By: Tushar Jain

For years, the United States has presented India as a natural partner in countering China. Washington has praised New Delhi as a like-minded democracy and a pillar of stability in the Indo-Pacific. But behind this cheerful diplomatic language, there is a quieter shift. The U.S. political establishment — especially under Donald Trump — is increasingly uneasy about India’s widening network of strategic partnerships.

To Washington, India’s “strategic autonomy” sometimes looks like India keeping its options open with America’s rivals. Cheaper Russian oil, mineral-focused cooperation with China, and participation in blocs like BRICS have triggered anxiety in U.S. circles that worry about losing leverage in future economic and security architecture.

Trump’s answer? Tariffs — his favourite foreign-policy hammer. By imposing up to 50% duties on Indian exports, Trump was not only playing the trade card; he was also signalling displeasure. The message was simple: If India deepens ties with Moscow and Beijing, there will be a cost.

This confrontation isn’t only about economics — it reflects a tug-of-war over who will shape global power in the decade ahead.

Minerals, Technology and the New Power Game

Critical minerals — copper, cobalt, nickel, manganese, rare earths — have quietly become the currency of global power. They sit inside the technologies that will drive the future: batteries, solar panels, defence electronics, AI chips, and advanced manufacturing.

Whoever controls access to these resources and their supply chains will shape the next strategic era. The U.S. has understood this, which explains Trump’s April 24, 2025 Executive Order fast-tracking American exploration of seabed minerals under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). Even without formally joining UNCLOS or the International Seabed Authority, Washington has decided it cannot afford delays while China and Russia move ahead.

Against this backdrop, India’s efforts to secure minerals — sometimes involving Chinese or Russian partners — complicate U.S. planning. If India rises as an independent technology and supply-chain actor, Washington’s dominance in strategic industries becomes harder to defend.

The Russia–China Factor and India’s Tightrope Walk

Russia’s war in Ukraine transformed Moscow and Beijing into near-strategic twins. China calls itself neutral, but evidence points to deep economic and dual-use support to Russia.

India, meanwhile, is trying to walk a tight line: condemning violence in principle, avoiding direct criticism of Moscow, and dramatically expanding oil imports from Russia. Discounted crude has shifted Russia from a minor supplier to almost 40% of India’s oil basket by 2024 — a change too big for Washington to ignore.

When Modi praised his 2023 meeting with Putin as “excellent,” U.S. policymakers took notice. In their view, large-scale Russian oil purchases blunt Western sanctions and indirectly assist Russia’s war effort.

In truth, India sees these purchases as simple statecraft — energy security first, geopolitics second. But in Washington, the optics landed differently.

Tariffs as Political Pressure

Trump’s response came swiftly. First a 25% tariff, then an escalation to 50%, applied widely across Indian exports. American officials argued they were penalising New Delhi for helping finance Russia through oil.

Economists, however, warned of messy outcomes:

• India’s growth could slip below 6%, against earlier estimates of 6.5%
• U.S. buyers faced higher costs and scrambled to source from places like Turkey and Thailand
• Supply-chain instability ironically rose inside the U.S. market

In short, the tariffs punished both sides. But for Trump, economics was secondary. The goal was to remind India of the value — and vulnerability — of access to the U.S. market.

New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy Isn’t Changing

India’s foreign policy rests on one simple idea: never become dependent on any single power.
So New Delhi juggles priorities — Russian defence ties, BRICS participation, engagement with China where necessary, strong security cooperation with the U.S., and a seat at the Quad.

To Washington, this sometimes feels inconvenient.
To India, it is common sense.

Tariffs may irritate Indian policymakers, but they won’t push India into abandoning multi-alignment — if anything, they strengthen New Delhi’s desire to stay independent.

A Smaller but Notable Concern: North Korea

India’s limited diplomatic contact with North Korea has also contributed to U.S. unease. The relationship is hardly central to Indian strategy, but in Washington’s narrative, every sign of independent Asian diplomacy reinforces the belief that India won’t fully integrate into America’s security umbrella.

Conclusion

Trump’s tariffs do not simply reflect a trade dispute — they reveal a deeper American anxiety. India’s rise as a resource-secure, energy-independent, and diplomatically autonomous power challenges old assumptions about U.S. primacy.

Washington wants India as a partner in containing China. But India wants room to manoeuvre — not a camp to join. And in this new world, access to oil, minerals, and technology supply chains matters more than applause from a superpower.

Tariffs might sting economically, but they won’t change New Delhi’s strategy. If anything, they highlight the very reason India refuses to rely on any single great power: in global politics, friendship is useful — but autonomy is security.