By: Arsh Mishra, Research Analyst, GSDN
India-Pakistan relations can best be described as a bed of particularly painful thorns, historically more so for one side than the other. Ever since the colonial gift of a nation divided into two by mere lines on a map, the two States have engaged in all sorts of hostilities possible, particularly army-against-army wars starting in 1947-48 followed by 1965 and 1971. The 1971 war that birthed Bangladesh prompted Pakistan to finally realise that as far as conventional warfare was concerned, it would always be outdone by the Indian forces. Thus began a deliberate and extensive Pakistani pivot to a new age of warfare and conflict, all the aspects of which can be aptly included under the umbrella of asymmetric warfare.
Asymmetric Warfare
In the simplest words, asymmetric warfare is described as conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities and strategies. While sounding very simple, this concept includes a myriad ways of waging conflict, some of which have been extensively employed by India’s hostile neighbour. Till today, with new conflicts around the world, and with the old ones evolving, asymmetric warfare and it scope continues to expand, making it one of the toughest challenges for State security and defence. In the current day and age, methods can range from age-old proxy warfare and guerilla tactics to the highly sophisticated realm of cyber and information warfare, and with seemingly futuristic concepts like weather weaponisation fast heading towards plausible operationalisation, it is in India’s best interests, nay a pressing necessity, to do all it can to stay ahead of the curve. Historical examples paint a less-than-conclusive picture of the success of asymmetric warfare. While the smaller belligerent party in the Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars secured victory, the same cannot be seen in more contemporary conflicts such as the post-October 7 Israeli war on Hamas and Hizb’allah, where the larger, more sophisticated party clearly has the upper hand. In the Indo-Pakistani context, the drawn nature of the conflict makes the analysis far more complex and the judgement of victory or defeat more uncertain. This article aims to qualitatively examine the effectiveness of Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare against India.
Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts
On September 22, 1965, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the immediate aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war and a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated ceasefire resolution, made a particularly fiery speech in the Council, which portrayed Pakistan as a victim of India’s “naked predatory unwarranted aggression”; a laughable notion at the very least considering Operation Gibraltar, the spark that lit the flame of war, was undertaken less than two months before this speech. Notable amongst all the usual rhetoric was one statement that has since defined Pakistan’s approach to its conflict with India, “We will wage a war for thousand years, a war of defence”. Furthermore, he threatened Pakistani withdrawal from the United Nations in the absence of a lasting settlement on the Kashmir issue; interestingly, the ultimatum has not been carried out till date despite the UN’s failure as per Pakistani perception.
After abject failure and utter humiliation in the 1971 war that created Bangladesh, Bhutto laid down the doctrine of ‘inflicting a thousand cuts’ upon India, to dismember it. Ironically, six years later, Bhutto himself was deposed and later executed by the new regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, who despite the clear difference in opinions, seemed to agree with waging low intensity and covert conflict against the Indian State, thus formalising and expanding on the doctrine of ‘Bleeding India with a Thousand Cuts’.
Since then, through cross border terrorism, separatist insurgencies and hybrid and information warfare, Pakistan has been waging a protracted war against India, a war that it aims to keep waging into the distant future. The significant pivot to a new type of warfare enabled Pakistan to achieve its objective of attempting to destabilise India and a nuisance to the neighbourhood, while foregoing the costs, both economic and otherwise, of engaging in direct conflict.
Terrorism and Separatist Insurgencies
After the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan sought to redirect the remaining Sunni mujahids into Kashmir to propagate acts of terror and insurgency. Thus, from the 1980s, the single greatest security threat to India till date began to take shape. Pakistan officially maintained the rising violence and armed struggle in Kashmir as the freedom movement of the Kashmiris who sought to secede from India. Reports of Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) admitting to the National Assembly that Pakistan did indeed sponsor acts of violence in Kashmir, and Gen Parvez Musharraf admitting to supporting and training Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, however, led the narrative of Pakistani non-involvement to an early grave.
Due to the terrorism being promulgated in Kashmir, the Indian Army and paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF) maintain a presence of close to 3.5 lakh troops, in addition to all the supporting logistics required to sustain this level of deployment. This comes at a significant economic and human cost to India, while the cost of carrying out terrorism to Pakistan is minimal and grossly incomparable to the Indian cost of countering it. Moreover, since 2000, more than 3000 security personnel have lost their lives in terror acts in Kashmir, in addition to a host of civilian lives and destruction of property and infrastructure. Even though estimates suggest more than 13000 terrorists have been neutralised in the same time frame, the value of human lives in India is far greater than in Pakistan, with the result being that every single life lost in India is felt with the same psychological and emotional solemnity.
In addition to Kashmir, Pakistan fuelled and continues to fuel separatist fires in Punjab through the Khalistan movement, extending support to organisations like the Babbar Khalsa Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force and the Khalistan Commando Force. The ISI, during the 1980s, set up a special cell to provide arms and ammunition to the Khalistani terrorists under Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Even though a strong Khalistani terror threat has long since diffused, the micro-involvement of Pakistan in Punjab even today through narrative building and cross-border drug smuggling, continues to present a problem for India significant enough to counter actively, something that has been a victim of recent neglect.
With Kashmir and Punjab being the main focus, Pakistan continues to attempt to infiltrate and sow discord in India through proxy assets in Nepal and Bangladesh, and with both new governments treading a wary and calculated approach to India’s influence in the region, there are opportunities for Pakistan to exploit, ones that must be shut down through Indian diplomatic and intelligence efforts sooner than later.
Inter Services Intelligence and Deep State
The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is responsible for handling Pakistan’s intelligence requirements, much akin to India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB). However, unlike its Indian counterparts, the ISI is not just an intelligence agency, but also the chief puppeteer behind every single aspect of ruling Pakistan. In close conjunction with the Pakistani army, whose officers both serving and retired make up much of the ISI, the agency forms a potent Deep State apparatus that effectively controls Pakistani affairs. It is common knowledge, supported by a plethora of studies and evidence, that no real power rests with the Pakistani federal executive, and that they serve at the pleasure of the ISI and army. Pakistan’s extensive experience with coups d’etat is enough to underscore the veracity of this system. Owing to such absolute control, it is far easier for Pakistan to devote time, efforts and resources dedicated to destabilising India, instead of focussing on actual governance, and the indications that this indeed is the state of affairs is highlighted by the complete breakdown of normal life, whether economic or civil, in most parts of Pakistan.
It also enables Pakistan to circumvent lengthy bureaucratic procedures to achieve its military and terror objectives, which is in stark contrast to the red tape culture in Indian administration. It was a common source of ridicule for Indian troops stationed along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border to be mocked by Pakistani troops who often used to call out the lengthy chain of permissions required for India to fire a lone bullet towards Pakistan while they could spray Indian posts with a barrage any time they pleased. While this situation has vastly improved with Indian troops being granted more autonomy, India is still a long way from streamlining its bureaucratic procedures, while maintaining accountability and democratic control, unlike Pakistan which is, for all practical purposes, an autocratic State with a government that serves at the pleasure of its generals.
Furthermore, the extensive penetration of the Pakistani Deep State into the nation’s administration has enabled it to dictate the diplomatic narrative, and it is no surprise that on every major international platform, Pakistan continues to propagate its narrative of being a victim of terrorism, claims that are dismissed often, and rebutted aptly by the Indian diplomats. However, the persistence of such narratives, and their selective subscription by the international comity of nations at times, highlights the reactionary nature of Indian diplomatic efforts instead of active and aggressive diplomacy aimed at dispelling such narratives before they take root.
Information Warfare
With the evolving nature of warfare, Information Warfare has emerged as a key aspect of asymmetric conflicts. During and after Operation Sindoor, narratives from both sides persisted for a long time, and despite clear operational victory, India was not able to capitalise on the opportunity to engage in effective information warfare (IW). Despite heavy losses, the Pakistani public celebrates Pakistani triumph in Operation Banyan-al-Marsoos, with the narrative gaining traction in parts of India as well. The ISI and Director General Inter Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), the army’s public relations branch have been miles ahead of India in propagating IW, which India awoke to too late and still has not caught up to the levels required.
In the modern age, wars will increasingly be fought through non-kinetic means, and IW remains the most important aspect of the same. ISI has been able to infiltrate Indian media space and influence people’s perception through effective use of social media sock-puppet networks and covert funding and directions to fringe anti-State outfits. Therefore, while at the international and diplomatic level, India maintains an upper hand through factual rebuttals, at the human level, Pakistan has been able to create chaos, confusion, hysteria and doubt with respect to Indian efforts, at minimal human or economic cost.
Upon the subject of cyberspace infiltration and sophisticated cyber-attacks, Pakistan currently lacks the wherewithal to break through India’s security, but with China as a trusted ally, it can soon be expected to possess the capability to perpetrate such attacks in the near future.
The threat to India’s media and cyber space is a clear and present danger, more so than kinetic and conventional security concerns, and Pakistan has the advantage of an enormous head-start in this respect.
The Economy of Asymmetric Warfare
The Indian Budget 2026-27 allocated the Ministry of Defence $86.7 bn, close to 2% of the national GDP. This figure excludes the additional $18 bn allocated to the Ministry of Home Affairs for the paramilitary forces and intelligence apparatus under it. In contrast, Pakistan’s defence budget for the current financial year is $10.8 bn. While the amounts look seem disparate and project India’s superior position regarding security, the reality is not so stark. The ISI and Pakistani Army propagate their conflict through proxy terrorist outfits, most of which are registered as not-for-profit organisations and rely on private funding just as much as covert government funding. Therefore, the cost of the conflict is far lesser for Pakistan, with its primary focus on destabilising India, and far greater for India, with its security spending itself directed into diverse sub-verticals. By drawing out the conflict as lesser costs, Pakistan ensures Indian drainage of funds on maintain security and countering threats, such as infiltration and terror attacks, that Pakistan has abundant resources to churn out through its well-established terror sponsoring State machinery.
The Judgement
Henry Kissinger stated “the conventional army loses if it does not win, but the guerilla wins if he does not lose”. It is an unpolished view on the subject; the real success or failure of an asymmetric conflict depends on whether the original objective is achieved. While Pakistan continues to bleed India economically through defence spending and human costs of the lives lost due to terror attacks, it falls extremely short of its objective of dismembering India. India, even through a less-than-ideal and fractured approach to countering the Pakistani asymmetric threat, has been able to heal its wounds faster than Pakistan has been able to inflict the cuts. The single most important factor in this is the resilience of the Indian people, who unite in the face of adversity despite diversity. It has been seen that incidents like terror attacks bring Indians closer together in their demand and hope for an end to the problem once and for all, a mindset that allows the State machinery to respond effectively to the threats. Thus, while India bleeds, it does not sustain injury for stretches of time long enough for Pakistan to fracture the integrity of the nation. In this sense, Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare, while potent, has failed in its objective.
The Way Forward
Contemporary Pakistan is begetting the rotten fruits of years of neglect towards its citizens, and the Deep State today is surrounded by threats from all sides, literally and figuratively. The Taliban is a major nuisance, the Balochistan Liberation Army has declared control over 85% of the province, there are whispers of the demand for secession in Sindh and there are mass uprisings in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-Occupied-Jammu and Kashmir. The time is opportune for India to forego its reactionary approach and aim at completely neutralising the Pakistani threat at a time when the rogue state is already crippled. Doing so does not require kinetic or conventional force, but a pragmatic and aggressive approach towards controlling the narrative at the highest diplomatic level and the grassroots at the same time. Economic pressure, dissent and diplomatic isolation pursued with focussed vigour will make sure Pakistan never again features as a security threat, all three of which can be achieved by a mastery of Information Warfare.
India does not need a thousand cuts for Pakistan, three well directed slashes will sever its ambitions of dismembering India once and for all, and the war of a thousand years shall have ended in less than a hundred.
