By: Tanuja Baura, Research Analyst, GSDN

The world is entering a new decade, and one of the hot topic scholars discuss around the world is the future of China and its relations with other countries. Within the last twenty years, it considerably increased its influence in Cambodia beginning with the sphere of Foreign Direct Investment and military cooperation.

At least since the 13th century, relations between Cambodia and China have existed. Diplomatic ties between the two nations were however established as far back as July 19, 1958. From the immediate aftermath of the Cold War until now, China’s geopolitical interest in Cambodia has undergone almost dramatic turns. It still has a lot of influence, partly because it is close to the Chinese minority in Cambodia and the major government officials as well as the late King Norodom Sihanouk. There is usually at regular intervals high level consultations between the two countries. China has provided significant bilateral aid, and economic links have since continued to expand.

The two nations upgraded the bilateral relation to a comprehensive partnership of cooperation in 2006 and then further upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010 In April 2019, the two nations also signed an “Action Plan 2019-2023 on Building China-Cambodia Community of Shared Future”. Two countries agreed to implement 31 activities in five fields- political, security, economic, people-to-people contacts, and multilateral cooperation- based on action plan. However, the development agenda might have overshadowed their relations. Since the introduction of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in late 2013, China has increasingly become influential within the realm of Cambodia, in which development agenda is used as a primary tool.

Nowadays, the involvement of China in Cambodia is more than just economic influence. China’s interest also aims at seeking Beijing’s visions of international acceptance of China’s alternative, and sometimes competing, governance models, above the status quo, in the contemporary global order, which Cambodia is likely to be a recipient as well as a supporter.

Since the era of Xi Jinping as the President since 2013, China’s foreign policy has confidently been moving toward a more assertive role in international affairs. In its competitive game with the US, China also took efforts to present itself as a benevolent power both in the international and regional arenas. China has incrementally utilized economic statecraft and discursive power to engage other nations, especially in the Global South, by offering alternative concepts and structures for international relations. In Southeast Asia, Beijing found Phnom Penh to be a strong ally in receiving the benefits of and promoting normative and discursive powers.

The relations between China Cambodia can be categorized in two major periods: historical and contemporary. The historical period dates back to the formation of the Kingdom of Cambodia and functioned until the close of the 1950s. The beginning of the historical period is associated with the King Norodom Sihanouk’s quest for a neutral foreign policy following Cambodia’s independence from French control in 1953. However, in the early 1960s, when the Vietnam War had begun to extend into Cambodia, Sihanouk looked for support against U.S. and Western encroachments and aligned the country more with China, which had previously been passive.

As early as 1958, China was among the first countries to recognize Cambodia and provided active assistance to the regime of Sihanouk. Their friendship took on special significance is the King’s deposition in 1970 in a coup that was sponsored by the US. After the coup, China went on to provide aid to Sihanouk who had gone into exile and later allied with the Khmer Rouge instigating the civil war that engulfed Cambodia in 1975.

Ironically, China persevered as one of the supporters of the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) which was the height of genocidal killings in the history of the country and even helped China traced the world map back to those brutal years. In 1979, the year after the Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, drove out the Khmer Rouge and put in place a puppet government, China aided the anti-Vietnamese forces, further deepening their grip in Cambodia. According to some historians, the first organized embassy to travel to India, Thailand, and China was sent by the Khmer Empire around the eighth or ninth century AB.

Political and Diplomatic Relations

In recent years, Cambodia has also drifted closer to China politically. Under the rule of Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has ruled the country since 1985, Cambodia has adopted an eastern facing policy at the expense of western powers ignoring to mention the primary western democratic nations. Hun Sen’s government has, on many occasions, sought the intervention of foreign powers like China whenever there is a crisis more so when the relation between the government and the western countries has deteriorated.

For example, the country’s fall into the hands of international critics waged against its deteriorating level of democracy, flagrant violation of human rights and oppression of the political opponents brought China to come into the fray. In the year 2017 for example, Cambodia dissolves its main opposition party, the Cambodian National Rescue Party, the CNRP and crushes the independent journalists. The west notably the US and EU responded by sanctioning and cutting aid to the country. Contrarily, Chinese aid increased, with Hun Sen often lauding this aspect of China, its respect for non-interference in the internal politics of other countries.

This close political relationship was further forged in 2010 when the two countries proclaimed their bilateral relations as the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation.’ Since this date, high level meetings of Chinese and Cambodian leaders have become commonplace with an influx of Chinese leaders to Phnom Penh.

Relations between China, Cambodia and the Role of ASEAN

Cambodia is intricately related to the patterns of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region concerning geopolitics, which is especially true in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Cambodia has often been seasoned to act on various regional settlements including the South China Sea disputes to the cardinal determent position of East Asia on behalf of China.

Because of this, difficult relations have existed between Cambodia and the rest of the ASEAN members, in- particular with Vietnam and the Philippines more conciliating claims over the contested water regions, due to Cambodian opposition on various ASEAN propositions. This behaviour was the most notable in the assertion of Cambodia’s unengaged position as the ASEAN chair in 2012 in which it blocked a joint statement that sought to censure China regarding the South China Sea. Similar statements and behaviours were repeated the next years proving more firmly Cambodia’s pro-Beijing stance regarding region’s main power’s geopolitics.

Concerns in the US and the West

The growing relations of China and Cambodia have also elicited an uneasiness on the part of the Western powers especially the United States. There are reports that the United States has voiced its concern over the possibility of the establishment of military structures by Chinese authorities in Cambodia, especially at the Ream Naval Base located at the southern coast of Cambodia. Even if a number of officials from Cambodia and China claim the reports are baseless, aerial photos and news outlets have alleged that the Chinese have embarked on the renovation of the facilities located within the base.

Conceivably, the establishment of Chinese military installation in Cambodia will alter the dynamics within the region as China will have access to vital trade routes in the South China Sea. This scenario is bound to aggravate the current tension escalation with the China and the United States of America given that America sees South East Asia as a stronghold in the Indo-Pacific region.

Cambodia’s Role in Advancing China’s Global Initiatives

At present, the presence of China in Cambodia is not only limited to the economic engagements. Rather, it points to aspirations from Beijing to gain international sympathy for its methods of global governance and other ideas that may exist apart from the current world order with Cambodia being one potential supporter. China regards Cambodia as a strategic beleaguered area in South East so as to contain the empire; its relations with South China Sea claimants are not that cordial. Under Xi Jinping, who assumed office in 2013, there has been a clear turn in China’s foreign policy that made the country much more active in the world. In the contest with the US, for example, China has been eager to project itself as a benevolent empire both in an international context and in a regional one.

Engagement with other nations, especially the southern hemisphere nations, has been graduated to the use of economic statecraft as well as discursive power for presenting other ways and means of conducting international relations. In Southeast Asia, Beijing discovered that Phnom Penh was a beneficial partner in both reaping the offers from and enhancing China’s normative and discursive powers. This resulted to ‘ironclad friendship’ to be hailed by Cambodia making it a reliable partner for china on issues of paramount importance to the country.

While neighbouring Southeast Asian states continue to have a rather ambivalent and cautious stance about China’s initiatives, it is Cambodia that has pioneered support to many Chinese related global initiatives including the recent Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative as well as the Global Civilization Initiative. These are all initiatives aimed at helping China further assert its power on the global stage and not least become the primary shaper of the international order.

Conclusion

To summarize, in present times, the Cambodia-China relationship is more than a simple economic partnership; it can be considered a multi-dimensional partnership. This is an alliance forged out of history and advancing state interests, which has made it an essential part of China’s global ambitions.

From Cambodia’s perspective, such a partnership has some advantages; there is economic growth, improvement of infrastructure, and assistance in political sphere especially when the West is critical. Hence, Cambodia aids in the advancement of China’s aspirations in that region, especially in the sensitive zones such as the South China Sea and is also considered a team player in China’s quest to counter the prevailing systems of governance in all regions around the world.

By: Manoj Karki

The emergence of China as a global techno-security state has significantly reshaped the international geopolitical landscape. At the core of this transformation is China’s ability to integrate cutting-edge technology into its national security framework, creating a comprehensive strategy for both economic and military dominance. In his book Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State, Tai Ming Cheung provides an in-depth analysis of how China has successfully implemented its techno-security strategy under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Historical Context and the Foundations of the Techno-Security State

China’s journey toward becoming a techno-security state can be traced back to Mao Zedong’s era, with the ‘Two Bombs, One Satellite’ project that aimed to secure China’s technological self-sufficiency in nuclear and space technologies​. However, it was under Xi Jinping’s leadership that the techno-security state truly took shape. Xi inherited a robust national innovation framework from previous leaders but expanded its scope by prioritizing technological self-reliance in the context of national security​.

Xi’s leadership has been marked by several key strategies aimed at integrating innovation with security. One of these strategies is the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (IDDS), launched in 2013, which focuses on advancing China’s technological capabilities to maintain its global competitiveness and safeguard its national interests. Xi’s emphasis on innovation is not only about economic progress but is deeply linked to military and strategic goals. This dual-purpose innovation approach underlines the techno-security state model​.

Key Elements of the Chinese Techno-Security State

Cheung identifies four pillars that underpin China’s techno-security state: innovation-driven development, military-civil fusion (MCF), military modernization, and national security strategies.

Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (IDDS): The IDDS, as the cornerstone of Xi’s innovation policy, encourages the development of critical technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and defense technologies. Cheung argues that this strategy is designed to reduce China’s dependence on foreign technologies, particularly from the United States, and to position China as a leader in the global tech race​.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF): One of the most distinctive aspects of China’s techno-security state is its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, which integrates civilian industries with the military to enhance national security. Cheung emphasizes that this policy enables China to pool resources from its civilian sector to accelerate military advancements without the need for a traditional arms race​. MCF has allowed China to leverage innovations in civilian industries, such as telecommunications and aerospace, for military purposes. This integration has proved crucial in developing dual-use technologies, which serve both commercial and defense needs.

Military Modernization: Xi’s administration has invested heavily in modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), making it a key component of the techno-security state. Cheung notes that China’s military modernization goes beyond conventional arms development, focusing on high-tech capabilities such as cyber warfare, space technologies, and precision-guided weapons. This modernization effort is in line with China’s broader national security strategy, which views technological superiority as essential to maintaining global influence and securing its national interests.

National Security Strategy: China’s national security strategy under Xi has expanded to address both traditional and non-traditional threats. The establishment of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) in 2014 exemplifies the institutionalization of this broader security vision, which encompasses not only military threats but also economic and technological vulnerabilities​. Xi’s holistic approach to national security ensures that technological innovation is viewed as a critical asset for both economic stability and military preparedness.

Comparison with the United States

Cheung provides a comparative analysis of China’s techno-security state with the United States, particularly focusing on their divergent approaches to technological innovation and national security. While the U.S. relies on a market-driven model of innovation, China’s state-led approach allows for more rapid mobilization of resources. Cheung argues that China’s authoritarian governance structure, combined with the SAMI (Selective Authoritarian Mobilization and Innovation) model, gives it a strategic advantage in mobilizing technological resources for both civilian and military purposes​.

However, Cheung also highlights the risks associated with China’s model. The centralized control that enables rapid resource mobilization can also stifle innovation, as it limits private sector dynamism and may lead to inefficiencies in the long run. Moreover, international responses to China’s techno-security strategy, particularly from the U.S., have resulted in increased scrutiny and trade restrictions, potentially hindering China’s access to critical technologies​.

Implications for International Security

The rise of China’s techno-security state has profound implications for global security. Cheung argues that as China continues to close the technological gap with the West, it is likely to exert more influence over global governance, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity, AI regulation, and space technologies​. The integration of civilian and military sectors under MCF further complicates the international landscape, as technologies developed in one context can quickly be repurposed for military use.

Additionally, Cheung suggests that the techno-security competition between China and the U.S. is likely to intensify, with both countries vying for dominance in emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and advanced manufacturing​. This competition could lead to further geopolitical tensions, particularly as both nations seek to protect their technological advantages and influence global standards.

Conclusion

Tai Ming Cheung’s Innovate to Dominate provides a comprehensive and insightful analysis of China’s rise as a techno-security state. Through its emphasis on innovation-driven development, military-civil fusion, and national security, China has positioned itself as a formidable global power with the potential to challenge the United States’ technological supremacy. However, as Cheung notes, the sustainability of China’s model is not guaranteed. Internal challenges, such as bureaucratic inefficiencies and external pressures, may limit China’s ability to maintain its technological edge. Nonetheless, the rise of the Chinese techno-security state marks a significant shift in global power dynamics, with far-reaching implications for international security and governance.

By: Megha Mittal, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a crucial multilateral platform established in 2000 to formalize and strengthen the strategic partnership between China and African nations. It includes 53 African countries, with Eswatini being the only exception due to its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. FOCAC aims to promote collective dialogue and practical cooperation across various sectors, including politics, economics, culture, and social development, thereby addressing the diverse needs and aspirations of African nations.

FOCAC is structured around ministerial summits held every three years, alternating between China and an African host country. This format facilitates high-level discussions and agreements intended to deepen ties between China and Africa while reflecting the continent’s unique challenges and opportunities.

The 9th FOCAC Summit, held in Beijing from September 4-6, 2024, was conducted under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” This significant summit was attended by heads of state and ministers from 53 African nations, along with representatives from regional and international organizations, including the United Nations. Notably, this year’s gathering occurred against a complex geopolitical backdrop characterized by increasing tensions between China and the West, particularly in light of the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry and the global repercussions of the Ukraine crisis.

The importance of FOCAC cannot be overstated, as it serves as a critical framework for advancing China’s engagement in Africa, which has significant implications for the continent’s developmental trajectory. Through FOCAC, China has positioned itself as a key partner for African nations, offering investment, infrastructure development, and capacity-building initiatives. The summit also provides an opportunity for African leaders to engage in bilateral discussions on governance, industrialization, agricultural modernization, and enhanced cooperation through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

As FOCAC continues to evolve, it addresses the pressing challenges faced by African countries, including poverty alleviation, economic diversification, and sustainable development. This article analyses the key outcomes and implications of the 2024 FOCAC summit, exploring its impact on the future of China-Africa relations and the broader geopolitical context in which these dynamics unfold.

Historical Context of China-Africa Relations

The relationship between China and Africa has evolved significantly, shaped by political, economic, and social factors. Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Africa has been a focal point of China’s foreign policy, particularly during the Cold War era. China provided support for various African liberation movements, positioning itself as a champion of anti-colonial struggles. For most years since 1950, the Chinese foreign minister has prioritized visits to African nations, signalling the importance of this relationship.

In 1971, the votes of African nations were crucial in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) seat in the United Nations General Assembly, replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan). This diplomatic victory solidified China’s engagement with Africa, leading several nations to shift their recognition to the PRC. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, and Senegal recognized the PRC, while Eswatini remains the only African nation to recognize Taiwan as of 2023.

China’s “Going Out” strategy in 1999 marked a new wave of economic engagement with Africa, promoting overseas investments by Chinese firms. This strategy led to infrastructure projects and resource extraction initiatives that transformed the economic landscape of several African nations. The establishment of FOCAC in 2000 further institutionalized this relationship, facilitating dialogue and cooperation across various sectors.

The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 signalled a strategic shift toward enhancing trade and infrastructure development across the continent. However, Chinese investment peaked around 2016 and subsequently declined due to domestic priorities in China and the repayment challenges faced by some African nations.

While China presents its investments as mutually beneficial partnerships, Western critics often frame it as “debt trap diplomacy,” suggesting that China’s loans can lead African nations into unsustainable debt. Nevertheless, many African countries have managed to create realistic debt arrangements with China, emphasizing the importance of responsible financial management.

China’s military engagement in Africa includes establishing its first overseas military base in Djibouti, strategically located near a U.S. military base. This move reflects China’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa and highlights its focus on regional security, including combating piracy and ensuring the safety of Chinese nationals abroad.

Recognizing that China’s approach to Africa has evolved since the Cold War is crucial. While it no longer seeks to export communist ideology, China maintains formal ties with various political parties and parliaments across the continent, adapting its strategy to fit the contemporary political landscape.

Significance of the 2024 FOCAC Summit

The 9th FOCAC summit occurs against a complex backdrop of global economic and geopolitical dynamics. As African nations grapple with high inflation, currency depreciation, and escalating debt, recent conflicts including the Israel-Hamas war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict complicate the geopolitical landscape, affecting African economies and international cooperation.

African leaders are expressing “summit fatigue” after engaging in numerous Africa+1 summits with countries like Türkiye, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. This sentiment emphasizes the need for a focused agenda, with suggestions to adopt the Banjul format involving 15 countries plus the African Union Commission for better management and representation. The effectiveness of FOCAC hinges on Africa’s ability to assert ownership over its strategic planning, moving away from being passive recipients of foreign assistance.

Economic Dynamics and China’s Approach

The significance of the 2024 FOCAC is amplified by China’s current economic situation. Post-pandemic, China faces a prolonged economic slowdown, with manufacturing struggles leading to deflationary pressures and rising unemployment. Reports indicate that President Xi Jinping is inclined to shift investments away from large-scale infrastructure projects toward “small and beautiful projects.” This approach aligns with China’s desire to promote advanced green technologies.

Amidst concerns about loan defaults—highlighted by Zambia’s and Ghana’s recent struggles African nations are expected to seek increased lending from China, despite the noticeable decline in Chinese financial support over the past few years. From a peak of approximately US$ 28 billion in 2016, Chinese lending to Africa plummeted to around US$ 1 billion in 2022 and increased slightly to US$ 4.6 billion in 2023. Countries like Kenya are pursuing funding for vital infrastructure projects, such as completing the Standard Gauge Railway to Uganda, despite their significant debts to China.

Key Outcomes of the 9th FOCAC Summit

The 2024 FOCAC summit yielded several significant outcomes, emphasizing the evolving dynamics of China-Africa relations:

1. Financial Commitments: China pledged approximately US$ 50.9 billion in financial support over the next three years, categorized into credit, development assistance, and investments by Chinese companies in Africa. This commitment aims to enhance infrastructure, technological innovation, and industrialization efforts across the continent.
2. Partnership Action Initiatives: The summit announced the implementation of ten partnership action initiatives, focusing on areas such as agriculture, infrastructure, green development, and health. These initiatives are designed to foster sustainable development and improve the overall quality of life for African nations, while also addressing climate change challenges.
3. Debt Relief and Sustainability: Acknowledging the rising external debt levels faced by African countries, Chinese leaders discussed strategies for debt relief and sustainable financial solutions. This includes considering more favourable lending terms and encouraging transparent dialogues on debt management, thereby supporting African nations in achieving economic stability.
4. Trade and Investment Cooperation: The summit reinforced the commitment to expanding trade between China and Africa, aiming to increase bilateral trade volumes to US$ 300 billion by 2026. This goal reflects China’s intent to diversify its imports from Africa, seeking not only raw materials but also processed goods, which could benefit African economies.
5. Cultural and Educational Exchanges: The summit emphasized the importance of cultural and educational exchanges, promoting people-to-people connections between China and Africa. Initiatives such as scholarship programs and training workshops for African professionals in various fields aim to foster mutual understanding and cooperation.
6. Health Cooperation: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the summit highlighted enhanced cooperation in health sectors, including vaccine distribution, healthcare infrastructure development, and disease prevention initiatives. China committed to providing additional resources to bolster Africa’s health systems.
7. Green Development Initiatives: Addressing the pressing issue of climate change, China announced plans to support African nations in transitioning to green energy. Investments in renewable energy projects and technologies are expected to play a crucial role in achieving sustainable development goals across the continent.
8. Infrastructure Development: Infrastructure remains a priority in the China-Africa partnership, with commitments to enhance transportation networks, energy systems, and digital connectivity. Projects aimed at improving logistics and trade facilitation are expected to create jobs and boost economic growth.
9. Regional Stability and Security: The summit underscored the need for collaborative efforts in promoting regional stability and security, particularly in addressing conflicts and fostering peace building initiatives. China reiterated its support for African-led solutions to security challenges on the continent.
10. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Integration: The discussions at the summit reaffirmed the alignment of FOCAC initiatives with the Belt and Road Initiative. This integration aims to enhance infrastructure connectivity, facilitate trade, and promote economic development across Africa, positioning the continent as a key partner in global supply chains.

Strategic Messaging and Future Implications

China’s messaging at the summit underscores its status as a developing nation, aligning itself with African countries against historical injustices linked to Western imperialism. This narrative resonates well with African leaders, potentially solidifying bilateral relationships.

However, while the 2024 FOCAC presents an opportunity for enhanced cooperation, there remain concerns regarding the implementation of initiatives and transparency in dealings. The anticipated outcomes may not fully address African nations’ demands for fair resource extraction deals and equitable trade balances, suggesting that negotiations around mineral exports will continue to be a critical area of focus.

The Interdependence of China and Africa: A Mutual Need

The relationship between China and Africa is increasingly characterized by mutual dependence, with both parties standing to gain significantly from their cooperation. China has become a major trading partner and source of investment for Africa, with trade between the two regions soaring to US$ 167 billion by mid-2024. African countries are eager to expand their exports beyond raw materials, while China seeks to enhance its economic prospects amid a post-pandemic slowdown and demographic challenges.

China’s investments in African infrastructure have significantly improved connectivity and quality of life across the continent. Projects in transportation, energy, and technology are vital for Africa’s development, particularly in sectors such as healthcare and renewable energy. Conversely, Africa’s growing markets offer China new avenues for its goods and services, especially as Chinese manufacturers face increased costs domestically. This shared interest in economic growth underscores the necessity of their partnership.

With China holding approximately 12% of Africa’s public and private debt, there exists a pressing need for dialogue on debt management. African nations are concerned about debt sustainability, prompting them to seek more favourable lending terms and transparency. China’s willingness to engage on these issues is crucial for maintaining its influence and fostering goodwill.

Additionally, China’s expertise in technology and industrialization has proven beneficial to Africa, particularly in digital infrastructure and renewable energy. As African countries modernize their economies, China’s role as a partner in technological advancement will likely continue to grow.

Conclusion

The 9th FOCAC summit marks a pivotal moment in the evolution of China-Africa relations. As both parties navigate complex geopolitical dynamics and economic challenges, their partnership is increasingly characterized by mutual dependency and shared aspirations. While the key outcomes of the summit reflect a commitment to sustainable development, economic diversification, and strategic collaboration, the effectiveness of these initiatives will ultimately depend on their implementation and the willingness of both sides to address existing disparities.

In the context of shifting global power dynamics, FOCAC presents an opportunity for African nations to assert their agency in international relations while capitalizing on China’s growing influence. As they move forward, the potential for a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future hinge on their ability to cultivate a partnership rooted in equality, transparency, and mutual benefit.

By: Utkarsh Ajay Ingale & Leivon Victor Lamkang

The Horn of Africa nation, Somalia, gained independence from the British Protectorate in the 1960s and was subject to military control thereafter. However, when President Mohammed Siad Barre was toppled in 1991, the military dictatorship came to an end. It was followed by a civil war between various factions. Many terrorist outfits moved into the area, taking advantage of the civil unrest. Several well-known ones are the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS), an affiliate of ISIS, and Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda.

Various reports in recent times indicate that the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has emerged as a financial hub for Islamic states. The primary methods used to obtain these earnings are extortion and using illegal activities to capitalise on the unrest in the region. Moreover, ISS has become global over the past three years, with cases of channelling money across continents. They have emerged as a major financial hub for financing terrorism throughout Africa and worldwide, with instances of transferring money to branches throughout Africa and reportedly even as far as Afghanistan.

Historical Context of ISS in Somalia

The Al-Shahaab group, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, saw several defections that resulted in the formation of the Islamic State of Somalia in 2015. Notable individuals such as Mohammad Makkawi Ibrahim, Hussein Abdi Gedi, Bashir Au Numan and other al-Shabaab commanders from the south defected. But Al-Shabaab swiftly stopped this expansion.

Later, in October 2015, the defection of Mumin, a well-known Al-Shabaab ideologue, and a small number of his soldiers gave the ISS a steady development. Mumin is regarded as one of the important members of the ISS worldwide leadership today. Under his leadership, ISS took control of the northern port town of Qandala in 2016. The organisation was extended and designated as an official province of the Islamic State later in 2017.

Today, the group’s primary base is in the Bari region of Puntland’s northeastern mountains, where it faces competition with Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, Somaliland has become a new recruitment hotspot in the region as a result of its connections to traffickers. The group has grown over time to become a crucial part of the Islamic State’s network, majorly through the collection and financing of the terror activities of Islamic States.

Key Sources of Financing

The ISS has sustained itself through diverse and well-coordinated financing mechanisms, taking advantage of regional instability and economic vulnerabilities. Abdeweli Mohammad Yusuf, the finance officer of ISS, has played a vital role in raising funds for the organisation, which has now become a hub for disbursing funds and providing guidance to other IS affiliates across the continent. ISS generates revenue of more than hundreds of thousands of dollars per month through extortion of financial institutions, mobile money service providers, and other local businesses in Port Basaso in the Bari region of Somalia. In the first half of 2022, ISS yielded nearly US$ 2 million by collecting extortion payments from local businesses related to imports, livestock, and agriculture.

Additionally, in the Puntland region, it has generated funds through exporting businesses in the seaport city of Basaso by exporting small quantities of gold mined in Bari, amassing around US$ 6 million from 2022 till now. The organisation is also involved in illicit charcoal trade, a critical commodity in Somalia. Despite an international ban, the trade has generated millions, with ISS benefiting by taxing smugglers at checkpoints who transport coal to Gulf countries.

Moreover, ISS is also benefiting from foreign donations, mainly from sympathizers in the Middle East and North Africa. ISS has received donations via cash transfers and money laundering through businesses, hawala, banks, and mobile money transfers within Somalia. A report published by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime in 2020 highlighted how Somalia remains a hotspot for terror financing in Africa through Hawala Channels. Therefore, despite global efforts to curb terror financing, ISS has demonstrated an ability to adapt and diversify its financial portfolio and emerged as a focal point of the terror financing network in Africa.

Terror Financing Networks in Africa

Due to its excellent fundraising skills, ISS plays a crucial role as a financer to the Islamic State’s more comprehensive African network, despite its limited territorial reach and operational capabilities.

In 2020, the Islamic State reoriented its strategy for Africa by establishing the Al Karrar office in Puntland, Somalia, to coordinate operations in Africa. Al Karrar’s office became a hub for conducting and guiding operations of the Islamic state throughout the continent. Under Al Karrar’s office, ISS became responsible for collecting and distributing funds to various IS affiliate groups in Africa. The funds are further employed to sponsor various terror activities in other regions, such as Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province and the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where IS affiliates have carried out insurgencies.

Moreover, ISS’s financial reach extends beyond Africa. According to the International Crisis Groups report, ISS Somalia has managed to funnel money from its core region in Africa to far-afield groups such as the Islamic State of Khorasan Province in Afghanistan. This case highlights the strategic shift by Islamic states, where they leverage local affiliates to expand and finance their operations into new regions such as Africa and Afghanistan.

Consequences for Africa’s Security

Terror financing poses a significant threat to the internal security and domestic stability of many African states. The funds generated are used to sponsor various terror activities, which further exacerbate regional conflicts.

ISS supports insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where more than 4000 people have been killed since 2017. IS Somalia has financially backed local IS affiliates, such as the Islamic State of Central Africa province, to carry out violent operations in the region. This insurgency has also hindered Mozambique’s critical Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects, halting regional development activities.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), various IS affiliate groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), are conducting violent attacks. In 2023 alone, the ADF is responsible for the deaths of more than 1000 people in the region. The influx of money from Somalia has allowed these groups to expand their operations and worsen the humanitarian crisis in the region. The flow of funds within these networks sustains long-term terror operations and becomes a significant threat to the domestic stability and national security of states in Africa and beyond.

International Response and Challenges

This growing threat of the ISS has been a matter of concern for the International community. To curtail this growth, efforts have been made by different states. For instance, the US Military, in particular, has conducted air strikes targeting ISS militants. The US has also been working closely with regional forces like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its successor, The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

Further, sanctions and financial restrictions to disrupt the ISS funding and supply lines, as well as various intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation initiatives, have also been put into effort by international actors like the United Nations and the African Union.

However, these efforts to tackle ISS are faced with challenges like the disputes between Mogadishu and authorities in Puntland over power and resources in the region. Leading to disruption of sharing of intelligence and lack of development of joint strategies of ISS extortion rackets and other illicit activities. Due to these factors, ISS remains a dangerous actor in Somalia, competing for influence with Al-Shabaab in the region.

Conclusion

The African Continent is becoming the new theatre of terrorism due to the emergence of terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Somalia, in recent years. The terror financing by ISS is becoming a significant threat to the regional security and stability in the region. ISS operates through intricate financial networks to fund terror activities across the continent and beyond. The expanding influence of ISS draws attention to the problems of regional instability and poor governance. Addressing this impending threat would require increased international coordination, better local government, and robust multilateral initiatives to stop the continent from becoming even more unstable.

By: Srijan Sharma & Prakrat Gupta

The colossal intelligence management failures of Mossad on October 07, 2023 when Hamas launched its largest attack on Israel, plunged the Middle East into a protracted and escalating conflict. This setback, which left Israel’s intelligence agency in a precarious position, has now been transformed into a story of redemption and revival. Mossad’s resurgence is a testament to the agency’s ability to reassess its strategies and pivot towards the Octopus Strategy, a precision-based approach that has dealt significant blows to the Axis of Resistance.

Mossad’s Failure

Israel had been caught off guard vis-à-vis Hamas, something which brings back the memories of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Then, too, Israel failed to rightly assess its opponents’ intentions.

Although tensions between the two countries had been rising to that point, Israel did not expect Egypt and Syria to launch an attack on October 6, 1973. The Mossad had not been left completely without warning, however. At almost the last moment, a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel” communicated that Egypt and Syria were about to launch an offensive. However, the Mossad ignored the information as it ran counter to its assessment of Egypt. The institute did not believe that Egypt could attack Israel because it thought it did not possess the necessary technology to counter Israeli airpower. They were wrong. Egypt was able to carry out a compelling and complex offensive against Israel using Soviet SAM-6 missiles for air defence.

The 1973 failure contributed to the fall of Golda Meir’s government and the sacking of its military intelligence chief, Eli Ziera after the Agranant Commission investigated the failure of Israel’s defence forces and intelligence.

A close examination of Mossad’s intelligence misses shows that, then as well as now, the real problem in Israel’s famed intelligence agency does not lie in intelligence gathering or awareness of the threat; the real problem lies in the assessment and feedback part, which is an integral part of the intelligence cycle.

Nations often pay a heavy price for biased or half-baked assessments and underestimated feedback. Israel falters, not in raw intelligence but in intelligence management, either by assessing intelligence through a prejudiced or biased perspective or by underestimating the policy response warranted by the intel in hand.

Although we cannot say so with certainty, Mossad may well have received some prior intelligence on the October 7 attack. Still, they underestimated Hamas’s capability of carrying out a well-coordinated three-pronged attack. Four possible reasons why they thought this is:

1-Overconfidence in Israel’s technology—Iron Dome, border security, surveillance capabilities, etc.

2-Normalization of ties between Israel and Arab nations, which perhaps led Mossad to believe that the situation with Palestine, too, was thawing.

3-Divided Israeli attention in the West Bank and domestic politics. Israel feared that the recent surge in unrest in the West Bank would lead to widespread violence. Israeli citizens, too, were restless. Security establishments were therefore focused on the West Bank and domestic fronts and distracted from Gaza.

Iran’s nuclear obsession kept Mossad under the impression that Iran would not wish to stir the pot because it was engaged in delicate negotiations regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action via backchannels with the US. Israel might have been under the valid impression that Iran would not sabotage the nuclear deal by encouraging an offensive action by its ally Hamas, at least for a time. At the time, Iran was lowering the pace of its nuclear stockpiling. The action of lowering stockpiling can be seen as a deception to shift Mossad’s attention and make them believe that Iran was still vigorously pursuing the deal via backchannels. If, as per some reports, Iran was behind the attack, it succeeded in carrying out a covert proxy attack where Iran could exercise clean deniability and play safe. Even if not, the appearance of detente may have contributed to catching Israel off guard.

As strategic affairs expert and national security analyst Praveen Swami notes, “successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.” This statement underscores the crucial role of continuous innovation and adaptability in shaping effective war strategies, a point that the audience should feel is urgent and essential.

Learning From Failures and Mossad’s Comeback

After failure to pre-empt and prevent the 7^th October attacks, Mossad must have gone in introspection and taken a few lessons, which they took fifty-one years back in 1973, where they nearly missed intelligence. The Commission, which investigated this failure, recommended organisational changes in Mossad, but most importantly, Mossad established an analytical capability to challenge the military intelligence assessments. Mossad failed then because their feedback loop was closed and not expansive, and the agency’s inconsistency in analytic objectivity.

In 1973, Mossad believed that Arabs were weak and wouldn’t attack Israel; this same assessment, at least to some extent, prevailed last year when Mossad thought that Hamas would not execute such a significant attack.  The rigidity in the evaluation and of diversifying its assessment led to the intertwining of fatalistic intelligence approaches and security policies where Israel’s Mossad was to some extent convinced that Arabs would not attack them as they are weak and prospects of war were relatively weak; however, to their shock, 1973 war happened.  The Thumb rule of intelligence assessment says that produced intelligence must run from analysis, free from prejudices and bias. In contrast, Mossad’s strong objectivity, which lacked analysis and sometimes ran into prejudices, caused Mossad to make wrong estimations.

The then chief of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, described Israeli views of the Arabs succinctly: “We scorned them,” and thus, the intelligence process and the policy process became a “cross-fertilisation breeding disaster.  In simple words, Mossad didn’t scrutinise the intent and capacity. It picturised a superficial assessment of the enemy, which has a high possibility of being untrue.

Mossad’s core problem was hinted at by the Aghat Commission, which pointed out the agency’s failed assessments. However, this issue was far from solved. Mossad again came into a tight spot after its failure in the 1982 Lebanon Invasion, when the agency encountered a complex intelligence assessment.

The 1982 Failure

In 1982, Mossad and the top echelons of the Israeli security establishment believed that a short war with Lebanon against the Palestinian resistance movement led by Yasser Afarat could alter the balance of power in favour of Israel, for which Israel used the attack on the Israeli ambassador, in London as a critical reason to invade Lebanon.

Mossad believed that on the ground, their right-wing Christian ally-Phalangists (Kateeb Party), who are anti-Palestine and want to drive them out, would support them with on-ground intelligence and combat support. Therefore, Mossad began operational engagements with Phalangists; the agency further believed that strengthening right-wing Christians would help them to establish a pro-Israel government in Lebanon. Mossad strengthened them, but the agency over-relied on their assessments and advocated for them. The agency was not able to assess that these right-wing Christians have extremists face as well, which can backfire and damage Israel’s position both operationally and diplomatically. These right wings carried out brutal  Sabra and Shatila massacres, killing Palestine civilians and Shia Muslims. This incident significantly contributed to Israel’s withdrawal from the war, leading to the secret rise of Hezbollah.

Kahan Commission sat to inquiry this massacre, which held Israel as indirectly responsible. However, Mossad was not reprimanded, but Israeli Defence Minister Sharon dismissed as “personal responsibility” for “ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge” and “not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed”—Sharon’s negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which had come under Israeli control.

As for Mossad, the then Director Nahum Admoni put it succinctly: “Mossad tried to the best of its ability to present and approach the subject (of intelligence on Lebanon) as objectively as possible; but since it was in charge of the contacts, I accept as an assumption that subjective and not only objective relations also emerged. The Director acknowledged that subjectivity existed, but the agency preferred objectivity, which led to the limited assessment of right-wing Christian behaviour and the consequences of deploying them in refugee camps, showing the glaring error in Mossad’s assessment yet again.

Fixing The Error and Octopus Strategy

Mossad seems to have gradually fixed its assessment errors by bringing a broad view of its intelligence assessment without prejudices. The successful execution of the targeted assassination of Hams and Hezbollah top leadership and the preparation to handle escalations show three critical improvements in the agency.

1. Mossad is considering various dynamics and pre-strike assessments, which were limited earlier

• Giving space for more subjectivity and less rigid objectivity, carefully reading the balance of power instead of acting hastily.

• Following the Octopus strategy of carrying out precise strikes against high-profile targets means going for the head and not for Octopus tentacles, showing operational and strategic patience.

As Mossad redeems its agency’s image and rebuilds Israe’s strategic power steering in the complex dynamic of power balance, the agency must realise that it must continue intelligence flexibility with an analytic-objective approach to reimagine its dominance in the Middle East security and strategic dynamics.

By: Paarvana Sree, Research Analyst, GSDN

China’s nuclear weapons have been playing a significant role in its national strategy. We can see that China’s nuclear doctrine has a very strong continuity. China has also made readjustments in its nuclear doctrine by taking into consideration the changes in the external and internal environment and its strategic threat perception. We can see that China’s nuclear programme has devolved from anti-nuclear blackmail to the policy of minimum deterrence. The five major part of China’s nuclear doctrine are policy of nuclear declaration, nuclear development, nuclear deployment, nuclear employment and nuclear disarmament. China’s nuclear doctrine has its own characteristics as China is faced with a different situation and has its own strategic culture. China’s nuclear doctrine is linked with national development strategy, national security strategy, National defense policy and that of military strategy of China.

Brief history of China’s nuclear programme

Mao Zedong, China’s founding father believed that it was conventional weapons that would play a greater role in war than the nuclear weapons. When China’s nuclear programme began in 1950s China always wanted to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. When China was working on modernizing the People’s Liberation Army which began in 1955, it was asserted that strategies for evolving a scientific base for China which was a mile stone in country’s nuclearisation which began in 1964. The emphasis for developing a nuclear weapon arsenal took place when United States tried to deter China’s involvement in Korean War. Many of the political leaders in China advanced for ‘master atomic energy’. This ultimately led to the development of China’s nuclear program which was consolidated with the aid from technological transfer agreements it signed with Soviet Union. Soviet Union assistance was indeed vital for China’s build of nuclear capabilities. Soviet Union gave  military and technical assistance for China and provided an experimental reactor and uranium processing units.

China remarked that the acquisition of nuclear weapon was the best way to attain military supremacy in the bipolar world which was governed by the two hegemons at that time the USA and USSR. China also viewed nuclear weapons as a stronger defence strategy to avoid potential threats from the US and USSR. China’s nuclear relationship with USSR was however strained because of the ideological differences between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev. Soviet Union withdrew its technical assistance for China because of the growing dissatisfaction it had with China. The attack by Chinese forces on the Soviet soldiers on Zhenbao Island on Ussuri River further aggravated the tensions. China saw this as a deterrence measure against the Soviet aggression. Even though the relationship between China and Soviet Union ended, China continued its development of nuclear weapons and consequently held the first nuclear test on October 16, 1964 at Lop Nor site, detonating a Uranium 235 fashion device. China then became the fifth nuclear state in the world.

Key developments in China’s nuclear programme

1. Hypersonic weapons:

China is one of the nations to develop hypersonic weapon system. There are two types of hypersonic missiles. One is hypersonic glide vehicle and the other is hypersonic cruise missile. China had been experimenting the test of DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle since 2014. China built its first hypersonic wind tunnel in 2013. In 2023 it finished the construction of JF-22 hyper velocity wind tunnels. China also deployed its DF-17 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a hypersonic light vehicle as a payload in 2020. DF-17 can carry either conventional or nuclear payload and has a range between 1800 and 2500 km. Besides developing hypersonic glide vehicles, China is testing hypersonic cruise missile that use scramjet technology. The China academy of aerospace aerodynamics conducted the test of Den Xing Kong-2 (Stray Sky 2) wave rider hypersonic flight vehicles in August 2018.

• Fractional orbital bombardment system ( FOBS)

The test for FOBS took place in August 2021 and in this a nuclear capable hypersonic missile was sent into an orbit and deorbited to achieve the target. The distance covered was 40000 km with a flight time of 100 + minutes. This was not a new technique as this technique was used by Soviet Union during the Cold War period. What is new with China is that China used  it with hypersonic glide vehicle. China is using these to escalate the formidable missile defence system of US.

• Increased nuclear arsenal

The Stockholm International Peace Research (SIPRI) reports that China has a stockpile of 500 nuclear warheads. By 2030 it may be increased to 1000 war heads says the US Department of Defence. China is building missile silos since 2021 in the north western desert of the country. This report expects that China has about 400 ICBMs in its inventory. China is going on with its construction in Lop Nor, the nuclear testing site. China also increased its production of plutonium through the efficient reactors. All this points out to the fact that China is going into a nuclear arms race with USA and Russia.

• Nuclear posture debate

The US Department of Defence says that China is now adopting the low posture called an early warning counter strike which was different from past. This enables China to launch a nuclear attack even when there is a suspicion of incoming missile. In such a situation China will launch an attack even though it had not hit the nuclear territory. These changed postures thus reveal a degree of aggression in Chinese nuclear planning.

Overall strategy and doctrine

China always maintained the policy of No First Use (NFU) and followed the policy of credible minimum deterrence following the 1964 nuclear test. China always followed the policy which emphasizes importance of second strike survivability of its nuclear weapons. In

this way we can view that the primary aim in modernizing and expanding the nuclear weapon arsenal is to maintain its position in global affairs and to build credible minimum deterrence from other states.

China is primarily concerned by its position in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is also to be noted that China is having a friendly relation with Pakistan in the transfer of nuclear technology, uranium mining and nuclear fuel supply. China also provides Pakistan the support to set up research reactors. Presently China’s nuclear doctrine consists of five elements-nuclear declaration, development, deployment, employment and disarmament. China replicated its support for nuclear disarmament while maintaining the importance of having an effective nuclear arsenal with a strategic second strike capability. The white papers published by China in 2019 reveal a detailed picture of China’s military and PLA strategies and very little about its nuclear weapon program. If it is true this means that China’s nuclear program is evolving around the surrounding geopolitical circumstances and countries threat perceptions. The white paper report of 2019 declared that China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country and keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. China also maintained the importance of defensive nuclear capabilities as the primary aim of its nuclear program. It also maintained complete and total nuclear disarmament as its priority and the goal of its nuclear strategy

Implications for India

Even though both India and China are nuclear weapons state they have certain implications for each other. China’s build-up of nuclear stockpile had been a major factor for India’s nuclear weapon program in the context of border dispute which occurred in 1962 and China’s nuclear test in 1964.

Both India and China apply the principle of NFU and credible minimum deterrence and follow the policy of escalation which deals with nuclear threats. Both states argue that their nuclear weapons will play a decisive role in military conflicts between them. India’s nuclear strategy dealt with Pakistan and while that of China is pointed at the US. This had been highlighted by 1993 and 1996 peace agreements along the India-China border highlighting the need for confidence building. Military modernization of China is largely playing a role in India’s own modernization efforts as the need for deterrence paves way for greater tensions. China does not see India as a potential rival discounting India’s nuclear capabilities. The growing Pakistan-China relationship is a vital factor in India’s perception of China and its nuclear program. While framing India’s security architecture they take into account India’s unresolved border issues with Pakistan and China which plays a greater role in the nuclear domain.

Conclusion

China’s efforts to improve its nuclear capabilities have received the attention of stakeholders who are involved in global conversations dealing with nuclear weapons and disarmament.

China’s goal to modernize its military and nuclear capabilities is mainly aimed at establishing the supremacy in world order. The US and its larger nuclear arsenal is a greater threat to China. Thus, in order to overcome potential risk China pursued the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. North Korea’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and breakdown of international agreements like INF paved the way for China’s disinterest in engaging in disarmament with the USA. The China’s nuclear program will definitely play a tense role in the current nuclear world and whether global disarmament could become a reality, remains unachievable as on date.

By: Anuraag Khaund

On September 18-19, 2024, two days before the fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit hosted by the US in Wilmington, Delaware, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister (PM) Alexei Overchuk had led a high level delegation to Pakistan, holding meetings with PM Shehbaz Sharif, President Asif Ali Zardari and with Deputy PM/ Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar. While the visit by the Russian Deputy PM was a normal occurrence in light of the burgeoning Russia- Pakistan relations in recent years especially areas such as trade, energy, defence cooperation and connectivity, what stood out during the visit was Moscow’s declaration of support, albeit conditional, for Pakistan’s membership into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) forum. This move precedes the invitation extended to Islamabad to join the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) extended by President Vladimir Putin to Islamabad during the former’s State of the Union address to Pakistan last year. Such moves have raised concerns whether the above actions are aimed at expressing Russian displeasure over the growing strategic convergence between India and the West, especially the US.

Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, following the dictum of strategic-autonomy and multi-alignment, India has maintained a balanced position by maintaining its traditional ties with Russia while also increasing its convergence with the West. This was highlighted in the Indo- Russian summit of July 2024 between PM Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin which saw the strengthening of cooperation in areas such as Arctic and Far East, INSTC and the Chennai Vladivostok Maritime Corridor. At the same time, the August 2024 visit taken by the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to the US saw the signing of Security of Supply Chain Agreement (SOSA) and the Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Assignment of Liasion Officers which ensures the ‘provision of reciprocal priority support in goods and services vital for national defence in order to mitigate unanticipated supply chain risks’ and the posting of Indian Armed Forces officers in key strategic US Commands. However, the maintenance of diplomatic balance by New Delhi has not been taken kindly by its partners, such as the US which has often expressed its disdain over India’s maintenance of neutrality over Russia in Ukraine and the continued engagement with Moscow. But now, in addition to the above, there might now emerge a similar pressure from Russia expressing displeasure over India’s bonhomie with the US.

The aforementioned invitation to Pakistan to join the INSTC which was reiterated again by Deputy PM Overchuk in the joint press conference with his Pakistani counterpart Dar would prove to be detrimental to India’s interest. The main purpose behind New Delhi’s interest and active participation in the INSTC was the need to find an alternative pathway to access and tap the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) bypassing the obstruction posed by the geographic location as well as the political stubbornness of Pakistan. Bolstering Indian participation in the INSTC is the recent Indo- Iranian agreement on Chabahar port which stipulates Indian operation as well as investment in the equipment of the Shahid Behesti terminal of the port. Any possible Pakistani participation would not only provide Islamabad the opportunity to stymie Indian connectivity interests to Central Asia by leveraging its geographical position along the route but also affect Chabahar’s prospects through competition with the port of Gwadar along Pakistan’s Makran coast.

In the same press conference, in answer to a question, Overchuk also mentioned about the possibility of linking the INSTC with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China. Such a linkage would inevitably involve the flagship project of the BRI−the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting the port of Gwadar with the town of Kashgar in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. The above possibility will be detrimental to Indian interests as it would be counterproductive to New Delhi’s core vision of the INSTC being an alternative/ competitor to the BRI. In addition, the inclusion of CPEC− accused of blatantly violating Indian territorial integrity and sovereignty− into the  INSTC connectivity project initiated by India (along with Russia and Iran) at the first place would be a geopolitical and strategic irony and could be interpreted by both Beijing and Islamabad as New Delhi’s acquiescence of CPEC and by extension, the Sino-Pakistani position on Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir  (POJK).

Moreover, the joining of the INSTC and the BRI/ CPEC would also allow Pakistan to pursue its plan of linking Chabahar and Gwadar as ‘sister ports’ which was first envisaged in 2016 and even received support from China. In the backdrop of the growing strategic convergence between Iran and China as well as Tehran’s  increasing dependence on Beijing in the face of Western sanctions, China is well positioned to bolster efforts towards synergising the ports of Gwadar and Chabahar through its influence over both Tehran and Islamabad. Coupled with the Chinese penetration in Bandar Abbas, a greater Chinese influence over Chabahar and Gwadar would provide it with strategic leverage over the critical Straits of Hormuz chokepoint. Most importantly, this linkage would fly in the face of Indian strategic interests and aspirations of developing Chabahar not only as a gateway to Central Asia but also an alternative and attractive transhipment hub vis-a vis Gwadar.

The other significant development of seismic potentiality was the support extended by Moscow to Pakistan’s membership bid for the BRICS. This should be seen in the light of the recent expansion of the BRICS membership last year which saw the inclusion of five new members− Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Ethiopia as well as the interest expressed by 33 other countries to join the grouping. From the Pakistani perspective, membership into BRICS would not only come with economic benefits such as access to investment and the New Development Bank (NDB) but also an increased international profile and prestige. But from the Indian viewpoint, inclusion of Pakistan would affect the nature of the BRICS from a geoeconomic grouping to a geopolitical one  and even add to the pro- Chinese tilt of the platform. The possible transformation of the BRICS into a pro-Chinese club should also be seen in the fact that in the same press conference, Overchuk referred to BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as ‘brotherly organisations’− the SCO being a platform where India’s strategic space is outmanoeuvred by Chinese clout.    

Both the above moves by Russia, which have adverse implications for India, can be seen as subtle moves on the part of Moscow expressing its displeasure over New Delhi’s increasing convergence and alignment with the West, especially the US and in forums such as QUAD. This is particularly in areas such as defence cooperation where Russia has traditionally enjoyed a dominant space with India. Some experts also suggest that the displeasure might also stem from PM Modi’s visit to Ukraine ; the focus on New Dehi-Kyiv defence cooperation have also raised eyebrows. Most significantly, reports of Indian ammunition being used in the Ukrainian offensive against Russia and alleged Indian ignorance of the same despite Moscow’s protests have also contributed to annoyance with India.

Yet, not all is lost in the Indo-Russian Druzba-Dosti (Friendship in Russian and Hindi respectively). This can be witnessed in the tampering down of the stated Russian support to Pakistan’s bid with Overchuk’s emphasis on ‘consensus’ (within the BRICS members) and ‘due process’ on inclusion of due process. This toning down of the statement could be seen as a signal allaying Indian concerns while reference to the intra-BRICS discussions based on ‘equality, mutual respect, and consensus’ as well as the ‘special brotherly relationship’ between the ‘sovereign and free BRICS nations’ by Overchuk could be seen as hinting towards the importance attached by Moscow to its strategic partnerships with the other members especially India. This could be seen as Russian exercise of its own ‘strategic autonomy’ vis – a vis New Delhi and Islamabad.

The above exercise of strategic autonomy by Moscow could be further corroborated by the Russian expression of support to India and Brazil’s bid for permanent membership at the UN Security Council by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the recent 79^th UN General Assembly. Despite its outreach to Pakistan, Russia would not risk to alienate an ally as vital as India whose continued support and engagement, especially its oil and defence imports  has helped Moscow sustain its economy in these trying times.  Moreover, the importance of India’s current weight in the international system as well as its ability to act as a bridge or peacemaker with the West is also not lost on Moscow.

Yet, a close listening of Overchuk’s answers during the press conference would reveal that while addressing the question regarding Pakistan’s BRICS membership, the Russian Deputy PM began answering it by outlining the brief history of the grouping as initially comprised of four nations with South Africa joining it later. However, while mentioning the initial four countries of Brazil, Russia, and China, somehow India does not find mention in the statement. Perhaps a slip of tongue on the part of Overchuk or a deliberate and overt sign of Russian annoyance?  

Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy.  His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com

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