By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Regionalism in Asia presents a paradox of uneven outcomes. While ASEAN has evolved into a resilient platform for cooperation, SAARC remains institutionally stagnant. This article compares their origins, structures, and political contexts to explain how institutional design, power asymmetry, and conflict management shape the success or failure of regional cooperation.

 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established with the signing of the SAARC Charter in Dhaka on 8 December 1985, was conceived as a regional mechanism to promote economic growth, social development, and collective self-reliance among its eight member states. Despite its broad mandate and institutional framework, SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by structural constraints—most notably unanimity-based decision-making and the exclusion of bilateral disputes—which have paralysed summit-level engagement. Enduring geopolitical tensions, particularly between India and Pakistan, have stalled regional cooperation, resulting in minimal intra-regional trade and weak policy coordination. Although recent sectoral initiatives, anniversary statements, and calls for revival—especially from Bangladesh and smaller member states—suggest limited residual relevance, the growing shift toward sub-regional arrangements such as BIMSTEC and BBIN reflects SAARC’s declining centrality in South Asian regionalism in the absence of political consensus and institutional reform.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok with the signing of the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, later expanding to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999), forming the ten-member bloc it is today. ASEAN’s Charter, launched in 2008 in Jakarta, transformed the organization into a legal entity and set the foundation for an “EU-style community” aiming at deeper regional integration, economic cooperation, and collective engagement in global affairs. Since then, ASEAN has pursued ambitious goals in trade liberalization, political cooperation, and social development. In recent years, the bloc has taken significant steps in strengthening its regional role: at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur (October 2025), leaders welcomed Timor-Leste as the bloc’s 11th member and endorsed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord to de-escalate the Cambodia-Thailand border crisis, demonstrating ASEAN’s capacity to mediate regional disputes. ASEAN also articulated a five-year strategic plan (2026-2030) to accelerate economic integration, enhance digital infrastructure, and promote sustainable development amid shifting geopolitical currents. Concurrently, ASEAN initiatives have advanced cooperation on education transformation, higher education resilience, and environment protection, while the bloc continues grappling with complex challenges such as implementing its peace plan in Myanmar and navigating the strategic interests of external powers in the Indo-Pacific. These developments reflect ASEAN’s evolving role as a central platform for multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, even as it contends with structural challenges and external geopolitical pressures. 

Formation and Conceptual Foundations of SAARC

The idea of South Asian regional cooperation predates the establishment of SAARC by several decades, evident in early initiatives such as the Asian Relations Conference (1947), the Baguio Conference (1950), and the Colombo Powers Conference (1954). These efforts reflected post-colonial aspirations for solidarity, economic cooperation, and collective self-reliance among newly independent states. However, they failed to evolve into formal institutions due to deep political mistrust, unresolved bilateral disputes, and the constraining influence of Cold War alignments. A decisive shift occurred in 1979 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which destabilized South Asia and heightened awareness of the region’s vulnerability to external powers. This security shock accelerated efforts toward regional institutionalization, culminating in the establishment of SAARC in 1985. Significantly, SAARC was designed as a non-political and non-security-oriented forum, deliberately excluding bilateral disputes from its agenda—an institutional compromise shaped by prevailing mutual suspicions among member states.

India–Pakistan Divergences and Institutional Design

India and Pakistan’s initial skepticism played a central role in shaping SAARC’s institutional architecture. India’s reservations stemmed from its regional primacy as the largest political and economic actor in South Asia. New Delhi feared that a multilateral framework might enable smaller neighbours to internationalize bilateral disputes, particularly Kashmir, form balancing coalitions against India, and constrain its strategic autonomy. Consequently, India insisted on principles of sovereign equality, non-interference, and the exclusion of security matters from SAARC’s mandate. Pakistan, in contrast, viewed SAARC through the prism of strategic rivalry and economic asymmetry. It feared that regional cooperation would consolidate India’s economic dominance, marginalize Pakistan diplomatically, and allow India to bypass core political disputes while projecting regional leadership. This mutual distrust resulted in a deliberately weak institutional structure, consensus-based decision-making, and an avoidance of contentious political issues—features that have continued to limit SAARC’s effectiveness.

Institutionalization, Expansion, and Contested Regional Identity

Despite these constraints, SAARC’s formal establishment was made possible through diplomatic leadership by Bangladesh. Between 1979 and 1980, consultations among South Asian UN representatives in New York led Bangladesh to draft a working paper that provided the basis for intergovernmental discussions. These efforts culminated in the first SAARC Summit held in Dhaka on 7–8 December 1985, symbolizing cautious collective commitment to regional cooperation. SAARC’s expansion with Afghanistan’s accession further exposed conceptual ambiguities regarding South Asian identity. Afghanistan’s application in 2005 generated intense debate, as it occupies a geopolitical crossroads between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. While the requirement to hold democratic elections prior to accession reflected SAARC’s normative aspirations, Afghanistan’s inclusion in 2007 also underscored the organization’s limited capacity to manage internal instability. The presence of numerous observer states—including China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union—highlighted SAARC’s strategic importance, even as meaningful regional integration remained elusive.

Contemporary Relevance and Persistent Stagnation

The structural weaknesses embedded at SAARC’s inception are clearly reflected in contemporary developments. The cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad following the 2016 Uri terrorist attack marked a critical rupture, as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan jointly boycotted the meeting, leading to institutional paralysis. Since then, no SAARC summit has been convened, with India increasingly prioritizing alternative regional and sub-regional frameworks such as BIMSTEC and broader Indo-Pacific partnerships. Although the COVID-19 SAARC Emergency Fund initiative in 2020 briefly revived engagement, disagreements over leadership and management revealed enduring trust deficits, particularly between India and Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan’s political transformation after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 has further complicated SAARC’s revival. Despite encompassing 21% of the world’s population and over 5% of global GDP, SAARC continues to function largely as a declaratory forum rather than an operational regional organization, constrained by unresolved security dilemmas, contested regional identity, and entrenched power asymmetries.

Origins and Formation of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) evolved from earlier attempts at regional cooperation, most notably the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established on 31 July 1961 by Thailand, the Philippines, and the Federation of Malaya. While ASA reflected early regionalist aspirations, its limited membership and weak institutional base constrained its effectiveness. A more comprehensive and enduring framework emerged on 8 August 1967 with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The Declaration articulated ASEAN’s core objectives: accelerating economic growth, promoting social progress and cultural development, fostering regional peace and stability, encouraging mutual assistance in training and research, enhancing cooperation in agriculture and industry, and maintaining constructive relations with international organizations. From its inception, ASEAN was envisioned as a pragmatic and flexible institution grounded in cooperation rather than formal supranationalism.

Cold War Context and Early Consolidation

ASEAN’s creation was strongly shaped by Cold War dynamics, particularly the desire of Southeast Asian states to contain the spread of communism and insulate the region from great-power rivalries. This shared security concern provided early cohesion among member states, which was further strengthened in the mid-1970s following major geopolitical shifts, including the fall of Saigon, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). ASEAN’s first summit, held in Bali in 1976, marked a significant step toward institutional consolidation with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. These agreements formalized principles of non-interference, peaceful dispute resolution, and regional solidarity, laying the normative foundation for ASEAN’s long-term stability and cooperation.

Post–Cold War Expansion and Functional Cooperation

The end of the Cold War enabled ASEAN to exercise greater regional political autonomy and expand its functional scope. During the 1990s, ASEAN emerged as a key regional actor in trade liberalization and security dialogue, positioning itself as a central platform for regional multilateralism. The signing of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995 further underscored ASEAN’s collective commitment to regional peace and security. Beyond strategic considerations, ASEAN’s cohesion has been reinforced by shared historical and cultural linkages, as Southeast Asia has long functioned as a crossroads between East Asia and South Asia, influenced by Islamic, Persian, and later European interactions. This combination of strategic pragmatism and cultural interconnectedness has enabled ASEAN to deepen cooperation while accommodating political diversity among its members.

Contemporary Dynamics and Institutional Adaptability

Today, ASEAN comprises ten member states with a total area of over 4.5 million square kilometres and an estimated population of approximately 668 million. Symbolically, the ten stalks of rice in the ASEAN flag represent unity and shared prosperity among its members. ASEAN has also made tangible progress in people-to-people connectivity, particularly through the institutionalization of visa-free travel, which has significantly increased intra-ASEAN tourism—by 2010, nearly half of all tourists within ASEAN originated from member states themselves. At the same time, ASEAN has faced unprecedented challenges, notably Myanmar’s political crisis since 2017, which has tested the organization’s principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making. ASEAN’s evolving response to Myanmar reflects a gradual but significant shift in its institutional character, highlighting its capacity for adaptation while striving to preserve unity and regional credibility.

Why ASEAN Worked Where SAARC Stalled: A Comparative Transition

From the perspective of new regionalism, ASEAN’s relative success can be attributed to its ability to evolve beyond narrow state-centric cooperation toward a multidimensional regional project encompassing economic integration, political dialogue, and societal connectivity. New regionalism emphasizes openness, flexibility, and functional diversification, all of which are evident in ASEAN’s post–Cold War evolution—from trade liberalization and people-to-people mobility to crisis coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, SAARC has remained trapped within a traditional, state-centric framework, heavily constrained by sovereignty concerns and elite-level mistrust. Its limited engagement beyond formal diplomacy and weak societal embeddedness have prevented the emergence of a shared South Asian regional identity, reinforcing institutional stagnation.

Institutionalist explanations further illuminate the divergence. ASEAN developed durable norms and practices—often described as the “ASEAN Way”—that, despite being informal and consensus-based, are reinforced through frequent summits, dense networks of ministerial meetings, and institutional continuity. These mechanisms have enabled ASEAN to adapt incrementally to crises, as seen in its collective response to Myanmar’s post-2021 political turmoil and its coordination under frameworks such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework. SAARC, by contrast, suffers from weak institutional density, infrequent high-level engagement, and an absence of enforcement or dispute-resolution mechanisms. Its consensus rule, combined with low institutionalization, amplifies veto power and renders the organization highly susceptible to political shocks, as demonstrated by its paralysis since the 2016 Uri crisis.

From a realist perspective, power asymmetry and threat perception are central to explaining SAARC’s stagnation. South Asia is characterized by a clear regional hegemon—India—whose economic and military dominance generates persistent fears of marginalization among smaller states and balancing behavior from Pakistan. This asymmetry has prevented the development of trust-based cooperation and encouraged zero-sum calculations, particularly in the security domain. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, the absence of a single overwhelming regional power has allowed ASEAN to function as a collective balancing platform amid intensifying US–China rivalry. ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, through forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, reflects its ability to manage external power competition without internal paralysis.

Taken together, these theoretical perspectives highlight that ASEAN’s effectiveness lies not in the absence of conflict but in its capacity to institutionalize cooperation amid diversity and tension. SAARC’s failure, conversely, reflects the limitations of depoliticized regionalism in a conflict-prone environment. Without mechanisms to manage power asymmetry, address security externalities, or foster functional interdependence, SAARC has remained a fragile and reactive institution. This theoretical contrast reinforces why ASEAN has emerged as a resilient model of regionalism, while SAARC continues to struggle with relevance in an increasingly interconnected and competitive regional order.

SAARC and ASEAN: Divergent Outcomes of Regionalism in Asia

South Asia today faces multiple overlapping challenges, including refugee and migration crises, unresolved territorial disputes, ethnic and cultural tensions, weak infrastructure connectivity, and fragile political trust among states. These challenges have directly constrained the effectiveness of SAARC, whose foundational objective of fostering regional cooperation remains unfulfilled. Persistent mutual suspicion—particularly between India and Pakistan—has prevented SAARC from evolving beyond a symbolic forum. In contrast, Southeast Asia’s regional mechanism, ASEAN, despite having a smaller population and territorial size, has successfully fostered a relatively stable regional order, deepened economic interdependence, and institutionalized cooperation in trade, connectivity, and security dialogue. This contrast has led many scholars to characterize the experience succinctly: SAARC has stagnated, while ASEAN has consolidated.

Conflict Management and Institutional Adaptability: ASEAN’s Advantage

Conflicts are not unique to South Asia; they are inherent to all regional systems. What distinguishes ASEAN is not the absence of conflict but its ability to manage tensions without institutional breakdown. During its first decade, ASEAN prioritized regional stability amid communist insurgencies and Cold War turbulence, reinforcing unity through shared threat perception. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the Bali Summit, marked a turning point by formally incorporating security concerns, dispute settlement mechanisms, and norms of peaceful coexistence. In recent years, ASEAN has demonstrated institutional adaptability, particularly in response to Myanmar’s political crisis following the 2021 military coup. By excluding Myanmar’s junta from high-level summits and adopting the Five-Point Consensus, ASEAN signaled a willingness to reinterpret its non-interference principle to preserve regional credibility—something SAARC has been unable to do in comparable crises.

Economic Integration and Trade Performance: ASEAN’s Structural Depth

ASEAN’s political stability enabled sustained economic integration. From the late 1970s onward, ASEAN leveraged institutional continuity to expand trade and investment cooperation. Its cumulative GDP growth between 1976 and 1982—averaging nearly 15% annually—laid the foundation for deeper economic frameworks such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Today, intra-ASEAN trade accounts for nearly 50% of total exports, supported by integrated supply chains and manufacturing networks. ASEAN’s central role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020, further reinforces its position as the hub of Asia-Pacific economic architecture. By contrast, SAARC’s economic instruments—SAPTA (1993) and SAFTA (2004)—have delivered limited outcomes, with intra-regional trade stagnating at around 7%, reflecting weak industrial complementarities and poor trade facilitation.

SAARC’s Structural Constraints and Persistent Underperformance

SAARC’s failure to generate meaningful regional integration is deeply rooted in its origins and structural design. Indo–Pakistan rivalry, extreme power asymmetry favoring India, and the colonial legacy of contested borders have repeatedly undermined trust. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC deliberately excluded security issues from its mandate, leaving no institutional mechanism to manage conflicts when they inevitably arise. Recent examples reinforce this weakness: the cancellation of the 19th SAARC Summit after the 2016 Uri attack, the paralysis following India–Pakistan tensions, and Afghanistan’s political uncertainty after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Even economically, SAARC remains one of the least connected regions globally; World Bank studies highlight excessive documentation, delays, and logistical barriers—such as the requirement of over 50 signatures and multiple days for cross-border cargo movement between India and Bangladesh. Large-scale regional projects like the TAPI gas pipeline remain stalled due to security and political distrust, illustrating the region’s inability to convert economic interdependence into cooperation.

Comparative Assessment: Why ASEAN Succeeds and SAARC Struggles

The contrast between ASEAN and SAARC highlights three critical differences. First, ASEAN evolved as a problem-managing organization, while SAARC remains a problem-avoiding forum. Second, ASEAN’s relatively balanced power structure enabled collective leadership, whereas SAARC’s India-centric asymmetry fostered fears of hegemony and counter-balancing behavior. Third, ASEAN successfully integrated economic incentives with political dialogue, creating a virtuous cycle of stability and growth. South Asia, despite housing nearly a quarter of the global population, remains dependent on extra-regional trade partners, with nearly 60% of SAARC trade occurring outside Asia. This dependence, combined with weak industrial diversification and low foreign direct investment, further marginalizes SAARC in global economic governance.

Pathways for Revitalizing SAARC in a Changing Regional Order

For SAARC to regain relevance, incremental and pragmatic reforms are essential. Strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms, expanding cross-border energy cooperation, simplifying trade procedures, and enhancing people-to-people connectivity are necessary first steps. In a region increasingly shaped by Chinese infrastructure investment and geopolitical competition, SAARC could serve as a collective platform to negotiate sustainable development terms, protect labor mobility interests, and assert South Asia’s shared cultural and historical identity. Ultimately, SAARC’s survival depends on allowing regionalism to evolve organically—supported not only by state elites but also by societal engagement—so that South Asia’s immense human and material potential can be translated into lasting regional cooperation.

Conclusion

The divergent trajectories of ASEAN and SAARC underscore that regional cooperation depends not merely on shared geography but on adaptive institutions, balanced power relations, and conflict-management mechanisms. ASEAN’s pragmatic regionalism contrasts sharply with SAARC’s structural rigidity, offering important lessons for revitalizing South Asian cooperation in an increasingly interconnected regional order.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and India: Strategic Economic Partnership

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an intergovernmental organisation established by the Stockholm Convention in 1960 with the purpose of promoting free trade and economic integration among its member states. EFTA originally included seven countries but now consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. This bloc operates as a trade partnership distinct from the European Union (EU), facilitating liberalised trade policies, removing tariffs, and fostering closer economic cooperation with global partners through free trade agreements (FTAs). 

India’s engagement with EFTA has culminated in a major milestone: the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) between India and the four EFTA countries was signed on 10 March 2024 after long negotiations and subsequently entered into force on 1 October 2025. This marks India’s first comprehensive trade pact with four developed European economies outside the EU framework. In the fiscal year 2022-23, EFTA ranked as India’s fifth-largest trading partner, trailing the EU, the United States, the UK, and China, with two-way trade valued at USD 18.65 billion and India recording a trade deficit of USD 14.8 billion; Switzerland stands out as India’s largest partner within the bloc, followed by Norway. Exports to EFTA dominated in machinery and pharmaceuticals, while Indian exports were led by organic chemicals.

The TEPA is designed not only to reduce tariffs on goods such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, watches, and processed foods but also to liberalise trade in services, expand investment flows and deepen economic cooperation. Over a 15-year period, the EFTA members have pledged about USD 100 billion in investments into India, with an aim to generate one million direct jobs, making it one of the most ambitious investment commitments in any Indian trade deal to date. By creating easier market access, streamlined customs procedures, and mutual recognition in professional and services domains, this partnership supports India’s broader goals of enhancing global supply chain integration and strengthening industrial competitiveness. 

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 under the Stockholm Convention, with the objective of promoting free trade and economic cooperation among its member states. India–EFTA relations have steadily deepened over the decades, culminating in a major breakthrough on 10 March 2024, when India and the four EFTA countries signed the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) in New Delhi, marking India’s first comprehensive trade pact with this European bloc. This growing engagement is reflected in trade figures as well—during FY 2022–23, bilateral trade between India and EFTA stood at USD 18.65 billion, underscoring the expanding economic interdependence and strategic relevance of the partnership.

In recent news, the TEPA implementation has been widely highlighted for its potential to boost bilateral trade, attract large-scale investments, and generate employment, with officials from both sides marking the agreement as pivotal in enhancing economic relations between India and European economies outside the EU framework. 

TEPA as a Strategic Reset in India–EFTA Economic Relations

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) represents a strategic reset after a decade-long pause in negotiations, which had stalled in 2013 due to differences over market access and investment commitments. Changing global geopolitics—particularly supply-chain disruptions, heightened trade uncertainty, and a shared interest in reducing over-dependence on China—created fresh momentum for the deal. Finalised in March 2024, TEPA consists of 14 comprehensive chapters covering market access for goods, rules of origin, trade facilitation, services, investment promotion, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and sustainable development, making it one of India’s most wide-ranging trade agreements with developed economies.

A standout feature of TEPA is its investment-centric architecture. EFTA has committed to facilitating USD 100 billion in foreign direct investment into India over a 15-year period, explicitly linked to direct job creation, while excluding volatile portfolio flows. This makes TEPA unique among India’s trade agreements, as it legally ties investment to employment outcomes. The agreement also reinforces strong IPR protections, aligned with the WTO’s TRIPS framework, addressing long-standing concerns of EFTA members—particularly Switzerland—while maintaining India’s regulatory flexibility in public interest areas such as healthcare and access to medicines.

On market access, TEPA demonstrates a calibrated balance. EFTA has offered tariff concessions on 92.2% of tariff lines, covering 99.6% of India’s exports, including full access for 100% of non-agricultural products and concessions on Processed Agricultural Products (PAPs). India, in return, has liberalised 82.7% of its tariff lines, covering 95.3% of EFTA exports, while safeguarding sensitive sectors such as dairy, soy, coal, and select agricultural goods. The agreement also advances services liberalisation, with enhanced access across Mode 1 (digital delivery), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of professionals), alongside provisions for Mutual Recognition Agreements in professions like nursing, architecture, and chartered accountancy. Recent policy discussions have highlighted TEPA’s role as a gateway for Indian firms into wider European markets, with Switzerland emerging as a strategic base due to its strong services linkages with the EU—positioning TEPA as both a trade pact and a long-term geo-economic partnership.

Why the India–EFTA TEPA Is a Strategic and Economic Game-Changer?

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) is significant primarily because of its investment-driven design, with EFTA countries committing to USD 100 billion in Foreign Direct Investment over 15 years, directly linked to job creation. This scale of assured FDI is unprecedented in India’s trade agreements and is expected to accelerate development in infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, clean energy, and high-end technology sectors. Beyond capital inflows, TEPA promotes technology transfer, R&D collaboration, and vocational skill development, which aligns closely with India’s long-term growth needs and its demographic dividend. Recent official statements following the agreement’s operationalisation have highlighted TEPA as a “model trade pact” that combines market access with tangible developmental outcomes rather than purely tariff reductions.

From a domestic policy perspective, TEPA strongly reinforces flagship initiatives such as “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat.” By incentivising local manufacturing and encouraging EFTA firms to establish production bases in India, the agreement supports import substitution while embedding India deeper into global value chains. Simultaneously, TEPA is expected to boost India’s services exports, particularly in IT, business services, professional services, and digital delivery, aided by commitments on Mode 1, Mode 3, and Mode 4 access. Indian consumers also stand to gain through greater access to high-quality Swiss and Nordic products—such as watches, chocolates, processed foods, and precision instruments—at more competitive prices as customs duties are gradually phased out over a decade. Recent trade commentary has emphasised that this balance between consumer welfare and domestic industry protection makes TEPA politically and economically sustainable.

At a broader strategic level, the India–EFTA deal carries geopolitical and systemic significance. It strengthens India’s economic footprint in Europe outside the EU framework, diversifies trade partnerships, and reduces dependence on a narrow set of trading partners amid global uncertainty. TEPA also sets a precedent for future trade negotiations with the UK and the European Union, offering a blueprint for integrating market access, investment commitments, intellectual property protection, sustainability, and government procurement into a single framework. With its emphasis on TRIPS-aligned IPR standards, environmental stewardship, and rules-based trade, recent policy analyses describe TEPA as positioning India not just as a market, but as a credible rule-shaper and  champion of free trade and economic cooperation in the evolving global trade order.

India’s Bilateral Engagements with EFTA Nations: Strategic Depth Beyond Trade

India’s relations with individual EFTA member states predate the TEPA framework and reflect long-standing diplomatic, economic, and strategic convergence. India–Norway ties, established in 1947, have evolved from traditional diplomacy into forward-looking cooperation in sustainability, maritime governance, and polar research. The launch of the India–Norway Task Force on Blue Economy in 2020 marked a significant shift toward ocean-based sustainable development, renewable energy, and fisheries management. Scientific collaboration remains a cornerstone, highlighted by HIMADRI, India’s Arctic research station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, which has gained renewed relevance amid global climate governance debates and Arctic geopolitics. In the context of TEPA, Norway’s support for India’s inclusion in key export control regimes and its emphasis on green growth align closely with India’s strategic and environmental priorities.

India–Switzerland relations form the economic backbone of India’s engagement with EFTA. Since the Treaty of Friendship in 1948, Switzerland has emerged as India’s largest trading partner within EFTA and a critical source of high-value investment, technology, and precision manufacturing expertise. The presence of over 300 Swiss companies in India, alongside major Indian IT firms operating in Switzerland, reflects a mature and mutually embedded economic relationship. Recent developments surrounding the India–EFTA TEPA (signed in 2024) have further elevated Switzerland’s role as a gateway for Indian firms into wider European markets, particularly in services, pharmaceuticals, innovation, and R&D. Ongoing dialogues on intellectual property protection, skill mobility, and investment-linked job creation underscore both opportunity and friction, making Switzerland central to the agreement’s success.

India’s engagement with Iceland and Liechtenstein, though smaller in scale, carries disproportionate strategic value. India–Iceland relations, established in 1972, have intensified since the mid-2000s, with Iceland becoming the first Nordic country to support India’s permanent UNSC membership—a politically significant gesture. Recent MoUs on renewable energy, geothermal technology, green hydrogen, and decarbonisation reflect convergence on climate action and clean energy transitions, areas where Iceland holds niche expertise. Meanwhile, India–Liechtenstein ties, formalised in 1993, are largely investment-driven, with FDI inflows—though modest—reflecting Liechtenstein’s role as a financial and investment hub. Under TEPA, these smaller EFTA economies gain strategic relevance as innovation partners and niche investors, reinforcing India’s broader objective of diversified, high-quality economic engagement with Europe beyond the EU framework.

Critical Challenges and Structural Constraints of the India–EFTA Trade Agreement

 Despite its potential benefits, the India-EFTA trade agreement faces several key challenges that warrant attention. Firstly, India’s selective exclusion of sectors like agriculture and dairy from significant tariff reductions may limit the advantages for EFTA exporters, particularly regarding India’s substantial imports of gold, mainly from Switzerland. Moreover, the agreement includes a provision allowing India to adjust duty concessions if the committed investments of USD 100 million fail to materialize, introducing a layer of accountability. Concerns also arise regarding data exclusivity provisions proposed by EFTA nations, which could hinder access to critical clinical trial data for generic drug manufacturers. Addressing the vast income disparities between India and EFTA countries is essential for ensuring equitable opportunities and fostering mutual growth. Additionally, streamlining non-tariff barriers such as differing product standards and technical regulations is crucial to prevent hurdles for exporters and ensure compliance with market requirements. Lastly, domestic opposition from Indian sectors facing EFTA competition underscores the importance of engaging stakeholders to address potential job losses and concerns about unfair competition. 

Conclusion

The India–EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement represents far more than a conventional free trade arrangement; it is a strategic experiment in aligning trade liberalisation with investment-led development, employment generation, and technological advancement. By combining deep market access with a legally anchored USD 100 billion investment commitment, TEPA signals a shift in India’s trade diplomacy—from tariff-centric negotiations to outcome-oriented economic partnerships. It strengthens India’s integration into high-value European supply chains, enhances services exports, and positions the country as a credible destination for long-term, quality capital in a period of global economic fragmentation.

However, the agreement’s long-term success will hinge on effective implementation and careful management of structural asymmetries. Persistent concerns over data exclusivity, non-tariff barriers, income disparities, and domestic sectoral resistance highlight the need for continuous stakeholder engagement, regulatory coordination, and policy flexibility. India’s ability to safeguard public interest—particularly in healthcare and agriculture—while remaining an attractive investment destination will be central to sustaining political and economic consensus around TEPA.

Ultimately, TEPA serves as a benchmark for India’s future engagements with advanced economies, including ongoing negotiations with the UK and the EU. If implemented with institutional coherence and strategic foresight, the agreement could redefine India’s role from a rule-taker to a rule-shaper in the global trade order, reinforcing its image as a champion of free trade, sustainable development, and equitable economic cooperation. In this sense, the India–EFTA partnership is not merely about trade expansion—it is a test case for India’s evolving global economic strategy in the 21st century.

By: Khushbu AhlawatConsulting Editor, GSDN

INTRODUCTION 

Regionalism in South Asia represents the shared endeavour of nations to manage common challenges, strengthen economic development, and promote political stability through cooperation. Amidst diverse cultures, historical rivalries, and developmental disparities, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985, has emerged as the primary institutional framework embodying this regional aspiration. By bringing together eight member states—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan—SAARC seeks to harmonize policies, facilitate socio-economic integration, and promote people-to-people exchanges, creating a platform where collaboration can transcend bilateral tensions.

In the context of globalization, where interdependence spans trade, security, and technology, regional organizations serve as vital instruments for coordinated action and collective bargaining. Headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal, SAARC’s observer status at the United Nations and engagement with extra-regional actors such as China, Japan, the European Union, and the United States underscores its international relevance. Despite challenges, SAARC reflects both the promise and complexity of South Asian regionalism, making it central to the region’s pursuit of peace, prosperity, and integration.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF SAARC IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 

Since its establishment in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has progressively evolved as a platform for fostering regional cooperation, dialogue, and collaboration among its member states. Some key achievements are as follows:

• Deepening Cooperative Frameworks
  Since its establishment in 1985, SAARC has aimed to strengthen cooperation among South Asian states to improve living standards, promote socio-economic development, and foster regional engagement. Functional cooperation has translated into practical initiatives such as the South Asian University, SAARC International College, the SAARC Development Fund, SAARC Food Bank, and agreements on judicial cooperation and counter-terrorism. Sector-specific programs, including the SAARC telemedicine network, SAARC Writers and Literature Foundation, and South Asia Foundation, have promoted cultural and people-to-people connectivity. Post-2020, SAARC has remained relevant through issue-based collaboration, particularly in disaster management, climate resilience, and public health. The SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund, virtual leaders’ meetings, and ongoing initiatives in food security, environmental protection, and women’s empowerment underscore the organization’s role in incremental, sector-driven regional cooperation despite persistent political constraints.
•  Advancing Trade and Economic Integration
  Economic cooperation is a core objective of SAARC, aimed at enhancing regional growth and integration. The transition from SAPTA to the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) marked a significant step toward reducing tariffs and promoting intra-regional trade through phased tariff liberalization. However, implementation has remained uneven due to political tensions, extensive sensitive lists, and non-tariff barriers. Despite these constraints, member states continue limited engagement through SAFTA concessions, trade facilitation measures, and development projects supported by the SAARC Development Fund. The importance of regional economic coordination was also evident during supply-chain disruptions in the COVID-19 period. Critically, intra-SAARC trade accounts for only about 5–6% of the region’s total trade, compared to over 25% in ASEAN, highlighting the gap between SAARC’s economic potential and its actual performance.
• Cooperation with Observer Countries
  SAARC’s engagement with observer countries and international organizations reflects its recognition of South Asia’s developmental constraints in areas such as capital availability, technology, infrastructure, and human resources. Observer states—including the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, Iran, and the European Union—have expressed interest in supporting the region through development assistance, technical cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. To institutionalize such engagement, SAARC has concluded agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with several multilateral organizations, notably UNDP, ITU, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNDCP, and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, covering sectors such as development planning, telecommunications, trade facilitation, drug control, and education.

In recent years, cooperation with observers has been most visible in issue-based and technical domains rather than through SAARC-led political initiatives. Japan and the European Union have supported regional connectivity, disaster management, and development projects, while China’s observer engagement has focused on infrastructure financing and development assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, collaboration with UN agencies, particularly WHO and UNICEF, played a key role in public health coordination and humanitarian support across SAARC states. Critically, while observer engagement has enhanced resources and technical expertise, much of this cooperation remains project-based and fragmented, often bypassing SAARC as an institution in favour of bilateral arrangements. This underscores both the utility and the institutional limitations of SAARC in leveraging extra-regional partnerships for sustained regional integration.

• Enhancing People-to-People Contacts
  SAARC recognizes that fostering people-to-people relations is a crucial goal of regional cooperation, complementing formal diplomatic and economic initiatives. Despite structural and political constraints, the organization has undertaken several initiatives to promote social and cultural connectivity across South Asia, including South Asian Festivals, the Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians, SAARC Law, cooperation with NGOs, the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organised Tourism, and the SAARC Documentation Centre. Civil society, including academics, writers, journalists, and retired officials, plays a vital role in establishing communication networks and supporting Track II diplomacy, especially between India and Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral described this process as “New Regionalism,” reflecting its regional significance. Recent developments, such as virtual cultural exchanges during COVID-19, the SAARC University Network, and online regional research collaborations, have strengthened youth and academic linkages. 
• Financial Cooperation and Regional Integration

SAARC has prioritized financial cooperation as a key component of regional integration, institutionalized through regular SAARC Finance Ministers Meetings, held in member states including Pakistan, India, the Maldives, and Bhutan. Early initiatives, such as the formation of the Inter-Governmental Expert Group on Financial Matters and the SAARC Expert Group on the Development of Capital Markets, aimed to chart a phased roadmap toward a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). Member countries have exchanged concept papers and explored mechanisms for harmonizing financial regulations, promoting investment, and facilitating regional capital flows. While progress was modest in the first two decades, recent years have seen renewed emphasis on regional financial coordination. Notably, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) has expanded its focus to include infrastructure, energy, and social sector projects, while discussions on regional payment systems, disaster risk financing, and SME financing mechanisms have gained momentum.

• Regional Security Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism

SAARC has recognized terrorism and transnational crime as major regional threats, formalized through the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987) and its Additional Protocol (2005) under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. However, practical cooperation has been limited, with member states often prioritizing bilateral initiatives over multilateral engagement. The SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) in Colombo illustrate institutional mechanisms for monitoring and intelligence sharing, though their impact has been modest.

In recent years, regional security concerns—such as cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and rising radicalization in the region—have underscored the need for stronger collaboration. Joint exercises, intelligence-sharing platforms, and discussions on cyber-security and counter-radicalization, including efforts coordinated with the UN and observer states like China and the EU, represent emerging areas of engagement. 

• Integrated Program of Action: Multi-Sectoral Cooperation

The Integrated Program of Action (IPA) is SAARC’s key mechanism for coordinating multi-sectoral cooperation across 12 areas, including agriculture, education, health, environment, rural development, tourism, science and technology, and women in development. Each sector is overseen by a Technical Committee, with progress reported to the Standing Committee. IPA has facilitated structured collaboration, capacity-building, and policy harmonization among member states. Recent initiatives include regional disaster management programs, climate resilience projects, telemedicine networks, and cross-border educational collaborations through the SAARC University Network, which were particularly useful during COVID-19.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF SAARC IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

• Challenges of Political Rivalries and Trust Deficit

SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by historical inter-state disputes, mistrust, and security concerns, particularly between India and Pakistan. Colonial legacies, territorial conflicts, and communal tensions have created enduring suspicion, impeding multilateral cooperation. The 19th SAARC Summit in 2016 was indefinitely postponed due to deteriorating India-Pakistan relations, highlighting the fragility of consensus-driven decision-making. Political differences, cultural divergences, and the “clash of civilizations” narrative, as noted by Samuel Huntington, exacerbate these divisions. Smaller member states, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan, have often expressed fear of Indian dominance, resulting in reluctance to fully engage in SAARC initiatives, while India has increasingly invested in alternative platforms like BIMSTEC, marginalizing Pakistan and weakening SAARC’s cohesion.

• Economic and Structural Constraints

SAARC’s economic integration has been limited despite initiatives like SAFTA (2006). Intra-regional trade remains below 6% of total trade, reflecting poor financial coordination, asymmetry between India and smaller members, and lack of complementary economic structures. Most member states export similar goods, while China and other external powers exploit South Asia’s markets through competitive pricing, infrastructure investment, and bulk production, reducing SAARC’s economic leverage. Divergent political systems, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and inconsistent commitment to regional projects further undermine financial cooperation. Recent economic crises, such as Pakistan’s FATF grey listing and Afghanistan’s humanitarian challenges post-Taliban takeover, have heightened regional instability, limiting SAARC’s capacity to respond effectively.

• Institutional and Operational Limitations

SAARC’s structural framework imposes additional constraints. The charter prohibits discussion of bilateral disputes, while the requirement for unanimity slows decision-making. Different governance systems—from India’s democracy to Nepal’s monarchy and Sri Lanka’s presidential system—complicate policy harmonization. Initiatives like STOMD, SDOMD, IPA, and regional development funds demonstrate potential, yet implementation has been largely project-based and fragmented. The lack of visionary leadership, limited cost-benefit analysis, and bureaucratic inertia impede SAARC’s ability to address emerging challenges, including terrorism, cross-border migration, climate risks, and water disputes. While SAARC remains a symbolic platform for dialogue, these political, economic, and structural shortcomings continue to restrict its effectiveness in achieving meaningful regional integration.

NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN SAARC

• Political Reforms

SAARC’s political effectiveness is constrained by mutual mistrust, bilateral disputes, and India’s perceived dominance. To rebuild trust, member states—particularly India—need to adopt a cooperative, equitable approach rather than a hegemonic stance. Proposals such as Conflict Coordination Groups (CCGs) to address bilateral disputes, the inclusion of international concerns like peace, security, and technological cooperation in summit discussions, and mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution could strengthen political collaboration. India’s proactive role during COVID-19, including coordinating virtual SAARC meetings and providing vaccines to all member states, including Pakistan, highlights the potential of political leadership to restore confidence and demonstrate SAARC’s relevance. A joint UN Peacekeeping Force proposal in response to the Afghanistan crisis reflects how SAARC could coordinate on regional security challenges if political will exists.

• Economic Reforms

Regional economic integration remains weak due to trade imbalances, low intra-SAARC trade, and inadequate infrastructure. Reforms should focus on establishing common standards, investment regimes, and free trade zones, along with improved road, rail, and air connectivity to facilitate cross-border commerce. Joint ventures in services, education, and technology can enhance people-to-people collaboration while promoting economic interdependence. India’s COVID-19 humanitarian outreach—including vaccine and aid support to member countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal—can serve as a springboard for restoring regional trade, market activity, and interdependence, moving toward a self-reliant “Atmanirbhar SAARC.” Sub-regional cooperation, such as Bangladesh–India–Nepal economic corridors, could provide practical models for broader integration.

• Social and Institutional Reforms

Social reforms should strengthen civil society and cultural exchanges to build a shared South Asian identity. Greater interaction among academics, writers, media, and historians can reduce historical misconceptions and foster trust. Institutional reforms are also critical: the SAARC Secretariat requires expansion, increased funding, and greater autonomy to prepare position papers and manage IPA initiatives. Proposals such as establishing a SAARC Parliament or Assembly, increasing the frequency of ministerial and summit-level meetings, and improved coordination with NGOs could significantly enhance operational efficiency and decision-making capacity. Recent initiatives like the SAARC University Network and digital youth forums demonstrate the potential of technology-enabled institutional reforms to support regional integration.

ENHANCING INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SAARC FUNCTIONING

Improving India‑Pakistan relations is critical for revitalizing SAARC, as bilateral tensions have repeatedly stalled multilateral cooperation and impeded regional summits.  It emphasizes the importance of regular SAARC meetings as mandated by the Charter, including virtual summits, which were used effectively during the COVID‑19 pandemic to coordinate responses and sustain dialogue. India’s leadership in convening these virtual sessions and providing vaccines to all member states demonstrated the potential of collaborative engagement even amid strained ties. However, recent developments underscore the fragility of bilateral relations; the 2025 India‑Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam attack and subsequent military exchanges, suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, and diplomatic downgrades have heightened mistrust, reopening old fault lines and disrupting initiatives for cooperation. Despite this, there are glimmers of dialogue: Pakistan has at times signaled willingness for talks, and any sustained confidence‑building measures—such as trade facilitation, cultural diplomacy, and people‑to‑people exchanges—could lay groundwork for broader engagement.

Multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provide alternative avenues for structured interaction, potentially easing tensions and building mutual confidence that could translate back to SAARC. Cultural diplomacy, including sports and arts exchanges, remains an underutilized but valuable tool for reducing political tension and fostering grassroots goodwill. While complex geopolitical dynamics and security concerns persist, sustained diplomatic efforts, confidence‑building measures, and inclusive dialogue between India and Pakistan are essential for SAARC to function as an effective regional cooperation mechanism. 

CONCLUSION

Nelson Mandela’s observation—“If you want to make peace with your adversary, you have to cooperate with your opponent, then he joins you as a partner”—aptly underscores SAARC’s potential as a platform for regional cooperation, even among historically contentious nations. Despite persistent political tensions, economic disparities, and institutional limitations, SAARC’s continued existence reflects the shared commitment of South Asian leaders to dialogue, coordination, and incremental collaboration. Revitalizing the organization requires enhanced political will, stronger leadership, effective branding, and active engagement at all levels, including people-to-people, economic, and security initiatives. While SAARC may face periodic setbacks, it remains more than an intergovernmental body—it embodies a vision of regional peace, integration, and collective prosperity, serving as a vital framework for addressing shared challenges and fostering cooperation in South Asia.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Central Asia has re-emerged as a strategically critical region in the post-9/11 global landscape, driven by its geostrategic location, proximity to conflict-prone zones, and abundant natural resources. The region’s vast reserves of oil, gas, and uranium, coupled with its position at the crossroads of Eurasia, have made it a central arena for major powers, including the United States, China, and Russia, to pursue overlapping security, economic, and political objectives. Simultaneously, regional actors such as India have increasingly sought to assert influence, balancing strategic interests with economic and security imperatives. India’s engagement is characterized by a multidimensional approach, combining energy cooperation, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, counterterrorism collaboration, and multilateral diplomacy to navigate great power competition while addressing regional instability. Initiatives such as the Connect Central Asia Policy (CCAP) and the Comprehensive Central Asia Policy (CCP) reflect India’s strategic intent to strengthen trade, enhance regional connectivity, secure energy access, and promote stability. This paper critically examines India’s evolving role in Central Asia, exploring both opportunities and constraints, analyzing the effectiveness of policy measures, and assessing the potential for India to consolidate its influence amid shifting regional and global power dynamics.

India’s Evolving Foreign Policy and Regional Institutional Engagement

A focused analysis of evolving regional dynamics underscores the role of key international organizations—such as the United Nations, NATO, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—while assessing the strategic impact of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. These developments directly influence regional cooperation, security frameworks, and mechanisms for conflict resolution. India’s evolving foreign policy emerges as a central theme, particularly through the strengthening of its strategic partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Attention is drawn to initiatives such as the “Look North” policy and the establishment of air bases in Tajikistan. At the same time, India’s absence from important regional groupings like the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is highlighted as a constraint on deeper regional integration. A brief assessment of India’s engagement with Central Asia over the past two decades provides historical context and underscores the complexities surrounding its regional strategic ambitions. The reference to the “Connect Central Asia” Policy (CCAP) is framed as a response to these challenges, though a more detailed examination of its components and alignment with India’s interests amid competing regional actors would add greater analytical depth.

Recent developments further illustrate India’s calibrated engagement with Central Asia. The convening of the India–Central Asia Dialogue at the foreign ministers’ level in recent years has underscored India’s emphasis on political dialogue, trade, connectivity, and development cooperation with the region. India has also sought to enhance regional access through initiatives such as the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar Port, aimed at bypassing geographical constraints and improving connectivity with Central Asian markets. Additionally, India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover reflects its continued security and stability concerns in the region. Participation in SCO platforms has provided India with limited multilateral engagement, even as institutional constraints persist.

Great Power Competition in Central Asia: Strategic Interests of the US, China, and Russia

Central Asia has become an increasingly contested geopolitical space as the strategic interests of the United States, China, and Russia intersect and compete. The United States’ engagement has evolved in the post-Afghanistan withdrawal phase, shifting from a direct military presence to diplomatic outreach, counterterrorism coordination, and selective economic engagement aimed at maintaining regional stability and preventing extremist spillover. Continued political engagement with Central Asian states and efforts to support connectivity and development initiatives reflect Washington’s attempt to retain strategic relevance despite a reduced footprint.

China’s expanding presence in Central Asia reflects a strategic blend of economic integration and security engagement, with infrastructure development, energy cooperation, and counterterrorism initiatives aimed at securing its western borders and deepening regional influence. At the same time, Russia continues to assert its traditional dominance through military cooperation, defense agreements, and energy partnerships, positioning itself as the primary security guarantor. The overlapping engagement of Beijing and Moscow highlights a shifting balance of power, where Central Asian states are increasingly caught between economic incentives offered by China and security assurances provided by Russia. This dual dynamic not only intensifies strategic competition but also reshapes regional alignments, compelling states to navigate a complex environment of great power rivalry while safeguarding their own political and economic interests.

India’s Strategic Imperatives in Central Asia Amid Shifting Power Dynamics

India’s strategic imperatives in Central Asia are shaped by the need to counterbalance rising great‑power competition, enhance regional connectivity, and safeguard its economic and security interests in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. With China expanding its economic footprint and Russia maintaining its traditional security role, New Delhi has shifted from symbolic engagement to a development‑centric approach that combines economic cooperation with strategic outreach. The 4th India–Central Asia Dialogue in June 2025 exemplifies this, bringing together regional foreign ministers to advance trade, connectivity, counterterrorism, and financial integration—including initiatives like rupee vostro accounts and potential adoption of India’s UPI system for cross‑border transactions. Historical ties, energy considerations such as the TAPI pipeline, China’s influence, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan further drive India’s multifaceted strategy, which blends politics, economy, and security to counter radicalization, mitigate Pakistan’s influence, and strengthen regional partnerships with the US, Russia, and China. By navigating Afghanistan’s instability and offering alternatives to dominant powers, India reinforces its strategic autonomy while contributing to a more balanced and stable regional order.

Russia–China Convergence and Its Implications for India’s Regional Influence

India’s engagement in Central Asia is increasingly challenged by the deepening strategic convergence between Russia and China, which reshapes the regional balance of power. Strengthened Russia–China cooperation, evident in joint military exercises, energy deals, and coordinated multilateral diplomacy through platforms like the SCO, limits New Delhi’s leverage in advancing its security and economic interests. India’s position has been constrained by Russia’s historical opposition, as seen in the Ayni base issue, while the Sino-Pak alignment further complicates New Delhi’s strategic calculus, particularly regarding energy corridors such as the TAPI pipeline. Recent developments—including UN vetoes affecting regional diplomacy, China’s growing control over strategic ports, and ongoing tensions in Ladakh—underscore the multidimensional pressures on India’s influence. Despite these challenges, India continues to pursue a multifaceted approach, combining political outreach, economic initiatives, and strategic partnerships with the US, Russia, and Central Asian states, aiming to secure connectivity, counter radicalization, and safeguard energy and security interests. This evolving dynamic highlights the urgency for India to recalibrate its regional strategy to navigate a more consolidated Russia–China front while preserving strategic autonomy.

Energy Security and India’s Engagement with Central Asia

India’s energy strategy increasingly prioritizes Central Asia as a critical source to address domestic shortages and support economic growth. Kazakhstan, with its vast oil and gas reserves, has emerged as a key partner, exemplified by deepening bilateral cooperation in hydrocarbons, atomic energy, and infrastructure projects. In 2025, Indian companies significantly expanded investments in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, while both countries explored collaboration on critical minerals and renewable energy initiatives. Kazakhstan’s potential integration into the TAPI pipeline project further highlights opportunities to diversify India’s energy supply, provided geopolitical and security challenges—such as transit through Afghanistan—are managed. Nevertheless, India’s efforts face barriers, including competition from China and Russia, infrastructure limitations, and regional instability, which constrain the full realization of these energy partnerships. Strategic engagement, therefore, combines investment, diplomacy, and regional cooperation to secure reliable energy access while strengthening India’s influence in Central Asia.

Economic Diplomacy and the Comprehensive Central Asia Policy (CCP)

India’s Comprehensive Central Asia Policy (CCP) aims to transform its historic ties with the five newly independent Central Asian states into a substantive economic partnership capable of competing with dominant actors such as China, Russia, and the EU. While New Delhi has steadily promoted trade, investment, and connectivity through mechanisms like the India–Central Asia Dialogue and business councils, recent developments indicate tangible progress: at the June 2025 Central Asia–India Business Council meeting, Kazakhstan’s leadership signaled a desire to triple bilateral trade and expand cooperation in energy, digital transformation, critical minerals, and infrastructure, reflecting a shared vision for deeper economic integration. Additionally, ongoing efforts to enhance logistical linkages via the International North‑South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and new container train services connecting India with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through Iran and Central Asia demonstrate practical steps toward reducing transit times and diversifying trade routes. Despite these strides, significant structural constraints persist: limited banking and trade finance mechanisms, infrastructural bottlenecks, and asymmetric trade flows continue to hinder growth. Collaborative initiatives like the EDB–India Exim Bank trade finance webinar underscore the pressing need for enhanced financial tools to unlock the region’s untapped economic potential.

Overall, CCP’s economic diplomacy reflects a calibrated strategy to expand influence and offer alternatives to other major powers, but realizing its full promise will require addressing persistent logistical, financial, and institutional barriers.

Counter-Radicalism, Security Cooperation, and Regional Stability

India’s strategic engagement in Central Asia increasingly prioritizes counter-radicalism and regional security, recognizing the enduring challenge posed by the post-Soviet resurgence of radical Islamic activity. Extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly ULO) continue to exploit socio-economic vulnerabilities, fueling instability across Afghanistan, Pakistan, and regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Tajikistan, given its geographic proximity to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and porous borders with Afghanistan, emerges as a critical partner in India’s security calculus. Through the Comprehensive Central Asia Policy (CCP), India has pursued multifaceted security cooperation, including intelligence-sharing, counterterrorism training, and joint capacity-building initiatives with Central Asian states. Economic engagement, development assistance, and humanitarian programs further complement these efforts by addressing the structural drivers of radicalization, reinforcing stability, and fostering goodwill. Simultaneously, India navigates a complex diplomatic landscape, balancing aspirations for deeper involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the realities of the China-US rivalry and Russia-China strategic convergence. Recent collaborations, such as India’s 2025 joint counterterrorism exercise with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, demonstrate a practical integration of military, economic, and diplomatic tools to safeguard regional stability. Effective implementation of such a holistic approach is essential for mitigating extremism while advancing India’s broader strategic objectives in Central Asia.

Conclusion

Central Asia occupies a pivotal position in the evolving architecture of global geopolitics, where security concerns, energy competition, and great power rivalry intersect. The region’s strategic importance has been further amplified by post-9/11 developments, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the growing assertiveness of China and Russia. Within this complex landscape, India’s engagement with Central Asia reflects both strategic necessity and long-term ambition. Through initiatives such as the Connect and Comprehensive Central Asia Policies, India has sought to advance its interests in energy security, counterterrorism, economic cooperation, and regional stability.

However, India’s ability to translate intent into influence remains constrained by structural challenges, including limited connectivity, institutional exclusion from key regional groupings, and intensifying Russia–China convergence. At the same time, persistent security threats, particularly radical extremism and instability in Afghanistan, continue to shape India’s strategic calculations. Moving forward, a more coherent and sustained approach—combining diplomatic engagement, economic investment, security cooperation, and regional multilateralism—will be essential for India to consolidate its presence in Central Asia. As power equations continue to shift, India’s strategic adaptability and policy coherence will ultimately determine its role and relevance in this increasingly contested region.

By: Rudraksh Saklani, Research Analyst, GSDN

The year 2025, geopolitically speaking, has not exactly been a bed of roses for the world in general but more importantly, for Asia in particular. With 2026 unravelling itself by the day if not by the hour, and because the world now rightly expects conversations around action-oriented policies vis-a-vis climate change and supply chain resilience to gain more ground, our global village seems to be rupturing itself from within.

The so-called conflict management mechanisms and systems, let alone resolutions, have been rather counter-productive in ways more than one in the previous year. The upcoming year leaves us in the middle of a misdirected transition. This time around, the situation in Asia is gradually descending into unprecedented turmoil. However, like always, there certainly is light at the end of the tunnel, unless countries and ‘blocs’ themselves decide to complement the chaos.

Introductory context

If we were to go by the ongoing unrest in Asia within the first two weeks of 2026 itself, the situation is anything but encouraging. With Iran facing unprecedented largely anti-establishment nationwide protests amidst an imminent economic collapse and Chinese acts of provocative aggression and military drills around Taiwan, alongside Saudi strikes in east Yemen in response to the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council consolidating and the latest United States (U.S.)-led punitive strikes on multiple Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria, to name a few.

Western think tank reports suggest Asia to be the center of systemic competition and adaptation. The China-US rivalries are very much in place, and so is India’s resilient strategic autonomy as the voice of the Global South. Reporting in western media identifies Asia’s pivotal role in shaping global security, technology, and economic architecture in the year 2026.

On the other hand, the Asian evaluations underscore adaptability and tactical change in the context of great power competition and economic volatility. Think tanks in Asia emphasize regional role continuity in driving global growth, particularly in information technology, consumer demand, and respective supply chain configurations, despite various regional tensions. The resistance of India to tariffs and its subsequent economic progress in the latest quarter underscores its strong fundamentals and the region’s interconnectedness.

Historical backdrop

The Asian geopolitical layout has been shaped by a long process of transformation that began in 1945. Decolonization reconfigured political boundaries, while the Cold War institutionalized alliance structures in Asia. From 1991 onwards, economic globalization was marked by persistent territorial disputes. China’s rise since the 1970s has transformed regional power relations, while India’s reforms from 1991 have expanded its strategic footprint. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and the COVID-19 pandemic further entrenched state strategies. Persistent hotspots—the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Durand line), Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, Jammu and Kashmir (India), the Levant, South China Sea—arranged against multi-polar diffusion currently position Asia as the theatre of global power transition in 2026.

Region-wise nuances within Asia

Western and regional analysts continue to expect instability in West Asia/Middle East in 2026. The ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon are likely to worsen, stress-testing diplomacy. Continued U.S. engagement remains vital as a main mediator amid the expressed desire of Washington to shift its focus to the Indo-Pacific, forcing Gulf nations to navigate relations with India, China, and Russia.

Various think tanks underline strong structural rivalry among main regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Qatar, Iran, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkiye, regarding issues related to terrorism. Gross Domestic Product forecasts, for their part, point out fiscal reforms and diversification efforts of Gulf countries in the face of geopolitical risks and fluctuations in the energy market. Strategic partnerships, such as the Indo-Abrahamic bloc aka India-Israel-UAE-U.S.A. (I2U2) and may help in strengthening security cooperation, but the Iranian nuclear situation and proxy wars which pose a threat to the very ambitious India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) have kept the region on the boil.

Central Asia will continue to be a geostrategic pivot among major powers in 2026. Analysts point to the region’s susceptibility to outside influence from Russia, China, the European Union (EU) and the U.S., as China fortifies its economic and security ties through the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia seeks to preserve its influence in its “soft underbelly”. The strategic partnerships and investment structures between the EU and Central Asia developed at recent summits illustrate Europe’s objective to deepen economic and governance cooperation. Central Asian states will continue hedge-balancing their geography to attract infrastructure investment, diversify their economic partners, and avoid overdependence on any one power. Threats to security persist, including Afghanistan and broader regional instability.

The future of South Asia will be affected by the environment of security challenges and economic development. Experts on South Asian policymaking forums highlight the following issues that will tend to affect this future : Pakistan’s state sponsored-terrorism through proxies with growing Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) footprint in the region, the Indo-China bilateral dynamics, increasing radicalization and fanaticism in Bangladesh, condition of women’s education in Afghanistan, the Myanmar junta’s handling of rebel groups and Nepal’s political transition being vulnerable to external interference.

Nonetheless, the demographics and economic trajectories of South Asia, including Indian rapid growth, consumption, and investment attractiveness, mitigate the risks posed by the international environment. India being the net security provider and first responder in the region is expected to continue to stabilize the region.

In 2026, South-east Asia is facing challenges in dealing with hedging strategies and economic resilience. Southeast Asia countries adapted to great power rivalry by harmonizing their strong economic ties with China and their defense partnerships with the U.S. and its set of allies. Political shifts, including elections in Thailand and other nations, could alter priority agendas, but collective engagement through Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains vibrant. As a bridge for major powers, combined with their economic engines, ASEAN is a dynamic player for these factors, even amidst territorial and maritime disputes.

East Asia remains at the center of the Sino-American strategic rivalry. Important trends such as tech competition (semi-conductors), and de-risking of supply chains. Greater U.S. military cooperation with U.S. partners like Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Philippines reflects efforts to cope with China’s unprovoked aggression in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, also North Korea’s hostile military power projection through missile testing every now and then affecting the Korean Peninsula. The ability of countries in East Asia to effectively navigate relationships between Washington and Beijing, underpinned by economic connections, will shape regional diplomacy despite continued military competitions in technology in 2026.

Perspectives of multilateral organizations & the “West

From the perspective of the Western institutions, Asia is an enabler of global strategic stability and economic security. The EU focuses on connectivity, climate finance, and supply chain resilience through initiatives such as Global Gateway. For the Group of 7 (G7), Asia signifies technology governance, economic stability, and the preservation of a rules-based order. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), though Euro-Atlantic in origin, is slowly coming to understand that instability in the Indo-Pacific has implications for European security, forging deeper partnerships with India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia to counter the systemic challenges posed by China.

BRICS Standpoint

Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) with new entrants like Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE from Asia among others, regards Asia as the central stage for multi-polar rebalancing. The key word is reshaping global governance, deepening South-South cooperation, and reducing dependence on Western monetary systems. BRICS is pressing for alternative development financing, more local currency settlements, and strategic autonomy. Compared to military alliances, Asia is now taken more as a continent of development, energy, and infrastructure.

 SCO Outlook

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) focuses on Asia primarily through counter-terrorism and regional stability. Moving ahead, SCO focuses on tackling extremism, cyber threats, and connectivity in the Eurasian region. Members utilize SCO as a mechanism against Westernization. The SCO avoids the politics of blocs and promotes a multi-polar Asia by encouraging security cooperation and economic integration in the region.

QUAD Outlook

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) views Asia based on maritime security, technological norms, disaster relief operations and resilient supply chains. This organization circumvents established military alliances and builds efficiency in economic and security cooperation between India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia. It is based on the shared principles of a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and focuses on capacity-building, crucial technologies, and infrastructure, as well as emergency and humanitarian responses, through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

G20 Outlook

From the Group-of-20 (G20)’s view, Asia is significant in the context of global economic progress and development. Taking into account the fact that Asia holds important economies and developing markets, the G20 promotes macroeconomic cooperation, debt relief, climate financing, and digital public infrastructure.

Role of India and China – 3Cs (Competition, Conflict, Cooperation)

China remains Asia’s dominant force, shaping Asian geopolitics through its economy, infrastructure development, and military strength. China’s BRI Infrastructure and its importance in trading and technological supremacy give China a substantial influence in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and parts of West Asia. However, China’s belligerent behavior (especially, its Wolf-warrior diplomacy) in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait continues to provoke counter-balancing alliances. China’s slower domestic growth forces it to address foreign markets, energy security, and increase its political influence within the Global South. Meanwhile, foreign policy continues to combine the politics of incentives, intimidation and security signals to prevent encirclement.

India’s status is that of a balancing force, an agenda-setter that is also the “Voice of the Global South”. India is nurturing strategic long-term trust-based value-driven partnerships in West Asia (I2U2, energy security, International North South Transport Corridor INSTC, Chabahar port in Iran), and in South-east Asia (Act East policy). India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific, especially alongside ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia & the U.S., makes it clear that India aims at effectively rising up to China’s expansionist tendencies without creating rigid, binding alliances. However, India maintains its “strategic autonomy” by partnering with Iran, Russia & the Global South. India’s growing economic heft, demographic dividend & digital public infrastructure further cement its stature in Asia as a credible, reliable democratic power. India is constantly forecasted to expand by about 6.6–6.7% in 2026, placing it among the fastest-growing major economies within Asia, powered by strong domestic demand, consumption, and government investment.  Against the backdrop of a worldwide slowdown, India’s growth rate outranks that of many major economies in Asia and elsewhere, putting it as a key driver in not only regional but also global output. These projections underline the paramount position of India in restoring Asian economic dynamism in 2026, thus contributing to regional development and stability.

The Global South in 2026 has become an active geopolitical player in Asia and can no longer be treated as a mere passive entity. The states in West Asia and South Asia as well as South-east Asia now stand for sovereignty, development, and resilience, and it constitutes an important swing player in the increasingly complex geopolitical game in Asia.

Conclusion

Structural realism, or neorealism, best explains the geopolitical landscape in Asia for the year 2026. It positson recalibrated and realigned international system in which states are concerned first and foremost with survival, balance power against one another, and respond to shifts in relative strength. In that respect, the Asian continent represents today’s pivotal theater of power transition. The South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Indo-Pacific demonstrate realist strategies of balancing and counterbalancing to guarantee national security. Of course, institutions and economics do matter; however, what defines the strategic behavior of Asia’s major players is power distribution and perceived threats.