File picture of Indian Navy & Singapore Navy cooperation: source Internet
Every year on 4 December, Indian Navy Day gives us a chance to reflect not just on ships, sailors, and operations, but also on the relationships and partnerships, that make the seas safer and the region stronger. This year, as I celebrate Indian Navy Day in Singapore, away from my home shores, the day has a different meaning. Celebrating it here with colleagues from the Republic of Singapore Navy, feels both familiar and special.
A Partnership Anchored in Training
Many Singaporeans may recognise the Indian Navy from ships frequently visiting Changi Naval Base or from the long-running SIMBEX exercise. However, fewer may know that since 1999, India has had a military training presence at SAFTI Military Institute (MI). For 25 years, Indian Navy officers have rotated through, becoming part of the training ecosystem and shaping young RSN officers.
This partnership has matured steadily over time. In classrooms, field exercises, and everyday conversations between instructors and cadets, the India–Singapore defence relationship has grown not through grand gestures, but through shared lessons, mutual respect, and consistent training. For an officer, standing in a SAFTI MI classroom wearing Indian Navy uniform and teaching future RSN leaders reminds us of how intertwined our maritime stories are. It also reflects something Singaporeans understand well: Training builds Trust.
At Sea Together: MSTD
Another vivid example of this trust is the Midshipman Sea Training Deployment (MSTD). Each year, a junior Indian Naval officer joins an RSN ship as midshipmen; budding footsteps towards their sea journey. They train, learn, and navigate together, often forming friendships that last beyond the deployment. Singaporeans appreciate the pride the RSN has in the Midshipman Course. For an Indian officer to be invited into that experience each year shows the confidence built over decades. In 2026, the deployment will take a significant step forward as Indian Navy Instructor deputed at SAFTI will also participate in MSTD. This role is a quiet acknowledgment that both navies trust each other enough to share not just ships and training programs, but also mentorship responsibilities. Collaborating on a ship’s bridge wing while watching midshipmen apply their lessons adds a new layer to our cooperation.
Strengthening Instruction Together
Another important step this year is the opportunity for the Indian Instructor at SAFTI MI to attend the SAF Instructor Course at the Institute of Military Learning. Anyone who has trained in Singapore recognises the SAF’s reputation for clarity, structure, and rigour in teaching. Being invited into that system shows both professional goodwill and a sense of belonging, as Indian officers here are contributors to a shared training environment, and not just guests. While this harmony may seem small at a glance, it has a big impact. It creates a smoother training experience for officer cadets and strengthens the interoperability of both navies long before they operate together at sea.
Why it Matters
These initiatives, participation in MSTD, the SAF Instructor Course, and the ongoing presence at SAFTI Military Institute, may seem just another training engagement when seen from India, but their significance here in Singapore is worth noting. Singapore and India are maritime nations by nature. Both are located near key international sea lanes and rely on the security and freedom of navigation in the high seas. Both countries also view security and stability in the Indo-Pacific as a shared responsibility. When two navies work together in classrooms, on training grounds, and at sea, they do more than exchange skills. They shape generations of officers who instinctively understand each other, officers who, years later, may command ships operating together in real missions.
A Singapore Experience
Serving in Singapore as an Indian Naval Instructor at SAFTI-MI has provided me a close-up view of this partnership. You notice the professionalism of RSN officers, the curiosity of midshipmen eager to learn how another navy approaches the profession of naval sea faring, and the genuine warmth that Singaporeans show to foreign officers living and training among them. As I get ready to join MSTD as an Instructor, I look forward not just to the sea time, but also experience how Singaporean midshipmen put their shore-based learning into practice. It’s a reminder that naval training, whether in India or Singapore, rests on a shared foundation of mentorship, discipline, and respect for the sea.
Celebrating Navy Day from a Different Shore
Observing Indian Navy Day from Singapore underscores a fundamental truth: Naval service extends far beyond Territorial waters. It is about building enduring partnerships, forging trust, and sustaining the security and stability of the maritime domain. The 25-year presence of Indian naval instructors at SAFTI MI is more than a training exchange; it is a tangible symbol of the professional cohesion and mutual confidence between India and Singapore. Navy Day reminds us that the real strength of a Navy is measured not only in ships or firepower, but in the relationships, shared values, and partnerships that safeguard the seas for all nations. To everyone who works at sea, trains those who go to sea, or supports them from home, this day is as much a tribute to their role in keeping our oceans safe, open, and peaceful.
The Chola dynasty emerged as a dominant force in South India during the medieval period, ascending to imperial heights under the leadership of monarchs such as Rajaraja Chola I (985–1014 CE) and his successor Rajendra Chola I (1014–1044 CE). From the late 9th century onward, the Cholas transformed from a regional Tamil kingdom into an expansive empire that exercised both territorial and maritime dominance. Central to their ascendancy was a highly organized administrative system, military efficiency, and most crucially, a formidable navy. This naval force not only defended coastal territories but also enabled overseas expeditions, culminating in the audacious campaign against the Srivijaya Empire in 1025 CE.
This military undertaking marked a watershed moment in Asian history. It was the first major Indian naval expedition that successfully projected hard power across the Bay of Bengal and deep into Southeast Asia. The campaign was not merely an exercise in conquest; it was underpinned by economic imperatives and strategic calculations. At its core, the Chola expedition was a response to rising constraints on Tamil commercial interests and a bold attempt to reshape the balance of power in maritime Asia.
By the early 11th century, the Cholas had established complete hegemony over peninsular India, stretching their influence from the eastern Deccan to the Coromandel Coast. With their land frontiers secured, they turned seaward. The Chola navy was one of the most advanced of its time, boasting large fleets capable of transoceanic voyages. These naval capabilities were not limited to warfare; they were intricately tied to commerce, diplomacy, and cultural dissemination.
The Bay of Bengal, a critical maritime highway connecting India with Southeast Asia and China, became the arena of Chola maritime engagement. Tamil merchant guilds—such as the Ayyavole, Manigramam, and Ainnurruvar—had long operated along these sea routes, establishing commercial enclaves across ports in Sri Lanka, the Malay Peninsula, and the Indonesian archipelago. However, their trading networks increasingly faced obstacles from Srivijaya, a powerful maritime empire based in Sumatra.
Srivijaya controlled vital choke points, most notably the Strait of Malacca, which served as the primary conduit for maritime trade between India, China, and the Islamic world. The kingdom leveraged its geographic position to impose tolls on merchant vessels and demanded that ships reroute through its ports. Indian merchants, particularly from Tamil Nadu, were often coerced—through maritime intermediaries such as the Orang Laut (sea people)—to dock at Srivijayan harbors, redirecting profits toward Palembang, the Srivijayan capital.
This systematic obstruction of Tamil commercial activity led to growing tensions. Scholars such as K.A. Nilakanta Sastri have argued that the Chola campaign was motivated more by economic retaliation than imperial expansion. The interference in trade routes posed a direct threat to Tamil merchant guilds, who were integral to the Chola economy. The Chola rulers, keen to protect these networks and assert dominance over critical sea lanes, saw military action as a necessary intervention.
In 1025 CE, Rajendra Chola I launched a massive naval expedition that would become one of the most sophisticated maritime operations of the medieval world. Chola inscriptions describe this undertaking with pride, referencing the deployment of “many ships in the midst of the rolling sea.” The campaign was notable for its logistical audacity and strategic ingenuity.
The Cholas employed diversionary tactics to confuse Srivijayan defenses. A secondary squadron was sent toward the northern reaches of the Strait of Malacca to create a false sense of threat, prompting Srivijaya to mobilize its forces in that direction. Meanwhile, the primary fleet sailed along the western coast of Sumatra, passed through the Sunda Strait, and launched a surprise attack on Palembang from the south. This route avoided heavily fortified areas and exploited the element of surprise—a rare feat in premodern naval warfare.
Inscriptions from the period list over a dozen port cities raided during the campaign, including Palembang (Srivijaya’s capital), Kadaram (modern-day Kedah, Malaysia), Pannai, Malaiyur (Jambi), Mevilimbangam, Talaittakkolam, and Mappapalam, among others. These cities were located across Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Myanmar, and the Nicobar Islands. The campaign led to the capture of King Sangrama Vijayatunggavarman of Srivijaya, along with elephants, treasures, and symbolic artifacts such as the jewelled war-gate, Vidyadhara-torana.
The Cholas did not attempt to establish lasting administrative control over these regions. Instead, their goal was to dismantle Srivijaya’s stranglehold over sea routes, humiliate its leadership, and open access for Tamil merchants. While Srivijaya continued to exist after the raids, its maritime supremacy was permanently weakened, creating space for emerging regional powers like the Khmer Empire in Cambodia and the Javanese state of Kahuripan.
Despite the military aggression, trade resumed relatively quickly. Chinese records from the Song dynasty indicate the arrival of Srivijayan emissaries in China as early as 1028 CE, only three years after the invasion. However, the balance of power had shifted. Tamil merchant guilds, emboldened by the Chola victory, expanded their reach across Southeast Asia. For the next century, they maintained significant commercial and cultural influence in key ports.
Archaeological and epigraphic evidence supports this narrative. Tamil inscriptions have been discovered in Kedah, Palembang, and Jambi. Artifacts and temple remains in these regions show stylistic features characteristic of South Indian architecture. Tamil loanwords entered local languages, and Tamil merchant settlements became integrated into the fabric of Southeast Asian port life.
This period also witnessed an increase in cultural and religious exchanges. While military in nature, the Chola intervention did not disrupt the longstanding flow of religious and philosophical ideas. On the contrary, Tamil Shaivism and Vaishnavism continued to spread alongside Mahayana Buddhism, contributing to the syncretic religious landscapes of Southeast Asia.
Historians remain divided on the underlying motives of the 1025 expedition. Early scholars such as G.W. Spencer interpreted the campaign as a classic case of imperial overreach—a desire to project Chola sovereignty across the sea. In contrast, more recent analyses emphasize the economic dimensions, viewing the campaign as a reaction to Srivijayan harassment of Indian traders.
Supporting this economic thesis, Chinese sources such as Zhufan zhi note Srivijayan acts of piracy and coercion directed at vessels bypassing their ports. These incidents, seen as economic provocations, suggest that the Cholas were not seeking territorial conquest, but rather the protection of trade routes vital to their polity.
Regardless of the lens through which the campaign is viewed, its consequences were far-reaching. It marked a shift from soft cultural influence to hard military projection. It demonstrated the capacity of an Indian polity to undertake long-range naval operations—a feat rare in ancient and medieval history.
In 2025, India commemorated the millennium of Rajendra Chola’s naval expedition with a series of national celebrations. Events included cultural exhibitions at Gangaikonda Cholapuram (the imperial capital), the release of a ₹1,000 silver commemorative coin, and a renewed focus on maritime history in Tamil Nadu’s tourism initiatives.
These celebrations were not merely historical tributes. They were framed within the context of contemporary strategic narratives, particularly India’s “Act East” policy and its Indo-Pacific maritime strategy. The Chola legacy was invoked to underline themes of ancient connectivity, maritime sovereignty, and regional engagement with ASEAN nations.
The campaign has also served as a case study in maritime strategy. Analysts highlight how the Cholas understood and exploited maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca—insights that remain relevant for present-day India’s naval doctrine. The strategic use of monsoon winds, navigational skill, and synchronised fleet movement offer valuable lessons in premodern logistics and planning.
Furthermore, the Chola model of decentralised governance—through local village assemblies (sabhas and urs)—has been cited in policy discussions on participatory governance and administrative reform. It illustrates how a strong central authority can coexist with local autonomy, a concept increasingly pertinent in discussions of federalism and rural empowerment.
The Chola naval expedition to Kadaram in 1025 CE represents the pinnacle of medieval South Indian maritime ambition. It was an unprecedented assertion of state power across the seas, executed with precision and strategic foresight. The campaign disrupted Srivijaya’s regional monopoly, safeguarded Tamil commercial interests, and paved the way for a century of Tamil economic and cultural prominence in Southeast Asia.
It also marked a departure from centuries of peaceful exchange to an era where military force became an accepted tool in regional geopolitics. Yet the Cholas did not seek territorial annexation. Their goal was pragmatic—ensuring free access to trade corridors, defending economic interests, and elevating prestige.
In modern times, the expedition stands as a reminder of the enduring link between maritime power and national influence. It underscores how strategic vision, technological adaptation, and commercial protection can coalesce into effective policy—principles as relevant today as they were a millennium ago.
Most importantly, the legacy of the Chola expedition should be appreciated not through the lens of cultural supremacy, but as a testament to the complex interplay between trade, diplomacy, warfare, and cultural exchange in shaping the history of the Indian Ocean world.
Across the vast expanse beyond Earth’s atmosphere, a new frontier of competition has emerged that will fundamentally shape global security and military dominance in the twenty-first century. The strategic competition between the United States and China in space has intensified dramatically, particularly over the past decade, as both nations recognize that superiority in orbit translates directly to dominance across terrestrial battlefields and beyond. Unlike conventional military competition confined to land, sea, and air, space warfare represents an entirely new dimension where the traditional doctrines of deterrence, capability development, and strategic messaging must be reimagined for an era where satellites weaponize information and proximity operations in orbit transform the rules of engagement.
The militarization of space by both superpowers did not begin recently. The United States conducted its first anti-satellite weapons test as far back as 1959 during the Cold War era, while the Soviet Union pursued parallel programs. However, the contemporary space competition differs fundamentally from its predecessor. Where the Cold War space race was driven primarily by ideological rivalry and technological prestige, the current strategic competition is driven by military necessity, economic advantage, and the realization that modern warfare depends almost entirely on space-based systems for communications, navigation, surveillance, and precision strike capabilities.
China’s deliberate entrance into modern space warfare capabilities began with a watershed moment on January 11, 2007, when it conducted an anti-satellite missile test that destroyed its own defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite at an altitude of approximately 865 kilometers. This test, observed by United States officials from the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, fundamentally altered global perceptions of space security. As Chief of Space Operations General Chance Saltzman reflected, that single event demonstrated that space was no longer safe and that everything had irrevocably changed. The test created approximately 3,500 trackable debris pieces, along with thousands of smaller fragments that remain a persistent threat to all space operations and continue to pose collision hazards for orbital infrastructure decades later.
Current Orbital Capabilities and Launch Infrastructure
The disparity between United States and Chinese space capabilities has narrowed considerably since 2015, though important distinctions remain. As of July 2025, according to the United States Space Force Space Threat Fact Sheet, China had deployed more than 1,189 satellites in orbit, representing an increase of approximately 927 percent since the end of 2015 when China maintained roughly 260 satellites. In comparison, the United States, including both government and commercial systems, maintains a combined orbital presence exceeding 2,600 satellites, though this includes numerous commercial communications systems operated by private companies.
More significantly, the composition of these orbital assets reveals the military orientation of Chinese space programs. According to authoritative Space Force assessments, the People’s Liberation Army benefits from over 510 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites equipped with optical, multispectral, radar, and radio frequency sensors. This ISR constellation has grown by approximately six times over the past eight years, with commercial ISR satellites increasing seventeen-fold. These satellites provide the PLA with persistent global awareness capabilities, enabling detection of United States aircraft carriers, expeditionary forces, air wings, and vulnerable military infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
In terms of launch capacity, China has demonstrated remarkable expansion. By July 2025, China had conducted 42 total space launches, of which 41 were successful, placing 112 payloads into orbit. This pace, combined with China’s successful testing of reusable launch vehicle technology including a 12-kilometer vertical takeoff and landing test conducted in 2024, demonstrates Beijing’s commitment to achieving rapid, frequent access to space. China plans to launch 648 G60 communications satellites to low Earth orbit by the end of 2025 and as many as 15,000 satellites by 2030 as part of its proliferated low Earth orbit constellation strategy intended to compete with Western commercial systems operated by companies such as SpaceX.
Counterspace Weapons Architecture: China’s Arsenal
China has developed a comprehensive, full-spectrum array of counterspace weapons designed to degrade, disrupt, or destroy United States and allied space systems. These capabilities span kinetic and non-kinetic domains and operate across multiple orbital regimes.
Anti-Satellite Missiles and Kinetic Systems: Following the 2007 ASAT test, China has continued developing and deploying ground-launched anti-satellite missiles capable of reaching low Earth orbit altitudes. According to Pentagon assessments documented in the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report, China may have already developed weapons capable of striking satellites in geosynchronous orbit, at altitudes exceeding 36,000 kilometers. This would represent a significant advancement, as geosynchronous orbit hosts critical United States military early warning systems, secure communications, and missile detection platforms.
Ground-Based Laser Weapons: China has fielded multiple ground-based laser weapons systems designed to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellite sensors and structures. General Saltzman testified before Congress that by the mid-to-late 2020s, the United States expects China to deploy systems with sufficient power to physically damage satellite structures, not merely degrade sensor performance. These systems provide China with a reversible counterspace capability that does not create persistent orbital debris and thus may be employed with reduced international escalation risk.
Co-orbital and Proximity Operations: Among China’s most concerning developments is its demonstrated capability to conduct proximity operations, which involve maneuvering satellites into extremely close proximity to other space objects. In 2024, the United States Space Force reported that China conducted proximity operations involving five satellites, specifically three Shiyan-24C reconnaissance satellites and two additional vehicles. These operations demonstrated precise orbital mechanics capabilities and satellite maneuvering proficiency.
More significantly, in 2024, China successfully maneuvered two reconnaissance satellites, Shiyan-21 and Shiyan-25, into extreme proximity in geosynchronous orbit, where they conducted probable satellite refueling experiments. According to United States Space Command observations, the Chinese military demonstrated the capability to maneuver a satellite equipped with a robotic arm out past geosynchronous orbit, deposit it in a different position, and return it to geosynchronous orbit in a period of only several days. These operations demonstrate that Chinese satellites possess not merely rendezvous capabilities but potentially destructive capabilities for removing adversary satellites from orbit through kinetic engagement or capture.
Electronic Warfare Systems: China operates jamming systems capable of targeting space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems across multiple frequency bands, including the Pentagon’s extremely-high-frequency military communications. These systems can temporarily disable or degrade critical command and control links, reconnaissance data transmission, and precision navigation signals upon which United States military operations depend. The non-destructive nature of these attacks creates ambiguity regarding escalation and makes attribution particularly challenging.
Space-Based Surveillance and Targeting Networks: Perhaps most concerning to United States military planners is China’s development of integrated “kill chains” that combine ISR satellites with precision strike systems. Chinese reconnaissance satellites provide targeting data directly to land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-to-air systems, and maritime platforms. This networked approach enables China to detect, track, and target United States naval assets at ranges exceeding previous capabilities and to assess the effectiveness of Chinese strikes against hardened targets.
United States Space Capabilities and Response Architecture
The United States maintains substantial advantages in space technology, launch reliability, and orbital asset sophistication, though these advantages have eroded significantly. The United States Space Force, formally established on September 20, 2019, operates approximately 8,400 active-duty military personnel across multiple operational commands. The Space Operations Command coordinates tactical space operations, while United States Space Command provides strategic space command authority.
United States satellite systems in orbit include early warning platforms in geosynchronous orbit, global positioning system navigation satellites in medium Earth orbit, secure military communications systems across multiple orbital regimes, and substantial imagery intelligence collection capabilities. The United States maintains superiority in launch frequency and reliability through a combination of government-operated systems and heavily subsidized commercial launch providers.
However, in response to China’s counterspace threat, the United States has initiated development of offensive counterspace capabilities, though these programs remain significantly constrained compared to Chinese systems. The Counter Communications System, an upgraded large ground-based antenna, was declared operational in 2020 and provides temporary jamming capabilities against adversary satellites. The United States military is now fielding two additional systems designed to jam Chinese and Russian reconnaissance satellites. The Meadowlands system, developed by L3Harris Technologies after years of technical delays, is undergoing final training and live-fire exercises and is expected to achieve operational status in 2025. The Remote Sensing Terminals are intended for deployment across multiple global locations and can be operated remotely.
These systems represent the primary operational counterspace weapons deployed by the United States military. Notably, the United States does not currently possess an operational anti-satellite missile capability equivalent to China’s ground-launched systems, nor does it possess demonstrated co-orbital satellite capabilities for proximity operations. This asymmetry in operational counterspace weapons has generated considerable concern within the Department of Defense and Congress.
Comparative Assessment: Advantages and Vulnerabilities
A comprehensive comparison of United States and Chinese space warfare capabilities reveals a complex calculus of advantage and disadvantage that varies by orbital regime and type of conflict.
Chinese Advantages: China possesses operational counterspace weapons across multiple domains, including ground-launched anti-satellite missiles, laser systems, and co-orbital satellite capabilities. These systems are deployed and operationalized, not merely under development. China’s commitment to building redundant ISR constellations across multiple orbital regimes demonstrates a determination to create resilience through proliferation rather than through advanced technology. China’s recent successful reusable launch vehicle testing suggests that launch frequency will increase substantially, potentially enabling China to reconstitute lost satellite assets more rapidly than adversaries. Additionally, China’s civil-military fusion strategy leverages civilian commercial space industry resources to support military objectives, creating an integrated space industrial complex.
United States Advantages: The United States maintains technological superiority in satellite design, on-orbit operations, and system reliability. United States satellites continue to incorporate more advanced sensors, more capable processors, and superior redundancy features compared to Chinese systems. The United States maintains a substantial launch infrastructure advantage, with commercial providers including SpaceX providing launch services at costs below equivalent Chinese capabilities. The United States possesses superior in-orbit satellite maneuvering capabilities and extensive experience operating complex orbital mechanics. United States ground stations and command and control infrastructure remain globally distributed and technologically sophisticated.
Chinese Vulnerabilities: China’s rapid expansion of space assets has created significant vulnerability. China now depends heavily on space-based systems for communications, navigation, and the command and control essential to its military operations. The proliferation of Chinese satellites creates a large target set that the United States could potentially degrade. However, the United States faces political and legal constraints on developing and deploying offensive counterspace weapons comparable to those employed by China. Additionally, China’s civil-military fusion strategy provides it with flexibility that the United States, with its separation between military and civilian space operations, does not possess. The space debris created by Chinese and Russian testing of counterspace weapons has increased the risk of Kessler syndrome, where cascading debris collisions could render certain orbital regimes unusable for decades.
United States Vulnerabilities: The United States military remains extraordinarily dependent on space systems for command and control, precision strike, intelligence collection, and communications. The loss or degradation of critical satellite systems during a conflict would substantially degrade United States operational effectiveness. General Dickinson, Commander of United States Space Command, has emphasized that space is decisive and critical to all military operations. The United States has explicitly restricted the development of certain offensive counterspace capabilities due to international treaty obligations and domestic policy constraints, creating an asymmetry with China’s approach. The United States Space Force has testified before Congress that it remains significantly underfunded for the execution of its newest and most critical mission: space control.
Anticipated Developments and Future Trajectory
Both nations are pursuing advanced technologies that will fundamentally reshape space warfare over the coming decade. China has published its Space Development Plan emphasizing Beijing’s intent to surpass the United States and become the world’s preeminent space power. This plan includes development of advanced orbital service vehicles, demonstrated reusable launch systems, and expanded ISR constellations.
The United States is investing in distributed satellite architectures designed to provide redundancy, technologies for rapid satellite replacement and on-orbit logistics, and advanced sensor systems. However, budget constraints and the delayed fielding of key counterspace systems have created a widening capability gap in certain domains.
Conclusion
The comparison between China and the United States in space warfare reveals a strategic competition characterized by Chinese acceleration across counterspace weapon systems and constellation expansion, while the United States attempts to maintain technological advantages while responding to policy constraints on offensive weapons development. China has moved from aspirational programs to operational counterspace capabilities, while the United States remains in development phases for comparable systems. The trajectory of competition suggests that China will continue narrowing the gap across multiple dimensions, potentially achieving rough parity or superiority in specific counterspace domains within the coming decade. This competition will shape not only military capabilities but also global stability, as both nations navigate the unprecedented challenge of conducting military operations in an environment that remains insufficiently governed by international law and agreements.
About the Author
Kumar Aryan is an analytical and results-oriented postgraduate from Symbiosis School of International Studies (SIU) with a Master’s in International Relations, Global Security, and International Business Strategy. He possesses a strong understanding of geopolitics and economics, expertise in research and data-driven strategy, and proven leadership in team management and is experienced in market intelligence, data analysis, and cross-cultural engagement.
Greenland has rapidly transitioned from a peripheral Arctic territory into a pivotal theatre in twenty-first-century geopolitics, driven by accelerating great-power competition for critical minerals and strategic access. Possessing vast deposits containing at least 45 million tonnes of rare-earth-rich ore, including high-value heavy elements such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium, the island occupies a unique position within emerging supply chain security debates. Considering China currently dominates 60% of global rare earth mining and controls up to 85% of worldwide processing capacity, Western policymakers increasingly view Greenland as essential for diversifying supplies critical to defence, renewable energy, and advanced technologies. In such circumstances, reports in late 2025 that Washington was exploring an equity stake in Critical Metals Corp – the company developing Greenland’s Tanbreez project – signalled a significant evolution in US policy thinking. However, such developments occurred alongside intensified diplomatic friction, renewed NATO debates, and expanding European and Canadian interest, revealing the complex intersections of resource competition, regional security, and Arctic governance shaping the trajectory of US-Greenland engagement.
Greenland’s Critical Minerals and Global Strategic Value
Rare Earth Elements and Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Greenland’s geological profile places it at the centre of global efforts to secure non-Chinese sources of critical minerals. The Tanbreez deposit in southern Greenland contains one of the world’s largest heavy rare earth concentrations, with approximately 27% of the deposit composed of high-value heavy elements essential for high-temperature magnets used in electric vehicle motors, missile guidance systems, wind turbines, and advanced radar technologies. Western governments increasingly regard these minerals as foundational to national resilience, given Beijing’s demonstrated willingness to leverage export controls during geopolitical disputes, including the 2010 embargo targeting Japan and more recent restrictions on gallium and germanium.
Greenland’s broader resource profile further amplifies its strategic value and geological surveys indicate the presence of 40 of the 50 minerals designated by Washington as “critical”, alongside 25 of the 34 raw materials categorised as “critical” by the European Commission. Considering such raw materials include gallium, tantalum, zinc, lead, gold, and uranium, however, the latter remains subject to a 2021 Greenlandic ban reflecting environmental and sovereignty concerns. Considering forecasts by the International Energy Agency that rare earth demand may rise by 600% by 2040, Greenland’s potential role within future supply chains appears substantial. In such circumstances, attention has also centred on the Strange Lake deposit, which analysts suggest could eventually supply nearly 16% of global heavy rare earth demand once fully operational.
Evolution of US Strategic Engagement
From Symbolic Interest to Institutional Engagement
American outreach towards Greenland intensified significantly during the Trump administration, though initial remarks overshadowed the seriousness of emerging institutional frameworks. Trump’s 2019 suggestion of purchasing Greenland attracted criticism; however, it also signalled renewed attention to the island’s strategic and mineral potential. Vice President JD Vance’s high-profile visit to Nuuk in March 2025 illustrated an evolution from rhetorical interest to structured diplomatic engagement, reflecting bipartisan recognition of Greenland’s role in addressing US supply chain vulnerabilities.
Considering this backdrop, rebuilding institutional architecture became a priority. Washington’s reopening of its consulate in Nuuk in 2020 strengthened bilateral contact, enabling sustained engagement on mineral development, scientific cooperation, and Arctic policy. In such circumstances, the 2019 US-Greenland memorandum on mineral resource development- despite expiring without renewal under the Biden administration – provided an early template for coordinated economic engagement.
Direct Government Investment and Strategic Stakes
American interest in converting a $50 million Defence Production Act grant into an estimated 8% equity stake in Critical Metals Corp demonstrated how Washington increasingly considers direct investment necessary to secure critical mineral supply chains. This approach mirrored domestic precedents, including the 2025 purchases of stakes in Lithium Americas (5%) and MP Materials (approximately 15%), financed through Department of Energy warrants and direct equity injections. Further, such interventions marked a notable shift from grant-based funding towards deeper state involvement in strategic extractive industries.
American financing architecture further expanded through the US Export-Import Bank’s preliminary offer of a $120 million loan for Tanbreez’s construction, equal to approximately 41% of project costs. Considering discussions within Washington about reallocating portions of the CHIPS and Science Act budget towards critical minerals, there is strong evidence that policymakers increasingly conceptualise mineral access as strategic infrastructure akin to semiconductors.
Geopolitical Dynamics and Regional Security Implications
NATO Tensions and Danish Sovereignty Concerns
US ambition in Greenland complicated relations with Denmark, which retains constitutional sovereignty over the island while granting extensive autonomy to its government. Tensions intensified in August 2025 when Denmark’s security service detected American attempts to identify potential supporters for pro-US narratives in Greenland, prompting a formal diplomatic reprimand. Danish leaders described such interference as unacceptable, whilst expressing concern that American rhetoric risked destabilising domestic political dynamics in Greenlandic communities. On the issue as Danish authorities summoned the US charge d’affaires for a formal dressing-down over the issue, with the Trump administration responding that Denmark should “calm down”, exacerbating diplomatic friction.
Further, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen who articulated that Greenlandic anxieties, noting how unsettling it felt for residents of small coastal settlements when the world’s strongest superpower spoke of them as something that could be bought or owned. Considering the long history of Danish stewardship in the Arctic, these tensions manifested symbolically when Denmark excluded US military participation from its major Arctic Light 2025 exercise, despite invitations to observe. In such circumstances, the episode revealed deeper structural frictions within NATO concerning Arctic priorities, alliance cohesion, and regional threat perceptions.
Greenlandic Political Agency and Sovereignty Assertions
Greenland’s domestic politics strongly shaped responses to US advances. Foreign Minister Naaja Nathanielsen described Trump’s public interest in acquiring Greenland as “disrespectful”, arguing that such statements disregarded Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen later reaffirmed this stance when addressing the European Parliament, emphasising Greenland’s commitment to maintaining constructive European partnerships whilst remaining open to diversified international cooperation.
Greenland’s 2021 uranium mining ban also illustrated willingness to reject foreign investment perceived as environmentally or politically problematic, ultimately preventing Chinese state-linked investors from pursuing the Kvanefjeld project. The ban demonstrated Greenland’s capacity to regulate extractive industries independently despite external pressure.
Multilateral Competition beyond the US
Growing global interest in Greenland’s mineral sector reflected broader strategic realignments across the Arctic. Considering the UK reopened free trade negotiations in 2025 and EU funding proposals exceeded €530 million, competition for access to Greenlandic minerals extends well beyond Washington. In such circumstances, Canadian policymakers have also argued that enhanced Canada-Greenland cooperation could help balance US influence, particularly given similarities between Greenlandic and Inuit-governed territories in northern Canada.
Development of the Tanbreez Project
Project Structure, Control, and Production Ambitions
Critical Metals Corp’s acquisition of Tanbreez for $216 million in combined cash and equity significantly altered ownership dynamics, enabling Western control over one of the world’s largest heavy rare earth deposits. The company’s subsequent increase in ownership to 92.5% strengthened this position, with European Lithium retaining a small minority (7.5%) share.
Such a projection appears particularly relevant given China’s historical tendency to manipulate rare earth prices during periods of emerging competition. In such circumstances, production plans outline phased expansion, beginning with 85,000 tonnes of rare earth concentrate annually from 2026, scaling potentially to 425,000 tonnes if modular expansion proceeds.
Further, such a scenario carries significant implications for market stability and long-term diversification efforts. Critical Metals also secured a ten-year offtake agreement with a US separation facility in August 2025, ensuring integration into Western midstream processing networks from the outset.
Environmental, Logistical, and Regulatory Considerations
Developing Tanbreez poses important logistical challenges due to harsh Arctic conditions and limited local infrastructure. Despite these challenges, the site’s proximity to deep-water fjords enables year-round shipping, offering a significant logistical advantage compared to other Arctic mining operations.
Environmental governance remains central to Greenland’s regulatory approach, particularly regarding radioactive material handling. Given the 2021 uranium ban, projects generating significant radioactive waste require exceptional safeguards. Greenlandic authorities have repeatedly stressed the importance of community involvement, respect for Indigenous rights, and strict compliance with environmental standards.
Market Dynamics and China’s Strategic Responses
Considering China’s dominance in rare earth processing, market analysts suggest that Beijing could attempt to undercut emerging Western suppliers by lowering prices or increasing output. In such circumstances, historical precedents demonstrate that Chinese pricing decisions significantly influence global market stability. Western policymakers nevertheless view diversification as essential despite potential volatility, given long-term demand growth driven by electrification and military modernisation.
Policy Implications and Strategic Futures
Building Mine-to-Magnet Supply Chains
Washington’s potential investment in Tanbreez forms part of a wider national strategy to construct full mine-to-magnet supply chains independent of China. This includes investment in separation facilities, magnet manufacturing plants, and streamlined permitting systems. Considering the United States historically relied almost entirely on Chinese processing, rebuilding midstream capacity remains essential for achieving technological and defence resilience.
Balancing Strategy with Diplomacy
The future of US-Greenland relations depends on recalibrating American diplomacy towards partnership rather than acquisition. Considering earlier tensions generated by Trump’s rhetoric and reported influence activities, Washington faces a strategic necessity to demonstrate respect for Greenland’s autonomy, environmental priorities, and political agency. In such circumstances, cooperation with Denmark and the EU remains essential to maintain NATO unity and sustain long-term Arctic governance stability.
Further, climate change fundamentally alters Arctic dynamics, with ice retreat opening new shipping routes and resource access whilst simultaneously raising environmental risks. Denmark’s investment commitments, which include considering the acquisition of P-8 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft for double-digit billion kroner to improve situational awareness around Greenland and the Faroe Islands, reflect growing threat perceptions. Such defensive investments, combined with increased NATO exercises in the region, risked escalating tensions yet proved necessary to maintain deterrence against potential adversaries.
Arctic Security Architecture and Multilateralism
Arctic governance is evolving due to intensifying multilateral competition and shifting security dynamics. Considering Russia’s extensive military build-up in the region alongside Sino-Russian cooperation, Western states increasingly emphasise surveillance, maritime domain awareness, and shared military exercises. In such circumstances, Greenland’s growing diplomatic assertiveness – including its increasing participation in European fora – indicates an emerging role in shaping Arctic governance frameworks rather than simply being governed through Danish representation.
Conclusion
US outreach towards Greenland during the Trump administration revealed an intricate convergence of strategic resource acquisition, Arctic security considerations, and diplomatic tension. Greenland’s exceptional rare earth endowments, particularly the heavy rare earth-rich Tanbreez deposit, provide Washington with an opportunity to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from Chinese dominance. However, these opportunities have unfolded alongside Danish concerns about sovereignty breaches, Greenlandic assertions of political agency, and intensifying European, British, and Canadian competition for access to Greenland’s resources. Further, Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen’s parliamentary address, warning that ‘Trump will be back’, reflected sustained concern despite temporary quiet on the issue.
Considering this interplay, the future stability of US-Greenland relations requires recalibrated diplomacy grounded in mutual respect, environmental responsibility, and recognition of Greenland’s autonomy. In such circumstances, Greenland’s emerging strategic role within broader Arctic governance debates demonstrates how resource security, alliance cohesion, and climate-driven geopolitical change are reshaping regional politics. The trajectory of the US-Greenland relationship will therefore remain a key indicator of whether great-power competition in the Arctic proceeds through cooperative partnerships or escalates into adversarial zero-sum dynamics.
Beyond infrastructure and financing, China’s ascent in South Asia is the result of a calculated cognitive strategy that influences regional dependence, perceptions, and decision-making to its advantage. The Belt and Road Initiative serves as a psychological and strategic influence tool in addition to being an economic initiative. As it prepares its 15th Five Year Plan for (2026-2030), China emphasises energy security, domestic consumption, national security, and technical self-reliance, signalling a move away from rapid growth and towards “strategic endurance”. This illustrates how, in addition to its economic and military prowess, Beijing is increasingly depending on cognitive weapons of power to shape influence and perception.
China’s political system has historically associated ideological control with economic statecraft. Under Xi Jinping’s quest for centralisation, the Communist Party’s internal governance mechanisms treat cognition – the way that people, markets, and states think – as a realm of power. This idea is expanded upon by the BRI, which influences South Asia’s mental and physical environments.
There is subtle logic to it. In addition to promising growth, stability, and connection, China’s projects foster an attitude of inevitable modernisation in the region, with Beijing serving as its vital architect. Even hesitant or suspicious governments start using Beijing’s developmental grammar to frame their national objectives once this image becomes entrenched.
China creates a kind of strategic habituation – a mental alignment where smaller governments accept disparity as normal and advantageous – through infrastructure diplomacy, loan leverage, technical dependency, and media narratives. In this sense, cognition serves as the glue that holds China’s South Asia Play together – not by coercion, but by a shared understanding and belief in Beijing’s developmental logic.
The 15th Five Year Plan, Powered and Codified
The forthcoming 15th Five Year Plan for (2026-2030) represents a major shift in China’s foreign policy approach. This blueprint places more focus on national security, strategic self-sufficiency, and resilience in the face of the global uncertainty than earlier plans that were fixated on GDP targets.
Its fundamental idea is the “dual circulation” approach, which aims to retain a limited, controlled foreign engagement while bolstering home economic circulation. This calls for a designated BRI for South Asia, one that places more emphasis on strategic embedding and less on aggressive loans, combining digital infrastructure, supply networks, and technology standards in ways that maintain long-term reliance.
Three key elements that stand out:
Technological Independence. China wants to control key technologies, including AI, quantum computing, renewable energy, and rare earth elements, including those found in Myanmar and export them in accordance with its own regulations. This strategy is evident in Huawei’s digital corridors, AI surveillance initiatives in Pakistan, and e-governance systems in Bangladesh and Nepal, reflects recognition of technological inevitability in which Chinese innovation is becoming more linked to regional wealth.
Security of Energy and Resources. China creates redundancy and reach by developing in ports like Gwadar and Hambantota as well as electricity grids in Bangladesh and Myanmar. This is done not only for trade but also for strategic continuity. Whether driven by necessity or aspiration, South Asian cooperation strengthens Beijing’s sense of fortitude in a changing global energy of environment.
Resilience in the Economy as a Psychological Leverage. China’s connection with South Asia grows increasingly selective, yet symbolically powerful, as its export dependencies decreases and its domestic consumption increases. Even in cases when financial results are unknown, smaller states view involvement of Chinese projects as a means of achieving long-term economic stability. Beijing’s silent victory is this anticipatory psychology, which is motivated by a fear of being left out.
Expansionism through Cognition
Overt coercion and territory grabs are no longer the mainstays of China’s expansionism policy in South Asia. Under the pretext of ‘win-win’ development, it shapes perceptions, expectations, and dependencies instead through institutional and psychological manipulation. Beijing creates a sense of inevitable outcomes by supplying financing, technology, and infrastructure; smaller states learn to view alignment as a strategic opportunity rather than a sign of capitulation. The fear of being shut out or losing access motivates engagement even in cases where nations acknowledge China’s aspirations. In essence, perception, not coercion, is used to create reliance, making intellect the tool of expansion. This creates a long-term strategic power that endures much beyond agreements or loans.
Acquiring the ability to think instead of reacting
To tackle this cognitive expansionism, South Asia needs to be intellectually agile rather than hysterical. The region needs to make investments in strategic cognition, which is the ability to read China’s internal changes, understand its economic psychology, and predict how it will manifest itself outside.
It is crucial to diversify developmental narratives; countries must imagine modernisation without adopting Chinese model of habit.
The prevention of cognitive capture by Chinese systems can be achieved through regional coordination on digital and infrastructure standards.
Local control over agency will be maintained by transparent debt structures.
Beijing’s strategy for South Asia is about rewiring cognition, not just only ports and railroads. This is made official by the 15th Five Year Plan, which unifies economic strategy, technological aspirations, and security considerations into a single framework of power.
Perception, not geography, is China’s new frontier. And South Asia will continue to be bonded to Beijing – not by debt, but by design – unless it can successfully negotiate that mental battleground.
In this era, which is not of war, but of geo-economics rather, the latent nature and unmet potential of the South American continent has begun to witness realignment within the broader rules-based global order. As the intra-nation as well as inter-nation power dynamics shift, in order to not repeat the mistakes of the past, it is only fair to not underestimate the impact and capability of the nations that make up this continent. It is equally imperative to let go of and overcome the stereotypes that engulf the image South America holds in the eyes of rest of the world, often restricted to its football prowess, Iberian colonial past, oil reserves, infamous drug cartels and a unifying hero in the form and resilient spirit of Simón Bolívar.
Introductory perspective
It certainly is strange and fascinating in equal measure, that most countries of South America (except Suriname), despite exercising sovereignty and achieving independence since the 19th century still get overlooked. A continent so rich in natural resources, so crucial to the global oil supply chains and still struggling to break free from the shackles of rampant corruption, rising crime rates, declining economies, environmental degradation and a serious drug problem? The questions are varied and their reasons are significantly embedded in the whirlwind of geopolitical undercurrents.
South America, often mistaken to be on the periphery, is actually central to the global discourse and logistical realities pertaining to food, energy, and climate security. Amidst rising great power competition between the United States of America (U.S.A.) and China, South America most definitely matters geopolitically because of its multi-layered dynamism as a continent. As Alberto Methol Ferré has famously proposed “a continentalist outlook of South America as a geopolitical unit, within a Latin American national dimension”, it indicates the desired cohesion, integration and shared identity.
The countries of South America are the likes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela and French Guiana (which is an overseas territory of France, not a sovereign state per se). The population of South America, is officially estimated to be between 438–453 million during 2025, as per United Nations (UN) Data.
Historical underpinnings
To reconstruct the past, it is imperative to objectively revisit and actively recall it first. South America’s colonial past, especially the Spanish-Portuguese legacy reverberates centuries later in its economic traditions and popular culture, spheres that manifest into geopolitical ramifications. The history of economic dependency through an extractive model, later followed by becoming a reluctant battleground in the struggle for ideological supremacy between the U.S. and the erstwhile Soviet Union in the second half of 20th century have been markers of the journey that the region has had.
While the Spanish and Portuguese empires turned South America into an exporter of raw commodities — silver from Potosí (Bolivia), gold from Brazil, sugar and coffee from plantations — this hampered the region’s self sufficiency, autonomy and agency. With that kind of a historical backdrop, the continent’s economy continues to be entrenched with inequality and dependency on external markets. This pattern explains why South America has always been a supplier of strategic resources (then silver, gold, sugar; now oil, lithium, soy).
The Cold War showed that control of South America mattered for ideological balance and global security. Today’s great power rivalry (U.S. and China, with Russia re-emerging and India rising) is a direct echo of these tensions. Many South American states although resisted full alignment with either superpower, back in the day. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also had strong Latin American participation (e.g., Argentina, Peru, Brazil to some extent). Countries pursued regional initiatives to reduce dependence (like early precursors to Mercosur “Mercado Común del Sur”). These non-aligned tendencies established a tradition of strategic autonomy.
Political ethos and chaos
The political fibre of the continent, despite varying country-wise, also has a thread that has held them all together, that thread being of chaos and instability. With the onset of the Pink Tide 1.0 in the 2000s, left-leaning leaders gaining ground (like Chávez, Lula, Morales) and the subsequent right-wing resurgence in the 2010s, which has now gone back to left (Lula’s comeback, Boric in Chile, Petro in Colombia) shows the diversity of public opinion, overriding the storms of realpolitik that the world has tried time and again to associate South America with. This frequent democratic fragility, almost across the board, including the coups like that of Bolivia in 2019, impeachment crises (like those in Brazil, Peru), have had repercussions on the policy swings that have hindered long-term strategies to either unite, or integrate into the changing tech-savvy landscape.
Colombia’s cocaine trade menace, organized crime spilling into politics, the Venezuelan crisis forcing millions of refugees to look for shelter and opportunities elsewhere, bankruptcy, hyperinflation have all cumulatively and collectively destabilized the path to the mainstreaming of modernity, innovation and collaboration. Whether it’s Argentina’s Falkland Islands unresolved issue with the United Kingdom (UK), or the Venezuela-Guyana territorial conflict regarding the Essequibo region, the equations are subject to the winds of change and the whims of scrutiny within South America as well as outside, making it a geopolitically charged entity.
Natural resources – exploited yet under-utilized
The continent has a lot to offer – like soybeans, lithium, copper, and oil etc. Venezuela holds the world’s largest oil reserves, but on the flip side, the recent instance of aggressive posturing by the U.S. near the Venezuelan coast in the Caribbean Sea (some have even gone on to the extent of terming it as an instance of doorstep warfare) and the not so friendly rapport that President Lula from Brazil or President Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela share with President Trump have cast aspersions on the viability and feasibility of maximizing the potential of these resources, through partnerships and collaborations.
Brazil and Argentina are now big players in exporting soybeans, especially because of the trade issues between the U.S. and China, which has made China look for more soybean suppliers in Latin America. This makes South America a stakeholder in the global food supply chains. Also, Argentina’s new policies under President Javier Milei and other countries in the region making it easier for businesses have boosted investors’ hope and confidence. Plus, the continent is key for clean energy, with Chile, Bolivia and Argentina (the Lithium Triangle with 60 % of global reserves) providing lithium used in batteries, have put South America on the map in green technology which is a rising domain. Regarding renewable energy potential, the wind energy landscape in Patagonia and the hydropower calibre of Brazil are treasure troves of geo-economic transformation waiting to be unlocked and unleashed.
Expanding relationship with China and its alarming aspects
China has solidified its position as South America’s leading trading partner by heavily investing in energy, infrastructure of railways and ports, and military sectors through the Belt and Road Initiative, of which various South American countries are signatories. In 2025, China hosted regional leaders and announced a US $9 billion investment credit line, reinforcing its economic influence. Chinese companies have filled the gap left by declining Western investment, building goodwill through aid, investment, and cultural diplomacy. Beijing’s increasing military cooperation, particularly with Venezuela, has raised concerns in Washington regarding the strategic implications for hemispheric security. Another area of suspicion is the Chinese technological and military footprint (courtesy Huawei’s operations under the scanner, satellite stations in Argentina etc).
The shifting alliances on the Taiwan issue—most recently highlighted by Honduras switching recognition to China in 2023—illustrates Beijing’s growing diplomatic influence. More importantly, Beijing’s history of charging exorbitantly high rates of interest when lending and wolf warrior diplomacy coupled with expansionist tendencies repeatedly put on display, the risk of debt dependency and debt traps is as real as one can speculate.
Strategic partnership with India
Meanwhile, the diplomatic engagement with India and the geopolitical vitality that it has in New Delhi’s outlook has been on an upward trajectory. South America, collectively, now has the defining choice to make – to continue to work with India as a strategic partner in mobilizing the Global South and be the voice of reason in multilateral forums.
The transition from non-alignment to all-alignment, as long as there is issue-based cooperation and the strategic autonomy stays intact, has been India’s policy so far in these unprecedented times of sanctions. With South America on-board, and the diversity, credibility and newness that it brings, sky is the limit to realize and operationalize mutually beneficial outcomes. Therefore, South America clearly has a role to play bridging the divide and communication gap that exists and persists in the world, in the form of camps and alliances.
Security and regional equations
An economic bloc like the Mercosur, with issues of uneven integration has had some pertinent history. UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) meanwhile stands rather weakened and UNCELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) signals a revitalizing attempt at ensuring Latin American unity. With the newfound activity within BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), of which Brazil is a permanent member and from which Argentina withdrew is another instance of different countries in the continent making different independent choices, often at the expense of contrast. While this does signify autonomy, but as a whole, it also shows how fragmented the continent really is.
South America’s ambitions to influence global standards on development, climate change, and conflict resolution are highlighted by Brazil’s 2025 BRICS chairmanship and the region’s heightened participation in international fora like the G20 (Group of 20). Its role as a resource-rich periphery still defines its geopolitical importance, after historically being turned into a strategic arena where resources, ideology, and autonomy collide. The same factors corroborate why the region is even more geopolitically vital today.
Geographical and environmental domain – climate politics
The geo-strategic location of South America, if we were to look at it from the lens of Rimland or Mackinder’s theory, is a myriad of gateways to oceanic spaces and land borders. The presence of the Amazon rainforest (“lungs of the Earth”) in the context of biodiversity preservation and conservation and also transnational security, the proximity to the Panama Canal with respect to movement in world trade, the direct access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as trade routes, the Andes mountains as resource hub and the Atacama desert as a natural barrier – are all to be factored in while ascertaining the sheer impact it has on the global ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) goals.
The politics surrounding climate change has also assumed a more pronounced geopolitical character with deforestation, illegal unchecked mining, wildfires and overall climate negotiations taking the centre stage in what we now know as climate justice amidst fulfillment of common but differentiated responsibilities. This very climate security ties South America to global future.
The U.S. conundrum
With the Monroe Doctrine (1823) declaring Latin America as U.S. “backyard”, thereby shutting out European colonial ambitions, South America has always been fundamental to the U.S. hemispheric stability and security doctrine. Throughout the 20th century, Washington has often been found to be somewhat considered by many, as party to interventions, coups, and economic pressure tactics to secure and assert its dominance. The classic case of Chile (1973) when the U.S. supported Pinochet against socialist Salvador Allende serves as an infamous example.
One famous school of thought amongst geopolitical commentators suggests that this is partly because of their geographical proximity to a superpower that at times overshadowed and overpowered them, unintentionally and otherwise. Albeit the U.S. influence off late has been viewed as a declining superpower with the rise of China, Russia, and regional assertions, but it still holds well in the spheres of military, migration and anti-narcotics operations in the region. Today, the U.S. faces the historical baggage and legacy of these policies and rightly so, as many South Americans remain persistently uncomfortable with, or skeptical of American influence and power.
Economic sustainability
South America has historically been a supplier of raw materials in global supply chains. However, as the circumstances and economic priorities have changed over the years, the situation is a lot more optimistic brimming with recovery and expected reforms, of which increased geopolitical relevance is a natural consequence.
Brazil, apart from being a full-time G-20 member, is the continent’s largest economy, followed by Argentina and Colombia. While South America’s total nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2025 is projected at around US $4.3 trillion, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimate a real GDP growth rate for South America of 2.7% in 2025, driven by recoveries in Argentina and Ecuador and steady expansion in Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay.
So far, South America has largely and consciously chosen to stay neutral as tensions rise between the United States, China, and the European Union. But the waves of change seem to have accelerated. For example, the recent completion of trade talks between the EU and Mercosur (bloc with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) in December 2024 shows how South America is working to build partnerships with different groups. Over 64% of local business leaders see the current split in global trade as a chance to grow. This nuanced approach enables the region to position itself as an important hub for foreign direct as well as institutional investments.
Way forward
South America’s geopolitical importance ought to be rooted in realism, with special emphasis on its strategic location, resource-richness and climate change-related food security, which is to be utilized as a leverage while carrying out its balancing act between various world powers.
While South America is no longer a passive participant or a dormant observer, it still faces multiplicity of challenges like political instability, economic inequality, corruption, water shortage, weak logistical base, and regional ideological fragmentation. By cracking new trade agreements and treaties, welcoming foreign investment, and carefully handling relationships with major world powers, the continent as a whole has the potential to become a solid, key player in the multipolar world of the 21st century.
About the Author
Rudraksh Saklani is postgraduate in History from the University of Delhi with graduation in the same discipline. He possesses solid analytical and communication skills honed through intense academic training and has diverse internship experience, including with the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. His research internship experience at The Indian Journal for Research in Law and Management has allowed him familiarization with law and management-related contemporary themes and case studies. He is an alumnus of The Army Public School, Dhaula Kuan, New Delhi where he scored perfect 10 CGPA in Class X and 92% in Class XII and was the Head Boy of the school.
Field Marshal Asim Munir & President Xi Jinping: source Internet
On January 24, 1972, a little over a month after Pakistan had lost East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, in the war with India, in the city of Multan in the Punjab province of Pakistan, a conference was held, presided over by the Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto which came to be known as the Multan Conference.
The Multan Conference was the strategic planning session for Pakistan’s military establishment and in it three important decisions were taken for Pakistan’s future. One, Pakistan would go nuclear. Two, Pakistan will wage a war for Jammu & Kashmir at a suitable time. Three, Pakistan would bleed India with attrition through low-intensity conflict.
Pakistan went nuclear on May 28, 1998 when five simultaneous underground nuclear tests were conducted under the codename Chagai-I as the nuclear tests were carried out in the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai district of Balochistan province of Pakistan. This was followed by the Chagai-II nuclear tests two days later on May 30, 1998 in the Kharan Desert of Balochistan province.
Pakistan had become a nuclear nation. The first decision of the Multan Conference for Pakistan to go nuclear had been fulfilled.
On July 05, 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief of the Army Staff of the Pakistan Army, seized power in a coup d’etat by over-throwing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and anointed himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The same year, the earlier decision taken in the Multan Conference of bleeding India with attrition through low-intensity conflict, was formalised as a military doctrine called “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts” and is till date taught to mid-level officers of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force undergoing the Staff Course in the Command and Staff College, Quetta.
Pakistan first put to use this military doctrine of “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts” in Punjab, India where it supported terrorism from 1980 till 1995 when terrorism was wiped out from this border state of India. Terrorism in Punjab that lasted for 15 years saw 13,442 civilians and security forces personnel being killed.
As terrorism was waning in Punjab, in end-1989 Pakistan started supporting terrorism in another border state of India, Jammu & Kashmir where terrorism still continues for over 36 years. Till 2024, total of 42,143 civilians and security forces personnel have been killed in Jammu & Kashmir due to the ongoing terrorism.
The third decision of the Multan Conference to bleed India with attrition through low-intensity conflict too was bearing fruits for Pakistan.
The second decision of the Multan Conference to wage a war on India for Jammu & Kashmir was nowhere near fructification as India being a superior military power to Pakistan had not only defeated Pakistan in every military confrontation, but had also dismembered Pakistan into two nations in 1971.
But Pakistan saw the glimmer of hope to wage the war on India on March 14, 2013, when Xi Jinping became the President of China.
Xi Jinping on becoming China’s President realised that with the immense money power that China had, it was now time to fulfil China’s military aims. The foremost being Taiwan, followed by Spratly Islands and then the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh in India, as with the age that Xi Jinping had on hand, these three military aims of China could only be targeted. If successful, this would make Xi Jinping the tallest leader in China, after Mao Zedong.
But to fructify the first of the two military aims ie Taiwan and Spratly Islands, China faced the Malacca Dilemma. When China and Pakistan signed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) on April 20, 2025, the Malacca Dilemma no longer bothered China as included in CPEC was a road corridor linking Kashgar in Xinjiang to the Gwadar port in Pakistan.
China faced another problem. It had not fought any war after 1979 when it was defeated by Vietnam. That year, China also announced the one-child policy which came into effect on September 25, 1980.
As China focussed on its economic growth and resolved not to take part in any military confrontation after 1979 till it had economic heft, the question often arose of its quality of soldiers and weaponry as neither the PLA soldiers nor weaponry being produced indigenously, had been tested in any global confrontation. China’s defeat by Vietnam on March 16, 1979 hung heavily. The one-child policy too started having negative effects as the Chinese families increasing started getting reluctant to send their only child in the Chinese military.
China found the answer that the one-child policy was creating for the PLA. Learning quick from the US-led 42-nation multinational coalition force which attacked Iraq in 1991, in which modern technology namely computers were used for the first time in combat, China started working on multi-domain operations. This technological development of its weapon systems had the latent aim to offset the quality of its soldiers. When the USA promulgated the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine, 2001 wherein the future wars would involve the non-kinetic domains comprising cyber, space and electromagnetic spectrum in addition to the kinetic domains of land, sea and air, China had already started moving in the field of the multi-domain operations.
Eventually, the one-child policy in China was cancelled on January 01, 2016 to address the aging population, the declining birthrate and the problems it was creating for recruitment of soldiers in the PLA.
China did not have to wait long to test its weapons in a live battle scenario. Sensing that differences between India and Pakistan would never end and some or the other military hostilities between the two nations would eventually happen, China upped its sale of weapons to Pakistan so that in such a scenario, its weapons would be used by Pakistan and it would built-up on the feedback received.
In December 2001, after Pakistan sent terrorists to attack the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, the two neighbours almost went to war with India launching Operation Parakaram with forces mobilised for over a year on the borders. Though, this did not result in war but China well understood that some military confrontation between India and Pakistan would happen sooner or later.
In the period 2001 to 2005, only 11.43% of the Pakistan military’s weapons were of Chinese origin. This increased to 38% in the period 2005-2009. In the period 2009-2014, it further increased to 51% and after Xi Jinping became China’s President for the first time in 2013, the period 2014-2019 saw the Pakistan having 73% of its weapons from China.
Then came the Balakot surgical air strike carried out by India in Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir on February 26, 2019 in response to the Pulwama terrorist attack carried out by Pakistan in India twelve days earlier. Pakistan countered India’s Balakot surgical airstrike by Operation Swift Retort the very next day,in which for the first time ever, Chinese made weapons were used in live combat apart from the American weapons that Pakistan used. Buoyed, China further increased its sales of weapons to Pakistan and in the period 2019-2024, 83% of the Pakistan military’s inventory came from China.
In May 2025, Pakistan and India were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation called Operation Sindoor by India in retaliation to the Pahalgam terrorist attack carried out by Pakistan in India in April 2025. In this military confrontation, Pakistan only used Chinese weapons against India.
On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, as the two nuclear-armed neighbours were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation from May 07-10, 2025. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons. The 2025 Annual Report to the US Congress by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission tabled on November 19, 2025, echoes the statements of the Indian Army General.
China-Pakistan relations after Xi Jinping becoming the Chinese President in 2013
To circumvent the “Malacca Dilemma” that bothered China for decades, Xi Jinping after becoming China’s President for the first time on March 14, 2013, a few months later, proposed the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project. Included in the CPEC is the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor which is a 3000-kilometer road linking China’s Xinjiang region to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which would obviate China’s “Malacca Dilemma”.
For China, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor is the jugular vein in case the Malacca Strait was to be ever blocked by the Indian Navy or the US Navy.
On April 20, 2015 Xi Jinping visited Pakistan on his first state visit as the President of China.
Before embarking on the two-day visit to Pakistan, Xi Jinping authored an op-ed in Pakistan’s Daily Times titled “Pak-China Dosti Zindabad” (Long Live the Pakistan-China Friendship), in which he wrote that “I feel as if I am going to visit the home of my own Brother” and also wrote that “the friendship between the two nations was higher than mountains, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey”.
On April 20, 2015, Pakistan and China signed an agreement to commence work on CPEC, on infrastructure projects worth US$ 45.6 billion during Xi Jinping’s maiden state visit to Pakistan, setting the foundation for a strong and robust Pakistani-Chinese friendship with underlying military overtones, which China would many times call this relation with Pakistan as “Iron Brothers” and “All Weather Friends”.
As the ties between China and Pakistan strengthened under Xi Jinping, Pakistan promulgated its first-ever National Security Policy 2022-2026 on January 14, 2022 which mentioned India as its primary conventional threat and rejected India’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A.
China-Pakistan’s relations post-India’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A
On August 05, 2019 after India had abrogated Article 370 & 35A of the Constitution that related to Jammu & Kashmir, two countries did not take it lying down and as time would reveal these two countries – China & Pakistan, clearly irked by India’s move, would step up pressure on India in due course and move in a tighter embrace with each other.
Four days later on August 09, 2019, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan dashed in a sudden two-day visit to China. In back-to-back meetings with the top Chinese leadership spread over two days on August 09-10, 2019, Pakistan and China decided that a strong response would be given to India’s move of abrogation of the two articles.
On August 11, 2019 the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S Jaishankar visited China to explain the abrogation of the two contentious articles of the Constitution that were for long perceived as the biggest hinderance in the growth and security of Jammu & Kashmir by an overwhelming majority of Indian citizens. But China had already made up its mind during its meetings with Shah Mehmood Qureshi, on the previous two days.
Pakistan eventually tasked its terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir since 1989 when terrorism broke out in India’s northern most state (now a Union Territory), and had been largely confined to the North of Pir Panjal Range (NPPR) which includes the Kashmir Valley, to shift their operations to the South of Pir Panjal Range (SPPR) which includes Jammu region.
But this wasn’t as easy as it seemed due to the heavy deployment of the Indian security forces on both the sides of the Pir Panjal Range, the mountainous range that roughly separates the Kashmir Valley from the Jammu region.
It was here that China came to the aid of its all-weather ally. Now, was the litmus test of China to show Pakistan that it meant each word that Xi Jinping had written in his op-ed of April 2015.
Just as all seemed well between China and India on the face of it, orders were given by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to plan an incursion in eastern Ladakh of India.
In early-April 2020, as the snow started melting in the higher reaches, the PLA started intruding in eastern Ladakh and the stand-off began between the PLA and the Indian Army that lasted over four years and included the bloody Galwan Valley Clash of June 15, 2020 which saw 20 soldiers of the Indian Army killed in action.
This resulted in the Indian Army redeploying its troops and about two divisions strength were moved from the Jammu region to eastern Ladakh to be deployed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) opposite China.
This was exactly what Pakistan needed. With a thinner Indian security forces deployment in the Jammu region, Pakistan stepped up terrorism in the Jammu region on the SPPR since early-2024. The relatively quiet Jammu region became as volatile as the Kashmir Valley.
The year 2021 saw three important military developments between China and Pakistan. One, Pakistan Army Officers started being posted to the Western Theatre Command of China. Two, a direct Optical Fibre Cable was laid between the Western Theatre Command of China in Chengdu and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi for swift and uninterrupted communications. Three, Pakistan opened the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing in Rawalpindi, in which the Chinese were wholly involved.
The military cooperation between China and Pakistan intensified since 2019, particularly in terms of air force capabilities and increased conduct of joint military exercises to include all six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.
China’s leadership for the three future wars
Xi Jinping’s age on being sworn in as China’s President for the first time on March 14, 2013 was 60 years. According to the 2022 World Bank data, the average life expectancy for a male in China is 75.96 years. Xi Jinping knew that he had about 20 years in hand to fulfil the military aims of China, as anyways after attaining the age of 80 years in 2033, old age would create problems for effective functioning.
Not wasting any time, as explained earlier CPEC was launched in 2015 as part of the BRI launched in 2013. On February 01, 2016, the PLA was reorganised into five theatre commands, subsequent to China declaring in 2014 that it was ready to fight in all six domains of modern warfare.
Now came the question of ensuring the continuity of leadership for the three wars that China would wage under Xi Jinping – Taiwan, Spratly Islands and the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh in India.
In March 2018, the Chinese Constitution was amended that removed the two-term limit for the President and Vice President. A two-term limit has been incorporated in the Chinese Constitution in 1982 to prevent the concentration of power seen during the Mao Zedong era.
With this constitutional amendment, Xi Jinping who would have had to step down in 2023 in due course, now could remain China’s President as long as he wished to. In words, till China would have fought the three wars for Taiwan, Spratly Islands and Tawang district of India.
Xi Jinping is well aware that China alone could not fight the three wars and it needs the full support of Pakistan, to which it has been helping the nation generously.
Xi Jinping seems to have learnt the lesson from military history, that despite Germany & Italy forging the military alliance known as the Pact of Steel on May 22, 1939, just as Adolf Hitler had initially decided to attack Poland on August 26, 1939, he had received a telegram from Mussolini on August 25, 1939 that Italy would not support Germany in the attack on Poland, as Italy was not prepared and needed seven million tons of petroleum, six million tons of coal, two million tons of steel and 150 anti-aircraft batteries amongst other items for assured military support to Germany. Hitler had to postpone his decision to attack Poland at the last moment, and finally when he attacked Poland on September 01, 1939, Germany had no military support of Italy. Germany eventually not only lost the World War II but Germany was spilt into two nations and Hitler committed suicide.
Xi Jinping by giving full military, economic and diplomatic support to Pakistan has ensured that Pakistan remains in the tight grip of China.
But there was no leader in Pakistan who could stand rock-solid behind China and Xi Jinping. Operation Sindoor by India in May 2025 provided that answer to Xi Jinping.
Pakistan’s constitutional amendment for the two-front war on India
Though India defeated Pakistan in the 88-hour military conflict called Operation Sindoor by India and Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos by Pakistan, but the narrative propagated by Pakistan after the ceasefire came into effect between both the neighbours on May 10, 2025, carried a different connotation. And this narrative of Pakistan was supported on many occasions by the US President Donald Trump.
On May 07, 2025 at 1.05 am India Standard Time as India struck Pakistan, little later at 3.30 am Pakistan Standard Time, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong, was escorted to the Operations Room of the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, which is not only the army headquarters of the Pakistan Army but unofficially the nerve centre of Pakistan, as the Pakistan Army controls everything in Pakistan.
Thereafter till the ceasefire came into effect on May 10, 2025 between India and Pakistan, Jiang Zaidong visited the GHQ multiple times and after each visit, cabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China giving feedback of each visit.
In the multiple briefings to the Chinese President during May 07-18, 2025, it was decided by Xi Jinping that General Asim Munir of Pakistan would spearhead Pakistan when China would wage the three wars under Xi Jinping and the same was conveyed to Pakistan.
Out of blue, the world was informed on May 20, 2025 that General Asim Munir had been promoted to the rank of Field Marshal. In the two trips to China, on July 24, 2025 and September 02, 2025, Field Marshal Asim Munir met the Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and the Chinese President Xi Jinping respectively. What was discussed in both the meetings has not been unravelled but it is for sure that something of great consequence was deliberated upon.
Field Marshal Asim Munir who was to initially retire on November 27, 2025 had got an extension in service by two years after a 2024 law in Pakistan extended the tenure of Pakistan’s service chiefs from three years to five years. He would now retire in 2027.
But this was not suiting the grandiose plans of Xi Jinping who wanted Field Marshal Asim Munir to spearhead Pakistan during the three wars to be fought under his Presidentship.
Pakistan had to find out the legal way out to keep Field Marshal Asim Munir in harness till Xi Jinping would remain in power.
On November 05, 2025, the 27th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan was introduced by the Federal Government of Pakistan headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. This amendment was passed by Pakistan’s National Assembly on November 13, 2025 which amended Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan, creating the appointment of the Chief of Defence Forces concurrent with the appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff while ensuring that the appointee remains in chair indefinitely, apart from other judicial and administrative provisions.
Field Marshal Asim Munir not only would become Pakistan’s first Chief of Defence Forces on November 27, 2025 when General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, the current Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee would retire and the appointment being tenanted would stand abolished, but also Field Marshal Asim Munir would remain in harness till he so desired.
With China having Xi Jinping as President-for-life and Pakistan having Field Marshal Asim Munir as the Chief of Defence Forces & Chief of the Army Staff-for-life, the final step for the two-front war on India has been taken.
Two-Front War on India
Three statements merit attention that will have bearing on India after five years. One, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, the Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force expressed concern on January 07, 2025 over the increased militarisation by China and Pakistan and the pace at which technology is growing at a very rapid pace in China.
Two, on March 17, 2025, General Upendra Dwivedi, the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army, while delivering the fourth General Bipin Rawat Memorial Lecture in New Delhi remarked that two-front war was no longer a possibility-it’s a reality.
Three, on July 09, 2025, General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, stated that the convergence of interests between China, Pakistan & Bangladesh will have serious implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.
All timelines available in public domain point towards China and Pakistan waging the two-front war on India any time after 2030. Three important points that require consideration are enumerated below.
One, China commenced the construction of the Medog Dam on July 19, 2025 which is at a distance of just 30 kilometres from the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh and whose completion year is 2030.
Two, the construction of the Xinjiang-Tibet railway line was commenced by China on August 19, 2025 and whose completion is in 2030.
Three, in the six naval dockyards of China, construction of two aircraft carriers, 15 nuclear submarines and 200 warships is going on day & night, which is to be completed in 2030.
Also, in 2030, Xi Jinping’s age would be 77 years, leaving him not much time in office.
After China’s war for Taiwan in 2027, the next big military target for China will be the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh in India. War for Spratly Islands will be a mere skirmish as neither the USA nor any of the littoral nations of the South China Sea will intervene militarily.
Much water has flown down the bridge since then. India released the Multi-Domian Operations Doctrine in August 2024. Beginning of this year saw the raising of Rudra Brigades and Bhairav light combat battalions by the Indian Army. Recently, in November 2025, the two-week military exercises were carried out by India codenamed Exercise Trishul, Exercise Astra Shakti & Exercise Poorvi Prachand Prahar, which were conducted in three different sectors of India, encompassing multi-domain operations, thereby depicting the two-front war scenario, for the first time since India became independent.
While Pakistan has and never will be ever a military challenge for India in a one-to-one military confrontation, it is the China challenge that India has to prepare for well. With Bangladesh turning hostile towards India after August 05, 2024, India has to be operationally prepared for any misadventure from Bangladesh too.
India has five years more to prepare for the two-front war and to be operationally ready for the third-front that can open up from Bangladesh. The famous saying goes “Even if there is 1% chance of a war, the nation has to be 100% prepared”. The next five years have to be the Great Indian Leap,for there are no runners up in a war.
General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff was correct in stating on August 26, 2025, “If you want peace, Prepare for war”. The war clouds on India have started darkening. Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment is the final step for the two-front war on India.
About the Author
Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.
The viability of the Arctic route has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary global geopolitics and geo- economics. The rapid melting of polar ice due to climate change has transformed the Arctic from a frozen periphery into a potential maritime frontier that may redefine the balance of power in global trade, resource extraction, and security architecture. The Arctic Ocean, bordered by Russia, the United States (via Alaska), Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and Norway, has long been considered inaccessible and unviable for sustained navigation or economic use. However, with average Arctic temperatures rising four times faster than the global average (IPCC, 2024), the region has witnessed unprecedented retreat of sea ice, making seasonal navigation increasingly possible through two primary routes — the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Siberian coast, and the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. These routes offer the possibility of drastically reducing transit distances between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, altering existing maritime networks that currently depend on chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.
The Arctic as a Geo- Economic Corridor
Beyond military and environmental debates, the Arctic’s core attraction remains geo-economic. It promises not only faster transit but also access to immense natural resources: hydrocarbons, rare-earth minerals, and fisheries. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its gas lie north of the Arctic Circle. Russia’s Arctic zone alone could yield vast revenues from LNG and critical minerals. Yet the geo-economic calculus extends beyond resource extraction. Control over the NSR gives Russia the ability to shape emerging Eurasian supply chains. For instance, an integrated corridor linking Arctic shipping → Northern Sea ports → Trans-Siberian rail → China/Europe could redefine continental trade dynamics. Russia’s 2025 invitation for “International Investors” in the NSR, despite sanctions, demonstrates its intent to normalize Arctic commerce and attract Asian capital. Nevertheless, these ambitions face three obstacles: first, sanctions and financial isolation limit Western participation; second, unpredictable ice conditions hinder schedule reliability; and third, the absence of universally accepted transit rules under UNCLOS leaves legal ambiguity. For global shipping firms, these factors translate into risk premiums that currently outweigh time savings.
The opening of the Arctic route presents a radical realignment of global geo- economic structures. From the perspective of maritime trade, the route promises cost efficiency, reduced fuel consumption, and a potential easing of congestion in traditional trade arteries. However, these benefits are unevenly distributed and deeply enmeshed within geopolitical rivalries. Russia’s strategic positioning in the Arctic, through its expansive coastline and exclusive control over the Northern Sea Route, has made it the de facto gatekeeper of this new maritime domain. Moscow’s Arctic strategy, updated in 2023, underscores the region’s significance not merely as an economic asset but as a strategic buffer and resource base to offset Western sanctions following the Ukraine conflict (Russian Federation Arctic Policy, 2023). The Russian government’s Arctic infrastructure expansion—including new nuclear-powered icebreakers, LNG terminals at Yamal and Murmansk, and military bases—reflects its attempt to consolidate control over the NSR while turning it into an energy and logistics corridor connecting Europe and East Asia.
At the same time, China’s self-declared status as a “near-Arctic state” and its Polar Silk Road initiative under the Belt and Road framework signify the increasing convergence of Asian and Arctic geo-economics. Beijing’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper identifies the Arctic as an essential part of China’s long-term strategy to secure trade resilience and energy security. Chinese companies, including COSCO Shipping, have already conducted multiple transits via the NSR, and China has invested heavily in Russia’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects, thereby gaining leverage in Arctic energy logistics. For China, the Arctic is not merely a passage but a strategic complement to its maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. The Arctic route provides Beijing with an alternative to the U.S.-controlled sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Thus, the Arctic, which was historically insulated from major power competition, is now a theatre of silent yet profound strategic contestation involving the United States, Russia, China, and, increasingly, middle powers like India and Turkey. The United States, traditionally focused on freedom of navigation and Arctic governance under international law, has recalibrated its Arctic policy since 2022. The reactivation of the U.S. Second Fleet, increased Coast Guard deployments in Alaska, and renewed investments in icebreaker capabilities reflect Washington’s recognition that control over polar routes is essential for maintaining maritime dominance. The U.S. Arctic Strategy (2023) emphasizes the need to counter Russian militarization and Chinese dual-use scientific presence in the region. The creation of the “Arctic Security Initiative” in Congress underscores a bipartisan recognition of the Arctic’s strategic centrality to national security. NATO has also incorporated Arctic contingencies into its defense posture, with Norway hosting recurrent Arctic defense exercises such as “Cold Response” and “Nordic Shield,” designed to enhance interoperability and cold-weather operational readiness.
However, the Arctic’s transformation is not merely a function of power politics but also an economic recalibration in the global supply chain. The Northern Sea Route shortens the Rotterdam–Yokohama transit from approximately 12,800 nautical miles via the Suez Canal to just 7,000 nautical miles, leading to potential savings of 10–15 days per voyage. This has substantial implications for global logistics companies and energy exporters, particularly in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. Russia’s Arctic LNG terminals are increasingly targeting Asian markets, including Japan, South Korea, and India, while Western sanctions have driven Moscow to pivot toward Eurasian cooperation frameworks such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India’s Arctic engagement has been historically limited, but the publication of its “India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development” in 2022 marked a strategic shift.
New Delhi envisions Arctic cooperation through five pillars—science, climate, economic development, connectivity, and governance—emphasizing the intersection between environmental responsibility and energy diversification. India’s energy security calculus is particularly linked to the Arctic through the Yamal LNG partnership with Novatek and Arctic Council observer status. As global competition for hydrocarbons intensifies, Indian policymakers view the Arctic as a supplementary energy corridor, especially as domestic energy demand continues to rise. Moreover, India’s participation in multilateral forums like the Arctic Circle Assembly and cooperation with Russia in ice navigation technologies reflect its effort to expand its maritime geo-economics footprint beyond the Indian Ocean. The viability of the Arctic route, therefore, is not only about navigational feasibility but also about the creation of new patterns of interdependence where energy, trade, and security converge.
From a technological standpoint, the Arctic’s opening represents a frontier of innovation and logistical adaptation. Advances in ice-class vessel construction, satellite-based navigation systems, and weather forecasting have made Arctic shipping increasingly predictable and commercially viable. Yet, the region remains inherently fragile. Seasonal variability, unpredictable ice floes, and extreme weather continue to challenge the reliability of transit. Additionally, insurance premiums for Arctic voyages remain high due to elevated risk profiles. The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code (2017) introduced regulatory safeguards, but enforcement and environmental compliance remain inconsistent, especially under unilateral Russian control of the NSR. Furthermore, environmental activists and indigenous communities have raised concerns about the ecological cost of Arctic commercialization, warning that increased shipping and drilling could exacerbate ecosystem degradation and accelerate climate feedback loops.
The intersection of geo- economics and security in the Arctic is particularly evident in the militarization of infrastructure. Russia’s establishment of bases at Nagurskoye, Tiksi, and Franz Josef Land, alongside radar systems and missile defense, effectively reconstitutes a Cold War–era arc of deterrence along its northern frontier. Western analysts argue that this militarization serves dual purposes—protecting energy infrastructure and signaling deterrence against NATO intrusion. Meanwhile, the U.S., Canada, and Nordic states are enhancing joint surveillance capabilities and under-ice submarine operations. The competition extends to digital infrastructure as well, with Russia and China collaborating on Arctic subsea data cables to reduce dependency on Western communication networks. This emerging Arctic techno-geopolitics indicates that the route’s viability will depend as much on security governance as on climate and technology. Energy exploration remains the single largest economic driver in Arctic geopolitics. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that the Arctic holds nearly 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas reserves. Russia’s energy strategy heavily depends on exploiting these reserves to sustain export revenues amid Western sanctions. The Northern Sea Route enables direct LNG shipments to Asia without relying on chokepoints vulnerable to Western control, such as the Suez or Hormuz. China’s investments in Arctic LNG projects not only ensure energy supply diversification but also solidify its political partnership with Moscow. Meanwhile, Western energy firms face reputational and regulatory constraints in re-entering Arctic drilling, creating an asymmetric advantage for state-backed entities like Rosneft, Gazprom, and CNPC. The Arctic, therefore, represents both a frontier of resource competition and a laboratory of strategic adaptation in a multipolar world.
Geo-economically, the Arctic route could reshape global connectivity by linking the Eurasian landmass through a northern maritime belt. The concept of a “Polar Silk Road” complements China’s overland Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), forming an integrated logistics ecosystem stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. This vision, though ambitious, faces structural and governance challenges. Arctic governance remains fragmented, with the Arctic Council serving primarily as a consultative body lacking enforcement power. The suspension of Russia’s participation in the Council following the Ukraine invasion has paralyzed its operations, further complicating cooperative frameworks. In this vacuum, alternative coalitions—such as the Arctic Five and ad hoc bilateral agreements—are shaping the regional order, potentially leading to overlapping jurisdictions and strategic ambiguity. The Arctic’s viability, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation from global crises and climate trajectories. While climate change facilitates navigation, it also introduces profound instability. The paradox of Arctic development lies in the fact that the very forces enabling its accessibility—global warming and ice melt—also threaten the ecological sustainability that future trade depends on. Thus, the Arctic route represents both an opportunity and a warning: an emblem of human adaptability and a symptom of planetary vulnerability. For global powers, it is both a new Silk Road and a new battlefield—where environmental, economic, and security imperatives collide.
Climate Change, Environmental Risks, and Economic Viability
While geopolitical enthusiasm for the Arctic Route is rising, its practical and environmental constraints are substantial. The region remains climatically volatile, with unpredictable ice conditions, extreme weather, and inadequate emergency response infrastructure. Despite record low ice extents in 2024, satellite data show increased year-to-year variability that complicates commercial scheduling. Insurers remain wary: premiums for Arctic voyages are often double those for conventional routes, reflecting heightened risks of hull damage, environmental liability, and costly rescue operations. Environmentalists argue that growing maritime traffic and fossil-fuel extraction in the Arctic contradict global decarbonisation goals. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has imposed the Polar Code and a partial ban on heavy-fuel oil use, but enforcement remains inconsistent. Spills or accidents in fragile ecosystems could have catastrophic long-term consequences. Moreover, the carbon footprint of ice-class vessels and ice-breaker escorts offsets some of the emissions savings from shorter routes. Thus, while the NSR offers a potential logistical advantage, its economic viability remains contingent on technological innovation, robust safety regimes, and predictable governance. Without these, commercial expansion could trigger ecological backlash and reputational risk for shipping lines.
The Militarization of the Arctic
The re-emergence of hard-power competition in the Arctic is unmistakable. Russia’s build up has been met with parallel measures from NATO members. The U.S. Navy’s 2nd Fleet has resumed operations in the North Atlantic, and allied exercises such as Cold Response and Arctic Challenge have become annual fixtures. Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 has effectively transformed the Baltic–Arctic continuum into a contiguous zone of Western defense coordination. Russia, however, retains significant advantages: advanced under-ice submarine capabilities, hypersonic missile deployment in the Kola Peninsula, and radar coverage across the Arctic archipelagos (Baev, 2024). The strategic logic is deterrence through presence—the ability to deny or monitor adversarial movement in the northern approaches. For NATO, the challenge is maintaining credible deterrence without escalating into confrontation. The militarization also influences economics. Each new base or missile system affects investor perceptions, insurance rates, and maritime risk assessments. The Arctic, once branded as a “global commons,” is increasingly an arena of controlled access.
Arctic Governance and Legal Framework
The governance of the Arctic is anchored in the Arctic Council, established in 1996 as a forum for environmental and developmental cooperation among eight Arctic states and six Indigenous organizations. However, the Council’s work was partially suspended after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and although limited cooperation resumed in 2024, political trust remains low (Arctic Council, 2024). The resulting vacuum has opened the door for unilateralism: Russia enforces its own navigation laws requiring prior notification and pilotage for foreign vessels in the NSR, a move contested by the United States as inconsistent with freedom-of-navigation principles under UNCLOS Article 234. The erosion of cooperative governance poses risks to both safety and stability. Without agreed mechanisms for search-and-rescue coordination, environmental monitoring, and accident response, increased shipping could heighten the probability of crises. This governance gap underscores the dual nature of the Arctic Route: it is both a promise of connectivity and a test of global order
Conclusion
The Arctic Route embodies the paradox of twenty-first-century globalization: climate change has made possible an economic corridor that itself accelerates environmental degradation; geopolitical rivalries intensify precisely where cooperation is most needed. Russia’s near-monopoly on ice-breaker capacity and infrastructure gives it a commanding geo-economic position but also invites counter-balancing coalitions. The United States and its allies, recognizing that infrastructure shapes influence, are racing to expand Arctic presence. China and India, though not Arctic powers, perceive the region as a strategic variable affecting future trade and energy networks. The Arctic is thus evolving into a new geography of power—one where temperature, trade, and territory converge. Its viability as a global transport artery depends not only on melting ice but on whether states can establish transparent governance, manage environmental risk, and prevent securitization from eclipsing commerce. In sum, the Arctic route’s viability is not a linear question of whether ships can pass through ice-free waters, but a multidimensional challenge that fuses climate transformation, great-power politics, and global energy flows. As the U.S., Russia, China, and India recalibrate their Arctic policies, and as Europe and Turkey explore new alignments, the Arctic becomes a mirror reflecting the broader transition of the world order from a unipolar maritime system to a multipolar oceanic architecture. Its future depends on the delicate balance between competition and cooperation—between the rush for extraction and the need for preservation. The Arctic route thus symbolizes both the promise and peril of the 21st-century geo- economic landscape.
About the Author
Gayathri Pramod works on the genealogy of governance over life and death in times of war, with a particular focus on the West Asian front. Her research interests centre on the thematic study of war crimes and other geopolitical flashpoints.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping back in 2013 is one of the most groundbreaking international infrastructure and development initiatives in the contemporary era. It is based on the ancient Silk Road and is meant to increase the connectivity of the region, trade, and economic development in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The program involves more than 150 countries/ international organizations, and it is the largest international cooperation framework by an individual country in the 21st century. But ten years after the establishment, there is still an ongoing debate on whether the BRI has managed to reach its objectives or it has failed on account of political, financial and geopolitical factors. Whether or not it has been successful is a complicated question, as the initiative is multidimensional, its organization changes over time, and the interests of the involved countries contradict each other.
The Vision and Scope of the BRI
The BRI was conceptualized as a two-tier system including the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. An overland Silk Road Economic Belt, which links China to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, is built by means of extensive railway and road networks. At the same time, the Maritime Silk Road is oriented towards sea routes to Chinese ports and Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean. The main aim of the project is to establish a smooth network of trading routes, industrial belts, and energy pipelines that will help in economic interdependence and make China the central part of the global trade.
The Chinese government has indicated that the BRI is geared toward facilitating policy alignment, the connectivity of infrastructure, the free movement of trade, the integration of the financial system, and human to human interactions. It is not just a project of infrastructures but is also an integrated structure of economic diplomacy. By 2024, approximately 75 percent of the population of the world and more than half of the global GDP had signed cooperation agreements with China under the BRI framework. The figures show how the project has gigantic geographic and economic scale, and China has a desire to transform the world trade routes and economic governance.
Economic Performances and Scale of Investments.
Economically, the BRI has brought great results. The USD 1 trillion of investment by China between 2013 and 2023 on the BRI related projects occurred through energy plants, highways, railways, ports, and telecommunication networks. As the Green Finance and Development Center of Fudan University asserts, in 2023 alone, the Chinese invested more than USD 67.8 billion in BRI countries. The project has facilitated the building of key infrastructures like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the Port of Piraeus in Greece.
In Africa, transportation and energy networks have been changed due to Chinese investments. Roads and railways that have been funded by the BRI have linked landlocked nations such as Ethiopia and Rwanda with international markets. The logistic hubs and rail connectivity in China have been used in Europe to reduce the time taken to transport between China and key cities in Europe such as Duisburg and Rotterdam to ensure that the supply chain activities are facilitated. China-Europe freight train network, which is one of the biggest entities of the BRI, has also undergone impressive growth; in 2023, more than 16000 trips were made compared to only 80 in 2013.
Also, the BRI has triggered trade flows between China and the member countries. In 2023, China traded more than USD 2.1 trillion with countries in BRI, which is an increment of 6.2 percent over the years. The program has also offered the development financing options to the countries that experience financial crunch by Western organizations such as the World Bank or IMF. The BRI loans and infrastructure assistance have allowed most developing countries to modernize their sectors of transport, energy and digital communication rapidly.
Strategic and Geopolitical Resolutions.
The BRI is not only a matter of economic success, but it is also important to consider it through the prism of geopolitics and strategy. The long term China has a vision of establishing its influence in the world by establishing an economic network which relies on it. The project enhances China to be a more global creditor and investor, as it can cast soft power and control over decision-making processes of partner states, politically and economically. Construction of ports, railways and industrial belt in South and southeast Asian, African and Mediterranean areas has provided China with strategic positions in areas of strategic significance to world trade.
As an example, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, as a constituent of CPEC, gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea and avoids the Strait of Malacca, which is a crucial yet vulnerable strategic point at sea. Equally, the Chinese investments at Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Piraeus Port in Greece have seen it increase its presence in the maritime industry beyond the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Such actions have cast doubt in the mind of the Western countries over the motives of this move by China as some tend to call the BRI a geopolitical instrument of world domination and not a program of cooperative development.
The United States and European Union have retaliated by launching other programs, including the Build Back Better World (B3W) and the Global Gateway to offset the increasing patriarchal influence of China. The fact that this competition denotes that although the BRI has increased the global reach of China, it has also increased geopolitical conflicts especially with the major western powers, and India, which is quite sceptical about the intentions of the initiative.
Criticism and Challenges
The BRI has been challenged by much criticism though its success despite the achievements it has had cannot be overlooked. The problem of the so-called debt-trap diplomacy is among the most durable ones. Opponents claim that China makes huge loans to developing countries to fund infrastructure projects that do not give sufficient economic payoffs thus leaving the developing countries in a position of unrepayable debts. The situation in Sri Lanka with the leasing of Hambantota Port to China on a 99 years basis after the island was unable to pay loans is often referred to as the best example of this phenomenon. The same debt issues have emerged in Zambia, Kenya, and Pakistan where the issue of repayment has burdened the national budgets.
The other significant issue is that there is no transparency in BRI agreements. Various initiatives have been accused of having obscured contract agreements, exorbitant prices, and of being corrupt. Indicatively, in Malaysia, the government successfully halted a number of BRI projects, in the year 2018, owing to corruption scandals, and overrun. These projects despite being renegotiated later revealed flaws in governance and accountability in the BRI model.
Current issues of concern have also been environmental and social sustainability. Many BRI projects are linked with the carbon intensive sectors like coal and cement thus casting doubts on whether China will ever adhere to green development. The world bank has observed that as much as the BRI can enhance trade in the world up to 9.7 percent, it can also lead to extreme environmental destruction in case the issue of sustainability is not given serious consideration. Moreover, local communities in some of the participating countries have also complained of being displaced, unemployed, transfer of skills to the Chinese companies and this has created resentment and social turmoil in some areas.
Economic Sustainability and Changing Trends.
The own slowdown of the Chinese economy and the world economy in general have also challenged the BRI on its long-term sustainability. Since 2020, the COVID-19 and global debt have made China to rebalance its foreign investment. Numerous BRI projects were postponed or reduced because China was oriented to local recovery and debt management. Boston University Global Development Policy Center states that the average annual Chinese development financing to BRI countries reduced to less than USD 5 billion in 2022 as compared to an average of USD 75 billion between 2013 and 2017. This drastic contraction points to the movement of big investments to the more selective and strategically important projects.
China has attempted to reorient BRI over the past years to the emphasis on high-quality development. This stage highlights the green initiatives, digital connectivity and sustainable financing. The introduction of the Green Silk road and Digital Silk road elements is an indicator that Beijing is trying to close the gaps of the BRI to the global sustainability agenda and the new industries. As an example, China has made more investments in renewable energy projects in Africa and Southeast Asia and encouraged digital infrastructure via the 5G network and cross-border e-commerce systems. This change implies a shift of the quantity based cooperation to quality based implying that the BRI is changing to meet the global economic realities.
Regional Impacts: Successes and Failures.
The BRI has not been successful in all regions. The development of new infrastructures such as the China-Laos Railway has shown real positive returns in the region and this has improved connectivity and improved tourism and trade in South East Asia. The railway was finished in 2021 and it now takes less than 10 hours to transport people between Kunming and Vientiane, which took two days previously. Equally, in Central Asia, BRI investment has re-established ancient trade routes and has eased energy exportation in pipelines to China in the form of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
There have been mixed results in South Asia however. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that was initially expected to result in transformational growth has been faced with delays, financial pressure, and local resistance after environmental and political reasons. In Africa, Chinese-constructed rail systems and power plants have increased the infrastructure, but certain nations are experiencing an increased debt crisis and reliance on Chinese contractors. In Europe, there has been a lack of interest in the BRI since the EU has become more stringent in investment screening as well as keeping in line with the United States on the issues of strategic reliance on China.
Ample or Economic, Strategic, or Symbolic Success?
The success of the BRI is relative, as it is mostly determined by the definition of success. In its economic aspects, the BRI has undoubtedly helped in the infrastructure growth and in the trade growth in the Global South. In a strategic undertaking it has increased the geopolitical sway of China and made it a pioneer of the third world. Symbolically, it has portrayed China as a superpower in the world with the capacity of reforming international relations by collaborating with others, as opposed to fighting them.
But when the measurement of success is in terms of financial sustainability, transparency, and mutually benefiting, then the picture is not so bright. Some of the projects have not achieved anticipated returns on the economy and some nations have ended up with unsustainable debts. Moreover, lack of unified systems of governance has given rise to inefficiencies and a dented reputation in China. Basically, the success of the BRI is relative, it has succeeded in giving China a geopolitical presence and international prominence, yet it has not succeeded in creating an internationally reliable model of global development.
Conclusion
The Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most revolutionary yet debatable projects of contemporary geopolitics that is more than ten years old. It is unmatched in terms of magnitude, ambitions, and spread over the globe and its influence on supporting the development of infrastructure, trade, and connectivity in the developing world cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, its disproportional execution, debt crisis and political scandals demonstrate fundamental structural weaknesses that make its conduction into a genuinely sustainable and collaborative project challenging. The fact that China is moving towards high-quality BRI development is an indication that the country appreciates these drawbacks and strives to meet the evolving demands of the world.
To sum it up, the BRI is a success and a struggle. It has managed to make China the centre stage of the global economic networks and offer an alternative to the western dominated financial systems. However, it is having problems of credibility, sustainability and inclusiveness. The way through which China will be able to reconcile geopolitical aspirations with real needs of global development is the future of the BRI.
The end product of the endeavor will only be evaluated not by the number of bridges and ports constructed but by the fact that the project led to equitable development, long-term sustainability, and actual international collaboration in a more multipolar world.
About the Author
Shreya Dabral is pursuing her Master’s in Mass Communication from Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. She balances her academic journey with active roles in research and digital media. Her research paper on consumer repurchase behaviour in the skincare industry, published in the International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Trends (IJSRET), is a testament to her curiosity, clarity, and commitment to exploring audience-brand dynamics in a digital age.
The AUKUS trilateral security partnership uniting Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was launched in September 2021 as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific security. Its objectives were to bolster deterrence against China, enhance defence integration, and promote advanced technological cooperation, particularly in nuclear-powered submarines, cyber, quantum, and AI systems.
Four years later, the alliance’s effectiveness remains under scrutiny. While AUKUS has succeeded in realigning strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific, its implementation has been slow and politically sensitive. This article assesses whether AUKUS remains an effective deterrent and strategic instrument by examining three key dimensions: strategic impact, technological integration, and geopolitical legitimacy.
The Strategic Genesis of AUKUS
AUKUS was conceived in response to China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive behavior. Between 2010 and 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) expanded from 210 to over 360 major warships, surpassing the U.S. Navy in numbers. Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea, near-daily air incursions around Taiwan, and island-building campaigns prompted Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. to adopt a forward defence posture.
For Australia, AUKUS represented the most significant defence decision in its modern history—abandoning its French diesel-submarine deal to pursue nuclear-propelled vessels. For the U.K., AUKUS served as a vehicle to project its “Global Britain” ambitions beyond Europe. For the U.S., it institutionalized “minilateralism”—small, flexible alliances to share strategic burdens in the Indo-Pacific.
Strategic Effectiveness: Deterrence and Force Integration
The first “pillar” of AUKUS focuses on nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) arguably the partnership’s most visible, yet contentious, component.
Under the “Optimal Pathway” (2023), Australia will purchase three to five U.S. Virginia-class SSNs by the early 2030s and begin producing eight new “AUKUS-class” submarines in Adelaide by the 2040s.
The estimated total cost is US$368 billion over 30 years, equivalent to nearly 1.2% of Australia’s GDP annually.
Strategically, the AUKUS SSNs promise long-range endurance, stealth, and power projection, enabling Australia to operate far into the South China Sea. Yet, the submarines’ deterrent effect will not materialize until the mid-2030s, leaving a decade-long capability gap.
Moreover, China’s submarine fleet already includes 80 vessels, of which at least 10 are nuclear-powered. By 2035, it is projected to outnumber the combined submarine fleets of the AUKUS partners in the region.
That said, AUKUS has achieved near-term deterrence through expanded joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and rotational U.S. and U.K. submarine deployments to Australia’s west coast. These moves have already increased allied maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, signaling resolve without provoking open confrontation.
Technological Cooperation: Pillar Two Progress
The second pillar of AUKUS technological and industrial collaboration is less visible but equally crucial. It encompasses:
Cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) for autonomous systems and intelligence analysis.
Quantum computing for secure navigation and communication.
Undersea, hypersonic, and electronic warfare capabilities.
By 2025, over 70 joint research projects are active across these domains. Pillar Two aims to transform AUKUS from a procurement pact into a technology accelerator, aligning military-industrial ecosystems. The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restricts the transfer of sensitive defence technology, frustrating both British and Australian partners. Delays in harmonizing export controls have limited progress in AI and cyber collaborations.
Moreover, industrial capacity constraints threaten execution. The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding backlog already delays its own Virginia-class submarines by up to two years. Australia’s domestic industry, still developing nuclear engineering expertise, faces a workforce deficit of nearly 20,000 skilled workers needed for AUKUS implementation.
Despite these setbacks, AUKUS’s technology-sharing framework represents an unprecedented step in Anglo-American defence cooperation. It effectively redefines what some scholars call a “plurilateral defence alliance” a flexible, non-treaty partnership oriented around capability fusion rather than formal obligations.
Geopolitical Impact: Regional Reactions and Strategic Signaling
The Indo-Pacific response to AUKUS has been mixed.
Japan and India both members of the Quad have cautiously supported AUKUS, viewing it as a deterrent to unilateral Chinese assertiveness.
ASEAN nations, notably Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed unease over the nuclear implications, fearing erosion of the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), which enshrines a nuclear-free Southeast Asia.
China has denounced AUKUS as an “Anglo-Saxon containment coalition,” accusing it of destabilizing the region and violating non-proliferation norms.
Yet, AUKUS has already altered Beijing’s threat perception. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded surveillance in the South Pacific and reinforced facilities on Hainan Island, indicating AUKUS’s psychological deterrence effect.
However, AUKUS also polarizes the Indo-Pacific. By strengthening one bloc while excluding regional organizations like ASEAN, it risks fragmenting security governance and undermining inclusive mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit.
The Future of AUKUS: Is It Still Effective?
Effectiveness depends on whether AUKUS fulfills its strategic purpose deterring China and ensuring Indo-Pacific stability without overextending its partners.
As a Deterrent Mechanism
Short term: AUKUS enhances deterrence by presence and signaling rather than capability.
Long term: Its real test will be in the 2030s when AUKUS submarines are operational.
As a Technology-Sharing Framework
AUKUS has begun redefining Western defence-industrial cooperation, with joint AI and quantum projects already influencing doctrine.
The alliance’s viability will depend on whether it can translate innovation into deployable defence assets.
As a Regional Construct
AUKUS’s exclusivity remains a structural weakness. It could become more effective if it interfaces with multilateral forums such as the Quad or ASEAN to balance deterrence with inclusivity.
Ultimately, AUKUS is neither obsolete nor fully realized. It remains a strategic signal of resolve a declaration that maritime democracies will share the burdens of Indo-Pacific security. Its success, however, hinges on sustained political commitment, industrial capacity, and regional diplomacy.
Conclusion
As of 2025, AUKUS remains strategically relevant but operationally constrained. It has reinforced Western unity, reoriented Australian defence strategy, and complicated China’s military calculus. However, its effectiveness as a defence instrument remains incomplete hampered by timelines, technology transfer barriers, and geopolitical skepticism.
In essence, AUKUS’s success lies less in what it delivers now and more in what it promises for the 2030s: a framework capable of uniting technological innovation with credible deterrence. Its endurance will depend on whether the partners can sustain funding, political will, and regional legitimacy over the next decade. If those conditions hold, AUKUS will not only remain effective it may define the next phase of Indo-Pacific security architecture.
About the Author
Drishti Gupta is a postgraduate in International Relations with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Delhi University. She brings a strong foundation in global affairs, diplomatic studies, and strategic policy analysis. Drishti has held multiple research positions with reputed organisations such as Global Strategic & Defence News, The Geostrata, and Defence Research and Studies India, where she has contributed to key research projects on cybersecurity, foreign policy, and India’s evolving defence posture. Her academic and professional journey is marked by a deep interest in international diplomacy, global governance, and national security. She has completed certified programs on Global Diplomacy (University of London), Power and Foreign Policy, and Political Economy of Institutions, alongside the McKinsey Forward Program for professional development.
