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Meeting in Camp David: Another Axis to counter China

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By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Camp David meeting: source Internet

Introduction

Growing China’s assertiveness and being vocal in regional and global development hasn’t only shifted its accommodation to global practices and order, it also began to threaten the fine fabric which kept global order since the end of Cold war. As North Korea and its nuclear programme and Taiwan and its sovereignty issue, have been a major issue in the East Asian region, and China’s response to such developments have alarmed countries like South Korea and Japan. With the US leading the approach to counter China in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, over the years, it has allowed many like-minded nations to bandwagon with the Biden administration to secure their shared interest and address threats emerging from China.

The establishment of the AUKUS, I2U2, CPTPP and other blocs like G7 and NATO, and the ongoing tech and trade war with China has become a part of today global geopolitics to thwart any Chinese aggression under President Xi Jinping’s leadership. Recent Camp David summit/meeting held on August 18, 2023 between the US, Japan and South Korea has opened a new era of trilateral cooperation between them in various domains. Unlike G7 and NATO’s annual meeting, this trilateral cooperation has allowed the US, Japan and South Korea to hold talks at different level range from state heads to cabinet level meetings over issues like the military and defence cooperation, the supply chain issue, emerging and advanced technologies, economic security, development assistance and countering disinformation. Such cooperation will allow the US to proceed with the 1969 Nixon-Sato the ‘Korea Clause’ to establish a strong trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea which has been stymied by a weak Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship.

Growing Chinese threat

China drive 1/3 of the global economy, a slump recovery of the Chinese economy has become a matter of concern for the global economy recovery. If the Chinese economic growth witness a growth of 1% point it will boost the global economy by 0.3% point, and thus recovery of the Chinese is needed. West decoupling from the Chinese economy and growing US-China trade and tech war has started to impact the Chinese economy has enhanced Chinese assertiveness to ensure the Chinese Communist Party’s control, relevance and dominance at home is secured. China’s economic, financial and military actions to secure its national interest and Chinese-led  developments in the South China Sea, East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the ongoing US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region made the Chinese threat to Japan, South Korea and the US concerning and alarming. On the other hand, China argues that to thwart the West and a quasi-NATO plus in the region, it needs to make full diplomatic and military preparation and strengthen its cooperation with its neighbours especially Russia to uphold true multilateralism and defend region’s peace and stability.

Slow Chinese economic growth coupled with the domestic economic woes has prompt fear in its neighbour like Japan, South Korea and in many ASEAN’s members that China will act more aggressively in near future. With China’s military capabilities mature, military actions by China in future can’t be ignored as the US prohibitory measures to strengthen its economy and counter China’s rise has alarmed China. As China’s naval presence and actions in the South China Sea has increased, the recent deployment of swarms of Chinese satellites like the Shiyan 12-01, Shijian-17 and Shijian-23 to spy the recently concluded Malabar Exercise such Chinese actions will increase in the coming years. As China views the developments in its vicinity directed against its rise, it will destabilise the Asia-Pacific region. It further argues that nations are becoming US hatchet men to serve its goals which will only incite confrontation in the region.

The Camp David Meeting: Development of new Axis

Japan and South Korea recognises China and its aggressive maritime policies as a major threat which today has coupled with North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and planned spy satellite, puts Japan and South Korea to strengthened the bilateral ties to address such concerning issues. The recently concluded Japan-South Korean-US Camp David meeting was a result of improved ties between Japan and South Korea. Deteriorating economic and bilateral ties between Japan-China and South Korea-China with increased competition from China in recent years push Japan and South Korea to play a greater and vital role in Northeast and East Asia’s geopolitics.

As South Korea and Japan have addressed their historical differences – Japan’s colonial and wartime legacy – and have aligned to counter Chinese influence in Northeast Asia, which also happen due to the external pressure. As the US actively working to bring its allies and new friends and strategic partners under the same umbrella which will not only create prospects for both and also helped them to counter China in near future. Such developments in the coming years will increase which will expand anti-China alliance pushing China to be more assertive in its approach unilaterally and through Chinese controlled blocs and institutions.

The Camp David was a result of rapprochement between South Korea and Japan as the threat posed by China’s economic transformation has today eclipsed Japan-South Korea long standing trade rivalries. With Chinese and North Korean dimension plays a vital role in such a development, improvement of South Korea-Japan bilateral ties also happen due to meeting of minds between South Korean President Yoon Suk and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on security issues. As Japan and South Korea’s trade relationship with China has shifted from strong complementarities to increasing competition in key strategic industries.

As the Camp David meeting is viewed as a milestone in the Northeast and East Asian region geopolitics, something similar to the scale and impact of the AUKUS and I2U2. It allows the US, Japan and South Korea to expand their economic and security relationship and it cemented a new agreement to form a new trilateral ally system to address the tense relationship with China and North Korea. With ‘Camp David Principle’ and ‘Spirit of Camp David’ is agreed upon with former setting guidelines for trilateral cooperation and later outlining the vision for cooperation and implement Camp David’s plans. To ensure it happens, a hotline communication has been established to ensure that the group works to ensure a safe world. The US President Biden has said that such cooperation is not about China, rather to focus on a broader security issue. However, the concluding joint statement, mentions China while highlighting its dangerous and aggressive actions in the South China Sea region. The statement says it strongly opposes any unilateral attempts by a country to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region.

Under this new trilateral security cooperation, to address the crisis emerging from China and North Korea, Japan, South Korea and the US have agreed to consult, share information and align their messaging with each other in the face of a threat or crisis. The role, place and significance of Camp David has in the US and world history, it has brought Japan and South Korea together to address security concerns emerging from China and North Korea to an extent. As forging of this new trilateral relationship strengthens the US treaty ally system with Japan and South Korea, to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and address Chinese economic coercion.

Challenges Ahead to counter China’s rise

China views the development as an effort to develop a Pacific version of NATO to encircle and curtail its rise and growth. It criticised the move as a starting shot for a Cold War which will bring more risks. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that such a development will transform Asia-Pacific region’s peace and development into an arena for geopolitical games. The ministry further said that attempts to form exclusive small cliques or groups will bring camp confrontation and military bloc in the region. While South Korea’s focus is on the developments in the Korean peninsula which isn’t a top priority for the US and Japan, the loss of all three nations will be different. China said that such aspects are concerning for South Korea who will be the biggest loser in such an arrangement

To make the meeting a success, it requires a strong coordination based on a more robust institutional foundations between the US, Japan and South Korea. As US President Joe Biden has stated that annual multidomain military exercises will bring the bilateral defence cooperation to unprecedented level. The initiative will assist them to build a strong commitment. Japanese PM Kishida has said that the international community is at a turning point in the history and the US-Japan-South Korea collaboration needs to ensure the trilateral security coordination reaches new heights in coming years.

The meeting is directed to address such concerning issues, as all three countries are aware that the Japan-South Korea rapprochement has a time frame of four years to cement their new found ties. South Korea President Yoon Suk is risking his political capital to mend relationship with Japan. As Camp David meeting was a standalone and has not happened at the side-line of any major global summit like of the NATO or G7 or G20, the meeting has to ensure that the work done in previous two meetings between Japan and South Korea are secured to strengthen bilateral trade, ties and strategic relationship under newly established trilateral security cooperation.

Conclusion

As the Camp David summit is of global significance, it will lay the roadmap for the US, Japan, South Korea to coordinate their efforts on military and security while ensuring global economic stability. Such a summit highlights that a consensus has been established amongst all three countries to push and counter the destabilising impact from Chinese threat. The significance of the summit can’t be ignored and all three nations have to ensure a grass-root support between them for unwavering support to the Camp David Principle. However, question remains with the US Presidential election 2024, that will a new US President be as motivated as Biden for such meetings or not? As no show from the US President will impact the trilateral defence and economic cooperation to thwart an aggressive posture from China and North Korea. Despite summit’s scopes and limitation, the trilateral cooperation has unanimously agreed to take necessary measures to confront any challenges the Indo-Pacific region is facing from authoritarian rulers.

Spratly Islands Dispute: Danger in South China Sea

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By: Varshitha Eddula, Research Analyst, GSDN

Spratly Islands: source Internet

A group of corals, reefs, atolls in the South China Sea are named after a British whaling captain Richard Spratly, who sighted Spratly Island in 1843. The name of the island eventually passed to the entire archipelago. Recently these islands garnered media attention because Manila opened the disputed islet, called Kalayaan Island Group (of the West Philippine Sea) to tourism, which is located in the region of Spratly Islands. The tour lets the visitors sail crystal clear waters, takes them along white sand beaches and gives them a view of lush green jungle. Game fishing is also offered.

Location significance

Spratly Islands are a large group of reefs, shoals, atolls, and small islets in the South China Sea. They are spread out in the ocean measuring some 409,000 square km. They are located north of Malaysia and are midway between Vietnam and the Philippines. There is neither indigenous habitation nor permanent human settlement due to its remoteness and exposure to harsh tropical storms. It is strategically located near several primary shipping lanes in the South China Sea. There are scattered garrisons occupied by military personnel of several states.

The Historical Development

Mariners avoided this region due to many reefs and shoals and was often called ‘dangerous ground’ on their charts. And soon all this changed. For a brief time between 1933 to 1939, the islands came under the French Occupation. It was the Japanese that developed a submarine base during WWII. After Japan renounced its claims, countries like China, Vietnam, and the Philippines declared themselves as the rightful authority of these islands. The island’s strategic location was the primary significance before 1970 to aid in war efforts.

Prior to World War II, the islands were largely unimportant. Fishermen went in search of fish, turtle meat, seashells guano (that is used as fertiliser). Miners looked for phosphate deposits on these islands.

The 1970s changed things forever. The discovery of oil in many regions accompanied by record high oil prices created an incentive among nations for oil exploration. Soon, oil fields were discovered off the coasts of Malaysia and Brunei. Then Russians discovered oil fields off the coast of North Vietnam. In 1973, the Philippines set off on oil exploration in Palawan. The discovery of oil fields around the islands led nations to turn their attention to the islands. Today, countries like China estimate billions of barrels of oil around these islands.

These islands have been disputed with varying degrees of intensity for over a few decades now. They continue to be a point of dispute between six different states to this day. The Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or part by The People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.

The Nine-Dash Line and Other Claims

China claims by far the largest portion of territory in an area demarcated by its so-called “nine-dash line”. The line comprises nine dashes which extends hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.

However, critics say China has not been specific about what exactly its claim includes, and that the nine-dash line that appears on Chinese maps encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates. It is also not clear whether China claims only land territory within the nine-dash line, or all the maritime space within it as well.

Vietnam disputes China’s historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracel and the Spratly Islands since the 17th Century and has the documents to prove it.

The other major claimant to the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.

Both the Philippines and China also lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) – a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS.

Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratly Islands.

Chronology of Serious Clashes

The most serious trouble in recent decades has flared between Vietnam and China, and there have also been stand-offs between the Philippines and China. Some of the incidents include:

In 1974, the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops. In 1988, the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors.

In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal. Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration operations in late 2012 led to large anti-China protests on Vietnam’s streets.

In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.

In June 2019, Manila accused a Chinese trawler of ramming a Filipino fishing boat with 22 people on board. The Filipinos were rescued by the Vietnamese. In early 2023, the Philippines said Chinese vessels have been shining lasers at Filipino boats to temporarily blind their crew. They also accuse the Chinese of dangerous maneuvers by sailing too close or blocking the Filipinos’ path.

The Resources and Shipping Lane Angle

Oil reserves: The islands are prone to military clashes and disputes that there have not been any drilling expeditions to date to find measurable quantities of oil. US Geological Survey estimates that the islands may contain 1 to 2 billion barrels.

Natural Gas: The estimates range from 24 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to 2000 Tcf of natural gas resources within the Spratly Islands. If the same rule of thumb were applied to the natural gas as in the oil equation, it implies that 900 Tcf of natural gas would yield 1.8 Tcf per year. While these are only estimates it still shows why the Spratly Islands could be so valuable to its claimants, most especially China. With Asia nearly completely dependent on foreign oil, discovery of proven reserves will at least temporarily relieve Asian dependency.

Shipping Lane: The importance of the Spratly Islands as a shipping lane as well adds another layer to the dispute. Nearly all of the Asian oil supply originates from Africa and the Middle East, which passes through the Strait of Malacca into the South China Sea. It has now become one of the world’s most heavily used shipping lanes and annually accounts for over half of the global merchant fleet in tonnage passing through it. The strait is not just important regionally but globally too, with half of the global merchant fleet traveling through the South China Sea. Conflicts that disrupt the shipping lanes are unacceptable to any party within and outside the Spratly Island dispute.

The Exclusivity Factor

According to UNCLOS, the EEZ is an “area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention”.

The advantages gained from an EEZ is a source of tension. Coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, the seabed and subsoil and with regard to activities for the economic exploitation and explorations such as energy production. Also, the state has jurisdiction to establish structures, conduct research and conserve the marine environment. The Spratly Islands lie near the EEZ of several claimant states.

Ownership over the Spratly Islands will ensure that the respective countries territorial seabed would extend not from their mainland coastline but from the island’s coastline. This factor has also been a point of contention in the South China Sea.

The Resolution Effect

On November 04, 2002 in Phnom Penh, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed by the 10 foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and China. The parties explicitly undertook in this declaration, “to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned”.

 In March 2005, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a joint accord to conduct marine seismic activities in the Spratly Islands. In July 2012, China (PRC) announced that it is open to launching discussions on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, but called for all parties to exercise self-restraint in keeping with the spirit of previous declarations and United Nation conventions.

The Philippines has sought international arbitration instead. In 2013, it announced it would take China to an arbitration tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims. In July 2016, the tribunal backed the Philippines’ case, saying China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights. China had boycotted the proceedings and called the ruling “ill-founded” further saying it will not be bound by it.

Conclusion

There are a lot of things at stake for the increased confrontations among countries. From wanting to control the oil and natural gas reserves to shipping lanes to expanding their EEZ zones. A group of remote islands where once only fishermen ventured has now been dragged to the International Court. Yet, the rulings have not been agreed by parties. Countries have also used soft power to extend territorial claims. Therefore, countries have to come together to find solutions to the Spratly Island dispute which will ensure peace and security and promote regional cooperation.

The Golden Triangle: Global Drugs Danger

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Golden Triangle: source Internet

What is the Golden Triangle

The Golden Triangle is a geographic area located in Southeast Asia that encompasses portions of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. Since the 1950s, the aforementioned area, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, has emerged as a prominent hub for opium production globally, alongside Afghanistan in the Golden Crescent region. Additionally, it serves as one of the most ancient conduits for the transportation of drugs to North America and Europe. It is the world’s second-largest producer of narcotics, after only Afghanistan’s Golden Crescent.

The Golden Triangle and the Shan State

The Shan state of Myanmar is well recognized as the primary source of illicit narcotics inside the renowned Golden Triangle, an area where the borders of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand converge. Before the influx of Afghan narcotics onto the global market during the 1990s, the Golden Triangle had the distinction of being the primary global hub for heroin production. Since the beginning of the 2010s, the manufacturing of methamphetamine with higher potency and more profitability has resulted in the area being the foremost global producer and exporter of this substance.

A significant portion of the precursor chemicals used in this context are readily obtained from China, which shares a border with the country. Additionally, some quantities of these compounds are also acquired from India. The prevailing instability in Myanmar has fostered the growth of manufacturing capacity, particularly in the case of Yaba (methamphetamine tablets), which can be manufactured with relative ease in small-scale cottages.

The production of illicit substances within the region of Shan State is an inherent and inseparable component of its intricate political economy. Following the dissolution of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, a residual faction known as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) emerged. Notably, the UWSA has fostered a significant rapport with China, characterized by substantial military assistance. In light of these circumstances, the UWSA engaged in negotiations with the junta forces, ultimately resulting in a ceasefire agreement. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) undertook a coercive measure involving the relocation of approximately 100,000 Wa civilians to Mong Yawn, a region situated along the Thai border. Subsequently, this area assumed the role of a prominent centre for the production of Yaba, a stimulant drug. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) has emerged as a prominent actor within the drug economy of the Shan region, alongside various other ethnic militia groups.

Following the occurrence of the 2021 coup in Myanmar, Thailand’s Office of Narcotics Control Board has reported the seizure of over 330 million Yaba tablets. The quantity of crystal methamphetamine, often referred to as ‘Ice’, confiscated is consistent with the previous year, amounting to 15 metric tonnes. According to an estimate provided by the International Crisis Group, the yearly production of methamphetamine in the Shan region is significantly above 250 tonnes. According to available reports, there has been a notable exponential surge in the retail price of methamphetamine as it makes its way to the profitable markets of Australia and Japan from Myanmar. Billions of dollars of illegal funds are being amassed in major metropolitan areas outside of Myanmar due to the flow of narcotics originating from the Golden Triangle. The markets catering to the upper echelons for these pharmaceutical products include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It is projected that the earnings from these markets in the year 2019 was a staggering sum of US$ 71 billion.

Evolution to chemical drugs: The golden triangle drug trade started with opium. The Shan State of Myanmar has massive labs that manufacture and export heroin. Smugglers utilized US military jets to deliver goods to America during the Vietnam War. Recently, the pharma industry has changed drastically. Due to difficulty accessing raw materials and infrastructure for opioid drug manufacture, the Golden Triangle drug business is changing to chemical-based substances like methamphetamine, ketamine, Yaba (methamphetamine plus caffeine), etc. These medications are simpler to make and earn greater money than opioids, thus opioids’ part of Golden Triangle’s drug sector has dropped to less than 30% and is declining rapidly. This is shown by UNODC data that showed methamphetamine seizures in Southeast Asia exceeded 171 tonnes in 2021 and 182 tonnes in 2022, including 28 tonnes of ketamine. South East Asia seizes over 90% of all pharmaceuticals as chemicals. These estimates are solely for seizure and represent merely the top of the whole output, which may be tens of thousands of tonnes.

Participation of Chinese drug dealers: Golden Triangle features some of the world’s most organized drug gangs in Guangzhou, Beijing, Shanghai, Hongkong, Thailand, Taiwan, and Macau. Most cartel leaders are Chinese, such Sam Gor gang, which controls roughly 40% of the Golden Triangle business. These cartels make narcotics in the Golden Triangle and distribute them worldwide. ASEAN ($100Bn), Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea ($30Bn), China & Russia ($20Bn), and other regions ($50Bn) are large markets. Cartel owners who control tiny armies to defend their manufacturing zones always keep local governments on their side. They have hired numerous former Army Generals in the current drug trafficking in Myanmar, and their ties to the government make it almost hard to capture or punish the cartel.

Manipur’s Importance and Drug Trade in Manipur: With over 400km of porous border with Myanmar, Manipur is an important Indian border state. Since the military junta took power in Myanmar, drug manufacturing has skyrocketed on both sides of the border. Chemical medications are becoming increasingly popular in Myanmar and Manipur due to their simplicity of production, transportation, little infrastructure, and inexpensive pricing. The state government data shows that opium production increased in Manipur, but international data shows that the market for opioid-based drugs has decreased to less than one-third of the drug business in Manipur. The drug industry in Manipur is estimated to be worth INR 70,000 crores. The numbers are worrisome. The drug industry in Manipur is mostly chemical (60-65%), opioid (30%), and cannabis (5-10%). Like the Golden Triangle, narcotics syndicates in Manipur include manufacturers, traders, intermediaries, politicians, armed insurgency groups, officials, and even security personnel.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S REGIONAL DYNAMICS

The extensive and permeable land border between India and Myanmar serves as a secure refuge for the infiltration of illicit substances, including yaba and heroin. The confiscation of heroin shipments in Indian urban centres like Guwahati and Dimapur may be traced back to their source in the Golden Triangle region. The entry sites for Myanmar’s heroin and methamphetamine into India are located at two distinct locations, namely Moreh in the state of Manipur and Champai in the state of Mizoram. The procurement of precursor chemicals, such as ephedrine, acetic anhydride, and pseudoephedrine, originates from locations in South India, namely Chennai. These chemicals are thereafter transferred to Kolkata and Guwahati, passing via Delhi, and are then illicitly smuggled over the border into Myanmar. This illicit activity underscores existing vulnerabilities in domestic security.

Opium cultivated in the border districts of Manipur and Mizoram is thereafter taken to the Golden Triangle, where it undergoes processing to be transformed into heroin, before being reintroduced into India. The states of Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, located in the northeastern region of India, are ranked among the top 10 states in terms of drug addiction prevalence.

Drug trade dangers include increased drug usage, HIV infection via sharing needles, and insurgency financing. According to reports, the Myanmar military may be assisting drug manufacturers by forming an informal alliance with northeast Indian rebel groups including the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and the Manipur-based People’s Liberation Army. Sixteen of these organizations usually acquire guns using drug money. Two years after the Indian and Myanmar military’s 2019 ‘Operation Sunrise’ demolished their camps, these rebel groups are reorganizing. Enforcement officials said large volumes of Myanmar’s drugs, mainly yaba tablets, have reached every “town and village” in Bangladesh over weak highland borders. Bangladeshi security forces have detained thousands of peddlers and killed hundreds accused of narcotics trafficking. Several gangs are trafficking approximately 80% of yaba tablets into the nation via Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, with an estimated 1.2 million people. In Bangladesh, the Arakan Army sells yaba tablets to support its struggle against the authorities in Rakhine. Yaba pills reach Bangladesh from India through Kurigram district in the north, Fatehpur border point in the southwest, and Patuakhali via sea.

CONCLUSION

The worldwide issue of illegal drug trafficking is prevalent, with some regions such as the Golden Triangle serving as significant hubs for this activity. The illicit proceeds derived from drug trafficking are used to fund unlawful endeavors, including but not limited to criminal actions and acts of terrorism. The establishment of multilateral collaboration among South and Southeast Asian nations within the banking sector to track illegal funds derived from drug trafficking may be very advantageous in addressing the transnational dimensions of this pressing issue. In 2021, a collaborative multinational endeavor spearheaded by the US Department of Justice and Europol resulted in the apprehension of 150 individuals involved in drug trafficking. These individuals were operating throughout the United States, several European nations including France, Germany, and Italy, as well as Australia, using the dark web as a platform for drug distribution.

The people who cultivate, make, and sell illegal drugs are usually poor. Often unemployed, people may be forced to perform such jobs. The COVID-19 epidemic has left millions of unorganized workers unemployed worldwide. The International Labour Organisation estimates that 72 million G20 workers were engaged in Covid-19-affected industries. Without social protection, disadvantaged and jobless people in underdeveloped nations are often pushed to labor illegally. To discourage vulnerable people from slipping into the drug trade, governments may offer social security systems and prioritize jobs.

BRICS 2023: Is China Trying to Convert it as an Alternative to G7

By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

BRICS 2023 logo: source Internet

Introduction

In global geopolitics, military strength and capabilities or economic viability and prospects of a nation, such data from a data analysis understanding are vital to understand and measures its national power and strength. Over the years, many nations have come together to achieve their shared objective and interest and have expanded their grouping despite such groups are vital or relevant today. NATO fits into such a description. In the paper, the analysis will be done on G7 and its challenger BRICS who has started to undermine the G7 reach, power and influence in the global geopolitics.

On June 16, 2009 BRIC (Brazil Russia, India and China) was formed and addition of South Africa in 2011 established BRICS, a group of emerging economies who are working to instate their world economic and trade systems. As data concerning to economy and military’s strength have a multi-frontal aspect, it remains relevant in geopolitics to understand a country or bloc like BRICS’ reach and influence. In 2023, as BRICS contribution to global GDP (31.5%) has surpassed G7 contribution (30.7%) and nearly accounts 1/3 of the world economic activity, it has become a voice of the developing nations worldwide.

The 2023 BRICS Summit was held in South Africa between August 22-24, 2023 under ‘BRICS and Africa: Partnership for mutually accelerated growth, sustainable development and inclusive multilateralism’ theme. BRICS has aimed to reshape the political economic landscape to benefit themselves and shape the global political and economic order to suit their vested and shared interest. The recent rise of BRICS and developments like the de-dollarisation, drive to expand BRICS and China’s push to oust G7 and make BRICS as a global leader has begun the G7 vs BRICS rivalry.

The significance of BRICS

The term BRICS was coined by Goldman Sachs Analyst Jim O’Neill who argued that in coming times G7 members should consider adding BRIC members as their contribution to the global GDP will only increase. At the time of such a statement, BRIC’s contribution to the global GDP at the end of 2000 was 23.3% and today has surpassed G7 contribution to global GDP and become significant and a strategic competitor and rival to the G7. The 2023 BRICS summit has become the biggest summit for the group in its history as it invited 69 state heads highlighting its rise and showcasing its growing value worldwide and global acceptance.

As BRICS mechanism works to promote peace, security, development and cooperation to establish a fair and equitable world, today, attracted by giving an alternative to other nations to join the group. With group accounts for 41% of the globe population, 30% of the land area, 31.5% of global GDP and 16% of international trade, BRICS, today, no longer can be ignored by other nations. While promoting cooperation, economic growth and development and enriching people-to-people contact being BRICS’ three pillars and since 2009 has worked and established more than 30 cooperation among themselves and like-minded nations. With BRICS combined worth equals the US economy, the group has become a voice for the global south (developing countries) and is pushing to reshape the global order and reform institutions like the UN, WHO, WTO, IMF etc. Further, despite ongoing border dispute between India and China, cooperation between both countries in BRICS forum has remained and the Beijing Declaration 2022 showcases the group’s intent to address conflict and ensure global peace and stability.

BRICS vs G7: China’s push to make BRICS alternative to G7

In recent years, China’s geopolitical initiatives and measures aren’t only to carve out a space for itself and counter the US-led order worldwide. Strategic moves like the Belt Road Initiative, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Civilisational Initiative (GCI) and its global acceptance have given ample scope to China to go past US in coming times. In such a scenario, growing significance of BRICS and becoming a strategic rival to G7 has become the centre of focus for other developing nations to align with the group to secure their interest.

BRICS transforming itself from a non-aligned club for economic interest of developing nations into a political force which openly challenges the West has yet to become a reality, and expansion of BRICS and inclusion of six countries will change the direction of the group and its approach towards global geopolitics. As South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa argues the expansion of BRICS will only represent diverse group of nations sharing a common desire and such approach is supported by India, Russia, China and Brazil. The invitation to Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Argentina to join BRICS in January 2024 will diversify the group’s power, hold and relevance in the global geopolitics. The inclusion of such nations will enhance the scope of BRICS, as presence of large oil reserves in such countries and their large share in global GDP will increase BRICS bargaining power in global power politics in coming years.

To understand such joining, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will amplify BRICS dominance in the Middle East region’s geopolitics, which will undermine US-led order in the region. Recently, China’s move to broker a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran has alarmed the West of China’s intent to counter the West as it has begun to flex its muscles. BRICS provides China an opportunity to expand its reach and its existing ties with BRICS. New members needs to be carefully looked upon as it could impact the working and functioning of the bloc in coming years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech during the summit stated that as China looks for expansion of BRICS, he emphasised China’s aversion to hegemonism and bloc confrontation and wished for a more equitable international order. Although, China and Russia look upon the bloc as a counter to the Western dominance and oust G7 as a global leader. Thus use of local currency for trade by BRICS members and push to de-dollarise global economy is being done with such intentions. A global de-dollarisation is still a distant dream, Chinese-led institutions and growing China’s hold in other blocs like SCO will give impetus to such a drive and thus the role of G7 to counter it has become pivotal.

On the issue of BRICS becoming alternative and strategic rival to G7, a shift has been witnessed in the global geopolitics post Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As anti-west narrative and its acceptance have gained a momentum to move away from US-led order viewed in push for local currency to de-dollarisation the global economy. As the invasion united the West against Russia but distant them from the rest as consolidation of the West is taking in the backdrop of a divided Cold War order and emerging powers like China and India and bloc like BRICS has taken a centre stage in global geopolitics. Push to formulate a BRICS currency has gained momentum which will impact G7 and the US hold in the global economy.

As the rise of BRICS in the last two decades is impressive and unquestionable, the bloc members continue to trade more with G7 members than within the bloc. China being the lead economy of the bloc, its trade with the G7 (27%) shadowed its trade with BRICS (7%) and such aspects reflect also in the case of India, South Africa and Russia excluding Brazil. In the current context, BRICS cannot offer the financial and economic incentives that the G7 has its disposal as global acceptance of dollar provide G7 better scope to compete with BRICS. The inclusion of new members and launch of BRICS currency in near future will empower BRICS. Being politically appealing to many countries, in the coming times, with new members, BRICS will become strategically vital and alternative to G7 to those countries who’re willing to bandwagon with the rise of global south and BRICS.

Conclusion

This raises a valid question that if BRICS has to remain relevant in global geopolitics in the coming decades, the members (existing and new one) must come together and formulate a clear vision to secure their core principles and pillars. The expansion of BRICS is a good prospect as it will strengthen bloc voice allowing them to venture in a new domain like the outer space, artificial intelligence etc. However, bloc members should strengthen trade with each other, strengthen their internal economy, National Development Bank and set-up a meditation process which will project the bloc as a serious player with intent to address global issues and threats.

Further, BRICS should set-up new institutions – transforming idea into a reality – like the BRICS Credit Rating Agency proposed by India benefiting others by providing an alternative to the Standard & Poor and Moody. Such developments will strengthen BRICS and supersede the G7 as a vital player and mediator in global geopolitics. It will empower China to push its agenda and idea of a new global order and Chinese-led initiative like the GDI and Global Security Initiative coupled with BRICS summit highlights the bloc is moving in this direction. However, other BRICS members need to address such a scenario and ensure to better the existing global order so that BRICS doesn’t become another SCO which act as a vehicle for China to challenge the existing global norms.

China’s Economic Woes: The Fault Lines Deepen

By: Sanoop Suresh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Representative picture of China’s economic woes: source Internet

The phrase “To get rich is glorious” was coined by Deng Xiaoping during his time as the paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to enable a financially prosperous China under communist rule. Deng believed that increasing production was the first step toward reaching common prosperity. Since then, the PRC has played a considerable role in the world economy and emerged as the second-largest economy in 2010. Recent estimates indicate that China accounts for 14.4% of global trade and 18.2% of global GDP. Due to the globalisation of the world, any economic wind that affects one player’s economy will cause a whirlwind in the global economy. Because of how the globe is now interconnected, there are rising concerns about the state of the world’s wealth as the PRC faces another financial crisis. For China, dealing with the economic crisis is nothing new; the country faced similar problems during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and the 2015–2016 stock market turmoil was only the latest example. However, the recent changes in the Chinese economy give a skewed view of the future, not just for Beijing but also for the rest of the world.

What is Happening in China?

China’s economic crackdown has been in the making for a while, and the faulted strategy of Covid management and the harsh quarantine measures significantly contributed to its birth. To avert inflation, China refrained from large Covid-era subsidies, which decreased disposable household income due to the concurrent stagnation of wages and property prices. The National Institution for Finance and Development reported that China’s household debt climbed from 61.9% of the national GDP in 2022 to 63.5% in the second quarter of 2023. It is approaching the red line of 65 percent that the International Monetary Fund previously used to indicate financial risk. Recent data suggest that the Chinese economy is also experiencing deflation, which causes great concern among analysts.

Deflation, as opposed to inflation, is an overall drop in the average price of goods and services across the entire economy. The consumer price index decreased 0.3% from a year earlier in July, the National Bureau of Statistics of China reported in August. These statistics signal the slowing pace of economic growth. Although China had a brief surge in economic activity once the stringent pandemic restrictions were lifted, the situation gradually deteriorated into a loss of confidence in the economy, which prompted People to save money rather than invest it in goods. The issue worsens due to a domino effect that spreads throughout the manufacturing sector and eventually into the labor market. China recently stopped publishing data on youth unemployment after finding that the number of unemployed young people aged 16 to 24 in metropolitan areas increased by 21.3% in June compared to the previous month. Reports state that foreign direct investment in China has decreased to 25-year low, and large-scale Chinese share sales have occurred among international investors. However, the ongoing economic collapse in China primarily affected the Chinese real estate market.

Why is China responsible for the downfall of its real estate market?

In the hope of recovering from the 2008 global economic crisis, Beijing borrowed money at the local level and invested in infrastructure projects, which were subsequently reflected in the real estate sector. Since 2016, the Chinese government has pushed the real estate sector through a variety of regulatory initiatives, helping Beijing surpass the United States to become the world’s largest real estate market. Reports say that Chinese households put up to 80% of their money into real estate. According to recent estimates, the real estate sector and other allied industries make up close to 35% of the Chinese economy. However, the once-vibrant industry and the main players facing a debt problem are now feeling the heat of the ongoing economic crisis as a result of the flawed structural arrangements.

Since the COVID pandemic had a negative impact on China’s economy, Beijing made the decision to lower interest rates in order to encourage citizens to borrow more money, which led to a boom in the real estate sector. The industry’s foundation became unstable due to China’s commitment to expansion at any costs, which led developers to rely on debt and loans. Due to the abrupt limits on borrowing by the authority, the “three red lines” in 2020 tied the real estate businesses, leaving many of them without finances. In the last three years, more than 50 Chinese developers defaulted on their loans or failed to make payments, and the major players in the sector are currently travelling the same path.

The 1992-founded Country Garden, a major player in the Chinese real estate market, is currently experiencing the worst crisis in its thirty-year existence and expects a loss of up to US$ 7.6 billion in the first half of the year. The Evergrande group, in a similar vein, has a total debt of about US$ 300 billion. These facts demonstrate the crises’ evenness and breadth, which has an impact on both the general public and the local governments. It is extremely concerning for economists that land sales, which account for 40% of all local government revenue, declined at a time when local governments in China were also faced with an impending financial crisis.

Why might local governments go into default?

Beijing’s 1994 “fiscal decentralization” policy restricted local governments’ borrowing rights and revenue streams, forcing them to discover alternative financing strategies like the Local Government Financing Vehicle (LGFV). These platforms are frequently employed to raise money for infrastructure investments that do not yield immediate returns, which causes the regional economy to rack up hidden debt. The LGFV has since become a significant source of revenue for the local government.

The zero covid policies and the ensuing economic pressures caused a growth in hidden debts, which demand higher interest rates and quicker payback which the local governments cannot meet. The looming crisis, which grew later, was foreshadowed in 2020 when Chinese state-owned firms defaulted on debt worth 71.8 billion Yuan. Without taking into account the reported borrowings, new estimates place China’s local government’s covert loans between 30 trillion to 50 trillion Yuan. The Chinese media outlets indicate that the local governments are having trouble making their payments and are being forced to impose restrictions on wages and fuel subsidies in addition to failing to provide public services. Beijing is making a valiant effort to address the issue by reducing debt, but strangely, rumours indicate that they are once more considering taking on more loans.

Beijing reportedly permitted the provincial governments to issue bonds worth 1 trillion Yuan to cover the unofficial borrowing of local governments. The program effectively shifts the burden to provincial governments by bailing out weaker issuers, such LGFVs. Even if purchasing additional debt to pay off existing borrowings will be futile in the long run, this strategy will allow Beijing time to restructure its economy. However, failing to do so will have catastrophic repercussions that severely hurt the world economy.

Why would the global economy suffer if the Chinese economy collapsed?

In spite of its controversial reputation as an authoritarian nation, China is the world’s largest exporter of products and a significant bilateral trading partner for a number of countries. The world is currently just waking up from an economic slowdown brought on by a number of factors, including inflation, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and extreme weather events. As a result, a drop in China’s economic activity could seriously disrupt the global demand-supply balance. China consumes a substantial portion of the world market’s energy, raw resources, steel, and food. Those countries who are dependent on China are being forced to look for alternate solutions by the current crisis, although it is difficult to do so.

165 nations owe China US$ 385 billion as part of their “Belt and Road Initiative,” which is further distorting the image because many of these nations are experiencing political and economic upheaval. The current crisis will compel other nations to plunge further into economic and political dangers. On the other hand, Beijing has little choice but to restructure its economy in order to avoid social and political turmoil in China, where the situation is the same.

Does China have a plan to resolve the crisis?

Despite uncertainty regarding its future, China’s economy is still expanding. The Chinese economy reportedly increased by 5.5% in the first half of 2023.The National Australia Bank forecast a 5.2% of economic growth for China in 2023. Beijing is not striving to match the pace of the outside world, but rather that of its own history. Without waiting for others, the Chinese economy grew rapidly for a number of years, but the current financial crisis has made it more difficult to keep up that pace. Dealing with the economic crisis is nothing new for China; the nation had a similar set of issues during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, and the 2015–2016 stock market upheaval was merely the most recent instance. China was able to stop the crisis in both of these cases by cutting interest rates, encouraging people to borrow money, and boosting economic activity. China is once more seeking to revive the old game plan in an effort to stop the present crisis and build confidence among its people to invest their money in the market. It is difficult to predict whether it will be successful, but the current crisis once again highlights the weak points in the fundamental underpinnings of the Chinese economy. It necessitates a deliberate reworking of the policies to reduce their reliance on debt and look into other avenues for maintaining a strong economy. To accomplish this, China still has a long way to go. 

India’s Mine Counter-Measure Vessels Gap: A Critical Maritime Security Concern

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By: Rahul Wankhede

Mine Counter Measure Vehicle: source Internet

Focusing on India’s evolving naval capabilities and priorities, this article highlights the importance of Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs) in the context of India’s maritime security. This article takes an overview of the MCMV acquisition process in the Indian Navy and presents an analysis of the attempts made by the navy to procure these vessels. It also emphasizes on the need to rationalize priorities and resources to achieve strategic objectives, without compromising on the quantity and quality of the naval fleet. It discusses the challenges faced in procuring MCMVs, the need for a balanced approach in naval modernization plans, and the implications of the absence of dedicated mine-warfare capabilities in the face of emerging tensions in the Indian Ocean region.

Introduction

Over the last few years India’s military naval fleet has seen a constant growth with the addition of new vessels like: frigates, destroyers, corvettes and even a full-fledged aircraft carrier that was built indigenously. Amongst the three-armed forces, it’s the Indian Navy that has been spear-heading the call for self-reliance in the defence sector, by in-house designing, building and acquisition of ships and other vessels.

Notwithstanding this appreciable growth and acquisitions is the glaring anomaly of absence of minesweepers in the Indian Navy. Technically called as MCMV – Mine Counter Measures Vessels, these ships perform the important function of locating and destroying enemy mines under-water. An under-water mine is a silent killer, as it silently floats under-water, waiting for a ship to pass by and it explodes after contact is established.

In a shocking revelation, it has recently come to public attention that the Indian Navy does not have a single minesweeper vessel since 2021.

Indian Navy’s Absent MCMV Fleet

India has a total of 13 major ports on its eastern and western seaboards. At the rate of 2 MCMVs per port, the Indian Navy needs at least 26 such vessels. Apart from these, there are various other small ports, docks and other important assets along the coastline that need to be protected. Sea going vessels also either need to be accompanied by a MCMV or fitted with mine-detecting equipment. But no new MCMV has been inducted in the navy’s service since 1998.

Earlier the Indian Navy operated a fleet of Pondicherry class MCMVs: INS Pondicherry, INS Bedi, INS Bhavnagar, INS Alleppey and INS Ratnagiri that were deployed under the Western Naval Command. These entered service during 1978-80 and were retired by 2007-2015.

The Karwar class MCMVs, namely: INS Karwar, INS Kunnor, INS Kuddulor, INS Kakinada, INS Kozhikode and INS Konkan were deployed under the Eastern Naval Command at Vishakhapatnam. These were inducted during 1986-88 and were retired by 2017-19.

The UPA government had tried to procure MCMVs, around 15 years ago, but the project was abandoned after the lowest bidder – Kanganam Corporation, a South Korean company was accused of wrongdoings.

The government scrapped the tender in 2014 amid allegations that the Korean firm had hired middlemen to swing things in its favour, thus violating the integrity clause.

As of 2015, India was left with just six MCMVs as against the requirement of 26. The Centre finally nominated Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) in February 2015 to build minesweepers in partnership with a foreign shipyard.

This time also, Kanganam had emerged as the lowest bidder. It was later clarified that the previous tender was scrapped due to “procedural issues” and Kangnam could compete again as it was not on the government’s blacklist. The deal was supposed to be closed the same year but discussions on technology transfer caused delays, and eventually the contract was finally scrapped in 2018.

The Defence Standing Committee is known to have requested that “sincere and concerted efforts” be made by the government to provide the navy with the essential MCMV capacity in its 2017 report, which was presented to the Parliament. The report also mentioned “the existing MCMVs are slated for de-induction by 2016-2018. 2016 has already passed and moreover, building the MCMVs will also take considerable time. The Committee feels that the entire process of procurement of MCMVs will be delayed inordinately”.   

Therefore, as of 2018 the Indian Navy was left with just two operational MCMVs. In fact, the navy lacks any MCM vessels, let alone modern counter-mine naval platforms.

Failing to procure new MCMVs through all the above attempts, in August 2021, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a Request for Information (RFI) for four used MCMVs hoping to get them on lease from a foreign government for the Indian Navy. “The government required three to four such units to be procured or leased, whose first vessel was supposed to be delivered in a maximum 10 months delay. The others were to follow by delivery every 4 months”. This proposal as well, did not go through.

The Indian Navy has now launched a fresh hunt to buy 12 new MCMVs from Indian shipyards to strengthen its mine-warfare capabilities, as per a report by Hindustan Times.  These minesweepers capable of finding, destroying and laying mines, would be constructed over a period of eight years according to a RFI published by the MoD. The order will be divided between L1 (lowest bidder) and L2 shipyards in an 8:4 ratio, with L2 shipyards being obligated to build the ships at L1 cost. The roles that the vessels should be able to carry out are listed in the RFI. This plan involves the induction of twelve minesweepers, the first one being delivered by 2031 and the last one being delivered by around 2037.

 It can thus be assessed that at present, India does not have the required capability to scour its harbours for potential mines and explosives for at least eight years, making them highly vulnerable to enemy action

Though alternative technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles have recently emerged on the technological spectrum, no viable alternative that can totally replace the need for a MCMV has yet been developed anywhere in the world

Importance of MCMVs for India’s Maritime Security

Considering India’s interests in the vast Indian Ocean Region, there is a constant threat of underwater mines being planted by Pakistan and/or China to deter Indian advancements in the region. It is now well known that the Chinese submarines regularly patrol the Indian Ocean – and could possibly deploy mines. Also, even modified fishing trawlers can be used for laying mines, multiplying the threat at the sub-conventional level, for India.

It is therefore high time that India devotes the necessary funds and resources from its defence budget towards acquiring more MCMVs and their related infrastructure and assets. While doing so, India may have to divert resources from its other ambitious programs to acquire a third aircraft carrier (a big-ticket item), ships, submarines etc. India does need more of these assets as well, but not at the cost of other key strike elements, force multipliers and support vessels.

India also needs to spend on other less glamorous but critical weapons platforms such as minesweepers, autonomous torpedoes, coastal surveillance radars, electronic warfare suites, reconnaissance drones and satellites etc. India can draw some lessons from China’s shipbuilding plan to stimulate the domestic economy rather than trying to compete “carrier for carrier” with China. Shipbuilding has served as the foundation for China’s industrial development, according to state policy established long ago by China’s political and military leadership. Since India is surrounded by countries to its north and northeast and has no other strategic space to move than the oceans, this can be very helpful India.

The Indian Navy needs to procure more than 26 units of MCMVs to fulfil its immediate requirements. This will have to be complemented by follow-on orders to achieve economies-of-scale and to keep the production lines active. Once the navy has the desired number of vessels, India can also look forward to build new MCMVs for exports. This would serve as a hallmark to the product quality and operational efficiency. Therefore, what is now needed on the government’s part is to take a bird’s eye view of the situation, ensure sufficient resources and prioritise its acquisition process by fully leveraging the available capabilities.

Conclusion

The absence of Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs) in the Indian Navy’s fleet is a significant and concerning aspect of India’s naval capabilities. Despite the notable growth and advancements in various naval domains, the omission of minesweepers, crucial for locating and neutralizing underwater mines, presents a glaring vulnerability.

This is not a welcome proposition for a country that wishes its Navy to be a blue-water force.

In light of the above challenges, it becomes imperative for the Indian Navy and the government to prioritize the acquisition lists, fund allocations and support the development of in-house solutions. Existing programs need to be continued rather than winding them up abruptly.

Addressing these gaps will not only enhance India’s defence capabilities but also contribute to the safeguarding of vital sea routes, maritime interests, and overall national security in the dynamic and complex maritime security environment of India.

About the Author

Rahul Wankhede is a post graduate in Defence and Strategic Studies with a gold medal. Rahul has worked with think tanks and NGOs in the domains of research, analysis and mentoring and is a former Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India. Currently he is doing PhD from JNU Special Centre for National Security Studies. The views expressed are personal.

India-US Ties: Are they Sustainable in the Long Run

By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Indo-Pacific region and flags of India, USA and China: source Internet

The unfolding geo-economic and geo-political “complex interdependence” as asserted by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s is the realpolitik while envisaging the future of two states which are hailed for their democratic values. However, growing apprehensions in both India and USA about Chinese aggression has created the strategic convergence long sought by the US defence establishment eager to enlist India to balance China. While tracing back the long history of these two states holding genuine relations since 1998 when the USA put sanctions on India after the nuclear test. The circular gambit of diplomacy has altered to the strategic level from America’s “strategic Altruism” to “America First” in the wake of Indo-Pacific region supremacy which renders India the pseudo-hope to consolidate its economic, military, and trade prospects in the future. The successive Indo-US ties have been captured in the wake of the leadership of respective states from the Bush-Vajpayee era to Bush-Singh era to Obama-Singh era to Obama-Modi era to Trump-Modi era and notably, to the present Biden-Modi era which seeks to embrace the idea of “multi-polar Asia.”

Furthermore, the dynamicity of bilateral cooperation also gets reflected in their Indo-Pacific partnership. The Indo-Pacific represents both convergences and divergences between India and the US. As such, both will have to approach their differences carefully, specifically on the definition of the exact geographic limits and definitive strategic intentions of their respective Indo-Pacific strategy. Biden Administration has the privilege to work on an already nurtured relationship between the US and India in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries have moved towards issue-based partnerships, while still maintaining differences and their core interests intact. Given the dire circumstances, India’s stimulus efforts have been unimpressive.  China’s aggressiveness has manifested itself across the Asia-Pacific in Beijing’s military buildup in the disputed South China Sea, its muzzling of Hong Kong’s autonomy, and its building of numerous ports and infrastructure projects around the world as part of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has witnessed China’s coercive behaviour on its border since the first Indo-Sino war of 1962 which further proliferates across its backyard in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Nonetheless, India will continue to hold on to its strategic autonomy as it navigates an uncertain geopolitical landscape. One of the Biden administration’s most critical tasks will be to ensure that the current convergence with India on the China threat endures. As they mull whether to partner with the United States in standing up to Beijing, policymakers in New Delhi will be carefully watching to determine whether they can rely on Washington to do the same. If they sense Washington adopting a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing, they may revert to a hedging approach once again.

Covid-19 has knocked an economy that was starting to stall on the side of the highway right into the ditch. The road to recovery will be long and tortuous. The established structural framework between the two countries, such as the Indo-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership; the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue; India’s designated status as a Major Defence Partner of the US; strong bilateral trade in the defence sector undergirded by a mutual democratic spirit and strategic convergences in the Indo-Pacific region are likely to continue to provide momentum to the bilateral relationship.

The growing recalibration of the US role may impact the modus operandi that may avowedly seek to undo some of the policies of the preceding administration. India has maintained a deft political poise befitting its foreign policy orientation. It allows a politically comfortable bandwidth to work with either a Democrat or a Republican President in the US. This approach in India’s foreign policy orientation has been appreciated by recent administrations in the US, allowing for a broad range of issue-based cooperation while still keeping fundamental differences in core interests at bay. This mutual understanding is likely to continue to guide India-US relations under President Joe Biden. India should, however, watch out for any unintended consequences of the Biden administration’s undoing of Trump’s foreign policy legacy that may impact US-India relations, or indeed India’s regional or global interests.

The recent successful visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the USA robust the strategic and mutual partnership in the long run where it contours joint development of Open Radio Access Networks, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, innovations under the iCET initiative, the establishment of a semiconductor assembly and test facility in India, rare earth and minerals security, collaboration in space exploration, the resolution of trade issues and establishment of new consulates therefore, leading these two states ahead with technology diplomacy. Notably, mutual interdependence has to be fulfilled by consolidating bilateral relations where India cannot fulfil its potential without a closer partnership with the US, especially in the high-tech sector, and the US cannot hope to ensure a multi-polar Asia without a robust relationship with a strong and resilient India.

India, on the other hand, is the world’s most populous democracy and a credible voice of the Global South. Presumably, India’s posture toward global and regional trade has left India on the outside looking in as the regional trade landscape has transformed during Modi’s tenure. His government’s most troubling decision, out of fear of Chinese goods flooding the Indian market, was to withdraw from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was finalized in November 2020. India may never have been ready to be a part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) trade agreement, the highest-standard Asia-Pacific trade pact and the third largest in the world. And despite its prior interest, India has been on the outside of the most inclusive Asia-Pacific trade forum in the region – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) bloc that aims to enhance regional economic integration through consensus. It is pertinent to observe the geopolitical context of ties, where a shared sense of rivalry with China between New Delhi and Washington will create opportunities for closer bilateral ties, the economic challenges facing the United States and India in the Covid-19 era will create counter currents.

Finally, a Biden administration will be faced with a problem that the Trump administration neglected entirely – India’s growing democratic deficit. Two of the original justifications for the United States to actively support India’s rise – its economic promise and its shared values – are therefore in some doubt.

The United States should invite India to participate in the summit and encourage it to take on a leadership role to “renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the Free World.” India has much to offer the world. While differences exist on particular issues, the U.S.-India relationship is strong enough for the administration to navigate bilateral concerns while reasserting U.S. leadership in the defence of democracy and human rights on the world stage. However, this will not be possible until the United States and India address their significant differences in data governance. India has alarmed US technology and financial companies through some of its proposed rules on data localization and e-commerce as it is shaping its entire digital regulatory framework. Therefore, the Biden administration would be wise to institute a bilateral dialogue track focused on digital cooperation, to identify shared standards for cross-border data flows.

Some differences over the nature of the current global order, which resists genuine reform of multilateral institutions, need not come in the way of a deeper partnership. The fact is, neither India nor the US can take the other for granted. Both countries must make continuous efforts to improve ties, as in any relationship. Paradoxically, the continuity in India-US partnership of convenience unravelled in recent years, but only after China became the world’s second-largest economic and military power. Notably, the two had no shared values, and it hardly mattered to either side. The close partnership between a democratic India and a democratic US is far more sustainable in the long run.

Trouble in Niger

By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Niger: source Internet

Introduction

A military coup and ousting of democratically elected Niger President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, created a crisis in this West African nation. The crisis has created a truly geopolitical moment for intra-African politics and opened the door for external powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of  Africa. The coup has created a tumultuous order in the country, and the use of force to remove Niger’s military Junta could spark a refugee crisis and regional war. Such instability and panic in Niger could expand in its neighbouring countries impacting most global power’s strategic interests, financial stake and role of their military presence in the country and the West African region. Niger is a landlocked country that sits on a large reserve of uranium and oil and continues to be a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) whose economy continues to depend upon subsistence agriculture and the export of raw commodities. Such an economic state and the impact of the coup could only result in a rise of the refugee crisis and bloodshed in Niger.

The nation has witnessed coups and political crises since its independence from France in 1960, and the victory of President Mohamed Bazoum on April 2, 2021 became Niger’s first President to witness a democratic transfer of power since its independence. West looked Niger as a bulwark to stop the spread of Islamist insurgency, disorder and spread of Russian influence in West Africa, hosting the US and French military bases. Post-coup, the military Junta ended such military cooperation and agreements with France and the US, increasing the scope and presence of Russian influence in Niger. The ongoing instability, violence and disorder in Mali, Burkina Faso and Libya will impact Niger’s border areas, impacting its security and stability, with spillover from such nations in Niger becoming another challenge for the Junta.

The Coup and its Impact

Considering Niger’s long history of instability, violence and infighting, the 2010 Constitution approved through referendum restored civilian rule in the country. As Niger has witnessed two failed coup attempts in 2015 and 2021, victory of President Bazoum in April 2021 was viewed as a landmark in Niger’s history, witnessing its first peaceful transition of power since 1960. Leader of the Presidential Guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, also known as Omar Tchiani removed President Bazoum, becoming the latest coup in Niger’s history. The event has pushed Niger into another tumultuous period and is at a critical juncture to act upon carefully.

The name of Omar Tchianai and his role emerged in a past military coup. He labelled the Bazoum government responsible for the deteriorating bad governance and was dissatisfied with the government’s inability to handle national security matters. Meanwhile, the growing role of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali pushed France to reduce its diplomatic presence and military role under the UN-led MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali. It allowed President Bazoum to welcome France under its renewed strategy to create a buffer between Niger and other West African nations against the Islamist state and Al-Qaeda’s destabilising effect. However, ousting of President Bazoum has tempered such partnership and fight against Islamist insurgency.

Post-ousting, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a group of 15 West African countries, came into action to take necessary military action against the Junta government and impose sanctions against Niger’s Junta to bring peace and restore democracy in Niger. Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu, who is also the Chairman of the ECOWAS, argues that any interference in the democratic governance and ill-treatment of ousted President Bazoum will not be accepted by the leadership of the body. A military response from ECOWAS against Junta remains an option at a time when the US is praising Tinubu’s leadership and emphasises that they support ECOWAS’s response and action to restore constitutional order in Niger. However, the prosecution of President Bazoum will push the bloc to take stringent means as severe financial transactions, closing the border and stopping electricity supplies and Niger’s imports.

As General Tchiani argues, he has evidence to back his claim to prosecute the ousted President Bazoum for high treason who has undermined the country’s internal and external security. Mixed signals are coming from Niamey, Niger’s capital, concerning Tchiani’s stance, saying it had learned of the threats with stupefaction. Such stance represents another form of provocation as ECOWAS argues it contradicts the report of the Junta’s willingness to restore constitutional order through peaceful means. On the other hand, the African Union (AU), on Tchiani’s defiant stance, argues that diplomacy is the viable solution to such a crisis and has called for better treatment of oust President Bazoum.

President Bazoum’s ouster, who witnessed two coups before, coupled with the military takeover in Mali and Burkina Faso has unleashed a shockwave in West Africa, disturbing peace and stability in the Western African region. As the ECOWAS has approved the deployment of standby forces to restore constitutional order in Niger as a hard means to compel the Military Junta to restore democracy in the country. Meanwhile, Tinubu argues that a military takeover of a government is no longer acceptable in Africa, and all options are being considered with the use of force as a last resort.

The Great Power’s Geopolitics in Niger – Russia and the US

Niger has strategic significance for the US, Russia, Europe and China because of its vast reserves of uranium and oil, and viewed as a hub for foreign powers like the US and France, who have military bases in the country to fight against regional Islamist insurgency in the West African region. Since coup, western powers and many African governments have called for the release of detained President Bazoum and to bring back peace and democracy in Niger by Junta. With more African governments falling to the military coup and Niger being the latest victim, Africa and its vast, diverse and rich resources have transformed the continent into an arena of great power competition. The military coup in Niger has allowed the US to expand its influence and counter Russia and China’s reach and dominance in the continent.

Russia has warned any military intervention by the ECOWAS in Niger would only lead to a protracted confrontation destabilising the Sahel region – adjacent to Niger and Mali. With the Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin welcoming the military takeover in Niger and offering his services to Military Junta, the US blamed the group is taking advantage of the situation. As the US called Military Junta to step aside and restore the country’s democratic constitution; on the other hand, on the ground support for the military and Russia and its influence in the country is visible and alarming for the West. The support for Russia has surged in Niger since the coup, with Military Junta’s supporters waving Russian flags in rallies showing support to the military and Russia while calling France to disengage from the country.

However, whether it was Mali and Burkina Faso in the past or Niger today, such coups show the government’s inability to address the nation’s poor economic and social governance coupled with the threat of Islamist terrorism. Niger’s military close connection with the Russian through the sale of arms or relationship with the Wagner group is one example of Russia’s reach and influence in Niger. West and many scholars argue that from Sudan to Mali to Burkina Faso to Niger, such coups show a similar trend or resemblance of subversion of national government and Russian involvement. However, the second Russia-Africa summit held recently in July in St. Petersburg has strengthened the relationship between Africa and Russia and recognised the relevance of the Global South.

However, a rise in coups in Africa highlights Russia’s ambition and aggressive strategy in Africa. Recent coup in Niger helps to illustrate many issues in world politics, like the happenings in Africa are interconnected and are determined by the great power competition. As Niger Junta received support from Russia, the rise in Russian influence in Niger and Africa has worried the West. Firm support towards Russia in Niger allowed Russia to warn the US and French-backed ECOWAS from taking any military action against the Junta.

The Military Junta has taken an anti-West stand and is inching closer towards Russia, which is highlighted by locals waving Russian flags and showing support to the Junta in their anti-West protests and rallies. The military coup clarifies Russia’s instrument of power, tactics and goals for nations in Africa and explains why Russia didn’t disband the Wagner after their June mutiny, as they’re central to Russia’s global strategy. Despite the West’s superior aggregate power in all dimensions, they failed to develop an idea to have coordination between them to have a comprehensive strategy for Africa, as the West hasn’t appreciated the rising importance of African countries to the global contest which is underway today.

Conclusion

Concerning West’s role in African nations, it’s not too late to have a strategy to counter Russia and its Wagner group’s role, influence and relevance among the African people. The West needs to acknowledge Russia and Wagner’s popularity and support among many African nations can’t be matched and should counter it strategically. Considering the economic state of Niger or other HIPC nations in Africa, strategic investment and economic cooperation from the West is highly needed. Niger’s current state is a reflection and an alarm to West that they need to acknowledge the relevance of African nations and should widen their perspective when looking at African nations. The locals and external players and powers involved in Niger’s situation need to ensure the developments shouldn’t spill out and become a major issue engulfing and impacting other nations in West Africa. Thus, all channels and means must be used, from diplomacy to ensuring communication is established to deploying hard approaches to bring peace and constitutional order back in Niger.

Russia, USA and South Africa: New Equations in an Old Friendship

By: Sanoop Suresh, Research Analyst, GSDN

US and Russian flags and South Africa: source Internet

Pretoria’s backing for Moscow is distinctive in the global order, despite the nation’s meagre trade and cultural connections with the Kremlin. South Africa’s trade with Russia is the lowest among the BRIC nations, comprising only 2.29% of its trade with BRICS nations. Nevertheless, despite their claim of neutrality, South Africa and Russia have a friendly connection that dates back to the USSR, when Moscow decided to aid the anti-apartheid resistance of African people. When no one else was willing to do so, the Soviet Union gave the African National Congress (ANC), which is currently in power in South Africa, significant and essential military and financial assistance. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has highlighted the close relations between South Africa and Russia. With several African countries, South Africa also abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly to denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last October. South Africa’s relations with the US, another significant regional actor, were frequently strained due to Pretoria’s tilt towards Moscow. Both Russia and the United States seek to win over the so-called Global South by isolating their respective counterparts. Given the criticism Russia has gotten from other African countries, the Kremlin is especially keen to maintain good relations with South Africa.

Tensions between Russia and African Countries

The ties between Russia and the African nations became sour after Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine began in February 2022. Due to their reliance on those countries for agricultural supplies like wheat and sunflower oil, the developing countries of Africa were the accidental victims of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Over 70% of the world’s sunflower oil, as well as over a third of its wheat and barley, are exported by Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine produced food shortages around the world, especially in Africa, which sparked inflation and social unrest there and hampered the already fragile economies of these countries as they attempted to recover their position following the global epidemic. Despite Moscow’s desire to play a more significant role in the region, African countries are beginning to question the credibility of the Kremlin due to its misplaced priorities and broken promises.

Intending to become a significant force in the Global South, Russia used a variety of strategies, including their allies’ becoming adversaries like the Wagner Group, resulting from sanctions and isolation from much of the Western world. The second Russia-Africa summit, which came after the first one in 2019, was held in Johannesburg on July 27-28, 2023, to attract more allies among the African leaders. However, the conference caught attention for its underwhelming attendance, which signals that African leaders are possibly deserting the Kremlin. Despite the Kremlin’s diplomatic push in Africa, only 17 African leaders attended the Russia-Africa summit, which is fewer than half the number that participated in the previous one in 2019.

Africa’s mistrust of the Kremlin is primarily due to Moscow’s broken pledge to raise trade with the continent to US$ 40 billion annually. The Chinese activities in the African continent and the Western sanctions on Russia leave little space for a proactive role for Moscow. Nevertheless, the fallout of the Black Sea grain initiative between Ukraine and Russia regarding its export to the global market, is the pressing issue of the moment in the Russia-Africa relationship.

The UN initiative has two components. Firstly, it ensures that Russian food and fertiliser reach international markets to avert famine and reduce food insecurity worldwide. Secondly, it allows commercial food and fertiliser export, including ammonia, from three crucial Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea: Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi. The agreement, signed on July 27, 2022 is the most significant negotiation success the international community has achieved since the beginning of the war. Thirty-three million tonnes of grain departed Ukrainian ports in the year leading up to July, despite the stark lack of trust, which led to a drop in high grain prices globally. According to reports, low and middle-income countries profited more from this program. Moscow’s recent and unexpected withdrawal from this deal hampered these states’ expectations of the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, several African governments have reacted strongly to Russia’s withdrawal from the agreement. The head of Kenya’s foreign affairs ministry, Korir Sing’Oei, wrote in a tweet last week “The decision by Russia to exit the Black Sea grain initiative is a stab in the back at global food security prices and disproportionately impacts countries in the Horn of Africa already impacted by drought.”. Despite the anxiety in relations between Russia and Africa, as well as the disapproval of the West, the third-largest economy on the African continent continues to seek to maintain friendly ties with Moscow.

Complex ties between Moscow and Pretoria

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a signatory to the 1998 Rome Statute, South Africa must detain Putin and send him to The Hague. The Rome Statute calls for under Article 59.1, that “A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws and provisions.”. Since the summit is supposed to happen in August 2023, Pretoria is desperately seeking a way to avoid this commitment since the President of South Africa thinks that arresting the Russian President would be equivalent to a ‘declaration of war.’ This recent controversy surrounding Putin’s rumoured trip to South Africa to attend the BRICS meeting once again exposed the nuanced relationship between South Africa and Russia.

Although South Africa tries to be outspoken about its loyalty to non-alignment and peace efforts, Pretoria demonstrates a tilt toward Moscow by defying Western demands to isolate Russia. Most crucially, its inclination is not at all covert. In February 2023, the South African Navy participated in a 10-day naval drill with Russia and China. This practice occurred after South Africa abstained from a UN vote denouncing the invasion. Additionally, it declined to impose sanctions against Russia despite the Western push. High-level diplomatic missions sent by Pretoria to the Kremlin further fuelled doubts about South Africa’s purported neutrality.

Scholer claims multiple reasons for South Africa’s inclination to favour Moscow. First, the ANC wants to thank Moscow for supporting the anti-apartheid movement with crucial financial and strategic support when no one else was willing to do so. Second, Pretoria doesn’t want to maintain a hostile alliance with a superpower. Nonetheless, the fundamental driver for South Africa’s decision to preserve tight links with Africa is the belief that a multipolar world will give South Africa’s voice greater weight than a unipolar world. However, South Africa’s friendly relations with Russia cause rifts in its relations with the United States.

Unanswered questions on the US-South Africa Relationship

South Africa’s refusal to sever its links with Russia upset the West, especially Washington. Despite efforts on all sides to allay their fears, there has been little success. South Africa is an essential component of Washington’s strategic jigsaw puzzle because it makes up a vital buffer against the rising influence of Russia and China on the continent, which the U.S. cannot afford to lose. However, recent developments do not favour Washington.

In May 2023, Reuben Brigety, the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, accused South Africa of secretly shipping weapons to Russia via a cargo ship linked to a sanctioned Russian corporation. Washington accused Pretoria of arming Russia, which led to significant concerns about the country’s purported neutrality, and called for a redrawing of relations between the U.S. and S.A., which had severe ramifications. Due to South Africa’s allegedly “deepening military relationship” with Russia, several U.S. congressmen have demanded that the US-Africa trade meeting scheduled for later this year in South Africa should be held elsewhere.

Similarly, South Africa also faces the risk of losing the advantages of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gives exports from eligible nations preferential access to the U.S. market. In the first three months of this year, South Africa’s exports to the U.S. via AGOA totalled around US$ 1 billion, making it the second-biggest beneficiary of the program behind Nigeria. Removing these benefits would be disastrous for the nation.

Pretoria’s relationship with Washington will depend on how South Africa engages with Moscow in the future. As a result, South Africa will have to choose between the United States and Russia. Given its financial dependence on Washington, it is doubtful that South Africa will select Russia over the United States. If the Kremlin does not bridge the gaps between its interests and those of Africa, it risks increasing isolation. Because of these factors, South Africa and the African continent will likely play a prominent role in the great power struggle between Russia and the United States.  What will this power game do for the region is the crucial question. Time alone has the answer to that query.

NATO Summit in Lithuania: The Journey Ahead

By: Hitti Chopra, Research Analyst, GSDN

NATO Summit in Lithuania in June 2023: source Internet

The NATO members gathered at Lithuania on July 11-12, 2023 bringing the 31 allies together in Vilnius, which is just 20 miles from Belarus, a Russian ally. The meet was attended by anticipated member Sweden, newly acceded Finland, assorted non-NATO members and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky

North Atlantic Treaty, also known as Washington Treaty was formed in response to USSR Joseph Stalin’s attempt to bring states under communist rule. NATO considers Russia as a revisionist and belligerent power and their history is tied together since 1949. From the fall of Berlin wall in 1989 with 16 countries as members to collapse of USSR in the 1990s to leading to total up to 31 members, with Finland being the latest member onboard, NATO today has a total 31 members. The allied unity of NATO especially since Russia aggression against Ukraine is paving the way for the re-emergence of NATO which had lost its essence since 1990s.

The position on Ukraine’s admission in NATO was the key question at the summit and it was decided that the “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This position cogitates about the United States and its ally’s perspective to curtail any risk involving Russia accentuating the conflict in Ukraine and beyond. The NATO members came to a conclusion that not now, but sooner or later Ukraine will be a part of NATO, signalling a commitment, support which is a roadblock in Russia’s motive. Russia since the beginning has been a firm believer of curtailing the expansionist motive of NATO which has been exposed with Finland and Sweden now part of the US ally organization.

Turkey, initially was not in favour of Sweden accession in NATO, but the former agreed which can increase the obstacles for Russian government. For the longest period of time, Turkey was pro-Russia, but since the re-election of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader is on the move of mending ties with the West. Russia has criticized this twitch by Turkey and reportedly the country officials have been suggesting that Turkey is turning into an “unfriendly country.”

China has been independently supporting Russia against its war with Ukraine. From establishing parallel financial institutions to aid Russia, to strengthening its hegemony over regions considered a strategic monopoly of the West, like Taiwan, China has been assertive and focused on countering the rising American leadership precondition in global matters.

The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania was attended by global leaders like Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins of New Zealand, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, and President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea. The NATO summit in Madrid (2022) released its Strategic Concept which expressed and revealed the Chinese ambitions vis a vis Asia-Pacific- which is important for the NATO in an interconnected world.

The summit exhibited Joe Biden’s diplomatic strategy by partnering with those like-minded countries as it not only serves the purpose of countering China but at the same time it reflected the awareness of its European allies, highlighting that the security of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions are closely interconnected. The partnering of NATO with like-minded countries in the Chinese dominated areas like cyber defence, arms control, technology, hybrid threats, and climate change (which have been a challenge for the NATO member states initially) is in anti-Beijing interest. China expressed its concerns over the NATO summit being held at Lithuania by a warning “any act that jeopardises China’s legitimate rights and interests will be met with a resolute response.”

The presence of the West and its allies in Tokyo or Asia can be observed as a threat to the neutrality that is often preferred by small nation states as well as raises concerns over strategic interests for ASEAN and South Asian countries. The NATO plans and presence of its allies in regions which are in close proximity to China brings an echo of the Cold War bloc politics. The international treaties of the post-Cold War era need to cater to the global dynamics of the 21st century and its integral that it aligns and simulates with the realities of today.

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