By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Energy security has emerged as one of the central strategic concerns of the twenty-first century. Rapid industrialization, population growth, and technological expansion have sharply increased electricity demand across the world. For a rapidly developing country like India, ensuring reliable and sustainable energy supply has become a national priority. While coal continues to dominate India’s energy mix, concerns about climate change and carbon emissions have pushed policymakers to diversify toward cleaner energy sources. Nuclear energy, which produces large amounts of electricity with minimal greenhouse gas emissions, has therefore gained increasing importance in India’s long-term energy planning.

However, nuclear energy expansion depends fundamentally on the availability of uranium fuel. India possesses uranium reserves, but they are limited and often of relatively low grade compared with deposits found in countries such as Canada. This constraint has historically limited the operational efficiency of India’s nuclear reactors. Consequently, international uranium partnerships have become essential for sustaining nuclear power generation. A recent example is the 2026 Canada–India uranium agreement, under which Canadian mining company Cameco will supply about 22 million pounds of uranium between 2027 and 2035, valued at roughly $2.6 billion, to fuel India’s nuclear reactors. This agreement reflects India’s growing reliance on global uranium markets to secure energy stability while expanding its nuclear energy capacity.

Historical Context: From Nuclear Estrangement to Strategic Cooperation

The trajectory of nuclear cooperation between India and Canada reflects a complex history shaped by both technological collaboration and political tensions. In the early years after independence, Canada played an important role in developing India’s civilian nuclear program. Canadian assistance contributed to India’s early nuclear infrastructure, particularly through heavy-water reactor technology derived from Canada’s CANDU reactor system. These collaborations helped establish India’s early nuclear research and power generation capabilities and reflected a broader international commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy during the mid-twentieth century. One of the most significant outcomes of this cooperation was the establishment of the CIRUS research reactor at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre with Canadian technical assistance and support from the United States. This reactor played a critical role in advancing India’s nuclear research capabilities and training a new generation of Indian nuclear scientists and engineers. The early phase of Indo-Canadian nuclear collaboration therefore laid the institutional and technological foundations of India’s nuclear program, even though later geopolitical developments temporarily disrupted this partnership.

This cooperative relationship dramatically changed after India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, known as the “Smiling Buddha” test. Canada and several Western countries viewed the test as a violation of earlier nuclear cooperation agreements and immediately suspended nuclear assistance to India. As a result, India remained largely excluded from global nuclear commerce for decades, particularly because it had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A turning point occurred in 2008 when India secured a historic waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group following the India–United States civil nuclear agreement. This waiver allowed India to participate in international nuclear trade under safeguards monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canada subsequently signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India that came into force in 2013, enabling the resumption of uranium trade. Recent diplomatic developments further highlight the normalization of nuclear relations. In 2026, during high-level talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, both countries announced a major uranium supply agreement alongside efforts to deepen trade and energy cooperation.  This renewed engagement marks a significant shift from decades of estrangement to a strategic partnership focused on clean energy and resource cooperation.

India’s Uranium Challenge: Domestic Limitations and Growing Demand

Despite possessing uranium deposits in regions such as Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan, India faces structural challenges in meeting domestic uranium demand. Much of India’s uranium ore is relatively low grade, which increases extraction costs and complicates mining operations. As India expanded its nuclear power infrastructure, the gap between uranium supply and reactor demand widened. Domestic production has therefore been insufficient to fuel all operating reactors at full capacity. While the Uranium Corporation of India Limited has undertaken efforts to expand mining operations and develop new uranium projects, production levels have not yet kept pace with the country’s rapidly growing nuclear energy ambitions. Environmental clearances, technological constraints, and the long gestation period associated with uranium mining projects further contribute to delays in increasing domestic output.

This limitation has compelled India to rely heavily on imported uranium. According to energy data, India currently imports over 70 percent of its uranium requirements from international suppliers. Countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia, and Canada have become key partners in meeting India’s nuclear fuel needs. For example, in FY2021 India imported more than 2,000 metric tonnes of uranium from Canada and Kazakhstan combined, illustrating the importance of global supply chains in sustaining India’s nuclear sector. In recent years, India has also sought to diversify its uranium import sources to reduce strategic vulnerability and ensure uninterrupted fuel supply for its reactors. Agreements with multiple uranium-exporting countries have allowed India to maintain reactor efficiency and stabilize fuel reserves. As India continues to expand its nuclear power program and construct additional reactors, securing reliable international uranium partnerships will remain essential for maintaining energy security and sustaining long-term nuclear development.

Recent policy initiatives further highlight the urgency of addressing India’s uranium challenge. The government of India has launched a Nuclear Energy Mission aiming to expand nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047, a dramatic increase from the current installed capacity of roughly 9 GW. Achieving this ambitious target will require secure long-term uranium supplies, making international partnerships like the Canada–India uranium agreement increasingly vital for sustaining India’s nuclear ambitions. In addition to large-scale reactors, India is also exploring the development of advanced technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) and fast breeder reactors to enhance efficiency and diversify its nuclear energy portfolio. Institutions such as the Department of Atomic Energy and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited are actively working to accelerate reactor construction and strengthen domestic nuclear infrastructure. Within this broader strategic framework, stable uranium imports from reliable partners will remain essential for enabling India’s long-term nuclear expansion and ensuring energy security.

The Canada–India Uranium Deal: Structure and Strategic Significance

The Canada–India uranium agreement represents one of the most significant developments in bilateral energy cooperation. Under the 2026 agreement, the Canadian uranium producer Cameco will supply approximately 22 million pounds of uranium ore concentrate (U₃O₈) to India between 2027 and 2035, with an estimated value of about $2.6 billion. The uranium will be used to fuel India’s fleet of nuclear reactors operated under civilian safeguards. This agreement builds on earlier cooperation, including a smaller five-year uranium supply contract signed in 2015, indicating a deepening long-term partnership between the two countries. The uranium sourced from Canada’s high-grade deposits in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin—one of the richest uranium-producing regions globally—ensures high-quality fuel supply for India’s expanding nuclear power sector. In practical terms, this arrangement helps Indian reactors operate at higher capacity levels, improving electricity generation efficiency while reducing the risks associated with domestic uranium shortages.

The deal also reflects broader geopolitical and economic dynamics. In addition to uranium trade, India and Canada have sought to expand cooperation in critical minerals, clean energy technologies, and nuclear innovation such as small modular reactors (SMRs). The uranium partnership forms part of a wider effort by both governments to strengthen bilateral relations and diversify strategic economic ties. Recent diplomatic engagements between the two countries have emphasized deeper collaboration in areas such as energy transition technologies, research partnerships, and supply chains for critical resources. Both governments have also expressed interest in expanding academic and technological cooperation in nuclear science, including safety standards and regulatory frameworks. Moreover, recent diplomatic meetings have set an ambitious target of increasing bilateral trade to $50 billion by 2030, highlighting the broader economic significance of the partnership. In this sense, the uranium agreement not only strengthens India’s nuclear fuel security but also serves as a catalyst for broader strategic cooperation in energy, trade, and technology.

Implications for India’s Nuclear Energy Program and Clean Energy Goals

The availability of reliable uranium imports has significant implications for the nuclear power program of India. Nuclear reactors require a consistent and uninterrupted fuel supply to operate efficiently, and uranium shortages in the past forced several Indian reactors to function below their optimal capacity. With long-term supply agreements such as the Canada–India uranium deal, India can maintain steady reactor operations and increase electricity generation. Currently, India operates about 25 nuclear reactors and has several more under construction, reflecting the government’s commitment to expanding nuclear power infrastructure. Recent developments also illustrate this expansion: the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited has accelerated work on new pressurized heavy water reactors in states such as Rajasthan and Gujarat, while the Kudankulam nuclear power project in partnership with Russia continues to add new reactor units to the national grid. These projects demonstrate how secure uranium supplies enable India to scale up its nuclear energy capacity while maintaining operational stability.

Nuclear energy also plays an important role in India’s broader clean energy transition. Unlike fossil fuels, nuclear power generates electricity without emitting large amounts of carbon dioxide, making it an important component of India’s climate strategy. As India attempts to balance rapid economic growth with its commitments under the Paris Agreement, nuclear power offers a reliable base-load energy source that complements renewable energy systems such as solar and wind, which are often affected by weather variability. The long-term uranium supply from Canada therefore strengthens India’s ability to pursue both energy security and climate goals simultaneously. Furthermore, discussions between the two countries on advanced nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, indicate that the partnership may extend beyond fuel supply into technological collaboration.

Scholars and energy analysts increasingly emphasize the strategic significance of such partnerships. For instance, nuclear policy expert Ashley J. Tellis has argued that reliable access to global nuclear fuel markets allows India to sustain its civilian nuclear program while maintaining strategic autonomy in energy planning. Similarly, analysts at the International Energy Agency highlight that nuclear power will remain an important pillar of India’s low-carbon energy mix if the country is to meet its long-term net-zero ambitions. Recent policy initiatives reinforce this trajectory: India has announced plans to expand nuclear capacity significantly by 2047 as part of its long-term energy transition strategy. Within this broader framework, international uranium partnerships—particularly with technologically advanced suppliers like Canada—play a critical role in ensuring that India’s nuclear energy expansion remains both sustainable and strategically resilient.

Conclusion

The Canada–India uranium partnership represents a significant milestone in the evolution of bilateral relations and global energy diplomacy. By ensuring a stable supply of uranium, Canada supports the nuclear energy ambitions of India while simultaneously strengthening economic and strategic ties between the two countries. The agreement demonstrates how international resource cooperation can address critical energy challenges faced by rapidly growing economies and underscores the importance of reliable supply chains in sustaining nuclear power programs. As India continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure to meet rising electricity demand and reduce dependence on fossil fuels, access to consistent uranium supplies will remain crucial for maintaining reactor efficiency and long-term energy planning. Moreover, the partnership reflects a broader shift toward strategic resource diplomacy in an increasingly complex global energy landscape. As countries compete for access to critical minerals and energy resources, long-term agreements such as the Canada–India uranium deal help ensure stability and predictability in fuel supply chains. The cooperation also signals growing trust between the two democracies and highlights the role of energy partnerships in strengthening broader geopolitical relationships. In the long run, such collaborations may pave the way for deeper engagement in nuclear research, technological innovation, and regulatory cooperation, thereby contributing to a more resilient and sustainable global nuclear energy framework.

Looking ahead, uranium diplomacy will likely play an increasingly important role in global energy politics as countries pursue cleaner energy pathways and attempt to meet climate commitments. For India, maintaining diversified uranium supply partnerships will be essential for sustaining its nuclear energy program and achieving long-term energy security. At the same time, the Canada–India partnership may open new avenues for broader collaboration in advanced nuclear technologies, reactor safety systems, and critical mineral supply chains. Such cooperation reflects a broader shift toward strategic energy partnerships that combine resource access with technological exchange and sustainable development goals. In this evolving global energy landscape, the Canada–India uranium agreement stands as a model of how resource diplomacy can contribute to energy resilience, geopolitical trust, and the pursuit of a low-carbon future.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By: Dr. Shweta Tiwari

The Two-Day International Conference on Changing Dynamics of India’s Narrative Diplomacy, was organized by the Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Liberal Arts, Shree Guru Gobind Singh Tricentenary University in collaboration with the Indian Council of World Affairs and sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research unfolded as a multidimensional academic engagement, on February 25-26, 2026. Bringing together scholars, practitioners and policymakers, the conference examined the ways in which India’s global image is increasingly shaped by narratives, perception-building and strategic communication. Through keynote lectures, panel discussions and thematic technical sessions, it highlighted that in an interconnected yet fragmented global order, countries compete not only for territory, trade, or military leverage but also for legitimacy, credibility and moral authority within discursive and digital spaces.

The conference began with a panel discussion titled “Narrative Diplomacy: Theory and Praxis”. The panellists, Dr. Artyom Garin, Dr. Aurora Martin, Dr. Titipol Phakdeewanich, Ms. Anamika Bhattacharjee and Ms. Cynthia Francis established the conceptual foundation of the conference by examining the evolving nature of diplomacy in the twenty-first century. They also emphasized that contemporary diplomacy extends beyond traditional statecraft into spheres such as storytelling, cultural memory, digital communication, diaspora engagement and human rights discourse. In this context, India’s civilizational heritage and pluralistic traditions were identified as important narrative assets. At the same time, they stressed that the effective articulation of such narratives requires credibility, adaptability and ethical grounding.

The Inaugural Session began with the rendition of Vande Mataram and the ceremonial lighting of the lamp. In her opening remarks, Dr. Nandini Basistha reflected on the transformation of diplomacy from conventional state-centric practices to what she described as a world of “many truths,” where global perceptions are shaped by cultural practices, food traditions, diaspora networks and digital media.

The Hon’ble Vice-Chancellor of SGT University, Prof. (Dr.) Hemant Verma delivered the inaugural address situating India’s narrative diplomacy within the changing geopolitical environment and emphasizing its growing relevance in global politics.

The Guest of Honour, Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, highlighted India’s cultural diplomacy through initiatives such as yoga, cinema, humanitarian outreach and vaccine diplomacy. The Keynote Address by Prof. Dr. Arvind Kumar provided a geopolitical overview of India’s emergence as a significant global actor, particularly through its role in institutions such as the G20. The Chief Guest, Dr. Vijay Chauthaiwale reflected on India’s diplomatic resurgence and emphasized trust-building and humanitarian engagement as key pillars of its global narrative. In the Presidential Address, Padma Bhushan Ram Bahadur Rai traced the historical evolution of India’s foreign policy, emphasizing the renewed sense of national confidence and civilizational pride in contemporary diplomatic discourse. The session also witnessed the release of the conference souvenir and the book Stories, Soft Power, and Strategy: India’s Narrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century. The inaugural proceedings concluded with a vote of thanks.

A special session titled “The Power of Perception: Narrative Diplomacy and Operation Sindoor” added a praxis-oriented dimension to the conference. It featured Dr. Hemang Joshi in conversation with Prof. (Dr.) Hemant Verma as they discussed how contemporary strategic operations unfold simultaneously across military, political and digital arenas. The “Operation Sindoor” was discussed not only as a security initiative but also as a symbolically resonant event demonstrating the importance of naming, framing, and communication in shaping public perception. The speakers highlighted the concept of narrative sovereignty, stressing that nations must proactively articulate their own perspectives rather than allowing external narratives to dominate. They also emphasized the responsibility of democratic institutions, political leadership, and the media in balancing transparency with strategic communication.

The technical sessions of the conference expanded these themes across a wide range of interdisciplinary perspectives. India’s Narrative Diplomacy: Theory and Praxis explored the philosophical and ethical foundations of India’s diplomatic narratives. Scholars discussed the role of concepts such as dharma, sustainability and constitutional ethics in shaping India’s international image. The papers highlighted that cultural practices including cuisine, environmental stewardship and democratic values contribute to a more nuanced global narrative. Another session titled The Narrative Diplomacy of Different Countries brought together eight papers examining narrative strategies across diverse geopolitical contexts. Presenters analyzed how different nations employ storytelling and symbolic communication to balance ideals with strategic interests, particularly in regions marked by political tensions and fragile neighbourhood relations. Several papers also emphasized the importance of indigenous epistemologies and sustainable development frameworks in shaping contemporary diplomatic practices. Bollywood and the Impact of Indian Cinema, examined the role of cinema as a powerful instrument of India’s soft power. Eight research papers stressed on Bollywood’s contribution to shaping global perceptions of India while also reflecting complex social debates within the country. Scholars discussed themes such as Indian Knowledge Systems, philosophical thought, gender representation, anti-caste discourse and national identity in cinematic narratives. Collectively, the session demonstrated that Bollywood transcends entertainment and functions as an influential cultural and diplomatic medium negotiating questions of identity, ideology and international representation.

Buddhist Heritage, Indology and the Indian Knowledge System comprised nine presentations exploring India’s civilizational heritage as a resource for contemporary diplomacy. Papers examined Buddhist diplomacy, ecological soft power, intellectual property strategies, educational traditions rooted in parampara and strategic thought. The discussions highlighted how ancient philosophical traditions can inform modern diplomatic practices by connecting cultural authenticity with strategic autonomy in a multipolar world.

The second day of the conference began with a panel discussion titled “Changing Dimensions of India’s Narrative Diplomacy.” The panel included Prof. S. D. Muni, Lt. Col. J. S. Sodhi, Dr. Sampa Kundu, Prof. Ramdas Rupavath, Prof. Dr. Alka Parikh, Prof. Saroj Kumar Verma, Dr. Ravi Rameshchandra Shukla, and Dr. Girisanker S. B. Nair. The panellists offered a multilayered understanding of India’s narrative diplomacy by integrating strategic, cultural and technological perspectives. Discussions emphasized the importance of adapting traditional diplomatic practices to a rapidly transforming global environment shaped by digital communication, geopolitical competition and emerging technologies.

The second day’s technical sessions further expanded the scope of the conference. The session Digital Storytelling and Social Media Diplomacy contained twelve papers examining the growing role of digital platforms in shaping diplomatic narratives. Scholars discussed language politics, Digital Public Infrastructure, misinformation and the ethical challenges associated with AI-driven communication. The session highlighted how digital technologies have transformed diplomatic engagement by enabling faster communication while simultaneously creating new vulnerabilities related to misinformation and data manipulation. Narratives of Food, Democracy, and Diaspora examined cultural practices and diaspora networks contribute to the formation of “Brand India.” Eight papers examined the interconnections between sustainable development, democratic values, diaspora engagement, and culinary diplomacy. Presentations also addressed developmental challenges such as poverty, health and education while reflecting on the opportunities and constraints involved in diaspora diplomacy within a multipolar global order. Challenges and Prospects of Narrative Diplomacy, featured eleven research papers analysing the evolving strategic landscape of India’s global engagement. Scholars discussed cultural partnerships such as India-Vietnam relations, maritime diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations as examples of India’s responsible international leadership. Papers also addressed issues such as coalition governance, national identity, inclusive education and ethical traditions in shaping both domestic and international narratives. The session concluded with reflections on emerging challenges, particularly the role of artificial intelligence and digital technologies in transforming the production and circulation of knowledge. The last session was conducted in an online format, included more than fifty research papers and significantly expanded the thematic scope of the conference. Scholars explored topics such as democracy, Buddhism, Gandhian thought, diaspora diplomacy, digital transformation, internal security, and strategic autonomy within the broader framework of narrative diplomacy. Papers examined instruments of soft power including geographical indication tags, gastrodiplomacy, grassroots leadership initiatives, and the internationalization of India’s digital payment systems such as UPI. Several presenters critically analysed China’s narrative strategies, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, neighbourhood diplomacy, and India’s engagement with the Global South in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council. Discussions also addressed contemporary concerns including AI-driven disinformation, identity politics, coalition governance, and security challenges in border regions such as Ladakh and the Northeast.

The conference concluded with a Valedictory session that brought together strategic, diplomatic, and academic reflections. The Chief Guest, Lt. Gen. Shokin Chauhan, provided a security-oriented perspective on narrative diplomacy. Drawing on his extensive experience in defence and international cooperation, he emphasized that contemporary conflicts increasingly unfold not only on physical battlefields but also within informational and cognitive domains. He argued that perception management, strategic communication and narrative framing have become essential components of national security. Highlighting India’s expanding global role, he noted that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, peacekeeping missions, maritime security initiatives and evacuation operations contribute significantly to shaping India’s international narrative as a responsible and responsive power.

Lt. Gen. Chauhan further stressed that strategic narratives must be grounded in clarity of national interest while remaining aligned with democratic values and ethical responsibility. He cautioned that hybrid warfare, misinformation, and AI-driven disinformation campaigns present serious challenges to national narratives. Consequently, he advocated greater institutional preparedness, stronger inter-agency coordination, and increased intellectual investment in strategic studies to safeguard India’s global image in an increasingly contested information environment. The Guest of Honour, Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar offered a diplomatic perspective based on decades of experience in international relations. He observed that India’s foreign policy has evolved from a largely state-centric approach to a more multidimensional model that integrates culture, diaspora engagement, digital diplomacy and economic partnerships. According to him, India’s civilizational depth, democratic framework, and pluralistic identity constitute enduring narrative strengths. However, he emphasized that these strengths must be communicated consistently and credibly across international platforms. Referring to India’s engagement with the Global South, multilateral institutions and Indo-Pacific partnerships he argued that narrative diplomacy must combine moral positioning with strategic pragmatism. He also highlighted the growing role of embassies and diplomatic missions as narrative hubs that engage with academia, think tanks, media organizations and civil society.

The valedictory deliberations reinforced the central insight of the conference: in the twenty-first century, nations compete not only through material capabilities but also through the credibility, coherence, and persuasive power of their narratives. The conference also included an award ceremony recognizing outstanding scholarly contributions presented during the event. Awards were presented in three categories. The Best Paper Award was conferred upon Dr. Mohd Shahzad, Ms. Devarati Mandal, Dr. Bijetri Pathak, Mr. Partha Debnath, and Dr. Amita Arora. The Best Graduate Paper Award was presented to Ms. Neha Kumari, Mr. Ashutosh Prasad, Mr. Prathamesh Kamble, Ms. Anamika Singh, Ms. Dona Martin, Mr. Mohd Zaid Irfan, and Mr. Santosh Kumar Sahoo. The Best Paper in the Intern Category was awarded to Mr. Daksh Singh and Ms. Surati Chaturvedi. The ceremony also recognized the contributions of the best interns across various organizing committees.

A key takeaway from the conference was that narrative diplomacy is not merely an academic concept but a comprehensive soft power architecture. It integrates Indian Knowledge Systems, cultural exports, digital infrastructure, humanitarian outreach and diaspora networks into a cohesive diplomatic vision. At the same time, participants acknowledged emerging challenges such as misinformation, data misrepresentation, geopolitical contestations and the disruptive potential of artificial intelligence. Several recommendations emerged from the deliberations. These included the establishment of a National Narrative Diplomacy Centre to facilitate cross-sectoral coordination between academia, policy institutions and diplomatic bodies expanding Digital Public Infrastructure and Indian Knowledge Systems through partnerships with the Global South; investing in counter-narrative strategies to address misinformation and AI-driven propaganda and leveraging diaspora networks to strengthen India’s engagement with regions such as Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

In conclusion, the International Conference successfully highlighted the transformative role of narratives in shaping India’s global presence. The discussions demonstrated that India’s diplomatic future lies in harmonizing civilizational heritage, democratic values, technological innovation and strategic communication. Over the course of two days, the conference not only enriched academic discourse but also generated meaningful insights for policy engagement and future research.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The global transition toward clean energy has fundamentally altered the geopolitical significance of natural resources. While fossil fuels dominated the twentieth century’s geopolitical rivalries, the twenty-first century is witnessing the emergence of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper as the new strategic commodities shaping international economic and security relations. These minerals are indispensable for manufacturing electric vehicle batteries, renewable energy infrastructure, energy storage technologies, and advanced electronics. As countries accelerate their decarbonisation strategies to address climate change and meet their commitments under the Paris Agreement, access to these resources has become a central component of national security and economic policy.

For India, the challenge is particularly significant. The country aims to achieve net-zero emissions by 2070, expand renewable energy capacity to 500 GW by 2030, and rapidly electrify its transportation sector. These ambitions require massive quantities of lithium and copper, minerals that India lacks domestically in sufficient quantities. Consequently, the search for reliable external sources has become a priority within India’s strategic planning. Latin America has emerged as one of the most promising regions in this regard.

Latin America holds some of the largest reserves of lithium and copper in the world. The so-called “Lithium Triangle”—Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—contains more than 60 percent of global lithium reserves, while countries such as Chile and Peru are among the world’s leading producers of copper. Historically, these resources were primarily integrated into global supply chains dominated by Western companies and later by China’s expanding mining investments. However, the evolving geoeconomic landscape has created new opportunities for countries like India to build partnerships with Latin American states.

This article examines how India’s engagement with Latin America’s critical mineral sector represents both an economic necessity and a strategic opportunity. It explores the historical evolution of global mineral geopolitics, the emergence of critical minerals as instruments of geoeconomic competition, the strategic significance of Latin America for India’s energy transition, and the challenges and opportunities that accompany this partnership. Ultimately, the article argues that India’s approach to Latin America must move beyond resource extraction toward a comprehensive framework of technological collaboration, environmental sustainability, and long-term economic cooperation.

Historical Evolution of Resource Geopolitics and the Rise of Critical Minerals

Resource geopolitics has long shaped global power structures. During the twentieth century, oil and natural gas dominated geopolitical calculations, influencing conflicts, alliances, and economic policies. The oil crises of the 1970s demonstrated how resource scarcity could destabilise global economies and reshape international relations. Scholars such as Daniel Yergin have described oil as “the prize” that determined geopolitical rivalries throughout modern history. However, the global energy transition is now redefining the strategic landscape. Renewable energy systems rely less on fossil fuels but depend heavily on critical minerals used in batteries, power grids, and renewable technologies. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for lithium could increase more than forty times by 2040 if countries pursue aggressive climate goals. Copper demand is also expected to rise significantly due to its use in renewable energy infrastructure, electric vehicles, and power transmission networks. Scholars increasingly describe this transformation as the “new geopolitics of energy transition.” Political economist Jeff Colgan argues that the shift toward renewable technologies will not eliminate resource politics but rather transform it by creating new dependencies. Instead of oil pipelines and tanker routes, global competition will revolve around mineral supply chains, refining capacities, and battery technologies. Historically, Latin America has played a crucial role in global resource extraction. During the colonial period, the region supplied silver, gold, and other minerals to European empires, shaping the global economic order. In the twentieth century, copper mining in Chile and Peru became central to industrial development, while multinational corporations dominated resource extraction industries. However, political movements across Latin America have often contested foreign control over natural resources, leading to nationalisation policies and stronger state involvement in mining sectors.

Today, the resurgence of interest in critical minerals has revived debates about resource sovereignty, environmental sustainability, and equitable development. Latin American countries are increasingly seeking to ensure that mineral extraction contributes to domestic economic development rather than merely serving external markets. This context shapes how India and other global actors engage with the region.

Latin America’s Strategic Importance in the Global Energy Transition

Latin America occupies a central position in the global critical mineral landscape. The Lithium Triangle—comprising Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—contains vast lithium deposits embedded in salt flats and desert ecosystems, making it one of the most strategically valuable resource zones in the world. Lithium extracted from these regions is essential for producing lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles, renewable energy storage systems, and portable electronics.

Chile has long been one of the world’s largest lithium producers and also possesses extensive copper reserves. Peru is another major global supplier of copper, contributing significantly to global industrial supply chains. Bolivia, although possessing enormous lithium reserves, has historically struggled to develop large-scale extraction due to technological challenges and political debates over resource control. The strategic importance of these minerals has attracted intense global competition. China has emerged as a dominant actor in the critical mineral sector, investing heavily in mining operations, processing facilities, and battery manufacturing. Chinese companies have acquired stakes in major lithium projects in Argentina and Chile while also expanding their presence in Peru’s copper sector. These investments form part of China’s broader strategy to secure supply chains for its rapidly expanding electric vehicle and renewable energy industries.

The United States and European Union have also recognised the strategic importance of critical minerals. In recent years, Western governments have introduced initiatives to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on Chinese processing capabilities. Programs such as the US-led Mineral Security Partnership aim to develop responsible and sustainable mineral supply chains by supporting mining projects in resource-rich regions. In this evolving geopolitical environment, Latin American countries have gained new bargaining power. As economist Ricardo Hausmann notes, countries rich in critical minerals have the opportunity to leverage global demand to negotiate better terms for development, including technology transfer, local industrialisation, and environmental safeguards.

India’s Strategic Engagement with Latin America’s Mineral Sector

India’s engagement with Latin America has expanded significantly in recent years, particularly in the context of securing critical mineral resources. Traditionally, India’s foreign policy toward Latin America focused primarily on trade and diplomatic cooperation. However, the accelerating energy transition has elevated the region’s importance within India’s strategic calculations. One of the most significant developments occurred in January 2024, when Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL)—a joint venture of Indian public sector enterprises—signed an agreement with Argentina’s state-owned mining company CAMYEN SE. This agreement granted India rights to explore and develop lithium reserves in the Catamarca province, covering more than 15,000 hectares of lithium-rich brine blocks. The partnership marked India’s first direct mining investment in Latin America’s lithium sector. Further cooperation followed in February 2025, when India and Argentina signed an additional memorandum of understanding to deepen collaboration in exploration and resource development. At the same time, India initiated discussions with Chile to expand cooperation in both lithium and copper mining. Indian private companies have also begun exploring opportunities in Peru and Bolivia, reflecting growing interest in the region’s mineral potential. India’s strategy is not limited to securing raw materials. Policymakers increasingly emphasise the need to integrate mineral supply chains with domestic manufacturing initiatives such as the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM) and India’s electric vehicle ecosystem. By combining overseas resource acquisition with domestic processing and battery production, India aims to reduce its dependence on imported energy technologies.

Scholars argue that India’s approach differs from earlier extractive models often associated with traditional resource diplomacy, which often prioritized raw material extraction with limited benefits for host countries. According to strategic analyst Harsh V. Pant, India seeks to build mutually beneficial partnerships that combine resource access with development cooperation, technology transfer, and capacity building. This approach reflects India’s broader foreign policy emphasis on South–South cooperation, where economic engagement is framed as collaborative development rather than unilateral extraction. In the context of critical minerals, India has increasingly promoted joint exploration, knowledge exchange, and infrastructure development with partner countries.

Recent initiatives illustrate this evolving strategy. In January 2024, India’s state-owned consortium Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL) signed an agreement with Argentina’s provincial mining company CAMYEN SE to explore five lithium-rich blocks in Catamarca province, covering about 15,703 hectares of lithium brine deposits—India’s first overseas lithium mining project. The partnership not only aims to secure lithium for India’s electric vehicle and renewable energy sectors but also promotes knowledge exchange and sustainable mining practices. Similarly, India has expanded dialogue with Chile and Bolivia on lithium and copper cooperation, while encouraging private companies to invest in mineral exploration and battery value chains across the region.

Beyond Latin America, India has also pursued multilateral collaboration to strengthen resilient supply chains. Its participation in initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership and domestic programs like the National Critical Mineral Mission reflects a strategy that integrates overseas resource access with domestic processing, recycling, and technological development. In this sense, India’s mineral diplomacy increasingly combines resource security with sustainable development partnerships, reinforcing its image as a collaborative actor in the emerging geoeconomics of the global energy transition.

Challenges, Environmental Concerns, and the Future of Sustainable Mineral Partnerships

Despite the opportunities presented by India–Latin America cooperation, the path forward is not without challenges. One major issue concerns the environmental impact of mineral extraction. Lithium mining in the Atacama Desert in Chile requires large quantities of water, potentially threatening fragile ecosystems and local communities. Similarly, copper mining operations in Peru have faced protests from indigenous groups concerned about environmental degradation and resource exploitation. Environmental scholars warn that the global energy transition must avoid reproducing the extractive injustices associated with fossil fuel industries. As Kate Raworth’s “Doughnut Economics” framework suggests, sustainable development requires balancing economic growth with ecological limits and social equity. Applying these principles to critical mineral extraction will be essential to ensure that the transition to clean energy does not create new forms of environmental harm. Political risks also shape the investment environment in Latin America. Changes in government policies, royalty structures, or mining regulations can significantly affect foreign investments. Bolivia, for example, has historically pursued a state-centric approach to lithium development, emphasising national control over resources. Chile has also debated reforms aimed at increasing state participation in the lithium sector.

Another challenge concerns global market volatility. Mineral prices fluctuate based on technological innovations, demand shifts, and geopolitical tensions. The rapid development of alternative battery technologies or recycling systems could alter the global demand for certain minerals. For India, this uncertainty underscores the importance of diversifying supply chains and developing domestic recycling capabilities. Nevertheless, these challenges also create opportunities for innovation. India could position itself as a leader in sustainable mining technologies, renewable-energy-powered extraction processes, and circular economy practices. Recycling lithium-ion batteries and recovering copper from electronic waste could significantly reduce dependence on new extraction while supporting environmental sustainability.

Conclusion

The global transition to clean energy is reshaping the geopolitical significance of natural resources. Critical minerals such as lithium and copper are emerging as the strategic commodities of the twenty-first century, underpinning renewable energy systems, electric mobility, and advanced technologies. As demand for these minerals grows rapidly, countries are increasingly competing to secure stable and diversified supply chains. For India, Latin America represents a crucial partner in achieving its clean energy ambitions and economic development goals. The region’s vast lithium and copper reserves provide an opportunity for India to strengthen its resource security while expanding its diplomatic and economic engagement beyond traditional partners. Recent agreements with Argentina and ongoing negotiations with other Latin American countries illustrate the growing strategic importance of this relationship.

However, successful cooperation will require more than simple resource extraction. India must adopt a comprehensive strategy that integrates technological collaboration, environmental sustainability, and long-term economic partnerships. By investing in responsible mining practices, supporting local development, and promoting knowledge exchange, India can position itself as a trusted partner in the global critical mineral economy. Ultimately, the future of the global energy transition will depend not only on technological innovation but also on the governance of resource supply chains. Latin America’s mineral wealth and India’s technological ambitions together offer the possibility of a new model of cooperative geoeconomics, one that supports sustainable development while addressing the pressing challenge of climate change.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

The Indian Ocean has long been a central artery of global trade, strategic competition, and maritime connectivity. Stretching across one-fifth of the world’s ocean surface and connecting the economies of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remains one of the most geopolitically significant maritime spaces in the twenty-first century. Traditionally, discussions surrounding maritime security in the region have focused on threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, arms trafficking, and strategic rivalries among major powers. However, a quieter but equally consequential challenge has been steadily emerging: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.

IUU fishing represents one of the most pressing non-traditional security threats confronting the Indian Ocean today. While often perceived primarily as an environmental or economic issue, its implications extend far beyond marine conservation. It undermines the livelihoods of millions of coastal communities, erodes national economic resources, and increasingly intersects with transnational criminal networks. In the context of the Indian Ocean—home to some of the world’s most productive fishing grounds—these impacts are particularly profound.

For India, the stakes are especially high. With a coastline spanning more than 7,500 kilometers and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering approximately 2.37 million square kilometers, the country’s economic and food security is closely tied to the sustainability of marine resources. Millions of Indians rely directly or indirectly on fisheries for their livelihoods, while fish remains a crucial source of protein for large segments of the population. Yet the increasing presence of foreign fishing fleets, weak regulatory mechanisms in international waters, and technological asymmetries in maritime monitoring have made it increasingly difficult to control illegal fishing activities.

In recent years, India has begun to recognize that addressing IUU fishing is not only about protecting fish stocks but also about safeguarding maritime sovereignty, economic stability, and regional security. As a result, the issue has gradually become integrated into India’s broader maritime strategy, including initiatives related to maritime domain awareness, regional cooperation, and the Blue Economy. Understanding the scope of the challenge and India’s evolving response requires examining the historical evolution of IUU fishing, its contemporary dynamics in the Indian Ocean, and the strategic opportunities it presents for regional cooperation.

 Historical Evolution and Global Context of IUU Fishing

The problem of illegal fishing is not new. For centuries, maritime resources were exploited with minimal oversight, as the oceans were largely treated as open-access spaces. However, the scale and intensity of fishing activities increased dramatically during the twentieth century with advances in industrial fishing technologies, including larger trawlers, satellite navigation, sonar fish-finding systems, and refrigerated storage vessels. These developments allowed fishing fleets to travel farther, remain at sea longer, and harvest fish stocks at unprecedented levels. The international community began addressing the issue of maritime resource management during the mid-twentieth century. A major turning point occurred with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which established the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones. Under UNCLOS, coastal states were granted sovereign rights over marine resources within 200 nautical miles of their coastlines. This framework was intended to enable countries to manage fisheries more effectively and prevent overexploitation by foreign fleets. Despite these legal provisions, enforcement challenges soon became evident. Many developing coastal states lacked the surveillance capacity required to monitor large maritime areas. Moreover, fishing fleets began exploiting gaps in international governance, including poorly regulated high seas and inconsistent enforcement by flag states. These weaknesses created fertile ground for the emergence of IUU fishing. In response, international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed frameworks to define and address IUU fishing. According to the FAO, IUU fishing encompasses three primary activities: fishing conducted without authorization within a state’s jurisdiction, fishing activities that are not properly reported or misreported to authorities, and fishing that occurs in areas where regulatory frameworks are either weak or nonexistent.

Over time, the scale of IUU fishing expanded into a global challenge. Studies estimate that illegal fishing accounts for up to 20 percent of the world’s total fish catch annually, representing billions of dollars in economic losses. Beyond the economic impact, the ecological consequences are equally severe, as unregulated harvesting contributes to the depletion of fish stocks and the degradation of marine ecosystems.

 Ecological, Economic, and Security Implications in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is one of the most biologically diverse marine regions in the world. Its waters host a wide variety of commercially valuable species, including tuna, mackerel, shrimp, and numerous reef fish. The Western Indian Ocean alone contributes nearly five percent of the global fish catch, making it an essential resource for both regional economies and global seafood markets. However, this ecological richness also makes the region particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Estimates suggest that between 16 and 34 percent of the total fish catch in the Indian Ocean may be attributed to illegal or unreported fishing activities. Such levels of exploitation place enormous strain on marine ecosystems and threaten the long-term sustainability of fish stocks.

For India, the implications are multifaceted. Marine fisheries support the livelihoods of over 28 million people, including fishermen, fish processors, traders, and related service providers. Many coastal communities depend almost entirely on fishing for their economic survival. When illegal fishing fleets deplete fish stocks or encroach upon traditional fishing grounds, local fishermen often face declining catches and rising economic insecurity. The economic losses associated with IUU fishing extend beyond the fishing industry itself. Reduced fish stocks can disrupt supply chains, increase food prices, and weaken export revenues. In countries where fisheries constitute a significant component of national economies, these impacts can undermine broader development goals.

Furthermore, IUU fishing increasingly intersects with maritime security concerns. Vessels engaged in illegal fishing often operate in remote maritime zones where regulatory oversight is limited. In some cases, these vessels are linked to other forms of transnational crime, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms transportation. Such activities blur the boundaries between environmental crime and organized criminal networks, complicating enforcement efforts.

Another emerging concern is the use of fishing fleets as instruments of geopolitical influence. Large distant-water fleets from major powers can establish a persistent presence in foreign waters, enabling countries to project influence and gather maritime intelligence. This phenomenon has raised concerns about the strategic implications of fishing activities in contested or sensitive maritime regions.

India’s Policy Response and Maritime Security Framework

Recognizing the growing severity of the problem, India has undertaken several measures to strengthen its response to IUU fishing. These initiatives span domestic policy reforms, technological advancements in maritime surveillance, and enhanced regional cooperation.

One of the foundational elements of India’s strategy is the National Policy on Marine Fisheries (2017), which emphasizes sustainable fisheries management and improved monitoring of fishing activities. The policy aims to balance economic development with environmental conservation, recognizing that long-term prosperity depends on the sustainable use of marine resources.

Institutionally, enforcement responsibilities fall primarily on the Indian Coast Guard, which has been authorized under relevant maritime legislation to take action against illegal fishing activities within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Coast Guard conducts patrols, monitors suspicious vessels, and coordinates with other maritime agencies to enforce fishing regulations.

Technological advancements have also played an important role in strengthening India’s maritime monitoring capabilities. The establishment of the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in 2018 marked a significant step toward improving maritime domain awareness. Hosted by the Indian Navy, the centre facilitates real-time information sharing among partner countries, enabling the identification and tracking of suspicious vessels.

India has also integrated IUU fishing concerns into its broader maritime diplomacy initiatives. The country’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) emphasizes cooperative approaches to maritime security and sustainable resource management. Through this framework, India seeks to enhance capacity-building efforts among smaller Indian Ocean states that often lack the resources required for effective maritime surveillance.

At the regional level, India has actively raised the issue of illegal fishing within forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Dialogues on IUU fishing held in Goa in 2022 and 2024 highlighted the need for greater information sharing, coordinated enforcement mechanisms, and stronger regional governance structures.

Additionally, government initiatives such as the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) aim to modernize India’s fisheries sector by promoting vessel tracking systems, digital registration platforms, and improved communication networks for fishermen. These measures not only enhance regulatory oversight but also improve the safety and productivity of the fishing community.

Strategic Challenges and the Way Forward

Despite these efforts, several challenges continue to hinder the effective management of IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean. One of the most significant concerns is the growing presence of distant-water fishing fleets from extra-regional powers. Among these, China’s distant-water fleet is widely regarded as the largest in the world, with hundreds of vessels operating across multiple oceans. Reports indicate that Chinese fishing vessels have increasingly expanded their activities in the Indian Ocean over the past decade. In some instances, these vessels have been accused of operating within the Exclusive Economic Zones of coastal states without proper authorization. Such incidents highlight the limitations of existing governance frameworks and underscore the need for stronger enforcement mechanisms.

Another challenge lies in the fragmented nature of regional fisheries governance. Organizations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) play important roles in regulating certain species and maritime zones. However, significant gaps remain in terms of both geographic coverage and species management, allowing illegal operators to exploit regulatory loopholes.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive and cooperative approach. India can play a leading role in strengthening regional governance frameworks by promoting greater coordination among regional fisheries management organizations. Expanding data-sharing agreements and joint patrols among Indian Ocean states would also enhance collective monitoring capabilities. Technological innovation offers additional opportunities. Satellite-based monitoring systems, artificial intelligence for vessel tracking, and automated identification systems can significantly improve the detection of suspicious fishing activities. By investing in these technologies and sharing capabilities with partner states, India can contribute to building a more resilient regional surveillance network. Equally important is the need to support coastal communities whose livelihoods depend on fisheries. Sustainable fisheries management must incorporate social and economic considerations, ensuring that local fishermen are not disadvantaged by conservation measures. Programs that provide alternative livelihoods, training, and financial support can help mitigate the economic impacts of stricter fishing regulations.

Ultimately, addressing IUU fishing is not merely an environmental or economic issue—it is a strategic imperative. By framing the challenge within the broader context of maritime security and regional stability, India can mobilize greater political and institutional support for coordinated action.

Conclusion

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has emerged as one of the most complex maritime challenges of the twenty-first century. In the Indian Ocean Region, where millions of people depend on marine resources for their livelihoods, the consequences of unchecked illegal fishing are particularly severe. The depletion of fish stocks, economic losses for coastal communities, and the growing intersection between illegal fishing and transnational crime all underscore the urgency of addressing the issue.

For India, the challenge is closely tied to its broader maritime aspirations. As a major regional power with extensive coastlines and a rapidly expanding maritime economy, the country has a strong interest in ensuring the sustainability and security of the Indian Ocean’s resources. Over the past decade, India has taken significant steps to strengthen its policy framework, enhance maritime surveillance capabilities, and promote regional cooperation against IUU fishing. Yet the evolving nature of the threat requires sustained attention and innovative approaches. Strengthening regional governance, leveraging advanced monitoring technologies, and fostering strategic partnerships will be critical components of an effective response. At the same time, ensuring that local fishing communities remain central to policy frameworks will help maintain the social and economic foundations of maritime sustainability.

As the geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean continues to grow, safeguarding its marine resources will become increasingly important for regional stability and economic prosperity. By positioning the fight against IUU fishing at the core of its maritime strategy, India has the opportunity not only to protect its own interests but also to shape a more cooperative and sustainable maritime order in the Indian Ocean.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The escalating conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has placed India in one of the most diplomatically sensitive situations in its contemporary foreign policy history. As tensions spiraled following coordinated US-Israeli military strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks across West Asia, New Delhi responded with calibrated restraint rather than rhetorical alignment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s assertion that India supports the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy captures the essence of this posture. Yet India’s position cannot be understood merely through official statements. It must be examined through the prism of strategic autonomy, defence partnerships, energy security, diaspora protection, regional connectivity ambitions, domestic political pressures, and the broader restructuring of global power equations. Far from being passive, India’s stance reflects a deliberate and cautious recalibration in response to one of the most volatile geopolitical crises in recent years. 

For decades, India’s West Asia policy has been guided by a doctrine of de-hyphenation engaging Israel, Iran, and Palestine independently rather than linking one relationship to another. During the Cold War and even afterward, New Delhi maintained solidarity with the Palestinian cause while gradually normalizing and deepening ties with Israel. Simultaneously, it cultivated energy, civilizational, and connectivity partnerships with Iran. This multi-vector engagement enabled India to protect its interests without being drawn into the region’s rivalries. However, the current conflict tests whether such strategic balancing remains viable when two of India’s long-standing partners are locked in direct confrontation, backed by competing global powers. The intensity of hostilities and the direct involvement of the United States add further complexity, compelling India to navigate between principle and pragmatism. 

India’s initial response to the outbreak of war was characterized by expressions of deep concern and calls for restraint. The Ministry of External Affairs urged all parties to avoid escalatory measures and to utilize existing channels of dialogue to de-escalate tensions. Significantly, India refrained from explicitly condemning the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, even though New Delhi has consistently upheld sovereignty and territorial integrity as foundational norms of international law. Nor did it directly criticize Iran’s retaliatory actions. This deliberate neutrality in language has sparked debate domestically and internationally. Critics argue that silence amounts to tacit approval, while supporters contend that calibrated messaging preserves diplomatic flexibility. India’s measured tone reflects its effort to avoid alienating any stakeholder while safeguarding its national interests. 

The optics of Prime Minister Modi’s diplomatic engagements further shaped perceptions of India’s stance. His conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized concern over the unfolding crisis and the urgent need for cessation of hostilities. He also engaged with Gulf leaders, including the President of the United Arab Emirates, expressing solidarity amid regional instability. However, there was no immediate high-profile engagement with Tehran following the reported assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader. This asymmetry fueled speculation that India was gravitating toward the US-Israel camp. Yet diplomacy often operates beyond public visibility. The absence of overt condemnation may reflect sensitivity to evolving ground realities rather than a strategic shift in alignment. India’s foreign policy tradition prioritizes autonomy over ideological positioning, especially during volatile conflicts. 

A central pillar influencing India’s calculus is its robust defence partnership with Israel. Over the past three decades, Israel has become one of India’s most dependable suppliers of advanced military hardware, including missile defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions, and surveillance technologies. Israeli support during the Kargil conflict in 1999 laid the foundation for enduring trust, particularly when other countries hesitated under international pressure. Since then, the relationship has evolved beyond buyer-seller dynamics into joint research, co-production, and collaboration in emerging technological domains such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space systems. Israel’s willingness to share sensitive technologies and tailor solutions to India’s operational requirements has reinforced its strategic value. In this context, openly opposing Israeli military actions during a crisis could have repercussions for India’s defence preparedness and technological modernization. 

Simultaneously, Iran’s geostrategic significance for India remains substantial. Located at the crossroads of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, Iran provides India with access to landlocked Afghanistan and Eurasian markets through the Chabahar Port project. This port, developed with Indian investment, is integral to New Delhi’s efforts to bypass Pakistan and expand trade corridors under the International North-South Transport Corridor framework. Iran has also historically supplied crude oil to India under favorable terms prior to the tightening of US sanctions. Beyond economics, Iran has at times adopted nuanced positions on issues sensitive to India, including within multilateral Islamic forums. Abandoning or alienating Tehran would undermine years of diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment. Thus, India must weigh the costs of perceived alignment against long-term connectivity and regional access objectives. 

Energy security constitutes another decisive factor shaping India’s approach. West Asia accounts for a significant share of India’s hydrocarbon imports, and any disruption in shipping routesparticularly through the Strait of Hormuz would trigger immediate economic consequences. A prolonged war could drive oil prices upward, widen India’s trade deficit, and intensify inflationary pressures. Such shocks would have domestic political and fiscal implications. Therefore, India’s emphasis on de-escalation is not merely a normative appeal for peace but an economic imperative. Stabilizing energy flows and preventing supply chain disruptions are central to national resilience, especially at a time when global markets are already strained by geopolitical fragmentation. 

Equally important is the safety of the Indian diaspora in the Gulf region. Nearly nine million Indians reside and work across West Asian countries, contributing billions of dollars annually in remittances. Escalation that draws Gulf states into direct confrontation risks endangering lives and destabilizing communities. The activation of emergency helplines, issuance of travel advisories, and review by the Cabinet Committee on Security to underscore that diaspora protection is paramount. Foreign policy decisions in this context are inseparable from humanitarian considerations. Safeguarding citizens abroad often necessitates diplomatic prudence rather than public posturing. 

Domestic political discourse has intensified the government’s stance. Opposition leaders have accused the administration of abandoning traditional principles by failing to condemn actions perceived as violations of sovereignty. They argue that India’s moral authority as a proponent of peaceful dispute resolution is undermined by selective silence. Supporters of the government counter that foreign policy must prioritize national interest over rhetorical consistency. This debate reflects broader ideological tensions between legacy non-alignment narratives and contemporary strategic partnerships. However, modern strategic autonomy differs fundamentally from Cold War non-alignment. It entails flexible multi-alignment engaging diverse power centers without exclusive commitment rather than strict equidistance. 

India’s growing strategic convergence with the United States further complicates the equation. Bilateral cooperation now spans defence interoperability, intelligence sharing, critical technologies, and Indo-Pacific security initiatives. The United States is a key partner in India’s efforts to counterbalance China’s regional assertiveness. Publicly condemning US military operations could strain this partnership at a critical juncture. Moreover, Israel’s integration into emerging connectivity initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor aligns with India’s vision of diversified trade routes. These structural incentives encourage cautious positioning rather than overt criticism. 

At the same time, India has maintained its support for Palestinian statehood and multilateral diplomacy. It continues to endorse a two-state solution in international forums and has sustained development assistance to Palestinian territories. Engagements with Arab states through institutional mechanisms reaffirm India’s broader West Asia outreach. This continuity suggests that India’s strategy is not binary but layered. Strengthening ties with Israel does not necessarily negate relations with Iran or Palestine; rather, it reflects differentiated engagement based on specific strategic imperatives. 

The sustainability of this balancing act remains uncertain. Strategic autonomy depends on credibility across competing blocs. If one side perceives persistent asymmetry in India’s responses, trust could erode. Conversely, excessive neutrality may disappoint partners seeking solidarity. The art of contemporary diplomacy lies in managing these competing expectations while safeguarding core interests. India’s approach public restraint coupled with active engagement illustrates this delicate maneuvering. 

Ultimately, India’s stand in the Iran-Israel-USA war reflects an evolution from moralistic rhetoric toward pragmatic statecraft. The emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy aligns with longstanding principles, yet the calibrated silence on specific provocations signals adaptation to shifting power realities. India is neither overtly choosing sides nor disengaging. It is pursuing a strategy designed to preserve leverage, protect economic stability, secure defence partnerships, and ensure citizen safety. Whether this nuanced positioning endures will depend on the trajectory of the conflict and the flexibility of regional actors. 

Therefore, India’s response to the Iran-Israel-USA war underscores the complexity of navigating twenty-first century geopolitics. Strategic autonomy today demands agility rather than rigid neutrality. By balancing principles with pragmatism, New Delhi seeks to maintain maneuverability in an increasingly polarized environment. The crisis serves as a defining test of India’s foreign policy maturity its capacity to engage adversarial powers simultaneously, shield domestic interests from external shocks, and project itself as a responsible global actor. As West Asia remains volatile, India’s calibrated diplomacy will continue to evolve, reflecting the interplay between national interests and global responsibilities. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The joint military offensive launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in late February 2026 represents one of the most consequential escalations in Middle Eastern geopolitics in decades. Framed by Washington and Jerusalem as a necessary act of pre-emptive self-defence, the strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile facilities, senior military leadership, and elements of its command-and-control apparatus. The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, marked an unprecedented moment in the history of the Islamic Republic and signaled that the campaign extended beyond limited deterrence into the realm of strategic transformation. To understand why the United States and Israel undertook such a high-risk operation, one must examine the convergence of nuclear concerns, regional proxy warfare, missile proliferation, domestic political calculations, and the collapse of diplomatic efforts that had attempted unsuccessfully to restrain Tehran’s ambitions. 

At the heart of the confrontation lies Iran’s nuclear program, a project that has generated international controversy for more than two decades. Iran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and oriented toward civilian energy production and medical isotope development. However, Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have repeatedly raised concerns over enrichment levels and verification gaps. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to strict limitations on uranium enrichment and intrusive inspection regimes in exchange for sanctions relief. That agreement, endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, was designed to lengthen Iran’s “breakout time” the period required to accumulate sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA during President Donald Trump’s first term, reimposed sanctions, and adopted a “maximum pressure” strategy aimed at compelling Tehran to negotiate a more comprehensive accord covering missiles and regional activities. 

Following Washington’s withdrawal, Iran gradually reduced compliance with JCPOA restrictions, increasing enrichment levels and expanding stockpiles of uranium. By 2026, U.S. officials alleged that Iran possessed approximately 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity technically below weapons-grade, but significantly above levels required for civilian reactors. American officials, including Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance, argued that such a stockpile could be further enriched to weapons-grade levels within days or weeks. Tehran countered that enrichment at 60 percent remained legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was reversible in the context of a credible diplomatic settlement. Nonetheless, Israeli intelligence assessments concluded that Iran’s “threshold” status maintaining the capacity to rapidly assemble a weapon without formally crossing the line posed an intolerable existential risk to Israel’s security. 

Israel’s security doctrine has long emphasized pre-emption against hostile states seeking nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly described a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to Israel’s survival. Israeli leaders argue that Iran’s rhetoric calling for Israel’s destruction, combined with its sponsorship of militant groups, differentiates it from other nuclear-capable states. The strategic calculation in Jerusalem is that deterrence may not be reliable against a revolutionary regime that views confrontation with Israel as ideological. Thus, Israeli planners have for years prepared contingency operations to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The joint operation in 2026 reportedly codenamed “Operation Epic Fury” by the United States and “Lion’s Roar” by Israel reflected the maturation of these plans into coordinated execution. 

Beyond nuclear concerns, Iran’s ballistic missile program served as a central justification for the strikes. Iran has developed one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East, including medium-range systems capable of reaching Israel and U.S. bases across the Gulf. Although U.S. intelligence assessments suggested that an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the American mainland might not be viable before 2035, policymakers in Washington emphasized Iran’s rapid progress in solid-fuel technologies and underground missile infrastructure. The construction of deeply buried enrichment and missile facilities some reportedly 70 to 80 feet underground fueled suspicions that Tehran was hardening assets against future attacks while advancing toward a more survivable deterrent capability. 

Equally significant was Iran’s network of regional proxies, often described as the “axis of resistance.” Through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, Iran has armed, trained, and financed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. These organizations have engaged in hostilities against Israel, attacked U.S. personnel, and threatened maritime shipping in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. The October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel and the subsequent regional escalation intensified Israeli perceptions that Iran was orchestrating a multi-front encirclement strategy. By 2026, Israeli officials argued that allowing Iran to combine proxy warfare with nuclear threshold capability would dramatically shift the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor. 

The collapse of diplomatic engagement also contributed directly to the decision to strike. In early 2026, U.S. and Iranian negotiators engaged in indirect talks mediated by Oman and European partners. According to American officials, the United States demanded a complete halt to enrichment above low civilian levels, stringent verification, and restrictions on ballistic missile development. Iran reportedly insisted on its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium on its own soil and rejected demands to dismantle key facilities. While Omani mediators expressed cautious optimism, Washington concluded that Tehran was using negotiations to buy time and disperse sensitive materials. The perception rightly or wrongly that Iran was negotiating in bad faith hardened positions in both Washington and Jerusalem. 

Domestic political considerations cannot be overlooked. In Israel, elections were approaching, and Netanyahu faced both security pressures and political vulnerabilities. A decisive strike against Iran offered the possibility of reshaping the strategic environment while reinforcing his leadership credentials. In the United States, President Trump had campaigned on preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and restoring American deterrence credibility. After earlier limited strikes in 2025 that reportedly set back Iran’s program only temporarily, the administration may have concluded that incremental measures were insufficient. The decision to escalate reflected a belief that the strategic window for decisive action was closing. 

Another dimension was the legal and normative framing of the operation. The United States invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting a right of self-defence against imminent threats. Critics, including Russia and China, described the attack as an unlawful act of aggression. European responses were divided, with some governments condemning Iranian retaliation while urging de-escalation. The legal debate underscores a broader tension in international law: whether anticipatory self-defence against a latent nuclear threat is permissible when concrete evidence of an imminent attack is contested. 

The targeting profile of the strikes further illustrates their objectives. Initial waves reportedly focused on air defence suppression, missile launch sites, and command centers. Subsequentattacks struck naval assets and facilities associated with uranium enrichment. The killing of senior Iranian military commanders and ultimately Khamenei himself indicated an effort not merely to degrade capabilities but to disrupt strategic leadership continuity. Whether regime change was an explicit objective remains debated. President Trump publicly encouraged Iranians to “take back” their country, while Israeli officials called for liberation from authoritarian rule. Yet history suggests that external military pressure often strengthens hardline factions rather than catalyzes liberal transformation. 

Iran’s response launching missiles at Israel and at U.S. bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates demonstrated its willingness to broaden the conflict geographically. Attacks near the Strait of Hormuz and threats to maritime traffic highlighted the global economic stakes. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s petroleum flows transit that chokepoint. Any sustained disruption could trigger energy price spikes and reverberate through global markets. Thus, the decision to attack Iran carried not only military risk but systemic economic consequences. 

In strategic terms, the United States and Israel appear to have calculated that the risks of inaction outweighed the risks of escalation. From their perspective, Iran was approaching a point where its nuclear threshold status, fortified underground infrastructure, and regional proxy network would become too entrenched to reverse without far greater cost. The strikes were intended to reset the strategic equation either by compelling Tehran back to the negotiating table under less favorable terms or by significantly delaying its path to nuclear capability. Whether this objective will be realized remains uncertain. 

Historically, military strikes on nuclear facilities have produced mixed outcomes. Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor delayed Saddam Hussein’s program but did not eliminate his ambitions. Similarly, the 2007 Israeli strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar facility removed a clandestine reactor but did not spark regional war. Iran’s program, however, is far more dispersed, technologically advanced, and politically embedded. Destroying physical infrastructure does not erase technical knowledge or national resolve. Indeed, some analysts argue that the attack may incentivize Iran to pursue an explicit nuclear deterrent as a guarantee of regime survival. 

Ultimately, the decision by the United States and Israel to attack Iran in 2026 reflects a convergence of strategic anxieties fear of nuclear proliferation, concern over missile and proxy warfare, frustration with stalled diplomacy, and shifting regional power balances. It also reflects divergent interpretations of deterrence and international law. For Washington and Jerusalem, the operation was a necessary act to prevent a hostile regime from acquiring irreversible capabilities. For Tehran and its supporters, it was an aggressive violation of sovereignty designed to impose regime change. 

The long-term implications will depend on multiple variables Iran’s internal political transition after Khamenei’s death, the resilience of its security institutions, the stance of Gulf Arab states, and the willingness of major powers to mediate de-escalation. What is clear is that the strikes mark a watershed moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. They underscore the fragility of nuclear diplomacy, the limits of sanctions as coercive tools, and the enduring appeal of military solutions when trust collapses. Whether this confrontation ultimately produces renewed negotiations, prolonged regional war, or a transformed Iranian political order remains to be seen. What cannot be disputed is that the attack was rooted in a complex interplay of nuclear fears, strategic rivalry, ideological hostility, and the perception shared in Washington and Jerusalem that the status quo had become unsustainable. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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