By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The Indian Ocean has long been a central artery of global trade, strategic competition, and maritime connectivity. Stretching across one-fifth of the world’s ocean surface and connecting the economies of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remains one of the most geopolitically significant maritime spaces in the twenty-first century. Traditionally, discussions surrounding maritime security in the region have focused on threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, arms trafficking, and strategic rivalries among major powers. However, a quieter but equally consequential challenge has been steadily emerging: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

IUU fishing represents one of the most pressing non-traditional security threats confronting the Indian Ocean today. While often perceived primarily as an environmental or economic issue, its implications extend far beyond marine conservation. It undermines the livelihoods of millions of coastal communities, erodes national economic resources, and increasingly intersects with transnational criminal networks. In the context of the Indian Ocean—home to some of the world’s most productive fishing grounds—these impacts are particularly profound.

For India, the stakes are especially high. With a coastline spanning more than 7,500 kilometers and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering approximately 2.37 million square kilometers, the country’s economic and food security is closely tied to the sustainability of marine resources. Millions of Indians rely directly or indirectly on fisheries for their livelihoods, while fish remains a crucial source of protein for large segments of the population. Yet the increasing presence of foreign fishing fleets, weak regulatory mechanisms in international waters, and technological asymmetries in maritime monitoring have made it increasingly difficult to control illegal fishing activities.

In recent years, India has begun to recognize that addressing IUU fishing is not only about protecting fish stocks but also about safeguarding maritime sovereignty, economic stability, and regional security. As a result, the issue has gradually become integrated into India’s broader maritime strategy, including initiatives related to maritime domain awareness, regional cooperation, and the Blue Economy. Understanding the scope of the challenge and India’s evolving response requires examining the historical evolution of IUU fishing, its contemporary dynamics in the Indian Ocean, and the strategic opportunities it presents for regional cooperation.

 Historical Evolution and Global Context of IUU Fishing

The problem of illegal fishing is not new. For centuries, maritime resources were exploited with minimal oversight, as the oceans were largely treated as open-access spaces. However, the scale and intensity of fishing activities increased dramatically during the twentieth century with advances in industrial fishing technologies, including larger trawlers, satellite navigation, sonar fish-finding systems, and refrigerated storage vessels. These developments allowed fishing fleets to travel farther, remain at sea longer, and harvest fish stocks at unprecedented levels. The international community began addressing the issue of maritime resource management during the mid-twentieth century. A major turning point occurred with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which established the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones. Under UNCLOS, coastal states were granted sovereign rights over marine resources within 200 nautical miles of their coastlines. This framework was intended to enable countries to manage fisheries more effectively and prevent overexploitation by foreign fleets. Despite these legal provisions, enforcement challenges soon became evident. Many developing coastal states lacked the surveillance capacity required to monitor large maritime areas. Moreover, fishing fleets began exploiting gaps in international governance, including poorly regulated high seas and inconsistent enforcement by flag states. These weaknesses created fertile ground for the emergence of IUU fishing. In response, international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed frameworks to define and address IUU fishing. According to the FAO, IUU fishing encompasses three primary activities: fishing conducted without authorization within a state’s jurisdiction, fishing activities that are not properly reported or misreported to authorities, and fishing that occurs in areas where regulatory frameworks are either weak or nonexistent.

Over time, the scale of IUU fishing expanded into a global challenge. Studies estimate that illegal fishing accounts for up to 20 percent of the world’s total fish catch annually, representing billions of dollars in economic losses. Beyond the economic impact, the ecological consequences are equally severe, as unregulated harvesting contributes to the depletion of fish stocks and the degradation of marine ecosystems.

 Ecological, Economic, and Security Implications in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is one of the most biologically diverse marine regions in the world. Its waters host a wide variety of commercially valuable species, including tuna, mackerel, shrimp, and numerous reef fish. The Western Indian Ocean alone contributes nearly five percent of the global fish catch, making it an essential resource for both regional economies and global seafood markets. However, this ecological richness also makes the region particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Estimates suggest that between 16 and 34 percent of the total fish catch in the Indian Ocean may be attributed to illegal or unreported fishing activities. Such levels of exploitation place enormous strain on marine ecosystems and threaten the long-term sustainability of fish stocks.

For India, the implications are multifaceted. Marine fisheries support the livelihoods of over 28 million people, including fishermen, fish processors, traders, and related service providers. Many coastal communities depend almost entirely on fishing for their economic survival. When illegal fishing fleets deplete fish stocks or encroach upon traditional fishing grounds, local fishermen often face declining catches and rising economic insecurity. The economic losses associated with IUU fishing extend beyond the fishing industry itself. Reduced fish stocks can disrupt supply chains, increase food prices, and weaken export revenues. In countries where fisheries constitute a significant component of national economies, these impacts can undermine broader development goals.

Furthermore, IUU fishing increasingly intersects with maritime security concerns. Vessels engaged in illegal fishing often operate in remote maritime zones where regulatory oversight is limited. In some cases, these vessels are linked to other forms of transnational crime, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms transportation. Such activities blur the boundaries between environmental crime and organized criminal networks, complicating enforcement efforts.

Another emerging concern is the use of fishing fleets as instruments of geopolitical influence. Large distant-water fleets from major powers can establish a persistent presence in foreign waters, enabling countries to project influence and gather maritime intelligence. This phenomenon has raised concerns about the strategic implications of fishing activities in contested or sensitive maritime regions.

India’s Policy Response and Maritime Security Framework

Recognizing the growing severity of the problem, India has undertaken several measures to strengthen its response to IUU fishing. These initiatives span domestic policy reforms, technological advancements in maritime surveillance, and enhanced regional cooperation.

One of the foundational elements of India’s strategy is the National Policy on Marine Fisheries (2017), which emphasizes sustainable fisheries management and improved monitoring of fishing activities. The policy aims to balance economic development with environmental conservation, recognizing that long-term prosperity depends on the sustainable use of marine resources.

Institutionally, enforcement responsibilities fall primarily on the Indian Coast Guard, which has been authorized under relevant maritime legislation to take action against illegal fishing activities within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Coast Guard conducts patrols, monitors suspicious vessels, and coordinates with other maritime agencies to enforce fishing regulations.

Technological advancements have also played an important role in strengthening India’s maritime monitoring capabilities. The establishment of the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018 marked a significant step toward improving maritime domain awareness. Hosted by the Indian Navy, the centre facilitates real-time information sharing among partner countries, enabling the identification and tracking of suspicious vessels.

India has also integrated IUU fishing concerns into its broader maritime diplomacy initiatives. The country’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) emphasizes cooperative approaches to maritime security and sustainable resource management. Through this framework, India seeks to enhance capacity-building efforts among smaller Indian Ocean states that often lack the resources required for effective maritime surveillance.

At the regional level, India has actively raised the issue of illegal fishing within forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Dialogues on IUU fishing held in Goa in 2022 and 2024 highlighted the need for greater information sharing, coordinated enforcement mechanisms, and stronger regional governance structures.

Additionally, government initiatives such as the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) aim to modernize India’s fisheries sector by promoting vessel tracking systems, digital registration platforms, and improved communication networks for fishermen. These measures not only enhance regulatory oversight but also improve the safety and productivity of the fishing community.

Strategic Challenges and the Way Forward

Despite these efforts, several challenges continue to hinder the effective management of IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean. One of the most significant concerns is the growing presence of distant-water fishing fleets from extra-regional powers. Among these, China’s distant-water fleet is widely regarded as the largest in the world, with hundreds of vessels operating across multiple oceans. Reports indicate that Chinese fishing vessels have increasingly expanded their activities in the Indian Ocean over the past decade. In some instances, these vessels have been accused of operating within the Exclusive Economic Zones of coastal states without proper authorization. Such incidents highlight the limitations of existing governance frameworks and underscore the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms.

Another challenge lies in the fragmented nature of regional fisheries governance. Organizations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) play important roles in regulating certain species and maritime zones. However, significant gaps remain in terms of both geographic coverage and species management, allowing illegal operators to exploit regulatory loopholes.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and cooperative approach. India can play a leading role in strengthening regional governance frameworks by promoting greater coordination among regional fisheries management organizations. Expanding data-sharing agreements and joint patrols among Indian Ocean states would also enhance collective monitoring capabilities. Technological innovation offers additional opportunities. Satellite-based monitoring systems, artificial intelligence for vessel tracking, and automated identification systems can significantly improve the detection of suspicious fishing activities. By investing in these technologies and sharing capabilities with partner states, India can contribute to building a more resilient regional surveillance network. Equally important is the need to support coastal communities whose livelihoods depend on fisheries. Sustainable fisheries management must incorporate social and economic considerations, ensuring that local fishermen are not disadvantaged by conservation measures. Programs that provide alternative livelihoods, training, and financial support can help mitigate the economic impacts of stricter fishing regulations.

Ultimately, addressing IUU fishing is not merely an environmental or economic issue—it is a strategic imperative. By framing the challenge within the broader context of maritime security and regional stability, India can mobilize greater political and institutional support for coordinated action.

Conclusion

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has emerged as one of the most complex maritime challenges of the twenty-first century. In the Indian Ocean Region, where millions of people depend on marine resources for their livelihoods, the consequences of unchecked illegal fishing are particularly severe. The depletion of fish stocks, economic losses for coastal communities, and the growing intersection between illegal fishing and transnational crime all underscore the urgency of addressing the issue.

For India, the challenge is closely tied to its broader maritime aspirations. As a major regional power with extensive coastlines and a rapidly expanding maritime economy, the country has a strong interest in ensuring the sustainability and security of the Indian Ocean’s resources. Over the past decade, India has taken significant steps to strengthen its policy framework, enhance maritime surveillance capabilities, and promote regional cooperation against IUU fishing. Yet the evolving nature of the threat requires sustained attention and innovative approaches. Strengthening regional governance, leveraging advanced monitoring technologies, and fostering strategic partnerships will be critical components of an effective response. At the same time, ensuring that local fishing communities remain central to policy frameworks will help maintain the social and economic foundations of maritime sustainability.

As the geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean continues to grow, safeguarding its marine resources will become increasingly important for regional stability and economic prosperity. By positioning the fight against IUU fishing at the core of its maritime strategy, India has the opportunity not only to protect its own interests but also to shape a more cooperative and sustainable maritime order in the Indian Ocean.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The escalating conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has placed India in one of the most diplomatically sensitive situations in its contemporary foreign policy history. As tensions spiraled following coordinated US-Israeli military strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks across West Asia, New Delhi responded with calibrated restraint rather than rhetorical alignment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assertion that India supports the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy captures the essence of this posture. Yet India’s position cannot be understood merely through official statements. It must be examined through the prism of strategic autonomy, defence partnerships, energy security, diaspora protection, regional connectivity ambitions, domestic political pressures, and the broader restructuring of global power equations. Far from being passive, India’s stance reflects a deliberate and cautious recalibration in response to one of the most volatile geopolitical crises in recent years. 

For decades, India’s West Asia policy has been guided by a doctrine of de-hyphenation engaging Israel, Iran, and Palestine independently rather than linking one relationship to another. During the Cold War and even afterward, New Delhi maintained solidarity with the Palestinian cause while gradually normalizing and deepening ties with Israel. Simultaneously, it cultivated energy, civilizational, and connectivity partnerships with Iran. This multi-vector engagement enabled India to protect its interests without being drawn into the region’s rivalries. However, the current conflict tests whether such strategic balancing remains viable when two of India’s long-standing partners are locked in direct confrontation, backed by competing global powers. The intensity of hostilities and the direct involvement of the United States add further complexity, compelling India to navigate between principle and pragmatism. 

India’s initial response to the outbreak of war was characterized by expressions of deep concern and calls for restraint. The Ministry of External Affairs urged all parties to avoid escalatory measures and to utilize existing channels of dialogue to de-escalate tensions. Significantly, India refrained from explicitly condemning the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, even though New Delhi has consistently upheld sovereignty and territorial integrity as foundational norms of international law. Nor did it directly criticize Iran’s retaliatory actions. This deliberate neutrality in language has sparked debate domestically and internationally. Critics argue that silence amounts to tacit approval, while supporters contend that calibrated messaging preserves diplomatic flexibility. India’s measured tone reflects its effort to avoid alienating any stakeholder while safeguarding its national interests. 

The optics of Prime Minister Modi’s diplomatic engagements further shaped perceptions of India’s stance. His conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized concern over the unfolding crisis and the urgent need for cessation of hostilities. He also engaged with Gulf leaders, including the President of the United Arab Emirates, expressing solidarity amid regional instability. However, there was no immediate high-profile engagement with Tehran following the reported assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader. This asymmetry fueled speculation that India was gravitating toward the US-Israel camp. Yet diplomacy often operates beyond public visibility. The absence of overt condemnation may reflect sensitivity to evolving ground realities rather than a strategic shift in alignment. India’s foreign policy tradition prioritizes autonomy over ideological positioning, especially during volatile conflicts. 

A central pillar influencing India’s calculus is its robust defence partnership with Israel. Over the past three decades, Israel has become one of India’s most dependable suppliers of advanced military hardware, including missile defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions, and surveillance technologies. Israeli support during the Kargil conflict in 1999 laid the foundation for enduring trust, particularly when other countries hesitated under international pressure. Since then, the relationship has evolved beyond buyer-seller dynamics into joint research, co-production, and collaboration in emerging technological domains such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space systems. Israel’s willingness to share sensitive technologies and tailor solutions to India’s operational requirements has reinforced its strategic value. In this context, openly opposing Israeli military actions during a crisis could have repercussions for India’s defence preparedness and technological modernization. 

Simultaneously, Iran’s geostrategic significance for India remains substantial. Located at the crossroads of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, Iran provides India with access to landlocked Afghanistan and Eurasian markets through the Chabahar Port project. This port, developed with Indian investment, is integral to New Delhi’s efforts to bypass Pakistan and expand trade corridors under the International North-South Transport Corridor framework. Iran has also historically supplied crude oil to India under favorable terms prior to the tightening of US sanctions. Beyond economics, Iran has at times adopted nuanced positions on issues sensitive to India, including within multilateral Islamic forums. Abandoning or alienating Tehran would undermine years of diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment. Thus, India must weigh the costs of perceived alignment against long-term connectivity and regional access objectives. 

Energy security constitutes another decisive factor shaping India’s approach. West Asia accounts for a significant share of India’s hydrocarbon imports, and any disruption in shipping routesparticularly through the Strait of Hormuz would trigger immediate economic consequences. A prolonged war could drive oil prices upward, widen India’s trade deficit, and intensify inflationary pressures. Such shocks would have domestic political and fiscal implications. Therefore, India’s emphasis on de-escalation is not merely a normative appeal for peace but an economic imperative. Stabilizing energy flows and preventing supply chain disruptions are central to national resilience, especially at a time when global markets are already strained by geopolitical fragmentation. 

Equally important is the safety of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf region. Nearly nine million Indians reside and work across West Asian countries, contributing billions of dollars annually in remittances. Escalation that draws Gulf states into direct confrontation risks endangering lives and destabilizing communities. The activation of emergency helplines, issuance of travel advisories, and review by the Cabinet Committee on Security to underscore that diaspora protection is paramount. Foreign policy decisions in this context are inseparable from humanitarian considerations. Safeguarding citizens abroad often necessitates diplomatic prudence rather than public posturing. 

Domestic political discourse has intensified the government’s stance. Opposition leaders have accused the administration of abandoning traditional principles by failing to condemn actions perceived as violations of sovereignty. They argue that India’s moral authority as a proponent of peaceful dispute resolution is undermined by selective silence. Supporters of the government counter that foreign policy must prioritize national interest over rhetorical consistency. This debate reflects broader ideological tensions between legacy non-alignment narratives and contemporary strategic partnerships. However, modern strategic autonomy differs fundamentally from Cold War non-alignment. It entails flexible multi-alignment engaging diverse power centers without exclusive commitment rather than strict equidistance. 

India’s growing strategic convergence with the United States further complicates the equation. Bilateral cooperation now spans defence interoperability, intelligence sharing, critical technologies, and Indo-Pacific security initiatives. The United States is a key partner in India’s efforts to counterbalance China’s regional assertiveness. Publicly condemning US military operations could strain this partnership at a critical juncture. Moreover, Israel’s integration into emerging connectivity initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor aligns with India’s vision of diversified trade routes. These structural incentives encourage cautious positioning rather than overt criticism. 

At the same time, India has maintained its support for Palestinian statehood and multilateral diplomacy. It continues to endorse a two-state solution in international forums and has sustained development assistance to Palestinian territories. Engagements with Arab states through institutional mechanisms reaffirm India’s broader West Asia outreach. This continuity suggests that India’s strategy is not binary but layered. Strengthening ties with Israel does not necessarily negate relations with Iran or Palestine; rather, it reflects differentiated engagement based on specific strategic imperatives. 

The sustainability of this balancing act remains uncertain. Strategic autonomy depends on credibility across competing blocs. If one side perceives persistent asymmetry in India’s responses, trust could erode. Conversely, excessive neutrality may disappoint partners seeking solidarity. The art of contemporary diplomacy lies in managing these competing expectations while safeguarding core interests. India’s approach public restraint coupled with active engagement illustrates this delicate maneuvering. 

Ultimately, India’s stand in the Iran-Israel-USA war reflects an evolution from moralistic rhetoric toward pragmatic statecraft. The emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy aligns with longstanding principles, yet the calibrated silence on specific provocations signals adaptation to shifting power realities. India is neither overtly choosing sides nor disengaging. It is pursuing a strategy designed to preserve leverage, protect economic stability, secure defence partnerships, and ensure citizen safety. Whether this nuanced positioning endures will depend on the trajectory of the conflict and the flexibility of regional actors. 

Therefore, India’s response to the Iran-Israel-USA war underscores the complexity of navigating twenty-first century geopolitics. Strategic autonomy today demands agility rather than rigid neutrality. By balancing principles with pragmatism, New Delhi seeks to maintain maneuverability in an increasingly polarized environment. The crisis serves as a defining test of India’s foreign policy maturity its capacity to engage adversarial powers simultaneously, shield domestic interests from external shocks, and project itself as a responsible global actor. As West Asia remains volatile, India’s calibrated diplomacy will continue to evolve, reflecting the interplay between national interests and global responsibilities. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The joint military offensive launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in late February 2026 represents one of the most consequential escalations in Middle Eastern geopolitics in decades. Framed by Washington and Jerusalem as a necessary act of pre-emptive self-defence, the strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile facilities, senior military leadership, and elements of its command-and-control apparatus. The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, marked an unprecedented moment in the history of the Islamic Republic and signaled that the campaign extended beyond limited deterrence into the realm of strategic transformation. To understand why the United States and Israel undertook such a high-risk operation, one must examine the convergence of nuclear concerns, regional proxy warfare, missile proliferation, domestic political calculations, and the collapse of diplomatic efforts that had attempted unsuccessfully to restrain Tehran’s ambitions. 

At the heart of the confrontation lies Iran’s nuclear program, a project that has generated international controversy for more than two decades. Iran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and oriented toward civilian energy production and medical isotope development. However, Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have repeatedly raised concerns over enrichment levels and verification gaps. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to strict limitations on uranium enrichment and intrusive inspection regimes in exchange for sanctions relief. That agreement, endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, was designed to lengthen Iran’s “breakout time” the period required to accumulate sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA during President Donald Trump’s first term, reimposed sanctions, and adopted a “maximum pressure” strategy aimed at compelling Tehran to negotiate a more comprehensive accord covering missiles and regional activities. 

Following Washington’s withdrawal, Iran gradually reduced compliance with JCPOA restrictions, increasing enrichment levels and expanding stockpiles of uranium. By 2026, U.S. officials alleged that Iran possessed approximately 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity technically below weapons-grade, but significantly above levels required for civilian reactors. American officials, including Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance, argued that such a stockpile could be further enriched to weapons-grade levels within days or weeks. Tehran countered that enrichment at 60 percent remained legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was reversible in the context of a credible diplomatic settlement. Nonetheless, Israeli intelligence assessments concluded that Iran’s “threshold” status maintaining the capacity to rapidly assemble a weapon without formally crossing the line posed an intolerable existential risk to Israel’s security. 

Israel’s security doctrine has long emphasized pre-emption against hostile states seeking nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly described a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to Israel’s survival. Israeli leaders argue that Iran’s rhetoric calling for Israel’s destruction, combined with its sponsorship of militant groups, differentiates it from other nuclear-capable states. The strategic calculation in Jerusalem is that deterrence may not be reliable against a revolutionary regime that views confrontation with Israel as ideological. Thus, Israeli planners have for years prepared contingency operations to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The joint operation in 2026 reportedly codenamed “Operation Epic Fury” by the United States and “Lion’s Roar” by Israel reflected the maturation of these plans into coordinated execution. 

Beyond nuclear concerns, Iran’s ballistic missile program served as a central justification for the strikes. Iran has developed one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East, including medium-range systems capable of reaching Israel and U.S. bases across the Gulf. Although U.S. intelligence assessments suggested that an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the American mainland might not be viable before 2035, policymakers in Washington emphasized Iran’s rapid progress in solid-fuel technologies and underground missile infrastructure. The construction of deeply buried enrichment and missile facilities some reportedly 70 to 80 feet underground fueled suspicions that Tehran was hardening assets against future attacks while advancing toward a more survivable deterrent capability. 

Equally significant was Iran’s network of regional proxies, often described as the “axis of resistance.” Through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, Iran has armed, trained, and financed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. These organizations have engaged in hostilities against Israel, attacked U.S. personnel, and threatened maritime shipping in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. The October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and the subsequent regional escalation intensified Israeli perceptions that Iran was orchestrating a multi-front encirclement strategy. By 2026, Israeli officials argued that allowing Iran to combine proxy warfare with nuclear threshold capability would dramatically shift the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor. 

The collapse of diplomatic engagement also contributed directly to the decision to strike. In early 2026, U.S. and Iranian negotiators engaged in indirect talks mediated by Oman and European partners. According to American officials, the United States demanded a complete halt to enrichment above low civilian levels, stringent verification, and restrictions on ballistic missile development. Iran reportedly insisted on its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium on its own soil and rejected demands to dismantle key facilities. While Omani mediators expressed cautious optimism, Washington concluded that Tehran was using negotiations to buy time and disperse sensitive materials. The perception rightly or wrongly that Iran was negotiating in bad faith hardened positions in both Washington and Jerusalem. 

Domestic political considerations cannot be overlooked. In Israel, elections were approaching, and Netanyahu faced both security pressures and political vulnerabilities. A decisive strike against Iran offered the possibility of reshaping the strategic environment while reinforcing his leadership credentials. In the United States, President Trump had campaigned on preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and restoring American deterrence credibility. After earlier limited strikes in 2025 that reportedly set back Iran’s program only temporarily, the administration may have concluded that incremental measures were insufficient. The decision to escalate reflected a belief that the strategic window for decisive action was closing. 

Another dimension was the legal and normative framing of the operation. The United States invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting a right of self-defence against imminent threats. Critics, including Russia and China, described the attack as an unlawful act of aggression. European responses were divided, with some governments condemning Iranian retaliation while urging de-escalation. The legal debate underscores a broader tension in international law: whether anticipatory self-defence against a latent nuclear threat is permissible when concrete evidence of an imminent attack is contested. 

The targeting profile of the strikes further illustrates their objectives. Initial waves reportedly focused on air defence suppression, missile launch sites, and command centers. Subsequentattacks struck naval assets and facilities associated with uranium enrichment. The killing of senior Iranian military commanders and ultimately Khamenei himself indicated an effort not merely to degrade capabilities but to disrupt strategic leadership continuity. Whether regime change was an explicit objective remains debated. President Trump publicly encouraged Iranians to “take back” their country, while Israeli officials called for liberation from authoritarian rule. Yet history suggests that external military pressure often strengthens hardline factions rather than catalyzes liberal transformation. 

Iran’s response launching missiles at Israel and at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates demonstrated its willingness to broaden the conflict geographically. Attacks near the Strait of Hormuz and threats to maritime traffic highlighted the global economic stakes. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s petroleum flows transit that chokepoint. Any sustained disruption could trigger energy price spikes and reverberate through global markets. Thus, the decision to attack Iran carried not only military risk but systemic economic consequences. 

In strategic terms, the United States and Israel appear to have calculated that the risks of inaction outweighed the risks of escalation. From their perspective, Iran was approaching a point where its nuclear threshold status, fortified underground infrastructure, and regional proxy network would become too entrenched to reverse without far greater cost. The strikes were intended to reset the strategic equation either by compelling Tehran back to the negotiating table under less favorable terms or by significantly delaying its path to nuclear capability. Whether this objective will be realized remains uncertain. 

Historically, military strikes on nuclear facilities have produced mixed outcomes. Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor delayed Saddam Hussein’s program but did not eliminate his ambitions. Similarly, the 2007 Israeli strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar facility removed a clandestine reactor but did not spark regional war. Iran’s program, however, is far more dispersed, technologically advanced, and politically embedded. Destroying physical infrastructure does not erase technical knowledge or national resolve. Indeed, some analysts argue that the attack may incentivize Iran to pursue an explicit nuclear deterrent as a guarantee of regime survival. 

Ultimately, the decision by the United States and Israel to attack Iran in 2026 reflects a convergence of strategic anxieties fear of nuclear proliferation, concern over missile and proxy warfare, frustration with stalled diplomacy, and shifting regional power balances. It also reflects divergent interpretations of deterrence and international law. For Washington and Jerusalem, the operation was a necessary act to prevent a hostile regime from acquiring irreversible capabilities. For Tehran and its supporters, it was an aggressive violation of sovereignty designed to impose regime change. 

The long-term implications will depend on multiple variables Iran’s internal political transition after Khamenei’s death, the resilience of its security institutions, the stance of Gulf Arab states, and the willingness of major powers to mediate de-escalation. What is clear is that the strikes mark a watershed moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. They underscore the fragility of nuclear diplomacy, the limits of sanctions as coercive tools, and the enduring appeal of military solutions when trust collapses. Whether this confrontation ultimately produces renewed negotiations, prolonged regional war, or a transformed Iranian political order remains to be seen. What cannot be disputed is that the attack was rooted in a complex interplay of nuclear fears, strategic rivalry, ideological hostility, and the perception shared in Washington and Jerusalem that the status quo had become unsustainable. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Strategic partnerships are often tested not in moments of rhetorical alignment, but in the hard realities of economic negotiation. The relationship between India and the United States stands today as one of the most consequential axes of global politics. Over the past two decades, the two democracies have built a multidimensional partnership encompassing defense cooperation, critical technologies, resilient supply chains, clean energy transitions, and Indo-Pacific maritime strategy. Yet, even as strategic convergence strengthens, trade—the most measurable and materially consequential pillar of the relationship—continues to fluctuate between optimism and friction. Bilateral commerce has expanded in scale and sophistication, but recurring disputes over tariffs, market access, digital regulation, and industrial subsidies reveal persistent structural tensions. These tensions underscore a broader truth: strategic trust does not automatically translate into seamless economic alignment.

The recent turbulence surrounding U.S.-imposed tariffs, particularly those framed under reciprocity and national security justifications, has once again injected uncertainty into bilateral economic negotiations. Reports that the U.S. Supreme Court curtailed elements of certain tariff frameworks, combined with evolving policy signals from Washington, have reignited a central question: where does the India–U.S. trade deal truly stand? This article examines the legal, political, and geopolitical dimensions shaping the current impasse, analyzes the structural asymmetries and domestic pressures influencing both capitals, and evaluates whether economic pragmatism can align with strategic ambition. Ultimately, it argues that the future of the trade deal will not be determined by tariff percentages alone, but by the depth of trust, predictability, and long-term vision underpinning the broader partnership.

The Legal Shockwave: Tariffs, Reciprocity, and Institutional Constraints

Trade tensions between India and the United States have rarely erupted overnight; they typically build through incremental disputes over market access, subsidies, and regulatory standards. The recent tariff episode, however, introduced a sharper institutional dimension. The U.S. administration’s reliance on emergency trade powers and national security justifications to impose tariffs—including on steel and aluminium imports—triggered domestic legal scrutiny. When the Supreme Court of the United States reportedly curtailed aspects of these tariff frameworks, the impact extended beyond legal technicalities. It reshaped diplomatic calculations and injected fresh uncertainty into bilateral trade negotiations. For Indian exporters—particularly small and medium enterprises integrated into global value chains—the unpredictability of tariff policy complicated pricing, contracts, and long-term investment decisions. Solar modules and other industrial goods similarly faced volatility at a time when supply chain resilience was being elevated as a shared strategic priority. Recent American scrutiny of electric vehicle supply chains, semiconductor subsidies under industrial policy legislation, and tightened rules of origin requirements have further signaled that trade measures are increasingly embedded within broader strategic competition frameworks.

The Court’s intervention underscored the strength of institutional checks within the American constitutional system, yet it also revealed how deeply trade policy is intertwined with domestic political cycles. Debates in Washington over “reciprocal tariff” proposals, renewed emphasis on reducing trade deficits, and pressure from domestic manufacturing lobbies have reinforced perceptions that economic policy is increasingly shaped by electoral considerations. Simultaneously, disagreements over digital services taxation, data localization norms, and agricultural market access have resurfaced as negotiation flashpoints. India’s response has been calibrated rather than confrontational. Instead of immediate retaliation, New Delhi has opted for sustained engagement through trade policy forums while accelerating production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes and concluding trade agreements with other partners to hedge risk. The broader message is unmistakable: trade policy in Washington has become an arena where law, politics, and strategy intersect. For India, navigating this landscape now requires not only economic negotiation but also strategic foresight—recognizing that tariffs today function as instruments of leverage, domestic signaling, and geopolitical bargaining as much as tools of commerce.

Economic Interdependence in an Era of Strategic Competition

Despite episodic friction, economic interdependence between India and the United States remains deep, dynamic, and structurally consequential. The United States continues to rank among India’s largest trading partners, with bilateral trade in goods and services reaching record highs in recent years. Crucially, the relationship now extends far beyond traditional merchandise trade. Indian IT firms remain deeply embedded in the American services ecosystem, while U.S. technology giants have expanded investments in India’s digital economy, semiconductor ecosystem, and clean energy transition. Recent initiatives under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), expanded cooperation on semiconductor fabrication, and collaboration in defense manufacturing—ranging from jet engine technology discussions to co-production frameworks—underscore that economic engagement is increasingly intertwined with strategic imperatives. At the same time, American companies have accelerated “China-plus-one” diversification strategies, with India emerging as a preferred destination for electronics manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and renewable energy supply chains. These shifts signal that economic ties are no longer transactional—they are foundational to broader geopolitical recalibration.

Yet asymmetry remains a defining feature. The United States, with diversified global trade networks and greater market leverage, retains stronger bargaining power in tariff negotiations. India, while one of the fastest-growing major economies, remains more vulnerable to sudden market access restrictions—particularly in labor-intensive exports such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, and engineering goods. Simultaneously, recent American industrial policies—such as domestic subsidy regimes favoring local manufacturing and tighter regulatory scrutiny on imports—have complicated the environment for external partners. Meanwhile, India has responded with production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes to boost domestic manufacturing capacity and reduce import dependence, signaling that economic resilience is now central to national strategy. This creates a paradox: both countries recognize the strategic necessity of supply chain alignment, especially amid intensifying competition with China, yet domestic political pressures on both sides constrain full liberalization. The trajectory of the trade deal, therefore, hinges on whether strategic foresight can override short-term protectionist signaling—transforming interdependence into durable economic architecture rather than episodic negotiation.

Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and the Limits of Strategic Alignment

The India–U.S. trade equation cannot be understood in isolation from shifting geopolitical currents. The Indo-Pacific has become the principal arena of strategic contestation, where maritime security, technology governance, and supply chain resilience converge. Cooperation through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue reflects a shared recognition that balancing China’s assertiveness requires deeper coordination among like-minded democracies. Joint naval exercises, expanded defense interoperability, and critical technology partnerships signal growing strategic trust. Yet, recent developments—from intensifying tensions in the South China Sea to disruptions in Red Sea shipping routes—have underscored how closely economic security is now tied to geopolitical stability. Initiatives such as semiconductor collaboration under bilateral technology frameworks and defense co-production agreements demonstrate that trade and strategy are no longer separate silos. However, this convergence also raises expectations: if strategic alignment is strong, why does economic friction persist? The answer lies not in diplomatic divergence but in domestic political constraints that shape trade decision-making in both capitals.

Strategic convergence, however, does not automatically produce economic accommodation. Trade policy remains one of the most politically charged domains in both democracies. In the United States, tariff rhetoric continues to resonate with constituencies concerned about manufacturing job losses, industrial decline, and trade deficits—particularly in an election-driven environment where economic nationalism carries bipartisan appeal. Recent proposals advocating stricter reciprocity standards and expanded domestic manufacturing incentives reinforce the narrative that trade must visibly benefit American workers. In India, too, electoral sensitivities shape policy. Protecting agriculture, small-scale industries, and emerging domestic manufacturing sectors remains politically imperative, especially as New Delhi advances self-reliance initiatives alongside production-linked incentive schemes. Meanwhile, global institutions such as the World Trade Organization face diminished authority, weakening multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms and amplifying bilateral tensions. The deeper question, therefore, is whether India and the United States can compartmentalize trade disagreements without allowing them to erode broader strategic cooperation. History offers cautious optimism—the civil nuclear breakthrough and defense foundational agreements survived earlier friction—but in an era of rising economic nationalism and fragmented globalization, maintaining that insulation demands far greater political discipline and long-term vision than ever before.

Strategic Patience or Strategic Drift? The Road Ahead for India–U.S. Trade

The current phase of engagement between India and the United States reflects a partnership in transition—caught between transactional tariff bargaining and the promise of structured economic alignment. On one hand, strategic cooperation is expanding in concrete ways. Under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), both sides have advanced semiconductor collaboration, including U.S. support for chip manufacturing and design ecosystems in India. Defense ties have moved beyond buyer–seller dynamics toward co-production, exemplified by jet engine technology cooperation and expanded defense industrial partnerships. American firms such as major semiconductor and electronics manufacturers have announced investments in India as part of “China-plus-one” diversification strategies, while Indian pharmaceutical and IT companies continue to deepen their footprint in U.S. markets. Yet, parallel to this progress, unresolved irritants persist—disagreements over digital services taxation, tightening U.S. subsidy regimes under domestic industrial policies, concerns over data localization, and longstanding tensions over agricultural access and tariff structures. Each side is careful not to concede ground that may carry domestic political costs, particularly in election-sensitive climates where trade debates are closely tied to employment, manufacturing revival, and strategic autonomy narratives.

This duality creates the risk of strategic drift. When disputes—such as steel and aluminium tariffs, market access for agricultural products, or regulatory scrutiny of technology flows—are repeatedly postponed rather than institutionally resolved, uncertainty becomes normalized. Businesses adjust through supply chain hedging, but long-term trust gradually absorbs strain. In Washington, electoral cycles intensify calls for tariff reciprocity and stricter industrial safeguards; in New Delhi, production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes and self-reliance initiatives signal a cautious approach to liberalization. Both capitals recognize that deeper economic integration strengthens their shared capacity to balance China and secure resilient supply chains. However, recognition alone is insufficient. Without structured dispute-resolution mechanisms, predictable tariff frameworks, and sector-specific confidence-building agreements—particularly in digital trade and clean energy—the partnership risks oscillating between strategic ambition and tactical friction. The challenge now is to convert episodic breakthroughs into institutionalized stability, ensuring that trade becomes a durable strategic asset rather than a recurring vulnerability.

Conclusion

At its core, the future of trade relations between India and the United States will not be decided by the next round of tariff adjustments or the resolution of a single dispute. It will be determined by whether both democracies are prepared to elevate trade from a bargaining instrument to a pillar of strategic architecture. Over the past two decades, the partnership has withstood sanctions, political transitions, and moments of diplomatic unease, emerging stronger each time because its foundations rested on converging long-term interests. Today’s trade friction is different in form but similar in implication: it tests whether economic nationalism and electoral calculations will narrow the horizon of cooperation, or whether strategic foresight will prevail. In a world marked by supply chain fragmentation, technological rivalry, and intensifying competition with China, the logic of deeper India–U.S. economic alignment is not ideological—it is structural. Both nations require resilient markets, diversified production networks, and trusted technology partnerships. Allowing trade volatility to persist unchecked would not merely slow commerce; it would weaken the very strategic ecosystem both are trying to build.

The challenge, therefore, is not to eliminate disagreement—no mature partnership is free of friction—but to institutionalize predictability. Trade must move from episodic negotiation to rule-bound engagement, from reactive tariff cycles to forward-looking sectoral compacts in digital trade, clean energy, defense manufacturing, and critical minerals. For India, this means leveraging its growing economic weight with confidence while sustaining reform momentum. For the United States, it requires reconciling domestic industrial renewal with the credibility expected of a global economic leader. If both sides can insulate long-term strategy from short-term political turbulence, the trade relationship can become the ballast of the broader partnership rather than its pressure point. Ultimately, the India–U.S. trade deal is not just a commercial arrangement—it is a litmus test for whether two of the world’s most influential democracies can align economic pragmatism with geopolitical vision. The choice before them is clear: remain trapped in cycles of tactical friction, or construct a durable economic compact capable of shaping the balance of power in the decades ahead.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s recent remarks during his visit to India have reignited a fundamental debate about global trade governance, power asymmetry, and the future of the Global South. At a time when protectionism is resurfacing in major economies and unilateral tariff measures are increasingly deployed as instruments of geopolitical leverage, Lula’s statement that “small countries negotiating individually with bigger ones always lose” captures a widening frustration among developing nations. His call for collective bargaining rather than fragmented negotiations is not merely rhetorical; it signals a deeper structural realignment underway in global economic diplomacy.

The context of Lula’s intervention is critical. The resurgence of tariff wars—particularly linked to U.S. protectionist cycles—has reshaped global supply chains and injected uncertainty into trade regimes. For countries such as Brazil and India, which are major emerging economies yet remain vulnerable to shifts in Western policy, tariff escalation presents both economic and political risks. Lula’s proposal that nations of the Global South act together in negotiations reflects an attempt to rebalance global trade power dynamics through coalition-building platforms such as BRICS, G20, and expanded South-South cooperation frameworks.

This article examines the strategic meaning behind Lula’s position, situating it within Brazil’s trade diplomacy, India–Brazil relations, BRICS politics, U.S.–Global South tensions, and the broader transformation of multilateral trade governance. It argues that Lula’s stance is not a tactical reaction to immediate economic pressures but part of a deeper recalibration of Brazil’s foreign policy identity in an era of geopolitical fragmentation. By privileging coalition-based engagement over bilateral vulnerability, Brazil seeks to expand its negotiating leverage while safeguarding developmental policy space.

The article also explores how Lula’s approach intersects with India’s own advocacy of strategic autonomy and reform of global institutions, highlighting areas of convergence and friction within BRICS. Furthermore, it situates Brazil’s posture within escalating U.S.–Global South tensions over tariffs, sanctions, and supply-chain security, demonstrating how trade has become increasingly securitized. Ultimately, the article contends that Lula’s trade philosophy reflects a broader shift from liberal globalization toward contested, multipolar economic governance—where middle powers leverage collective platforms to reshape the rules rather than merely comply with them.

Lula’s Trade Philosophy: Collective Bargaining over Bilateral Vulnerability

Lula’s trade philosophy is deeply rooted in both his personal political evolution and Brazil’s long-standing diplomatic tradition of strategic autonomy. Emerging from the labor movements that challenged Brazil’s military regime, Lula developed a worldview shaped by resistance to inequality and external dependency. During his first presidency (2003–2010), he strengthened South–South cooperation, expanded Brazil’s engagement with Africa and Asia, and helped institutionalize BRICS as a platform for emerging power coordination. The commodities boom of that era reinforced the belief that collective action among developing economies could rebalance global governance structures historically dominated by Western powers. For Lula, multilateralism is not ideological symbolism but a strategic instrument to amplify bargaining capacity and protect national development priorities.

Drawing lessons from the Latin American debt crisis and more recent U.S. tariff measures on Brazilian steel and aluminum, Lula argues that bilateral negotiations with economic superpowers expose mid-sized economies to structural asymmetry. His current approach prioritizes bloc-based engagement through BRICS and similar coalitions to reduce vulnerability to unilateral trade pressures and the securitization of economic policy. By promoting alternative financial mechanisms, local currency trade settlements, and diversified partnerships, Lula seeks to redefine economic sovereignty as diversified interdependence rather than isolation. In an era marked by great-power rivalry and economic weaponization, his philosophy positions collective bargaining as both a pragmatic shield against volatility and a pathway toward a more multipolar and inclusive global economic order.

India–Brazil Convergence: Strategic Partnership in an Uncertain Trade Environment

India–Brazil convergence is not a recent phenomenon but the product of two decades of structured engagement. Diplomatic relations between the two countries date back to 1948, yet the partnership gained strategic momentum in the early 2000s. During the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Lula’s first term (2003–2010), both sides institutionalized cooperation through the creation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 and later through BRICS in 2009. These platforms were designed to amplify the collective voice of major democracies from the Global South, particularly in trade negotiations and development financing debates. The shared experience of navigating post-Cold War globalization—while managing domestic development imperatives—fostered a natural alignment in multilateral forums.

Over time, economic complementarities strengthened the political foundation. Bilateral trade, which was modest in the 1990s, expanded significantly during the commodities boom of the 2000s, laying the groundwork for today’s $15–16 billion trade relationship. Both countries faced similar challenges during episodes of global financial instability—most notably the 2008 financial crisis—reinforcing the importance of diversified trade partnerships and South–South economic resilience. Cooperation within the G20, especially during the global economic downturn, further consolidated coordination on financial regulation reform and development-oriented growth strategies.

In recent years, collaboration has broadened into new domains such as renewable energy, biofuels, climate governance, and digital public infrastructure. Brazil’s global leadership in ethanol production aligns with India’s push for cleaner energy transitions, while India’s digital public goods model—particularly in financial inclusion and identity systems—has generated interest in Brazil. Defense and space cooperation discussions reflect both countries’ desire to diversify partnerships beyond traditional Western suppliers and enhance strategic autonomy. In this broader historical arc, Lula’s visit symbolizes continuity in a partnership that blends developmental pragmatism with geopolitical ambition, positioning India and Brazil as coordinated voices in an increasingly fragmented global trade order.

BRICS and the Architecture of Economic Counterbalance

Lula’s call for collective bargaining is deeply intertwined with the evolution of BRICS as a geopolitical and economic platform. Originally coined as “BRIC” in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to describe high-growth emerging economies, the grouping became institutionalized with its first leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009 and expanded to include South Africa in 2010, transforming it into BRICS. From the outset, BRICS reflected dissatisfaction with Western dominance over global financial governance, particularly the IMF and World Bank, whose quota and voting structures were widely criticized as misaligned with contemporary economic realities. The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis strengthened this perception, as emerging economies bore spillover costs from instability originating in advanced markets. The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) marked concrete efforts to build alternative financial safety nets and development financing channels with fewer political conditionalities. Over time, annual summits expanded cooperation into areas such as health, digital economy, counterterrorism, and energy security. The bloc’s recent expansion to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE significantly enhances its demographic, energy, and geopolitical weight, strengthening its claim to represent a broader Global South constituency and increasing its leverage in debates over trade and development governance.

In trade diplomacy, BRICS increasingly functions as a coordination platform against unilateral tariff pressures and financial coercion. Debates over local currency trade settlements and reduced reliance on the U.S. dollar gained traction following sanctions episodes on Russia and secondary sanctions affecting other economies, which exposed vulnerabilities in dollar-centric systems and cross-border payment networks such as SWIFT. Finance ministers and central bank governors within BRICS have intensified consultations on payment connectivity, credit rating alternatives, and development finance expansion. While internal divergences—particularly between India and China—limit full cohesion, and economic asymmetries persist between commodity exporters and manufacturing powerhouses, members share an interest in resisting securitized trade policies framed under national security justifications. Lula’s emphasis on collective negotiation aligns with this trajectory: tariff disputes are framed not as isolated bilateral tensions but as structural imbalances in global economic governance that require coordinated institutional responses. Despite challenges of asymmetry, geopolitical rivalry, and policy divergence within the bloc, BRICS remains a strategic hedge—an evolving architecture through which emerging economies seek greater bargaining power, financial resilience, and a more multipolar trade order.

U.S. Protectionism and the Reshaping of Trade Diplomacy

The resurgence of tariff politics in the United States—visible across successive administrations—has fundamentally altered global trade calculations. Beginning with the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act and extending into broader strategic trade restrictions on China in sectors such as semiconductors, clean energy technologies, and advanced manufacturing, U.S. policy has increasingly linked trade to national security and domestic industrial revival. Even as rhetoric shifts between administrations, the structural emphasis on reshoring critical industries, reducing strategic dependencies, and protecting domestic employment has endured. Legislative measures such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act further institutionalized industrial policy tools, combining subsidies with trade preferences to incentivize domestic production. For emerging economies, this continuity signals that protectionism is no longer episodic but embedded within American economic statecraft. As a result, global markets face heightened unpredictability, with trade flows shaped not solely by comparative advantage but by geopolitical alignment and strategic competition.

For countries such as Brazil and India, the implications are significant. Export-dependent industries—from agriculture and steel to pharmaceuticals and technology components—can be exposed to sudden tariff barriers or regulatory restrictions. Supply chains are increasingly reorganized through “friend-shoring” and “near-shoring,” privileging political alliances over cost efficiency, thereby narrowing opportunities for non-aligned economies. Moreover, retaliatory cycles risk disadvantaging middle powers that lack the economic scale to impose equivalent countermeasures, particularly when disputes spill into multilateral forums such as the WTO, whose dispute resolution mechanisms have weakened in recent years. Lula’s critique therefore addresses structural asymmetry rather than individual administrations: smaller economies negotiating alone with a major power face inherent leverage deficits. Yet Brazil and India must pursue calibrated hedging rather than confrontation, deepening Global South coordination through BRICS and the G20 while preserving diversified trade engagement with the United States and Europe to avoid strategic isolation and economic retaliation.

Conclusion

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s intervention during his India visit ultimately reflects more than a critique of tariff politics—it signals a structural shift in how middle powers interpret sovereignty, vulnerability, and leverage in the 21st-century global economy. His assertion that smaller countries lose when negotiating individually with larger powers distills a central dilemma of contemporary trade governance: asymmetry has become embedded not only in market size but in the ability to weaponize finance, technology, and supply chains. In this context, coalition-building is not a rhetorical flourish of South–South solidarity but a strategic recalibration aimed at redistributing negotiating power in an era of securitized interdependence.

The transformation underway is not a simple binary between protectionism and free trade. Rather, it marks the erosion of the liberal multilateral consensus that characterized the post-Cold War decades. As tariff measures, export controls, and industrial policy instruments proliferate, trade diplomacy increasingly overlaps with strategic competition. Institutions designed to mediate disputes and preserve predictability face credibility challenges, while national security exemptions expand the policy space of major powers. For countries such as Brazil and India, whose developmental trajectories depend on external markets yet whose autonomy remains politically non-negotiable, this environment demands calibrated adaptation rather than ideological alignment. Within this shifting terrain, platforms like BRICS emerge as instruments of hedging. They do not replace engagement with Western economies, nor do they constitute a cohesive counter-bloc. Instead, they provide negotiating ballast—mechanisms through which emerging powers can diversify financial channels, coordinate responses to trade pressures, and incrementally influence rule-setting debates. The strategic logic is clear: collective weight mitigates bilateral vulnerability. Yet the effectiveness of such coordination will depend on internal coherence, the management of intra-bloc rivalries, and the capacity to translate political signaling into institutional innovation.

For India–Brazil relations, Lula’s articulation of collective bargaining reinforces an evolving partnership anchored in shared developmental priorities and strategic autonomy. Both states seek reform, not rupture—greater voice within existing institutions alongside parallel efforts to strengthen alternative platforms. The challenge lies in sustaining equilibrium: balancing Global South coordination with continued integration into Western markets and value chains.

Ultimately, Lula’s trade philosophy encapsulates a broader inflection point in global governance. As globalization fragments into competing spheres of influence and economic nationalism gains legitimacy, middle powers are redefining agency through coalition diplomacy. Whether this recalibration produces a more equitable multipolar order or merely a more complex arena of contestation will depend on how effectively these coalitions convert shared grievances into durable institutional reforms. In that uncertainty lies both the risk and the promise of the emerging trade order.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The dramatic deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban marks one of the most consequential geopolitical reversals in South Asia in recent decades. Once perceived as strategic allies bound by ideological affinity and convergent interests against external actors, Islamabad and Kabul now find themselves locked in escalating hostility that borders on open conflict. The transformation is striking: Pakistan, long accused of nurturing and sheltering the Taliban during the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, is today conducting cross-border strikes against targets inside Afghan territory. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime in Kabul resists Pakistani pressure, asserts sovereignty over contested border regions, and deepens diplomatic outreach beyond Islamabad’s traditional sphere of influence.

This rupture is not a sudden rupture but the culmination of structural contradictions embedded in Pakistan’s long-standing “strategic depth” doctrine. For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment viewed a friendly regime in Kabul as essential to offset India’s influence and secure its western flank. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was therefore initially welcomed in Islamabad as a geopolitical dividend. Yet the outcome has proved far more complex. Instead of subservience, the Taliban have pursued autonomy; instead of stability, Pakistan faces intensified attacks from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What was once considered a strategic asset has evolved into a multidimensional liability.

Understanding this shift requires unpacking three interconnected dynamics: the Durand Line dispute, the resurgence of the TTP, and the Taliban’s recalibrated foreign policy, particularly its cautious outreach to India and regional powers. Together, these factors illuminate why former allies are drifting toward confrontation and what this means for the broader regional order.

Historical Foundations: Strategic Depth and Its Miscalculations

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy since the late 1970s has been deeply shaped by two enduring strategic anxieties: its rivalry with India and its fear of encirclement. Within the Pakistani military establishment, particularly the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was never viewed merely as a neighbouring state; it was seen as a critical buffer space. The concept of “strategic depth” emerged from this worldview — the belief that a friendly or compliant government in Kabul would provide Pakistan with rear security in the event of a conventional war with India and prevent New Delhi from gaining a foothold on Pakistan’s western flank. This thinking crystallized during the anti-Soviet jihad (1979–1989). When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became the frontline state for the U.S.-led effort to arm and fund Afghan mujahideen factions. With financial and military support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a central role in selecting, training, and equipping Islamist groups fighting Soviet forces. This period institutionalized Pakistan’s influence networks within Afghanistan and reinforced the belief that militant proxies could serve long-term strategic objectives.

After the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of Afghanistan into civil war, Pakistan backed factions it believed would secure its interests. When the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s under Mullah Mohammad Omar, promising order amid chaos, Islamabad quickly recognized their potential utility. In 1997, Pakistan formally recognized the Taliban regime, becoming one of only three countries to do so, alongside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban’s ideological conservatism was less important to Islamabad than their geopolitical orientation: they were perceived as anti-India, anti-Iran (at the time), and dependent on Pakistani logistical and diplomatic support.

During the Taliban’s first rule (1996–2001), Islamabad believed its strategic objectives were largely being met. India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan was eliminated, and Pakistan enjoyed considerable influence in Kabul’s political and security circles. The expectation was that this alignment would translate into long-term stability along the western border and suppress Pashtun nationalist claims that historically challenged Pakistan’s control over its frontier regions. The events of 9/11 fundamentally disrupted this equation. After the United States launched its military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan officially aligned itself with Washington as a key non-NATO ally in the “War on Terror.” However, this alignment was layered with strategic ambiguity. While Pakistan cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and received billions in military and economic aid, it was widely accused of maintaining selective tolerance for Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. This dual-track policy was rooted in long-term calculations: Pakistan feared that the eventual U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, and it sought to retain leverage over any future political settlement in Kabul.

Over two decades of conflict, the Afghan Taliban reorganized and regrouped, benefiting from sanctuary networks and cross-border tribal linkages. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s own security landscape became increasingly volatile with the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant umbrella organization formed in 2007. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the TTP directed its violence against the Pakistani state itself. Nevertheless, Islamabad continued to differentiate between “good” and “bad” Taliban, maintaining that the Afghan Taliban were strategically useful while the TTP posed an existential threat.

When the Taliban regained control of Kabul in August 2021 following the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan’s leadership initially viewed the development as a strategic vindication. Statements from senior Pakistani officials suggested a sense of triumph, interpreting the Taliban’s return as the collapse of Indian influence and Western presence in Afghanistan. There was a widespread expectation within Pakistan’s security establishment that the new Taliban regime would prioritize Islamabad’s concerns, particularly by curbing TTP activities and recognizing the Durand Line as the official border.

However, these assumptions underestimated two structural realities. First, the Taliban, despite years of external support, are fundamentally rooted in Afghan nationalism. Their leadership has consistently resisted the perception of being Pakistan’s proxy. Domestic legitimacy within Afghanistan requires demonstrating independence from foreign influence — especially from Pakistan, which many Afghans historically view with suspicion. As a result, the Taliban have been reluctant to concede on politically sensitive issues such as border recognition or decisive military action against the TTP. Second, the Taliban’s victory in 2021 had a powerful symbolic impact across militant networks in the region. The success of an insurgent movement in expelling a superpower emboldened ideologically aligned groups, including the TTP. Instead of weakening anti-Pakistan militancy, the Taliban takeover indirectly strengthened it. The TTP found renewed sanctuary and operational space across the porous border, increasing attacks within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.

Thus, the strategic depth doctrine began to unravel under the weight of its own contradictions. A policy designed to secure Pakistan’s western frontier instead contributed to internal instability. A regime expected to function as a compliant partner asserted sovereign autonomy. What Islamabad perceived as a geopolitical asset evolved into a complex liability, exposing the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a transformed post-American Afghanistan.

Border Faultlines: The Durand Line and Escalating Military Tensions

At the heart of current tensions lies the unresolved status of the Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometre boundary demarcated in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan. Pakistan regards the Durand Line as the legitimate international border, inherited under international law after 1947. Afghanistan, however, has historically disputed its legitimacy, arguing that it divided Pashtun tribal lands without proper consent. No Afghan government—monarchist, republican, or Taliban—has formally recognized the border. Pakistan’s attempt to fence the entire border accelerated after 2017 to curb cross-border militancy. The project, involving hundreds of checkpoints and surveillance installations, was framed as a security necessity. Yet Taliban fighters have repeatedly dismantled fencing segments, declaring them illegal encroachments.

Since 2022, border clashes have intensified in regions such as Torkham, Chaman, Spin Boldak, and Kunar. Artillery exchanges, closure of trade crossings, and civilian displacement have become recurring features. These incidents signify more than tactical disagreements; they reflect a clash between Pakistan’s security-driven border consolidation and the Taliban’s refusal to legitimize colonial-era demarcations. The border question also carries symbolic weight. For the Taliban, acquiescing to Pakistani demands risks undermining domestic legitimacy among Pashtun constituencies. For Pakistan’s military establishment, failing to assert control undermines state authority and emboldens insurgents. Thus, the Durand Line dispute has transformed into a litmus test of sovereignty and power projection.

The TTP Challenge: Blowback and the Security Dilemma

The most immediate catalyst for hostility is the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Formed in 2007, the TTP seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state and impose its version of Sharia law. It was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan’s history, including the 2014 Army Public School massacre in Peshawar.

Following Pakistan’s military operations—Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017)—many TTP militants fled into Afghanistan. Islamabad expected that the Taliban’s return to power would result in decisive action against these elements. Instead, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach. While occasionally facilitating talks between Islamabad and the TTP, they have resisted direct confrontation, viewing the group as ideological brethren and fellow jihad veterans. A temporary ceasefire brokered in 2021 collapsed in late 2022. Since then, TTP attacks have surged, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistani officials accuse the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary and logistical support. Kabul denies these claims, insisting that Pakistan’s security issues are internal matters. In response, Pakistan has conducted airstrikes targeting suspected TTP hideouts inside Afghan territory, including in provinces such as Khost and Paktika. These strikes have killed militants but also civilians, provoking sharp condemnation from Kabul. The Taliban government has warned of retaliation and characterized the strikes as violations of sovereignty.

This dynamic exemplifies classic blowback: policies designed to cultivate militant proxies for external leverage have generated internal insecurity. Pakistan now confronts a security dilemma where coercion risks escalation, but restraint enables militant consolidation.

The India Factor and Regional Realignments

One of the most significant shifts complicating Pakistan–Taliban relations is the Taliban’s evolving approach toward India. Historically, India opposed the Taliban during their first regime (1996–2001) and supported the Northern Alliance. During the U.S.-backed Afghan Republic (2001–2021), New Delhi invested over $3 billion in infrastructure, development projects, the Afghan Parliament building, the Salma Dam (Afghan-India Friendship Dam), and capacity-building initiatives. For Pakistan, India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan was viewed through a zero-sum lens — as strategic encirclement. Islamabad’s support for the Taliban was partly driven by the objective of eliminating Indian influence from Afghan soil. However, after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, India adopted a pragmatic recalibration rather than confrontation. It reopened channels of communication, resumed humanitarian assistance (including wheat shipments and medical aid), allowed limited diplomatic presence in Kabul, and engaged Taliban representatives in Doha and Afghanistan. The Taliban, seeking international legitimacy, economic relief, and political recognition, responded cautiously but positively. High-level engagements and the gradual normalization of contact indicate that both sides are willing to compartmentalize past hostilities in pursuit of present interests. For Pakistan, this development is strategically unsettling because it weakens the very premise of “strategic depth” — the assumption that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would automatically align against India.

Beyond India, the Taliban have pursued a broader strategy of regional diversification. They have engaged China on economic cooperation and the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, participated in Moscow-led regional dialogues, maintained working relations with Iran despite border and water disputes, and strengthened ties with Qatar and Central Asian republics. China’s approach remains cautious and transactional, focused on security assurances against militant spillover and potential mineral investments. Iran, meanwhile, has confronted the Taliban over water-sharing issues related to the Helmand River and refugee flows, demonstrating that Kabul’s assertiveness extends beyond Pakistan. Russia and Central Asian states maintain limited but pragmatic engagement aimed at containing instability. This multipolar outreach reflects the Taliban’s strategic intent to avoid overdependence on any single actor, particularly Pakistan. By expanding diplomatic options, the Taliban enhance their bargaining leverage, assert sovereign independence, and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. For Islamabad, this emerging autonomy challenges long-held assumptions about influence and control, underscoring the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.

Conclusion

The breakdown in Pakistan–Taliban relations marks a decisive strategic inflection point in South Asia. What Islamabad once considered a geopolitical triumph—the return of the Taliban to Kabul—has evolved into a complex security and diplomatic liability. The foundational logic of “strategic depth” has collided with Afghan nationalist assertion, the Durand Line dispute, and the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead of ensuring a compliant western flank, Pakistan now faces cross-border militancy, escalating military tensions, and a Taliban leadership unwilling to be perceived as subordinate. Simultaneously, Kabul’s calibrated outreach to India, China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian states reflects a deliberate attempt to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.

This evolving confrontation underscores a broader lesson about proxy politics and regional power management. Influence built on tactical convergence rather than institutional trust is inherently fragile. For Pakistan, sustainable stability will require policy recalibration—strengthening internal security frameworks while institutionalizing diplomatic engagement with Kabul. For the Taliban, long-term legitimacy depends on balancing sovereignty with responsible regional conduct. The trajectory of this strained relationship will not only define bilateral ties but also shape the wider strategic architecture of South Asia in the years ahead.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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