By: Darshan Gajjar, Research Analyst, GSDN

American President Abraham Lincoln famously remarked, “Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.” Elections in a democracy are always interesting, especially when they have the potential to shape and change the geopolitical dynamics not only for the region but also for the world at large.

Recently, on October 15, 2023 the Republic of Poland held its parliamentary elections, which are being held on a regular basis four years apart. The Polish constitution does not mention any body such as the parliament; instead, it provides the composition of a bicameral legislature, with the Sejm being a lower house akin to the House of Representatives in the USA and the Senate being an upper house.

To be precise,Article 95 of the Polish Constitution states that, “Legislative power in the Republic of Poland shall be exercised by the Sejm and the Senate,” further the same article also mentions that, “The Sejm shall exercise control over the activities of the Council of Ministers…” During the October 15 election, seats for both houses were contested.

This piece aims to provide a geopolitical analysis of that election and its implications on the country’s politics, in addition to analysing Poland’s relationship with the European Union (EU), stance on the ongoing Ukraine conflict, and broader implications for populist policies in Europe.

Results of the Elections

The current elections saw the one of the highest turnouts of voters, nearly 74%, the highest since the fall of communism in 1989. As per the final count, the incumbent PiS (Law and Justice Party) got 35.4% of votes, with the centrist Civic Coalition securing 30.7% and the centre-right Third Way getting 14.4% of votes, in addition to the Left with 8.6% and the far-right Confederation with 7.2% of the votes.

In numerical strength, the Law and Justice party takes 194 seats in parliament, followed by the Civic Coalition with 157, the Third Way with 65, the Left with 26 and Confederation with 18 seats.

Although the incumbent PiS is the largest party, it did not garner enough seats to form the majority even with its coalition partners. Thus, paving the way for the change of government with PiS losing the reign of power for the first time since 2015. Former European Council President and Prime Minister Donald Tusk is expected to lead a new coalition with his Civic Coalition, which will partner with the Third Way and the Left, who together hold 248 seats.

However, it will not be a cakewalk for Mr. Tusk to become the Prime Minister. As per Article 154 of the Polish Constitution, the President will have to appoint a Prime Minister within 14 days after convening the first session of the newly elected Sejm. The current President Andrzej Duda, a PiS ally, has signalled picking up a person from the winning party, i.e., the party with the greatest number of seats, which is PiS in this case. In due course, however, Mr. Tusk is believed to be the new Prime Minister. Let’s look into the various policy changes and implications that Mr. Tusk has suggested during his campaign.

Ukraine Policy

Strategically the location of Poland makes it one of the most important countries in Europe. Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war last year, the former Warsaw Pact country has proven to be instrumental in many ways, from accepting refugees to sending important weapons to Ukraine from western countries.

Poland is not directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict; however, it has been actively involved in providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which includes providing shelter, medical assistance, and support for Ukrainian refugees.

Further, Poland has provided Ukraine with 320 Soviet-era tanks and 14 MiG-29 fighter jets in terms of military aid. However, in early August this year, a diplomatic rift emerged over the grain deal.

The European Union had brokered a deal between Poland and four other neighbouring countries to ban grain imports from Ukraine to protect their domestic farmers; with the condition that they must allow the grain to cross their territory into other countries. The agreement was set to expire on Sept 15, 2023 but Polish officials have called for extending the restrictions. Eventually, on September 21, 2023 Ukraine filed a complaint with the WTO, against Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic over the ban and threatened retaliatory import restrictions.

This move did not go well with Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who was facing an election just next month. Subsequently, Poland has suspended all military aid to Ukraine, citing military modernization plans. Experts believe that the populist Polish PM invoked the grain issue for the benefit of their rural voters rather than for them to solve it.

However, it is clear from the results that such a move failed to materialise and yield any results. Now, one of the prime tasks that the new government has to perform after being sworn in will be to make sure the engagement with Ukraine on all fronts is back on track.

Mr. Donald Tusk is believed to be pro-Ukraine and keen on resolving disputes and enhancing engagement. During his political campaign, he even called for unwavering military aid to Ukraine to defeat Russia in addition to moral and diplomatic support.

Under a new Prime Minister, Poland would likely have remained a key player in channelling humanitarian aid for Ukraine and supporting sanctions against Russia, among other things.

Relations With the EU

Due to the populist policies of PiS and the divergence of interests between conservatives in Poland and progressives in the EU, the relationship between Brussels and Warsaw saw a rough patch in the last few years, which is expected to hit a reset once former European Council President Mr. Tusk takes over the executive.

It is obvious that Mr. Tusk is deeply pro-European Union (EU). Many EU officials are keen on restoring liberal democratic principles in Poland. Mr. Tusk has promised to do so during his election campaign. Thereupon, the EU will most likely unlock billions of euros in EU funding that was allocated to Poland as part of the COVID-19 pandemic recovery fund, which was frozen due to the EU citing a threat to the independent judiciary in Poland, further increasing tensions between Warsaw and Brussels. “Poland must use all methods possible to access frozen European Union funds,” said Mr. Donald Tusk during his trip to Brussels on October 25, 2023.

Among other things, in last few years, Poland also criticised the EU’s centralised model, citing threats to its sovereignty. Additionally, it has refused to cooperate with the EU on the European Green Deal and has outright rejected the EU’s migration policies concerning the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Amid growing geopolitical tensions in the region, it becomes extremely necessary for Poland to amend its ties with the EU, strengthening overall European security vis-à-vis Russia.

Way Forward

The result of the election in Poland serves as a reminder for countries around the world that populism alone will not be enough to help them sustain power. PiS’s excessive authoritarian policies, along with interfering in the domain of the judiciary, a hyper-adversarial attitude towards the LGBTQ+ community, and blind opposition to the EU, were rejected by Polish voters.

As mentioned earlier, there may be some initial constitutional hindrances in front of Mr. Tusk, like the President calling PiS to form the government due to it being the largest party in the Sejm. Even after becoming Prime Minister for Mr. Tusk, the immediate reversal of policies will not be possible.

This election may be the first of many European elections that may take a pro-EU shift in the future. With due deliberation with his coalition partners, the new government has to make sure the relationship with the EU picks up from where it was raptured, in addition to making sure that support for Ukraine doesn’t fall short in the domestic population, for it is consequential since Poland is a NATO ally and plays a very crucial role in deterring Russia against the West.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Over its decades of independence, Myanmar has undergone a turbulent history marked by military authority, civil conflict, inadequate administration, and terrible poverty. Political unrest has plagued Myanmar since the military took control of the nation on February 1, 2021. However, this kind of upheaval is nothing new. Myanmar has had a sporadic democratic transition.

Following the Saffron Revolution in 2007, Myanmar enacted its third constitution in 2008, granting the military 25% of the seats in both chambers of Parliament as well as authority over the ministries of home affairs, defence, and border affairs. The constitution went into effect in 2011, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) won elections in 2015.

A major watershed moment happened in February 2021, when a military coup dashed Southeast Asia’s expectations for democratic transformation. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, staged a calamitous putsch two years ago, plunging the nation into further turmoil and economic disaster.

The second anniversary of the military “coup” in Myanmar, which occurred on February 1, 2023 was the NLD’s abortive attempt to retake power after winning a landslide victory in the November 2020 elections (which followed the first in 2015) under the 2008 constitution drafted by the military.

Following the coup, the military imposed a one-year state of emergency, detained, arrested, and ultimately sentenced to lengthy prison terms on pretences President Win Myint, State Counsellor and leader of the NLD, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other opposition figures. They also established a State Administration Council (SAC) to manage the day-to-day operations of the nation. 

The democratic “transition” that Senior General Than Shwe, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s politically astute predecessor, started with his seven-stage “road map” towards a “discipline-flourishing democracy” and which was ostensibly “fulfilled” with elections that brought the reformist, military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to power in 2010 has been effectively reversed together with subsequent developments.

Despite the military’s use of force against peaceful protestors and a widespread Civil Disobedience Movement, launched by government doctors in Yangon, and then against spontaneously proliferated new ‘People’s Defence Forces’ (PDFs) in Bamar and ethnic areas, as well as several long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the situation has not been stabilized.

The violence has led to thousands, if not tens of thousands of arrests, four judicial executions (including one involving a member of parliament), and an estimated 1.5 million people displaced in Myanmar and abroad (including an estimated 50,000 refugees in India). The military’s use of arson, artillery, airpower, and scorched earth policies has also caused widespread armed resistance and retaliation from the populace.

The Association for the Assistance of Political Prisoners (AAPP) has documented close to 3,000 deaths, with other estimates placing the number as high as 30,000.

Escalating Conflict 

After two years, the situation in Myanmar remains unresolved. Images of nonviolent protestors giving the three-fingered salute still accompany many news stories and opinion pieces about the nation, but they no longer adequately capture the political unrest that exists there.  Instead, it seems like a bleak tapestry of political violence, with photos of bullet-riddled dead, burned-out communities, and uprooted families. The Tatmadaw has utilized its indiscriminate “four cuts” technique on the same people it claims to protect; the horrific methods that were previously used with impunity in ethnic minority areas have now been unleashed on the Bamar heartland.

Practically speaking, it is a war waged by the Tatmadaw (the name given to the Myanmar military as the leaders of Burma’s independence movement) against its people, free from the stigma associated with being classified as “majoritarian,” “sectarian,” “ethnic,” “religious,” “minority,” “left,” “right,” or “communist,” and, on the other hand, a “people’s war” that primarily employs guerilla tactics against the Tatmadaw. Even those EAOs that have traditionally disagreed with the Tatmadaw and rejected their peace proposals have been excluded from the fight for tactical or political reasons.

Following the coup, the political opposition established the National Unity Government (NUG), which is supported by the wider National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a committee consisting of deposed elected lawmakers, the Committee Representing the Pyidaunsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a Federal Democratic Union charter, a Defence Ministry, a military “high command,” and an announcement of a “defensive war” against the armed forces.

The state has designated the NUG as a ‘terrorist’ group, but the ‘people’s war’ is more than simply a fight for democracy, a federal union, or a civil conflict. It is now more accurately described as a brutal war for freedom.

Humanitarian Crisis

The above figures do not include the uncounted tens of thousands who died during the Covid-19 third wave, as well as deaths from preventable or treatable diseases as a result of a weakened health system, the toll among displaced and refugee communities, and rising suicides amid the country’s mental health crisis.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 17.6 million people, or about a third of Myanmar’s population, need humanitarian assistance, and around 1.3 million have been displaced since the coup.

These astonishing figures do not include the approximately 330,000 internally displaced people from conflicts before the coup.

They do not include the 1 million Rohingya refugees who have been languishing in Bangladeshi camps for the last five years, having been ignored by the world community and preyed upon by their former protectors.

Economic Collapse

Myanmar’s economy continues to struggle after falling dramatically in 2021. Overall macroeconomic indicators seem to have stabilized, but they are hampered by falling productivity, foreign current and import permission limitations, insecurity, rolling blackouts, and rising inflation, all of which are exacerbated by heavy-handed SAC policies that change without notice.

Businesses are balancing between the junta and its adversaries, fearing crackdowns, bloodshed, and social humiliation.

Because of mismanagement, speculation, and rumours, the kyat has plummeted by half versus other currencies since the takeover. Those who still have money have hurried to acquire real estate and gold to protect against the kyat’s volatility. The financial sector looks to have stabilized as well, albeit it is still constrained.

International Response

Nonetheless, despite a recent December 2022 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669 (its first on Myanmar since 1948, on which Russia, China, and India abstained), Myanmar remains in the shadow of international and domestic media attention, with political resolution largely left to the ASEAN alliance, of which Myanmar is a member and its April 21, 2021 five-point consensus.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been unable to impose pressure on Myanmar due to disagreements on its approach to the country. Following a secret trial, Myanmar killed four pro-democracy campaigners in July of this year. The act was deemed “reprehensible” by ASEAN.

ASEAN, of which Myanmar became a full member in 1997, had asked the Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing to attend the ASEAN conference in Jakarta in 2021 when a five-point consensus—a road plan to cease violence, talk with pro-democratic activists, and return to democracy—was developed. Myanmar’s contempt for this agreement was evident when it refused to let an ASEAN special envoy meet with Aung San Suu Kyi and other imprisoned leaders.

ASEAN declined to allow General Min Aung Hlaing to attend the biennial ASEAN Summit in October 2023, stating that only “non-political” bureaucrats or officials may participate, and Myanmar refused to send a representative.

Despite worldwide censure, ASEAN remains divided on its engagement with Myanmar. Both India and China, who are striving for power in Myanmar, are still engaging with the Tatmadaw. Russia and Pakistan continue to send weapons to Myanmar’s military.

The refugee movement demonstrates the geographical effect of the military coup and the resulting unrest and bloodshed. In an act of ethnic cleansing, Myanmar displaced around 7 million Rohingyas from the Rakhine state during the 2017 conflict.

Even though Bangladesh was inundated with Rohingya migrants long before the coup, the violence has worsened. Other ethnic groups, like the Chins and other pro-democracy activists, have left the military crackdown and sought asylum in Myanmar’s neighbouring nations, India and Thailand. Myanmar has never had complete control over its borders. The violence is altering border regions, causing ethnic fragmentation and deepening fault lines. Political splintering will make it impossible for the nation to stay together, with major consequences for the area.

Conclusion

All of these tragedies are the result of an unjustified coup that ended Myanmar’s imperfect democratic experiment. The whole situation is man-made and could have been avoided. In contrast to other nations, Myanmar currently has two factions claiming to be its true government, but neither is willing to pursue a peaceful political settlement.

Whoever “wins” will discover a burnt environment, impoverished people, and a future in ruins. As a result, in addition to guaranteeing an open political discussion, ASEAN is responsible for providing humanitarian help to those in need. While isolating the nation will not restore normality, a comprehensive strategy is required to enable an open discourse. Military authorities in Myanmar must be pressed to engage in consultative engagement with all stakeholders, particularly the NUG and key EAOs, to restore peace and stability.

By: Harshit Tokas, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Israel-Hamas conflict has been a long-standing and deeply entrenched issue in the Middle East, with profound regional and global implications. The recent escalation of violence, including the surprise attack by Hamas on southern Israel on October 07, 2023 and subsequent retaliation on Northern Gaza, has once again brought the conflict to the forefront of international attention. This article explores the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, its regional implications, and the dynamics involving major global players.

The roots of the Israel-Hamas conflict can be traced back to the late 1980s when Hamas emerged as a Palestinian resistance movement. The group, founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was born out of frustration and opposition to the Oslo Accords, which sought to establish a framework for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Hamas is deeply entrenched in the Gaza Strip and is known for its armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

The conflict revolves around key issues such as the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, the status of Jerusalem, the rights of Palestinian refugees and the establishment of a Palestinian state. These unresolved issues have led to a series of violent confrontations over the years.

The surprise attack by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades into southern Israel on October 07, 2023 shocked the region. Thousands of Israeli and Palestinian civilians have lost their lives in the subsequent violence. This attack, occurring on Israeli soil, was unprecedented and deeply traumatic for the Israeli population, unaccustomed to such large-scale violence.

In retaliation, Israel launched a brutal bombing campaign on Gaza, resulting in significant casualties and widespread destruction. This aggressive response prompted discussions about the lack of a clear endgame for Gaza and the seemingly punitive nature of the Israeli campaign against the 2.3 million Palestinians living in the besieged enclave, approximately half of whom are children.

As the conflict intensifies, there is increasing speculation about the possibility of an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. Such an operation in this densely populated urban territory would likely result in a high number of casualties on both sides and raise critical questions about the future of Hamas, the Gaza population, and regional dynamics.

The prospect of an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza raises significant concerns among Arab states in the region. Responses to such a campaign and its aftermath would likely reveal divisions among Arab governments.

Arab states that normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020, namely Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have openly criticized Hamas for the October attack. In contrast, other Arab states have either firmly opposed normalization with Israel or refrained from joining the Abraham Accords. These include Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

The response of these Arab states to an Israeli invasion of Gaza is expected to be directly proportional to their relationships with Israel. The UAE, with its close ties to Israel and a mild approach to criticism, is likely to take a more measured stance than other Arab states that may be critical of such an invasion.

Regime legitimacy is a crucial variable in determining Arab states’ responses to an Israeli invasion of Gaza. Arab governments that are concerned about their own legitimacy and face internal pressures may adopt more vocal and critical stances in response to the conflict.

Public opinion on the Palestinian cause is an essential issue for Arab citizens. The plight of the Palestinians holds great significance in the collective identity of many Arabs and Muslims. While the public emphasizes the importance of the Palestinian issue, ruling elites often have different priorities.

Any escalation of suffering, human rights violations, and war crimes in Gaza could lead to popular mobilization in solidarity with the Palestinians. This mobilization could be directed not only against Israel but also against ruling elites with formal or informal relationships with Tel Aviv and close partnerships with Washington.

Anger among citizens of Arab countries could shift from being directed against Israel and the United States to their own governments. Arab states, particularly authoritarian ones, have often used the Palestinian cause as an outlet for public sentiment against Israel, instead of addressing domestic issues. The region has seen widespread protests, particularly post-Arab Spring, against the socio-economic and socio-political conditions in many Arab countries.

These protests indicate that Arab populations are increasingly frustrated with their governments and seek political and economic reforms. Public demonstrations, ostensibly in support of Palestine, can become an outlet for grievances against authoritarian regimes.

The looming Israeli ground invasion of Gaza raises questions about how countries in the Abraham Accords might respond. While it is unlikely that any Arab state in the normalization camp would abrogate their normalization deal with Israel, it is possible that they may take symbolic steps to express their concerns.

Countries like the UAE and Bahrain, which have benefited from the Abraham Accords, might choose to withdraw ambassadors or cool their relations with Tel Aviv. This middle-ground approach would allow them to maintain the benefits of their normalization agreements while aligning with domestic and regional public opinion.

The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict takes place in the context of a changing global landscape. China has deployed warships to the Middle East, and Russia has strongly condemned the U.S. for its role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, and GCC members, are closely watching China and Russia’s involvement in the crisis. These great powers are major players in the region, and their actions could significantly impact the balance of power and influence in the Middle East.

The world is becoming increasingly multipolar, with multiple centers of power and influence. China and Russia’s coordinated response to the Israel-Hamas conflict is a significant development, as it represents a departure from previous dynamics.

The involvement of China and Russia could reshape the Gaza final solution, the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the regional order. Their presence may influence the actions and reactions of regional states, including those in the Arab world.

The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict is a deeply entrenched and complex issue with far-reaching regional and global implications. The recent escalation in violence and the potential for an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza have sparked concerns among Arab states and raised questions about the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements.

Furthermore, the role of great powers like China and Russia in the region adds another layer of complexity to the conflict. The world’s changing dynamics and the multipolar nature of international relations underscore the need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to address the Israel-Hamas conflict and its ramifications for the Middle East and beyond.

By: Barsha Hazarika, Research Analyst, GSDN

In geopolitics, the kind of neighbor one has can make a big difference. A good neighbor can mean beneficial security and trade relations. A bad neighbor can mean a border crisis, resource conflict, and war. Mexico, by most measures, is a good neighbor to the USA. It’s been long since the two nations had any military conflict. And Mexico is arguably the US’s most important trading partner. This closeness has allowed the United States to rely on peace in its neighborhood and to focus on other issues abroad. This US neighbor is an emerging country with the 15^th largest economy in the world. It is America’s most important trading partner ahead of China and Canada.

Today, some 11 million Mexicans and 35 million Mexican Americans are a big part of the US population. Mexico is also important regarding the USA’s shared environment along the border in terms of industries, waterways and overall security.

It is said that no other country in the world affects day-to-day life in the United States than Mexico. However, there are a few hot-button issues in the USA regarding Mexico, like trade, immigration, and drug trafficking.

Trade relations: in 2022, an estimated US$ 855 billion in trade was conducted between Mexico and the United States, affecting 5 billion jobs. Again, that’s higher than overall trade with China in the same year. So today, when we look at products in the US, Mexico and Canada are integral in making these products, and these countries are big buyers of US goods and services when they make products. So, for instance, a product that comes in from Mexico, on average, about 40 % of the product is made in the US. So, US workers put things together that are then sent to Mexico to be assembled. If you look at a product from China, it’s less than 4% made in the US, so almost everything is made on the other side of the ocean. Hence, Mexico and the US are essential to each other because they make things together.

However, there is a downside in this trade relation for the US in the form of NAFTA. It is because there was the loss of United States manufacturing jobs. As higher-paying factory jobs relocated to more cost-effective countries, many jobs went from the United States to Mexico. This was especially true in lower-skilled industries like automotive and textiles. Between 1994 and 2010, the US trade deficit with Mexico totaled US$ 97.2 billion. In the same period, 682,900 U.S. jobs were displaced.

Almost 80% of losses were in manufacturing. California, New York, Michigan, and Texas were the hardest-hit states. They had a high concentration of industries that moved plants to Mexico.

There was a trade deficit of US$ 131.1 billion with Mexico in 2022, which is estimated to increase. US exports mainly raw materials and other parts that return to the US as finished goods. For instance, US auto parts export of US$13 billion returned in the US$ 30 billion worth of cars and trucks imported from Mexico each year. Unlike Canada and Chile, the US’ other established free trade partners, Mexico isn’t developing into a major consumer market for American products. 

Peter Navarro, a former senior adviser to the US President on trade and industry, stated that a deficit threatens national security because the United States depends on foreign debt and investment to finance it.  In terms of trade, USA is clearly at a disadvantage with Mexico.

On July 01, 2020 USMCA came into force, substituting NAFTA in the hope of a more mutually beneficial trade agreement between all the partners- USA, Canada, and Mexico.

Illegal immigration: Immigration that is most talked about in USA. Former US President Donald J Trump has declared constantly that the presence of immigrants on US soil has eroded the security of the country, both historically and in present times. The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the 45^th federal administration of the United States places the immigration policy as a top priority in order to protect the homeland, its nationals, and the “American way of life.” That is why the former President has raised the need to build a physical wall at the southern border and to reshape the immigration policy, which has sparked major controversy.

However, it is not about Mexican migration as much but about migration from other places that come through Mexico. Since 2014 and 2015, the USA has seen waves of Central Americans coming through Mexico’s border to the United States. This migration is mainly driven by violence, poverty, bad governance, corruption, etc. Many Central Americans are looking for a life elsewhere, and many have pulled into the United States. The most significant spike of migrants was from Central America, particularly from the northern triangle. In this sense, Mexico is not only an export country; it is also a transit country and is becoming a receiving country. Recent cases of migration include lots of Haitians coming, tens of thousands. So, Mexico has become a gateway for migration to the United States.

In 2016, nearly 44 million immigrants living in the United States, representing 13.5% of the total population. The National security strategy, states that “illegal immigration [….] burdens the economy, hurts American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals.”

This poses a huge problem for the USA to deal with, as Mexico doesn’t have the capacities or the resources even close to what is required to deal with this problem professionally or humanely.

Organized crime: it is one problem that has been persistent for decades. The 2023 Mexico Peace Index finds that the national organized crime rate has risen by 64.2 percent in the past eight years. The rate has climbed every year since 2016, with the exception of a slight decrease in 2020. According to Al Jazeera, “Today Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America. Since the late ’80s and ’90s, Mexico has become one of the most significant sources of drugs imported into the US, starting with marijuana and cocaine and then moving into 2010 to meth. Today, much of the fentanyl that comes into the States from abroad comes through Mexico. Due to illegal drugs, particularly in recent years, the rise of fentanyl, about 70,000 Americans died last year from fentanyl and opioid overdose. Mexico supplies almost the entire US drug market.

Security is a massive issue in the US-Mexico relations and goes both ways. The US has not been able to curb the sale of guns to the Mexican cartels, which has become an irritant. Mexican cartel has become all-powerful and is even a threat to the state.

It impacts American businesses, tourism, and border-area security, and its effect is predicted to grow. In one survey, nearly half of American companies in Mexico said fear over drug violence was affecting their expansion plans. For 20 years, Columbia endured of chaos, terrorism, and warfare with its neighbor due to drug gangs.

Democratic backsliding: Mexico has operated as an electoral democracy for nearly three decades, despite corruption, violence, and inequality, with political competition and a thriving civil society. But in recent years, Mexico’s autonomous institutions are gradually losing their ability to serve as a counterweight to the executive under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a pugnacious and popular leader who stormed to power in 2018. Many people on both sides of the border are concerned that recent reforms to Mexico’s National Electoral Institute may erode the country’s ability to assure the quality and integrity of elections and significantly influence the quality of Mexico’s democracy.

Mexico is embroiled in a heated debate over the future of its democracy. The United States should pay close attention, maybe even more so given the ongoing dispute over the functioning of American democracy.

These are major challenges that directly affect the United States in terms of security and prosperity. That is why the USA needs a stable Mexico at its border, but these are some huge issues that hit deep political, social, and economic nerves that the USA needs to deal with.  However, these challenges are being addressed through cooperation between the two governments. But this has been the most challenging part of the relationship because it is hard to know what to do in complex issues like building capacity to manage tens of thousands of people flowing through. And one of the more significant challenges is that Mexico needs more capacity to do that. Misunderstanding about the shared problem has emerged as a theme over and over again in US-Mexico relations.

What happens in Mexico will continue to affect the lives of Americans every day. So, if Mexico does well, America will do well. If Mexico is doing poorly, it will be a massive problem for the United States.

Both have a history of long partnerships, and there would be an enormous problem if the relationship deteriorates.

By: Aishwarya Dutta and Chaitanya Deshpande

History of Five Eyes

Recent events in Canada which led to the straining of bilateral relations between India and Canada have sparked a controversy in the international political scenario. The killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Khalistani terrorist on June 18, 2023 has caused major disruptions. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is allegedly suspecting the role and involvement of the Indian government behind the killing. Though India has rejected the allegations as “absurd”, it is also aware that these events would affect the talks regarding India’s inclusion in the Five Eyes.  The Five Eyes (FVEY) is an intelligence alliance created for cooperation in signals intelligence, i.e., intelligence gathering through the interception of signals. The formal foundation of the organization took place in the aftermath of the World War II, through the Multilateral Agreement for Co-operation in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), known as the UK-USA Agreement, on March 05, 1946. There is an exchange of a wide range of intelligence within the grouping. It is one of the most secretive and powerful intelligence-sharing alliances in the world.

Informal secret meetings that took place during the World War II between USA and UK, the then Allied powers who were fighting to counter the Axis uprising in the world, served as the base for the Five Eyes alliance. While the origins of the alliance date back to World War I, it wasn’t until the early 1940s that the alliance started taking formal shape. It was formally signed on March 05, 1946 between the US and UK. Canada joined in 1949 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956. Together it came to be known as the Five Eyes. However, it was not until 2010 that the alliance was fully made public. Until the 1990s, the member states were mostly bound by a common goal of defeating the Soviet Union in every aspect. Post the Cold War, the Five Eyes were also responsible for some of the most egregious human rights abuses carried out by the Anglosphere.

Relation between the Anglosphere and five eyes

The Five Eyes has been hailed as the ‘Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere.’ ‘Anglosphere’ is one of the salient terms we come across in International Relations. It is a shorthand for the Anglo-American sphere of influence, representing a major transnational community. The Anglosphere has been the architect and a staunch proponent of international norms. It has incubated and hatched the institutional norms and philosophies that continue to dominate the international security architecture.

The FVEY has been an infrastructure of surveillance with a global reach and it remains one of the most complex and far-reaching intelligence and espionage alliances in the history of the world. Each and every member of the alliance is equally responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis over specific regions of the world. The states comprising the Anglosphere share several convergent aspects: common language and principles, liberal democratic values, similar national interests and strategic cultures. These characteristics foster mutual understanding, trust and respect. The alliance is thus the ‘gold standard’ of intelligence alliances. It is an enormous asset to keep the citizens of the ‘English-speaking World’ safer and maintain mutual trust and partnership among them.

The debate around India’s Possible Inclusion into the Alliance

The proposal of reforms and expansion of the Alliance consisting of Anglo-Saxon countries has been in discussion since 2020. US Congress Subcommittee on Intelligence and Operations had suggested that “in light of Great Power Competition, Five Eyes Countries must work closer together, as well as expand the circle of trust to other like-minded democracies.” It mentioned the names of Japan, Germany, India and South Korea as proposed members.

Out of these four, India is the only country which doesn’t have a formal alliance with the USA or Anglo-Saxon world. Also, India is undoubtedly not an Anglo-Saxon country which will fit into an inherently Anglo-Saxon Intelligent alliance. Despite these facts, India’s increasing strategic convergence with the US, Australia and the UK allowed the possibility of including India in FVEY. With India’s concerns about cross-border terrorism and other security threats, inclusion in FVEY had generated the possibility of having unparalleled state of art of intelligence from countries like the USA and the UK.

Also, the proposed expansion was more or less focused on countering China using intelligence agencies of India, Japan and South Korea. Though this proposal is politically attractive when the USA is trying to build many alliances in the Indo-Pacific Region like QUAD and AUKUS in light of increasing Chinese assertiveness, the question is whether there is a deep trust between the intelligence agencies of Five Eyes and the proposed members.

Similarly, members apart from the USA and the UK had expressed concerns over the ‘expansion’ of the Five Eyes Alliance. It is also pointed out that India and the other three proposed members don’t have common worldviews on global threats such as terrorism which the existing members of the FYEY have.

Anglosphere, Five Eyes and Nijjar Case

The talks of the inclusion of India in the Five Eyes have vanished in the air. The current diplomatic standoff between India and Canada has brought the Five Eyes Alliance back into the limelight. US Ambassador to Canada, David Cohen, said during the CTV interview that there was ‘shared intelligence amongst Five Eyes partners’ before the Canadian PM accused India of involvement in the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar. He also said that ‘this was a matter of shared intelligence information.’

The Five Eyes providing intelligence pointing out towards possible hand of Indian intelligence agencies in the killing of a Khalistani separatist and a ‘Canadian Citizen’ has many implications.  Despite the close relations between the US and India, Anglospheric Five Eyes could encircle India with doubts and insist on cooperation with Canada in the investigation as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken asserted the same. This shows that The Five Eyes as an alliance don’t consider India as a close and trustful partner to be a member of the Anglosphere Intelligence Alliance.

Though the US might be willing to cooperate on a range of issues including QUAD and other issues especially when the US has become India’s largest trading partner, the other members of the Five Eyes especially Canada and New Zealand have a history of roller coaster relationships with India. Given the tough diplomatic situation, the hopes of optimists who were seeing India as a member of Five Eyes have been smoked out.

Thus, the situation between India and Canada has shadowed any possibility of expansion of Five Eyes. The talks of expansion in 2020 have disappeared with time. Also, there are fundamental disagreements about the expansion within the Five Eyes. The Five Eyes institutionalize the conception of Anglosphere in a very tightly knit security alliance. The recent India-Canada standoff made the alliance closer and tighter, ruling out any possibility of expansion at least in the near future.

By: Vaishnavi Verma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Smaller but strategically significant states are sometimes used as a stage for a battle between larger powers aiming for regional domination. The Maldives, also known as the Republic of Maldives, is no exception. The Indian Ocean archipelago has a population of fewer than 500,000 people and a total land area of less than 300 square kilometres. However, the Maldives’ closeness to crucial internal marine trade lines, as well as its participation in the Sino-Indian competition, has long put it in the geopolitical spotlight. In addition to being closely observed for their potential regional ramifications, the recent Maldivian elections were also closely observed for their internal politics.

However, the Maldives’ closeness to crucial internal maritime trade lines, as well as its participation in the Sino-Indian competition, has long put it in the geopolitical spotlight. The outcome of the recently finished presidential elections, and the success of pro-China candidate Mohamed Muizzu, has once again thrust the Maldives into the global spotlight, causing foreign policymakers throughout the globe to turn heads and take note.

The Maldives, a tourist destination known for its exquisite tropical beaches, has long been considered to be within India’s sphere of influence. It is just 70 nautical miles from Minicoy Island in India and 300 nautical miles from India’s Western Coast.

The Maldives’ location in the northern Indian Ocean places it near seas patrolled and even controlled by Indian Navy vessels. India has long had cultural, ethnic, and political relations with the Maldives. India is well aware of this, and it is virtually always represented in speeches and official papers. In a document dated June 03, 2023 India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) asserts that “India has a pre-eminent position in the Maldives,” having relationships in “virtually most areas.”

India, via its naval forces, has often been the first to respond to natural catastrophes such as the 2004 Tsunami and the 2014 water crisis in the Maldives. India has also displayed its military strength in the Maldives, assisting the government in repelling an attempted military coup in 1988. India maintains little military presence on the island. India has given the Maldives defense-related facilities and equipment in recent decades, in addition to the regular military presence. These include a military hospital, a coastal surveillance radar system, and the $500 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project, which will connect Malé with several neighbouring islands.

The Maldives’ presidential election was won by pro-Beijing candidate Mohamed Muizzu, who defeated incumbent President Ibrahim Solih in the runoff round. This change may cause concern in New Delhi since there are fears of China gaining more sway in the historically Indian-friendly Maldives.

Through the “India First” strategy, Solih advocated for better connections with New Delhi. Several agreements were reached as a consequence of the endeavour, including authorization for India to establish minor military detachments.

Implications for India and China

The Maldivian Democratic Party is headed by outgoing President Ibrahim Solih, while President-elect Mohamed Muizzu leads a coalition of opposition parties. Solih, who has been president since 2018, was running for re-election. Muizzu, on the other hand, won a run-off election with little more than 54% of the vote. Muizzu was the mayor of Male, the national capital, before campaigning for president. He was also a cabinet minister under previous President Abdulla Yameen, whose term witnessed an increase in hostilities between India and the Maldives.

The anticipated shift in Maldivian politics advantages China more than anybody else and would upset the geopolitical balance in India’s vicinity, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. This election was a first for the area since it was framed as a contest between the slogans “India First” and “India Out.” This postulation was avoidable. Some called the elections a virtual referendum on India or China. The opposition party did not mask its pro-China leaning and staked its claim to power on the sovereignty plank of no foreign troops on Maldivian soil.

Muizzu built his campaign on the “India Out” platform, and he ended up with 54% of the vote in the runoff election on September 30, 2023. Viewed as a supporter of pro-China former president Abdulla Yameen of the Maldives, Muizzu has opted to characterize the Indian military’s deployment in the Maldives as an assault on the nation’s sovereignty. It won’t be exaggerated to say that China is expected to gain the goodwill that India has had under President Solih for the last five years.

In recent years, President Solih had adopted a strategy that is sceptical of China. China is eager to have free commerce with the Maldives. A ‘free-trade’ agreement between the two countries defies logic as it would blatantly and significantly favor China, an economic giant with a GDP of USD 18 trillion compared to the Maldives’ USD 5 billion. Solih had managed to stave off the Chinese by putting the agreement in virtual cold storage.

Talks on the deal are likely to pick up steam with Muizzu leading the team in the not-too-distant future. Muizzu said that his administration would not compromise the Maldives’ sovereignty and would not be close to any nation. There seems to be a small lean towards China, but Maldives’ internal dynamics will lead the government towards a balanced foreign policy.

India has shown the Maldives great generosity since 2018, giving billions of dollars to help the nation pay off enormous debts left by the previous administration, giving vaccinations during the COVID-19 outbreak and making its own planned infrastructure initiatives.

While India has increased its collaboration with the Maldives in the previous five years, China has been increasing its footprint in the Indian Ocean archipelago since 2010. China constructed infrastructure in the Maldives, including bridges, resorts, buildings, museums, and housing projects, as well as investing in renewable energy, tourism, and telecommunications.

Under the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing sponsored various infrastructure projects, forcing the Maldives to owe $935 million in sovereign guarantees to Chinese enterprises and another $600 million to the Chinese government. 

A pro-China president returns to office after a protracted absence, and he plans to enact more pro-China measures. However, the recent election of Muizzu will also throw in a need to maintain a careful balance between Beijing and New Delhi due to India’s significant participation in the Indian Ocean archipelago.

Despite the Maldives’ rising mistrust of India, Muizzu will need to take other aspects into account, such as Indian-sponsored infrastructural initiatives. In diplomacy, there are no everlasting allies or adversaries. The global landscape is evolving, and Muizzu’s anti-Indian policies may be detrimental to the Maldives as well as the economy of the region. The Maldives and India have very synergistic relationships, making it impossible for one to exist without the other. Strategic, socioeconomic, and most critically, security interests are shared by both.

Conclusion

New Delhi must evade the perception of endorsing certain groups within the political landscape of the Maldives. President-elect Muizzu now must keep the promise to sustain close relations between India and the Maldives.

Notably, he has not condemned India in the same way that his party has. President-elect Muizzu may need to find a balance between India, its nearest neighbor, and engagement with China and the United States, both of whom are keenly monitoring regional events. Both Delhi and Male must address these concerns without resorting to the ‘zero-sum’ game, which has damaged their ties in the past.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Introduction

As the British decided to exit India in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, aspiring to keep the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as an independent nation, did not accede to either India and Pakistan. Pakistan laid claim on Kashmir since it is a Muslim majority region. It ignored the fact that the criterion of division along religious majority applied only to the regions directly colonized by the British and not to princely states like Jammu & Kashmir.

Operation Gulmarg was launched by Pakistan on the intervening night of October 21-22, 1947 with Srinagar as the main target. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India on October 26, 1947 thereby acceding to the Indian Union. While the whole of the erstwhile J&K State acceded to India, portions of it came to be illegally occupied by Pakistan and has been under Pakistan’s unlawful control ever since. The area of Gilgit-Baltistan is of great strategic importance and plays an increasingly important role in the security calculus of nations in the region.

Over the decades, Pakistan has repeatedly ceded parts of Gilgit-Baltistan to China in return for Beijing’s help in infrastructure development and support in international forums. Under the pretext of “liberating” the region from India, Pakistan has not only turned Gilgit-Baltistan into a colonial-inspired administrative entity, but also excluded the region from its constitution, deprived the people of their political, legislative, and judicial rights, and subjected them to demographic

Sectarian Divide & Identity Crisis

Gilgit-Baltistan is made up of ethnic and sectarian groups that are considered minorities in Pakistan. Shia Muslims, Ismailis, and Noor Bakshis have been the most populous communities, and they have mostly coexisted peacefully in this region. Despite the fact that the region’s indigenous peoples have common ethnic, linguistic, social, and cultural ties, the Pakistani state has incited and fuelled interethnic strife in order to achieve its own security goals.

In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, abolished the State Subjects Rule, which prohibited outsiders from obtaining land in the area, as part of his efforts to Islamize the area. The action was taken in an attempt to confront the Shia population, who made up the majority in Gilgit-Baltistan, and their developing sense of sectarianism. In addition, he supported and enabled Sunni immigrants from other regions of the nation to relocate to the Northern Areas. Centuries of peaceful coexistence between the Shia and Sunni populations in the Northern Areas were progressively destroyed by the inflow of non-natives.

In May 1988, groups of Sunni zealots from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), supported by locals, raided Shia villages on the outskirts of Gilgit, killing many. These attacks were followed by other violent incidents against Shias in 1990, 1992, 1993, 2001, and 2005. These events and the violence have created a sectarian divide between the small parts of Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan, with a majority Sunni population in PoJK and a majority Shia population in Gilgit-Baltistan. While the parties in POJK want to merge Gilgit Baltistan with them, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan want to reunite with India because of its fraternal treatment in Pakistan.

In 2009, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under President Asif Zardari issued the Gilgit-Baltistan Order, which stated that the region would remain part of the Northern Areas as Gilgit-Baltistan. The Order was later revoked and replaced by the 2018 Order when the government led by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi introduced the Order after the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in December 2013, which abolished the legislative powers of the elected assembly in Gilgit-Baltistan. The 2018 ordinance ensured that real authority rested with none other than the country’s prime minister. The earlier assertion that the council, headed by the prime minister, had primary authority was abandoned. The 2018 decree ensured that the region has no control over roads or highways, as it is the starting point of CPEC, and that highways remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the government. It also removed taxation powers, which increased the region’s financial dependence on Islamabad.

According to reports, since January 2001, the traditional population ratio of 1:4 (non-natives to natives) has shifted to 3:4. Non-Shia populations continue to grow in regions historically controlled by Shia, such as Skardu and Gilgit. The Pakistani government has attempted to alter the demographic character of Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making the indigenous population a minority. Non-natives have been allocated significant swaths of land in the Gilgit and Skardu districts. Other strangers have purchased large tracts of property because they are better off economically than the locals. The increased settlement of Punjabi and Pashtun outsiders has instilled fear among the locals.

Way Forward

Pakistan’s fixation with Kashmir reflects its goal for territorial acquisition rather than meeting the aspirations of its people. The fact that it chose to invade Kashmir rather than wait for the people to decide its future proves that its reasoning about “respecting the will of the people” was not very valid to begin with. Its seven-decade-long efforts to dilute the population and extract maximum benefits from the land of Gilgit-Baltistan are proof of its nefarious intentions.

It is imperative for India to engage with the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan and the nationalist groups that expect moral support from India, so that the downward spiral in the life and living of the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan is put to an end. If India reaches out to these groups, it is likely that more voices will rise in support of Gilgit-Baltistan’s reunification with India, a viewpoint that has gained traction recently despite Pakistan’s efforts to suppress the voices. It is also important that New Delhi works to draw international attention to the atrocities in Gilgit-Baltistan in every possible international forum. By highlighting the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan, India will not only give a voice to the people of the region, but also shine a light on that region of Jammu & Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan, which seems to have been forgotten by everyone.

By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The QSD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), commonly known as the QUAD, and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) are two important alliances which have a direct bearing on the Indo-Pacific Region. The beginning of QUAD in 2007 with the strategic interest of the US, India, Australia, and Japan to balance the natural calamity of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and its catastrophic aftermath. One of the deadliest natural disasters in history took more than two lakh lives along with the destruction of the economies creating a havoc situation around the affected countries. A number of programs and humanitarian responses were launched by the navies of Australia, Japan, and India along with the US providing the base for the operation from Indonesia to Madagascar. With the dynamic coupling of freedom and prosperity, the idea of QUAD was resurrected by the former Prime Minister of Japan Abe when he visited India in 2007 with picturesque boundaries of ‘broader Asia.’

In the continuation of security cooperation with swirling activities, the QUAD in 2008 was relinquished in itself with the blurry face of extremely negative reaction from China in the aftermath of the reaction against the inclusion of regional countries to sign up for their vision and approach. However, the reactivation of QUAD, in 2017, brought a series of strategic meetings with the vision of structural realism as brought by Kenneth Waltz vide areas of cooperation ranging from diplomatic ties, maritime connectivity and developmental assistance to infrastructure, cyber security, and people-to-people connect. With the tangible objective of QUAD to advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, the identity is strengthening with discernible challenges of China’s geopolitical interests along with negation of letting other countries become the geographical hegemon of the Indo-pacific cum South East Asian region. 

Whereas, in the twentieth century, after the two world wars when the world was divided into two halves of capitalism and communism backed by the US and USSR respectively, Asia had little role to play in world politics, despite various dimensions of groupings like Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which was the voice of global south. It was the culmination of this process, Asia did not offer much, nor did the West heeded it, where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came into existence in 1967 with ten founding members. The promotion of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the spirit of equality, partnership, and prosperity was envisioned and culminated in the Bangkok declaration of August 08, 1967 to achieve considerable results in the economic field, for instance, high economic growth, poverty alleviation, substantial trade facilitation and two-way investment flows keeping liberalization measures intact in. 

Since the beginning, the ASEAN states strived for a “balance” between China and India. Although member states were aware of the Chinese presence in their vicinity, they never showcased this point openly and gave due recognition and importance to China, while simultaneously engaging with India pragmatically. This is often called as “ASEAN way” of dealing with the two most powerful nations in its backyard. Over the years, the gradual expansion of the organization was recognizable, as other countries of the region (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) became members of it. Southeast Asia represents the world’s third-largest population market along with fifth-largest economy. Since, Southeast Asia is the heart of the Indo-Pacific, geographically, between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, all major players (the United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia) engaged in shaping the strategic contestation in a vast region stretching from East Africa to the South Pacific. ASEAN seeks to encourage multilateralism by playing a central role as ASEAN-led mechanisms. Nonetheless, while achieving the goals there exists a myriad of obstacles and impediments to ASEAN’s regional strategic trajectories. 

Recognizing the statement of amalgamation as a consequence of external factors and internal disturbances

The most serious charge of failure pertains to the weakening of institutions and politicization of intelligence. The shifting of regional supply chains, the fulcrum of ASEAN’s vision, is a further matter of concern that could do more harm to ASEAN countries to do any good. China has always been ASEAN’s imperative economic partner. 

Logistic infrastructure and skilled labor give a compelling advantage to ASEAN countries which renders a profound opportunity to the domestic market of ASEAN countries. For instance, if QUAD countries established their secondary sector bases in ASEAN countries, the basic requirements of manufacturing, still, will be coming from none other than China. Even though small economic assistance can be provided by other non-member states as well to a larger extent it is non-undependable to China. Likewise, QUAD countries cannot make assumptions about the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) without recognizing ASEAN’s position and role as outlined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Without unity, the ASEAN’s centrality loses much of its credibility, a dynamic regional grouping that aims to promote economic and security cooperation among its ten members is losing its credibility due to an ongoing geopolitical shift in the unity among the members due to an underlying not-to-ignore China and USA proxy war factor. Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia are not in favor of the US offering nuclear submarines to Australia. The presence of various developments led by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) is equally alarming for many ASEAN member states due to strategic interests. The recent ASEAN nine-member summit started without Myanmar’s presence, is again an internal complication that this grouping is facing which might flip the possible geopolitical interests.

Today, ASEAN is divided where seven out of ten members incline towards China’s plate to eradicate their starving disposition according to their requirements. It will be very difficult to define which side ASEAN is going to take either China or the US but as we discussed earlier the ‘balancing’ factor is what ASEAN member states strategic interest lies in. 

Vision and Challenges 

Collision between QUAD members and China, in and around Southeast Asia, is a concern for ASEAN nations. Therefore, there are numerous challenges for ASEAN and QUAD in securing a conducive environment for integrated measures. The first and foremost is the rising power factor in the region, which is none other than China, as how to get China engaged with Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific grouping QUAD for the advancement of logistic supply chains in the region.

Another challenge is the increasing nature of institutionalisation of the QUAD which might take a u-turn to unbalance ASEAN centrality. Earlier, Indonesia saw QUAD as a potential threat coalition as an ‘outsider’ power to hinder sides of ASEAN member states. “Formalisation of structure” as proposed by US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun in a diplomatic summit posed an invitation for the confluence of ASEAN and QUAD architecture. Again, it’s a complete 180-flipping position. However, with the magnitude of the future prospects, there lies another challenge as to how to avoid regional technological fragmentation of so-called “choosing sides” with major powers along the narrow lines of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). 

The escalation of trade and geopolitical tension across the region plays a critical function in the Indo-Pacific region. Whereas soft balancing of ASEAN’s strategy brings forth the presence of the US in the region, while the continuation of engagement with China at various levels.

ASEAN has fundamental niches to attract the support of both, China and QUAD members for reaffirmation of ASEAN centrality. William TR Fox’s vision of a superpower lies in their wish to act in their own way but China as a major power cannot envision a BRI project without the involvement of Southeast Asia. On the same terms, QUAD cannot realize IPS without executing reaffirming terms with ASEAN. Therefore, to access BRI and IPS, ASEAN’s active presence is much required through which it can sail the boat without compromising its geopolitical interests. 

Synonymity of ASEAN and QUAD with Indian lens 

India recognized the importance of ASEAN in Asia in terms of trade and diplomacy and in world politics. This was substantiated by the fact that the economies of ASEAN countries along with China, Japan, and India played a dominant role in the 1990s and the trend continues to this day as well. The recent QUAD summit held in Japan on 22nd May, put forth productive dialogue in the development of the Indo-Pacific with shared democratic values and strategic interests. However, the execution of realistic principles is what these dialogues depend upon, nonetheless, reiteration of principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

But, India has to be very cautious of every step otherwise her geopolitical position can be an advantage for the US and China backed as a sandwich between two proxies. On the other side of diplomatic relations India and ASEAN hold a significant relationship since their participation in various forms of summits. In the recent stagnant ocean of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) where bilateral issues are much discernible among the member states, India has potential opportunities to explore in Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, India as a QUAD member renders a balanced vision which was inculcated in the recent ASEAN-India Summit held in Jakarta of a 12-point proposal from promoting multi-modal connectivity, mission LiFE to cyber security, and digital public infrastructure. Over the years, India has navigated the dynamicity of QUAD and ASEAN with the strategic presence of its rival China and its ruthless aggression. While rectifying internal differences and developing common programs for India and ASEAN, newer areas have been recognized such as cyber, financial, and maritime security domains. To build on the comprehensive strategic partnership between India and ASEAN, the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, convergence between the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”(AOIP), and India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative have to make their practical footing.

Way Forward

In the furtherance of peaceful coexistence, while maintaining diplomatic relations with other states without compromising on the national interest of their nations, there is a queue of connections that can be discussed here. ASEAN and QUAD had various options to consider without giving a thought to the pseudo-realistic idea of the amalgamation of two groupings. First, ASEAN and QUAD can try to limit the impact of political issues on the economic front while realizing the inner strength of their respective groupings. ASEAN community to strengthen ASEAN Economic Community to boost intra-regional trade and investment. Whereas, QUAD to reduce China’s domination in the region while focusing on intra-regional connectivity. Second, to avoid being caught between the QUAD and with dwindling position of the US and China in any dispute is imperative for ASEAN to seize the stability and prosperity of the region. In the Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN holds a central position both politically and geographically, therefore, inclusiveness and consensus building among the member states is highly crucial at this juncture of geopolitical uncertainty. This shared outlook also leans strongly towards a strong voice on critical issues related to diplomatic, and security concerns.

This map of navigating varied and complex relationships between QUAD and ASEAN is basically the rational choice approach by the actors of major powers as well as rising major powers among the region and across the globe. Lastly, the contextualization of geopolitical competition among state powers should be non-unbridled in nature to make a shift from repressing action towards active participation with wearing lens of ‘3S’ principles of statism, survival, and self-help.