uncover ideological drivers, planning details, and potential external connections.

A major emphasis of the investigation was online radicalisation. Security services scrutinized digital activity, encrypted messaging, and extremist media consumption, highlighting the shifting character of lone-offender terrorism. Intelligence sharing was strengthened between federal and state levels, while global information-exchange channels were engaged to evaluate any cross-border extremist influence.

In the immediate period following the incident, security alerts were elevated nationwide. Police presence expanded across public venues, religious sites, and large events, while risk evaluations for upcoming gatherings were updated. Politically, the reaction prioritized prevention over mere response, reigniting debate on early-intervention policies, monitoring of online extremism, and community-driven counter-radicalization programs.

In total, although the operational response succeeded in containing the assault, the episode highlighted the necessity for more robust preventive measures to tackle radicalization before it escalates into violent acts.

Societal Impact

At the society level, the attack provoked a profound sense of shared shock and fragility. Bondi Beach, long seen as an emblem of openness, recreation, and multicultural harmony, was abruptly turned into a place of dread and grief. The targeting of a public, faith-based gathering magnified the psychological effect, as it shattered the belief that social and cultural occasions were naturally secure environments.

One of the most immediate social repercussions was the intensified feeling of insecurity in everyday life. Mass assemblies, religious observances, and cultural festivities came under greater examination, with groups voicing unease about their protection. This climate of apprehension threatened to reshape daily conduct, fostering self-restraint, diminished involvement in communal activities, and increased mistrust in interpersonal relations.

The incident also deepened worries about escalating antisemitism and religious bigotry. By striking a Hanukkah event, the attackers reinforced anxieties among Jewish communities about their safety and sense of belonging. This produced a ripple across other minority groups, who interpreted the episode as a cautionary sign of how extremist beliefs could evolve into targeted aggression. Although there was a surge of solidarity and interfaith backing, there was simultaneously the danger of stigmatization and societal division.

Political Impact

Politically, the Bondi Beach attack triggered swift and resolute actions from the Australian authorities. National figures denounced the brutality without hesitation, presenting it as an assault on Australian ideals rather than a single group. This rhetorical positioning was crucial, as it aimed to avert social division while reaffirming the government’s duty to safeguard all citizens equally.

The episode rekindled discussions on homeland security and anti-terror strategies. Legislators encountered renewed demands to assess whether current intelligence systems, monitoring powers, and preventive mechanisms were sufficient to identify and counter radicalization at earlier stages. Special focus was placed on solitary actors and online-driven extremism, which strain conventional security approaches centred on organized networks.

Safety at public gatherings emerged as a major political concern. Doubts were raised about risk evaluation procedures, collaboration between national and regional agencies, and the adequacy of safeguards for religious and cultural assemblies. This spurred appeals for greater investment in community policing, intelligence sharing, and rapid-response infrastructure.

The incident also shaped political dialogue on individual rights. Although there was wide agreement on the necessity of stronger protection, worries surfaced about the possible expansion of surveillance authority and its consequences for privacy and democratic liberties. Political conversations increasingly revolved around how to balance citizen security with the preservation of Australia’s liberal democratic identity.

Why Australia Should Act Against Radicalism

Radicalism serves as the ideological foundation for terrorism. Although not every person influenced by radical ideas resorts to violence, nearly all terrorist acts are preceded by ideological indoctrination. Australia has long confronted dangers from both organized extremist groups and solitary attackers, the latter being especially challenging to identify and stop.

Contemporary radicalism often evolves gradually, largely through digital platforms, encrypted messaging systems, and global propaganda networks. Individuals may adopt radical beliefs without traveling overseas or formally joining militant organizations, thereby reducing conventional intelligence warning signs. If ignored, such radicalization heightens the risk of sporadic, high-impact assaults aimed at civilians, religious minorities, or public venues, as demonstrated in the Bondi Beach episode.

Neglecting to address extremism at an early stage compels the state into reactive counter-terrorism actions, which are more expensive, less efficient, and frequently occur only after irreversible damage has been done.

Australia should confront extremism not from fear and anxiety, but with strategic and deliberate foresight. Extremist ideologies weaken national defence, erode social unity, threaten democratic principles, and create enduring economic and institutional burdens. The Bondi Beach incident revealed that even strong societies remain susceptible when radical movements are left unchallenged.

The attack showed that radicalism is both a concrete, real-life threat and one that resides in domestic environments, online spaces, and everyday communities. The strategies to address it need to be long-term and comprehensive, going beyond reactive policing.

Education is the key to prevention: schools and universities have to develop critical thinking, digital literacy, and civic engagement to counter radical narratives. Community-based programs can help in early intervention and assist the vulnerable to radicalization. Through an integrated strategy that unites protection, learning, civic participation, and online regulation, Australia can address radicalism at its foundation rather than only its aggressive expressions. Taking firm action now is vital to safeguarding Australia’s future as a safe, welcoming, and democratic nation.

Programs of deradicalization also have to be expanded. These programs need to focus on disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration, not punishment. Online platforms should also be made accountable for the extremist content they host, more so, with the major revenues they amass in Australia, usually running into hundreds of millions of US dollars annually.

Conclusion

The terrorist attack at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025 marked a real turning point in the Australian understanding of domestic security threats. It exposed something about the evolving nature of radicalism, testing assumptions about safety in public space. Beyond the immediate tragedy, it underlined the urgent need for proactive prevention and social resilience that would be sustained.

Any Australian response will have to be vigilant and inclusive, firm but principled. Reinforcing efforts to address the causes of radicalisation, strengthen community cohesion, and adapt counter-terrorism frameworks, Australia can pay homage to the victims of Bondi, taking further action toward ensuring that such an incident will never happen again.

India’s ‘RELOS’ agreement with Russia: An Analysis

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By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

Prime Minister Modi meeting President Putin: source Internet

The Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) is a significant bilateral administrative arrangement that will enhance military cooperation between India and Russia. The RELOS agreement sets out procedures governing the movement of military formations, warships and military aircrafts between Russia and India, as well as the arrangements for providing logistical support to each other’s forces. It is a military pact which allows both the nations to draw on each other’ ports, airfields and facilities for refuelling, resupply, maintenance and berthing. The pact is administrative rather than a mutual-defence treaty. It will be applicable during both wartime and peacetime missions. The agreement was signed earlier in 2025 and moved through Russian parliamentary ratification late in the year. President Vladimir Putin signed the law formally enacting the pact on Russia’s side. RELOS was ratified by the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, on December 2, followed by approval from the Federation Council, the upper house, on December 8.

Its Effects

RELOS agreement enables armed forces to operate far from home bases for longer durations. Access to partner-country ports, airbases, and logistics hubs reduces dependence on long supply chains, thereby improving mission endurance during joint exercises, patrols, or humanitarian operations. It will enable smoother utilisation of the host nation’s existing logistics networks and enhance the ability to respond swiftly to crises. It will also provide a strategic edge to the military operations of both countries. Exposure to advanced logistics practices of partner militaries helps improve domestic logistics planning, inventory management, and maintenance standards, contributing to long-term military modernization. It enhances India’s maritime outreach and influence in strategically important regions. It will boost Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and shared logistics facilities would enable better information exchange about maritime activities. Access to refuelling and replenishment facilities enhances naval and air force presence in critical regions such as sea lanes of communication, choke points, and contested areas, contributing to deterrence and regional stability. The practical effect of RELOS depends on which facilities the two sides make available and how often they are used. Russia’s territory spans the Arctic, the Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea littoral zones. Indian access to certain Russian ports or airfields could extend India’s operational options from the Indian Ocean into higher latitudes and Eurasian approaches. The arrangement could open access to scores of Russian naval and air facilities stretching from Vladivostok to Murmansk, a capability that, if operationalised, would materially expand Indian options in areas like the Northern Sea Route and Russia’s Far East. That prospect is strategically significant because it deepens India’s ability to operate in theatres that were previously remote or logistically difficult to sustain. For Russia, reciprocal access to Indian ports in the Indian Ocean would make long-distance deployments, logistics for joint operations and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions more sustainable in the Indo-Pacific region. RELOS balances India’s logistics agreements with Quad countries and Russia’s non-Quad stance. It strengthens Russian presence in Indo-Pacific without Quad involvement. It Counterbalances US influence and China’s regional role for both India and Russia. The pact gives India an additional logistics partner and reduces single-point dependencies. That diversification can be seen as strengthening autonomy rather than constraining it. India already has logistics arrangements and defence cooperation with other partners such as the United States, France and Australia. Adding a formal logistics arrangement with Russia expands the menu of partners and complicates attempts by any one external power to limit India’s operational freedom. By sharing existing logistics infrastructure instead of creating new facilities abroad, countries can significantly reduce operational costs. This reimbursement model avoids heavy upfront investments while still ensuring logistical availability. RELOS would strengthen the strategic partnership between India and Russia, deepen trust and institutionalize defence cooperation between the two countries. It acts as a confidence-building measure and signal long-term strategic intent, reinforcing broader diplomatic and security relationships. In UN peacekeeping, anti-piracy patrols, and multinational task forces, RELOS simplifies logistics coordination. Shared support structures reduce duplication of effort and improve mission efficiency. RELOS agreement demonstrates India’s ability to operate with major powers or regional partners like Russia, signalling strategic depth and readiness. This can have a deterrent effect by showcasing extended operational capabilities.

Its Challenges

Logistics cooperation is as much about common procedures and standards as it is about geography. India will need to invest in interoperability protocols, legal frameworks, and supply-chain agreements so that visiting Russian and Indian units can be serviced smoothly without ambiguity. Many Russian bases are optimized for Russian systems and logistics chains and currently unsuitable for Indian machines. India will need to evaluate which ports and airfields can practically and safely service Indian platforms and vice versa, and what upgrades or mutual-standard provisions are necessary for both the nations. Differences in equipment, fuel standards, accounting procedures, and documentation complicate execution. India will have to be careful of the legal and administrative details as such agreements work only if customs, diplomatic clearances, status of forces, health and medical protocols and liability rules are clearly spelled out. Issues such as jurisdiction, liability, taxation, and dispute resolution can be contentious. While India and Russia can agree bilaterally, the use of certain technologies, spare parts, dual-use equipment, banking or payment channels could be complicated by third-country sanctions or export controls. It may affect relations with Western institutions or investors sensitive to geopolitical alignments. Both, India and Russia will need compliant mechanisms to avoid exposure to secondary sanctions or legal entanglements. Neighbouring countries or adversaries may view such agreements as threatening resulting in escalation of regional insecurity. Maintaining good relations with them and gaining their trust is crucial. Such agreements complicate a country’s stance during international conflicts involving the partner state. Access to ports, airbases, and logistics hubs carry a risk of leakage of strategic or operational information resulting in exposure of sensitive facilities. Sharing logistics systems can also expose vulnerabilities in supply chains and infrastructure. RELOS does not guarantee support during wartime and access may be restricted due to domestic laws or political decisions. The agreement may be ineffective in fast-moving or high-intensity conflicts. While RELOS agreements enhance logistical efficiency and military reach, they are not cost-free. Strategic autonomy concerns, security risks, geopolitical repercussions, and operational complexities limit their effectiveness.

Indo-Russian Engagement

Politically, both countries engage through annual meetings of two Inter-Governmental Commissions. One focuses on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) and another on Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC). India and Russia regularly conduct the Tri-Services exercise ‘INDRA’. The joint military programs between both the nations include BrahMos cruise missile program, 5th generation fighter jet program and Sukhoi Su-30MKI program. India has purchased S-400 Triumf, T-90S Bhishma and AK-203 Rifles from Russia. Kamov Ka-226 200 are going to be manufactured in India under the Make in India initiative. Russia remains India’s largest and most important arms seller.

India needs to treat RELOS as a tool to increase operational flexibility and resilience, not as a geopolitical pivot. If implemented with carefully, with multiple logistics lines, legal safeguards, and transparent diplomacy, RELOS will add to India’s strategic autonomy.

Pax Silica Initiative: Can It Counter China?

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By: Sk Md Assad Armaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

Pax Silica Initiative: source Internet

In the twenty-first century, global power is no longer defined by military strength or territorial control. Instead, it is increasingly shaped by technological dominance and control over digital infrastructure. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and data governance now form the backbone of economic productivity, military capability, and political influence. This transformation has given rise to what analysts describe as Pax Silica a technology centric global order led primarily by the United States and its allies, grounded in dominance over chips and digital standards. Much like Pax Americana once relied on military and financial supremacy, Pax Silica rests on technological superiority as the primary instrument of global influence. At the heart of this emerging order lies a strategic question with profound geopolitical implications: can Pax Silica meaningfully counter China’s rise as a technological and systemic rival? Rather than confronting China through direct military conflict, US and its partners have increasingly turned to technological containment restricting access to advanced chips, limiting knowledge transfers, and shaping global technology governance. These measures have undeniably introduced friction into China’s technological ascent. Yet they also expose the limits of containment in an era defined by scale, adaptation, and long-term strategic patience. Pax Silica may constrain, but whether it can decisively counter China remains deeply contested.

Technology as Power: How Pax Silica Seeks to Counter China

Pax Silica operates on simple logic: advanced technologies, particularly semiconductors and artificial intelligence, form the foundation of modern economic growth, military power, and geopolitical influence. Control over these technologies translates into leverage across global supply chains, defense systems, and future innovation pathways. In this framework, technological leadership becomes a substitute for territorial control, and access denial replaces traditional coercion. The most visible portrayal of this strategy has been the tightening of export controls on advanced semiconductor technologies. Restrictions on cutting-edge chips, chip-design software, and manufacturing equipment aim to slow China’s progress in high-performance computing and AI systems. Advanced lithography machines, produced by firms such as ASML, and fabrication capabilities concentrated in companies like TSMC, remain embedded within an ecosystem of allied states. Pax Silica seeks to use these chokepoints by ensuring that China remains downstream in the technological value chain. This approach reflects a deliberate attempt to weaponize interdependence. Rather than decoupling entirely, the United States accelerates its position at the global tech networks to impose selective constraints. Export controls, and supply-chain reshoring initiatives under policies such as the CHIPS and Science Act aim to preserve technological asymmetry without triggering open conflict. In theory, Pax Silica offers an efficient, low-cost method of strategic competition one that avoids military tension while imposing real constraints. In the short term, this strategy has produced tangible effects. Chinese firms face rising costs, limited access to AI training hardware, and engineering inefficiencies caused by reliance on older-generation chips. These constraints do not halt innovation, but they slow down its pace. Delays in AI model training, reduced computing power, and higher capital expenditure translate into strategic friction, particularly in sensitive domains such as military simulation, autonomous systems, and advanced surveillance technologies. Pax Silica thus succeeds as a form of temporal containment: it buys time for the United States and its allies to consolidate their technological lead while complicating China’s trajectory. Moreover, Pax Silica reinforces alliance cohesion. By coordinating export controls and setting shared standards among like-minded states, the United States constructs a rules-based technological environment that China must either adapt to or bypass. This collective approach enhances the credibility of technological containment in the near future. In this sense, Pax Silica does not merely constrain China it reshapes the structure of global technological competition itself.

Limits of Technological Containment: China’s Adaptation and the Boundaries of Pax Silica

Yet, technological containment faces fundamental limitations when applied to a state like China. Unlike smaller or economically dependent countries, China possesses the scale, resources, and political capacity to counter external pressure and respond strategically. Rather than collapsing under technological denial, Beijing has increasingly turned inward accelerating domestic innovation, expanding research and development, and framing technological self-reliance as a core national objective. One of the most significant factors undermining Pax Silica’s long-term effectiveness is China’s scale advantage. With a vast population, immense data-generation capacity, and centralized state coordination, China can compensate for technological constraints in ways that most countries cannot. In artificial intelligence development, access to massive datasets can partially mitigate limitations in hardware. Over time, this allows China to pursue alternative technological pathways rather than replicating Western models exactly. Technological pressure has also strengthened China’s political narrative of self-reliance. External restrictions are framed domestically not as evidence of vulnerability, but as justification for intensified national investment. This framing reduces political costs and mobilizes long-term state support for indigenous innovation. Paradoxically, Pax Silica risks accelerating the very decoupling it seeks to avoid pushing China toward a more autonomous and resilient technological ecosystem.

The deeper limitation of Pax Silica lies in its assumption that technological superiority alone can counter a systemic rival. Technology does not operate in isolation. Political systems, economic resilience, and demographic scale shape outcomes in long-term rivalries. China’s model of technological development differs fundamentally from that of liberal market economies. Whereas Pax Silica relies on private innovation governed by legal and ethical constraints, China integrates technology directly into state strategy. This enables rapid resource mobilization, tolerance for short-term inefficiencies, and prioritization of strategic outcomes over market logic. Additionally, Pax Silica depends on sustained alliance coordination with an inherently fragile foundation. Export controls and technology governance require long-term consensus among democracies with divergent economic interests. Any fragmentation within this coalition weakens the effectiveness of containment. China, by contrast, benefits from centralized decision-making. These asymmetries suggest that while Pax Silica can shape the pace and cost of China’s rise, it cannot decisively determine its outcome.

Strategic Insights: Global South and the China Question

Beyond bilateral competition, the effectiveness of Pax Silica also depends on how it shapes the broader global technological environment, particularly in the Global South. China’s technological rise is not confined to domestic innovation alone; it is deeply intertwined with its ability to export digital infrastructure, platforms, and standards across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Through initiatives such as digital connectivity projects, smart city technologies, and affordable telecommunications infrastructure, China embeds itself within the technological ecosystems of developing states. This presents a structural challenge for Pax Silica. While advanced semiconductor controls target the upper end of the technology spectrum, much of China’s global influence operates at the middle and lower tiers, 5G networks, surveillance systems, digital payment platforms, and cloud services. For many Global South states, Chinese technology is not only cheaper but also bundled with financing, infrastructure, and political non-interference. Pax Silica, by contrast, offers technological superiority without always offering accessibility at scale. Standard-setting further complicates containment. Global governance bodies that define technical norms for telecommunications, data flows, and artificial intelligence are increasingly contested arenas. China’s active participation in international standards-setting institutions allows it to shape the technical rules that govern future digital systems. Even if Pax Silica maintains dominance over cutting-edge innovation, losing influence over standards risks eroding long-term leverage. Technological leadership without normative leadership produces an incomplete form of power.

Moreover, the perception of Pax Silica matters as much as its material strength. If technological containment is viewed by non-aligned states as exclusionary or protectionist, it may generate resistance rather than alignment. Many emerging economies seek access to technology, not participation in great-power rivalry. Without offering alternatives, Pax Silica risks reinforcing a fragmented digital order rather than consolidating global influence. These dynamic highlights a central paradox: the more Pax Silica focuses narrowly on denying China access to advanced technologies, the more space it may leave for China to consolidate influence elsewhere. Containment at the top of the value chain does not automatically translate into dominance across the broader digital arena. As a result, Pax Silica’s success in countering China depends not only on restriction, but on its capacity to provide attractive, scalable, and politically legitimate technological alternatives.

Conclusion: Constraint Without Containment

Pax Silica represents a significant evolution in how global power is exercised. By shifting strategic competition from military confrontation to technological dominance, it offers a means of managing rivalry without immediate escalation. In doing so, it has redefined the terrain of great-power competition for the digital age. Yet the evidence suggests that Pax Silica can delay and constrain, but not fully counter, China’s rise. Technological containment imposes costs and friction, but it does not neutralize the structural advantages of scale, and long-term strategic commitment that underpin China’s trajectory. Rather than preventing China’s ascent, Pax Silica reshapes it forcing adaptation rather than submission. The future global order will therefore not be decided by technological dominance alone. It will depend on how technology interacts with political legitimacy, economic resilience, and strategic vision. Pax Silica may define the rules of competition, but it cannot, by itself, determine the winner. The central question moving forward is not whether Pax Silica can counter China, but whether technological power without broader political consensus and global legitimacy can sustain a stable order in an increasingly fragmented world.

Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century: The Way Forward

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By: Ishan Singh

Pictorial representation of disarmament: source Internet

Even in the 21st century, the world is still battling many challenges such as climate change, poverty, and pandemics, but one of the biggest threats to human survival has been nuclear weapons. Saving countless lives of innocent human beings and building a world free from the threats of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the real idea of nuclear disarmament in the 21st century. Humanity’s best gift to the next generation is a nuclear-weapons-free world.

This blog explores the current happenings in the issue of nuclear disarmament and the major challenges that make progress lag in the world today. Indeed, as this blog topic presumes, we will venture beyond the simple questions relating to nuclear disarmament in the 21st century, the barriers to disarmament today, and how we can move toward a more peaceful and secure world.

Global Landscape of Nuclear Disarmament

During the initial phase of the nuclear era, nuclear weapons were adapted for a broad variety of delivery systems: artillery systems, land, air, and sea-based missiles of various ranges, as well as carrier-based and land-based aircraft. The Soviet Union had even developed nuclear landmines. Till the 1970s, important force categories of the US and Soviet Union had become less dependent on conventional warfare due to the widespread substitution of nuclear weapons for conventional weapons.

The current nuclear power list adds up to nine countries: ‘The United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.’ The global nuclear stockpile in total comes close to 13,000 weapons which even though is much lower than what it used to be during Cold War but is still well enough to pose a very huge threat to humanity.

The current world scenario is dominated by the United States and Russia, accounting for more than 9/10th of the world’s nuclear arsenal. They are currently modernizing their arsenals while also participating in arms reduction treaties, like New START, that further decreased and limited the long-range nuclear weapons of both USA and Russia. Other countries such as China, India, and Pakistan are either expanding their arms inventories or acquiring fresh weapon systems considering the regional security conditions. Since, India has its border disputes with Pakistan and China it has no choice but to carry on the work of developing its defence projects. As a matter of fact, though the UK and France have arsenals that are relatively stable, they have pressures to improve their deterrent capabilities subsequent to the changes in threats. Since 2006, the North Korean regime has steadily tried to increased its nuclear capability with frequently occurring tests causing. There are some concerns about the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program too.

Several key international agreements deal with nuclear disarmament, including the Treaty on the ‘Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)’, which intends to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and the ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW)’, which seeks to completely ban these weapons. The ‘Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)’ prohibits nuclear test explosions, but it has yet to enter into force because some key states have not ratified it.

Modern Disarmament Efforts

Arms control initiatives have transformed dramatically in recent years, especially in the context of US-Russian relations. A new START treaty came into force in 2011 and was extended for a further five years in February 2021, it thus provides a necessary framework to limit the deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each for the two nations. Although both United States and Russia, even in the wake of mounting tensions fuelled by geopolitics, had refused to pull out of the treaty in its entirety till its expiration in February 2026, there’s increasingly less hope about arms control after Russia suspended it altogether in 2023 amidst its invasion of Ukraine.

Critical bilateral and multilateral treaties that prevent nuclear proliferation and serve as the roadmap for the destruction of nuclear arsenals include the ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT)’ and the ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)’. Agreement on compliance with these treaties is almost impossible, considering the reality that nuclear-armed states have been and are still trying to increase their stockpiles. Direct diplomacy between nuclear-armed states remains an important part of trust building, cooperation enhancement, and stockpile reduction.

Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament

Various nuclear states have waged high-intensity rivalries during the twenty-first century that presented many major problems for nuclear disarmament efforts. Most notably, the United States-Russia relationship has continued to deteriorate since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has led to the suspension of key arms control treaties, most notably the New START treaty.

Meanwhile, tensions between the United States and China are increasingly rising since China is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to catch up with that of the United States, giving it an arms race mentality. In South Asia, the long-standing hostility between India and Pakistan has remained unresolved, caused by territorial disputes and military buildups, this rivalry can increase the chances of nuclear escalation in future conflicts. North Korea’s continued development of nuclear arms, however, does pose a global security threat complicating the disarmament dialogue because their government continues to test missiles even after being subjected to international sanctions.

Advances in technology, for their part, have also posed a major hurdle to the process of nuclear disarmament. The emergence of hypersonic missiles has become a nightmare for traditional deterrence strategies since the high speed at which it travels presents the challenge to be detected even by an early warning system, thus being a cause of uncertainty and a likelihood to be miscalculated or to have a false launch.

In the same way, while artificial intelligence is being integrated with armed forces systems, it boosts the capabilities of such forces in operations and leads to less human loss due to wars, but decision-making in nuclear operations is a big concern as of now. AI’s potential for errors may result in unintended nuclear escalation during crises. The AI system would misidentify a common civilian carrying arms for self-defence as an army personnel. The increase in the threats of cybersecurity increases vulnerability to the nuclear command and control systems. This is a cause of worry relating to unauthorized entry and a chance of devastating effects if cyber criminals were successful.

Steps taken towards Disarmament and way forward

The United Nations has time and again claimed that nuclear disarmament has to play the key role in the promotion of global peace and security. The UN Secretariat plays an important role in regulating nuclear proliferation while at the same time leading towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. “Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament” underlines the UN agenda, which advocates for dialogue and negotiation between nuclear states by encouraging risk-reduction measures and transparency in nuclear weapon programs. The first UN resolution in 1946 created a Commission to manage atomic energy control. It also showed a commitment to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to disarmament. The UN also played an important part in establishing several multilateral treaties aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, such as the NPT, CTBT, and TPNW.

The ‘International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’ also plays a key role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. It does this mainly through its safeguards system, which makes sure that civilian nuclear programs are not used for military purposes. The Agency checks international agreements, promoting transparency and building trust between countries. Some regional organizations and initiatives, such as ASEAN and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, are also working to establish nuclear-free zones to help reach global disarmament goals.

Balancing security and disarmament are a significant challenge for nations. They want to reduce their arsenals without jeopardizing their national security. New diplomatic methods, like phased disarmament with mutual verification and transparency, can help build trust among nations. These methods can include confidence-building actions, such as joint military exercises and sharing information. The goal is to lower tensions and create genuine opportunities for negotiation.

Conclusion

Nuclear disarmament is in every sense of the term mandatory, especially for the new century, for the fact that the mere presence of nuclear weapons becomes a serious threat to their existence but a greater threat to human race in general. With the rise of geopolitical tensions and new technological capabilities emerge, the risks of nuclear proliferation are also increasing. To stop this, world leaders and citizens must recognize that working together through diplomacy, cooperation, and significant peacebuilding projects is crucial for nuclear disarmament.

The need for nuclear disarmament is more pressing today than in the past. The existence of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to humanity. Growing geopolitical tensions and emerging technologies increase the risks of nuclear spread. It is crucial for world leaders and citizens to understand the importance of working together through diplomacy, cooperation, and strong peacebuilding efforts.

This means that nuclear disarmament in the twenty-first century should be even more urgent. The threat these weapons pose to human existence is significant. The escalating tensions create a serious potential for risks that could lead to global nuclear spread, which in turn threatens peace and global security. World leaders should recognize the need for coordinated efforts to address this issue through actions like international diplomacy, cooperation, and effective peace building.

It would require global cooperation to build trust among nations, to make disarmament talks meaningful, and to ensure a nuclear weapon-free world for future generations. The path to complete disarmament needs constant dedication and collaboration in dismantling the systems that support nuclear deterrence. This approach puts humanity first and safeguards our world.

USA’s National Security Strategy 2025: Implications for Europe

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By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

Europe: source Internet

The 2025 United States National Security Strategy (NSS), released under President Donald Trump’s administration, marks a pivotal shift toward a sovereignty centered approach, prioritizing American interests while demanding greater self-reliance from European allies. It marks a sharp departure from the language and priorities of recent administrations. President Trump believed the past US strategies to be too vague or unrealistic so he introduced the NSS to focus only on core national interests. After the cold war, United States’ leaders tried to dominate the whole world, which drained resources and exploited the middle class. The NSS acts as President Trump’s ‘correction approach’. It focuses on economic growth, industrial policy, defence, and supply-chain security as national security imperatives, not just as trade or domestic policy topics but as core instruments of statecraft. The NSS emphasizes on safety and sovereignty of the state by building the world’s strongest military which can protect the borders and take actions as per US interests. US believes in peace through strength. It also stressed upon the prevention of espionage, drugs, propaganda and uncontrolled immigration. The United States is home to the majority of immigrants and President Trump is set to take control on who enters and exits the American borders. It prioritizes on safeguarding free speech, religion and democracy. The NSS links domestic industrial revival and protection of critical technologies to geopolitical advantage, signaling that the United States will use tariffs, export controls, and targeted investment policies as instruments of national strategy.

Its Implications

The 2025 NSS amends US grand strategy in ways that matter for Europe on multiple levels. The document in its ‘America First’ frame, says, that America will prioritize direct national interests first and expect partners to shoulder more of their own defense and regional stability as it advances a narrower conception of US global responsibility. It pushes Europe for self-reliance. The doctrine’s insistence that allies must take on greater responsibility for their security logically pushes European governments to boost defense spending and capability development. For many states that is politically acceptable or necessary. For example, the German government has already adopted measures to increase military expenditure following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The US wants Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense rather than relying heavily on American support. This reprioritization does not mean US withdrawal but a rebalanced partnership. NATO allies are expected to spend more on defence. President Trump’s ‘Hague Commitment’ has set a target of 5% of the GDP for all NATO states.

The document contains unusually sharp critiques of European governments and institutions, questioning European migration, governance, and what it describes as erosion in civic culture. It also signals limits to US backing for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) enlargement. The strategy suggests NATO should not keep expanding indefinitely. This could mean fewer new members in the future and a focus on strengthening existing alliances instead of enlarging them. European capitals responded with surprise and to some extent, anger. European political leaders reacted publicly and quickly. Several EU (European Union) leaders and officials condemned the tone of the NSS and its apparent willingness to criticize European democracies. Germany’s chancellor called for Europe to become less dependent on the US for security.

One of the sharpest concrete implication concerns Ukraine. The US is interested to negotiate a quick end to the Ukraine war to stabilize Europe and prevent escalation of the conflict. It emphasizes on restoring ‘strategic stability’ with Russia, which could mean encouraging Europe to accept compromises for peace. This posture of America increases the pressure on Europe to become the primary security broker for Ukraine’s future, role European nations are not uniformly prepared to accept. This is a shift from open-ended support for Ukraine toward a settlement that prioritizes stability. International relations (IR) experts and analysts worry that the NSS’s messaging about NATO expansion and its emphasis on regional responsibility could be read in Russia as a window for aggressive diplomacy or coercion. European publics and policymakers in countries bordering Russia and in those with high stakes in Ukraine’s future fear that US’s signaling might embolden Russia’s bargaining position or reduce the appetite in the US for strong deterrence measures in Europe. Media and think-tank commentary suggests that the NSS’s combination of praise for nationalist movements in some allied states and its critique of European governance risks inflaming division within Europe itself. The document criticizes Europe’s low birthrates, migration policies, censorship, and loss of national identity. It implies the US will support European movements that promote national sovereignty, cultural revival, and resistance to EU-style transnational governance. This could help in emboldening the nationalist or populist parties across Europe. The NSS will affect domestic politics in European democracies. The document’s critique of certain European policy choices and its apparent sympathy in tone towards nationalist movements may embolden far-right parties that already favor closer ties with the US administration responsible for the NSS. Pro-Atlantic parties will face pressure to demonstrate both independence and competence in national security. This dynamic could increase polarization, complicate coalition-building, and make sustained transatlantic coordination more difficult.

The NSS emphasizes on economic security. Reshoring, secure supply chains, and protection of critical technologies will prove to be both, advantageous and disadvantageous for Europe. European leaders share an interest in protecting semiconductor production, critical minerals, biotech and other strategic industries and coordinated industrial policy between the US and EU could yield mutual resilience but a competitive mercantilist streak in US policy could increase trade friction, pressure European firms to choose between markets and accelerate de-globalization trends. The NSS makes it likelier that United States will adopt unilateral measures such as tariffs, investment screens, export controls, etc. to protect domestic industry and forcing Europe to respond with its own defences or accept regulatory divergence. America wants Europe to combat Chinese overcapacity, tech theft, and cyber espionage. Europe is urged to open markets to US goods and treat American businesses fairly. This means that Europe will be pushed to align more closely with US trade and technology policies.

The NSS essentially accelerates Europe’s trend of moving towards strategic autonomy. This has positive sides for Europe. A Europe capable of credible defense, stronger industrial bases, and independent diplomacy would be less vulnerable to external coercion and better able to act as a global security actor in its own right. A more capable Europe would also be a stronger partner to the United States on shared challenges like China’s assertiveness, climate security, and technological governance but strategic autonomy is not a binary switch. Building military capabilities, industrial capacity and political strength will take time and resources. European states remain interdependent with the US for nuclear deterrence, power projection, certain intelligence capabilities and advanced defense technologies. The optimal path is therefore not autarky but ‘strategic sovereignty’. This means strengthening European capacities while preserving the institutionalized transatlantic cooperation that delivers unique value. The NSS’s challenge is to push Europeans toward this middle ground.

Despite criticism, the United States sees Europe as vital for global stability and prosperity. Transatlantic trade, science, and culture remain central pillars. The US wants a ‘strong Europe’ that can partner in preventing adversaries like Russia or China from dominating the continent. Europe must redefine its role with discipline, ensuring priorities like Russian deterrence are defended amid US recalibration. Unity requires accepting US-led diplomacy, internal cohesion, and economic hardening to remain indispensable. Failure risks strategic irrelevance, but renewal could strengthen the West against shared threats. The 2025 US National Security Strategy is a political and strategic provocation as much as it is doctrine.​ The NSS shapes years of US policy, pushing Europe towards sovereignty. Transatlantic ties endure but evolve, with Europe’s agency pivotal in a competitive era.

USA’s National Security Strategy 2025: Will it Deter China from Attacking Taiwan?

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By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Titular representative picture: source Internet

The strategic rivalry between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China has become the central axis of international politics today. Among the many flashpoints arising from this rivalry, Taiwan remains the most dangerous and consequential. Taiwan’s political status, democratic identity, economic importance, and strategic location at the heart of the Indo-Pacific make it a focal point for regional stability and global security. As Washington articulates its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan stands as a core objective. The strategy is expected to outline how the United States of America intends to preserve peace, reassure allies, and manage competition with China without triggering a major war. This article examines whether the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is likely to deter China from attacking Taiwan by analysing the strategic environment, deterrence logic, military posture, economic and technological tools, alliance dynamics, diplomatic signalling, and the broader limitations that shape deterrence outcomes.

Strategic Context of National Security Strategy 2025

The National Security Strategy is the principal document through which the United States of America outlines its perception of threats and defines long-term priorities. By 2025, the international system will likely still be marked by persistent great power rivalry rather than periodic crisis. The rapid economic growth and technological advances of China, as well as large-scale military modernization, have finally positioned China to challenge the United States of America’s influence in various dimensions. The government in Washington increasingly characterizes Beijing’s actions as revisionist, with a particular emphasis on maritime Asia, as China pursues greater dominion over nearby waters and political outcomes.

Taiwan occupies a uniquely sensitive position within this strategic context. The Chinese leadership considers Taiwan as an integral part of the national territory and has proclaimed on several occasions that the issue cannot be passed on indefinitely to future generations. Over the past years, China has mounted pressure on Taiwan through military exercises, frequent air and naval operations near the island, cyber intrusions, and diplomatic efforts aimed at shrinking Taiwan’s international space. These activities aim at signalling resolve, testing responses, and gradually changing the status quo. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is expected to frame Taiwan not only as a regional concern but also as a measure of the United States of America’s credibility and commitment in the Indo-Pacific.

Deterrence Theory and the United States of America’s Policy Toward Taiwan

Deterrence works by affecting an adversary’s calculus about cost, benefit, and probability of success. In the Taiwan scenario, deterrence is intended to persuade the PRC that any employment of force will result either in military defeat or in unacceptable political, economic, and strategic consequences. The integrated deterrence that will most probably be stressed in the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) unites military capability, economic leverage, diplomatic coordination, technological robustness, and informational influence in one strategic framework.

The basis of the policy of the United States of America toward Taiwan has, for decades, been strategic ambiguity. It aims to deter the People’s Republic of China from using force while discouraging Taiwan from unilateral declarations of independence. Strategic ambiguity has contributed to stability in the past, but growing confidence and expanding military capabilities have raised doubts about its continued effectiveness. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) may therefore maintain ambiguity in formal statements while strengthening practical measures that enhance deterrence credibility and reduce incentives for aggression.

Military Foundations of Deterrence

Military power remains the most visible and immediate component of deterrence against a potential attack on Taiwan. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) is expected to give priority to the goal of maintaining a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. It includes continuous investments in naval forces, airpower, long-range precision strike capabilities, missile defence systems, space resilience, and cyber operations. These assets are designed to deny China the ability to attain a quick or decisive victory in a conflict over Taiwan.

Force posture adjustments further reinforce deterrence: forward-deployed forces, rotational presence, and access improvements to regional facilities reduce response times and increase operational flexibility. Regular joint exercises with allies build interoperability and signal readiness. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) will probably highlight these measures as concrete expressions of determination and readiness.

Support for Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities is yet another key pillar of military deterrence. The United States of America has increasingly focused on providing asymmetric systems tailored to counter amphibious assaults and air operations. Capabilities such as mobile missile launchers, air defence platforms, maritime surveillance systems, and unmanned technologies are all supposed to increase the operational cost of any invasion. If effectively integrated into Taiwan’s defence planning, these capabilities strengthen deterrence by denial and complicate the Chinese military calculations.

Economic and Technological Aspects of Deterrence

In the modern strategic competition, deterrence is no longer confined to traditional military spheres. Economic strength and technological leadership are increasingly vital in determining national power and strategic consequence. Taiwan’s preeminence in advanced semiconductor fabrication grants it an exceptional status in the international economy. Any disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would impact supply chains crucial for everything from consumer electronics to leading-edge weapons systems.

The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) will likely identify economic resilience and technological security as integral to national defence. Investments in domestic manufacturing capacity, supply chain diversification, and research and development would reduce vulnerabilities, with close technological cooperation with trusted partners, such as Taiwan, being retained. In this way, economic interdependence will not be able to develop into a strategic vulnerability.

Second, economic deterrence encompasses the credible threat of collective sanctions and trade restrictions should aggression occur. Sanctions against a large economy such as China would be costly for all parties involved, but the threat of prolonged economic harm may help alter the Chinese decision calculus. The forthcoming National Security Strategy 2025 ( NSS 2025) will probably highlight multilateral coordination as key to making economic deterrence plausible and impactful.

Alliance and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

The alliance remains one of the greatest strategic advantages of the United States of America. The National Security Strategy 2025 is likely to reiterate that alliances magnify deterrence through the sharing of burdens, pooling capabilities, and signalling collective resolve. In the Taiwan context, Japan’s role is particularly significant due to its geographic proximity and its own security concerns regarding regional stability.

There is also a need to enhance defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint planning with the allies to increase the credibility of deterrence. Strengthening the partnership with Australia, the Philippines, and other regional actors further complicated China’s strategic calculus. The possibility that a conflict over Taiwan could escalate into a broader regional confrontation increases the potential costs of aggression and hence reinforces deterrence.

Similarly, minilateral frameworks and flexible coalitions will also be featured prominently in the National Security Strategy 2025. Minilateral arrangements enable targeted cooperation on discreet security challenges without a set of formal obligations required of traditional alliances. Collectively, these partnerships demonstrate unity of purpose and reduce the likelihood that China could isolate Taiwan diplomatically or militarily.

Diplomatic Signalling and Crisis Management

Deterrence is a function not just of strength, but also of communication. Clear and consistent signalling reduces the prospect of misinterpretation and unintended escalation. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 205) will likely reinforce commitments to channels of dialogue with China, including military communication mechanisms, as a means of crisis management to lower the risks of accidents or miscalculations during times of heightened tension.

At the same time, diplomatic engagement with Taiwan has gradually expanded. High-level interactions, trade initiatives, and support for Taiwan’s participation in international forums signal a sustained commitment without formally altering long-standing policy positions. These actions contribute to deterrence by showing that Taiwan is not isolated and that the United States of America remains invested in its security and resilience.

Limitations and Challenges of Deterrence

These steps notwithstanding, deterrence is intrinsically uncertain and manifoldly constrained. The Chinese leadership may feel that its increasing military power and degree of economic leverage decrease the risks of an attack against Taiwan. Domestic considerations of political nature, such as nationalism and regime legitimacy, may also influence strategic choices being made in Beijing.

Accelerating technological changes further complicate deterrence dynamics. Cyber operations, space capabilities, and information warfare blur the distinction between peace and conflict. Gray zone activities provide the possibility of incremental pressure without crossing thresholds toward a full-scale military response. The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) must hence engage with a wide spectrum of challenges extending beyond conventional warfare scenarios.

Sustaining political will is another important factor. Deterrence is a function of credibility, and the latter depends on consistent policy, alliance cohesion, and commitment of resources for the long term. China will closely monitor domestic debates in the United States of America and political splits among allies in assessing whether intervention can be sustained in a Taiwan contingency.

Assessment of Deterrence Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) at deterring China is, of course, a matter of perception. If Beijing believes that the costs of military action would exceed any potential gain, deterrence will likely hold. Integrated deterrence makes this approach more credible by melding military readiness with economic leverage, diplomatic coordination, and technological resilience.

However, deterrence is not a static condition. It requires a continuous adaptation to evolving circumstances and sustained investment over time. While the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) can significantly lower the possibility of war, it is not possible to altogether eradicate the danger element. Strategic miscalculations, domestic pressures, or unforeseen crises could still undermine stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Broader Strategic Implications

Beyond immediate deterrence, the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) shapes long-term expectations across the Indo-Pacific. The way in which the United States of America approaches the Taiwan issue informs regional views on questions of leadership, reliability, and commitment. A coherent and consistent strategy reassures allies and partners, while ambiguity or inconsistency could embolden hedging behaviour and foster strategic uncertainty.

The Taiwan Strait is also one of the most economically important maritime corridors in the world. Any conflict would disrupt trade flow, energy supplies, and financial markets on a global scale. Preventing conflict, therefore, supports not only regional security but also global economic stability and shared prosperity.

Domestic politics and strategic signalling play core roles in driving deterrence outcomes. Bipartisan concern about coercion in the Indo-Pacific in the United States of America strengthens deterrence through policy continuity. Nationalism and regime legitimacy are shaping risk tolerance in China, where signalling is a delicate matter as aggression would create sustained consequences.

Information warfare and strategic narratives also shape deterrence. Countering disinformation, reinforcing shared values, and supporting transparent communication strengthen international support for stability. Stability signalling through consistency, restraint, and preparedness remains essential for preventing miscalculation during periods of heightened tension. Success will depend over time on coordination across military planning, economic policy, alliance diplomacy, and sustained public communication. These reinforce credibility and strengthen deterrence. They produce durable regional stability and have served to manage competition responsibly, diminish escalation risks, and preserve strategic balance.

Conclusion

The National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) of the United States of America is designed to prevent an attack by China on Taiwan through an integrated approach that encompasses military strength, economic and technological tools, alliance networks, and disciplined diplomacy. Although deterrence can never be certain, a credible and sustained strategy dramatically increases the likelihood that peace and stability are maintained across the Taiwan Strait. To help manage competition, including preventing a conflict with profound consequences for regional and global security, the National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) reinforces the need for commitment, adaptability, and cooperation.

INAS 335: A New Chapter in the Indian Navy’s Rotary Wing Modernisation

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

INAS 335: source Internet

INAS 335 the Indian Navy’s second MH 60R squadron represents a clear inflection point in the Indian Navy’s rotary wing modernisation, translating years of planning for the MH‑60R Seahawk into a dedicated, shipborne helicopter squadron. Focused on delivering multi‑role, networked air power from the decks of frontline warships, the squadron marks the transition from legacy platforms to a contemporary generation of maritime helicopters.

Rotary Wing Modernisation Thrust

The raising of INAS 335 is part of a deliberate, long‑term effort to recapitalise the Navy’s ship‑borne helicopter fleet. Indian Navy’s drive towards a modern blue‑water force has given a decisive upgrade of its shipborne helicopter fleet. INAS 335 builds on this foundation by fielding a platform conceived from the outset for demanding shipborne roles, bringing rotary wing capability in step with the reach and sophistication of the fleet’s major combatants enhancing their reach.

The MH‑60R aircraft with INAS 335 originate from a 24‑helicopter acquisition programme concluded under Foreign Military Sales, reflecting careful planning of assets, training human capital and sustainment. This programme underpins a broader shift towards network‑enabled, multi‑mission helicopters that can seamlessly plug into task‑group operations in the Indian Navy’s fleet.

A True Multi‑Mission Squadron

INAS 335 will be operating the MH‑60R helicopters designed for all‑weather, day‑and‑night operations across a wide spectrum of missions. The platform is optimised for anti‑submarine warfare, anti-shipping and anti‑surface warfare, while also being configured for search and rescue, medical evacuation and vertical replenishment at sea. This mission versatility makes the squadron a flexible tool in the hands of operational commanders both at shore and afloat.  It can shift rapidly from a high‑end combat role to humanitarian or logistics tasks, ensuring that critical aviation support is available across the full range of naval operations from peacetime presence to crisis response.

Technology Driving Capability

The MH‑60R at the core of INAS 335 represents a substantial technological leap over earlier generations of ship‑borne helicopters. An integrated suite of dipping sonar, sonobuoys, maritime surveillance radar and electronic support measures enables the aircraft to build a detailed picture of surface and sub‑surface activity around the force. Onboard data fusion and secure data links allow sensor information to be combined and shared with ship combat systems in real time.  This compresses the detect‑to‑engage timeline, reduces uncertainty in the underwater domain and helps commanders make timely decisions in demanding tactical situations.

Extending the Fleet’s Reach and Protection

Operating from fleet ships, INAS 335 extends the protective envelope around naval task groups well beyond the horizon. The aircraft enhances the fleet’s awareness and influence on the high seas. It can rapidly investigate contacts and create a protective ASW and ASuW envelope around task groups, directly contributing to the survivability and confidence of surface forces deployed far from shore. Armed with lightweight torpedoes and other precision weapons, the MH‑60R can convert situational awareness into decisive action, when tasked by the Commander’s.

This combination of reach, persistence and credible firepower significantly enhances the survivability and freedom of manoeuvre of surface forces operating far from the mainland. The operational validations gives the modernisation effort practical credibility, proving that new rotary capabilities are not just theoretical enhancements but field‑tested tools which are ready for action.

Proven in Operations and Exercises

Even before the formalisation of it’s second MH‑60R squadron, MH 60R helicopters have already been employed extensively in fleet activities and have proved their worth in Operation Sindoor and major fleet exercises such including bilateral/ multilateral exercises, demonstrating reliability, interoperability and tactical effectiveness alongside Indian and partner‑nation forces.

INAS 335 builds on this operational foundation by providing a dedicated, cohesive unit focused on optimising tactics, procedures and training for the MH‑60R.  The squadron’s work will further refine how these helicopters are integrated with the IN fleet and joint task forces across the Indian Ocean Region.

Building a Future‑Ready Rotary Force

INAS 335 also anchors a new training and professional ecosystem for rotary‑wing operators, maintainers and planners. Exposure to complex avionics, mission systems and ship–air integration norms prepares personnel for a future in which helicopters are tightly woven into the Navy’s wider network‑centric architecture. As a result, the squadron becomes both an operational unit and a template for subsequent rotary‑wing inductions, influencing doctrine, tactics and sustainment model for naval aviation.

In this sense, INAS 335 is not only a new squadron number on the order of battle, but the leading edge of a broader transformation in how the Indian Navy conceives, equips and employs its rotary‑wing force.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

China’s Last Lap for Taiwan: Time for Military Alliance

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By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

China & Taiwan’s flags: source Internet

Giulio Douhet, the famous Italian army general, regarded as the Father of Strategic Air Power’s statement in the 20th Century “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur,” holds equal if not more weight in the 21st Century too, as modern warfare now encompasses six official domains and numerous unofficial domains.

On January 17, 1999, the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf War, two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui released their book “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s master plan to destroy America”. The date chosen for release of the book had special significance as the Gulf War of 1991 was the first war of the modern era in which computers were used to take out the daily flight plans of over 1000 fighter aircrafts that were operating in Iraq as part of the US-led 42-nation multi-coalition force. For the first time ever, computers were used in live military operations.

The 196-page well-written book had just a simple message to convey that anything that can be weaponised, will be weaponised. The book did not garner much interest in the USA for many years after its release, till it was too late and China had overtaken the USA in economic, military and diplomatic power. The book now is a compulsory-read in most of the US military training institutions and combat formations. A typical example of “Too little, too late”.

After the success of the Gulf War of 1991, militarily known as Operation Desert Storm, which lasted from January 17, 1991 to February 28, 1991 saw the USA led 42-nation coalition, exhibiting unprecedent level of professionalism that included a whopping 1000 aircraft sorties being undertaken daily, which were totally decided by computers based on the daily inputs given, USA promulgated the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, replacing the Airland Battle Doctrine of 1982.

The Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine of 2001enshrined that the cumulative effect of dominance in air, land, maritime, space domains and information environment that includes cyberspace, that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference. This would espouse a strategic intent capable of achieving full spectrum superiority in a conflict, enabling the control of any situation across the range of military operations, by defeating any adversary.

Surprisingly, China became the only nation in the world to publicly declare its competency and capability to fight any nation in the world in consonance with the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine. In 2014, PLA in its military doctrine called Joint Integrated Operations stated that it is ready to fight any country anywhere in the world in all the six-domains of war consisting Land, Sea, Air, Cyber, Electromagnetic Spectrum and Space.

Interestingly, such a declaration has not been made till date by any other military of the world including USA, who despite propounding the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001, lay basking in its success of the 1991 Gulf War, whilst China stealthily and secretly worked towards establishing supremacy in the full spectrum operations warfare, pretty much understanding well how the future modern wars would be fought.

For China, the first and foremost military aim is annexing Taiwan.

China’s earlier military attempts for Taiwan

The past six decades have seen three major conflagrations between China and Taiwan which are called as the First, Second and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis also called as the Formosa Crisis occurred during the period September 03, 1954 to May 01, 1955. It was a brief conflict between China and Taiwan over a group of islands in the Taiwan Strait that were under Taiwan but China staked claim over them by shelling the Kinmen Island. Subsequently China seized Yijiangshan Islands from Taiwan. This led to Taiwan abandoning the Tachen Islands. This conflict saw 519 Chinese soldiers and 393 Taiwanese soldiers killed. This crisis ended after the USA threatened the use of nuclear weapons on China and the erstwhile USSR refused any help to China. This crisis also resulted in the Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty between USA and Taiwan.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis also called as the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis took place during August 23-December 02, 1958 saw China shelling the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. It included a naval battle between China and Taiwan which saw the Taiwanese Navy getting the better of the PLA Navy. This conflict saw 514 Chinese soldiers dead and 460 Taiwanese soldiers killed. China saw it’s one ship and two fighter jets destroyed whilst Taiwan lost 31 fighter jets. The US Navy sent additional warships to the Taiwan Strait as a show of strength of its support to Taiwan. This further escalated the Chinese aggression. This crisis ended as China was faced with a stalemate as its artillery had run out of shells and China declared a unilateral ceasefire as the US Navy moved the warships in the Taiwan Strait.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis which lasted from July 21, 1994 to March 23, 1996 was a result of a series of missile tests conducted by China in the waters surrounding Taiwan as a strong signal to the Taiwanese government under Lee Teng-hui who was seen as having a strong foreign policy and to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election. The US sent its naval Seventh Fleet which included the aircraft carriers USS Independence and USS Nimitz. Seeing the heavy American military build-up in the Taiwan Strait, China ended this crisis quietly without any loss of life on either side.

There were two important lessons that China learnt from the earlier failed three military attempts for Taiwan – lack of nuclear weapons and a small navy.

During the First & Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, China had no nuclear weapons. China with the aid of USSR under President Nikita Khrushchev, began its nuclear programme in 1958 and subsequently conducted in first nuclear test in Lop Nur, Xinjiang on October 16, 1964 under a project codenamed as Project 596. Since then, China has progressed steadily and at the end of 2024 possesses 600 nuclear weapons with the aim of acquiring 1000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1500 by 2035.

To capture Taiwan, Xi Jinping realised that China has to have a formidable navy as not only Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will play a pivotal role in the military operations for Taiwan, but it will also have to be formidable enough to take on the US Navy, which in 2013 was the biggest navy in the world, with 287 warships and submarines, while China had 273 warships and submarines in the same year.

Clearly, the numbers were grossly inadequate of PLAN to take on the might of the US Navy and to deal with multiple maritime challenges like securing the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait Dilemma, in case China was to go to war with USA over Taiwan.

Xi Jinping was clear that China’s national maritime power had to stepped-up if the China Dream was to materialise. Though the PLAN had surpassed the US Navy in size in 2015 but Xi Jinping was not contended with such statistics. In April 2018, Xi Jinping stated that “the task of building a powerful navy has never been urgent as it is today”. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper encapsulated the need for a modernised and strong navy that is capable of carrying out missions in the far seas. With this in mind, PLAN was told to construct two aircraft carriers, 21 nuclear submarines and 200 warships by 2030.

In comparison 55 warships and submarines of the US Navy are under construction while 67 warships and submarines of the Indian Navy are being constructed.

Work on constructing the warships and submarines started in right earnest in the six biggest and important shipyards of China – Bohai, Dalian, Jiangnan, Hudong Zhonghua, Wuchang and Huangpu Wenchong.

The results bore fruits. As of 2024 the PLAN with a lead of 90 warships and submarines over the US Navy, has 370 warships and submarines whilst the US Navy has 280 warships and submarines. In contrast, the Indian Navy has 150 warships and submarines as of 2024 whilst the Taiwan Navy has 90 warships and submarines.

China’s war for Taiwan in 2027

On February 03, 2023, William Burns, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA officially tasked with gathering, processing and analysing national security information from around the world, said in a statement that USA and China will go to war over Taiwan in 2027. On January 17, 2024 Grant Shapps, the British Defence Secretary warned of multiple war theatres opening up in the next five years which would involve Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command on October 28, 2024 said that China is carrying out the largest military buildup since World War II, perhaps in world history. And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

President Xi Jinping on October 06, 2023 while on a visit to Indonesia to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Summit told Vincent Siew, the Taiwanese envoy to the summit that the issue of Taiwan being physical part of China cannot be passed from generation to generation. A clear indication, that during Xi Jinping’s term in office the issue of Taiwan would be settled once and for all.

Since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in 1996, China is now the undisputed leader in all the six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space. Given Russia’s unwavering support to China and USA’s disinterest in the Indo-Pacific region clearly evident in US’ National Security Strategy 2025 made public on December 04, 2025 shows that the three Superpowers are now in an informal alliance called the G3 which this author had correctly predicted in his article on August 31, 2025. USA’s National Security Strategy 2025 talks of “spheres of influences” and disregards Russia & China as threats.

In March 2025, the American Portrait Survey found that 59.6% Taiwanese citizens do not consider the United States trustworthy. The Brookings Institution Report released on April 25, 2025 noted that 60.9% of the Taiwanese disagreed with the statement that “Taiwan is safer than before with Trump as President”. The Taiwanese are absolutely correct and the National Security Strategy 2025 of USA puts all speculations to rest whether USA will aid Taiwan in case of a military aggression by China on the island nation.

Further, the US military has lost its might to take-on the PLA, even if by quirk of circumstances the USA decides to aid Taiwan militarily. On April 12, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the Defence Secretary of the 47th US President Donald Trump’s administration shocked the world when in a candid statement he admitted that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy the 11 US Navy aircraft carriers in just 20 minutes. He further added that in every war game conducted in the US Military, the Americans always loose to the Chinese. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios.

The Pentagon’s “Overmatch Brief”, the US government’s top-secret document submitted in 2021 but whose details have come in the public domain on December 11, 2025 unambiguously states that China would defeat the US militarily in any conflict over Taiwan.

Ukraine has lost about 20% of its territory (roughly the size of Taiwan) to Russia in the ongoing war between the two neighbours and President Donald Trump has time and again made it clear that Ukraine will never get back this territory as and when this war ends. The USA or any other NATO nation will not help Taiwan militarily.

And, Taiwan alone is incapable of taking on the Chinese military might.

Time for Military Alliance

With USA pulling away from the Indo-Pacific region as clearly enumerated in its National Security Strategy 2025, the Quad has virtually collapsed as was evident after President Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025 and so has AUKUS.

In almost eleven months of President Donald Trump’s second Presidential tenure, no Quad heads of state summit involving USA, India, Japan and Australia has been held. The way USA is going hammer and tongs on India, it is unlikely that any Quad heads of state summit will be held till President Donald Trump’s tenure comes to an end on January 20, 2029.

The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom has announced its decision on December 09, 2025 to reduce its deployment and overseas training in the Indo-Pacific region for a period of four years. Thus, the AUKUS alliance comprising USA, the United Kingdom and Australia too has slipped into comatose.

The Indo-Pacific region stands open for China. And with Taiwan falling, the next two wars that China will wage will be for Spratly Islands and Arunachal Pradesh in India.

The time is now opportune to form a military alliance between the six nations Taiwan, India, Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea which are to go to war with China in the next ten years for three reasons. One, there is no military alliance that exists in the Indo-Pacific Region amongst the countries that are facing the maximum threat due to China’s ever increasing military power. Two, China only understands a strong military language and these seven countries are incapable as on date to fight China singly. Three, no nation has ever won a two-front war.

With the near-collapse of Quad and AUKUS, there is no alliance whatsoever in the Indo-Pacific region which can stand against the growing Chinese aggressiveness. USA, the main pivot of both Quad and AUKUS is no longer the force that is interested in keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open as envisaged in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, also known as the FOIP strategy or simply as the Indo-Pacific Strategy published by the United States Department of State as a formalised concept on November 04, 2019.

History is replete with examples of the formidable strength the military alliances have. The most striking example being the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation whose Article 5 clearly states that an attack on any one NATO member-nation will be deemed as attack on all member-nations. No wonder, Russia till date hasn’t attacked any NATO member-nation.

General MM Naravane (Retd), the 28th Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army wrote on July 29, 2023 that no nation has ever won a two-front war. China, if confronted with the two-front war threat of engaging militarily with Taiwan on its eastern part and with India on its western part, will not make the move of attacking Taiwan.

With the growing proximity of China, Pakistan & Bangladesh, the security situation for India too is becoming grim. General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces on July 08, 2025 remarked that the convergence of interest between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh will have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.

2027 isn’t too distant away. Stephen Kinzer’s quote “Alliances and partnerships produce stability when they reflect realities and interests” holds deep meaning for the Indo-Pacific region and Asia where China’s reality of its military aims is no secret and for countries like Taiwan, India and the other littoral nations of the South China Sea, the interests have converged to stop China’s hegemonic designs. A military alliance is the only answer. Any delay will be detrimental, for the fall of Taiwan will spell disaster for democracy and rules-based world order.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

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