By: Naveenika Chauhan

A new era of strategic realignment and tech sovereignty may have just started in a world reshaped by shifting alliances, weaponized trade, and a deepening global arms race, as India makes a decisive move, not just on the battlefield, but in the boardrooms of defense tech.

As the West scrambles to ramp up military-industrial complexes in response to rising geopolitical threats, India’s focus is different: strategic self-reliance. And the ₹61,000 crore fighter jet engine pact with France is undoubtedly more than a defense contract, it’s a strong declaration. A declaration that India will no longer remain a passive buyer in the global arms bazaar but intends to co-create, co-own, and ultimately, control the heart of its future aerial firepower.

The Indian Ministry of Defence has formally recommended a collaboration with France to co-develop next-generation fighter jet engines, a landmark breakthrough in the country’s long, often frustrating quest for engine sovereignty. After months of detailed consultations, stakeholder inputs, and a rigorous technical review process, France’s proposal was deemed more aligned with India’s long-term vision, edging out a competing offer from the UK’s Rolls Royce.

At the center of the ₹61,000 crore collaboration is the joint development of a 120kN thrust class engine that will power the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), India’s ambitious stealth fighter program. The proposal by French engine maker Safran includes a full transfer of technology (ToT), matching AMCA’s timeline, a move seen as rare and geopolitically significant, given the tight global control over core engine technologies.

More than a commercial agreement, it’s a critical leap in India’s attempt to build an indigenous defense ecosystem. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, a strong advocate of homegrown defense capabilities, has championed the engine development program as a cornerstone of India’s aerospace independence. The decision to collaborate with France is seen as strategic, both technically and diplomatically.

That said, the road to engine independence is far from over. The first fleet of AMCAs may still need to rely on US-made GE 414 engines, even as the indigenous engine evolves in parallel. With an expected demand of over 250 next-gen engines over the next decade, India is positioning itself for the long game, learning, manufacturing, and eventually mastering the one component that defines the true capability of a fighter aircraft: its powerplant.

Historically, India has struggled in this domain. The Kaveri engine project, despite years of R&D, failed to meet the required thrust levels. While a derivative of Kaveri is being repurposed for unmanned aerial platforms, it’s a reminder of how elusive fighter-grade engine technology remains guarded by a handful of nations.

Currently, every fighter aircraft in the Indian Air Force runs on a foreign engine — from the Sukhoi to the Rafale to the Tejas Mk1. Engine imports also make up a significant chunk of lifecycle costs, including maintenance, repair, and upgrades. With India also negotiating a separate technology transfer deal with the US for the GE414 INS6 engine (to power Tejas Mk2), including advanced features like hot-end coatings, single-crystal blades, and laser drilling, the geopolitical puzzle becomes even more layered.

But in choosing France for the AMCA engine, India may be signaling something beyond engineering a subtle but powerful recalibration of its global defense alignments.

Europe’s Military Boom, When Business Finds Opportunity in War

While India is investing in defense to break free from foreign dependence, Europe is moving in a very different direction: it’s turning war into an economic engine. As regional tensions escalate and NATO sets ambitious defense spending targets, a new breed of military-industrial capitalism is rising across the continent. Civilian companies are rebranding themselves as defense contractors, tech firms are building weapons-adjacent infrastructure, and the stock market is responding with unambiguous enthusiasm.

The numbers paint a telling picture. The Stoxx Europe Aerospace and Defense Index has surged over 50% since the beginning of the year, a meteoric rise driven by a collective European push to rearm. The European Commission’s €2 trillion budget proposal, with nearly €800 billion earmarked for defense, signals that the continent has fully embraced what Brussels is now openly calling its “era of rearmament.”

Hence, more than just weapons it signals transforming entire industries.

French telecom giant Orange, through its enterprise arm Orange Business, has launched a dedicated defense and homeland security division. Its goal is to merge civilian infrastructure with military needs. From sovereign cloud hosting to hybrid civilian-military networks and cybersecurity for emergency response systems, Orange is mobilizing its deep tech expertise to profit from defense sector expansion, not only in France, but across Europe and even for clients like NATO.

“We have a historically established activity in the sector,” said Nassima Auvray, who now heads Orange’s new defense division, “but until now it was fragmented.” Her mandate – consolidate capabilities across AI, cloud, and digital infrastructure to capture a larger slice of the European defense budget.

And Orange is not alone.

Swedish tech company Einride, best known for its autonomous electric freight trucks, is also entering the defense domain. Its latest AI-driven software, originally developed for optimizing logistics is now being deployed in hazardous, high-risk environments as part of confidential defense contracts. While the company remains tight-lipped on specifics, it has openly acknowledged that its autonomous vehicle systems are now being adapted for military use.

This blurring of lines between civil innovation and military application is not coincidental. It’s systemic.

As governments unlock huge defense budgets, private companies are repositioning themselves not out of necessity, but out of opportunity. From logistics to telecom to cloud computing, European firms are racing to become indispensable to the continent’s new war economy.

It’s a sharp contrast to India’s engine pact with France. India is not looking to militarize its economy but to insulate itself from geopolitical vulnerability. Europe, on the other hand, is embracing defense as a growth sector — a new industrial policy disguised as security preparedness.

At its core, this divergence reflects differing worldviews. India seeks sovereignty through creation. Europe seeks profit through conflict adaptation.

The West’s commercial reorientation toward defense is certainly not without precedent but rarely has it been this fast, this broad, and this lucrative.

The New Arsenal of Democracy?

Also expanding its arsenal in the rapidly escalating defense race is Fincantieri, the Italian cruise ship and mega-yacht builder that’s no stranger to steel and sovereignty. Long embedded in military contracts, the company has now sealed a €700-million pact to construct two multipurpose combat ships for the Italian Navy, in collaboration with fellow Italian defense behemoth Leonardo.

Fincantieri’s CEO Pierroberto Folgiero made no bones about the strategic pivot. Speaking to CNBC, he underscored that the company’s defense vertical is no longer a side project it’s becoming central to its core business. When asked whether NATO’s ambitious new 5% of GDP defense target would catalyze growth, his answer was clear: “Absolutely, yes.”

Folgiero pointed to a “distributed increase in demand for naval ships” across Europe and beyond not just as a reaction to geopolitical tensions, but as a restructuring of the global security order. The message to the West – is rebuilding its defense industrial base and this time, it’s looking long-term.

This bullish sentiment isn’t isolated to traditional players. Enter VRAI Simulation, a Dublin-based virtual reality training platform designed for high-risk sectors like aerospace and defense. CEO Pat O’Connor sees Ireland long a tech darling but militarily neutral as Europe’s stealth wildcard. “Ireland’s historical underinvestment in defense ironically presents us with an opportunity,” he argued. With a digital-first economy and a talent-rich ecosystem, Ireland could leapfrog legacy systems and position itself as a next-gen defense tech leader.

In a way, the continent’s defense realignment mirrors its economic ethos: modern, modular, and multinational. And it’s not just industrials getting bullish. Big money is circling too. Deutsche Bank CEO Christian Sewing recently admitted to a strategic shift stepping up allocations to defense after years of “under investing.” The war economy isn’t just an abstract concept anymore; it’s an asset class.

Even Temasek, Singapore’s heavyweight state investment fund, is eyeing opportunities in Europe’s militarized pivot. Chief Investment Officer Rohit Sipahimalani revealed that defense is now on their radar: “It’s clearly an area where there’s going to be a lot of capital spent.”

Whether it’s state contracts, shipyards, or simulations or sovereign funds and Silicon Valley-style innovation Europe seems to be rearming not just for battle, but for business. And for the first time in decades, war is becoming investable.

The Last Bit

In the face of rising global instability, both India and Europe are rewriting their defense playbooks but with fundamentally different intentions. One is engineering autonomy; the other is engineering advantage.

India’s ₹61,000 crore engine pact with France is a conscious pivot away from dependency, an investment not in war but in capability. It is about closing a technology gap that has, for decades, limited India’s strategic choices. The country is clearly building the ability to say “no” when needed, and “yes” on its own terms.

Europe, by contrast, is embracing defense not only as a matter of security, but as a source of industrial revival. From telecom giants to AI logistics firms to simulation startups, the continent is transforming its civilian tech base into a defense engine and in doing so, reviving a 21st-century version of its old military-industrial complex. The war economy is no longer a relic of the Cold War; it’s a growth vertical on corporate strategy decks and investment memos.

These two approaches – one defensive, the other opportunistic – speak volumes about where each region sees itself in the global order. For India, sovereignty is the end goal. For Europe, defense is the new business model.

But whether born of necessity or profit, both paths reveal a world where geopolitics no longer lives solely in parliaments or war rooms it is increasingly shaped in boardrooms, R&D labs, and bilateral tech pacts. As the engine pact with France shows, sovereignty today isn’t just about borders. It’s about blueprints.

And India, at long last, is claiming its place on the drawing board.

By: Suryendu Bhattacharya

In International Politics, the universally accepted oldest actor is known to be the state. But with the advent of globalisation, there have been advent of multiple actors outside the purview of the state, such as MNCs. TNCs, IGOs, NGOs, Civil Societies, Terrorist Organisations, Religious Organisations or Diasporas, termed as non-state actors. In modern day affairs of the state these actors have made an impact over the decision-making process. As an off-shoot of globalisation, the cyber space has emerged as the newest strand in international politics. The virtual communities have been serving as an influencer of states’ decision-making.

International politics is known to be governed by various policies which emerges from a proliferation of various state actors, alongside the backing of the principle of good governance. Having said that, the key consideration argument is that a major role of state decision-making and policy design is being influenced by the emergence of various non-state actors within international politics, ranging from sub-state actors, inter-governmental organisations, MNCs and TNCs, NGOs, communities within cyberspace various international groupings with criminal intent, and extremist and terrorist organisations, leading to a phenomenon regarded as the depleting role of the state.

The idea of good governance, coupled with globalisation and global change has given rise to multiple non-state actors and new forms of multi-actor and multilevel governance. One of the major underpinnings of globalisation has been technological change or development of Information and Communication Technologies. The internet and international telephony have been one of the key tools of transnational networking, which have contributed to the growth of non-state actors’ involvement in global governance. Although states also benefit from the development of ICTs, but its returns are enjoyed by the non-state actors more. It reduces the ability of the state to act as a gatekeeper between state polity and international governance, thus enabling easy and cheap communication across boundaries which facilitates transnational governance. This helps non-state actors to monitor state and corporate behaviour and to assess their adherence to international and transnational standards.

With the rapid development and the advancement of ICTs in the 21^st century, the world has witnessed the emergence of a number of non-state actors in the cyberspace. Although different cyberspace non-state actors (CNSA) operate with different motives – some are financially motivated, which the others have some sort of political motivation. Nevertheless, all these actors have a growing crucial importance within society with the capability to influence state decision. With the passage of time, the number of non-state actors operating in the cyberspace, using cyber tool in warfare to make a hard attribution similar to conventional warfare, are increasing. The asymmetric nature and the low barriers for entry within the cyberspace have been a growing concern for every government, thus influencing various legal actions. This makes the cyberspace an interesting arena for both the nation-state and the non-state actors.

Cyberspace non-state actors can be classified based on their motivation, form of organisation, and their relation to the host state. Some CNSA could help the government financially, by providing them with the profits generated by malicious activities or conduct operations for the political or ideological motives of the state. Some CNSA operates unofficially, but under the control of the host state, i.e., military and intelligence agencies, while some offer immunity to state’s actions to foreign entities. On the contrary, a starkly different kind of CNSAs are the ones which have no connection to the state, rather has political or ideological motives which opposes the state’s ideology, i.e., terrorist organisations or extremist groups operating within the cyberspace.

Organisations within the cyberspace operating with criminal intent, have cumulatively been regarded as world’s third largest economy after the United States and China. Cybercrime was estimated to cost US$ 10.5 trillion annually to global economy by 2025, according to the Internet Crime Report 2020 which was released in 2021. The resultant causes of cybercrime activities often include destruction of data and infrastructure, intellectual properties, and theft of personal and financial data, which more often than not poses a threat to the state structure. Herein lies the question of the degree and kind of damage cyberspace non-state actors pose to nation-state.

To understand the role CNSAs play in state diplomacy, we can cite the example of the collective called ‘Anonymous’ operating in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is significant from the spectrum of international law and geopolitics. In this particular scenario a non-state actor, with unmarked territory or any territorial sovereignty, is moving war to a state. With reference to this, a number of questions arise – how would international law be applicable in such scenario? What are the possible state actions to bring peace? How would cyber diplomacy play out in this regard? To understand this, it is imperative for us to understand the negative and positive impacts these actors have over state decisions.

From a negative standpoint, the certain CNSAs work with the aim to damage critical infrastructures, private businesses and government organisations, which ripples out a direct impact on the economic and social stability of the government. The issue of individual privacy is also questioned with the presence of a string CNSA in a particular state. With the emergence of Artificial Intelligence and Deepfake AI tools, impersonation of any individuals sits at the fingertips of cyber criminals, making state prone to unforeseen threats. International Politics has witnessed a number of cyber threats over the years. Examples can be cited of the Stuxnet Virus which attacked the Iranian Nuclear Program, the cyber-attack in Estonia in 2007, and the attack on Ukrainian rocket forces and artillery by group called Fancy Bear in 2014 and 2016.

The positive side of the spectrum is that if these CNSAs are taken to act within the purview of the state, it could bear encouraging effects socio-economically. In an era where cyberspace is dictating the way of life, and the introduction of Metaverse and augmented reality determines the way we connect socially or how we work, the usage of these actors within the state system as ‘competent tools’ would increase the state’s capability to secure the socio-economic spheres of cyberspace. As long as the aim and motive of the CNSAs align with that of the state, it benefits both the parties involved. It enhances cyber-competence, while also being available to be used a tool of retaliation which often beyond laws and regulations.

The states do often opt to enter into collaboration with CNSAs for using them covertly in cyberwarfare. Often the usage of conventional techniques of warfare comes with certain political, legal, and military burden, and the adherence to the IHL becomes absolutely imperative. Thus, opting to use irregular forces, i.e., cyberwarfare helps state skip the burden of IHL rules and regulations. It also helps the state move past the questions of legality due to the difficulty in tracing the link of the attack between the state and a cyberspace non-state actor.

To conclude, cyberspace and the actors within it are growing important with the passage of time which poses a severe concern for states. With the fast-paced advancement, newer forms of technologies will be at the disposal various non-state actors operating within the cyberspace. It might have a two-fold reaction towards state polity. It could either pose a direct threat to the state, or it can be brought under state legitimacy to carry out covert operations or to secure more efficient cyberspace for the state. Nevertheless, there will be a constant oscillation of the impacts of the emergence of non-state actors within the cyberspace and the ready availability of advanced technologies for them. The state’s reaction towards such actors would determine whether or not it would increase or decrease the gravity of the issue of cyber defense.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, as the two nuclear-armed neighbours were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation from May 07-10, 2025. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.

Little earlier, on June 19, 2025, officials of China, Pakistan & Bangladesh met in Kunming to discuss forming a new grouping aimed at boosting regional connectivity and cooperation. The Kunming meet came close on the heels of a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral in May 2025 which resulted in the thawing of Pakistan & Afghanistan’s turbulent relations since Taliban 2.0 returned to power on August 15, 2021.

The messaging is clear. Efforts are on at a break-neck pace to create an alternative to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which has been comatose after its Kathmandu summit in September 2014 where Pakistan, Nepal & Sri Lanka had proposed including China as a full-fledged member of SAARC, to which India had objected. After 2014 no SAARC summit has been held.

The new South Asian alliance sans India, which is in the pipeline and can be officially announced anytime soon, aims to sideline India in its own neighbourhood.

On the face of it, any non-military alliance should not raise hackles. However, when China gets involved in forming non-military alliances, the issue acquires an underlying military overtone. In all non-military alliances that China has been pivotal in creating after Xi Jinping has become China’s President in 2013, there has been a latent military aim.

The most prominent case in point is the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) which on the façade aims for infrastructure development but has military aims ingrained deeper. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is the flagship project of the BRI. Included in the CPEC is the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor which is a 3000-kilometer road linking China’s Xinjiang region to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which would obviate China’s “Malacca Dilemma”. For China, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor is the jugular vein in case the Malacca Strait was to be ever blocked by the Indian Navy or the US Navy.

China’s planning of encircling India by the sea-route is complete. With the Gwadar port of Pakistan, the Hambantota port of Sri Lanka and the Cox Bazar port of Bangladesh firmly in the Chinese grip and PLA activity having been noticed in the Laamu Atoll of Maldives and Kyaukphyu island of Myanmar, the String of Pearls as the Chinese maritime strategy of encircling India is complete.

While China & Pakistan have been in a tight embrace since 2013, the fleeing of Sheikh Hasina from Bangladesh on August 05, 2024 gave the opportunity China was looking for, to encircle India by the land-route. Sheikh Hasina during her being in power for 15 years had been inclined towards India and had firmly resisted the Chinese pressure to sway away from the Indians.

But after August 05, 2024, Bangladesh has openly gravitated towards China. Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s ruler since August 2024, not only eyed the seven north-eastern states of India but also invited China to expand its influence in the region in a statement on April 01, 2025, that further damaged the India-Bangladesh relations which have been on a downhill since August 2024.

On May 27, 2025 came reports of China rebuilding the Lalmonirhat airport in Bangladesh which is just 20 kilometres from the strategic 22-kilometres-wide Siliguri Corridor of India, also known as the Chicken’s Neck, which connects the seven north-eastern Indian states with the balance of the country.

Of the seven countries that comprise South Asia, China has signed BRI with five excluding India and Bhutan. China doesn’t have a formal group alliance with the South Asian countries though one-on-one bilateral agreements exist.

China which is one of the principal founders of BRICS & SCO alliances which are non-military in nature, but has always tried using these forums for furtherance of its core interests. The reason that China hasn’t been successful in using BRICS & SCO for military interests is because of the presence of India in these two forums.

However, the new South Asian alliance, though officially will be an economic alliance, will be fully utilised for China’s military interests as India will not be made part of it. It is then the encircling of India by the land-route will be put into effect by China, though a major portion of it has already been done. The 3488-kilometre-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China & India and the 740-kilometre-long Line of Control (LOC) between Pakistan & India have been totally integrated by China & Pakistan because of their close military ties that encompasses all the six domains of modern warfare ie Land, Sea, Air, Cyber, Electromagnetic Spectrum & Space which are commonly known as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) or Full Spectrum Operations (FSO).

China is the only country in the world which in 2014 has stated that its military is prepared to fight in all the six domains of modern warfare. Till date no other country has expressed so. Not even, the USA which had propounded the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001 and has the biggest defence budget at US$ 1 trillion, has intimated its readiness to fight in all the six domains of war.

To the six domains of modern warfare, China has added the seventh domain-Water! On July 09, 2025 Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh said China’s mega dam being built on Medog on River Brahmaputra (known as River Yarlung Tsangpo in China) is a ticking water bomb and poses an existential threat. The dam being built at a cost of US$ 137 billion is to be completed by 2030.

USA is clearly rattled by China’s military might. On April 12, 2025 Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy the 11 aircraft carriers of the US Navy in just 20 minutes. He further stated that internal war games of the US military indicated the USA losing to China. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios.

The flagging of the grave danger that China poses to the US military which for long as been regarded as powerful and potent, is a clear warning to the world and specially those countries that face the Chinese threat. Ignoring or underestimating China’s military prowess, will be detrimental and devastating.

The China Challenge

While India has always had a clear victory over Pakistan in all the military confrontations with Pakistan in 1947-49, 1965, 1971, 1999 and 2025, it is the China challenge that poses difficulties ahead.

India lost the war against China in 1962 and as on date China is thirty years ahead of India in military preparedness. General Manoj Naravane (Retd), the 28^th Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in his article in The Print on August 07, 2023 has expressed concern over the result of the two-front war that China & Pakistan will wage on India.

Much water has flowed since this article was published in 2023. After the regime change in Bangladesh in 2024, it is unlikely that Bangladesh will ever have normal ties with India again due to the close proximity that Bangladesh now has with both China and Pakistan. Nepal too is now firmly in the Chinese grip. On December 05, 2024 Nepal and China inked the framework for BRI cooperation, a good seven years and seven months after both the countries had signed the MoU on BRI. This development formally endorsed Nepal’s involvement in BRI opening floodgates for Chinese investments in Nepal.

General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces on July 08, 2025 remarked that the convergence of interest between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh will have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.

Last year, Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command on October 28, 2024 stated that China is conducting the largest military buildup in world history. Early this year, on January 08, 2025 Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, the Indian Air Force Chief expressed concern over increased militarisation by China and the rapid pace at which the Chinese defence technology is growing.

On November 06, 2024 China announced the successful testing of Death Star, a weapon system which combines pulses of microwave radiation into a single powerful beam that can destroy enemy satellites in space. Also, on June 22, 2025 China achieved unprecedented breakthrough in satellite communication by using a 2-watt laser to transmit data at 1 Gbps thereby maintaining high-quality signal over 36,000 kilometres, without the need for complex infrastructure on the ground.

China on December 22, 2024, placed a massive government order of 1 million lightweight kamikaze drones to a private Chinese drone manufacturer Poly Technologies, be delivered by 2026. On April 21, 2025 China started mass production of humanoid robots with 11 manufacturers in China given confidential specifications and strict timelines, thereby signalling intent for defence use.

India is now staring at a war with China and Pakistan in which Bangladesh and Nepal will fully support China – whether it is militarily or infrastructure use, that time will reveal. But support rendered during a war can’t certainly be termed as an act of neutrality. China’s planning of encircling India both by the sea-route as well as the land-route is nearing fructification.

An often-asked question is that why did China not openly support Pakistan militarily in the recent India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 when the Pakistanis were being hammered badly by the Indians? The answer is pretty simple. China will not get embroiled in any military confrontation till it wages the war for Taiwan in 2027 as Taiwan is China’s first and foremost military aim.

Another question that is generally asked in various fora is that China lost its last war with Vietnam in 1979. It has been over 46 years that China has not taken part in any military confrontation. So why worry about China’s military prowess now? The answer to this question too is pretty simple. China has heavily invested in technology in the last four decades. As on date, China leads in 57 of the 64 critical technologies in the world. And, the USA is leading in the balance seven technologies. In the future wars that China will wage non-kinetic warfare will precede kinetic warfare. Once non-kinetic warfare has unleashed mayhem and chaos, only then will kinetic warfare start which will be for a short duration as the critical infrastructure of the country being attacked will be crippled due to non-kinetic warfare.

On July 09, 2023, the US President Joe Biden stated that China will wage a war for Taiwan and South Tibet. China calls Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. The Director of National Intelligence, USA in both its Annual Threat Assessments reports of 2024 & 2025 has predicted China, Pakistan and India inching towards war.

Whatever terminology be given to the war that is on India’s horizon that is a decade away in 2035, whether one-front reinforced war, two-front war or three-front war, China stands as a formidable military challenge, not only to the USA but to India as well, as the first three military targets with timelines for China are Taiwan in 2027, Spratly Islands in 2029 and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in 2035.

China’s interest in Arunachal Pradesh started from 2007 when it became the world’s third biggest economy and two years later in 2009, it started issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh desirous of visiting China. Since 2017, China has renamed 92 places in Arunachal Pradesh five times in 2017, 2021, 2023, 2024 and on May 14, 2025 just a couple of days after the ceasefire of the India-Pakistan Conflict.

Adding to China’s discomfiture with India is the announcement of His Holiness The Dalai Lama about his successor. The tensions between China and India will increase further after the successor is announced.

India has exactly one decade to increase its economic and military preparedness, for China is India’s main threat. Pakistan & Bangladesh are the subsets of this main threat.

The Way Ahead for India

Reduce trade with China: India needs to reduce its trade with China. For every dollar worth of trade, a part of it China is using to strengthen its military which in the times ahead will wage a war on India. It is indeed ironical in 2020 when the Galwan Valley Clash took place between China & India in which 20 Indian Army soldiers were killed in action, the trade that year between India & China stood at US$ 87.5 billion. The trade volumes kept on increasing year-on-year till 2023 when it peaked at US$ 136.2 billion. However, in 2024 the trade between the two nations dipped to US$ 127.8 billion. India has to further reduce its trade with China.

Increase in Defence Budget: India’s defence budget has been reducing as its percentage of GDP since 2019. From 2.5% of the GDP in 2019, the defence budget of India has reduced to 1.9% of the GDP. Chanakya had quoted centuries ago that from the strength of the treasury, increases the strength of a nation’s army. With China announcing to supply latest weaponry to Pakistan which includes the fifth-generation J-35A fighter aircrafts while plans are afoot to induct the sixth-generation J-36 and J-50 fighter aircrafts in the Chinese Air Force (known as PLAAF), the Indian military needs more money. On July 07, 2025 the Indian Defence Secretary RK Singh stated that the defence expenditure would be increased from 1.9% to 2.5% of the GDP.

In-house defence technologies:  In the event of a nation going to war, what will matter is domestic defence production and defence technologies so that in case of any supply chain disruptions, the war production isn’t affected. While Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make in India initiatives have proved very successful for the Indian defence sector, but India is still heavily dependent on foreign technologies. In the last 15 years, India has imported about US$ 20 billion worth of weapon systems but no worthwhile Transfer of Technology (ToT) has ensued. This is because most nations are wary of ToT.

To obviate, reliance on imported defence technologies two aspects need immediate consideration. One, to have increased number of Doctorates (PhD) in Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics (STEM). Two, increase the budget for Research & Development (R&D) as percentage of the GDP. R&D plays a major role in a country becoming a manufacturing hub, apart from business-friendly laws, low taxes and skilled manpower.

The world’s two biggest manufacturing hubs ie China & USA are also the world’s two top nations in having the largest PhDs in STEM. In 2019, China produced 49,498 PhDs in STEM and USA produced 33,759 whereas India produced 700 PhDs in STEM. Of these 700, a whopping 70% have renounced Indian citizenship. The last known figures available in public domain of Indian PhDs in STEM are of 2019. By 2025 China is projected to have 77,179 STEM PhDs which would be nearly double of the 39,959 projected STEM PhDs of USA the same year.

The figures for spending on R&D also show startling facts. According to a study conducted by the Indian government think-tank Niti Aayog in 2022, while USA spent 2.9% of its GDP on R&D, China spent 2% of its GDP and India spent 0.7% of its GDP on R&D. The R&D spending as percentage of GDP has dipped to 0.64% of the GDP for India in 2024 whereas for China it has increased to 2.68% and for USA to 3.5% of the GDP. Interestingly in 2024, Israel’s spent 5.4% of its GDP on R&D.

Conclusion

On May 18, 1998 the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes had rightly remarked China being India’s main threat. So much was the political pressure on George Fernandes that he had to withdraw his statement five years later on May 04, 2003. In hindsight, George Fernandes was absolutely correct. China is indeed India’s main threat.

By: Junaid Suhais

The relationship between Israel and Iran, long characterized by a “shadow war” involving covert operations, cyber-attacks, and proxy conflicts, has been a defining feature of Middle Eastern geopolitics for decades. Tensions had been steadily mounting, with confrontations in 2024 serving as a grim prelude to a more overt and dangerous phase of hostilities. These earlier clashes signaled a shift from indirect engagement to a willingness for direct military exchanges, setting the stage for the events of June 2025.

June 13 to 25, 2025, witnessed an unprecedented escalation into direct and sustained military conflict between Israel and Iran. This confrontation significantly involved the United States, inflicted considerable human and material costs on both sides and culminated in a tenuous US-brokered ceasefire, leaving the region on a knife’s edge.

This report will outline the chronological progression of this 12-day conflict, detailing the initial Israeli offensive, Iran’s retaliatory measures, the subsequent escalation involving US military intervention, the profound humanitarian impact, the complex diplomatic maneuvers leading to a ceasefire, and the varied international reactions to this critical period of instability.

I.    The Spark: Israel’s Offensive and Initial Retaliation (June 13 – June 15, 2025)

The simmering tensions between Israel and Iran boiled over on June 13, 2025, marking the beginning of a direct and intense military confrontation that would last for twelve days. This period was characterized by a major Israeli offensive, followed by swift Iranian retaliation, setting a dangerous precedent for the days to come.

Israel’s Initial Large-Scale Operation (June 13)

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a significant and anticipated military operation against Iran. The primary targets of this offensive were strategically chosen, focusing on Iran’s nuclear facilities, key military sites, and critical regime infrastructure. The stated rationale behind this operation was twofold: to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, an ambition Tehran has consistently denied, and to respond to nearly two years of escalating conflict with Iran-backed militant groups. Reports indicated that Israel employed a combination of airstrikes, utilizing warplanes and drones, some of which were allegedly smuggled into Iran before the operation.

Expansion of Israeli Strikes (June 14-15)

Following the initial wave of attacks, Israel did not relent. On June 14 and 15, Israeli airstrikes expanded in scope, extending to include targets within Iran’s energy industry. The intensity of the offensive was sustained, with Israel unleashing airstrikes across various parts of Iran for a third consecutive day. Israeli leadership also threatened the application of even greater force, signaling a commitment to achieving its strategic objectives.

Iran’s Immediate Retaliatory Actions (June 13-15)

Iran’s response to the Israeli offensive was swift and forceful. Beginning on June 13 and continuing through June 15, Iran initiated a series of missile and drone attacks targeting Israel. Iranian missiles reportedly struck several locations in Israel, including the Nevatim and Hatzerim military bases. Civilian areas and cities such as Beersheba, Tel Aviv, the Negev region, and Haifa also reported missile impacts. Tehran was quick to claim success for its retaliatory strikes, asserting “precise hits” and highlighting what it described as its “growing offensive missile power”. This initial exchange set a dangerous tit-for-tat pattern that would characterize the conflict in the days that followed.

II.    Escalation, US Intervention, and Continued Hostilities (June 16 – June 22, 2025)

The conflict rapidly intensified following the initial exchanges, drawing in international actors and culminating in direct military intervention by the United States. This period was marked by sustained hostilities, significant military actions by both Israel and Iran and early, though ultimately insufficient, diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis.

Intensified Military Exchanges and Diplomatic Overtures (June 16-20)

From June 16 to June 20, Israel and Iran continued to trade heavy strikes, with civilian populations in flashpoint areas bearing the brunt of the escalating violence. Iran undertook several notable military actions during this phase. Air defense systems were activated in Bushehr, the location of Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant, indicating heightened alert levels. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced it had fired its “17th wave of missiles” at Israeli military facilities. Furthermore, Iranian military spokespersons claimed the use of long-range and ultra-heavy missiles against Israeli military sites, defense industries, and command and control centers.

On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted on June 16 that Israel’s strikes had significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Amidst the escalating military actions, tentative diplomatic efforts emerged. On June 20, Iranian and European officials met in Geneva for talks. An Iranian source described the discussions as initially tense but having become “much more positive.”

However, Iran firmly maintained that its uranium enrichment capability was a “bold red line” and non-negotiable. Concurrently, then-US President Donald Trump indicated he would allow up to two weeks for negotiations before deciding whether to launch further US strikes on Iran.

Direct US Military Involvement (Around June 21-22)

The window for diplomacy proved short. As the conflict wore on, the United States moved towards direct military intervention. President Trump held Situation Room meetings, for instance on June 18, to discuss US options. Sources indicated that while he was receptive to arguments, including from Israel, that only the US could decisively neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he was also wary of becoming bogged down in a prolonged foreign conflict.

Around June 21-22 (local time), the United States launched direct military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. The targets were three key Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. These were described as among the “most critical and fortified sites” in Iran’s nuclear program, which Israel had reportedly been unable to destroy with its arsenal. The US military employed B-2 stealth bombers, which dropped “bunker-buster” bombs (Massive Ordnance Penetrators) on the Fordo and Natanz facilities, while Tomahawk cruise missiles struck the Isfahan site. The stated objective of the US operation was the “destruction of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity” and to “stop the nuclear threat posed by the world’s number one state sponsor of terror”. However, a preliminary classified US intelligence report, emerging around June 24, suggested that the American bombing had set back Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months, raising questions about the long-term efficacy of the strikes.

III. The Human Cost: Casualties and Civilian Impact

The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran exacted a significant human toll, with casualties and widespread disruption reported in both nations. The use of ballistic missiles, drones, and airstrikes in populated areas led to civilian deaths, injuries, and displacement, underscoring the devastating impact of modern warfare on non-combatants.

Casualties in Israel

According to data compiled after 12 days of fighting (by June 25), Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel resulted in the deaths of approximately 28 people. Notably, all but one of these fatalities were civilians. The conflict also led to over 3,000 wounded, with Israel’s Health Ministry reporting a total of 3,238 people hospitalized. Among the hospitalized, 23 were seriously injured, 111 moderately, and 2,933 lightly. An additional 138 individuals suffered from acute anxiety, and the conditions of 30 others were undetermined at the time of reporting.

The vast majority of casualties in Israel were civilians. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that only seven soldiers were hurt in one missile impact in central Israel, and one off-duty soldier was killed in Beersheba Iranian attacks also caused significant material damage and displacement. Israeli authorities stated that more than 9,000 people were displaced from their homes, dozens of which were damaged or destroyed. At least 31 ballistic missile impacts were reported in populated areas or on critical infrastructure sites, including a power station in southern Israel, an oil refinery in Haifa, and a university in central Israel.

Casualties in Iran

Assessing the full scale of casualties in Iran proved more complex due to varying reports from different sources. However, available information indicated a substantial number of deaths and injuries.

• On June 16, CNN reported at least 224 people had been killed in Iran since hostilities began.
• By June 21, The Defense Post, citing the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), a US-based NGO, reported that Israeli strikes had killed at least 657 people in Iran. This figure included 263 civilians (among them, HRANA had verified the identities of more than 20 children, mostly in Tehran) and 164 members of the military
• By June 24, HRANA, as reported by Wikipedia, stated that over 900 people had been killed and over 3,000 wounded by Israeli strikes. The Iranian Health Ministry also reported over 4,000 people wounded
• An updated HRANA report on June 24 detailed 974 killed (comprising 268 military personnel, 387 civilians, and 319 unidentified individuals) and 3,458 injured

Beyond the overall numbers, Israeli strikes reportedly targeted and killed several senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. Among those named were IRGC Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri, IRGC commander Hossein Salami, senior IRGC commander Gholam Ali Rashid, and IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

Nuclear scientists reported killed included Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber (who led the SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group), Fereydoon Abbasi, and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi. Ali Shamkhani, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, was initially reported killed but later confirmed to be alive, albeit severely injured.

 

Disruption to Daily Life and Evacuations

The conflict caused significant disruption to daily life in both countries. In Israel, emergency restrictions led to the closure of schools and workplaces for a period. The heightened security risks also prompted the evacuation of foreign nationals. For example, South Korea arranged for the evacuation of its citizens from both Israel and Iran, highlighting the international concern over safety and the conflict’s broader impact.

IV.  The Path to a Fragile Ceasefire (June 23 – June 25, 2025)

After nearly two weeks of intense military exchanges and escalating tensions, diplomatic efforts, primarily spearheaded by the United States, led to the announcement of a ceasefire. However, the path to this uneasy truce was fraught with accusations, violations, and uncertainty, highlighting the deep-seated mistrust between the belligerents.

US-Brokered Ceasefire Announcement (June 23)

On June 23, 2025, then-US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire. The terms of the agreement reportedly included a phased halt to hostilities, with Iran expected to cease strikes on Israel 12 hours before Israel would stop its attacks on Iran. This announcement offered a glimmer of hope for de-escalation after days of escalating conflict.

Initial Fragility and Accusations (June 23-24)

The nascent ceasefire was immediately tested. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office thanked President Trump for his role and declared that Israel had achieved its primary objective of “eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat”. However, the situation on the ground remained volatile.

Mutual accusations of violations quickly surfaced. Israel accused Iran of a “severe violation” of the ceasefire by launching missiles after the truce was supposed to be in effect and vowed a forceful response. Iran, in turn, denied violating the truce. Reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) indicated that Iran conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel around the time the ceasefire was due to be implemented. Five of these attacks occurred before the ceasefire officially went into effect (12:00 AM ET on June 24), one at 12:06 AM ET, and another around 3:25 AM ET. One such post-ceasefire Iranian missile attack reportedly killed four people in Beersheba. In response to these perceived violations, Israel conducted retaliatory strikes, including an attack on an Iranian radar installation north of Tehran.

The fragility of the ceasefire drew a sharp reaction from President Trump, who reportedly expressed intense anger as the truce appeared to falter. He was said to be particularly unhappy with Israel at one point, publicly urging them via social media: “DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS”.

Ceasefire Takes Hold (June 24-25)

Despite the initial breaches and heightened rhetoric, by June 24-25, the ceasefire began to take hold more firmly. Both Israeli and Iranian officials issued statements affirming their commitment to the truce, conditional on the other side’s adherence. In Israel, signs of a return to normalcy began to emerge as authorities lifted emergency restrictions. Schools and workplaces, which had been closed due to the conflict, started to reopen. Ben Gurion Airport, the country’s busiest international gateway near Tel Aviv, was expected to fully reopen on Wednesday, June 25, allowing thousands of passengers to travel.

In a common pattern following such conflicts, both Israel and Iran declared victory in the 12-day confrontation, each framing the outcome as favorable to their strategic interests.

Lingering Tensions and Unresolved Issues

The ceasefire, while holding, did not resolve the underlying issues that fueled the conflict. Iran announced on June 24 that it was taking measures to continue its nuclear program and was assessing the damage to its facilities caused by Israeli and US strikes. This statement underscored Tehran’s defiance and its intention to press forward with its nuclear activities. Meanwhile, President Trump continued to insist that Iran’s nuclear program had faced “obliteration,” a claim that contradicted some intelligence assessments suggesting a more limited setback. These diverging narratives and Iran’s stated intentions pointed to a future where tensions over its nuclear ambitions would likely persist.

 Key Points: Path to Ceasefire                                                                                                                                    

• US President Trump announced a ceasefire agreement on June 23.
• Initial period marked by accusations of violations from both Israel and Iran.
• Iran reportedly launched missiles post-ceasefire deadline, causing casualties in Beersheba.
• Israel retaliated for perceived violations.
• By June 24-25, the ceasefire largely held, with both sides claiming victory.
• Iran vowed to continue its nuclear program, indicating unresolved core issues.

• Global Reactions and Diplomatic Landscape

The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, marked by its intensity and the direct involvement of the United States, elicited a wide range of reactions from the international community. Global and regional powers, as well as international organizations, weighed in on the crisis, reflecting diverse geopolitical interests and concerns over regional stability and nuclear non-proliferation.

United Nations

The United Nations voiced grave concerns throughout the escalation. UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued stark warnings, fearing the conflict could spiral into “a fire no one can control” and potentially lead to a “catastrophe”. He described the US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites as a “perilous turn” for the region. Guterres consistently urged for an immediate ceasefire and a return to “serious, sustained negotiations” to de-escalate the situation and address the underlying causes of the conflict.

Major Powers

United States: Beyond its role as a direct military participant and the primary broker of the ceasefire, the US administration, under President Trump, emphasized that it did not seek regime change in Iran, stating a desire to avoid “chaos”. This stance aimed to manage perceptions of US objectives amidst its significant military intervention.

European Union: The EU’s response was characterized by calls for de-escalation but also by internal divisions. Officially, the EU called on all sides to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and refrain from actions that could worsen the crisis. However, significant disagreements emerged among member states regarding the legality of Israel’s strikes and the extent of its right to self-defense. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself, a position that was not unanimously supported by all EU members, highlighting the complexities in forging a unified European stance. Diplomatic efforts included talks in Geneva where German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, along with other European officials, engaged with Iran in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to de-escalate the nuclear aspects of the crisis.

United Kingdom: The UK Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House of Commons on June 16, updating Parliament on the evolving conflict and the government’s response.

France: France reaffirmed its commitment to diplomacy as a means to resolve the tensions, aligning with broader European calls for de-escalation.

Russia: Moscow condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, expressing concern that the escalation posed risks of further destabilization across the Middle East.

China: Beijing’s response evolved during the crisis. Initially, China condemned the Israeli attack on June 13 as a “violation of Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity”. However, its rhetoric subsequently shifted to become more measured, focusing on brokering dialogue and a ceasefire rather than outright denunciation of Israeli actions. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly urged a ceasefire in a phone call with the Russian leader. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged with his Iranian and Israeli counterparts; in his call with the Israeli Foreign Minister, he termed Israel’s strikes “unacceptable” but notably refrained from using the word “condemning”.

Key Regional and Other Nations

Japan: Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba initially condemned Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military targets as “totally intolerable”. However, Japan later appeared to distance itself from G7 statements that affirmed Israel’s “right to defend itself,” with Prime Minister Ishiba emphasizing Japan’s position of urging “maximum restraint” from both Israel and Iran.

South Korea: Seoul expressed alarm at reports of Iranian missiles penetrating Israel’s sophisticated missile defense systems The South Korean government took practical steps by evacuating its nationals from both Iran and Israel and raising travel alert levels for these countries, urging citizens to leave immediately.

Saudi Arabia: A key regional power, Saudi Arabia welcomed the US-brokered ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran on June 24, reflecting a broader desire within the Gulf region to see a reduction in tensions that could threaten regional stability and economic interests.

VII.  Conclusion: An Uneasy Calm and an Uncertain Future

The twelve days from June 13 to June 25, 2025, marked a perilous chapter in the long-standing animosity between Israel and Iran. The period witnessed a rapid and dangerous escalation from targeted Israeli strikes to widespread Iranian retaliation, direct military intervention by the United States, and significant human and material costs. The eventual US-brokered ceasefire brought a halt to the immediate hostilities, but it settled upon a landscape fraught with unresolved tensions and deep-seated mistrust.

Recap of the 12-Day Crisis

The crisis began with a major Israeli offensive targeting Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, justified as a preemptive measure against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and a response to ongoing

proxy conflicts. Iran retaliated with missile and drone barrages against Israeli targets. The conflict quickly escalated, drawing in the United States, which launched its own strikes against key Iranian nuclear facilities. This period was characterized by significant casualties on both sides, particularly among civilians, and widespread disruption. Diplomatic efforts, primarily led by the US, eventually culminated in a fragile ceasefire agreement that took effect around June 24-25.

Immediate Aftermath

In the immediate aftermath, an uneasy calm descended upon the region. The ceasefire, though initially marred by accusations of violations, largely held. Both Israel and Iran publicly claimed strategic victories, seeking to project strength and resolve to their domestic and international audiences. While the region stepped back from the brink of a wider conflagration, it remained on high alert. The lifting of emergency restrictions in Israel signaled a tentative return to normalcy, but the psychological scars and the heightened sense of insecurity lingered.

Unresolved Issues and Future Outlook

The ceasefire did little to address the fundamental drivers of the conflict. Iran’s nuclear program remains a central point of contention, with Tehran vowing to continue its efforts and assess the damage to its facilities. The conflicting assessments of the impact of Israeli and US strikes on this program—with the US claiming significant degradation and some intelligence reports suggesting a more limited setback—highlight the ongoing uncertainty. The deep-seated animosity and competing regional ambitions of Israel and Iran persist, suggesting that the ceasefire is more of a pause than a resolution.

The long-term effectiveness of the US strikes in deterring Iran’s nuclear progress and the overall durability of the ceasefire remain highly uncertain. Future provocations, miscalculations, or shifts in the regional balance of power could easily reignite hostilities. The underlying security dilemmas that plague the Middle East have not been resolved, and the potential for future conflict remains significant.

Broader Implications

The June 2025 conflict carries several broader implications:

• Regional Volatility: It starkly underscored the volatile security dynamics of the Middle East and the ease with which long-simmering tensions can erupt into direct, large-scale military confrontations.
• Great Power Involvement: The direct US military intervention highlighted the potential for regional conflicts to draw in global powers, with significant implications for international stability and power balances.
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The focus on Iran’s nuclear facilities raises critical questions about the future of nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the region and globally. The attacks could perversely incentivize Iran or other nations to accelerate clandestine weapons programs as a deterrent.
• Humanitarian Concerns: The significant civilian casualties and displacement serve as a grim reminder of the human cost of such conflicts and the challenges of protecting non-combatants in modern warfare.

In conclusion, while the ceasefire of June 25, 2025, provided a temporary reprieve, the Israel-Iran relationship and the broader Middle Eastern security landscape remain precarious. Addressing the root causes of instability, fostering credible diplomatic channels, and strengthening non- proliferation regimes will be crucial to preventing future, potentially more devastating, conflicts.

 Key Takeaways from the Conflict                                                                                                                                    

• Unprecedented direct military escalation between Israel and Iran over 12 days.
• Significant US military intervention targeting Iranian nuclear sites.
• Substantial human cost, with hundreds killed and thousands wounded on both sides.
• A fragile US-brokered ceasefire halted immediate hostilities but left core issues unresolved.
• Iran’s nuclear program remains a central point of contention and future risk.
• The conflict highlighted extreme regional volatility and the potential for wider escalation.

By: C Shraddha

The contemporary world has undergone significant military transformation, with the technological and scientific advancements of a few international players overshadowing the others. Laser technology innovation materialising out of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enabled the country to top the list as a trailblazer in scientific innovation and development. The potential of the country to redefine modern warfare has raised concerns amongst prominent international powers, especially the United States of America.

In 2022, a paper published by Professor Yao Jianquan and team in the Journal of National University of Defence Technology was lauded as a leap in integrating hypersonic weapons with 6G technology for the purpose of a space defence system. An eminent laser scientist, Professor Yao, appraised the experiment as a “critical improvement in China’s near-space defence”. The experiment successfully achieved a “complete penetration” of signal-blocking shields around hypersonic weapons using electromagnetic waves. Furthermore, this development enables Chinese scientists to rectify the problem known as a “black barrier”. This issue arises when a hypersonic weapon is unable to maintain communication with the outside world due to surface blockade of electromagnetic waves created by ionised gas. Additionally, the black barrier hinders radar detection and identification of hypersonic weapons due to the presence of the plasma shelter. 

The creation of this laser device by Professor Yao and his team has been extensively explored for the adaptation to military applications such as high-speed communication in space and radar for stealth aircraft detection. Furthermore, the invention generates continuous electromagnetic wave beams in the terahertz band, which would travel across the plasma shield created by the hypersonic weapon at 10 times the speed of sound. Thus, wiping the “black barrier” out of existence. 

A year later, in 2023, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) claim of a “major breakthrough” in energy weapons technology. As per the report, scientists at the National University of Defence Technology in Changsha engineered a cutting-edge cooling system. In a move that could alter modern warfare, this state-of-the-art technology would enable high-energy lasers to remain charged without heating, making them capable of shooting laser beams indefinitely. Furthermore, it would eliminate the damaging heat expended during the usage of high-energy lasers. 

As per laser weapon scientist Yuan Shengfu, “This is a huge breakthrough in improving the performance of high-energy laser systems.” Previously, in the field of laser weapon development, the issue of cooling had hindered desirable progress. Even attempts of innovation by US organisations such as the Middle Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), Space-Based Laser (SBL), Navy Advanced Chemical Laser (NACL) and Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) proved to be unfruitful. While a portion of these weapons were able to destroy supersonic missiles during a US military field test, they were ultimately cancelled due to the weight of the lasers and their sheer size. According to Mr Shengfu, whereas US missiles have a limited range of only a couple of kilometres, the newly developed Chinese laser beam is capable of surpassing their performance. Former British military official, Steve Weaver, commented on X (formerly Twitter), “If they have overcome the heating and distortion issues as claimed, in a (relatively) small enough unit for deployment, this is a big breakthrough considering the US failures in this area.” The advanced cooling system, combined with optimised gas flow to reduce heat production, has increased China’s potential to alter methods of modern warfare. According to researchers, a reduction in vibration, turbulence, and improved mirror cleanliness make the system a superior innovation. Additionally, this new development would help extend the range, engagement, and damage while significantly reducing logistical costs. 

With a flair for theatrics, China unleashed a new high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon upon the world named the Death Star. With its name inspired by the popular sci-fi franchise Star Wars, the HPM was first tested in 2024 by combining minute electromagnetic waves to create an enormous focused laser beam. According to Euro Weekly, the Death Star has an accuracy of at least 1,100 miles with an ability to incapacitate orbiting satellites, turning them into mere space junk. While other anti-satellite missiles pollute space, HPM does not leave behind a debris trail, thus rendering it impossible to trace.  Additionally, as per SCMP reports, the HPM weapon is equipped with exceptional precision such that vehicles transmitting the beams can synchronise within 170 picoseconds. Scholars have speculated that the country would use the Death Star to target communication and navigation systems pertinent to missile guidance.

While China’s laser technology developments have raised concerns amongst Western players, the technological prowess it showcased during the Russia-Ukraine War is particularly noteworthy. Developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, the Low Altitude Laser Defence System (LASS), better known as the Silent Hunter, made headlines when it shot down Kyiv’s drones, with its laser “piercing holes into a steel plate” before ultimately burning the Ukrainian drones. First unveiled during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, the weapon is specifically made to “search, track, blind and neutralise enemy drones.” The Silent Hunter possesses characteristics that set it apart from traditional aerial defence weapons. The power of the electric fibre optic laser ranges from 30 to 100 kilowatts with a target range of 4 kilometres. Additionally, its laser can penetrate five two-millimetre steel plates from a distance of 800 meters or one five-millimetre plate from 1 kilometre. 

The Silent Hunter comes in two versions as well as four power modes. Accounting for better adaptability and ease of transportation, the weapon can either be mobile or stationary. This means that it can either be mounted on a 6X6 wheeled chassis or deconstructed into separate sections of approximately 200 kilograms. Additionally, the 5-kilowatt, 10-kilowatt, 20-kilowatt and 30-kilowatt power modes equip the Silent Hunter with a target capture of over 4 kilometres and an interception radius ranging from 200 metres to 400 metres. The LASS is also capable of neutralising a target with a speed less than 60 m/s and a diameter less than 2 metres. However, the major advantage of the Silent Hunter stems from its cost-effectiveness. It is estimated that the use of each system costs less than £10, distinguishing it from existing traditional missiles. 

For the Chinese, 2025 is a year of advancement in laser technology, ranging from laser-based imaging systems to nuclear fusion through laser technology.  Earlier this year, Chinese scientists disclosed a laser-based imaging system capable of reading minute texts as concise as one millimetre from approximately 1.4 kilometres away. By manoeuvring the method of active intensity interferometry, the imaging system overcomes externalities such as degraded resolution and atmosphere. Although the purpose of the innovation remains unclear, experts have raised concerns regarding its utilisation in surveillance, privacy and spying. However, some Chinese reports suggest that the usage of the laser would primarily pertain to archaeology and wildlife monitoring. 

Mianyang, a city in the Sichuan province, became the centre of global attention with its development of nuclear fusion through laser technology. While details of the developments remain hidden from the public, if successful, it would modify the country’s nuclear capability. This particular technology, which intends to emulate the exothermic reaction of the Sun, may serve as a loophole to advance China’s nuclear weapon capabilities without explicitly violating international treaties. The advancements in Miyang are a leap forward in bridging the nuclear gap between China and the US. In terms of size, the Miyang facility dominates the National Ignition Facility of the United States and is furnished with a 50 per cent larger experimental bay, which could make it the largest laser fusion site in the world. This facility would allow the Chinese to improve weapons and conduct blasts without “real-world tests.”

Despite their technological advancements, the PRC has been accused of using its laser technology to harm US pilots. In 2018, China was accused of interfering with US military aircraft and injuring the pilots in the country’s overseas military base at Djibouti. Following this incident, America launched a formal diplomatic protest with Beijing as well as issued a notice to the US airmen. The notice stated “to exercise caution when flying in certain areas in Djibouti, which was issued due to lasers being directed at US aircraft on a small number of separate occasions over the last few weeks.” Furthermore, the notice described a particular incident when an aircrew flying a C-130 sustained two minor eye injuries due to exposure to military-grade laser beams. Military-grade laser beams, also known as dazzlers, emit potent light beams which can traverse vast distances and irradiate cockpits while momentarily blinding pilots. Again in 2020, the US Navy accused China of firing military-grade lasers at the P-8 Surveillance aircraft. The US Indo-Pacific Fleet issued a statement in which it condemned the actions of the PRC as “unsafe and unprofessional.” “Weapons-grade lasers could potentially cause serious harm to aircrew and marines, as well as ship and aircraft systems”, stated the Pacific Fleet.  

Following this incident, the US undertook precautions to protect its airmen from the powerful laser technology of the Chinese. In 2023, the US Air Force purchased specially made laser protective eyewear after reported incidents of the Chinese military firing military grade laser beams at Western aeroplanes increased. As per the announcement made by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Centre’s Human Systems Division, the eyewear is supposed to provide protection against ballistic as well as laser threats. In the next three years, the US Air Force intends to acquire over 42,000 pairs of glasses and visors. The head of the eyewear initiative at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, Captain Pete Coats, expressed in a press briefing, “The health of the eye is so important to our pilots. The consequences of getting lasered without having proper protection could not only prevent the pilot from flying and landing an aircraft safely, but also cost them their career. So, we aim to ensure the right eyewear is available to everyone.”  

China’s strides in laser technology development have long challenged the dominance of the West. Despite the scepticism around the validity and authenticity of China’s laser innovations, they have undoubtedly caused concern in the United States. As China moves forward with its plan to bridge the nuclear gap between itself and the US, these advancements not only signal a shift in technological leadership but also a recalibration of global power dynamics. From rectifying significant optimisation issues to creating high-powered lasers, China’s technological mission is methodical and efficient. However, while such developments have the ability to transform methods of modern warfare, they also contain the ability to evade accountability and jeopardise security. Given the pace and precision of such developments, the superpower has to be increasingly wary about the Asian giant. Their ability to outshine existing defence systems and develop modern equipment makes them a strategic threat that can no longer be sidelined.