By: Priya Naik. Research Analyst, GSDN

The 21st century has witnessed a profound transformation in global power dynamics, marked by China’s economic dominance and Russia’s assertive resurgence. These shifts have disrupted the post-Cold War unipolar order dominated by United States (hereafter, US), creating a strategic triangle where Western Europe must navigate competing pressures from Washington, Moscow and Beijing. While maintaining its traditional transatlantic security alliance through NATO, Europe now faces dual challenges that are to manage Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics and territorial ambitions, particularly in Eastern Europe region, while addressing China’s expanding economic footprint through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative.

This complex landscape forces Western Europe to balance its liberal democratic values with pragmatic economic interests. China’s investments in critical infrastructure and technology sectors have exposed its vulnerabilities, encouraging EU wide screening mechanisms for foreign acquisitions. Simultaneously, Russia’s energy leverage and disinformation campaigns test European cohesion. The region’s response reflects a cautious, multifaceted strategy reinforcing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) deterrence against Russian aggression while pursuing selective economic engagement with China, albeit with heightened scrutiny of strategic dependencies.

Historical Background and Strategic Context

NATO, established in 1949, represented the cornerstone of Western Europe’s security framework against Soviet expansionism in the region. This alliance formalised US protection of Western Europe during the Cold War and beyond. Consecutively, Western European nations developed significant energy dependencies on Russia, which by 2021 supplied 25% of the EU’s oil and 45% of its gas imports. Despite pledges to sever these ties following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe continues to maintain energy connections with Russia in 2025, with countries like France, Hungary, Austria and Spain still purchasing Russian fossil fuels.

EU-China relations, formalised in 1975, entered their diplomatic stage between 2000-2004, with mutual recognition as strategic partners in 2003. China’s economic presence in Europe expanded dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis in Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative has evolved in Europe, shifting from infrastructure projects toward financial and monetary connectivity in Western Europe, while Eastern European nations continue to embrace Chinese investment, creating a “two-speed Europe” regarding China engagement. EU policy now characterises its relationship with China as a mixture of “partnership, competition and systemic rivalry“.

The EU simultaneously favours multilateralism while adhering to American “de-risking” methods toward China, seeks economic revitalisation while hesitating to expand technological cooperation with China, and seeks strategic autonomy while maintaining its reliance on the US. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has contributed to this problem, sparking discussions about NATO’s modern mission and producing a paradoxical scenario in which actions taken to reassure Eastern partners exacerbate rather than lessen tensions with Russia.

Western Europe and Russia: Confrontation and Containment

The relationship between Western Europe and Russia has deteriorated significantly since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, evolving into a complex pattern of containment strategies, economic sanctions, energy politics, and information warfare. This confrontation has reshaped European security architecture, energy policies and diplomatic relations simultaneously exposing internal divisions within the European Union and NATO regarding how to effectively counter Russian aggression.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the European Union implemented comprehensive sanctions targeting the country. These economic restrictions included import bans on Crimean products, prohibitions on EU based companies investing in the region and export restrictions on goods related to transport, telecommunications and energy sectors. The sanctions have repeatedly been extended since their implementation, aimed at imposing economic costs on Russia for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

NATO was brought together by Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, which led to the bolstering of defences along its eastern flank. To show the “allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate allied response to any aggression,” NATO built an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In January 2017, the United States demonstrated its presence in Central Europe and commitment to collective defence by sending M1A2 Abrams tanks to Poland further solidifying this commitment.

Russia has deployed sophisticated hybrid warfare tactics against Europe, blending conventional military threats with non-kinetic methods targeting political, social and economic vulnerabilities. With Russia using its position as a major supplier as a weapon to influence European countries that rely on its resources, the energy sector has turned into a vital battlefield. State owned businesses like Gazprom have been carefully employed by the Kremlin to further its foreign policy goals and keep influence over neighbouring nations.

Disinformation campaigns represent another pillar of Russia’s hybrid strategy. France, Germany and Poland have become “permanent” targets for Russian disinformation attacks, with narratives tailored to each country’s specific sensitivities. In France, these operations focused on the Olympic Games; in Germany, they exploited concerns over migration and security; while in Poland, they promoted narratives portraying Ukrainian refugees as burdensome. These tactics seek to undermine European resolve against Russian aggression, promote division, and weaken faith in institutions.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a watershed moment in European security. The war prompted unprecedented European unity in supporting Ukraine and implementing sanctions against Russia. Just two days after Germany suspended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, Russia launched its invasion demonstrating the interconnection between energy policy and security concerns.

The war accelerated Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Nord Stream 2, once a symbol of Germany’s policy of building “political bridges through trade,” became emblematic of a failed strategy that had driven the country into “fatal dependence on Russian oil and gas“. Russia’s subsequent attacks on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure in February 2024 further highlighted its willingness to weaponise energy to weaken Europe’s supply during its transition away from Russian resources.

There are still major differences over Russia policy within the European Union and NATO, despite greater cooperation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Different member nations still have different opinions about the Russian threat, especially when it comes to whether Russia will attack NATO countries in the Baltic. Developing a cohesive, long term plan is made more difficult by these conflicting threat perceptions.

Southern NATO members have expressed concerns that the alliance focuses disproportionately on Eastern security challenges while neglecting threats from the South, weakening overall solidarity and cohesion. Additionally, logistical challenges in moving troops and equipment across Europe to the Eastern flank demonstrate practical limitations in NATO’s defensive capabilities. These divisions reflect varied historical experiences, geographic positions and economic ties with Russia, creating persistent fault lines in European policy coordination.

Western Europe and China: Cooperation and Caution

Western Europe’s relationship with China has evolved into a complex dynamic of economic interdependence tempered by growing strategic caution. While trade and investment remain central pillars, geopolitical tensions, human rights concerns, and competing visions of global order have led Europe to adopt a more guarded approach.

China is the EU’s largest import partner ($588.86 billion in 2024) and third largest export market ($242.57 billion), creating a record $346.28 billion trade deficit. The proposed EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), concluded in principle in 2020, seeks to remove barriers like joint venture requirements and technology transfer mandates in the manufacturing sector representing 50% of EU foreign direct investment in China. However, ratification remains stalled due to political tensions.

The EU has increasingly criticised China’s policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, with the European Parliament urging targeted sanctions against Chinese officials and restrictions on dual use technology exports. This aligns with the bloc’s “de-risking” strategy, which aims to diversify supply chains and reduce critical dependencies without full decoupling. The approach reflects tensions between economic pragmatism and values-based diplomacy.

Initiatives like Italy’s 2019 entry to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy in Central Europe, which revealed the EU’s coordination flaws during the pandemic, were significant victories for China. These initiatives have encountered increasing doubts, though, as forceful diplomacy and human rights issues have caused China’s soft power in Europe to decrease.

The EU has strengthened security and tech partnerships with Indo Pacific democracies like Japan and India while aligning more closely with U.S. positions on technology controls and maritime security. This balancing act seeks to counter Chinese influence without fully mirroring Washington’s confrontational stance.

The EU-China partnership currently functions within more constrained boundaries, combining increased competition in technology and governance models with selective collaboration in trade and climate. Europe faces a tightrope walk that calls for constant cooperation among its frequently disparate member states in order to preserve economic involvement while upholding democratic norms and fostering resilience against coercive techniques.

Strategic Dilemmas for Western Europe

Western Europe faces compounding strategic dilemmas as it navigates competing pressures from global powers, internal divisions, and the urgent need to secure critical supply chains. The EU’s attempt to balance economic pragmatism with geopolitical resilience has exposed vulnerabilities in its approach to the US-China-Russia triangle.

The US push for alignment against China and Russia clashes with Europe’s economic realities. While 66% of EU-China trade involves Chinese imports ($588.86 billion in 2024), distancing a risk of disrupting green transition industries dependent on Chinese rare earths and EV components. Simultaneously, Trump’s trade policies and demands to reduce Chinese reliance exacerbate transatlantic tensions, with the Euro depreciating 12% since October 2024 due to growth concerns. Russia’s energy coercion evident in its 2024 attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure has accelerated Europe’s shift to renewables, though complete gas independence by 2025 requires tripling clean energy deployment rates.

There are serious vulnerabilities because China controls 90% of the world’s solar panel output and 98% of EU imports of rare earth elements. Given current rates below 1%, the EU’s ambition to get 25% of essential minerals through recycling by 2030 is viewed with scepticism. As evidenced by recent trade restrictions impacting $22.7 billion in bilateral trade, this reliance makes it more difficult to implement tariffs to stop Chinese EV dumping.

Diverging threat perceptions persist:

• Eastern members prioritise containing Russia through NATO
• Southern states focus on Mediterranean migration and energy security
• Germany and France clash over defence spending (2.1% vs 1.9% of GDP)
  These divisions hinder consensus on China policy, with Italy maintaining BRI ties despite EU de-risking directives.

Macron’s vision of “European sovereignty” faces implementation challenges:

• Only 11 EU states meet NATO’s 2% defence spending target
• The European Defence Fund accounts for just 0.5% of EU’s 2025 budget
  While von der Leyen’s “de-risking” strategy aims for 40% clean tech self-sufficiency, China’s control of pharmaceutical precursors (79%) and renewable supply chains undermines these goals.

The strategic future of the EU depends on balancing effective deterrence with economic interdependence, a challenge made more difficult by China’s systemic rivalry and US unpredictability. Though there are still many trade-offs between security and prosperity, success necessitates overcoming internal fragmentation while speeding up energy transitions and supply chain diversity.

Future Outlook: Scenarios and Recommendations

As of 2025, Western Europe finds itself at a critical geopolitical crossroads, forced to redefine its position between an increasingly assertive China and a confrontational Russia alongside the dwindling trust on USA. This complex landscape requires careful strategic consideration as Europe navigates its future in a rapidly evolving multipolar world. The following scenarios and recommendations outline potential pathways forward for European policymakers.

Scenario 1: Continued Alignment with U.S.

In this situation, Western European nations prioritise their traditional transatlantic alliance, reinforcing NATO commitments and maintaining firm positions against Russian aggression while adopting increasingly cautious stances toward China. This approach builds on historical security frameworks but presents significant challenges. The strengthened military posture provides security reassurance for Eastern European members feeling threatened by Russian activities. However, economic backlash from China could severely impact European economies dependent on Chinese markets and investment. Additionally, this alignment reduces Europe’s diplomatic leverage as an independent mediator in global conflicts.

Scenario 2: Strategic Autonomy and Middle Path

Under this scenario, Europe pursues its “strategic autonomy” by reducing vulnerabilities and increasing its capacity to act independently. This approach involves pragmatic economic engagement with China while maintaining vigilance against Russian hybrid threats. Europe positions itself as an independent power pole in a multipolar world, pursuing its interests rather than automatically aligning with American positions. This path requires significant investment in European defence capabilities, technological independence, and energy self-sufficiency. The EU has already made steps toward this direction by placing strategic autonomy at the heart of its foreign policy.

Scenario 3: Fragmentation and Policy Paralysis

The most concerning scenario involves increasing fragmentation of European policy positions, creating an incoherent stance that weakens collective influence. This “Single Market Fatigue” is already evident in many policy areas. Internal divisions between Eastern and Western Europe on Russia policy and Northern and Southern Europe on economic approaches to China could paralyse decision-making. This fragmentation would allow both Russia and China to exploit divisions, practising “divide and rule” diplomacy that undermines European cohesion and sovereignty.

To successfully manage these obstacles, Europe should:

1. Boost investments in green energy transformation and technological independence, which will cost about $159 billion a year by 2030 to establish a self-sustainable energy sector by 2040.
2. To avoid fragmentation, strengthen diplomatic coordination channels at the EU level, especially when creating cogent strategies for China and Russia.
3. Develop strategic alliances with other regional actors, such as Japan, ASEAN, and India, to increase balancing choices and diversify reliance.
4. Boost resistance to hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns by enhancing inter-institutional collaboration and expanding on current frameworks such as the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats.

Western Europe would be able to navigate the increasingly complicated geopolitical terrain between China and Russia while upholding its principles and interests with the support of these concerted efforts.

By: Sonalika Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) stands as a testament to the collaborative spirit of South and Southeast Asia. Established in 1997, BIMSTEC comprises seven member states: India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. With a combined population of over 1.8 billion people and a significant share of the global GDP, BIMSTEC represents a dynamic and diverse region. The year 2025 marks a pivotal moment for this regional organization, with the 6th BIMSTEC Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand, from April 2 to 4. This summit not only underscores the organization’s commitment to regional integration but also sets the stage for future cooperation across various sectors.

It brought together the leaders of seven neighboring countries amid a period of global uncertainty. This summit served as a much-needed opportunity to revitalize the regional grouping, which had long remained stagnant. Originally envisioned as a bridge between South Asia’s SAARC and Southeast Asia’s ASEAN, BIMSTEC has struggled in recent years due to a lack of direction and political challenges.

The diminishing relevance of SAARC, especially after the deterioration of India-Pakistan relations post-2014, has prompted India to shift focus toward BIMSTEC. Meanwhile, sub-regional efforts like the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative lost momentum when Bhutan’s Parliament rejected the proposed Motor Vehicles Agreement. In this context, New Delhi has invested fresh energy into BIMSTEC, viewing it as a platform to enhance regional cooperation.

Although the pandemic disrupted the planned biennial summit cycle, the very fact that this summit was held despite recent natural disasters, including an earthquake in Myanmar and Thailand is a positive development. The summit resulted in several notable outcomes. Among them was the formation of a BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce, and progress on the long-delayed India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which aims to connect India’s North-East to Southeast Asia, potentially transforming it into a regional hub. Given the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters, the summit also underscored the urgent need for a joint disaster management mechanism.

Beyond multilateral engagements, the summit also enabled important bilateral interactions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus used the opportunity to address lingering tensions over issues such as minority rights, border killings, and the presence of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in India. Mr. Modi’s call to avoid inflammatory rhetoric between neighbors was timely and necessary, though it will require mutual commitment from both Dhaka and New Delhi.

Another key meeting was between Mr. Modi and Nepali leader K.P. Sharma Oli, following months of diplomatic strain over the absence of an official invite to Mr. Oli. Their exchange signaled a potential thaw and could pave the way for an early visit and progress on unresolved bilateral issues.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the summit was the inclusion of Myanmar’s Prime Minister, General Min Aung Hlaing. The invitation was seen as a deliberate move by the BIMSTEC grouping to maintain diplomatic engagement with Myanmar. Mr. Modi’s reported counsel to both Gen. Min and Mr. Yunus emphasized the importance of restoring democratic processes in their respective countries, highlighting India’s continued support for democratic values in the region.

While the summit was certainly productive, it is important to note that many of the initiatives echo earlier SAARC agreements. For BIMSTEC to avoid the same fate as SAARC which has largely become inactive member states must commit to ensuring institutional cohesion, policy implementation, and long-term sustainability. Without a clear vision and political will, BIMSTEC risks slipping into the same state of inertia that has hampered other regional efforts in South Asia.

Under the chairmanship of Thailand, the summit was guided by the vision of a “Prosperous, Resilient, and Open” region, an aspiration formally encapsulated in the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030. One of the major outcomes of the summit was the adoption of this vision document, a comprehensive roadmap that outlines the strategic direction for the next decade, focusing on sustainable development, economic integration, and improved connectivity. Alongside it, the Report of the Eminent Persons’ Group on the Future Direction of BIMSTEC offered critical recommendations for strengthening the organization’s structure, operations, and efficiency. Another key takeaway was the BIMSTEC Summit Declaration, in which all member nations reaffirmed their commitment to deepen cooperation in areas such as trade, security, and disaster management.

The summit also witnessed several major agreements and forward-looking initiatives. Substantial progress was made on the long-anticipated BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a move that aims to boost intra-regional trade and economic cooperation. A new Maritime Transport Agreement was also signed, enhancing maritime connectivity among member nations and facilitating smoother trade routes across the Bay of Bengal. In response to the devastating earthquake in Myanmar and other recent natural disasters, BIMSTEC leaders emphasized stronger collaborative frameworks for disaster response and humanitarian aid. Additionally, recognizing the growing role of digital infrastructure in development, the member states pledged to work closely on cyber security and digital governance, with the goal of building secure and inclusive digital ecosystems across the region.

India, as a founding member and major regional power, played a central role in shaping the summit’s outcomes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation underscored India’s ongoing commitment to regional stability and growth. India strongly advocated for the swift implementation of the BIMSTEC FTA and emphasized the need for greater trade and investment flows within the grouping. In terms of physical and digital connectivity, India proposed several infrastructure projects to ease the movement of goods, services, and people across borders. Responding to the humanitarian crises brought about by natural disasters in the region, India also pledged technical assistance, financial support, and logistical coordination to bolster disaster preparedness and response.

India further highlighted its focus on youth empowerment through initiatives aligned with the Skill India Mission and the National Education Policy. These efforts aim to promote innovation, entrepreneurial development, and skill-building among the youth of the region. India’s emphasis on human capital reflects a broader understanding that sustainable development cannot be achieved without investing in the capabilities of the next generation.

The BIMSTEC Summit also functioned as a diplomatic platform for bilateral interactions among its members. A noteworthy development was the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s interim leader, Muhammad Yunus. The dialogue emphasized avoiding divisive rhetoric and focusing on constructive cooperation, particularly considering recent political changes in Bangladesh. Similarly, the presence of Myanmar’s military leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, facilitated much-needed discussions around disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and regional infrastructure development, even as Myanmar continues to grapple with internal political unrest.

Youth engagement emerged as a major theme in 2025, with the inaugural BIMSTEC Youth Summit hosted in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, in February. As an initiative to foster the spirit of regional cooperation among the youth of the Bay of Bengal region, India hosted the 1st BIMSTEC Youth Summit in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, from February 7 to 11, 2025. The summit is a follow-up to the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s announcement at the 4th BIMSTEC Summit and is jointly organized by the Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports and the Ministry of External Affairs, with the Confederation of Indian Industry’s Young Indians (CII YI) serving as the knowledge partner.

The summit was officially inaugurated on February 8 by Dr. Mansukh Mandaviya, Minister of Youth Affairs & Sports of India, in the presence of Shri Bhupendrabhai Patel, Chief Minister of Gujarat, Minister of State for Youth Affairs & Sports Smt. Raksha Khadse, and Shri Jaideep Mazumdar, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs. The inauguration marked the beginning of a three-day congregation of young leaders from BIMSTEC countries, focusing on discussions around challenges and opportunities in entrepreneurship, emerging technologies, digital connectivity, cyberspace, sustainable development, and the importance of forging ties that transcend borders.

India proposed the establishment of a BIMSTEC-wide startup network aimed at fostering innovation and entrepreneurship among young people. There was also a strong focus on expanding educational and vocational training to ensure that the youth are equipped with the skills necessary for the jobs of tomorrow. The summit additionally emphasized the importance of cultural exchange initiatives, which can strengthen people-to-people connections and build mutual understanding among future leaders of the region.

The summit is thematically centered on “Youth as a Bridge for Intra-BIMSTEC Exchange” and aims to reinforce the shared cultural and civilizational heritage of the region. It reaffirms India’s commitment to regional cooperation in alignment with its ‘Neighborhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies, along with the vision of ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR).

More than seventy youth delegates from all seven BIMSTEC member countries are participating in the summit. The delegates include Ministers, Members of Parliament, Mayors, entrepreneurs, tech developers, cultural figures, social media influencers, and civil society leaders. The key objectives of the summit are to encourage young leaders from member nations to engage actively with pressing regional challenges, economic and social issues, and the broader development agenda; to facilitate the constructive exchange of views on strategic issues empowering youth; and to collectively build innovative ideas for a brighter and more connected future.

A key highlight of the event was the “Viksit Bharat Young Leaders Dialogue X BIMSTEC”, which provided a platform for delegates to showcase impactful youth development initiatives from their respective countries. Another important feature of the summit was the session on “Mera Yuva Bharat (MY Bharat),” a flagship initiative announced by the Hon’ble Prime Minister. MY Bharat represented a forward-looking, tech-enabled institutional framework for youth development and engagement, aimed at providing equitable opportunities for young people to achieve their aspirations and contribute meaningfully to India’s vision of Amrit Bharat by 2047. The session illustrated how technology was being leveraged by the Government of India to enhance youth welfare, offering valuable learning experiences for delegates from across the BIMSTEC region.

In addition to the policy and thematic sessions, delegates had the opportunity to experience India’s rich cultural heritage and modern innovations. Site visits included Dandi Kutir, India’s largest museum dedicated to the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi; Sabarmati Ashram, his former residence and a symbol of India’s non-violent resistance; and the Sabarmati Riverfront, a major urban revitalization project. Delegates also toured GIFT City (Gujarat International Finance Tec-City) India’s first operational smart city and International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) which offered insights into the country’s vision of becoming a global hub for financial services, technology, and innovation. Through these visits, delegates witnessed firsthand the development of cutting-edge infrastructure and sustainable urban planning, inspiring them to envision similar advancements in their own countries.

Through this landmark initiative, the BIMSTEC Youth Summit is expected to provide greater momentum to youth engagement and youth-led development in the region, strengthening bonds and laying the foundation for long-term collaboration among the future leaders of South and Southeast Asia.

Despite the progress achieved, BIMSTEC faces several challenges. Political instability remains a concern, particularly in countries like Myanmar, where internal unrest hampers effective regional cooperation. Infrastructure gaps also persist, limiting the full potential of trade and connectivity goals. Additionally, environmental vulnerabilities, particularly due to climate change and natural disasters, pose ongoing threats to the stability and sustainability of development efforts in the region.

Nevertheless, these challenges offer opportunities for transformation and renewed commitment. BIMSTEC, as a regional organization, has the potential to lead in areas where collective action is needed most—from climate resilience to technological innovation, and from youth development to sustainable trade. The organization’s unique positioning, bridging South and Southeast Asia, gives it both the strategic leverage and responsibility to shape the future of one of the most populous and promising regions in the world.

The 2025 BIMSTEC Summit marks a transformative phase in the organization’s evolution. With strategic agreements, forward-looking policies, and renewed political will, BIMSTEC is increasingly asserting itself as a vital forum for regional cooperation. The summit laid the foundation for a more interconnected, resilient, and prosperous Bay of Bengal region. As member states work in unison toward the goals of the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, there is ample reason to be optimistic about the future. With a shared commitment to peace, development, and solidarity, BIMSTEC is not only redefining regionalism but also offering a compelling model for international cooperation in the 21st century.  

By: Rishya Dharmani, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Biden administration had proposed SQUAD to bolster peace, mutual deterrence and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. The US Secretary of Defence, Llyod George said, “We have chartered an ambitious course to advance that vision together” at the sidelines of the April 2024 meeting of Defence Ministers – Richard Marles (Australia), Kihara Minoru (Japan), Gilberto Teodoro (Philippines) and Lloyd Austin (US) in the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in Hawaii. The seeds for this grouping were sown in the preliminary meeting of defence ministers in the 2023 Shangri La Dialogue. Later, joint maritime patrols in the hotly contested South China Sea (SCS), followed by a trilateral summit of American, Japanese and Phillipino leaders, further cemented this partnership.

This institutionalisation of SQUAD comes at the hills of regime change in the Philippines from pursuing a passivist policy towards China towards the current term of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s shift towards collaborating with the US to strengthen ‘integrated deterrence’ in the South China Sea (SCS). Further, Australia, in recent years, has also shed its reticence in irking China of not entering into strategic partnerships with others in the region. Japan also looks to wean away from its pacifist constitution. The other major player in the region, India, forms QUAD with the US, Japan and Australia, but its insistence on ‘strategic autonomy’ while keeping independent ties with Russia and also resisting a more militaristic colour to this union has prevented QUAD from achieving strategic coherence and utility against formidable Chinese intransigence.

As a part of the larger trend of transitioning beyond traditional foreign policy tools, the Indo-Pacific has been the incubator of minilateral associations as the site of hot strategic competition. The growing intersection of economic, military, political, and cultural conflicts within and outside the region’s states has been a shot in the arm for such rebalancing strategies. Initiatives like QUAD, US-Republic of Korea-Japan Trilateral, AUKUS, and SQUAD, all grapple with traditional and non-traditional currencies of power politics. Both China and the US are spearheading activist diplomatic regimens to woo countries to broaden their network of friendly and cooperative states. Whether to funnel strategic rivalry by perusing ‘hard’ politics or pursue ‘human security’ and ‘soft’ issues (Singapore-Indonesia-Malaysia Malacca Straits Patrol) – minilateral initiatives in Indo-Pacific are blurring boundaries in strategic wargaming.

QUAD to SQUAD à a mere strategic dribble or a concrete gameplan?

Chinese commentators have seen SQUAD as a part of the declining hegemon’s (US) last-ditch attempt to ‘contain’ an inevitable Chinese ascendancy. The Dragon has accused the US of fielding proxies like the Philippines to provoke its “Ukrainization”. They claim that the United States is manipulating the Philippines and provoking it against China. This ‘cold war mentality’ will entrench regional divisions and mistrust, complicating the security atmosphere even more. This will force states to take sides and pose challenges to cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries. This point is of relevance as China-ASEAN trade has increased four times since 2019. Furthermore, the Regional Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP) backed by China has been touted as the world’s biggest security pact by Al Jazeera, covering 30% of the global population and economy. This raises doubts about the efficacy of the strategic alignment of US-led groups with SCS littoral states.

But the era of simplistic geopolitical games is over as the age of alliances has eclipsed countries, especially from the Global South, valuing the strategic depth accruing from issue-based ad hoc coalitions. As Kissinger famously opined that ‘America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests’ – this maxim underscores the need for adaptation to constantly changing geopolitical alignments. SQUAD is a much more focused attempt than QUAD to build pressure on China to temper its predatory attitude in SCS, especially the Taiwan Straits. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has already reasoned in the Munich Security Conference on February 19, 2022, that QUAD is not Asian NATO and simply about “four countries who have common interests, common values, (a) great deal of comfort, who happen to be located in the four corners of the Indo Pacific”. This counterbalance will perhaps be much more effective with replacement of a reluctant India with Philippines, an ally of United States, having a Visiting Forces Agreement with Australia and negotiating Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan.

SQUAD, by aiming for greater military interoperability and strategic coordination, is a step forward from QUAD. Aiming to strengthen the joint response to a wide variety of traditional and non-traditional threats, SQUAD is a part of the “lattice-like” security architecture that the US has been cultivating in recent years. Moving away from an unpopular, costly and strategically dubious collective defence posture for sustaining a favourable balance of power, the United States, as the preeminent power, is now seeking mutual plurilateral partnerships. The greater shift from grand alliances to minilaterals underscores the need to counter a limited but imminent spectrum of threats in flexible and improvised groupings.

Informalism in Indo-Pacific diplomacy 

With its roots in off-the-table diplomatic manoeuvres, the SQUAD needs to institutionalise and promise actionable partnership through regular punitive and preventive joint patrols in the South China Sea and across the Pacific, coordinated intelligence-sharing and maritime security cooperation, and modernisation and interoperability of partners’ defence systems. It needs to score a bullseye in its counter plans to Chinese aggression and hybrid grey zone warfare, which have seriously jeopardised regional security and cooperation. China smartly nibbles at others’ territory by playing the victim and enmeshing its target in disadvantageous bilateral negotiations, but with mechanisms like ASEAN and QUAD, South East Asian states can proffer a multilateral response to the Dragon’s increasingly threatening behaviour. Such institutionalised cooperative platforms signal to China that its targets are not alone and that it can be subjected to military and economic countermeasures.

However, there are problems with this interpretation of SQUAD for two reasons. First, SQUAD is not Asian NATO – an idea dumped by all relevant stakeholders but one that irks China. A collective defence system in South East Asia is not even a remote possibility because even if China is recognised as a common threat – the perception of the nature of its irredentism differs between Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and others. Furthermore, despite China’s economic coercion by weaponising its supply chain dominance, surveillance infiltration, and trade dumping – South East Asian states are so deeply integrated and have benefitted from RCEP and bilateral arrangements with China that they will ponder twice before directly standing up to it. It is a chicken and egg situation of whether to float a militarised forum to respond to already prominent Chinese abrasions while also risking an enraged China.

Deep Chinese pockets have successfully orchestrated its ‘dual circulation’ strategy in which its manufacturing exports-driven economy earns foreign exchange by becoming the factory of the world and also caters to booming domestic demand. This has been aided by piloting gargantuan projects, massive in imagination and investments, all across the world to capture the markets and minds of the larger world, especially the Global South. Initiatives like the Global Civilisation Initiative are part of China’s attempt to replace the cultural industry of American hegemony and replace it with its own. It remains to be seen if SQUAD can provide real deterrence beyond the reputational deterrence of standing against a ‘quartet of chaos’ of autocracies.

Way Forward

An assessment of Chinese strategic culture is aptly summed by recalling an observation of its founding father, Mao Zedong, that power flows from the barrel of a gun. All revisionist powers like China are hardwired to maniacally try to bridge their strategic insecurities in the balance with the current superpower. Military capabilities and economic resourcefulness are the two rules of the game, with its theatre, the Indo-Pacific, transforming into a textbook case of Mandala dynamics. India already has its playbook astutely described by master strategician Kautilya. Guided by new age wisdom of eschewing war by pursuing ‘dialogue and diplomacy’, India has done well to shun the militaristic avatar of QUAD and by refusing to play the Western proxy. By retaining its value as an autonomous swing state, India has preserved sufficient systemic space for a cold war between the ‘Alliance of Democracies’ and ‘Eurasian Entente’ to cement.

China, meanwhile, has been pursuing its own brand of ‘value-based’ minilateralism against the ‘cold war mentality’ of block politics. It insists on a Global South and Asian solidarity against the erstwhile colonial and imperialist powers. It poses a ‘common future for mankind’ under the benign Chinese umbrella. This is a reproduction of the 1990s talk shop of ‘Peaceful Rise’ where Beijing successfully managed to use multilateral arrangements of liberal internationalism like WTO to their full potential to be the indisputable challenger state to the US. As is the fundamental tenet under Hegemonic Stability Theory, a rising power invariably faces off with the current one. China’s claim to power has been to promote ‘common prosperity’, and yet its actions within and outside its borders suggest otherwise.

As for SQUAD itself, someone has to stand up and build resilience and guarantee mutuality in acknowledging and addressing a common strategic irritant. Chinese mouthpiece Global Times has regularly lambasted the idea of Asian NATO, but China itself is pushing South East Asia into a Western embrace by failing to honour international laws. It refused to accept the 2015 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea dispute and recently scuttled an attempt by ASEAN to have a voluntary code of conduct for non-confrontational and non-interventionist open and free navigation. It has turned SCS and the broader Indo-Pacific into a playground for great power showdown. On the contrary, the continuous intrusion of the United States, an extra-regional alien power, in Asian subregions has delegitimised existing regional security architectures like ASEAN, East Asia Summit and even SAARC to reproduce dependencies of client states on superpowers. Such western interventions have precluded the natural emergence of an autonomous regional balance of power within Asia and raked up insecurities for Russia and China.

The spectrum of offensive tactics followed by China just manages to remain actions short of provoking a full-scale war – but it should be mindful that this rapidly changing, volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) world poses newer definitions and strategic thresholds. Unlike conventional war, the escalation ladder in grey zone kinetic warfare (as implemented by China) does not have a clear chain. All modern wars are wars of attrition, with even so-called major powers being embarrassed into the ‘Afghanistan Trap’ of never-ending conflicts with smaller and ‘insignificant’ states. China’s possible future misadventure in Taiwan can learn lessons from Iraq (US) and Ukraine (Russia).

In Senkakau Paradox, Michael E. O’Hanlon poses the danger of small states acquiring magnified and bloated perceptions in the balance of power politics and provoking war – a similar danger is faced in the South China Sea where small (and some artificial islands) risk igniting this region. In contrast, he proposes an ‘integrated defence’ of a mix of mild military reprisals and economic sanctions to deter the threat actors. Such measures are already in place – Mineral Security Partnership, IPEF, iCET etc. However, the deployment of geoeconomic tools is a dicey proposition as it can further push the adversary into evolving alternative and independent architectures like the proposed BRICS currency against the weaponisation of SWIFT and sanctions regimes by Euro-Atlantic countries.

An opposite reading would suggest that small states have very often been ignored and trampled in the interstate system. In the Indo-Pacific itself, the Pacific Islands are mentioned as an afterthought, and their existential concerns of being drowned by rising sea levels due to climate change are dismissed as ‘low politics’ matters. The superpowers only remember them for their strategic locales while eyeing their rich mineral resources. Indo-Pacific remains a unique stage of enactment of geopolitical rivalries as non-state actors are not major players, unlike in the Gulf, where Houthis have wreaked havoc. In this sense, traditional IR models of statism and power politics still seem to apply and offer prescriptive models for Asian hawks and doves.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Due to recent changes in the United States nuclear policies, many countries have started doubting America’s nuclear umbrella and thinking of having their own nuclear weapon. The distrust was visible in Former President Joe Biden and it is worsening in the Trump administration. Although the calls for nuclear armament had already been rising in both Japan and South Korea before Trump’s return to office, Trump.s new approach towards nuclear policies of Japan and Republic of Korea in his second presidency have forced both countries to start think seriously and urgently about developing their own Weapon of Mass Destruction instead of relying on America’s Nuclear Umbrella.

South Korea & Japan – Pursuit for Nuclear Weapon

The biggest threat both Japan and South Korea have is the increasing number of North Korea’s nuclear potential. Even though America assured to deter the Korean peninsula, the history has shown otherwise. North Korea has not only developed but increasingly expanding its nuclear arsenal and also become more provocative, testing missiles powerful enough to reach the United States. Which has triggered Japan and South Korea to lean towards the idea of nuclear option.

South Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, as Washington pushed non-proliferation, and chose to rely on the United States to defend it against the North. The pursuit of nuclear weapons in South Korea is an old debate that triggers every once in a while, especially since 2006 when North Korea tested its first bomb. However, in the last few years, the call for South Korea to have nuclear weapons has increased significantly. Public opinion polls have shown that a majority of South Koreans over 70% support the development of indigenous nuclear weapons.

Right now, South Korea is under the protection of United States Nuclear Umbrella which they signed with Washington in 1953. North Korea has a long history of pursuing nuclear capabilities since the 1960s, even before it initiated its nuclear programme around 1993. But America already withdrew all American tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, with Seoul’s consent, and the joint declaration of the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Japan’s former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato gave the “Three Nonnuclear Principles” in December 1967, that later became the foundation of Japan’s nuclear policy. The policies are that “Japan would not develop nuclear weapons; It would not possess nuclear weapons; It would not allow nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory.” Later he added the fourth principle that Japan would adhere to the three Principles as long as it retained confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella.

The concept of developing a nuclear weapon is long opposed by the people of Japan. However, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe deeply resented the Americans imposing this constitution on them. Japan wants the alliance with America, since 90% of energy requirement is imported in Japan. Mr Abe was supporting the idea of going nuclear, although it is believed that he was suggesting to borrow some nuclear weapons from U.S. instead of Japan build its own.

Why going nuclear is important now more than ever?

Just days into Trump’s second presidency, his secretaries of defence and state referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” This could potentially imply that U.S. has accepted North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. In addition, Trump said he would “reach out” to Kim Jong-un, raising speculation that Washington might pursue arms control with North Korea instead of denuclearization, leaving South Korea vulnerable to nuclear threats. Recently, the US administration’s attempts to withdraw the US Forces in Korea (USFK) from South Korea. Trump also has indicated that he wants the ROK to contribute US$ 10 billion every year in order to deploy of U.S. troops in South Korea, which will be a big impact on South Korean economy and gives one more region to strengthen their own military and to consider nuclear option.

All this has increased the security anxiety of both Japan and South Korea. This shift of America’s approach to Pyongyang, all while North Korea’s increasingly belligerent behaviour, the Russia-Ukraine war, China expanding its territory and another critical factor are the reasons for the increasing distrust of Japan and South Korea with the United States. Regardless of its growth in soft and hard powers, being a non-nuclear state, South Korean has question that why would the US sacrifice New York for Seoul?

It’s no coincidence this call-to-arms in Japan came just as Russia has invaded Ukraine. Since than Japan has started thinking seriously and urgently about nuclear weapons. In 2022 Shinzo Abe got security anxiety by watching the invasion of Ukraine serves as a useful example of what can happen to countries that don’t defend themselves properly against bigger, better armed and more aggressive neighbours.

China hasn’t launched any major attacks yet, but it does seem to be moving in a bit of a Russia-like direction. China has been trying to slowly slice off bits of territory from India, the Philippines, and Bhutan, and it’s also now pushing a claim to the Japanese island and South Korea. This pattern shows that the China wouldn’t be satisfied with the conquest of Taiwan, they are more likely to have plans to claim Japan’s island of Okinawa, and might support a North Korean takeover of South Korea in order to turn the whole peninsula into a Chinese satellite state.

Many researchers believe that Mr. Kim Jong Un would no doubt use the nuclear arsenal in case it becomes clear they are about to lose any war. In that case, any non-nuclear country has only two options to defend their country, either by asking for help from the nations like U.S. and U.K. or to develop your own nuclear power if their policies are not reliable enough. 

Impact on Proliferation

Majorities of nuclear experts believe that the existing nuclear policies are discriminative and overly-exaggerated. A breach in the Non-Proliferation is undesirable, but no sanctions were applied against the United Kingdom, France, or Israel. Similarly, U.S. had futile attempts to prevent India and Pakistan from joining the nuclear club and eventually accepting them as nuclear state. India gave the reasoning to deter from nuclear armed China, similarly Pakistan wanted to deter from India. Japan and South-Korea has the same reason to deter from North-Korea and potentially from China and Russia as well. South Korea’s nuclear weapons would let the state take a more responsible role on the global stage as a key U.S. ally and that such a change of national status would upgrade the ROK-US alliance, as well. From the view point of Seoul, South Korea is already more than justified to go nuclear.

But if Japan and South Korea get nukes, the other neighbour countries might consider to do the same such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. This will promote the normalization of development of nuclear weapon. This will have a big impact on Proliferation by increases the probability of use of a nuclear weapon. The world needs non-discriminative proliferation regime, at the time America is showing less interest in being world leader, decreasing world’s trust in American nuclear umbrella even more.

Former Prime Minister of Japan Mr. Shinzo Abe suggested to share the U.S. nuclear weapon similarly current Prime Minister debated to have Asian version of NATO, a nuclear consulting body with U.S. to share the nuclear arsenal. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s diplomatic conversations in the initial years, culminating with the signing of the Washington Declaration in 2023, where both sides agreed to “commit to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear “deterrence”. However, whatever approach America might take, it must ensure that its decision is a well-considered policy considering all the consequences.

The political pressure on the U.S. will be too huge to respond with nukes in retaliation, putting the U.S. President in a dilemma: whether to put the US cities, innocent civilians, and worldwide US bases at risk or sacrifice them to defend an ally which is not a part of the US territory. Seoul also considers that “We cannot expect — and should not ask — the American president to use his nuclear weapons to defend an ally at the risk of sacrificing his own people.” This idea gives Japan and South Korea full right to consider nuclear option. Japan and South Korea are under direct threat of nuclear-armed neighbours, while neighbours continue to enhance their nukes, US allies remain without. Both Japan and ROK are aware of the U.S. decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The majority of Koreans and Japanese think nuclear armament is not the best option, but it is inevitable.

Conclusion

Eventually, the President of America has to make a decision on nuclear talks for both Japan and South Korea. There are many reasons why Japan and South Korea have all the right to consider nuclear option. But this will lead in breach in existing Proliferation regime. The increase in number of nuclear states will also increase the probability of using it. But that cannot be allowed due to the devastating effect on that detonated land far worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In order to prevent that from happening, a strict non-discriminatory Proliferation regime has to be enforced thought out the world. For that, the leading global powers have to take the lead and responsibilities to make all the nuclear countries and many non-nuclear countries to comply with that regime.