This article mainly focuses on how US-India relations will impact under newly elected President Donald Trump as USA’s 47th President. It has a potential of redefining bilateral relations and how it is affecting India defense partnerships and geopolitical relations. With Donald Trump securing a second term as President of the United States, the 2024 election marks his second successful presidential run after securing the presidency in 2016 and serving as the 45th president of the United States from 2017 to 2021.
Defense and Strategic Effects
Trump’s administration elevated the U.S.-India relationship to a “comprehensive strategic threat,” encouraging a coalition global strategic partnership. India is a vital member of the QUAD alliance, and the cooperation will probably concentrate on increasing defense, intelligence sharing, and military presence in the area. Trump’s administration was the first to label China as a “to counter Beijing’s influence”, including the formation of the Quad in 2017. India, which shares 3,488 km of disputed border with China, enhances US-India defense cooperation, especially in countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Trump administration prioritized enhancing defense ties with India, viewing India as a key partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Trump’s rhetoric toward Pakistan was often harsh, as he accused the country of harboring terrorists and providing support to militant groups that destabilized Afghanistan and India as Pakistan is a central player of terrorism.
Under Trump, U.S.-India defense relations were significantly strengthened, with agreements like the COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) and LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), facilitating better interoperability and defense cooperation. A return to the presidency could lead to continued or even enhanced military collaboration.
Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI)
India’s booming digital economy and growing demand for data storage have attracted significant foreign investment in data centers and cloud infrastructure. Global giants like Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Oracle have committed to expanding their cloud and data center operations in India.
Indian government’s push for digital transformation, coupled with a large tech talent pool, is positioning India as a key player in AI, machine learning, and robotics. Investments from both Western and Asian companies are increasing in this space.
FPIs are foreign entities or individuals investing in assets that are relatively liquid and easily tradeable, such as equities and bonds, typically with shorter investment horizons than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which involves long-term business commitments.
Both the US and Indian IT sectors stand to gain from increased IT investments. However, offshoring might face challenges if Trump encourages more jobs in the US. A cut in corporate tax by Trump is likely to bring more business for the Indian tech companies.
Under Trump’s first term, IT companies grew at a CAGR of 13% during 2016-2020 and the IT index generated a return of 45% despite challenges on visa and offshoring.
How Trump 2.0 will impact his branded homes in India?
The first Trump Tower in India was unveiled in 2014 in Mumbai and was developed through licensing agreements with Lodha Group. Through Licensing agreements with various developers, Trump Towers came up in Mumbai (Lodha), Pune (Panchshil Developer), Gurugram in NCR and in Kolkata.
Tribeca Developers is the Trump’s Organizations’ exclusive Indian partner, founded by Kalpesh Mehta. Initially, the going for Trump Tower projects in India were slow and Mehta could license the brand only to Lodha in Mumbai and Panchshil in Pune. In 2018, Trump Tower with 250 units was launched in Gurugram and another with 136 units was launched in Kolkata. Trump Towers have also been planned in Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Chennai.
How much are they priced at?
The Trump branded houses are priced in the range of ₹5-15 crore per apartment. The demand for such Uber-luxury homes is going up significantly in India. Across Trump projects in the country, over 600 super luxury homes have been sold with a total combined revenue of more ₹5000-₹6000 crores.
Military exercise between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Sea of Oman in October 2024 marks a new development in the Middle East geopolitics. A rivalry, for long, exists between Saudi Arabia and Iran driven by difference in ideology, sectarian affiliations, and geopolitical influence. Their competition expressed through proxy wars and diplomatic standoffs is evident over the Yemen conflict, Syrian war, and the war in Iraq. However, the military exercises in 2023 are of great symbolic importance and potential change in regional dynamics. This article outlines implications of such exercises with respect to historical context, geopolitical implications, impacts on regional conflicts, and broader implications for global security.
Historical Context of Saudi-Iran Relations
For many decades, Iran held an animosity against Saudi Arabia so deeply rooted and much of it is based on political and religious differences. The Islamic Revolution, held in 1979 in Iran, heightened the animosity to a great extent by implementing Iran’s theocracy within its borders. Especially as it concerned the government of Iran’s backing of Shia militias and political organizations in the area, both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi rebels in Yemen-whose members were a minority, Sunni in Saudi, the conflict with Saudi Arabia flared over the area.
The two most significant theaters of this struggle have been Yemen and Syria. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. In Syria, the two nations have taken diametrically opposing positions during the civil war—Saudi Arabia has supported opposition groups against Assad’s regime, while Iran has backed Assad. These conflicts have deepened the sectarian divide and significantly contributed to the longstanding hostility between these two regional powers.
Despite all these tensions, in 2023, there was this great breakthrough in the diplomatic front between Saudi Arabia and Iran led by China. It followed a military drill that showed the end of one and the beginning of another phase in that relationship.
Strategic Implication of such an event for Saudi Arabia
This would, in itself, be of major strategic implications for Saudi Arabia, as this would mark a shift in its foreign policy and regional strategy. Traditionally, Saudi security was so closely tied to its alliance with the United States because the latter provided it with military support against Iranian aggression. However, following the decline of U.S. influence in the region, the Kingdom has sought to diversify its alliances.
This is because Saudi Arabia is forced to reposition itself with the growing security threat from Iran and its allies, which include Houthi rebels in Yemen and Iranian militias in Iraq. Military cooperation with Iran allows Saudi Arabia to improve its security without having a heavy dependence on the United States and at the same time aligning itself with the greater strategy of balancing relations with Western powers and new emerging global players like China and Russia.
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint of the world oil trade, thereby worrying for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The two would approach this through military exercises strengthening security, which could go on to stabilize global energy markets as important to their economies. The exercises may mark a new page for more cooperative approaches to security in the Gulf, which will calm high tensions that may impact the volume of crude exported at a time when prices were rising.
Implications to Iran
This is the opportunity for military exercises with Saudi Arabia for Iran: as a tool of regional hegemony and to show the power. Iran has already employed proxy forces in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and militia forces of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to expand its power around its region. The military drill with Saudi is just one way that the Iranian regime can parade its strength while utilizing its regional context. This simultaneously signals a pragmatic approach to resolving longstanding tensions between two antagonists.
But maybe, the timing could be important for Iran, too. For the past few years, it has been a favorite punching bag in the West on nuclear activities and as an accomplice of terrorists. Exercises may finally turn out to be an instrument of its attempts to raise its international respectability and also showcase it as a willing player on the security table with the regional opponents. This may make the country let go of its disruptor image and be a more responsible player in the geopolitics of the Middle East.
Internally, it may serve as an instrument for the consolidation of political support in demonstrating that the regime can ensure its security and enhance stability in the region. Success in cooperating with Saudi Arabia will give legitimacy both nationally and internationally to the Iranian government.
Regional Conflicts Consequences
Military relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will most likely seriously impact the already existing regional conflicts, primarily in Yemen and Syria. This war has been said to be one of the worst humanitarian crises around the world by some experts. Indeed, this is one of the major flashpoints between both the Saudi and Iranian camps. The Saudi Arabian state led a military coup into the Iran-backed Houthi rebels and had devastating effects on all sides. These military exercises may facilitate demilitarization, as both the parties would look forward to a political solution from the crisis.
Although a quick peace deal seems not to be in the pipeline, military exercises show both Iran and Saudi Arabia are in the mood to negotiate it. Cooling of the two can even pave the way to a ceasefire, which may, at least, soothe Yemen’s civilians. This deal may also represent a paradigm shift, regionally, as countries try to build on areas of conflict rather than sectarian identities.
Military exercises may be opening the doors of dialogue in Syria, that country which has been divided by sides supported by Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran has taken the side of Assad’s regime, while Saudi Arabia supports groups opposing the regime. It is still complicated to come up with a solution for the Syrian war, but increasing cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran may present opportunities for joint cooperation toward stabilizing the country by discussing sectarian divisions and supporting political reconciliation.
Global Security Implications
This has very significant global security implications of Saudi-Iran military drills outside of the Middle East. The Gulf region constitutes a major reserve in terms of size, in terms of oil. Whichever party is favored then has an immense economic implication for the rest of the world since their tiffs tend to have a bearing on the Strait of Hormuz.
This can lead to the safer region, which will stabilize eventually the world’s oil supply through a safe region. Moreover, if it becomes clear that the middle ground tension will gradually relax in time between Iran and Saudi Arabia, then the possibility of conflict in the Gulf could potentially subside so as not to risk an outright disruption to shipping of oil. The region, therefore, counts to most of the countries as energy plays an indispensable role in its economy.
China and Russia, therefore, complicated this scenario even much since there is growing power within the Middle East. The two nations have even tried forming new allegiances with both Saudi and Iran as the alternative route to garner their support. Military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and embracing China and Russia can be regarded as a sign of the multi-polar world order that is emerging in the Middle East. The United States’ influence in this region would be derailed, and this would affect American foreign policy for many decades to come.
This could have security implications far, as improved cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in reducing tension would eventually make both states work on more common security issues at a regional level, like how to counter terrorism and improve security and consolidate war-ridden states. Both may soon bring about an improved safer Middle East after eliminating all these common dangers by terrorists like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) whose strengths continue to grow.
Saudi-Iran 2024 war exercises are a turning point of the political game of the Middle East. For several decades, the two states have been in mutual competition. But lately, they have started to cooperate militarily. This may be a herald of an imminent shift of regional strategies and alliances. These exercises are an effort at a reassessment on the part of Saudi Arabia concerning its foreign policy and security agenda in reducing the country’s dependence on America and increasing its influence in this region. For Iran, military exercise is a way to flex muscle, gain international prestige and boost internal legitimacy.
Maybe one day, that future may finally appear in this region between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The region maybe more stabilized and there can be possible cooperation along with long term peace deals being made with those fighting regions. However the way to achieving durable peace will not be well known but global super powers participating in that conflict will largely determine that result.
Conclusion
The 2024 Saudi Arabia-Iran military exercises marked the dawn of a new chapter in Middle East geopolitics. Since it is traditionally a place with sharp ideological divisions and proxy conflicts, cooperation-oriented military exercises do hint that it’s open to sharing some of its collective pains and solutions through mutual and frank communication. The possibility of de-escalation in Yemen and Syria, combined with a strengthening regional stability, would open the way for more durable peace in the Gulf. On the global level, this cooperation strengthens energy security and signals a trend toward a multi-polar regional order. While there are significant challenges still ahead, these exercises underline the potential for transformation that diplomacy has to bring about stability and alter alliances.
On November 08, 2024 Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed two acts viz. Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and Philippine Maritime Zones Act. While the former complements both the maritime and aerial policy, the latter defines the extent of Manila’s maritime entitlements and fully declares its metes and bounds in accordance with International Maritime Law, UNCLOS. Beijing responded to this using its ‘lawfare strategy’ by releasing another set of maps claiming the Scarborough Shoal and a statement that Manila sought to justify its illegal claims in the name of implementing UNCLOS.
The South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as one of the most contentious maritime dominions in the contemporary epoch, wherein multifarious sovereign entities vie for territorial sovereignty and nautical prerogatives. The Philippines archipelago finds itself ensconced at the nexus of this geopolitical maelstrom, confronting the formidable imperative of safeguarding its maritime territories against China’s imperious territorial postulations and expansionist maritime behaviour vis-à-vis virtually all claimants in the SCS.
Manila’s strategic methodology in countervailing China’s sweeping maritime assertions has concentrated on the metamorphosis of its indigenous defense apparatus, the exploitation of supranational juridical instruments, and the innovative Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) as a sophisticated riposte to Beijing’s territorial provocations. Notwithstanding substantial augmentation through internal balancing by Manila, circumnavigating Beijing’s influence in the SCS necessitates an incremental, multifaceted stratagem that mandates both the aegis of preeminent global powers and the prescriptive multilateral framework of ASEAN.
Unveiling the Veiled: Three Pivotal Events
While perusing the chronological trajectory of this contentious region, three seminal occurrences illuminate the labyrinthine complexities and multifaceted ramifications of this geopolitical conflagration. The manifestation of increasingly bellicose Chinese maritime territorial assertions in the SCS, particularly in the Spratly archipelago and Scarborough Shoal, demarcated an epochal watershed moment. First, is the 1995 Chinese Occupation of Mischief Reef in the SCS territorial disputes, which marked a critical escalation of China’s maritime assertiveness towards the Philippines. Located in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines’ claimed exclusive economic zone, Mischief Reef was initially discovered with wooden structures that China claimed were shelters for fishermen. However, the Philippine government quickly recognised these as strategic military installations.
Second, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff which represented a dramatic and tense maritime confrontation that significantly transformed Philippines-China relations. This standoff was particularly significant as it represented a clear demonstration of China’s maritime coercion strategy, utilising maritime militia, coast guard, and naval assets to assert territorial claims. The Philippines found itself strategically outmanoeuvred, unable to prevent China’s de facto control of the disputed maritime territory, following which Beijing has maintained a persistent presence in the area, effectively controlling this precious real estate. Third, notwithstanding these claims, the 2016 landmark arbitration case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 UNCLOS) emerged as a groundbreaking legal challenge to China’s maritime claims, a comprehensive ruling that was unprecedented in international maritime law. The court’s ruling categorically rejected China’s historical claims and represented a significant diplomatic and legal victory for the Philippines.
Treading the Eggshells: The Philippines’ Strategy
First, the Philippines has adopted a diplomatic balancing strategy, this strategy represents a delicate navigation between confrontation and cooperation, leveraging multiple diplomatic channels to create a comprehensive security framework. The cornerstone of this diplomatic approach is the strategic alliance with the United States, which has been systematically strengthened since the early 2010s. The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014 symbolises this deepening partnership, allowing increased US military presence in Philippine bases and providing critical security guarantees. Moreover, in June 2023 also, defence leaders from the United States, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines convened, strengthening a collaborative regional group informally called the “Squad” by Pentagon officials.
This quadrilateral partnership represents one of Washington’s strategic efforts to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence. Second, within ASEAN’s diplomatic framework too, the Philippines has emerged as a proactive diplomatic actor, leveraging multilateral mechanisms to internationalise the SCS dispute. Rather than pursuing a unilateral confrontational approach, the country has consistently sought collective regional responses to maritime tensions. This strategy involves building consensus among ASEAN members, promoting dialogue-based conflict resolution, and presenting a united regional perspective on maritime disputes. By advocating for a collective ASEAN approach, the Philippines transforms a bilateral dispute into a broader regional security concern, thereby increasing diplomatic pressure on China and preventing potential isolated confrontations.
Further, the Philippines has also adopted a military modernisation program which represents a critical strategic response to the evolving maritime security challenges in the SCS, driven by the urgent need to develop credible defence capabilities against potential regional threats. Initiated through the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernisation Act in 2013, the program aims to comprehensively transform the country’s military from a decades-old, poorly equipped force to a modern, technologically advanced defensive apparatus. The Philippine government has allocated substantial resources to this program. From 2013 to 2028, the modernisation program is set to invest approximately US$ 5.4 billion in military asset acquisition and technological upgrade. Third, is the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept which has emerged as a sophisticated strategic response to maritime challenges, integrating multiple dimensions of national security.
Developed by Philippine military strategists, CADC represents an innovative approach to territorial defence that goes beyond traditional military strategies and cumulatively focuses on resource exploitation. However, Prof Renato Cruz De Castro argues that, “The United States and Australia stand out as the most capable and willing security partners in assisting the Philippines in developing its capabilities to transform the CADC into a viable defense strategy. ” Thus, CADC requires multilayered support of actors involved in the region. Yet, the strategic posture of Manila remains defensive, which potentially allows China to maintain the initiative in maritime confrontations. This reactive stance might inadvertently legitimise incremental Chinese territorial encroachments.
In response to Beijing’s persistent and escalating aggression, it is imperative for Manila to recalibrate the strategic imagination and cumulatively orchestrate existing plans into praxis. This, however, would depend on continued strategic innovation, international cooperation, and maintaining a balanced yet assertive approach to territorial integrity.
Agriculture, a cornerstone of India’s economy, is increasingly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. This article examines the multifaceted impacts of climate change on Indian agriculture, focusing on changes in crop yields, cropping patterns, and water resources. It highlights the socio-economic consequences for farming communities, including income instability and migration. Through detailed case studies of Punjab, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan, the article illustrates the diverse challenges and adaptive strategies employed by farmers. It also evaluates government initiatives like the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana and the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture. The article underscores the need for comprehensive policy measures to enhance climate resilience, such as sustainable water management, investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, and integration of climate considerations into agricultural policies. Recommendations for future research emphasize the development of region-specific adaptation strategies and the importance of collaboration among stakeholders. This analysis aims to inform policymakers, researchers, and practitioners about effective strategies to mitigate the impacts of climate change on agriculture, ensuring the sustainability and productivity of this vital sector in India.
Introduction
Agriculture forms the backbone of India’s economy, intricately linked to the livelihoods of more than half of its population. This sector is not only pivotal for ensuring food security but also contributes significantly to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and rural employment. According to the Economic Survey of India (2020-21), agriculture and allied sectors accounted for 17.8% of the national GDP, underscoring its critical role in economic stability and growth (Government of India, 2021).
However, the increasing threat of climate change poses a substantial risk to agricultural sustainability and productivity. Climate change is evidenced by rising temperatures, altered precipitation patterns, and more frequent extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, and cyclones, which severely impact agricultural practices (IPCC, 2021). These climatic changes are projected to intensify, with average temperatures in India expected to rise by 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius by 2050, coupled with significant regional variations (World Bank, 2020).
The effects of these changes are multifaceted. For instance, higher temperatures can shorten the growing season for certain crops, affect flowering and fruiting, and increase the prevalence of pests and diseases. Studies have shown that wheat and rice, which are staple crops in India, are particularly vulnerable. A study by Aggarwal et al. (2019) indicated that a 1°C increase in temperature could reduce wheat yields by 6% and rice yields by up to 10%. Similarly, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has projected that climate change could reduce overall agricultural productivity in India by 15-25% by 2080 if adaptive measures are not taken (IFPRI, 2019).
Changes in rainfall patterns are another critical factor. The Indian monsoon, which is vital for rain-fed agriculture, has become increasingly erratic. The Ministry of Earth Sciences (2020) reported a trend of declining monsoon rainfall in eastern and central India, while some regions in the northwest have experienced excessive rainfall, leading to floods. These shifts not only disrupt the agricultural calendar but also exacerbate water scarcity, as seen in states like Punjab and Haryana, which rely heavily on groundwater for irrigation (Kaur & Singh, 2018).
The increased frequency of extreme weather events further compounds these issues. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) noted a significant rise in the incidence of extreme events such as heatwaves, cyclones, and heavy rainfall events, which have devastating impacts on crop yields and farming infrastructure (NDMA, 2020). For example, Cyclone Amphan in 2020 caused extensive damage to crops in West Bengal, affecting millions of farmers and leading to significant economic losses (Ghosh & Mukhopadhyay, 2021).
This article delves into the multifaceted effects of climate change on Indian agriculture, examining changes in crop yields, cropping patterns, and water resources. It highlights the socio-economic consequences for farming communities, including income instability and migration. Through detailed case studies from Punjab, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan, it illustrates the diverse challenges faced by farmers and the adaptive strategies they employ. Additionally, the article evaluates government initiatives such as the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY) and the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), assessing their effectiveness in enhancing climate resilience.
The Role of Agriculture in India’s Economy
Agriculture has long been integral to India’s socio-economic framework, sustaining the livelihoods of millions and shaping the nation’s cultural landscape. Historically, it has been the foundation of rural economies, serving as the primary source of income and employment. According to the Economic Survey of India (2020-21), agriculture and allied sectors contributed approximately 17.8% to the nation’s GDP, reflecting its substantial economic impact (Government of India, 2021). Employing nearly 60% of the rural workforce, agriculture is crucial for rural employment and livelihood security. It ensures food security, supports agro-industries, and contributes significantly to export revenues (FAO, 2020). The socio-cultural importance of agriculture in India is profound, with agricultural cycles dictating the timing of rural festivals and traditions (Singh & Singh, 2017). However, the sector’s heavy reliance on monsoon rains and traditional farming techniques makes it particularly vulnerable to climatic variations. The Indian monsoon, responsible for 70-80% of annual rainfall, is vital for crop success but has become increasingly unpredictable due to climate change, posing significant risks to agricultural activities (Ministry of Earth Sciences, 2020). In recent decades, Indian agriculture has faced challenges such as declining soil fertility, water scarcity, and population pressure. Intensive farming, excessive use of chemical fertilizers, and inadequate soil management have led to soil degradation, impacting crop productivity (ICAR, 2019). Water scarcity, particularly in regions like Punjab and Haryana, where groundwater depletion is severe, affects irrigation and agricultural productivity (Central Water Commission, 2019). Rapid population growth increases food demand, necessitating the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices (Chand & Singh, 2017). To address these challenges, it is imperative to adopt sustainable and resilient agricultural practices, such as crop diversification, conservation tillage, integrated pest management, and efficient water use (Rao et al., 2019). Government initiatives like the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY) and the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA) focus on promoting these practices (Government of India, 2020). In conclusion, while agriculture remains vital to India’s economy and socio-cultural identity, the threats from climate change necessitate a shift towards sustainable practices to ensure the sector’s sustainability and productivity, safeguarding livelihoods and food security for future generations.
Understanding Climate Change
Climate change refers to significant, long-term changes in global or regional climate patterns, largely driven by human activities such as deforestation, industrialization, and the burning of fossil fuels. The past century has seen a notable increase in global temperatures, resulting in altered weather patterns and a higher incidence of extreme weather events (IPCC, 2021).
India, with its diverse climate zones, has experienced significant climatic shifts in recent decades. Average temperatures have risen, monsoon patterns have become erratic, and extreme weather events like droughts, floods, and cyclones have increased in frequency (Ministry of Earth Sciences, 2020). These changes pose severe challenges to agriculture, a sector heavily dependent on stable climatic conditions.
Future projections indicate that India will continue to experience significant climate variability. By 2050, average temperatures in India are expected to increase by 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius, with significant regional variations. This warming is likely to exacerbate existing agricultural challenges and introduce new ones, making climate adaptation a critical priority for policymakers and farmers alike (World Bank, 2020).
Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture
Climate change exerts a multifaceted impact on Indian agriculture, affecting crop yields, cropping patterns, and overall agricultural productivity. Higher temperatures, altered precipitation patterns, and an increase in extreme weather events such as droughts and floods are some of the primary ways through which climate change disrupts agricultural activities.
Impact on Crop Yields
One of the most immediate effects of climate change is the alteration in crop yields. Higher temperatures can shorten the growing season for several crops, adversely affecting the processes of flowering and fruiting, and increasing the prevalence of pests and diseases. Research by Aggarwal et al. (2019) indicates that wheat and rice, two of India’s staple crops, have shown decreased yields in regions experiencing significant temperature increases. For instance, a study projected that a 1°C rise in temperature could reduce wheat yields by 6%, and rice yields by up to 10% (Lobell et al., 2012). Similarly, higher temperatures and increased CO2 levels can exacerbate the incidence of pests, further stressing crops (IPCC, 2021).
Shifts in Cropping Patterns
Climate change has also led to noticeable shifts in cropping patterns and agricultural zones. Changes in rainfall patterns and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events like droughts and floods have necessitated adjustments in crop choices and farming practices. Regions traditionally known for specific crops are witnessing shifts, forcing farmers to adapt by selecting more resilient crop varieties or altering their planting schedules. For example, farmers in Punjab and Haryana are moving away from water-intensive crops like rice to less water-dependent crops due to water scarcity exacerbated by erratic monsoon patterns (Kaur & Singh, 2018).
Water Resources and Soil Degradation
The increased frequency of droughts and floods has a profound impact on water resources and soil health. Water resources, crucial for irrigation, are under immense stress due to erratic rainfall and over-extraction of groundwater (Central Water Commission, 2019). The depletion of groundwater and the degradation of soil quality due to frequent floods and droughts significantly hamper agricultural productivity. Soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and salinization are some of the adverse effects of climate-induced extreme weather events on soil health (Rao et al., 2019).
Impact on Specific Crops
Rice and wheat, the primary staples of Indian diets, are particularly vulnerable to temperature variations. Research has shown that temperature increases not only reduce yields but also affect the quality of the produce. Sugarcane and cotton are also impacted by fluctuating water availability and increased pest infestations, affecting their growth cycles and productivity (Aggarwal et al., 2019). The increased occurrence of pests like the pink bollworm in cotton fields is linked to warmer temperatures and changing precipitation patterns (ICAR, 2019).
Socio-Economic Impacts
The socio-economic impacts of climate change on agriculture are significant. Farmers face reduced incomes, increased debts, and greater uncertainty about future yields. This economic strain often leads to distress migration, with many rural inhabitants moving to urban areas in search of better livelihoods. The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) reports that agricultural households in regions severely affected by climate change show higher rates of migration (NSSO, 2020). Additionally, the increased cost of adaptation measures, such as investing in irrigation infrastructure and adopting resilient crop varieties, places a financial burden on already strained rural economies. Studies indicate that small and marginal farmers are particularly vulnerable due to their limited financial capacity to invest in necessary adaptation strategies (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Adaptation Strategies in Indian Agriculture
The challenges posed by climate change to Indian agriculture are formidable, but farmers have shown considerable resilience through both traditional and modern adaptation strategies. Traditional practices, such as crop diversification, intercropping, and the use of drought-resistant crop varieties, play a crucial role in mitigating risks associated with climate variability. For instance, farmers in Rajasthan have long relied on traditional water harvesting techniques like tankas and johads to cope with water scarcity (Agarwal & Narain, 2020).
Advancements in agricultural technology and innovation have further bolstered the resilience of Indian agriculture. Precision farming, which involves the use of GPS and IoT technologies to optimize resource use and enhance productivity, is becoming increasingly prevalent. This method allows for more efficient use of water, fertilizers, and pesticides, thereby reducing costs and environmental impact (Jat et al., 2016). Additionally, the adoption of climate-resilient crop varieties, developed through advanced breeding techniques, has helped farmers maintain yields despite adverse weather conditions (ICAR, 2019).
The Indian government has been proactive in supporting these adaptation efforts. Key initiatives include the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY), which provides crop insurance to mitigate financial losses due to extreme weather events, and the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY), aimed at improving irrigation infrastructure (Government of India, 2020). The promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, such as organic farming and integrated pest management, is also part of the government’s strategy to reduce vulnerability to climate change.
Role of Technology and Innovation
Technological advancements have played a critical role in enhancing the resilience of Indian agriculture. The development of climate-resilient crop varieties, such as drought-tolerant rice and heat-resistant wheat, has been pivotal. These varieties have been developed through both traditional breeding methods and modern biotechnological approaches, ensuring that they can withstand the changing climatic conditions (Rao et al., 2019).
Improved irrigation techniques, particularly the adoption of micro-irrigation systems like drip and sprinkler irrigation, have significantly increased water use efficiency. These systems ensure that water is delivered directly to the root zone of plants, minimizing evaporation and runoff losses (Narayanamoorthy, 2009). Furthermore, mobile-based agricultural advisory services provide farmers with timely weather forecasts, pest and disease alerts, and farming advice, helping them make informed decisions (Rao et al., 2019).
Government Policies and Initiatives
The Indian government has implemented several policies to support farmers in adapting to climate change. The National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA) focuses on enhancing agricultural productivity through sustainable practices, including soil health management, efficient water use, and the promotion of organic farming (Government of India, 2019). The National Innovations in Climate Resilient Agriculture (NICRA) project, spearheaded by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), emphasizes research and development to improve the resilience of Indian agriculture to climatic stresses. This project encompasses the development of climate-resilient crop varieties, efficient water management practices, and the dissemination of climate-smart technologies to farmers (ICAR, 2019).
Challenges in Implementing Adaptation Strategies
Despite these efforts, significant challenges remain in implementing adaptation strategies. Limited access to technology and financial resources, particularly for small and marginal farmers, poses a major hurdle. Financial constraints often prevent farmers from investing in necessary adaptation measures such as improved irrigation systems or climate-resilient seeds (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Policy gaps and the lack of coordination between different government agencies also hinder the effective implementation of adaptation strategies. There is often a disconnect between policy formulation and on-the-ground realities, leading to inefficiencies in the delivery of support to farmers (Jha et al., 2019). Additionally, the lack of awareness and education among farmers about climate change and adaptation measures further complicates the issue. Many farmers are unaware of the benefits of climate-resilient practices or lack the technical knowledge to implement them effectively (Singh et al., 2020).
Detailed Case Studies
To comprehensively understand the impact of climate change on agriculture and the effectiveness of various adaptation strategies, it is essential to consider detailed case studies from different regions of India. These case studies illustrate both the challenges faced by farmers and the innovative solutions they have adopted.
Punjab: The “Granary of India”
Punjab, often referred to as the “Granary of India,” plays a crucial role in the country’s food security by producing a significant portion of India’s wheat and rice. However, this region is experiencing severe water scarcity due to the over-extraction of groundwater and changing rainfall patterns (Kaur & Singh, 2018). Groundwater levels have been depleting at an alarming rate, leading to increased costs and energy use for irrigation.
Farmers in Punjab are now shifting from water-intensive crops like paddy to less water-consuming alternatives such as maize and pulses. This crop diversification helps in reducing water use and maintaining soil health (Singh et al., 2019). Moreover, advanced irrigation techniques like drip and sprinkler systems are being adopted to optimize water usage. The state government has also been promoting the use of laser land leveling, which helps in even distribution of water across fields, thereby reducing wastage (Jain et al., 2020).
Maharashtra: Coping with Droughts
Maharashtra frequently experiences droughts, significantly affecting its agrarian communities. The state has implemented several measures to mitigate the adverse effects of droughts. One such strategy is the introduction of drought-resistant crop varieties, which are capable of thriving with minimal water (Deshpande & Arora, 2021). Additionally, rainwater harvesting techniques have been promoted extensively. These techniques include the construction of farm ponds, check dams, and percolation tanks that help in capturing and storing rainwater for use during dry periods (Mishra et al., 2018).
Furthermore, the Maharashtra government has launched the Jalyukt Shivar Abhiyan, an initiative aimed at making the state drought-free by 2019. This program focuses on deepening and widening streams, constructing cement and earthen stop dams, and rejuvenating water bodies to enhance water availability (Government of Maharashtra, 2017).
Andhra Pradesh has been at the forefront of implementing climate-smart agriculture (CSA) practices. The state has successfully adopted zero-tillage farming, which minimizes soil disturbance and maintains soil structure and health (Rao et al., 2019). This practice not only conserves soil moisture but also reduces greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural activities.
Integrated pest management (IPM) is another CSA practice widely adopted in Andhra Pradesh. IPM involves the use of biological control agents, crop rotation, and resistant varieties to manage pest populations in an environmentally sustainable manner. These practices help in reducing dependency on chemical pesticides and enhance crop resilience to climate variability (Rao et al., 2019).
In addition to these practices, the Andhra Pradesh government has been promoting the use of organic farming and agroforestry. These practices contribute to carbon sequestration, improve soil fertility, and enhance biodiversity, making agricultural systems more resilient to climate change (Reddy et al., 2020).
Rajasthan: Traditional Water Conservation
Rajasthan, known for its arid climate, has long relied on traditional water conservation techniques to manage its scarce water resources. One such technique is the construction of tankas (underground water storage tanks) and johads (small earthen check dams). These community-based water management systems have been effective in capturing and storing rainwater, thus providing a critical water source during dry periods (Agarwal & Narain, 2020).
The revival of traditional water harvesting structures, along with modern techniques like drip irrigation, has significantly improved water availability and agricultural productivity in Rajasthan. Community involvement in managing these water resources has also been crucial, ensuring the sustainability and maintenance of these systems (Narain et al., 2018).
Policy Recommendations
Addressing the impact of climate change on agriculture in India necessitates a multi-faceted policy approach that combines immediate relief efforts with long-term strategic planning. This approach should encompass financial support, insurance schemes, access to climate-resilient technologies, sustainable water management, investment in agricultural research, and the development of climate-resilient infrastructure. The following sections elaborate on these key areas, supported by relevant studies and literature.
Short-term Measures
Financial Support and Insurance Schemes
Providing immediate financial relief to farmers affected by climate change is essential. This can be achieved through direct subsidies, low-interest loans, and grants aimed at helping farmers recover from climate-induced losses. The Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY) is an existing insurance scheme that offers coverage and financial support to farmers in case of crop failure due to natural calamities. Evaluations of PMFBY have shown that it has provided a safety net for farmers, although improvements in claim settlement processes and coverage expansion are necessary (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Access to Climate-Resilient Technologies
Promoting access to climate-resilient technologies such as drought-resistant crop varieties, efficient irrigation systems, and precision farming tools is vital for immediate adaptation. For instance, the use of micro-irrigation systems like drip and sprinkler irrigation has been proven to enhance water use efficiency and crop yields in water-scarce regions (Rao et al., 2019). Mobile-based agricultural advisory services that provide timely weather forecasts and farming advice have also shown to be beneficial in helping farmers make informed decisions (Mittal et al., 2018).
Long-term Strategies
Sustainable Water Management
Long-term sustainability in agriculture heavily relies on effective water management. This includes measures like rainwater harvesting, groundwater recharge, and the adoption of water-efficient irrigation practices. The National Water Policy emphasizes the need for integrated water resources management, aiming to enhance water availability for agriculture through conservation and efficient use (Central Water Commission, 2019). The construction of check dams, percolation tanks, and farm ponds has been effective in improving water availability in drought-prone regions (Mishra et al., 2018).
Investment in Agricultural Research
Investment in agricultural research is critical for developing new crop varieties that are resilient to climate extremes and for advancing sustainable farming practices. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) has been at the forefront of this effort, promoting research on climate-resilient agriculture through initiatives like the National Innovations in Climate Resilient Agriculture (NICRA) project. NICRA focuses on developing technologies and practices that can withstand climatic stresses, thereby improving agricultural productivity and sustainability (ICAR, 2019).
Development of Climate-Resilient Infrastructure
Building climate-resilient infrastructure, such as improved storage facilities, transport networks, and rural electrification, supports the agricultural sector’s adaptability to climate change. Improved infrastructure helps reduce post-harvest losses, enhances market access, and ensures reliable energy supply for irrigation and other farming operations. Studies have shown that investment in rural infrastructure can significantly boost agricultural productivity and rural incomes (Fan et al., 2008).
Integrating Climate Change Considerations into Agricultural Policy
Integrating climate change considerations into agricultural policy is crucial for developing a robust and adaptive agricultural sector. This involves revising existing agricultural practices to incorporate sustainable land use, promoting agroforestry, and enhancing the capacity of local institutions to support adaptation efforts.
Revising Agricultural Practices
Policies should promote sustainable land use practices such as crop rotation, conservation tillage, and organic farming. These practices help maintain soil health, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and increase the resilience of agricultural systems to climate variability (Lal, 2020). Agroforestry, which integrates trees and shrubs into agricultural landscapes, provides additional benefits such as enhanced biodiversity, improved soil fertility, and carbon sequestration (Jose, 2009).
Enhancing Institutional Capacity
Building the capacity of local institutions to support climate adaptation is essential. This includes training extension workers, strengthening farmer cooperatives, and establishing local climate adaptation committees. Effective institutional support can facilitate the dissemination of climate-resilient practices and technologies, ensuring that farmers are well-equipped to cope with climate impacts (Rao et al., 2019).
International Cooperation and Funding
International cooperation and funding are vital for supporting India’s adaptation efforts. Global initiatives such as the Green Climate Fund and partnerships with international agricultural research organizations can provide the necessary financial and technical resources. These collaborations can help scale up successful adaptation strategies and promote knowledge exchange (World Bank, 2020).
Recommendations for Future Research and Development
Addressing the impacts of climate change on agriculture requires ongoing research and development to create effective, region-specific adaptation strategies. Future research should prioritize several key areas, including the resilience of marginal and small farmers, the effectiveness of government programs, and collaborative efforts among various stakeholders. Below is a detailed explanation of these areas, supported by relevant studies and literature.
Developing Region-Specific Adaptation Strategies
Understanding Regional Climate Variability
One of the primary goals of future research should be to develop adaptation strategies tailored to the specific climatic conditions of different regions. India’s diverse agro-climatic zones each face unique challenges due to climate change, necessitating region-specific approaches. For example, the northern plains, which are highly dependent on rice and wheat, require different strategies compared to the arid regions of Rajasthan or the coastal regions of Andhra Pradesh.
Studies have highlighted the need for detailed regional climate models that can predict local climate impacts with greater accuracy. Such models can help in designing precise agricultural practices suited to local conditions (Aggarwal et al., 2019). Research focusing on local crops, soil types, and water availability will aid in developing tailored solutions that enhance the resilience of regional agriculture (Singh et al., 2020).
Customized Crop Varieties and Practices
Research should also focus on developing crop varieties that are resilient to local climatic stresses. For instance, drought-resistant and heat-tolerant varieties can significantly benefit regions prone to water scarcity and high temperatures (Lobell et al., 2012). Additionally, practices such as zero-tillage farming and integrated pest management need to be customized to fit regional agricultural systems (Rao et al., 2019).
Improving Resilience of Marginal and Small Farmers
Targeted Support and Capacity Building
Marginal and small farmers are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to limited resources and access to technology. Research should focus on creating targeted support systems that address the specific needs of these farmers. This includes providing access to affordable climate-resilient technologies, financial support, and training programs (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Capacity building initiatives are crucial for equipping small farmers with the knowledge and skills needed to adopt sustainable farming practices. Extension services should be strengthened to offer continuous support and guidance, ensuring that farmers can effectively implement adaptation strategies (Mittal et al., 2018).
Micro-financing and Insurance Schemes
Developing effective micro-financing and insurance schemes tailored to the needs of small farmers can help mitigate the financial risks posed by climate variability. Studies have shown that inclusive financial products, such as weather-based insurance schemes, can provide a safety net for farmers, helping them recover from climate-related losses (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Enhancing Effectiveness of Government Programs
Evaluating and Refining Existing Programs
Future research should evaluate the effectiveness of existing government programs aimed at enhancing agricultural resilience. This includes assessing programs like the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY) and the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY) to identify areas for improvement and ensure they meet the evolving needs of farmers (Government of India, 2020).
Research findings can help refine these programs to increase their impact. For example, improving the claim settlement process in crop insurance schemes and expanding coverage to more crops and regions can enhance their effectiveness (Chand & Singh, 2017).
Promoting Integrated Policy Approaches
There is a need for integrated policy approaches that combine agricultural policy with environmental and social policies. Research should explore how policies in different sectors can be aligned to create a cohesive framework for climate adaptation in agriculture. This includes integrating water management policies, land use regulations, and social welfare programs to support sustainable agricultural practices (Central Water Commission, 2019).
Collaboration Among Stakeholders
Fostering Partnerships
Future research should emphasize the importance of collaboration between research institutions, government agencies, and farming communities. Collaborative efforts can facilitate the sharing of knowledge and resources, ensuring the successful implementation of climate-resilient practices (ICAR, 2019).
Partnerships with international organizations and funding bodies can provide additional support for research and development initiatives. Such collaborations can bring in global expertise and funding, helping to scale up successful adaptation strategies and promoting innovation (World Bank, 2020).
Community-Based Approaches
Involving local communities in the research and implementation process is crucial for ensuring the relevance and acceptability of adaptation strategies. Community-based approaches can help tailor solutions to local needs and conditions, enhancing their effectiveness and sustainability (Agarwal & Narain, 2020).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the impact of climate change on agriculture in India is a critical issue that necessitates immediate and sustained efforts. The sector’s vulnerability to increased temperatures, erratic rainfall, and extreme weather events threatens food security and the livelihoods of millions. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach that includes the integration of traditional and modern adaptation practices, robust government policies, and international cooperation. By focusing on region-specific strategies, enhancing the resilience of small and marginal farmers, and fostering collaboration among stakeholders, it is possible to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change and ensure the sustainability of India’s agricultural sector for future generations.
The need to protect civilians in conflict zones around the globe should be paramount and at the forefront of global efforts to prevent genocide. With reports of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Sudan and Burkina Faso, global leaders must do more to prevent such a widescale tragedy from taking place.
Sudan
Armed groups and national armed forces have committed numerous human rights violations against civilians in Sudan since the start of the conflict in 2016. Thousands of civilian deaths have been recorded, especially in besieged areas, according to the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED).
Since fighting first broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, ACLED recorded 8,752 events of political violence and more than 27,120 reported fatalities in Sudan.
Outbreaks of dengue fever, malaria, cholera, and measles are hitting children the hardest, with the collapse of the education system also keeping roughly 90% of Sudan’s kids out of school, according to a recent CBS report.
Foreign Secretary David Lammy, the current rotating UN Security Council president, led a vote on a UK-Sierra Leone resolution urging civilian protection in Sudan. “The UK will never let Sudan be forgotten,” Lammy said, pledging to double UK aid for Sudan to £226 million ($285 million).
But Russia used its veto to block the proposal, accusing the UK of “neo-colonialism.”
Lammy said it was a “disgrace” that Russia had blocked the UN effort to call for a ceasefire in Sudan, adding that the “mean, nasty, and cynical veto sends a message to the warring parties that they can act with impunity.”
He said, “Shame on [Russian President Vladimir] Putin for using his mercenaries to spread conflict and violence across the African continent. And shame on Putin for pretending to be a partner of the Global South while condemning black Africans to further killing, further rape, further starvation in a brutal civil war.”
Russia’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Dmitry Polyanskiy, responded, saying Lammy’s speech was “an excellent demonstration of British neo-colonialism” and the UK’s stance was “nothing but an attempt to allow themselves to meddle in Sudanese affairs.”
A new report by Amnesty alleges the RSF is using weapons supplied by the U.S.-allied United Arab Emirates and equipped with military technology made in France.
Amnesty identified armoured personnel carriers (APCs) made in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in various parts of Sudan. New research has shown that these APCs, which are in use by the RSF, include sophisticated French-designed and manufactured reactive defense systems.
“Our research shows that weaponry designed and manufactured in France is in active use on the battlefield in Sudan,” said Agnès Callamard, Amnesty’s Secretary General.
“All countries must immediately cease direct and indirect supplies of all arms and ammunition to the warring parties in Sudan,” she said. “They must respect and enforce the UN Security Council’s arms embargo regime on Darfur before even more civilian lives are lost.”
UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderit, has warned against the possibility of genocide in Sudan and has pushed for a resolution to the crisis.
“I’m calling for attention to this particular conflict. I have been trying to get my voice out, but my voice is drowned out by other wars – in Ukraine and Gaza,” she said.
Israel’s war in Gaza against the terrorist group Hamas, which is entrenched amidst the civilian population, has also drawn vociferous criticism and accusations of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The U.S. has resisted these claims, but until the conflict ends and the fog of war dissipates, it will be impossible to verify whether these accusations are true or not.
Burkina Faso
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), an Islamist armed group massacred at least 133 people in the town of Barsalogho, Burkina Faso, on August 24, 2024 and forced civilians to build a trench to protect the town with a military base.
The massacre is the latest example of atrocities by Islamist armed groups against civilians. The government must cease placing their civilians at such high risk of injury or death.
Since last year at least, Amnesty has been reporting on armed groups in the region committing war crimes against civilians.
According to Amnesty, since 2016, Burkina Faso has faced a non-international armed conflict opposing the government forces against Ansaroul Islam, a local armed group affiliated with Al Qaida and with the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISS or ISGS).
Government forces have been fighting insurgencies by the Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) and the ISS since the armed groups entered Burkina Faso from Mali in 2016.
The two Islamist armed groups control large swathes of Burkinabè territory; they have attacked civilians as well as government security forces and fought each other.
And now, the military regime wants to reinstate the death penalty, which was abolished in the country in 2018.
Amnesty has reported a surge in the use of the death penalty on the African continent, saying in a statement in October that “recorded executions more than tripled and recorded death sentences increased significantly by 66 percent.”
The conflict is part of the broader armed conflict in the Central Sahel that began with the 2012 conflict in Mali before spreading to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger and further south to Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire.
“We are witnessing an incredibly concerning surge in Islamist violence in Burkina Faso. The Islamist armed groups’ massacres of villagers, worshipers, and displaced people are not only war crimes but a cruel affront to human decency,” said Ilaria Allegrozzi, the senior Sahel researcher at HRW.
“The leaders of the Islamist armed groups should immediately end these deadly attacks on civilians,” she said.
Changing the paradigm
With so much tragedy, we must think of ways to end these terrible conflicts.
Kholood Khair, founding director of the Sudanese think tank Confluence Advisory and a prominent civil society advocate for Sudan, together with Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health, and Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, explored whether there is a way to stop the war in Sudan.
They suggested that the warring parties abandon the idea of winning and agree to a ceasefire. They also suggested that the UN Secretary-General use Resolution 2417 to help protect civilians. And others have taken steps as well.
As HRW noted, since he gained power in a September 2022 military coup, President Ibrahim Traoré has increased the use of civilian auxiliaries called Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie, or VDPs).
The international community must do more to pressure the various governments and armed groups in Sudan and Burkina Faso to end their conflicts and cease committing crimes against humanity. Nations must unite to fight and prevent such crimes wherever they might be committed.
Over the past few years, India and Canada have experienced a major diplomatic showdown. Bilateral relations have been blemished by diplomatic spats, reactionary frictions, and an overall sense of mistrust between the two nations. This sudden downturn in ties between the two democracies that have maintained a customary relationship has left many wondering about the implications for India’s foreign policy and the future of Indo-Canadian relations.
The History behind the ties
Canada and India have a connection rooted in their history as British colonies, which set the stage for their diplomatic ties. Their relationship began in the 1800s with people moving between the two countries and later on which grew into official diplomatic links after India gained independence. They set up formal diplomatic relations in 1947 starting a new phase in their two-way engagement backed by their shared belief in democracy and diversity. But this relationship has had its rough patches too, when it comes to issues about Sikhs living in Canada and India’s worries about the rising call for a separatist movement.
Canada’s significant Sikh population and the majority of their support for a sectarian movement against another sovereign state, has created problems for diplomacy over the years. In the wake of the most tragic and disturbing event of the 1984 Anti-Sikh Riots, a few sections of the Sikh diaspora in Canada found themselves at the forefront of a movement that has often been viewed with suspicion by the Indian side. Subsequently, the bombing of Air India Flight 182 back in the year 1985, made things more tough for both sides and a major concern in terms of security for India.
The Recent Tussle
The recent tensions started with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegations in September 2023, which claimed credible evidence linking Indian government agents to Hardeep Singh Nijjar’s murder on Canadian soil. The Indian side refuted such claims calling it “absurd”. What followed next was a climatic loop of diplomatic actions, further intensifying the existing rift. Canada’s accusation was followed by the expulsion of six Indian diplomats, at the same time India fired back by swiftly suspending Canadian diplomats, mirroring the concept of “Tit for Tat” diplomacy. The move by India exemplifies India’s fierce approach towards its foreign policy that prioritizes national interest, sovereignty, and security.
In the month of October, things got more complicated when the Canadian Government named the Indian High Commissioner and other diplomats as ‘persons of interest’, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) debunked the claims, stating “preposterous imputations” and blamed Canadian PM Justin Trudeau’s “political agenda” based on “vote bank politics”. Subsequently, New Delhi recalled its High Commissioner and other diplomats back to India.
The statement released by the Ministry of External Affairs on October 14, in response to diplomatic communication from Canada, can be described as extraordinarily ‘harsh’ and pinpointed. Many geopolitical or foreign policy commentators, for instance, Abhijit Iyer Mitra, a senior fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) believed that such languages were not even used for countries like the state in mess, Pakistan.
It’s not India, but Canada.
The Indian Government time and again has mentioned the growing anti-India sentiments, and calculated attacks on Hindu temples in Canada, However, Ottawa overlooked all such diplomatic messages, even about the high chances of attacks on Indian diplomats. The series of attacks and threats show Canada’s failure to provide security and ensure the safety of Indian officials. This is not the first time, the Canadian PM’s action tried to poke the relationship negatively, back in the year 2020, he expressed ‘uninvited’ concern for the farmer’s protests, which is an ‘internal’ matter of India. Similarly, the Canadian Government has entertained serious anti-India activities like the glorification of the assassination of a former Indian PM, which shows how Canada takes the relationship with India seriously as a mature nation pursuing a relationship.
Turning a blind on such serious events not only hinders the relationship but also the notion of ‘interdependence’. Captivating separatist movements to pander to political gains will complicate foreign relations, as countries, in this case for India are a ‘deception’ of trust and an affront to India’s sovereignty. The path of resolving the tussle through ‘dialogue and discussion’ is also in question, which has always been the first step of ‘conflict resolution’ for democracies.
India’s immediate and reactionary stance signifies India’s adherence to strategic autonomy, a core principle of India’s foreign policy. This autonomy allows India to confidently address challenges from countries, irrespective of economic or diplomatic consequences, affirming that India is no longer willing to overlook actions that it perceives as baneful to its security and sovereignty. The whole India-Canada event also brings out a major argument, that cooperation through economic interdependence is not always effective when national security concerns are prioritized by countries. From the Canadian lens, the same can be visualized with the allegations stating ‘India, violated Canada’s sovereignty’. Thus, the way forward for the relationship requires a ‘matured’ stance, and calculated move, with an assurance of respect to the notion of ‘sovereignty’, and ‘national security’.
On October 21 of this year, news came about India and China having reached a possible agreement on patrolling arrangements along the volatile Line of Actual Control (LAC) which has witnessed the armed forces of both the countries engaged in a stalemate since 2020. This announcement by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was bolstered by External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar’s claim of the situation ‘going back to where it was in 2020…we can say that the disengagement process with China has been completed’. The agreement being alluded to was centered on the friction regarding Demchok and Depsang Plains while the understanding of disengagement in the other two points− Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso− would remain the same as reached in 2022 with the creation of mutually agreed upon buffer zones. The current agreement would entail Indian troops having access to patrol points in the sector of Depsang and Demchok which were blocked since 2020 and the same are being confirmed with the onset of verification patrolling by the Indian Army. In addition, the agreement also entails ‘coordinated patrolling’ between the both the armies to prevent the flaring up of violent face-offs during patrolling while the Chinese troops would be allowed to patrol till the Yangtse sector along the eastern part of the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh which was the site of a major confrontation in 2022.
Most importantly, it should also be noted that the above Sino-Indian disengagement have been endorsed by both PM Modi and President Xi Jinping during their bilateral meet in the sidelines of the recently concluded BRICS Summit in Kazan Russia from 22nd to 24th October. In the bilateral summit, both the leaders welcomed the ‘recent agreement for complete disengagement and resolution of issues’ while emphasizing that ‘stable, predictable, and amicable bilateral relations’ between the two Asian giants were crucial not only for the region, but for the wider world. In addition, both sides asked their respective Special Representatives (SR) on the border issue− National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi− to expedite and carry forward the process of disengagement.
While the agreement has generated enthusiasm or a sense of it in official statements as the thawing of relations which would pave the way for greater engagement, yet there have also been expressions of skepticism and cautious reception of the same. This has especially been regarding the yet unrevealed details of the agreement and the status of the ‘buffer zones’ created because of the earlier disengagement dialogues following the 2020 clash. The fact that the current agreement focused only on Demchok and Depsang sectors without any mention of revision or settlement over the above zones has led to the perception that the latter’s existence would hinder any sort of return to the pre-2020 status. In addition to sketchy details about the agreement released in the public domain, another reason why the agreement hasn’t generated much excitement in policy and strategic circles is the latter’s focus only on ‘disengagement’ which precedes the more important steps of de-escalation and de-induction of troops on the border. While both sides have hailed the current phase of disengagement, there has been no clear signals from any side regarding the steps to be taken for de-escalation and de-induction as of now.
The challenge of de-escalation is further compounded by the lack of trust between the populace of both the sides as well as the systemic and geopolitical challenge posed by China to India’s global ambitions in its immediate and extended neighbourhood which goes beyond the boundary dispute. This sense of mistrust and skepticism was also witnessed in speculations that the talk surrounding the disengagement was designed to provide optics to pave the way for the Modi- Xi Summit as well as providing a convenient cover for New Delhi to continue the unequal but vital trade and economic relationship with Beijing. On the same note, the ‘convenient cover’ also provided justification for India sharing dais as well as having summits with fellow BRICS countries such as China, Russia and Iran− dubbed as the ‘Axis of Evil/ Upheaval’ by Western strategic circles and thinkers.
However, in addition to the above, the LAC disengagement would also have repercussions on two major areas of importance for both India and China− leadership of the Global South and Taiwan. These ramifications might also add to the skepticism and mistrust around the current Sino-Indian ‘thaw’ or ‘rapprochement’.
As the two largest economies and markets of the non-Western world accounting for around 35% of the global population and around 29% of the global GDP, both India and China have aspired for the leadership role of the non-Western world of developing and underdeveloped countries also known as the Global South. However, both sides have held different perceptions of the Global South vis a vis the West− while New Delhi views itself as a ‘Southwestern power’ acting as the bridge between the West and the non-West world; Beijing, on the other hand, sees itself as leading the developing countries of the world in a bid to replace the current Western origin global international system with a new one which is more ‘just and representative’. In addition, as per some quarters, China is not considered by India to be a part of the ‘Global South’ which was reflected in New Delhi’s non-invitation to Beijing to join the Voice of Global South Summit held last year under the aegis of India’s G20 Presidency in 2023 as well as in August this year. But, China has in recent years picked up the narrative of itself being a ‘natural partner of the Global South’ by virtue of being ‘the largest developing country’. This sentiment of Global South leadership has also been echoed in the launch of the three Global Initiatives by China on Development, Security and Civilizational Dialogue.
The link between the Global South and the current LAC disengagement was highlighted in the official readout of the Modi-Xi Summit by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As per the readout, President Xi called upon both the countries to ‘to keep to the trend of history and the right direction of bilateral relations’ given the importance of India and China as ‘time-honored civilizations, large developing countries and important members of the Global South’ with ‘both stand(ing) at a crucial phase of their respective modernization endeavours’. What also adds to the salience of the Global South is the fact that the Summit took place in the sidelines and in the immediate aftermath of the 16th BRICS Summit which in recent years has emerged as an important and crucial platform for advocating the concerns of the Global South on matters such as reform of multilateral and international institutions, just and equitable development and security for all. Any action of goodwill such as ‘taking the initiative’ of promoting peace by mending of long-standing strained ties is bound to attract the attention of all the member states, and by extension, highlight and justify one’s claim of possessing the qualities to lead the non- Western world. It cannot be ruled out that this might have been one of the primary motives underlying the actions on the part of both China and India to seek disengagement at this point of time.
However, what needs closer scrutiny is the way China has shaped the narrative on the disengagement agreement. While lauding the latter as the first step towards heralding peace between two major Asian countries, comments from scholars such as Lin Minwang of ‘China ha(ving) always maintained a positive attitude and hope to improve India- China relations, but India has always set thresholds for border issues’ appears to give the impression that Beijing had been willing all along to resolve the long-standing border issues, but it was New Delhi who was stubborn and inflexible and hence, not interested in peace. Such a statement should also be seen in the backdrop of Beijing earlier laying the blame for the 2020 confrontation squarely on Indian ‘illegal encroachment on Chinese territory’. Moreover, Lin also goes to state that ‘the uncertainty of the United States (as well as the US election outcomes) is an important factor that prompted India to soften its stance toward China’ thereby implying that more than the internal wish for peace and tranquillity, it was the unfavourable external environment which pushed India to seek peace. As a corollary, such a view also reinforces the Chinese misperception of New Delhi having no existence of its own without the support of US− the propagation of such would also put a dent into Indian image of a credible leader of the Global South. This perception of Indian ‘dependence on US’ was also carried in the Global Times editorial on the disengagement which emphasised on China’s unwavering maintenance of its position in the face of ‘strengthening India- US cooperation’ as well as Washington’s ‘attempt’ at using ‘India to exhaust China’ (which was realised by New Delhi as per the editorial). In addition, the editorial also goes to list the ‘internal reasons’ which ‘compelled’ India to seek disengagement− increasing burden of defence expenditure, the rising Sino- Indian trade and interdependence despite the calls for ‘de-coupling’ and difficulties faced by Indian technological and production companies due to visa restrictions imposed by New Delhi. The above focus on ‘internal factors’ not only exposes the level of Indian dependence on China (which can be weaponised by Beijing in the future) but also attempts to showcase New Delhi as a junior partner who is not capable of providing leadership to the Global South.
The competition between India and China to claim leadership of the Global South is not new and can be traced to the early years of the Independence and formation of both the countries in the 1940s and 60s. By framing Nehru-led India as part of the ‘imperial and expansionist bourgeoisie’, Mao painted the 1962 war as Beijing’s ‘revolutionary’ defence against the creation of a ‘Great Indian Empire’ by Nehru and his masters in the Western World. This narrative allowed Mao and revolutionary China to become the icon of liberation in the then Third World (colonised countries of Asia and Africa). Drawing parallels to current times, Beijing can be said to be striving for leadership in the eyes of the Global South by portraying itself as the active initiator of the disengagement while painting New Delhi as the recipient who has been ‘forced’ to come to the negotiating table because of external complications.
The other major area subject to potential LAC disengagement ramification is Taiwan. Weeks before the announcement of the LAC disengagement, Taiwan had grabbed headlines when its President Lai Ching-te, during his National Day speech on 10 October, rejected the claim of China or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) being the ‘motherland’ of Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC)− the official name of the self-governing island nation. Lai rooted his rejection in the fact that while the PRC was founded in 1949, the ROC came into being in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution that had overthrown the Qing dynasty and established a Republican government, thereby making it older and deserving of much more respect than the Communist ruled regime led by Mao Tse Dong. This statement by the Taiwanese president was preceded by Xi’s own remarks on the National Day of the PRC on 1st October where he reaffirmed his commitment to ‘achieving complete national reunification’ which is the ‘common aspiration of the Chinese people’ (on both sides of the Taiwan Straits).
The comments by Lai were rejected by the Taiwan Affairs Office of Beijing which lambasted the latter for ‘fabricating fallacies about “Taiwanese independence, advocating separatist views, and inciting hostility and confrontation across the Straits’ while reiterating the ‘unstoppable’ nature of the ‘historical trend of national rejuvenation and reunification’. This reiteration was followed by the conduction of ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ military exercise on 14 October by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s Eastern Command which saw the participation of the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force and was conducted in the Taiwan Straits as well as in the northern, southern and eastern vicinity of Taiwan.
In the midst of the above disturbance in the Straits, on 16 October, India allowed Taipei to open its third Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in Mumbai which would cater to the services of Indian nationals in four states− Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Goa and the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu. The opening of this new office marking the 113th National Day of Taiwan is a sign of the increasing ties between Taipei and New Delhi on areas such as semiconductors, technology, and trade as well as strategic convergence in areas such as the Indo- Pacific. As expected, the development of such Indo-Taiwan ties has not been to Beijing’s liking which called upon New Delhi to adhere to the One-China principle and ‘avoid interference in the improvement of Sino- Indian ties’ by handling the ‘Taiwan issue with caution’.
Given the precedence of the above events before the announcement of the LAC Disengagement, can it be reasoned that the sudden Chinese interest in rapprochement with India is also linked with its strategic calculus on Taiwan?
From Beijing’s perspective, the thawing of strained relations with India and further improvement would provide an opportunity to incentivize New Delhi to re-examine its burgeoning ties with Taiwan. However, given the new normal of ‘cautious engagement’ such a scenario seems unlikely as of now. On the converse, the instance of ‘thawing’ and ‘normalisation’ of Sino-Indian ties could be weaponised in a misinformation campaign to dissuade Taipei from relying upon India as a credible partner who will support it against Chinese manoeuvres.
At the same time, the proximity between the current tensions and military exercise across the Taiwan Straits and the seeking of disengagement with India could also be interpreted as China’s tactic of avoiding pressure on two fronts as it prepares to realise the goal of ‘national reunification.’ This speculation is partially buttressed by the fact that the latest Joint Sword-2024B exercise was much more aggressive in nature which included drills focused on ‘capture of key ports and islands and the joint seizure of comprehensive superiority’. This exercise, involving, 153 sorties by PLA aircraft and quarantine operations of maritime cargo by Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), was conducted on a larger scale unseen till date and in much closer proximity to Taiwan as compared to the drills of the past− hinting at the possibility of it being a preparation exercise for the eventual invasion to be conducted in near future. Moreover, the ‘near future’ would seem to be approaching soon, if one considers the recent published work of Lt Col (Retd) JS Sodhi titled ‘China’s War Clouds’ focusing on China’s long term military strategy of the future. Here Sodhi cites an article published by the pro- Beijing daily Wenweipo in 2013 which mentioned six wars or military campaigns to be undertaken by the PLA in the next 50 years− the invasion of Taiwan in 2027 which precedes the two-front war with India in 2035-40. As per Sodhi, 2027 would be the year when Xi would seek a fourth term to his Presidency and the ‘reunification’ of Taiwan would not only justify the latter but also cement his legacy. Moreover, with the pacification of Taiwan, the PLA would be free to re-direct their energy in the confrontation with India via both land and sea.
Other factors buttressing the above speculation is the return to power of Republican candidate Donald Trump as US President. The latter’s aversion towards long-term military commitments and wars as well as comments accusing Taiwan of ‘stealing jobs from the American chip industry’ and ‘not paying for defence’ has brought uncertainty in Taipei over US commitment to its defence in the face of Chinese onslaught. In addition, reports of American company Space X led by Elon Musk asking Taiwanese suppliers to move manufacturing away from Taiwan because of ‘geopolitical concerns’ further adds fuel to such interpretations of an ‘imminent Chinese invasion’ about to come. Combing the above with US involvement in the wars in Ukraine and West Asia, and the possible pacification of border dispute with India, Beijing might be tempted not to derive the upmost opportunity of this moment vis a vis its ambitions on Taiwan. History is replete with examples when Beijing did not deter from the using moments of global crises to further its own strategic ends− the 1962 war with India in the backdrop of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2020 eastern Ladakh clashes during the n-COVID 19 pandemic.
While only time will tell whether the LAC Disengagement is a genuine effort at seeking peace or an elaborate eyewash for ulterior motives, India should not let its guard down and repeat mistakes of the past.
As Sun Tzu said- “Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”
About the Author
Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy. His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com
The modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under President Xi Jinping is one of the most significant military transformations of the 21st century. To transform the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049, Xi Jinping has driven a series of extensive reforms since assuming office in 2012. These reforms, first announced in 2015, seek to enhance the PLA’s capabilities in joint operations, advanced warfare, and global power projection, aligning with Xi’s vision of China’s “national rejuvenation.” The modernization process emphasizes organizational restructuring, technological integration, and combat readiness to equip the PLA to respond to regional and global threats.
Strategic Vision and Political Context
Xi Jinping’s modernization of the PLA is rooted in his strategic goal to reclaim China’s historical standing as a major world power. His “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation sees military strength as integral to safeguarding China’s territorial integrity and expanding its global influence. The PLA’s transformation is also a response to perceived threats, particularly from the United States, and a reflection of China’s ambitions to reshape the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. This vision aligns with China’s increasing assertiveness in regional hotspots, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.
Xi’s modernization agenda has redefined the PLA’s role as the protector of the Communist Party’s authority. By reinforcing the Party’s control over the military, Xi has positioned the PLA not just as a national defense force but also as a tool for promoting China’s political and economic interests on the global stage. His reforms have focused on enhancing the PLA’s ability to “fight and win wars” by preparing it for modern warfare scenarios through a series of phased, top-down structural adjustments.
Key Phases of Modernization
Xi’s reforms can be divided into two main phases: “above-the-neck” and “below-the-neck” reforms. These phases address both the high-level command structures and the operational capabilities of the PLA across its branches.
Above-the-Neck Reforms: The “above-the-neck” phase began in 2015, focusing on the centralization and streamlining of the PLA’s command structure. One of the most significant changes was the reorganization of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the establishment of five Theater Commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central), which replaced the former seven Military Regions. This move aligned command chains with strategic regions, enhancing coordination and readiness for joint operations. The reforms also emphasized “jointness,” pushing for integration across the PLA’s four conventional services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
As part of this restructuring, the PLA’s general departments were dismantled and reformed into 15 functional departments directly under the CMC, which strengthened civilian oversight and Xi’s direct control. Xi’s reforms aimed to remove corruption and inefficiencies, consolidating the Party’s authority over the PLA and ensuring that it could be deployed in line with Xi’s political and strategic goals.
Below-the-Neck Reforms: The “below-the-neck” phase, initiated in 2016, focused on improving the operational capabilities of the PLA’s individual services and introduced organizational restructuring at lower command levels. A shift to a brigade-centric structure for ground forces replaced the division-based system, allowing for faster mobilization and greater flexibility in joint operations. This change aligned the PLA with advanced military organizations, emphasizing the development of combined arms brigades capable of executing independent operations.
Additionally, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Rocket Force (PLAARF) were restructured for improved strategic and tactical coordination. The Rocket Force, previously known as the Second Artillery Corps, gained prominence as an independent branch, signaling China’s focus on long-range strike and nuclear deterrence. In parallel, the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) which has been disbanded now and replaced with three deputy theater-level forces that sit directly under the CMC: the PLA Information Support Force (PLAISF), the PLA Space Force (PLASF), and the PLA Cyberspace Force (PLACF). The likely motivation for this reorganization is to enhance the CMC’s control over these critical capabilities so that top leaders can exert more strategic influence over how they are allocated to and used by other parts of the military. Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF) introduced specialized capabilities in information warfare, cyber operations, and military logistics, essential for modern and future battlefields.
Modernization of PLA’s Key Branches
PLA Ground Forces: The Army has undergone substantial downsizing and restructuring to become more versatile and responsive. By reducing troop numbers by 300,000, Xi aimed to shed the Army’s historical dominance within the PLA and redirect resources toward advanced weapons, army aviation, and cyber warfare capabilities. The reformed brigade-battalion structure enabled the PLA to adopt a flatter, more agile command hierarchy, suitable for modern, multi-domain operations.
PLA Navy (PLAN): The PLAN has received increased funding and focus under Xi’s leadership, reflecting China’s ambition to project power beyond its borders. PLAN’s modernization includes expanding its fleet, which now includes advanced destroyers, frigates, and submarines, and the commissioning of aircraft carriers like the Liaoning and Shandong with the third, Fujian, currently undergoing sea trials. These assets support China’s “far-seas” naval operations, securing its interests along maritime trade routes, and increasing its presence in contested waters like the South China Sea. PLAN’s development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities counters U.S. influence in the region, asserting Chinese dominance over critical sea lanes.
PLA Air Force (PLAAF): Under the reforms, the PLAAF has enhanced its strategic reach and integrated new technologies. Key advancements include fifth-generation fighter jets like the J-20 and H-20 stealth bombers, improving China’s aerial combat and strategic strike capabilities. The PLAAF has adopted a base-brigade structure that promotes coordination with other services and enables faster deployment. The PLAAF’s modernization not only bolsters China’s air defense but also supports its broader geopolitical ambitions by projecting air power in contested areas like Taiwan and the East China Sea.
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF): The PLARF, designated as an independent branch, has become central to China’s strategic deterrence and power projection. Equipped with a growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, including hypersonic missiles, the PLARF represents China’s emphasis on counter-intervention strategies. The development of long-range missiles and advancements in nuclear technology reflect China’s intention to maintain a credible deterrent against potential adversaries, particularly the United States. This enhanced capability underscores China’s resolve to defend its core interests while reshaping the regional security architecture.
Strategic Support Force (PLASSF): Established in 2015, the PLASSF embodies the PLA’s push toward “intelligentized” and “informationized” warfare, encompassing cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities. The PLASSF integrates artificial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support PLA operations, creating a “system of systems” approach for future combat scenarios. As cyber and electronic warfare become increasingly critical, the PLASSF’s role in securing Chinese interests in digital and space domains makes it an essential component of the PLA’s modernization. But in April 2024, the PLASSF was disbanded and replaced by three deputy theater-level forces that sit directly under the CMC: the PLA Information Support Force (PLAISF), the PLA Space Force (PLASF), and the PLA Cyberspace Force (PLACF). This bureaucratic upgrade suggests a rising focus in the PLA on information warfare and network capabilities.
Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF): The PLAJLSF, created in 2016, supports the logistical demands of China’s expanding military operations. It coordinates resources across all Theater Commands, ensuring efficient supply chains and medical support. The PLAJLSF’s capacity was tested during the COVID-19 pandemic when it managed rapid resource deployment across China and facilitated global medical support as part of China’s “mask diplomacy.” Its establishment highlights the need for a sophisticated logistics network to support China’s ambitions for a global military presence.
Technological Advancements and Training Reforms
Technological innovation is a cornerstone of Xi’s military reforms. The PLA has invested heavily in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned systems. The incorporation of such technologies reflects China’s desire to leapfrog conventional military limitations and compete with advanced military powers. The modernization process also involves enhancing training regimens, with PLA exercises increasingly focusing on joint operations, realistic combat scenarios, and readiness for multi-domain warfare.
Challenges and Future Prospects
Despite impressive advancements, the PLA faces several challenges. Corruption within the ranks, while mitigated, remains a concern, and the restructuring has temporarily affected morale among mid-level officers. Additionally, the PLA’s lack of recent combat experience limits its ability to test its new capabilities in real-world scenarios. U.S. export controls on high-tech goods pose another obstacle, making self-reliance in defense technology a pressing necessity.
Xi’s vision for a “world-class” military by 2049 remains ambitious, particularly as the PLA still has strides to make in mastering joint operations and achieving interoperability across its branches. Moreover, the international community, led by the U.S. and its allies, has increased its vigilance, potentially countering China’s rise with collaborative security frameworks. Nevertheless, the PLA’s modernization underscores China’s commitment to reshaping the balance of power in Asia, signaling that its transformation is well underway.
Conclusion
Under Xi Jinping, the modernization of the PLA represents a strategic shift in China’s military posture, with implications for regional and global security. Through extensive reforms, organizational restructuring, and technological integration, the PLA has transitioned into a formidable military force. While challenges persist, Xi’s leadership has laid the foundation for a new era in Chinese military power, one that aims to project influence and defend China’s interests on the world stage. As China approaches its 2049 target, the PLA’s trajectory will remain a critical element in the evolving landscape of global security.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had amassed a large number of troops and armaments in eastern Ladakh and other areas along the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) in April-May, 2020. The PLA moved into the Indian Territory and built fortified structures and defenses, in an attempt to permanently alter the ‘status quo’ on the ground contrary to the Protocols and Agreements signed in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 between the two neighbours with nuclear power destroying the peace and tranquillity along the border holding out for the preceding four odd decades.
The clashes that erupted on the north bank of Pangong Tso on May 5, 2020 in which 70 Indian soldiers were injured was triggered by the PLA ingress blocking the routine Indian Army (IA) patrol to Finger 8 followed by at Naku La in north Sikkim on May 9, 2020. This compelled India to respond by mobilizing additional troops and equipment to match the Chinese build up. The clash at Galwan on June 15, 2020 resulting in loss of lives of 20 Indian soldiers and over 45 PLA soldiers, though only four lives of PLA soldiers claimed to have been lost by China, was followed by yet another clash on December 9, 2022, when the IA soldiers prevented the PLA from transgressing into Indian territory resulting in injuries.
The disengagement process at five friction points was completed in September 2022. The latest agreement announced on October 21, 2024 by the Foreign Secretary Mr Vikram Misri that was reached with China on “patrolling arrangement” along the LAC leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020 brings hope of restoration of stability including removal of the buffer zones and resumption of patrolling as was undertaken prior to April 2020 post-disengagement in Depsang and Demchok that were considered complex and tricky.
There are two immediate benefits from the months-long negotiation that led to the agreement. First, political re-engagement has commenced with the Modi-Xi meeting in Kazan as there has been no meeting between the top leaders of the two nuclear-armed states for the past five years, and the resumption of the Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor-level dialogues.
Second, it ends the five-year crisis by bringing the resolution of the standoffs at Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh, thus stabilizing the border region.
In addition, the same also is hoped to restore the access of the IA patrols to their Patrolling Points (PPs) 1 to 65 from Karakoram pass to Chumar in eastern Ladakh extending over a distance of 832 kms in High /Super-High Altitude Areas. These PPs, in vogue since 1996 based on the China Study Group guidelines, largely located on the limits of patrolling depicting the benchmark locations mutually agreed to by both India and China, are to be patrolled regularly by the Indian Security Forces (ISF).
According to one of the research papers submitted at the police conference in January 2023, out of 65 PPs, India’s presence reportedly had lost in 26 PPs due to restrictive or no patrolling by the ISFs. Later China, by process of “Salami Slicing”, to grab land inch by inch forcing India to accept the fact that as such areas did not have the presence of ISFs or civilians since long, the presence of Chinese in these areas entitled the same to the latter leading to shifting of border under control of ISFs towards Indian side. The same thus resulted in creating a buffer zone in all such pockets leading to loss of control over these areas by India thereby denying grazing rights for herders.
The traditional grazing grounds have served as pastures of the semi-nomadic community of Changthang region (Rebos) and given the scarcity of the rich pastures, they would traditionally venture into the areas close to the PPs. As there has been enhanced restrictions on the grazing movement and areas imposed on the Rebos by the ISFs , the same has caused resentment amongst them. The issue of grazing grounds has been a major friction point between India and China and the latest agreement addresses that in Demchok area.
The next stage of de-escalation in eastern Ladakh to guarantee that the agreement remains durable will be more difficult and may require extended and patient negotiation by two sides. As trust is in short supply, neither side will dilute its military presence unless there is confidence that the other side will not exploit the situation to their respective advantage.
The “mobilization differential” of PLA being faster than ISFs owing to former’s better connectivity being on flat terrain to its forward locations as against long distances and adverse terrain friction in the Indian side of the border, India should retain the same as one of the central factors for negotiation in favour of ISFs by locating suitable force close to “Point of Action” for a proactive “Response Matrix” if not better based on effective Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to avoid being surprised in future.
Using the current thaw as a trigger, India should consider establishing permanent structures incrementally and locate ISF along all the 65 PPs to stabilize and resolve the long pending border dispute permanently on “As is Where is” basis.
The defense budget that has been declining from approximately 16.4% in 2012-13 to 12.9% in 2024-25 of Annual Central Government Expenditure must be increased as continued investment in the military will enhance India’s defence capability, urgently required along the borders.
Overall, the rebuilding of trust with China will require China working on the same. India would do well to be cautious, trust but verify and continue building deterrence, as both are necessary for national security.
Major General Sudhakar Jee, VSM (Retd) has been General Officer Commanding, 3 Infantry Division and Colonel of the Mahar Regiment of the Indian Army. The General Officer is now an internationally renowned defence and strategic affairs analyst who often appears on leading television news channels for discussions and whose articles and comments are regularly published in reputed print media publications.
