By: Ishan Singh

“To suppress free speech is a double wrong. It violates the rights of the hearer as well as the speaker” – Frederick Douglass

In September 2025, Nepal experienced a significant youth-led uprising. Gen Z protesters took to the streets to challenge the country’s entrenched political elite and demand change. Their nonviolent initiatives were encountered nationwide by social media shutdowns, curfews, and lethal force. The use of power and authority to suppress the youth led to significant tension and struggle between the young voices fighting for their demands and Government of Nepal.

International human rights law guarantees many rights to individuals, but in the digital age, these rights can be oppressed by various methods. Online platforms can be easily blocked and regulated by governments which can greatly impact online communication between individuals. The Gen Z protest in Nepal has revealed a serious issue which is, the enforcement of International human rights law in this digital era depends heavily upon the government, although there are Legal frameworks such as the ICCPR and UN standards, they frequently fail when governments use force to stifle dissent.

In this article, we will explore how international human rights law are unable to protect people’s freedom in the modern digital world. Nepal’s case highlights the pressing need for more accountability and legal frameworks that safeguard both offline and online freedom of expression. This article examines how the Nepalese government responded to the demands of their citizens by using force, suppressing digital rights, and toying with human rights legislation. It also demonstrates how citizens are left vulnerable by weak enforcement and also suggests the ways by which contemporary protests can be better protected by international law.

Immediate Causes of the Gen Z Protests in Nepal

The immediate cause of Nepal’s Gen Z protests was the government’s decision to ban 26 popular social media platforms. However, the deeper issues emerged from years of corruption carried out by those in power, high unemployment rate and a stagnant economy.

On 4th September 2025, the government suddenly banned social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, YouTube, and X, citing non-compliance of these platforms with the required registration. Young people in Nepal use digital platforms to communicate, to engage in learning, to do business, and to participate in civic life, and this decision was not received well in the public.

This digital crackdown revealed a broader frustration. For years, people have accused Nepal’s political class of corruption and poor governance. They enrich themselves while ordinary citizen’s struggle. Anger intensified with the viral “Nepo Kids” campaign, where politician’s children showcased their lavish lifestyles online. For many young Nepalis, this became the ultimate symbol of inequality. The privileged elite enjoy unchecked benefits while the majority face hardship.

Economic hardships had further increased the discontent among the young workforce, and on top of that the government did not show any efforts to address this. According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate for youth aged between 15 to 24 reached around 21% in 2024, one of the highest rates in South Asia. With few opportunities at home, many people depend on migration to neighbouring countries such as India because this became the only way to keep the wolf from the door. Remittances make up a large share of Nepal’s GDP, leaving the economy built on shaky ground and heavily reliant on money sent by workers abroad. This situation highlights the lack of real development within the country.

In this context, the ban on social media was not just a technical imposition of a new policy; it was the final blow for the youth to come out and call the government. To an entire generation that had grown up using social media platforms, it felt like an attack on their last bastion of resistance. Platforms that had been used to reveal corruption, voice concerns, and organize protests were suddenly blocked. Thus, the Gen Z uprising was not a reaction to a single government policy but rather a series of longstanding frustrations related to corruption, elite privilege, youth unemployment, and economic inequality, which had been made worse with time by the government which seemed to oppress the opinion of common people in both physical and digital spaces.

International Law Framework: Rights at Stake

The right to peaceful assembly is stated in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),  yet in Kathmandu and elsewhere, protesters faced curfews and reports of violent crackdowns. While international law allows restrictions on assembly, they must be necessary and proportionate. The UN Human Rights Committee has specifically warned states against blanket bans and to avoid the use of excessive force, since it attacks the basis of democratic participation. In Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom (1980), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) clarified that peaceful assembly encompasses not merely static gatherings but also participation in marches and processions.

Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression. This includes the right to seek, receive, and share information through any media of choice. Nepal government’s ban on major social media platforms directly impacted the young citizens ability to express criticism and mobilize. The Human Rights Council has confirmed that rights in the real world must also be protected online. By shutting down the channels where people voice dissent, Nepal effectively silenced free expression. The ECOWAS Court in SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria looked at Nigerian government’s decision to ban the social media platform ‘Twitter’. The court pointed out that modern technology allows for the sharing of ideas, views, and opinions, which supports freedom of expression. It also stated that access to Twitter is a “derivative right” that complements the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression.

Internet shutdowns represent a new challenge where international law is having trouble keeping up. Nepal’s reasoning that platforms did not register with authorities reflects a wider global pattern where governments use technical reasons to limit access, but their motives are clearly political. In Amnesty International v. Togo, the Court ruled that internet shutdowns implemented by the Togolese government in 2017 were illegal and held it as an unjustifiable violation, stating that online access improves expression and therefore needs legal protection.

Together, these episodes show how fragile protection of rights are in the digital age. The ICCPR and UN’s frameworks offer strong guarantees on paper, but enforcement is often depended on the government and to silence people, they usually don’t comply with these standards. Nepal’s case is a clear example that there is an urgent need for a binding global enforcement of fundamental human rights.

Enforcement Gap and Accountability Challenges

The ICCPR guarantees rights of freedoms of expression, assembly, and association to individuals, but their protection often rests on the state’s goodwill, leaving citizens at the mercy of governments. The concerned stakeholders can suggest solutions, yet their words are not binding and thus, carry no real weight. This gap between law on paper and rights in practice shows that promises without enforcement are useless.

Digital activism is a great medium to express dissent against governments, however, by pulling the plug on online platforms, governments can easily silence dissent against them. This tug-of-war between state sovereignty and global norms shows how vulnerable human rights are in 21^st Century and without sharper regional and global safety measures, states will continue to oppress both online and offline expression with little fear of consequences.

It is important to address these gaps and doing so will not only protect the rights of young people today but also stop states from using technology to undermine fundamental civic freedom. Nepal’s situation is a warning, showing the importance of respecting the autonomy of individuals and protect their basic rights, otherwise not doing the same could lead to dire consequences.

Recommendations and Forward-Looking Analysis

In order to address the gaps revealed by the Gen Z protests in Nepal, states should create clear legal protections for both online and offline expression. For instance, a guideline can be framed that would require any state-imposed digital restriction to be time-bound depending upon the situation like – Internet shut down for a period of maximum 3 months. Virtual restrictions should also be publicly justified – They should be implemented only in view of protecting public order, national security, preventing internal instability, etc.

These restrictions should also be subject to independent judicial review by an Independent and fair Judiciary and should be minimally restrictive which means that the government’s actions limit rights only as much as necessary to achieve a legitimate goal, without unnecessarily silencing basic human rights. This would ensure that genuine criticism is being heard by the government. International and regional institutions, such as the UN Human Rights Council, ASEAN or SAARC could each help hold states accountable in case of violation of rights.

Encouraging young people’s engagement must go beyond mere promises. Policies and programs should be open for young people in policymaking (subject to limitations) to create safe platforms for debate, thus providing young people a voice at the table and protection on the ground. This would ensure that young people have an opinion in the policies being made concerning them and would increase trust between them and the government. Understanding digital rights as a necessity and building participatory structures, would uphold human rights obligation.

Conclusion

Nepal’s scenario highlights the sharp gap between digital-age civic action and the enforcement of international human rights on the ground level. Online restrictions and violent crackdowns show how fragile freedom of expression and assembly really are today. Legal protections, recognition of digital rights, and creating spaces for youth to be involved will be critical to solving these issues. Nepal’s experience is a reminder that international law must evolve to keep fundamental freedoms of concerned individuals relevant in this increasingly interconnected world.

By: Kumar Aryan, Research Analyst, GSDN

The global semiconductor industry stands at an unprecedented inflection point where technological prowess directly translates to geopolitical dominance, economic supremacy, and military capability. As artificial intelligence revolutionizes computing, autonomous systems, and defense technologies, control over semiconductor manufacturing and design has transformed from a purely commercial competition into a full-scale technological war between the United States and China, with profound implications for global stability, supply chain resilience, and the distribution of power in the international system.

Strategic Importance and Market Dynamics

The semiconductor industry, valued at approximately US$ 681.05 billion in 2024 and projected to reach US$ 755.28 billion in 2025, represents far more than a commercial sector. Semiconductors constitute the foundational layer of artificial intelligence, 5G telecommunications, advanced defense systems, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and virtually every critical technology that will define the next decade. The global semiconductor market is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 15.4 percent, reaching approximately US$ 2,062.59 billion by 2032, indicating explosive expansion driven primarily by AI chip demand, data center infrastructure buildout, and emerging technologies.

Asia-Pacific dominates semiconductor production, accounting for 81.3 percent of global semiconductor market revenue in 2024, with the region projected to grow at 6.9 percent compound annual growth rate through 2030. Within this landscape, Taiwan commands a unique and increasingly vulnerable position as the world’s critical semiconductor chokepoint, while South Korea and Japan maintain essential roles in memory production and specialized materials.

United States Strategic Position and Policy Initiatives

The United States maintains substantial strategic advantages in semiconductor design, intellectual property, and fabrication technology, though this leadership has been steadily eroding across multiple dimensions. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, United States-based semiconductor companies held 50.2 percent of global market share in 2023, the highest of any nation’s semiconductor industry.

However, this apparent leadership masks concerning vulnerabilities. The United States currently controls approximately 12 percent of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity, down from 37 percent in 1990. This fundamental shift reflects decades of outsourcing and off-shoring to Asia, leaving the United States dangerously dependent on Taiwan and South Korea for advanced chip production.

In response to strategic vulnerability, the United States enacted the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022, representing the largest government industrial policy investment in decades. The legislation provides US$ 39 billion in direct subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing and US$ 13 billion for research and workforce training, bringing total semiconductor and related technology investments to approximately US$ 106 billion. The legislation includes 25 percent investment tax credits for semiconductor manufacturing equipment costs, creating powerful financial incentives for domestic production expansion.

As of December 2024, over US$ 32 billion of the US$ 39 billion designated for manufacturing incentives had been allocated. Intel received up to US$ 7.86 billion in direct funding in November 2024, in addition to US$ 3 billion for secure enclave programs, to support its US$ 100 billion investment in domestic manufacturing across Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. Texas Instruments announced US$ 1.61 billion in CHIPS Act funding in December 2024 to support three new 300-millimeter wafer fabrication plants in Texas and Utah.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company received US$ 6.6 billion in CHIPS Act funding in April 2024 to construct advanced fabrication capacity in Arizona, with construction slated to commence in 2028 for 2-nanometer process technology. Samsung Electronics secured up to US$ 6.4 billion in CHIPS Act funding to support expansion of its Austin semiconductor facilities and construction of a new advanced manufacturing plant in the United States.

These investments represent unprecedented commitment to reshoring semiconductor manufacturing, though implementation challenges remain substantial. United States manufacturing costs for advanced semiconductors remain 30 to 50 percent higher than equivalent Asian production, driven by elevated energy costs, labor expenses, and raw material expenses. Additionally, the United States faces severe talent shortages in specialized semiconductor manufacturing and engineering disciplines, requiring sustained workforce development investments.

China’s Strategy and Self-Sufficiency Drive

China has adopted a fundamentally different approach to semiconductor dominance, pursuing vertical integration across the entire semiconductor value chain while simultaneously implementing “Made in China 2025” policies explicitly designed to achieve technological self-reliance across semiconductors, advanced materials, and critical technologies.

China originally targeted 70 percent semiconductor self-sufficiency by 2025, though current assessments indicate China will achieve approximately 30 percent self-sufficiency by the end of 2025. However, this apparent shortfall obscures remarkable progress in specific semiconductor segments, particularly mature-node production where China has become increasingly competitive.

According to United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission analysis, China’s mature-node semiconductor capacity grew more than four times faster than global demand between 2015 and 2023. China is projected to account for nearly half of new mature-node capacity additions over the next three to five years, with China’s share of global mature-node production expected to expand from 31 percent in 2023 to 39 percent by 2027.

China’s primary chipmaker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), is developing advanced production capabilities targeting 5-nanometer class processes, potentially achieving true 5-nanometer capability by 2025 or 2026 despite persistent exposure to United States export controls on advanced manufacturing equipment. SMIC reportedly achieved 28-nanometer production yields exceeding 90 percent and is steadily advancing process technology despite restrictions preventing access to cutting-edge extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment manufactured exclusively by Netherlands-based ASML.

China made record purchases of foreign semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2024, spending over US$ 28 billion on equipment imports as officials accelerated domestic production expansion before anticipated further tightening of United States export controls. This extraordinary equipment procurement surge reflects China’s determination to acquire remaining equipment capable of supporting advanced node development before international restrictions become more comprehensive.

Taiwan’s Irreplaceable Role and Geopolitical Vulnerability

Taiwan has become the single most important semiconductor manufacturing location globally, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company commanding unprecedented market dominance that creates both strategic advantage and profound vulnerability.

TSMC secured a record 71 percent share of the global pure-play foundry market in the second quarter of 2025, up from 65 percent in 2024, according to TrendForce analysis. TSMC’s quarterly revenue surged to approximately US$ 32.47 billion by the third quarter of 2025, driven by explosive demand for advanced artificial intelligence chips, high-performance computing infrastructure, and mobile processors. The company’s dominance in 3-nanometer and leading-edge processes is unparalleled, with approximately three-quarters of TSMC’s revenue derived from nodes of 7-nanometers and below, and approximately one-quarter from 3-nanometer production.

TSMC’s competitive position reflects extraordinary technological achievement, sophisticated manufacturing operations, and unmatched capital investment. The company operates fabrication capacity exceeding 16 million 12-inch equivalent wafers annually, with facilities distributed across Taiwan, China, the United States, and Japan. TSMC announced new fabrication plants in Germany scheduled for commissioning in 2027, further diversifying production capacity.

However, TSMC’s concentration in Taiwan creates strategic vulnerability. Taiwan faces unprecedented geopolitical tensions as China continues military modernization and develops capabilities potentially enabling forced reunification or coercive scenarios. Academic research utilizing tabletop exercises and scenario analysis suggests that if China were to seek control over Taiwan, a quarantine approach targeting economic blockade would likely be adopted, with maximum effectiveness before 2027.

A Taiwan semiconductor supply chain disruption would inflict catastrophic damage on global technology industries. The entire advanced semiconductor supply chain depends on TSMC’s production, with major customers including Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, MediaTek, and Qualcomm. Disruption of TSMC’s 3-nanometer and 5-nanometer production would paralyze artificial intelligence chip supply, halt smartphone manufacturing, cripple data center expansion, and create cascading failures across dependent industries.

Taiwan’s leadership recognizes that semiconductor dominance constitutes a “silicon shield” providing strategic deterrence, yet simultaneously fears being “hollowed out” if excessive production relocates abroad. TSMC founder Morris Chang warned that excessive offshoring of Taiwan’s chip capacity could undermine the island’s strategic deterrent value by eliminating the unique concentration of advanced manufacturing capability unavailable elsewhere.

Advanced Node Competition: TSMC, Samsung, and Intel

The competition for supremacy in advanced semiconductor manufacturing has intensified dramatically as TSMC, Samsung Electronics, and Intel race to achieve leadership in the most technologically sophisticated nodes, where production expertise, yield rates, and capital investment determine competitive positioning.

TSMC commenced customer volume production of 2-nanometer chips in the second half of 2025, employing gate-all-around transistor architecture for the first time. The 2-nanometer process offers 10 to 15 percent better performance, 25 to 30 percent power reduction, and 15 percent increased transistor density compared to current 3-nanometer processes. TSMC has achieved yield rates exceeding 60 percent, crossing the threshold for stable volume production. According to TSMC Chief Executive Officer C.C. Wei, demand for 2-nanometer technology in the first two years is expected to exceed demand for 3-nanometer and earlier nodes.

Samsung Electronics initiated mass production of 2-nanometer chips in the second half of 2025, targeting production for its Exynos 2600 application processor for forthcoming Galaxy S26 smartphones expected in early 2026. However, Samsung faces significant manufacturing challenges, with reported yield rates approximately 40 percent, substantially below TSMC’s performance levels. Samsung was the industry’s first manufacturer to adopt gate-all-around architecture at 3-nanometer, but experienced low initial yield rates, illustrating the extreme difficulty of manufacturing at advanced technology nodes.

Intel, facing unprecedented competitive pressure and technical challenges, is betting its foundry business revival on an 18-nanometer process node branded as “18A,” positioned as approximately equivalent to competitors’ 1.8-nanometer capability. Intel has experienced substantial schedule delays in 18A development, with company officials acknowledging failure to deliver planned schedules. However, Intel maintains that 18A is now on track for high-volume manufacturing in the second half of 2025, with the company asserting it will soon challenge TSMC and Samsung in advanced nodes.

Intel’s new Fab52 facility in Chandler, Arizona, represents a Hail Mary effort to revive Intel’s manufacturing capabilities, with the facility comprising over one million square feet of cleanroom manufacturing space interconnected by 30 miles of overhead transport tracks. The plant is equipped with over 15 extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the most critical and expensive equipment in advanced chip fabrication. However, wafers produced on the 18A node have exhibited defects limiting yields, with Intel officials admitting yield remains a persistent concern at advanced nodes.

Supply Chain Control and Critical Chokepoints

The semiconductor supply chain contains several critical chokepoints where single companies or countries exercise near-monopolistic control over essential technologies, creating profound vulnerabilities and leverage points in the ongoing geopolitical competition.

The Netherlands’ ASML maintains a near-absolute monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography systems, the essential technology enabling production of nodes below 7-nanometers. ASML’s machines cost approximately US$ 120 to 150 million each and require extraordinary technical sophistication. The Dutch government, responding to United States pressure, has restricted ASML’s export of extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment to China, effectively constraining China’s ability to develop leading-edge chip production independently.

Japan dominates production of critical semiconductor materials including photoresists, silicon wafers, and rare-earth elements essential for chip manufacturing. South Korea controls a substantial share of dynamic random-access memory and NAND flash memory production through Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, creating additional vulnerability points.

China controls substantial reserves and refining capacity for rare-earth elements essential for semiconductor equipment, magnetic materials, and other critical technologies. China accounted for approximately 60 percent of global rare-earth element production and has increasingly weaponized export restrictions on these materials as leverage in geopolitical disputes.

The fragmented nature of semiconductor supply chains creates mutual vulnerability where no single nation or company can achieve complete independence, yet concentration in specific locations, particularly Taiwan, creates critical vulnerabilities threatening global technological systems.

Export Controls and Strategic Technology Restrictions

The United States has implemented increasingly stringent export controls targeting China’s access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence capabilities. The Department of Commerce imposed restrictions on exporting advanced computing chips exceeding specific performance thresholds, particularly targeting NVIDIA’s artificial intelligence accelerators destined for Chinese customers.

In response, China discouraged state-linked enterprises from purchasing NVIDIA’s H20 chip, designed specifically to meet United States export control thresholds while remaining legal for export. The deliberate rejection of nominally compliant technology demonstrated China’s determination to develop independent capabilities rather than accept compromised products.

In December 2025, the Trump administration announced a fundamental policy shift, authorizing conditional exports of NVIDIA’s H200 chip to approved Chinese customers in exchange for 25 percent revenue sharing with the United States government. Advanced Micro Devices was similarly authorized to export MI308 processors following Commerce Department approval. This policy reversal represents recognition that comprehensive export controls cannot indefinitely prevent China’s access to advanced semiconductors and reflects calculated judgment that controlled revenue-generating exports provide superior strategic outcomes compared to complete embargoes.

However, China has reportedly considered imposing restrictions on some approved chip imports while excluding them from domestic subsidy programs, indicating Beijing’s complex calculus regarding technology dependence versus strategic autonomy. This dynamic exchange illustrates the fundamental tension between commercial opportunity and strategic vulnerability driving semiconductor policy at the highest governmental levels.

Emerging Technologies: Quantum Computing and Next-Generation Semiconductors

Beyond conventional silicon-based semiconductor competition, emerging quantum computing technologies represent the next frontier of technological warfare where early advantages could yield irreversible strategic superiority.

China has mobilized state-scale investment and industrial coordination in quantum computing, achieving near-parity with the United States in superconducting quantum computer development while achieving leadership in quantum communications. In December 2024, China announced the Tianyan-504 superconducting quantum computer, with subsequent advancement to Zuchongzhi-3 featuring 105 qubits, becoming accessible to remote users via the Tianyan quantum computing network in October 2025.

The United States maintains distributed research efforts across universities, private companies, and government laboratories, with IBM releasing a 1,121-qubit chip and the Quantum Nighthawk processor featuring 120 linked qubits enabling computing requiring up to 5,000 two-qubit gates. Amazon, Microsoft, and others are pursuing alternative quantum computing architectures, potentially providing multiple pathways to quantum advantage.

China’s centralized, state-directed approach to quantum development provides advantages in concentrating resources and coordinating disparate efforts, whereas the United States’ decentralized model potentially provides advantages in spurring innovation through competition and diverse technical approaches. However, quantum technology remains nascent, with commercialization projected 5 to 10 years in the future, making current competition primarily focused on research dominance and foundational capabilities.

Current Status and Future Trajectory

As of December 2025, the United States retains technological leadership in advanced semiconductor design and specialized manufacturing, supported by renewed commitment through CHIPS Act investments and policy initiatives prioritizing domestic production expansion. However, this leadership faces erosion as China accelerates mature-node production and develops indigenous advanced capabilities despite United States export controls, while Taiwan’s concentration of advanced manufacturing capacity creates critical vulnerabilities threatening global technological systems.

The semiconductor war represents not a conclusion but rather an intensifying competition with no clear victor, where technological sophistication, capital investment, supply chain resilience, and geopolitical positioning determine outcomes across dimensions that reshape global economic and security relationships.

TSMC’s extraordinary market dominance, commanding 71 percent of pure-play foundry market share, creates overwhelming competitive advantage in artificial intelligence chips, the most commercially valuable semiconductor category. Yet this dominance remains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption, supply chain restriction, and the emergence of alternative suppliers developed through sustained Chinese and American investment.

The distributed geographic expansion of semiconductor manufacturing, with TSMC, Samsung, and Intel establishing new capacity in the United States, represents strategic response to geopolitical vulnerability. However, decades of outsourcing cannot be reversed through industrial policy alone, and manufacturing capacity developed today will require years to achieve maturity and competitive efficiency comparable to Asian production ecosystems.

Conclusion

The semiconductor war does not feature a clear victor but rather an evolving competitive landscape where different nations and companies dominate specific segments while facing distinct vulnerabilities across others. The United States maintains design and technology leadership but lacks manufacturing capacity; China rapidly expands production of conventional and mature-node chips while remaining constrained in advanced nodes; Taiwan commands unparalleled advanced manufacturing capability while facing extraordinary geopolitical vulnerability; and other nations including South Korea and Japan maintain critical roles in memory and specialized technologies.

The integration of semiconductor competition into broader United States-China technological rivalry ensures that semiconductors will remain at the center of national security strategy, industrial policy, and geopolitical positioning for the foreseeable future. The outcome of this competition will determine not merely commercial success but fundamental technological dominance, economic power, and strategic capability defining global security architecture in the artificial intelligence-driven era.

By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

A tremor runs through Mexico’s streets as the nation’s youth demand answers from those in power. Mexico is currently experiencing a roaring wave of unrest driven by political, security, and social pressures. A wave of youth-led demonstrations, sparked by public anger over persistent corruption, rising violence, and abuse of power has brought thousands of people to rally across the streets of major cities.

Simultaneously, the government has expanded security measures in response to escalating cartel activity, further stirring public debate over the state’s capacity to ensure safety and justice. Growing mistrust in institutions clubbed with economic grievances have created a volatile scenario where widespread frustration and calls for meaningful reform are evident. Underneath the visible demonstrations, the unrest in Mexico projects a deeper structural collapse that has been ongoing for years. Communities in several states are struggling with the growing reach of criminal networks nibbling at the social fabric from within.

Triggering point for the movement

The current wave of protest was triggered by the assassination of Uruapan Mayor Carlos Manzo. During a Day of the Dead event on November 1, 2025, Manzo was fatally shot at a festival. He had been vocal in his fight against organized crimes in Michoacan. Manzo was a firm critic of cartel violence. He gained attention for urging stronger action and criticizing Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum’s approach to handling crime.

Mexico’s security minister, Omar García Harfuch informed that the man suspected of orchestrating this attack has links to the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel. This particular cartel is notorious in this area for extorting money. Only a few months ago, Bernardo Bravo, a leader of lime growers in the violent western Mexican state of Michoacan, was killed after taking stand against extortion demands by criminal groups. His death has quickly fuelled momentum among protesters in Michoacan, with many arguing that his killing projects the government’s inability and possibly unwillingness to curb cartel violence.

However, beyond Manzo’s murder, this momentum has ignited a deeper sense of frustration among young Mexicans. Particularly, the presence of Generation Z (Gen Z) protesters, joined by university students, young professionals, and established civil society organisations, is expressly visible. The activities carried out under the banner of Generacion Z Mexico. They organise quickly through social media, use digital tools to coordinate protests, and rely on decentralised systems rather than traditional leadership structures. The majority of the protesters have firsthand experience with limited job security, rising living costs, and a widening gap between promises and reality.

Rise of organised crimes in Mexico

Organised crimes in Mexico is a longstanding phenomenon. It is beyond a criminal problem for many living in Mexico— it is a structural, political and societal obstacle that unfortunately shapes national life, governance and public trust. It has become one of the major causes instigating public unrest, political debate and demands for profound reforms. Mexico has been suffering from the influence of dozens of powerful criminal organisations, most notably the Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, among others. Such groups function across multiple states and maintain networks that extend into the U.S. and other continents as well. Their activities are not at all just limited to drug trafficking. They control arms trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, fuel theft, smuggling, illegal mining, and local taxation of businesses. Through their power and influence, they create such an environment where most of these crimes go unpunished, which means, cartels face little legal consequence.

Cartel influence, in particular has further hollowed out governance in many regions. Organized crimes exerts more power than elected authorities, shaping local economies, intimidating societies, and undermining the rule of law. These complications are exacerbated by weak institutions. Police forces struggle with capacity and trust, the judiciary is plagued by delays and impunity, and oversight bodies are vulnerable to political interference. The protesters are using Manzo’s death to highlight wide-ranging problems such as corruption, impunity, and insecurity.

What Gen Z wants

The Gen Z protesters demand reforms to hold political authority accountable, moreover, their plan goes beyond the traditional movements of the past. They are also pushing for reforms that could strengthen people’s participation in governance. They seek judicial transparency and apparatuses that would enable ordinary citizens, not just political parties or elites, to initiate institutional assessments and challenge administrative actions to demand transparency from elected officials. This involves audits of public spending, direct evaluate public spending, influence over urban planning, and scrutiny of security policies that affect their society at large. The protesters are clear about their message: “We are not for any party. We are for Mexico.”

What propels Gen Z to gather in the streets is a belief that Mexico’s future is slipping away unless they raise their voice or take action. This sense of vulnerability has gradually deepened distrust in local authorities. As a result, ordinary citizens, like farmers, health workers, and others, fear that anything could happen to them and no action will be taken by the authority. Such a perspective has left many convinced that they must cope with daily risks without any state protection.

Throughout the process, the organisers frequently asked people to remain calm and keep the demonstrations peaceful. However, there have been incidents of clashes between protesters and security forces. The protests convey both anti-government sentiments and, at the same, time a desire to rebuild government institutions. They demand that the government take more efficient actions to protect citizens, uphold the law and order, curb corruption and crime. However, many protesters precisely demanded the removal of the president, blaming her for persistent violence. Gen Z protesters hold the view that political institutions neither reflect their needs nor protect their communities, and they argue that public mobilisation is the only means to push for change.

Government stance

This amalgamation of a high-profile political assassination and longstanding institutional failures has stimulated the Mexican youth. President Sheinbaum’s administration, however, sees the protests as part of an “inorganic, paid” campaign planned by her opponents. Police actively engaged in breaking up protests escalated near government infrastructures, detaining participants and identifying groups of individuals who were provoking hostilities.

The government has responded in different ways, using both heavy security measures alongside political messaging to contain the crisis. The Mexican government launched a new initiative, “Michoacán Plan for Peace and Justice,” that includes an action plan focused on three strategic pillars— primarily centered around security and justice, economic development, and social development. In the presence of President Sheinbaum, the Secretary of National Defense, Ricardo Trevilla Trejo, announced the “Paricutín” security plan, launching a major security operation in Michoacán. Thousands of personnel from the Army, Air Force, and National Guard were deployed, with the aim of “sealing off the state” and preventing criminal groups from moving in and out of Michoacán. The Paricutín Operations also will involve the expansion of the Anti-Extortion Unit.

The plan places a special emphasis on the economic dimension. The government aims to create new opportunities, generate employment, and productive investment in the state as part of its economic strategy. It also includes security measures to protect key production zones, such as avocados and citrus, so farmers can operate without the constant fear of extortion. The initiative proposes a social development program for the state. The social policy actions are meant to rebuild trust in authority and reduce fear and community dependence on criminal groups.  

External Influence

The external elements/influences on Mexican Gen Z protests can be generally categorized into global connections and social media influence. There have been claims of foreign financial and political elites’ involvement. President Sheinbaum has directly pointed out that the movement was “promoted from abroad against the government.” She further added that the demonstration is being promoted on social media by bots operating from outside the country.  According to an official fact-checking agency, Infodemia, the key sponsors of the march include billionaires and prior political leaders of the state.

Over the span of the last few years, several states have experienced youth-led protest. The protest in Bangladesh in 2024 are widely known as the first successful Gen Z protest, inspiring Nepal, and have since spread to the Philippines, Morocco, Madagascar, and many more. The adoption of symbols like the “Straw Hat Pirate’’ flag from a Japanese anime “One Piece” is a pure external influence. This symbol has been used in other global youth protests to represent resistance.

Some analysis also speculates that the demonstrations have a “Pro-USA” angle, as protesters call for US intervention in Mexico. Moreover, some particular international organizations, far-right groups like the NGO Atlas Network, have been mentioned by government officials as being involved in promoting anti-government sentiment among people.

Future perspective

Mexico is apparently experiencing a tense environment, combining sensitive security operations and public suspicion. The government has intensified deployments in sensitive regions and adopted firmer security strategies in major cities, in order to reassert control. This could temporarily reduce nationwide protest, but risks a backlash. Public opinion may polarise further as other competing narratives develop about whether the protests should represent civic activism or destabilising forces.

Over time, the momentum of the demonstrations may reduce or channel in different ways. Simultaneously, the political landscape may shift as opposition groups, independent actors and youth-driven platforms attempt to alter electoral or civic influence. Looking at the present landscape, a second large-scale protest against Claudia Sheinbaum has shown significantly fewer participants and lower energy than the first wave, according to a November 23, 2025 media report. Nevertheless, the situation in Mexico is neither clear nor settled. Analysts warn that, as long as local institutions continue to be vulnerable to intimidation or penetration, security operations possibly have limited impact. These dynamics together, have shaped a tense national atmosphere where calls for reform strategies are intensifying.

By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

Ever since Bangladesh became a sovereign state on December 16, 1971, following a turbulent and transformative war of independence founded on the ideals of democracy, secular values, nationalism, and social equity, the nation has been witnessing a spate of attacks on Minorities specially Hindus since the government change happened on August 05, 2024.

The nation’s Constitution promises equal treatment under the law, freedom of faith, and fundamental liberties for all citizens. Yet, despite these constitutional guarantees, religious and ethnic minority groups in Bangladesh continue to endure insecurity, prejudice, and occasional violence. These difficulties are neither random nor isolated; they are firmly rooted in the country’s political and electoral framework.

The persecution of minorities in Bangladesh has consistently escalated during times of political unrest and electoral rivalry. This recurring trend highlights a crucial link between defective democratic practices and communal vulnerability. In the absence of transparent, fair, and inclusive elections, the safeguarding of minorities remains weak, and democratic legitimacy remains incomplete.

Minorities in Bangladesh: Demographic Presence and Political Precariousness

Religious and ethnic minorities in Bangladesh, such as Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and indigenous groups, continue to face political and social fragility despite constitutional promises of parity and religious liberty. Their smaller population size, territorial clustering in specific areas, and restricted participation in governing bodies expose them to greater dangers during times of political turmoil and electoral rivalry. Elections often sharpen partisan divisions, and minority populations are frequently viewed as sympathetic to certain political factions, leaving them vulnerable to harassment, aggression, and pressure. This climate discourages genuine political involvement and erodes trust in democratic institutions.

Structural deficiencies further intensify minority insecurity. Security forces frequently fail to act decisively against assaults, while sluggish inquiries and a lack of responsibility enable offenders to operate without consequence. Economic disadvantage, especially uncertainty over land rights and limited access to public resources, adds to these difficulties by weakening minorities’ ability to obtain protection or justice. Collectively, these conditions perpetuate a cycle of marginalization and vulnerability, underscoring that safeguarding minorities in Bangladesh is inseparable from the necessity of transparent, equitable, and inclusive elections that guarantee equal political participation and reinforce democratic values.

Electoral Violence and the Historical Targeting of Minorities

Political unrest tied to elections has been a persistent element of Bangladesh’s political sphere, with minority groups repeatedly suffering a disproportionate burden. Periods around national polls often bring heightened political strain, breakdowns in public order, and mobilization of party-based factions. In such unstable conditions, religious and ethnic minorities are frequently singled out because of assumed political loyalties or their demographic clustering in particular constituencies. Election-related aggression has included assaults on households, places of worship, businesses, and individuals, creating an atmosphere of fear that stifles civic participation.

Past experience reveals a strong connection between defective or exclusionary elections and the persecution of minorities. Polls lacking competitiveness, openness, or broad participation weaken democratic legitimacy and sharpen political divisions. In these contexts, minority groups are often scapegoated as symbols of opposition or blamed for electoral outcomes. The absence of effective accountability mechanisms enables aggressors to act with near impunity, perpetuating cycles of insecurity and violence.

The enduring consequences of electoral violence go beyond immediate harm. Repeated exposure has led to displacement, migration, and demographic decline among minority populations, reducing their political influence over time. Fear of retaliation discourages minorities from exercising their voting rights freely, undermining the principle of equal suffrage. This pattern highlights the urgent need for transparent, fair, and inclusive elections to break the cycle of violence and ensure the safety, dignity, and political inclusion of minority communities in Bangladesh.

Political Exploitation of Identity

The manipulation of identity has played a major role in shaping electoral violence and the targeting of minorities in Bangladesh. Religious and communal identities are frequently harnessed by political leaders to rally support, discredit rivals, or sway electoral outcomes. In this process, minority groups are depicted not as equal citizens but as political symbols linked to opposition parties or foreign interests. Such portrayals intensify social divisions and turn political competition into communal conflict, especially during election periods.

During electoral struggles, identity-based mobilization becomes a calculated tactic to intimidate voters and tighten control over constituencies. Minority communities, because of their smaller numbers and geographic clustering, are particularly exposed to this strategy. Acts of aggression, threats, and property destruction are employed to silence minority participation and reshape local power balances. This exploitation of identity undermines democratic principles by replacing policy-centred competition with fear-driven politics.

The widespread acceptance of identity-based political methods carries long-term consequences for social harmony and democratic resilience. When political success depends on communal polarization, trust between groups deteriorates and opportunities for inclusive dialogue shrink. Minorities increasingly retreat from political involvement, reinforcing their exclusion. Confronting this challenge requires dismantling the political incentives that encourage identity-based mobilization and strengthening democratic institutions that foster inclusive, issue-oriented electoral competition.

Institutional Fragility and the Cycle of Impunity

Weakness within institutions has been a key factor enabling violence against minority groups in Bangladesh, especially during times of political unrest and electoral rivalry. Law enforcement bodies often lack autonomy, resources, or political support to act quickly and fairly in response to assaults on minority communities. Delayed actions, biased application of laws, and poor investigations create conditions where victims receive little protection while offenders face few repercussions. This fragility erodes public trust in the state’s ability to deliver justice and uphold social stability.

The collapse of accountability systems has cultivated a culture of impunity that sustains recurring violence. When offenses against minorities remain unpunished, it signals that such acts are either tolerated or politically advantageous. This perception emboldens aggressors and discourages victims from reporting abuses, further weakening the rule of law. Over time, repeated failures to secure justice normalize violence and embed discriminatory practices within local power structures.

The broader consequences of institutional weakness extend beyond immediate safety concerns. Ongoing impunity undermines democratic legitimacy and deepens minority estrangement from political institutions. Without reliable legal remedies, minority groups increasingly view the state as indifferent or complicit in their exclusion. Reinforcing institutional autonomy, ensuring accountability, and rebuilding confidence in the justice system are therefore vital steps toward ending abuses and creating an inclusive democratic framework in Bangladesh.

Socioeconomic Exclusion and Land Instability

Economic and social exclusion has greatly increased the fragility of minority groups in Bangladesh, particularly through ongoing insecurity over land. Past land regulations and administrative practices led to widespread dispossession of minority populations, especially Hindus, whose property was often transferred or seized through both legal and extra-legal means. Although certain corrective measures were introduced over time, uneven implementation and weak enforcement have allowed land disputes to remain a persistent source of vulnerability for minorities.

In rural Bangladesh, land ownership is deeply tied to social standing, financial stability, and political influence. For minority groups, the loss of land often means the loss of livelihood, restricted access to loans, and heightened reliance on local elites. During times of political unrest or elections, this dependence is exploited through intimidation, coercion, or forced displacement. Land grabbing and property-related violence frequently escalate during electoral periods, further undermining minority security.

Wider socioeconomic exclusion reinforces political marginalization. Limited access to public resources, education, and employment opportunities reduces minorities’ ability to pursue legal protection or organize collectively. Economic hardship discourages resistance to injustice and weakens participation in democratic processes. Tackling land insecurity and socioeconomic inequality is therefore crucial to breaking the cycle of exclusion and ensuring that minorities can engage in political life on equal and secure terms.

Why Transparent, Equitable, and Inclusive Elections Are Crucial

Transparent, equitable, and inclusive elections are vital for protecting minority rights and reinforcing democratic governance in Bangladesh. Polls that are open and competitive guarantee that political authority stems from genuine public approval rather than coercion or exclusion. When all citizens, including minority groups, can participate without fear of intimidation or violence, elections serve as a channel for peaceful political expression instead of a spark for conflict. Inclusive electoral practices lessen political polarization and reduce incentives for leaders to exploit communal identities for strategic advantage.

Inclusive elections also strengthen representation and accountability. Minority populations are more inclined to take part in democracy when they trust that their votes count and their voices are echoed in decision-making bodies. Authentic elections compel political leaders to respond to the needs of all communities, including marginalized groups, rather than relying solely on majority support. This broad-based accountability reinforces constitutional principles and upholds the idea of equal citizenship.

Furthermore, the credibility of elections directly influences institutional stability and the rule of law. Governments established through transparent and fair electoral processes enjoy stronger legitimacy, enabling them to govern more effectively and safeguard minority rights. In contrast, defective or exclusionary elections weaken democratic institutions, diminish public trust, and foster conditions where violence and impunity thrive. Guaranteeing transparent, fair, and inclusive elections is therefore not merely a democratic ideal but a necessary foundation for ending abuses and promoting long-term social harmony in Bangladesh.

Electoral Validity and Democratic Responsibility

The validity of elections is a foundation of democratic responsibility and plays a vital role in safeguarding minority rights in Bangladesh. When polls are carried out in a transparent, competitive, and inclusive way, the resulting government gains its authority from the genuine approval of the people. This legitimacy reinforces the ethical and political duty of elected officials to govern for the benefit of all citizens, including marginalized and minority groups. Authentic electoral outcomes lessen political disputes and discourage the use of violence as a method of asserting power.

Democratic responsibility is closely tied to the reliability of electoral procedures. Administrations that arise from free and fair elections are more attentive to public oversight and institutional checks. Representatives are compelled to address governance shortcomings, uphold constitutional guarantees, and respond to grievances, since their political survival depends on popular support. For minority communities, this accountability opens pathways to seek justice, influence policy, and demand protection through democratic channels rather than resorting to protest or withdrawal.

By contrast, elections viewed as defective or exclusionary weaken accountability systems and concentrate authority in the hands of a small political elite. Such conditions reduce incentives for inclusive governance and heighten the risk of rights violations going unchallenged. The decline of electoral validity erodes confidence in democratic institutions and deepens minority estrangement. Reinforcing electoral legitimacy is therefore crucial to restoring democratic responsibility and ensuring that the state remains answerable to all sections of society.

Institutional Autonomy and Upholding the Rule of Law

The autonomy of institutions is crucial for the proper functioning of the rule of law and for safeguarding minority rights in Bangladesh. Democratic bodies such as the election commission, judiciary, police, and civil service must operate free from political interference to guarantee impartial decisions. When these institutions remain independent, they can apply laws fairly, investigate violations, and provide equal protection to all citizens, including vulnerable minority groups. Institutional freedom is therefore vital for sustaining public trust in the justice system.

Weak institutional autonomy undermines the rule of law and fosters conditions where abuses thrive. Political influence over policing and judicial processes often leads to selective enforcement, delayed inquiries, and biased judgments. For minorities, this results in restricted access to justice and protection. The perception that institutions serve political agendas rather than constitutional principles erodes confidence and discourages victims from reporting crimes or seeking remedies.

Strengthening institutional autonomy reinforces democratic governance and electoral credibility. Independent institutions are better positioned to supervise elections, settle disputes, and hold offenders accountable regardless of political ties. A strong rule of law curtails impunity, deters violence, and ensures rights are consistently upheld. By protecting institutional independence, Bangladesh can bolster democratic stability and create a safer environment for minority communities.

Global Attention and Democratic Expectations

Global focus on Bangladesh’s democratic processes reflects wider concerns about governance, human rights, and regional stability. As an important player in South Asia with rising economic and strategic significance, Bangladesh’s political direction is closely monitored by neighboring states, international organizations, and global rights institutions. Matters relating to electoral credibility, political inclusion, and minority protection are often regarded as indicators of the nation’s adherence to democratic standards and constitutional principles.

The international community’s democratic expectations stress the need for free, fair, inclusive, and participatory elections. Genuine electoral practices enhance Bangladesh’s global legitimacy and bolster its diplomatic reputation. In contrast, polls seen as exclusionary or defective can attract criticism, weaken trust among development partners, and hinder economic cooperation. International involvement in this regard is not purely punitive but often intended to encourage institutional reforms and democratic strengthening.

Safeguarding minorities holds a central position within these democratic expectations. Global norms increasingly connect minority rights with democratic governance and the rule of law. When minority groups experience violence or exclusion, it raises alarms about democratic regression and institutional fragility. By maintaining inclusive electoral standards and protecting minority rights, Bangladesh can reinforce its international credibility, deepen global partnerships, and affirm its dedication to democratic values and social harmony.

Conclusion: Democracy as the Pathway to Minority Protection

The persecution of minorities in Bangladesh is closely tied to its political and electoral system. History shows that flawed elections, exclusionary politics, and weak governance foster violence and discrimination. Free, fair, and inclusive elections are therefore essential, not optional.

Protecting minorities requires reforms that ensure inclusivity, accountability, and justice. When all citizens, regardless of religion or ethnicity, can participate safely and meaningfully, Bangladesh moves closer to fulfilling the ideals of its liberation struggle. Strong democratic processes also build legitimacy, reduce impunity, and create trust in institutions.

Ultimately, democracy must serve as both a mechanism for leadership and a safeguard for minority dignity. By embedding inclusivity and accountability, Bangladesh can break cycles of marginalization and build a stable, just, and cohesive future.

By: Sk Md Assad Armaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

In December 2025, the United States Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China introduced a subtle but significant shift in how Beijing’s territorial priorities are understood. For the first time, China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh referred to by Beijing as “South Tibet” were placed within the language of core interests. This categorization carries major strategic weight. In Chinese strategic doctrine, “core interests” are not negotiable claims; they are issues over which Beijing reserves the right to use all instruments of national power, including military force.

Until now, this category had been reserved for Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and certain maritime claims. The inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh signals an important escalation. For India, this development marks a change in the nature of the boundary dispute. What was previously managed as a contested border issue rooted in colonial-era ambiguity is now being elevated by China into a matter of sovereignty, regime legitimacy, and national rejuvenation. This shift has profound implications for India’s security posture, diplomatic strategy, and long-term approach to managing China along the Himalayan frontier. China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh are not new.

Since the 1950s, Beijing has rejected the McMahon Line and maintained that the region is part of “South Tibet.” However, for decades, this claim was largely reinforced through diplomatic protests, symbolic renaming of places, and limited military signaling. What distinguishes the present moment is not the claim itself, but its elevation within China’s strategic hierarchy. This mirrors China’s approach to Taiwan, where sovereignty claims are framed not as territorial disputes but as unfinished historical missions central to Communist Party authority. Once an issue is placed within this category, compromise becomes politically costly, if not impossible. For India, this marks a decisive narrowing of diplomatic space. The Pentagon’s 2025 report notes that Beijing increasingly frames territorial disputes through the lens of national rejuvenation and regime legitimacy. By categorizing Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest, China is effectively asserting that the issue is central to the Communist Party’s authority and historical narrative. This mirrors the logic applied to Taiwan, where sovereignty claims are linked directly to the survival and credibility of the Chinese state.

This shift narrows diplomatic space. Core interests are, by definition, non-comprisable. Dialogue can manage escalation, but it cannot resolve the underlying claim. For India, this means that border agreements, and disengagement mechanisms while still necessary are no longer sufficient to stabilize the dispute in the long term. In Chinese strategic thinking, core interests justify the use of all instruments of national power, including military force, if sovereignty is perceived to be threatened. By elevating Arunachal Pradesh to this category, Beijing is signaling that future tensions along the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control may no longer be treated as peripheral or negotiable. Instead, they risk becoming embedded within China’s broader project of regime legitimacy and national rejuvenation.

Militarization Without War

The implications of this reclassification are already visible on the ground. Over the past few years, China has invested heavily in border infrastructure opposite Arunachal Pradesh. Advanced airfields, logistics hubs, civilian infrastructure, and road networks have significantly improved the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to mobilize forces rapidly. Unlike earlier phases of border tension, this build-up is not episodic or reactive; it is structural and permanent. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report highlights that the People’s Liberation Army is increasingly oriented toward rapid mobilization, joint theatre command integration, and localized conflict along disputed borders.

The Eastern Theatre Command, responsible for operations opposite Arunachal Pradesh, has received sustained investment in airlift capability, logistics infrastructure, and intelligence-surveillance assets. This suggests that preparedness in the eastern sector is no longer contingency planning but a standing operational priority. The Pentagon report highlights China’s emphasis on rapid mobilization, integrated joint operations, and localized conflict readiness along disputed borders. Arunachal Pradesh, with its strategic depth, proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, and terrain advantage for the defender, occupies a critical place in this calculus. By elevating the region to core-interest status, Beijing signals that military preparedness here is not contingency planning but strategic necessity.

For India, this transforms the Line of Actual Control into an arena of constant strategic friction. Even without active conflict, the requirement to maintain high levels of readiness imposes economic, logistical, and political costs. The risk is not immediate war, but sustained pressure where crisis becomes the norm rather than the exception. China’s interest framing also operates in the political and psychological domains. Symbolic actions such as renaming locations in Arunachal Pradesh, issuing standard maps that incorporate Indian territory, and amplifying claims through state media serve a strategic purpose. They normalize China’s claim domestically while testing India’s diplomatic responses internationally. Over time, such symbolic repetition risks shaping international perceptions, particularly among states that seek neutrality in India–China tensions.

If left uncontested, these narratives can gradually shift the framing of the dispute from one of contested sovereignty to one of assumed Chinese legitimacy. For India, the challenge lies in countering narrative erosion without amplifying Beijing’s signaling. These actions are designed to create narratives. By repeatedly asserting sovereignty claims, Beijing seeks to present the dispute as settled in principle, even if unresolved. Over time, such repetition risks shaping international perceptions, particularly among countries that prefer neutrality in India–China tensions. For India, the challenge lies in preventing narrative erosion. Silence risks normalization, while overreaction risks escalation. Maintaining a consistent diplomatic posture that reaffirms sovereignty without amplifying Chinese signaling is now an essential component of India’s China strategy.

Strategic Implications for India’s Security Posture

The elevation of Arunachal Pradesh to core-interest status has direct consequences for India’s defense planning. First, it reinforces the need for permanent force deployment rather than rotational presence along the eastern sector of the LAC. Second, it increases the importance of air power, surveillance in a region where terrain heavily shapes operational outcomes. Third, it complicates India’s broader China strategy. Arunachal Pradesh cannot be treated in isolation from developments in Ladakh, the Indian Ocean, or the Indo-Pacific. China’s approach reflects a pattern of multidirectional pressure where pressure in one theatre is calibrated alongside signaling in others.

Pressure along Arunachal Pradesh cannot be viewed independently from Chinese activity in Ladakh, the Indian Ocean Region, or the Taiwan Strait. Land-based pressure along the Himalayas complements maritime signaling and diplomatic assertiveness elsewhere, creating a cumulative effect on India’s strategic bandwidth. This makes integration between India’s continental defense planning and Indo-Pacific strategy increasingly unavoidable. India must therefore integrate its continental and maritime strategies rather than viewing them as separate domains. Importantly, this also affects civil–military coordination. Infrastructure development, population retention, and economic integration in border regions are no longer developmental choices alone; they are strategic imperatives. A populated, connected, and economically resilient Arunachal Pradesh strengthens India’s deterrence posture without relying solely on military means.

Diplomatic Constraints and the Limits of Engagement

China’s core-interest framing also constrains diplomatic engagement. Border talks, military hotlines, and working mechanisms remain essential for crisis management, but they operate within increasingly narrow parameters. When one party views an issue as existential, compromise becomes politically costly. For India, this raises a difficult question: how to engage without legitimizing an escalated claim. The answer lies in separating crisis management from dispute resolution. While India must continue engaging to prevent miscalculation, it must also prepare for a prolonged period in which the dispute remains structurally unresolved. India’s reluctance to internationalize the boundary dispute stems from a desire to preserve strategic autonomy and prevent external mediation. However, selective signaling through partnerships can still reinforce deterrence without formal internationalization. Quiet alignment with like-minded states serves to raise the geopolitical costs of unilateral revisionism while maintaining diplomatic restraint. This places greater emphasis on coalition diplomacy. While India has avoided internationalizing the boundary dispute, the strategic environment is changing. Without making Arunachal Pradesh a bargaining chip, India can still reinforce its position through partnerships, signaling that unilateral revisionism carries broader geopolitical costs.

A Structural Shift, not a Tactical One

China’s designation of Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest marks a structural shift in the India–China relationship. It transforms a territorial dispute into a question tied directly to Beijing’s vision of national rejuvenation and strategic control. For India, this does not imply inevitability of conflict, but it does mean permanence of pressure. Managing this challenge will require patience, consistency, and strategic clarity. Military preparedness must be matched with political restraint, infrastructure development with diplomatic steadiness, and regional engagement with global partnerships.

Arunachal Pradesh is no longer just a frontier region; it has become a central node in the evolving Asian balance of power. The key question for India is not whether China’s claims can be immediately countered, but whether India can sustain long-term deterrence without allowing escalation to define the relationship. In an era where borders are increasingly shaped by power rather than treaties, sustaining deterrence in such an environment will depend less on dramatic responses and more on India’s capacity for endurance, institutional resilience, and strategic consistency over time. How India responds to this redefinition of Arunachal Pradesh may well shape the future stability of the Himalayan order.

By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The rise of China as the manufacturing powerhouse of the world constitutes one of the most dramatic economic transformations of the contemporary world. In less than five decades, China transformed itself from an agrarian and inward-looking economy into the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for nearly a third of global manufacturing output. Chinese factories, today, dominate global supply chains in everything from low-cost consumer goods to high-end electronics, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies. This manufacturing surge has reshaped not only international trade patterns but also global power dynamics.

The role of manufacturing in China’s rise exceeds economic growth. Manufacturing formed the backbone of China’s export-oriented development model, a source of employment for hundreds of millions, and the foundation for technological advancement and military modernisation. As global politics becomes increasingly shaped by supply chains, industrial capacity, and technological leadership, understanding how China surged in manufacturing is essential to understanding the basic contours of contemporary geopolitics. This article argues that China’s manufacturing predominance grew through deliberate state-led reforms, strategic global integration, labour and infrastructure advantages, and long-term industrial planning, all transforming economic strength into strategic power.

Historical Context: China Before Economic Reform

Until the late 1970s, China’s economy was dominated by a highly rigid, centrally planned regime under Mao Zedong. Most industrial output was produced under state control, where ideological ambitions took precedence over efficiency and innovation. For the most part, in terms of scale, quality, and technological levels, manufacturing output was low in China, while that country remained relatively closed to international markets. The absence of competition, weak incentives, and partial integration with international trade led to low productivity and stagnation in industrial growth.

It was apparent by the mid-1970s that China had dramatically lagged behind advanced industrial economies and several developing ones. Manufacturing served domestic consumption, rather than export markets, and technological capabilities were severely constrained. In fact, industrial capacity was further weakened by the failure of the Great Leap Forward and disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. This background thus made it plain that without fundamental reforms, China was destined to be an economically peripheral country. The requirement for transformation set the stage for a historic shift in economic strategy.

Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms and the Opening-Up Policy

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which began in 1978, represented a decisive break from Maoist central planning and laid the foundation for China’s manufacturing rise. Deng refocused priorities in China from ideological purity to economic pragmatism, growth, productivity, and modernization. His famous principle – “It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” caught this pragmatic approach.

These reforms introduced market mechanisms within a socialist framework: state control was gradually relaxed, enterprises were given greater autonomy, profit incentives were introduced, and private entrepreneurship was cautiously allowed. Most importantly, China adopted a gradual and experimental reform strategy, testing policies in limited regions before expanding them nationwide. This avoided economic shocks and ensured political stability.

The Opening-Up Policy encouraged foreign trade, investment, and technological transfer. China opened coastal regions to international markets, invited foreign firms, and integrated into international production networks. These reforms then transformed China into an export-oriented manufacturing economy, where, in return, its rapid industrial growth could be achieved alongside strongly maintained state oversight. Deng’s reforms thus created the institutional and policy foundation for China’s emergence as a global manufacturing powerhouse.

The Role of State and Industrial Policy

Contrary to most developing countries relying on the free-market mechanisms, China followed state-led development. The Chinese state took a central and decisive role in driving the manufacturing surge through proactive industrial policy and long-term planning. In contrast to market-driven development models, China opted for the development state model, wherein the government played an active leading role in guiding industrial development and providing scope for market mechanisms under such controlled settings. Manufacturing had been marked as a strategic national priority, which was to be associated with economic growth, employment, and national power.

It was through the Five-Year Plan that the state identified the priority sectors, set production targets, and coordinated investment across regions. State-owned enterprises were retained and strengthened in strategic industries like steel, energy, transport, and heavy machinery, ensuring control by the state over key inputs. Simultaneously, private and foreign firms were allowed to compete in non-strategic sectors to create scale and efficiency.

The state also supported manufacturing through subsidies, tax incentives, cheap credit from state-owned banks, land access, and export support policies. Local governments were active in developing industrial clusters and infrastructure. This coordinated state-market model gave policy stability, a reduction of risks for investors, and the rapid scaling up of manufacturing with technological upgrading in China.

Special Economic Zones and Foreign Direct Investment

One of the most innovative tools in China’s manufacturing strategy was the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have played a decisive role in China’s manufacturing surge by acting as gateways for foreign capital, technology, and global integration. Since the late 1970s, China has established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou, providing advantages of tax incentives, simplified regulations, flexible labour policies, and export-oriented infrastructure. Deliberately positioned along the coast, these zones are meant to enable trade and attract multinational corporations.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowed into Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as global firms sought low-cost production bases with reliable infrastructure and policy stability. In return, China accesses not only the capital but also advanced technologies, managerial expertise, and international standards of production. China was able to learn from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through joint ventures, subcontracting, and supplier relationships in order to gradually move up the manufacturing ladder.

Importantly, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) served as experimental laboratories for market-oriented reforms: successful policies were later extended nationwide, enabling China to scale industrial growth without destabilizing the broader economy. Integrating China into global value chains, SPECIAL Economic Zones (SEZs) transformed in from a peripheral producer into a central hub of global manufacturing.

Labour Advantage and Demographic Dividend

The labour comparative advantages and demographic dividend have strongly supported the rise of manufacturing in China. Throughout the several decades, the Chinese had a large working-age population and surplus rural labour that could be absorbed at relatively low wages into factories. Large-scale rural-to-urban migration supplied the manufacturing hubs with a disciplined and abundant workforce. That allowed firms to keep their operations low in cost and high in volume, with China becoming very competitive, especially in labour-intensive industries like textiles, electronics assembly, and consumer goods.

The demographic dividend, the proportion of the working-age population being much higher compared to dependents-boosted productivity and economic growth. The State simultaneously invested in basic education, vocational training, and skill development, leading to gradual improvement in the quality of labour. The country could thus move progressively from simple assembling work to more complex manufacturing processes.

The combination of low labour costs, workforce discipline, and improving skills let China dominate world manufacturing during its era of rapid growth. Now, this comparative advantage is starting to erode with rising wages and an ageing population, pushing China towards automation and higher-value production.

Infrastructure and Logistics Revolution

The large-scale manufacturing surge in China was led by an equally large-scale state-led infrastructure and logistics revolution. Realizing above all that efficient infrastructure in central to industrial competitiveness, the Chinese government invested massively in ports, highways, railways, airports, and power generation, and in industrial corridors. These investments drastically reduced transportation costs, delivery times, and supply-chain bottlenecks, therefore making large-scale manufacturing feasible and efficient.

Large, modern ports like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Ningbo developed into some of the busiest in the world, enabling easy integration with sea routes serving international trade. Networks of high-speed rail and expressways linked inland production centres to coastal export hubs, including manufacturing well past a few coastal cities. Reliable electricity supplies, industrial parks, and export-processing zones also facilitate uninterrupted production.

This logistics efficiency enabled just-in-time manufacturing and rapid export fulfilment, which attracted multinational firms seeking reliability and scale. Whereas in most developing countries, a poor infrastructure strategy created a strong backbone for years of sustained manufacturing expansion and dominance in global supply chains.

World Trade Organisation (WTO) Accession and Export-Led Growth

China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 marked a defining moment in its manufacturing rise. For China, membership meant that it had gained predictable and legally secured access to major global markets in particular, the United States and the European Union. With this development, trade uncertainty decreased, investor confidence increased, and the pace at which global manufacturing was relocating to China quickened. Chinese exports also expanded rapidly, with falling tariffs and the stabilization of trade rules in sectors such as electronics, textiles, machinery, and consumer goods.

World Trade Organisation (WTO) integration allowed China to implement an export-oriented growth model in which manufacturing exports emerged as the leading locomotive for economic growth. The large trade surplus translated into huge foreign exchange reserves, bolstering the fiscal and financial capacity of the state. These resources, therefore, were reinvested in infrastructure, industrial upgrading, and technological development, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of growth within the manufacturing sector. In addition, conformity to the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) regulatory standards compelled China to rationalise its institutional environment and be more competitive. All in all, World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession transformed China from a regional Producer into a cornerstone of the global manufacturing system.

Technological Upgradation and Moving Up the Value Chain

The technological upgradation has been central in the transition of China from a low-cost manufacturing base to high-value production. Starting off with labour-intensive assembling, China gradually developed research and development, automation, and advanced skills so that its dependency on foreign technology decreased. State-led initiatives like Made in China 2025 have a strategic focus on areas such as semiconductors, robotics, aerospace, electric vehicles, and renewable energy.

Through sustained public investment, technology transfer from foreign firms, and the emergence of national champions such as Huawei, Build Your Dreams (BYD), and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL), Chinese manufacturers have climbed global value chains, from basic assembly to design, branding, and innovation. Automation and artificial intelligence have further raised productivity, compensating for increasing labour costs. This process has had strategic implications given that control over advanced manufacturing enhances economic resilience, military capability, and geopolitical influence. China’s technological upgrading has therefore heightened global competition, especially with the United States, and has made manufacturing and technology core to contemporary power politics.

Manufacturing, Economic Power, and Strategic Influence

The foundation of China’s economic and strategic power has been its manufacturing strength. Large-scale manufacturing allowed for sustained export-led growth, amassing enormous foreign exchange reserves and fiscal capacity. This economic surplus made available to the Chinese state the wherewithal for heavy investment in infrastructure, technology, and military modernisation, directly linking industrial capacity with national power.

Manufacturing dominance also meant the building of global supply chain dependence, with China acquiring structural leverage over other economies. Many countries rely on Chinese inputs for electronics, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy equipment, and consumer goods, thus enhancing Beijing’s bargaining power in trade and diplomacy. The interdependence has strategic implications, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and recent supply chain disruptions.

At the geopolitical level, manufacturing has emerged as a national security asset. Control over advanced manufacturing, such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and telecom equipment, translates into technological leadership and military advantages. This is why China’s industrial rise has triggered strategic competition with the United States, including trade wars, export controls, and efforts to restrict China’s access to critical technologies. In other words, China’s manufacturing surge turned economic strength into strategic influence, drastically changing the contours of global power.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Sustainable Concerns

Despite the overall success of the model, huge challenges lie ahead. For one thing, rapid industrialisation has brought severe environmental degradation, raising serious questions about sustainability. Increasing wages and an aging population are eating into China’s low-cost labour advantages; thus, some firms have already begun shifting their production to other developing countries. Centrally guided expansion has also been associated with industrial overcapacity and high levels of local government debt, thus lowering efficiency. China also faces intensifying trade tensions, export controls, and supply-chain diversification efforts, especially from the United States and its allies.

In addition, reliance on foreign technology in strategic areas, such as semiconductors, presents strategic vulnerabilities. In all, these issues indicate that whereas China remains a powerhouse in manufacturing, sustaining dominance will need technological innovation, greener production, and structural reforms. Finally, critics question whether China’s state-led model of manufacturing is sustainable in a more complex, innovation-driven global economy. Although state coordination was useful in catch-up industrialization, excessive intervention may suppress innovation, competition, and efficiency in the advanced sectors.

The challenge for China is how to rebalance the role of the state: to provide strategic guidance while allowing market forces to drive innovation. How successfully China navigates this transition determines whether its manufacturing dominance is sustainable in the long term.

Comparative Perspective: Why China Succeeded Where Others Did Not?

Most developing countries that attempted industrialisation failed to achieve the same success as China. China benefited from a particular set of conditions that included: strong state capacity, policy continuity, massive domestic market size, and favourable timing within an era of globalisation. Massive investment in infrastructure, stable industrial policies, and integration into global value chains allowed firms to achieve economies of scale. Unlike fragmented or inconsistent reformers, China maintained a long-term commitment to manufacturing as a national priority.

These, in turn, have prevented countries like India and those in Latin America from fully taking advantage of the forces of globalisation due to infrastructure deficits, regulatory complexity, or political instability. China also had the benefit of timing. Industrialisation occurred at a period when the West was offshoring production as part of globalisation. Most countries had to bear fragmented governance, policy reversal, weak infrastructure, and premature deindustrialisation. The ability to coordinate policy across levels of government and integrate manufacturing with the national strategy sets China apart from most peers.

Conclusion

China’s rise in manufacturing is a product of conscious reforms, state-led industrial policy, global integration, labour, infrastructure advantages, and sustained strategic planning. Manufacturing was the bedrock of China’s economic ascendance and became one of the most important sources of national power. Today, China’s industrial might defines global trade, energizes technological competition, and shapes geopolitical dynamics, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

As global politics increasingly revolves around supply chains, technology, and economic resilience, China’s manufacturing story is a critical lesson for developing economies and policymakers alike around the world. Manufacturing is not just an economic sector; it has been a strategic asset for the reshaping of global power structures. China’s case displays how industrial capacity, allied with long-term vision and state capacity, can change a nation’s standing in the international system.

By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

The National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) is a crucial United States law passed annually by Congress that sets defence policy, priorities and funding levels for the Department of War (DoD) and related agencies, authorizing spending for the upcoming fiscal year, with the latest being the FY 2026 NDAA signed by President Donald Trump in December 2025. It is an annual bill for the US Department of Defence and other agencies involved in national security such as Energy, State, Homeland Security, etc. Traditionally passed every year for more than six decades, the NDAA is far more than a budgeting exercise. It articulates United States’ geopolitical objectives, shapes partnership mechanisms, and serves as a barometer for America’s strategic vision globally.

The FY 2026 NDAA, signed by President Trump on December 19, 2025, builds on this by emphasizing “Peace through Strength”, funding the Department of War and national security programs while prioritizing Indo-Pacific alliances. These acts mandate reports on defence cooperation and integrate partners like India into supply chain security. The NDAA is the primary legislative instrument through which the US Congress directs national defence policy. While the language of the Act covers appropriations for military personnel, equipment procurement, research and development, and readiness, it simultaneously enunciates strategic priorities such as including foreign partnerships, alliance frameworks and emerging technology cooperation. In its FY 2026 iteration, the NDAA not only authorises funding for the Pentagon and related national security agencies but also advances policy language reinforcing US strategic competition with China and Russia. A significant component of this strategic emphasis involves strengthening defence alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, with a specific emphasis on India.

Implications for India

India, being one of the major emerging global powers and a central player in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, will have extensive implications of this Act such as spanning diplomatic influence, security cooperation, industrial partnerships, and broader balance of power in the region. National Defence Authorization Act deepens engagement with India through the Quad, aiming to counter China’s influence, and supports Taiwan’s defence. The NDAA calls for increased participation of Indian defence forces in bilateral and multilateral exercises with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia. This includes deepening cooperation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework. NDAA iteration counters China’s influence by bolstering Quad partnerships like US, India, Japan, Australia. The 2026 version urges expanded joint exercises, maritime security, and defence trade with India to ensure a free Indo-Pacific. Such expanded military interaction improves interoperability between Indian and U.S. forces. This is particularly important for combined operations involving humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or maritime security missions.

There will be explicit support of India in Indo-Pacific strategy. The NDAA articulates a clear sense of Congress that the United States should broaden engagement with India as a core partner in realising a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This broad language encompasses not only enhanced military cooperation but a shared vision of regional stability and deterrence against coercive policies by China. With a vast coastline commanding critical sea lanes and an expanding military footprint, India’s geographical position makes it a vital partner in United States’s Indo-Pacific strategy for years to come. Provisions promote interoperability, such as integrating defence industrial bases with India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea for supply chain resilience. This responds to threats from unmanned systems and AI subversion by adversaries. Earlier NDAA amendments, like FY 2020 proposals, mandated US reports on India-US defence ties in the Indian Ocean, reinforcing shared interests. Recent acts extend this to AI-enabled weapons and counter-drone capabilities, inviting Indian collaboration. Formalising collaborative mechanisms is also an essential part of the act.

One of the concrete provisions in NDAA calls for the establishment of a joint consultative mechanism between the United States and India to assess and work through impediments to nuclear cooperation, specifically India’s nuclear liability framework. This issue has long been a stumbling block for expanded civil nuclear cooperation, which American firms have viewed as a deterrent to investment without liability protections aligned to international norms. The Act requires the Secretary of State to submit detailed assessments on this mechanism to Congress, ensuring accountability and sustained political attention. Furthermore, the NDAA directs enhanced roles for strategic dialogues, notably the US–India Strategic Security Dialogue, positioning this as a vehicle for general diplomatic and defence cooperation beyond traditional bilateral channels. The Act encourages expanded defence trade including sales and broader technology collaboration, which could translate into access for India to advanced United States military platforms and systems.

India has already emerged as one of the largest importers of US defence equipment, from Apache helicopters to advanced avionics, but the NDAA’s framework now fosters not just sales but potentially co-development and co-manufacture opportunities, in line with India’s Make in India initiatives. This could extend to cutting-edge domains such as naval platforms, next-generation fighter technologies, and advanced missiles, subject to mutually agreeable terms on technology transfer and industrial collaboration. Beyond military exercises and sales, the FY 2026 NDAA reflects a strategic emphasis on defence industrial base cooperation among Indo-Pacific partners. The Act proposes initiatives to strengthen cooperation across defence manufacturing supply chains, research and development networks, and interoperability frameworks. India, placed among priority partners including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, is expected to participate in a Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, a long-term initiative to secure supply chains and co-create defence industrial capacity. Given global disruptions in defence supply chains in recent years, such cooperation is critical for ensuring that partner nations are not left vulnerable by unilateral dependencies, whether in hardware components, semiconductor technologies, or logistics infrastructure. For India, this opens potential avenues to integrate its own defence industry, including private sector entities, into multinational value chains.

However, significant policy alignment and capability building will be necessary to transform these prospects into real industrial outcomes. One of the geopolitically consequential provisions of the NDAA is the direction for a joint consultative mechanism to assess India’s civil nuclear liability regime. India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) has historically been a barrier to large-scale U.S. nuclear reactor exports due to concerns about supplier liability and risk allocation. By legislating a mechanism to assess and potentially align India’s liability rules with global norms, the NDAA clears a path for deeper nuclear collaboration, both for clean energy and dual-use technology cooperation. While the NDAA does not create binding alliance commitments like NATO treaties, it actively shapes a collective deterrence architecture in the Indo-Pacific by promoting multilateral integration, especially through the Quad. By explicitly calling for cooperation not just bilaterally but within the Quad format, the Act affirms that India’s role is not peripheral but central to collective strategic planning. Given India’s complex relationships, including military ties with Russia, this balancing act will be crucial as the strategic climate evolves.

Nevertheless, the NDAA signals that US views India as a cornerstone partner in its regional strategy, not simply another client state. India’s defence procurement has historically been diversified, with significant equipment sourced from Russia, Europe, and increasingly the United States. The NDAA’s push for closer integration with US defence industries potentially accelerates this diversification. Yet practical challenges remain, such as technology transfer negotiations, supply chain logistics, and interoperability concerns can slow implementation. Successful collaboration in high-tech domains such as AI-enabled systems, secure communications, and hypersonic weapons, would require robust institutional frameworks between Indian and US stakeholders.

Challenges

India’s foreign policy tradition emphasises strategic autonomy, avoiding formal alliances that could constrain independent decision-making. The NDAA’s provisions, while supportive, risk perceptions that India might be drawn closer into American strategic frameworks, potentially complicating its relations with other major powers like Russia. Navigating these expectations will require diplomatic finesse, leveraging US cooperation where it aligns with India’s interests, while maintaining autonomous policy posture in global issues where convergence is limited. The Act’s encouragement of co-development and industrial cooperation faces practical barriers. Trust, intellectual property concerns, and regulatory mismatches can slow joint ventures, especially in sensitive areas like defence electronics or aerospace. Moreover, ensuring India’s defence industrial base can absorb and scale advanced technologies will be a long-term endeavour necessitating consistent policy support from both governments.

In an era where geopolitical competition is intensifying, driven by China’s assertiveness and shifting global power equations, the NDAA underscores a unique moment in India–US relations, with implications that will reverberate for years to come.

By: Tushar Jain, Research Analyst, GSDN

The question of whether the Islamic State (ISIS) is regaining a foothold in Syria continues to draw global attention. More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and over five years since ISIS lost its territorial “caliphate,” the group remains a persistent concern for policymakers, security analysts, and local populations alike. While headlines often suggest a dramatic resurgence, the reality is far more layered and complex. ISIS today is not the same organization that once ruled large parts of Syria and Iraq, yet it has not disappeared from the regional landscape either.

This dual reality creates confusion. On one hand, the group no longer controls cities, collects taxes openly, or governs millions of people. On the other, it continues to carry out attacks, maintain underground networks, and exploit political instability. The persistence of ISIS raises an important question: is the group regaining strength, or is it merely surviving in a weakened but dangerous form?

This article examines whether ISIS is truly re-emerging in Syria, the nature of its current operations, and the political, social, and security conditions that allow it to endure. It also explores the broader regional and international dynamics that shape Syria’s future and influence the long-term trajectory of extremist movements. The aim is to present a grounded and factual assessment without exaggeration or alarmism.

Understanding ISIS: From State-Building to Survival

To understand ISIS’s present condition, it is necessary to revisit its past. Between 2014 and 2016, ISIS reached an unprecedented level of power for a non-state armed group. It controlled vast territories across Syria and Iraq, including major cities such as Raqqa and Mosul. At its peak, ISIS governed millions of people, operated oil fields, imposed taxation systems, ran courts, and maintained police forces. It also developed a sophisticated propaganda network that attracted thousands of foreign fighters from across the world.

This period represented the height of ISIS’s ambition to establish a so-called caliphate. Its governance model relied on extreme violence, ideological indoctrination, and strict social control. However, this same brutality also mobilized an international military response.

By 2019, sustained military operations by the US-led coalition and local partners, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), dismantled ISIS’s territorial control. The fall of Baghuz marked the symbolic end of the caliphate. Yet, while territory was lost, the organization itself did not vanish.

Instead, ISIS adapted. It shifted from a state-like entity to a decentralized insurgent network. This transformation allowed it to survive military defeat by reducing its visibility and avoiding large-scale confrontations. Understanding this strategic shift is essential to evaluating ISIS’s current threat.

The Current Landscape in Syria

Syria today remains one of the most fragmented states in the world. More than a decade of conflict has left the country politically divided, economically devastated, and socially fractured.

The Syrian government, backed primarily by Russia and Iran, controls most major urban centres and western regions. Kurdish-led forces, supported by the United States, dominate much of northeastern Syria. Turkish-backed opposition groups maintain influence in parts of the north, while various militias and armed factions operate in contested zones. This fragmented control has produced governance gaps that are difficult to manage and easy to exploit.

ISIS operates mainly in central and eastern Syria, particularly in the vast desert region known as the Badia. This area stretches across multiple provinces and offers ideal terrain for insurgent activity. Its remoteness, sparse population, and limited state presence make surveillance and security operations challenging.

From these areas, ISIS conducts ambushes, assassinations, and sabotage operations. Targets often include Syrian government forces, allied militias, and occasionally local leaders accused of cooperating with authorities. These attacks are designed less to capture territory and more to demonstrate survival, weaken morale, and maintain relevance.

Crucially, ISIS does not currently govern towns or cities. Its influence is tactical rather than territorial, reflecting a significant reduction in its overall power.

Nature of ISIS Operations Today

ISIS today operates as a low-intensity insurgency. Its activities are calculated, limited, and designed to minimize risk while maximizing symbolic impact. Typical operations include:

• Attacks on military checkpoints and patrols
• Assassinations of local officials, tribal leaders, or informants
• Planting roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices
• Night-time raids and hit-and-run attacks

These operations rarely result in large territorial gains but serve strategic purposes. They reinforce the group’s image as an active force, help maintain internal morale, and attract attention from supporters and potential recruits.

Unlike during its peak years, ISIS avoids prolonged engagements with heavily armed forces. This reflects both its reduced capacity and a deliberate strategy of survival rather than expansion. The organization has learned from its past losses and now prioritizes endurance over dominance.

Detention Camps and the Risk of Radicalization

One of the most serious long-term challenges in Syria is the situation in detention camps such as Al-Hol and Roj. These camps house tens of thousands of individuals, including women and children linked to ISIS fighters.

Living conditions in these camps are extremely poor. Overcrowding, limited access to education and healthcare, and weak security structures have created an environment ripe for radicalization. Reports suggest that hardline ISIS supporters continue to enforce ideological discipline within the camps, intimidating others and spreading extremist beliefs.

Children growing up in these conditions face severe psychological trauma and lack exposure to alternative worldviews. Many have known nothing but conflict and extremist ideology. Without proper rehabilitation and reintegration programs, these children risk becoming the next generation of militants.

The international community has struggled to address this issue. Many countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens due to political and security concerns. As a result, the camps remain overcrowded and unstable, representing one of the most serious long-term security threats linked to ISIS.

International Military Presence and Its Limits

The United States and its coalition partners maintain a limited military presence in northeastern Syria. Their objectives include supporting local forces, preventing an ISIS resurgence, and securing detention facilities.

However, this presence is politically sensitive and inherently fragile. Domestic pressures, regional tensions, and shifting foreign policy priorities could lead to a reduction or withdrawal of forces. History has shown that sudden power vacuums in Iraq and Syria often lead to rapid security deterioration.

At the same time, military presence alone cannot resolve the deeper causes of instability. Without political reconciliation, economic recovery, and inclusive governance, military operations serve only as temporary containment measures.

Is ISIS Gaining Strength?

In terms of manpower, finances, and territorial control, ISIS is significantly weaker than it was during its peak. It no longer controls oil fields, major population centres, or significant revenue streams. Its leadership has been repeatedly targeted, and its communication networks face constant surveillance.

However, weakness does not mean irrelevance. ISIS remains capable of carrying out deadly attacks and inspiring violence beyond Syria’s borders. Its ability to adapt, decentralize, and exploit instability ensures its continued presence.

Therefore, while ISIS is not “back” in the sense of rebuilding a caliphate, it is also not defeated in any final or absolute sense.

The Role of Regional and Global Politics

Regional and international politics play a decisive role in shaping Syria’s future and ISIS’s prospects. Competing interests among global and regional powers often undermine coordinated stabilization efforts.

Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States pursue overlapping but often conflicting objectives. These rivalries complicate governance, delay reconstruction, and weaken institutional capacity. In such an environment, extremist groups can exploit grievances and insecurity.

Economic collapse further worsens the situation. Sanctions, war damage, corruption, and lack of investment have devastated Syria’s economy. High unemployment and poverty create fertile ground for radicalization, particularly among young people with limited opportunities.

Media Narratives and Public Perception

Media coverage of ISIS often oscillates between alarmism and neglect. Isolated attacks may be framed as signs of resurgence, while long-term structural issues receive less attention.

This distortion can shape public opinion and policy in unhelpful ways. While it is important not to underestimate the threat, exaggeration can also lead to short-term, reactionary decisions rather than sustainable solutions.

A balanced understanding recognizes that ISIS remains a security concern but not an existential threat comparable to its peak years.

Comparing Past and Present Capabilities

At its height, ISIS operated like a proto-state, controlling territory the size of a small country. It managed oil production, taxation systems, courts, and a global propaganda apparatus. Tens of thousands of foreign fighters joined its ranks.

Today, its capabilities are vastly reduced. Fighters operate in small cells, funding is limited, and communication is constrained. Yet, history shows that insurgent movements can persist for decades if underlying grievances remain unaddressed.

Preventing a Future Resurgence

Preventing ISIS from rebuilding requires a comprehensive approach beyond military action:

• Political Stability: Inclusive governance that addresses grievances and restores trust.
• Economic Recovery: Investment, employment, and basic services to reduce desperation.
• Rehabilitation Programs: Education and reintegration for former fighters and affected families.
• Regional Cooperation: Shared responsibility among global and regional actors.
• Long-Term Security Planning: Avoiding abrupt withdrawals that create power vacuums.

Without addressing these structural issues, any military victory will remain temporary.

 

Conclusion

ISIS today is a shadow of its former self, but shadows can still cast fear. The group is not regaining territorial control in Syria, nor is it close to rebuilding a caliphate. However, it continues to exploit instability, weak governance, and unresolved humanitarian crises.

The true danger lies not in ISIS’s current strength, but in the conditions that allow it to endure. Syria’s prolonged instability, economic collapse, and political fragmentation create an environment where extremist ideologies can survive and adapt.

Defeating ISIS permanently requires more than airstrikes or counterterrorism raids. It demands long-term commitment to governance, justice, and social recovery. Until those deeper challenges are addressed, ISIS may remain weakened—but it will not fully disappear