By: Prachi Kushwah, Research Analyst, GSDN

India and Russia go way back. Their partnership really took off in the middle of the last century—especially during the Cold War. Back then, India leaned on the Soviet Union for all sorts of things: defense gear, support at the UN Security Council, and help with building up its industries. When the Soviet Union fell apart in December 1991, Russia stepped in and kept the relationship alive. Defense deals, energy projects, and technology swaps became the heart of their friendship.

But things aren’t as simple as they used to be. The world’s shifting. Russia is getting closer to China and Pakistan, while India’s building stronger ties with the US. On top of that, the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war has shaken up the global economy. All of this has people wondering—does the India-Russia partnership still have the same strength it once did?

A Legacy Anchored in History

India and Russia built their partnership on trust, common goals, and the fact that each side brought something the other needed. India got reliable, affordable military gear, and Russia often backed India at the UN, using its veto to support Indian security interests. The big moment came on August 9, 1971, when both countries signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. That treaty gave India a sense of security, especially with all the shifting power dynamics in Asia at the time.

Over the decades, Russia became India’s main source for defense equipment—most of India’s imported military hardware came from Moscow. Even after India opened up its economy in 1991 and started buying weapons from other countries, Russia still played a key role in India’s plans to modernize its military. That connection hasn’t faded, even as the world keeps changing.

Defense Cooperation: Enduring Pillar with New Strains

Defense is still the biggest piece of the partnership. India’s military depends on Russian gear—Sukhoi fighter jets, T-90 tanks, all sorts of engines and spare parts. The two countries even build things together, like the BrahMos cruise missile, which they kicked off back in 1998. That shows just how close their defense ties run.

But things aren’t as smooth as they used to be. India’s started buying a lot more from Israel, France, and the US. The US, for its part, is working hard to pull India closer, especially in the Indo-Pacific, with groups like the Quad (that’s India, Japan, Australia, and the US). On the flip side, Russia has started selling more weapons to Pakistan and is teaming up strategically with China—India’s main rivals.

Even with all this shifting around, Russia still backs India where it counts. They help with nuclear subs, supply parts for older equipment, and upgrade aging systems. India also got the S-400 Triumf missile defense system in a $5.4 billion deal signed in 2016, even though the US threatened sanctions over it. So, for now, Russian defense tech is still something India isn’t ready to let go of.

Energy: New Opportunities Amid Changing Markets

Ever since the Russia-Ukraine war started in February 2022, India and Russia have gotten a lot closer when it comes to energy. With Western sanctions hitting Russia’s economy and energy exports hard, Moscow turned to Asia. India jumped at the chance, quickly becoming one of the biggest buyers of Russian oil—at a discount, too. Millions of barrels every month, often cheaper than anywhere else. That’s not just an economic boost; it gives India some real strategic leverage.

But it’s not just oil. India’s involved in Russian LNG projects and still holds a stake in the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas field out in eastern Russia. And when it comes to uranium fuel for India’s nuclear reactors, Russia keeps the supply steady, all under existing civil nuclear deals. From Russia’s side, India looks like a safe bet—a stable, long-term market that isn’t swayed by Western sanctions.

Still, the future of this partnership isn’t set in stone. It depends on how global prices swing, whether sanctions stick around, and how far India goes with its push for green energy—a goal it made public at COP26 in late 2021. India wants to use less oil and gas, but Russia depends on selling it. So, while the ties are strong right now, they’ll probably need to branch out—maybe into nuclear, hydrogen, and renewables—if they want to keep this cooperation going.

Economic Relations: Below Potential but Strengthening

Even though the two countries have lined up their strategies, their economic results haven’t really matched up. For years, trade between them stayed pretty low-key and focused mostly on India buying defense equipment, sending pharmaceuticals, and the two working out energy deals. Things changed after 2022. Suddenly, trade shot up—hitting over $65 billion in 2023. Most of that jump came from India’s oil imports. Still, the numbers aren’t exactly balanced. India buys a lot more from Russia than it sells back.

Both sides have been looking for ways to get around Western financial systems. They’ve talked about settling trade using their own currencies instead of the usual international routes. This push got a lot stronger once sanctions made it tough for Russian banks to use global systems. They’re also working together on the International North-South Transport Corridor—a big project that’s supposed to make shipping between South Asia and Eurasia faster and cheaper.

Geopolitical Realignments: Diverging Priorities

India’s place in the world has shifted a lot. New Delhi’s gotten closer with Western economies, ramped up its naval partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, and now openly sees China as its main strategic rival for the long haul. Russia, on the other hand, has thrown its lot in with China, leaning on Beijing for political, economic, and military support—especially after Western sanctions tightened in 2014 and got even tougher following the Ukraine war. This new setup makes India uneasy. Russia and China call their relationship a “no-limits partnership,” a phrase they rolled out in Beijing on February 4, 2022. Russia still tries not to mess up its old friendship with India, but being so dependent on China really complicates things between the three countries.

There’s something else bothering New Delhi, too: Russia has started reaching out to Pakistan. Sure, it’s still on a small scale, but Russia has sold military equipment to Pakistan and even held their first joint military exercises with Islamabad back on September 24, 2016. These steps, even if minor, show Russia drifting away from its old, India-first approach in South Asia.

Diplomacy and Summitry: The Personal Equation Endures

Geopolitics might keep changing, but top leaders from India and Russia keep meeting face-to-face, which really keeps the trust strong. Modi and Putin clearly get along well—you see it in their frequent summits, those big conversations about energy, and all the defence deals they keep signing. Even as India builds ties with other countries, it always stands up for talking with Russia on the world stage.

One big moment that showed how solid this relationship is came on December 18, 2025, when Putin landed in New Delhi for the Twenty-Third Annual India-Russia Summit. He and Modi went over defence projects, signed new energy deals, and talked a lot about wanting a world that doesn’t just follow one superpower. They locked in new plans to make defence spare parts together, agreed to send more Russian oil to India at better prices, and mapped out ways to work together in nuclear and space technology. That visit—especially with so much pressure on Russia and Western countries trying to woo India—made it pretty clear: this partnership still matters a lot to both sides.

Multilateral Platforms: Shared Interests in a Fragmented World

India and Russia work together in a bunch of regional and international groups. Take the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—India joined as a full member back in June 2017. It’s a place where countries talk about security across Eurasia. There’s also BRICS, which pulls in Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and now a few new countries. This group matters a lot to both India and Russia. They want a world where Western countries don’t call all the shots.

But things aren’t always smooth. India isn’t exactly comfortable with China, and China’s a heavyweight in both these groups. Russia sees these alliances as a way to push back against the West. India’s more cautious. They pick and choose, always keeping their independence front and center.

Is the Partnership Still as Strong?

Are India and Russia still as close as they used to be? Well, it really depends on what you’re comparing. Back during the Cold War, their bond had a lot of emotional and ideological glue holding it together. That’s faded. These days, their economies don’t really move in sync, and their big-picture goals don’t always line up. You can see it in Russia getting closer to China, and India leaning into the whole Indo-Pacific thing. That’s not just a little spat — it’s a sign that the world around them has changed.

Still, let’s not act like the relationship is falling apart. India continues to rely on Russia for defense. Russia, on its side, looks to India as a major market, a diplomatic ally, and a way to connect with the Global South. They both like the idea of a world where no one power dominates, and neither wants to get boxed in by the old-school “bloc politics.” The summit on December 18, 2025 made it pretty obvious — both leaders want to keep this thing going. No one’s looking to walk away.

Conclusion

India and Russia aren’t as close as they used to be, but their relationship isn’t falling apart. These days, it’s less about dependency and more about practical give-and-take. They still agree on a lot—defense deals, energy needs, and making sure they have a say in global decisions. Sure, they don’t always line up on regional issues or where things are headed, but both countries get that working together just makes sense, even while they form new partnerships elsewhere. The bond isn’t what it was during the Cold War, but it’s still strong, grounded in history, and flexible enough to handle the twists and turns of the modern world.

By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Balochistan, the largest yet least developed province of Pakistan, has once again emerged as the epicentre of violent unrest and political instability, raising a pressing question that, why is Balochistan “boiling” and what does it mean for Pakistan’s future? The province’s turmoil is not a sudden development but the culmination of decades of political marginalisation, economic exploitation, cultural anxieties, and militarised governance. Recent attacks, including the deadly bombing at Quetta Railway Station and the dramatic hijacking of the Jaffar Express, illustrate how deeply entrenched grievances have evolved into a persistent insurgency that challenges the authority of the Pakistani state. These incidents are not isolated acts of violence, but manifestations of a long-simmering conflict rooted in history, identity, and the struggle over resources. 

On a cold winter morning in November 2024, nearly 100 passengers gathered at Quetta Railway Station to board the Jaffar Express bound for Rawalpindi. At approximately 8:25 a.m., a powerful explosion ripped through the station, killing 32 people and injuring around 60 others, most of whom were security personnel returning home on leave. Pakistani officials attributed the attack to a suicide bomber, and responsibility was later claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an armed separatist group engaged in a protracted conflict with the Pakistani establishment. The attack formed part of a broader pattern of violence that has plagued the province for decades. Soon after, insurgents carried out a daring hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan’s mountainous terrain, taking nearly 400 passengers’ hostage, again including many security personnel. Although the Pakistan Army managed to secure the release of many hostages and later rescued about 190 individuals while killing all 33 insurgents, the militants executed 21 passengers. These incidents underscore the volatility of the region and the escalating sophistication of insurgent tactics. 

To understand the roots of this unrest, one must examine Balochistan’s geography and historical evolution. Strategically located with Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the north, and boasting a 770-kilometre coastline along the Arabian Sea, Balochistan accounts for approximately 44 percent of Pakistan’s landmass. Despite its vast size and abundant natural resources, it remains sparsely populated and economically underdeveloped. The province is endowed with significant reserves of natural gas, coal, copper, gold, and other minerals that contribute substantially to Pakistan’s economy. Yet the local population continues to face poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to education and healthcare. This paradox immense wealth beneath the soil but persistent deprivation above it lies at the heart of Baloch grievances. 

Ethnically, Balochistan is home to three major groups, the Balochs, the Brahuis, and the Pashtuns. The Balochs and Brahuis, often considered a single cultural grouping, form the largest ethnic bloc and lend the province its name. The people of Balochistan possess a strong cultural identity rooted in tribal traditions, literature, and a history of resistance and valor dating back centuries. Prior to colonisation, the region comprised numerous tribes frequently in conflict with one another. It was not until the eighteenth century that Nasir Khan, the sixth Khan of Kalat, unified these tribes under a central authority, establishing a unified army and administrative system that brought relative stability and prosperity to the region. The province then consisted of four princely states Kalat, Makran, Kharan, and Las Bela with Kalat as the largest and most influential. 

This fragile unity was disrupted during British colonial rule, which employed a divide-and-rule strategy by weakening the authority of the Khan of Kalat and empowering tribal chiefs with financial and political incentives. This policy ensured that tribal divisions persisted, preventing unified resistance and enabling British control. When British India was partitioned in 1947, the princely state of Kalat initially declared independence under Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, reflecting widespread Baloch fears of political and cultural marginalisation within a Punjabi-dominated Pakistan. However, in 1948, the Pakistan Army marched into Kalat, compelling the Khan to sign the instrument of accession. His brother, Prince Karim, rejected this decision and launched an armed revolt, marking the first of several major conflicts between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state. 

Since then, Balochistan has witnessed recurring insurgencies, each driven by demands for autonomy, equitable resource distribution, and cultural recognition. The conflict is fundamentally ethno-nationalist rather than religious, distinguishing it from other militant movements in Pakistan. Baloch fears extend beyond cultural erosion; they are acutely aware that their land contains vast natural resources capable of transforming Pakistan’s economy. This awareness has made resources control the focal point of conflict. Baloch leaders argue that the federal government extracts wealth from the province while investing little in local development, fostering a sense of internal colonialism. 

The discovery of natural gas at Sui in 1953 exemplifies this grievance. Gas from Sui began supplying cities in Punjab, including Multan and Rawalpindi, in 1964, yet Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, did not receive gas until 1986. Such disparities reinforced perceptions that the province’s resources were being exploited for the benefit of other regions. Today, Balochistan’suntapped oil and gas reserves, along with its mineral wealth, continue to attract federal and international interest, intensifying local fears of displacement and marginalisation. 

These anxieties have deepened with the development of Gwadar Port under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While initially welcomed as a potential catalyst for economic growth, CPEC has generated apprehension among locals due to land acquisitions, the establishment of military bases, and the influx of non-Baloch workers. Many residents fear becoming a minority in their own homeland, a demographic shift that could dilute their cultural identity and political influence. Insurgent groups, particularly the BLA, have capitalised on these fears, portraying CPEC as an exploitative venture that benefits outsiders at the expense of indigenous communities. 

Founded in 2000, the Balochistan Liberation Army has emerged as the most prominent separatist organisation, advocating independence and accusing the Pakistani state of resource exploitation and political repression. The death of nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, coupled with the group’s designation as a terrorist organisation, served as a catalyst for intensified insurgent activity. Since then, the BLA has targeted military personnel, infrastructure, and Chinese-funded projects. In the past year alone, the group reportedly carried out more than 150 attacks, including the Quetta Railway Station bombing. The hijacking of the Jaffar Express marked a significant escalation, demonstrating enhanced coordination and tactical sophistication. 

Experts warn that this escalation may indicate growing collaboration between Baloch insurgents, Sindhi militant organisations, and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), raising the spectre of a broader militant nexus. The convergence of ethno-nationalist and Islamist militancy poses a complex security challenge for Pakistan, stretching military resources and complicating counterinsurgency efforts. The involvement of educated middle-class professionals and women in the insurgency further signals a shift from tribal resistance to a broader social movement, reflecting widespread frustration across different segments of society. 

Human rights concerns have further inflamed tensions. Allegations of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and collective punishment by security forces are frequently reported by activists and families of missing persons. Protests in Quetta and other cities highlight demands for accountability and transparency. While the state denies systematic abuses, the lack of credible investigations fuels mistrust and reinforces the insurgents’ narrative of repression. 

Socioeconomic underdevelopment remains a critical driver of unrest. Balochistan records Pakistan’s lowest literacy rates, highest infant mortality, and weakest infrastructure. Large areas lack basic amenities such as clean water, electricity, and paved roads. Youth unemployment is widespread, creating fertile ground for militant recruitment. Development projects often fail to deliver tangible benefits to local communities, reinforcing perceptions of exclusion and neglect. 

Geopolitically, Balochistan occupies a strategic crossroads bordering Iran and Afghanistan and overlooking vital maritime routes near the Strait of Hormuz. Its location and resources attract international interest, particularly from China. Pakistan has accused foreign actors of supporting Baloch separatists, though such claims remain contested. Regardless of external influences, the internal drivers of unrest political exclusion, economic inequality, and heavy-handed security policies are widely acknowledged as the primary causes of instability. 

Pakistan’s broader political and economic crises exacerbate the situation. Civil-military tensions, declining public trust in institutions, and economic distress limit the state’s capacity to address multiple security challenges. Instability in Balochistan threatens key economic assets, including energy projects and CPEC infrastructure, potentially undermining investor confidence and straining relations with China. Attacks on Chinese personnel have already raised concerns about the security of foreign investments. 

The growing participation of women and urban youth in the insurgency underscores a profound social transformation. Once dominated by tribal fighters, the movement now reflects broader societal grievances. Female suicide bombers and student activists symbolise the depth of alienation and the widening appeal of resistance narratives. This evolution indicates that the conflict is no longer confined to remote tribal areas but has become a wider struggle over rights, identity, and resource control. 

Despite repeated military operations, a purely coercive approach has failed to resolve the conflict. While security forces have neutralised militant leaders and disrupted networks, underlying grievances remain unaddressed. Each cycle of violence deepens mistrust and fuels further recruitment. Experts emphasise that sustainable peace requires political dialogue, equitable resource sharing, respect for human rights, and genuine provincial autonomy. 

Balochistan’s instability also carries regional implications. Ethnic ties with Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province raise the risk of cross-border unrest, while insecurity along the Arabian Sea affects global energy routes. As great-power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, the province’s stability will influence regional connectivity and strategic dynamics. 

Ultimately, Balochistan is “boiling” because it encapsulates Pakistan’s structural contradictions, a resource-rich region plagued by poverty, a centralised state confronting demands for autonomy, and a security-first approach confronting political grievances. The persistence of insurgency reflects not only local discontent but also systemic governance failures. Without meaningful reforms, greater provincial autonomy, inclusive development, fair distribution of resource revenues, and accountability for human rights abuses, the cycle of violence is likely to continue. 

For Pakistan, the stakes are extraordinarily high. Stability in Balochistan is essential for national integration, economic recovery, and regional credibility. Failure to address the province’s grievances risks entrenching insurgency, undermining strategic projects, and deepening political fragmentation. As Pakistan navigates economic challenges and political uncertainty, Balochistan stands as both a warning and a test, a warning of the consequences of exclusion and exploitation, and a test of whether the state can transform coercion into consensus and conflict into cooperation. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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By: Prof. (Dr.) ML Meena and Ravi D. Bishnoi

In recent years, geopolitical analysts have frequently framed the Indo-Pacific as a compelling geopolitical imagination shaping contemporary global strategy. You may have often heard about certain geopolitical imaginations that gradually become strategic realities, such as the idea at dawn in the South China Sea, naval vessels move silently across contested waters. Submarines glide beneath shipping lanes that carry trillions of dollars in global trade. Fighter jets conduct patrols near Taiwan. Undersea cables hum with digital traffic linking financial markets across continents. No formal war has been declared. Yet the Indo-Pacific feels increasingly like the front line of a slow, calculated strategic contest, because of Indo-Pacific is not just a map in contemporary global geopolitics. It became a new paradigm-based strategic idea.

This is the geopolitical setting in which the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has re-emerged, not as a symbolic diplomatic forum, but as a maritime coordination mechanism responding to structural shifts in global power.

Now, it is important to understand that the Indo-Pacific is not simply a geographic label. It is a geopolitical construct born from strategic necessity. Geopolitics tells us that regions are not discovered randomly; they are imagined, framed or institutionalized. The Indo-Pacific is one such “strategic imagination.” It connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single security continuum. This framing itself is a geopolitical act. It widens India’s security horizon to the east and extends the US strategic focus to the west. It places Southeast Asia at the centre of a new maritime arc.

Why did this framing become urgent?

Because power at sea has returned as the primary language of great power politics.

In the last decade, Chinese naval expansion has accelerated dramatically in this region. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now operates one of the world’s largest fleets. Artificial islands in the South China Sea have been equipped with airstrips, radar systems, and missile installations. Freedom of Navigation Operations by the United States continue regularly. Taiwan Strait tensions have intensified through frequent air and naval maneuvers. These developments have produced what International Relations scholars describe as a “security dilemma spiral”, where defensive moves by one actor are perceived as offensive threats by another.

In this environment, the QUAD’s revival in 2017 marked a strategic recalibration. Initially formed in 2007 and then fading into diplomatic silence, QUAD was once dismissed as fragile. Today, however, it has institutional momentum. Leader-level summits have become regular. Ministerial meetings are structured, and working groups address cybersecurity, critical technologies and maritime domain awareness. This shift from ad hoc dialogue to sustained coordination reflects a deeper geopolitical reality means Indo-Pacific competition is structural, not temporary.

Recent events reinforce this point. Last year, Exercise Malabar expanded its anti-submarine warfare components, reflecting growing undersea competition in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. We understand that Submarines are no longer peripheral assets only; they are central to deterrence strategy. Quiet propulsion systems, seabed sensors and anti-submarine patrol aircraft define the new maritime chessboard in this region. So, some geopolitical analysts increasingly speak of Undersea Geopolitics as the next frontier.

Simultaneously, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) has strengthened surveillance cooperation. Through satellite-based tracking, small island states can now monitor illegal fishing and suspicious maritime activity. This may appear non-military, but in strategic terms, it enhances transparency deterrence because when activities are visible, coercion becomes costlier.

The technological dimension is equally significant. When we see the recent techno-based phase, we have seen QUAD discussions expand into critical technology supply chains, semiconductor security, artificial intelligence governance and cyber resilience. Defence is no longer limited to ships and aircraft. It includes digital networks and data flows. In modern geopolitics, control over sea lanes must be matched by resilience in information lanes. This fusion represents a Techno-Maritime Convergence.

In parallel with QUAD, the AUKUS pact continues to reshape Indo-Pacific deterrence. Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines increases the region’s undersea complexity. AUKUS focuses on hard military capability, while QUAD operates as a broader strategic coordination platform. Together, they create layered balancing, describe this as networked deterrence geopolitical imagination, where security is distributed across overlapping frameworks rather than concentrated in a single alliance.

India’s position within QUAD is particularly nuanced. Unlike treaty-bound allies, India preserves strategic autonomy. Its participation reflects balancing without alignment in the traditional Cold War sense. India’s naval modernization reinforces this posture. INS Vikrant’s operational status, expanded maritime patrol aircraft deployments, and enhanced logistics agreements with the United States and Australia extend India’s operational radius. These developments strengthen India’s capacity in the Indian Ocean Region, where extra-regional naval activity has increased steadily.

Classic geopolitician such as Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasized sea power as the foundation of national strength. Later, Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland theory argued that control over coastal fringes determines global balance. The Indo-Pacific today resembles a modern Rimland theatre, where maritime corridors determine economic and strategic influence. QUAD can thus be understood as a Rimland coordination mechanism responding to continental-maritime tension.

Yet the QUAD does not function as NATO. It has no mutual defence clause. It relies on voluntary convergence rather than treaty obligation. This flexibility is deliberate because it reduces escalation risks while preserving cooperation. Some critics argue that this loose structure limits credibility. Others counter that formalization would provoke sharper confrontation and alienate ASEAN states wary of bloc politics.

The economic dimension complicates matters further. China remains a major trading partner for many QUAD members. Supply chains are deeply intertwined. This interdependence produces Complex Interdependence, means economic ties reduce war probability but increase vulnerability. In this context, QUAD’s efforts to diversify supply chains represent strategic hedging rather than economic decoupling.

Recent developments highlight this hedging strategy. We see, Japan has increased defence spending and adopted counterstrike capabilities under its revised security strategy. Australia has strengthened its northern military infrastructure to host allied forces. The United States continues Freedom of Navigation patrols and expands access to basing in the Indo-Pacific. India deepens defence partnerships with Southeast Asian states while maintaining independent diplomatic engagement with major powers. Each state adapts within its own strategic culture, but alignment emerges through shared concern over maritime stability.

Looking ahead, three trends are likely to shape QUAD’s evolution. First, intensified undersea competition. Submarine fleets will grow. Seabed infrastructure protection will become central. Artificial intelligence-enabled sonar detection systems may transform anti-submarine warfare. This domain is quiet but decisive. Second, defence technology integration. AI-driven maritime surveillance, autonomous vessels, and cyber-maritime coordination will define next-generation deterrence. QUAD’s technology working groups may gradually evolve into defence innovation hubs. Third, distributed deterrence networks. Instead of relying solely on US dominance, regional powers will share surveillance burdens and operational readiness. This reduces over-dependence on any single actor while increasing collective resilience.

However, risks remain. Escalation in the Taiwan Strait would test QUAD cohesion. Economic retaliation strategies could strain domestic politics. Divergent threat perceptions among members may create hesitation in crisis scenarios. The absence of a binding military commitment means responses will depend on real-time political calculation.

Yet perhaps this ambiguity is part of the design. In an era of Managed Rivalry, overt alliances can harden divisions. Flexible coordination allows adaptation. The Indo-Pacific today is not divided into rigid blocs. It is shaped by overlapping alignments and cautious balancing. QUAD embodies this hybrid structure.

The larger question is whether QUAD stabilises or de-stabilises the region. From one perspective, coordinated deterrence reduces the likelihood of unilateral dominance. It reassures smaller states. It increases transparency. From another perspective, military exercises and strategic signaling may deepen the security dilemma. Politico-geo-realism reminds us that space is never neutral. Oceans are political spaces shaped by power projection and institutional frameworks. The Indo-Pacific has become the primary maritime theatre for negotiating global order.

In this unfolding contest, QUAD has moved beyond symbolism. It represents a maritime security arc linking the eastern coast of Africa to the Western Pacific. It does not promise automatic defence. QUAD’s trajectory suggests that maritime geopolitics has returned to the centre of global politics. The Indo-Pacific is the arena where great power competition is managed, calibrated, and constantly renegotiated, and in that arena, QUAD stands not as a rigid alliance but as a flexible instrument of balance in an age defined by uncertainty at sea.

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction
India’s space journey began not as a quest for prestige or power projection, but as an instrument of national development. In the early decades after independence, space technology was conceived as a tool to bridge inequality—bringing weather forecasting to farmers, communication to remote villages, and disaster warning systems to vulnerable coastlines. Under visionary scientific leadership and through institutions such as the Indian Space Research Organisation, India crafted a model of space development rooted in societal transformation rather than geopolitical rivalry.
From the experimental launches at Thumba to the operational success of the PSLV, and from lunar exploration through Chandrayaan missions to the Mars Orbiter Mission, India steadily expanded its technological horizons. These achievements demonstrated cost efficiency, indigenous innovation, and scientific ambition. For much of its history, however, India’s space programme maintained a distinctly civilian orientation—carefully separating developmental priorities from overt strategic signalling.
Over the past decade, this equilibrium has gradually shifted. The global space environment has become more congested, contested, and competitive. Major powers are investing heavily in military space capabilities, satellite constellations are crowding low-Earth orbit, and commercial actors are reshaping the economics of launch and satellite services. Precision warfare, intelligence gathering, secure communications, and navigation systems have reinforced the reality that space infrastructure underpins modern state power.
Against this backdrop, India’s space trajectory is entering a new phase. The coming period represents more than technological advancement; it signals the consolidation of a civil–military space architecture aligned with national security, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy. Human spaceflight ambitions, the rapid rise of private launch enterprises, indigenous breakthroughs in communication and propulsion technologies, and closer coordination between civilian and defence space agencies together mark a structural transformation. India is no longer only a developmental space power. It is emerging as a strategic space actor—seeking not merely access to orbit, but influence within it.

From Thumba to Strategic Orbit: India’s Space Power in a Contested Era
India’s space programme began in the 1960s with modest sounding rocket launches from Thumba, driven by a developmental philosophy that viewed space technology as a tool for nation-building. The creation of the Indian Space Research Organisation in 1969 institutionalised this vision. Early milestones such as Aryabhata (1975) and the operational success of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) established India’s credibility as a reliable and cost-effective spacefaring nation, supporting weather forecasting, telecommunications, disaster management, and remote sensing.
The 21st century marked a decisive expansion of ambition. Chandrayaan-1 confirmed water molecules on the Moon, the Mars Orbiter Mission showcased interplanetary capability at minimal cost, and Chandrayaan-3 achieved a historic south polar landing. More recently, the success of Aditya-L1 signalled India’s growing sophistication in solar and space-weather studies—critical for satellite protection and grid resilience.
Strategic imperatives have simultaneously sharpened. The 2019 ASAT demonstration, expanding satellite-based maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific, and growing military reliance on secure communications reflect the operational centrality of space assets. With the rise of private players like Skyroot Aerospace and the push for human spaceflight under Gaganyaan, India’s programme is no longer compartmentalised. It is evolving into a civil–military integrated space architecture suited to an increasingly contested orbital environment.

From Strategic Restraint to Civil–Military Fusion: Recasting India’s Space Doctrine
For decades, India’s space doctrine was anchored in strategic restraint and developmental prioritisation. While major powers openly integrated military objectives into their space programmes, India emphasised peaceful uses of outer space, socioeconomic applications, and cost-effective innovation. The Indian Space Research Organisation became globally respected for enabling weather forecasting, tele-education, disaster management, and navigation services rather than overt power projection. Even as launch vehicles such as the PSLV gained international credibility, New Delhi maintained a measured posture regarding the security dimensions of its orbital assets.
However, the transformation of the global strategic environment has compelled doctrinal evolution. The Indo-Pacific’s maritime competition, satellite-enabled precision targeting, and the centrality of real-time intelligence in modern warfare have redefined space as a critical operational domain. The establishment of India’s Defence Space Agency in 2019 and the demonstration of anti-satellite capability that same year marked an inflection point—signalling that space security could no longer remain implicit.
Today, the global space domain is characterised by congestion, contestation, and commercial disruption. Mega-constellations deployed by entities such as SpaceX under the Starlink programme are crowding low-Earth orbit (LEO), raising concerns over orbital debris and spectrum competition. Major powers continue to develop counter-space capabilities, blurring the line between deterrence and weaponisation. Simultaneously, AI-enabled surveillance, battlefield analytics, and dual-use commercial satellite imagery—widely used during the Ukraine conflict—have demonstrated how private-sector platforms can decisively shape military outcomes.
India has absorbed these lessons. Satellite-based maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean Region, enhanced integration of NAVIC navigation systems for defence applications, and the growing reliance on secure satellite communications for joint operations reflect a shift toward operational integration. The success of missions such as Chandrayaan-3 and Aditya-L1 further illustrate the expanding technological base that underpins both civilian and strategic capabilities.
Equally significant is the rise of private actors like Skyroot Aerospace, whose launch ambitions complement national objectives. The convergence of public institutions, commercial startups, and defence requirements signals the emergence of a civil–military fusion model tailored to Indian realities.
In this evolving context, 2026 is likely to formalise a more integrated doctrine—where civilian innovation, commercial agility, and military preparedness operate in synergy rather than separation. India’s space programme is no longer defined solely by developmental aspiration; it is increasingly structured around resilience, deterrence, and strategic autonomy in an era of orbital competition.

Human Spaceflight, Commercial Agility, and Technological Sovereignty: India’s Orbital Leap Forward
India’s space programme has long prioritised satellites for communication, navigation, and remote sensing, but the ambition to place an Indian astronaut in orbit has been part of its strategic imagination for decades. From Rakesh Sharma’s 1984 mission aboard a Soviet spacecraft to the steady maturation of launch vehicles like PSLV and GSLV, the groundwork for human spaceflight has been gradually laid. The success of Chandrayaan-3 and Aditya-L1 further strengthened confidence in India’s systems engineering and mission management capabilities.
The Gaganyaan programme now represents the next decisive step. By sending Indian “vyomanauts” into low-Earth orbit aboard an indigenously developed spacecraft, India will demonstrate mastery over life-support systems, crew escape mechanisms, precision re-entry technologies, and orbital manoeuvring. Human spaceflight is not merely symbolic—it signals technological maturity and strategic credibility in a domain historically dominated by a few powers. It also lays the foundation for India’s long-term vision of establishing the Bharatiya Antriksh Station, a modular space station intended for scientific research, technology validation, and international collaboration under Indian leadership.
However, this ambition unfolds in an increasingly congested orbital environment. The challenges faced by the International Space Station and China’s Tiangong space station underscore the risks of debris and dense satellite constellations. With companies like SpaceX deploying thousands of satellites, space situational awareness and debris mitigation have become operational necessities for astronaut safety.
Parallel to human spaceflight, India is strengthening commercial launch agility. The Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV), developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation with industrial collaboration including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, is set to enter commercial service, offering rapid, low-cost deployment for small satellites. Meanwhile, the anticipated orbital launch of Vikram-1 by Skyroot Aerospace marks the rise of private-sector dynamism in India’s launch ecosystem. Defence-oriented rapid launch systems, reportedly under development, further highlight the strategic imperative of on-demand orbital access.
Complementing these capabilities are indigenous breakthroughs—Travelling-Wave Tube Amplifiers, Quantum Key Distribution for secure communications, and high-thrust electric propulsion systems. These dual-use technologies strengthen both civilian resilience and military preparedness, aligning space innovation with India’s broader goal of technological sovereignty in an increasingly contested domain.

Recalibrating the Commercial Compass: From Western Dependence to Multipolar Partnerships
India’s commercial space journey began cautiously, with limited private participation under a tightly regulated framework. For decades, the Indian Space Research Organisation functioned as both operator and regulator, while commercial launches were channelled through state-backed mechanisms. However, reforms over the past few years—particularly the creation of IN-SPACe and the opening of launch infrastructure to private firms—have transformed the ecosystem. Start-ups such as Skyroot Aerospace and Pixxel have emerged, signalling India’s intent to compete in the global small-satellite and Earth observation markets.
Yet geopolitical flux has introduced new realities. Sanctions regimes, export controls, and strategic alignments have exposed vulnerabilities for companies overly reliant on Western supply chains and markets. The experience of global firms during the Ukraine conflict—where commercial satellite services such as those provided by SpaceX became entangled in geopolitics—demonstrates how commercial space can quickly assume strategic overtones.
Against this backdrop, India is likely to recalibrate its partnerships. Diversifying beyond traditional Western blocs, strengthening South–South cooperation, and engaging emerging space actors in Asia, Africa, and Latin America will become priorities. India’s launch services, satellite manufacturing capabilities, and cost-effective engineering offer attractive options to multipolar markets. As one of the world’s fastest-growing large economies, India can leverage space diplomacy as a tool of geopolitical outreach—expanding satellite exports, remote sensing collaborations, and training partnerships.

Space Security and Strategic Reach: Safeguarding India’s Expanding Sphere
India’s strategic sphere of influence increasingly spans the Indo-Pacific, where maritime security, sea-lane protection, and real-time surveillance are indispensable. Satellite-enabled maritime domain awareness, NAVIC navigation support, border surveillance, and encrypted communications form the backbone of modern defence preparedness. The establishment of dedicated defence space structures and the growing integration of civilian satellite data into military planning reflect this shift.
In the coming phase, integration between commercial and defence assets is likely to deepen. Earth observation constellations developed for agriculture or climate monitoring may also support strategic reconnaissance. Dual-use technologies—already evident globally—blur the line between civilian and military platforms. India’s policy approach will therefore balance three imperatives: deterrence against hostile disruption, sustainability in orbital conduct, and sovereignty through assured access to space-based capabilities.
This civil–military fusion architecture is not an abandonment of peaceful principles, but a pragmatic adaptation to an environment where space infrastructure underpins economic resilience and national security alike.

Orbital Sustainability and Strategic Convergence: Shaping the Rules of the Future
The rapid proliferation of mega-constellations has intensified concerns over orbital congestion and debris. Incidents affecting platforms such as the International Space Station and China’s Tiangong space station highlight the growing hazards in low-Earth orbit. For India, particularly with human spaceflight ambitions underway, orbital sustainability is not theoretical—it is operationally urgent.
In the near term, India is well positioned to advocate responsible satellite deployment norms, transparent debris mitigation standards, and cooperative space traffic management mechanisms. Such initiatives would align with its longstanding commitment to equitable and peaceful uses of outer space while reinforcing its credibility as a responsible power.
Looking ahead, the artificial separation between civilian, commercial, and military space activities is dissolving. By the end of 2026, India’s space architecture is likely to reflect strategic convergence: operational readiness for human spaceflight, a maturing private launch ecosystem, indigenous technological breakthroughs, and stronger coordination between defence and civilian agencies. In a fragmented global order, space will not merely be a technological frontier—it will be a central arena of India’s strategic statecraft.

Conclusion
India’s space trajectory today reflects far more than technological progress—it signals the consolidation of national power in a domain that increasingly shapes geopolitical outcomes. What began as a development-centric programme aimed at social transformation has evolved into a multidimensional architecture integrating commercial dynamism, military preparedness, and technological sovereignty. The maturation of institutions such as the Indian Space Research Organisation, the rise of private innovators, and the operationalisation of defence space structures collectively underscore this transformation.
Human spaceflight under Gaganyaan, the emergence of agile launch capabilities, indigenous breakthroughs in secure communications and propulsion, and recalibrated international partnerships reflect a deeper structural shift. India is positioning itself not merely as a participant in the global space economy, but as a rule-shaper in debates over orbital sustainability, strategic stability, and equitable access to space. As orbital congestion intensifies and space becomes central to economic resilience and deterrence, India’s approach will hinge on balancing sovereignty with responsibility. The coming phase—particularly through 2026—may well mark the consolidation of India as a strategically integrated space power: development-driven in origin, security-conscious in practice, and globally consequential in ambition.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security partnership, announced in September 2021, was presented as a transformative strategic alignment designed to reinforce stability in the Indo-Pacific and ensure a long-term technological and military edge for its members. At its core lies an unprecedented commitment to provide Australia with nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines and to deepen collaboration in advanced defence technologies. Yet, several years after its unveiling, mounting concerns about industrial feasibility, strategic reliability, sovereignty, and geopolitical shifts have prompted a pressing question that, Is AUKUS still a potent alliance, or has its promise outpaced its deliverability? 

AUKUS emerged from a rapidly changing strategic environment. The Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of global power competition, shaped by China’s expanding maritime reach, growing naval capabilities, and assertive posture in contested waters. For Australia, a geographically vast nation with a limited population and defence manpower, nuclear-powered submarines promised a generational leap in deterrence and maritime reach. For the United Kingdom, AUKUS represented a concrete expression of its “Global Britain” ambition. For the United States, the pact offered a means to reinforce allied burden-sharing while strengthening its strategic posture in a region critical to 21st-century geopolitics. In principle, AUKUS aligned the interests of all three nations around a shared vision of maintaining a favourable balance of power. 

However, the potency of any alliance is measured not by its declaration but by its execution. Pillar I of AUKUS for the submarine programme has become the focal point of both ambition and anxiety. Under the agreed pathway, Australia is expected to acquire three to five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States beginning in the early 2030s, followed by the construction of a new SSN-AUKUS class developed jointly with the United Kingdom and built in Australia by the early 2040s. The projected cost, estimated at up to US$368 billion through the mid-2050s, reflects the scale and complexity of the undertaking. 

Yet serious doubts persist regarding whether the United States possesses the industrial capacity to deliver submarines to Australia without compromising its own naval readiness. American shipyards are already struggling to meet domestic demand, producing attack submarines at a rate significantly below strategic requirement. Workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and post-pandemic disruptions have compounded delays. If Washington faces a shortfall in its own fleet, the political and strategic calculus of transferring submarines to Australia becomes fraught. U.S. law requires certification that any such transfer would not diminish American undersea capabilities a condition that may prove difficult to satisfy in an era of intensifying great-power competition. 

These constraints have given rise to a troubling possibility: submarines intended for Australia may instead remain under U.S. control, operating from Australian bases but flying American flags, commanded by American crews, and serving primarily U.S. strategic objectives. In such a scenario, Australia risks being perceived less as a sovereign operator of advanced capabilities and more as a forward operating hub for U.S. power projection. This perception carries significant implications for national autonomy, domestic political legitimacy, and regional diplomacy. 

The uncertainty surrounding U.S. reliability has been amplified by broader shifts in American foreign policy. The resurgence of “America First” rhetoric and a more transactional approach to alliances have unsettled long-standing assumptions among U.S. partners. Statements by political leaders emphasizing reduced dependability have prompted debate in Australia about the risks of overreliance on a single security guarantor. While alliance ties between Canberra and Washington remain deep and institutionalized, strategic planners increasingly acknowledge the necessity of hedging against uncertainty. The possibility, however, remote delayed or withheld submarine transfers underscores the importance of sovereign capability and diversified defencepartnerships. 

Domestic debates within Australia reflect these anxieties. Critics argue that AUKUS may entrench dependence on foreign defence industries while diverting resources from more immediately deployable capabilities such as long-range strike systems, drones, cyber defences, and missile technology. Others warn of a potential capability gap as the ageing Collins-class submarines approach retirement, raising the spectre of a period during which Australia may lack a credible undersea deterrent. Supporters counter that rotational deployments of U.S. and U.K. submarines from HMAS Stirling will provide interim capability and strengthen interoperability, even as Australia develops its own nuclear-powered fleet. 

Sovereignty concerns also extend to basing arrangements. Expanded U.S. and U.K. submarine presence on Australian soil enhances deterrence but raises questions about operational control and strategic autonomy. Critics worry that Australia could become entangled in conflicts not of its choosing if foreign-operated assets based on its territory are used in military operations. Proponents respond that such integration is the essence of alliance cooperation, and that shared basing arrangements have long underpinned collective security. 

From a regional perspective, AUKUS has elicited mixed reactions. Some Indo-Pacific partners, including Japan and India, view the pact as a stabilizing force that strengthens deterrence against coercion. Others, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, have expressed concerns about nuclear proliferation risks, environmental safety, and the militarization of the region. The Treaty of Rarotonga, which enshrines a nuclear-free Pacific, has heightened sensitivities regarding nuclear propulsion, even though AUKUS submarines will not carry nuclear weapons. For many Pacific Island nations, security priorities such as climate change, economic resilience, and disaster preparedness remain more urgent than great-power military competition, creating a disconnect between strategic narratives and regional needs. 

Despite these concerns, AUKUS is not solely defined by submarines. Pillar II, focusing on advanced technologies, may ultimately prove more consequential. Cooperation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber capabilities, undersea surveillance, hypersonic systems, and electronic warfare promises to accelerate innovation and enhance interoperability across allied forces. Unlike the decades-long timeline of submarine construction, these initiatives can yield tangible benefits in the near term, strengthening situational awareness, decision-making speed, and deterrence capabilities. By integrating defence industrial bases and sharing sensitive technologies at an unprecedented level, AUKUS represents a new model of alliance cooperation tailored to an era of rapid technological change. 

The economic dimension of AUKUS also merits consideration. The partnership is expected to generate thousands of skilled jobs in Australia, particularly in shipbuilding, engineering, and advanced manufacturing. Investments in infrastructure, such as the expansion of shipyards in Adelaide and Perth, aim to establish a sovereign industrial base capable of sustaining nuclear-powered submarines. However, the financial burden is substantial, and long-term funding commitments may constrain other defence and social spending priorities. The opportunity cost of AUKUS what Australia forgoes in alternative capabilities remains a subject of vigorous debate. 

Historical experience underscores the risks inherent in large-scale submarine programmes. Australia’s past efforts have been marked by delays, cost overruns, and shifting strategic requirements. The cancellation of the French submarine contract in favour of AUKUS not only strained diplomatic relations but also highlighted the volatility of defence procurement decisions. Repeated changes in submarine design and partnership have contributed to capability gaps and eroded confidence in long-term planning. AUKUS, therefore, must overcome not only technical and industrial challenges but also a legacy of procurement instability. 

At the same time, it is important to recognize the strategic logic that continues to underpin AUKUS. The geographic position of Australia makes it a critical node in Indo-Pacific security architecture, enabling access to key sea lanes and facilitating allied operations. For the United States, enhanced access to Australian bases strengthens its ability to project power and maintaina forward presence. For the United Kingdom, participation reinforces its relevance as a global security actor. These converging interests suggest that AUKUS serves enduring strategic purposes beyond the immediate question of submarine delivery. 

Critics who argue that AUKUS primarily advances U.S. strategic dominance may not be entirely incorrect; alliances often reflect asymmetries of power. Yet such asymmetries do not negate mutual benefit. Australia gains access to technologies and capabilities that would otherwise be unattainable, while the United States and United Kingdom benefit from a more capable and integrated ally. The challenge lies in ensuring that these benefits are balanced and that Australia retains meaningful operational sovereignty over its defence assets. 

The future potency of AUKUS will depend on several factors. First, the United States must revitalize its submarine industrial base to meet both domestic and allied requirements. Second, Australia must develop the workforce, regulatory frameworks, and infrastructure necessary to operate nuclear-powered vessels safely and effectively. Third, the partnership must maintain political support across changing administrations in all three countries. Fourth, AUKUS must address regional concerns through transparency, confidence-building measures, and engagement with Pacific and Southeast Asian partners. 

There is also a growing discussion of contingency options. Some analysts advocate exploring alternative submarine designs, such as France’s Suffren-class, which may be better suited to Australia’s operational needs and available on shorter timelines. Others propose investing more heavily in asymmetric capabilities, including unmanned underwater vehicles and long-range precision strike systems, to mitigate risks associated with submarine delays. Such debates do not necessarily signal the failure of AUKUS but rather reflect prudent strategic planning in an uncertain environment. 

Ultimately, the question of whether AUKUS remains potent cannot be answered solely by assessing current delays or political controversies. Alliances are dynamic institutions that evolve in response to shifting strategic landscapes. AUKUS was conceived as a multi-decadal endeavour, and its success will be measured over generations rather than election cycles. Even if submarine delivery timelines slip, the partnership has already deepened technological integration, expanded allied presence in the Indo-Pacific, and signalled a long-term commitment to regional security. 

Nevertheless, potency requires credibility. If promised submarines fail to materialize under Australian sovereign control, the alliance risks reputational damage and diminished deterrent value. Regional partners may question the reliability of Western security guarantees, while domestic critics may view AUKUS as an expensive miscalculation. Conversely, successful delivery combined with tangible progress in advanced technologies would reinforce confidence in allied cooperation and strengthen the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. 

Therefore, AUKUS remains a potent alliance, but its strength lies more in its strategic trajectory than in its current capabilities. The partnership continues to align the interests of three major maritime democracies, foster technological innovation, and enhance deterrence in a contested region. Yet its credibility hinges on overcoming industrial bottlenecks, preserving Australian sovereignty, and sustaining political commitment across changing geopolitical conditions. Whether AUKUS ultimately fulfils its promise or becomes a cautionary tale of overambitious defence planning will depend not on rhetoric, but on delivery. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

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By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

In an era marked by geopolitical fragmentation, economic uncertainty, and climate distress, multilateral institutions face an urgent legitimacy crisis. The Group of Twenty (G20), which emerged in 1999 in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and was elevated to Leaders’ level during the 2008 global financial crisis, has evolved into a premier platform for coordinating responses to systemic global challenges. Yet, persistent inequalities between developed and developing countries, especially in debt relief, climate finance, and digital governance, have underscored the need for institutional reform and greater inclusivity.

India’s presidency (December 2022–November 2023) unfolded against the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war, supply-chain disruptions, rising inflation, and growing polarization between major powers. Navigating these divisions, India positioned itself as a bridge-builder, foregrounding the concerns of the Global South. The New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration—adopted by consensus—reflected this balancing act, emphasizing sustainable development, reform of multilateral development banks, climate action, and digital public infrastructure. Notably, India championed the permanent inclusion of the African Union, strengthening the representational character of the forum.

Guided by the civilizational ethos of “One Earth, One Family, One Future,” India advanced a reformist agenda aimed at democratizing global governance. By prioritizing debt vulnerability in developing countries, energy transitions, and technology-driven inclusion, India reframed the G20 discourse beyond traditional power politics toward development-centric multilateralism. Its presidency demonstrated an attempt to recalibrate global governance toward multipolarity—where emerging economies assert agency rather than remain rule-takers.

Thus, India’s G20 leadership was not merely diplomatic stewardship but a strategic assertion of Global South solidarity, institutional reform, and accountable multilateralism in a transforming international order.

Global Governance in Transition: From Bretton Woods to the G20

The contemporary global governance system reflects a gradual shift from the rigid hierarchies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank toward more flexible, plurilateral forums capable of responding to complex interdependence. Scholars such as Robert Keohane argue that institutions reduce uncertainty and transaction costs in an anarchic system, while John Ikenberry highlights how liberal order institutions sustain cooperation through embedded rules. Yet, post–Cold War realities—marked by the rise of emerging economies and the relative decline of Western dominance—have exposed representational deficits in traditional institutions.

The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis revealed the inadequacy of G7-centric coordination, catalyzing the creation of the Group of Twenty (G20) in 1999. Conceived at the Cologne Summit of the Group of Eight, the G20 expanded decision-making beyond industrialized powers to include systemically important developing economies. Its elevation to Leaders’ level during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis marked a critical juncture, with the G20 recognized as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.” Today, its members account for approximately 85% of global GDP, 75% of world trade, and two-thirds of the global population—indicating both systemic weight and representative breadth.

Unlike formal institutions, the G20 lacks a permanent secretariat, constitution, or enforcement mechanisms. As scholars of informal governance note, this flexibility allows rapid consensus-building but also limits institutional accountability. Nevertheless, its agenda has expanded beyond macroeconomic coordination to climate finance, digital transformation, debt restructuring, and sustainable development—reflecting the diffusion of global risks.

Institutional Evolution and Contemporary Relevance

Recent global disruptions—including the COVID-19 pandemic, sovereign debt crises in the Global South, and the Russia–Ukraine conflict—have reinforced the G20’s centrality. During the 2008 crisis, coordinated stimulus packages stabilized financial markets; similarly, in the post-pandemic period, the G20 advanced the Debt Service Suspension Initiative and Common Framework to assist vulnerable economies.

The forum’s growing engagement with climate governance aligns with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, particularly in mobilizing climate finance for developing countries. The permanent inclusion of the African Union in 2023 further strengthened its legitimacy and corrected long-standing representational imbalances.

Constructivist scholars emphasize that institutions shape norms as much as they coordinate policy. In this respect, the G20’s evolution signals a broader normative shift toward multipolarity and inclusive multilateralism. While challenges of fragmentation and geopolitical rivalry persist, the G20 represents an adaptive model of global governance—informal yet influential, flexible yet systemically indispensable in navigating twenty-first-century economic and developmental challenges.

From Westphalia to the United Nations: The Institutional Foundations of Global Governance

The evolution of global governance reflects a gradual transformation from balance-of-power diplomacy to institutionalized multilateralism. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia laid the normative foundation of sovereign equality and non-intervention, principles that continue to underpin international order. Yet early cooperation remained fragmented and largely bilateral, shaped by imperial hierarchies and strategic bargaining.

The 19th century marked a decisive shift toward structured multilateralism. The 1815 Congress of Vienna institutionalized collective security through great-power consultation, inaugurating the “Concert of Europe.” Functionalist cooperation expanded through bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Universal Postal Union, illustrating what David Mitrany later conceptualized as functionalism—cooperation in technical areas to reduce conflict.

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II exposed the limits of idealist multilateralism without enforcement mechanisms. Post-1945 reconstruction, particularly the Bretton Woods Conference, institutionalized economic governance through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The creation of the United Nations consolidated security, development, and human rights under a universal framework. Scholars such as Hedley Bull describe this as the emergence of an “international society,” while Robert Keohane underscores how institutions facilitate cooperation under anarchy.

Multipolarity, Informal Governance, and the G20

The 21st century has introduced transnational threats—pandemics, climate change, cyber insecurity—that transcend state-centric governance. The COVID-19 crisis and intensifying geopolitical rivalries have stressed institutional capacity, while debt distress across the Global South and climate finance gaps expose persistent inequalities. Regional bodies like the European Union and the African Union illustrate the layering of governance beyond the global level.

Simultaneously, emerging economies demand greater voice, challenging Bretton Woods-era voting structures. The Group of Twenty represents an adaptive response—an informal yet influential forum accounting for most global GDP and population. As scholars of global governance such as Ian Bremmer argue, the contemporary system reflects “G-Zero” tendencies, where no single power dominates, necessitating flexible coalitions.

However, concerns persist regarding the G20’s informality, lack of binding authority, and limited representation of smaller states. Current debates on reforming multilateral development banks and expanding representation highlight the urgency of institutional recalibration. Global governance, therefore, is not static but evolutionary—moving toward multipolar, networked, and inclusive frameworks that must reconcile legitimacy, effectiveness, and equity in an era of systemic transition.

India and the G20: Strategic Leadership and Global Advocacy

India’s participation in the Group of Twenty (G20) illustrates its emergence as a major economic and diplomatic power that not only advances its own interests but also pushes for a more inclusive global governance framework. As the world’s fastest-growing large economy, India leverages G20 platforms to strengthen sustainable growth, enhance economic security, and advocate for the developmental priorities of the Global South. Economists like Raghuram Rajan and Harsha V. Singh note that India’s economic rise is reshaping global policy discussions, and its performance in world markets underscores this influence.

At the 2025 G20 Johannesburg Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi articulated a forward-looking agenda rooted in inclusive and sustainable development, proposing six major initiatives: a Global Traditional Knowledge Repository, a G20–Africa Skills Multiplier Initiative, a Global Healthcare Response Team, a joint effort against the drug–terror nexus, a Critical Minerals Circularity Initiative, and an Open Satellite Data Partnership aimed at health resilience, knowledge sharing, and resource security. These proposals reflect India’s effort to broaden the scope of G20 cooperation beyond macroeconomic issues to dimensions like health preparedness and technology governance. 

India’s emphasis on equitable development and fair trade aligns with broader calls for reforming global trade governance to ensure that developing countries are not disadvantaged by protectionism or unequal standards. Through the G20, India has promoted transparent, rule-based trade frameworks that safeguard developmental space for emerging economies—even as global inflationary pressures and supply-chain vulnerabilities persist following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recent G20 deliberations have also reinforced India’s push for sovereign debt treatments and climate finance mechanisms that address the needs of low-income countries, strengthening the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment. 

In the past two months, India’s diplomatic engagements at the G20 have continued to emphasize solidarity, sustainability, and equity, with Prime Minister Modi participating in high-level discussions in South Africa and reinforcing cooperation on climate change, health governance, and digital inclusion—areas where India seeks a leadership role in shaping norms for a fairer global order.  Overall, India’s G20 participation portrays it not only as a key economic actor but also as a mediator between developed and developing nations, advocating for balanced policies that enhance inclusive growth and strengthen multilateral cooperation.

India’s G20 Presidency: Developmental Multilateralism and Strategic Assertion

India’s presidency of the Group of Twenty in 2023 marked a substantive shift toward inclusive, development-centric multilateralism amid geopolitical fragmentation and economic uncertainty. Framed around the civilizational motto “One Earth, One Family, One Future,” India positioned itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South. A major diplomatic achievement was the unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration despite divisions over the Russia–Ukraine conflict—demonstrating India’s consensus-building capacity. The inclusion of the African Union as a permanent G20 member significantly enhanced the forum’s representational legitimacy. India also foregrounded sovereign debt vulnerabilities, climate finance gaps, and reform of multilateral development banks, aligning discussions with ongoing crises in Africa, South Asia, and small island states. Scholars such as Harsh V. Pant interpret this presidency as India’s assertion of “issue-based leadership” in a multipolar order, balancing strategic autonomy with normative advocacy.

Beyond declarations, India introduced concrete initiatives with long-term implications. The Green Development Pact reinforced commitments aligned with the Paris Agreement, while the LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) movement emphasized sustainable consumption patterns. India institutionalized Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) as a global public good, offering its Aadhaar-UPI model as a template for financial inclusion in developing countries. Strategic geo-economic announcements—including the Global Biofuel Alliance and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—highlighted ambitions to reshape energy transitions and supply-chain connectivity, even as West Asian instability presents challenges to IMEC’s rollout. Additionally, initiatives on women-led development, disaster risk reduction, critical minerals, and pandemic preparedness broadened the G20 agenda beyond macroeconomics. Collectively, India’s presidency reflected an effort to democratize global governance, amplify Global South concerns, and reposition itself as a norm-shaping power in an increasingly fragmented international system.

African Union’s Inclusion in the G20: Structural Rebalancing and Emerging Agency

The permanent admission of the African Union into the Group of Twenty in September 2023 represents a structural recalibration of global economic governance. This decision addressed longstanding criticisms of representational asymmetry within major multilateral forums. Africa—home to over 1.4 billion people and central to global supply chains through its reserves of cobalt, lithium, and rare earth minerals—has become indispensable to discussions on energy transition and sustainable development. A current illustration of this relevance is the intensifying global competition over critical minerals for green technologies, where African states are negotiating more assertive terms with external partners. Additionally, ongoing sovereign debt restructuring negotiations involving African economies such as Zambia and Ghana highlight why African participation in G20 finance track deliberations is indispensable. India’s diplomatic leadership during its presidency played a catalytic role in securing consensus, reflecting a broader shift toward inclusive, multipolar governance.

However, the AU’s integration presents both opportunities and operational complexities. The Union must consolidate the diverse priorities of its 55 member states into coherent negotiating positions to exercise meaningful influence. At the same time, its presence strengthens Africa’s leverage in debates on climate finance implementation under the Paris Agreement, particularly amid ongoing global discussions on loss and damage funding mechanisms. Furthermore, renewed instability in regions such as the Sahel underscores the need for Africa’s voice in conversations on development-security linkages within the G20 framework. While broader membership may complicate consensus-building, the AU’s accession enhances the forum’s legitimacy, deepens South–South solidarity, and embeds African agency within the core of global macroeconomic governance. Ultimately, this development signals a transformative moment—shifting the G20 from elite economic coordination toward a more equitable and representative multilateral architecture.

Strategic Balancing and Contemporary Geopolitical Engagement

India’s presidency of the Group of Twenty illustrated a pragmatic strategy of multi-alignment—deepening ties with major powers while preserving strategic autonomy. Engagement with the United States intensified through cooperation on clean energy, semiconductor supply chains, and critical technologies under the broader Indo-Pacific framework. A recent example includes ongoing collaboration on critical and emerging technologies through the iCET framework, reflecting shared concerns over supply-chain resilience and technological security. Simultaneously, India revived trade negotiations with the European Union, with 2024–2025 ministerial rounds focusing on market access, digital trade norms, and sustainable development standards. Security coordination also advanced through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, where discussions increasingly center on maritime security and critical minerals—particularly relevant amid disruptions in Red Sea shipping routes that have affected global trade flows. These engagements demonstrate India’s ability to build flexible, issue-based coalitions in a fragmented global order.

Financial Reform, Debt Diplomacy, and Global South Advocacy

India leveraged the G20 platform to press for reform of the International Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks, advocating voice and quota revisions to reflect the economic weight of emerging economies. A current illustration of this agenda is the continued G20 deliberations on sovereign debt restructuring, especially in cases such as Zambia and Ghana, where coordination among creditors remains complex. India has emphasized responsible lending practices and faster implementation of the Common Framework to prevent prolonged fiscal distress in developing economies. Additionally, climate finance debates have intensified ahead of global climate negotiations, with India reiterating demands for predictable adaptation funding for vulnerable states under the Paris Agreement framework. Through these initiatives—combined with its earlier push for the inclusion of the African Union—India has positioned itself as a vocal advocate for equitable financial governance. While structural reforms remain politically contested, India’s diplomacy has reinforced momentum toward a more representative, development-oriented multilateral system.

Conclusion

India’s presidency of the Group of Twenty marked an important moment in the trajectory of contemporary multilateralism. The New Delhi Summit showed that consensus is still achievable despite deep geopolitical divisions, particularly over the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The unanimous adoption of the Leaders’ Declaration and the permanent inclusion of the African Union strengthened the forum’s representational legitimacy and underscored India’s role as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South.

At the same time, the presidency revealed structural constraints within the G20. While commitments were made on climate finance, debt relief, and multilateral development bank reform, questions remain regarding the scale of financial mobilization and the speed of implementation. In a global context shaped by restrictive monetary policies, sovereign debt distress, and slowing economic growth, effective follow-through will determine whether the summit outcomes translate into tangible progress.

India’s leadership advanced a development-focused agenda that emphasized inclusivity, equity, and institutional reform. However, the long-term impact of its presidency will depend on sustained cooperation among successive G20 chairs—particularly within the India–Brazil–South Africa Troika—and on the collective political will to convert consensus into concrete, measurable outcomes for global economic stability and sustainable development.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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