By: Meghna Dasgupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

South Asia is a home to nearly 2.04 billion people, and is marked by its rich cultural diversity and complex socio-political landscape. The region faces several external as well as internal issues which has often threated its stability and has caused significant unrest. Factors like colonial baggage, ethnic and religious divides, and border disputes remain the most significant problems in South Asia. The partition of British India in 1947, which led to the creation of the independent states of India and Pakistan resulted in communal violence of unprecedented level, displacement of millions, and left a feeling of antagonism over territorial dispute over Kashmir. The Kashmir conflict remains a trigger for both the nuclear armed states even today, with both the countries striving for control over the region. Conflict between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka had resulted in a civil war that lasted for almost three decades. Similarly, Pakistan continues to struggle with sectarian violence between the Shia and Sunni Muslims causing tensions and unrest. Hindus and Muslims in India have often engaged in riots which has been further exacerbated by political actors, and information warfare.

The recent political upheaval in Bangladesh, which resulted in the dramatic ousting of Sheikh Hasina further highlights the political instability in the region. Sheikh Hasina has however claimed that this upheaval was the result of a foreign interference. This political instability in Bangladesh will likely cause security and economic difficulties for India. Pakistan has also been struggling with economic inefficiencies since the 2022 flood, and had sought help from the IMF and bilateral creditors. The 2024 elections in Pakistan were marred by allegations of irregularity and lack of fairness. The influence of the military remained significant, which further orchestrated various aspects of the election. Terrorism in Pakistan has worsened since the Taliban came to power in the neighbouring Afghanistan and the collapse of ceasefire with Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP).

Sri-Lanka has been struggling with economic hardships, and the recent elections are a hope towards a more stable economy, that promotes sustainable and inclusive growth. This election aims to attract investors, so as to help quarter of 22 million population raise out of poverty. In 2023, Nepal faces its first recession in over six decades. Nepal is also under scrutiny for still discriminating against women, even after amending its citizenship law in 2023. According to UNICEF, 33 percent of girls and 9 percent of boys are married before the age of 18 (Human Rights Watch , 2023).The rate of child marriage is believed to have increased during the pandemic. India has been facing criticisms for its subtle shift towards right-wing politics, and nationalistic Hindutva ideologies. This has caused a feeling of insecurity among the religious minorities. The 2023 Manipur clashes further exasperated the tensions. 2023-2024 has been the year of elections, or campaigning for several South Asian countries, and the chaos and struggles during this period raises the question whether democracy is struggling in South Asia or not.

The colonial past of South-Asia has set a precedence for its contemporary challenges. The strategy of “divide and rule” led to ethnic and religious tensions, particularly between the Hindus and the Muslims. The 1947 partition sowed distrust, and animosity between India and Pakistan, leading to the long-standing violent rivalry. This remains a major source of instability in South Asia. Similarly, the arbitrary drawing of Durand line between Pakistan and Afghanistan during the colonial era has remained a source of tension between both the countries. One of the most persistent problems in South Asia is the territorial disputes. The 2020 border dispute between India and Nepal in the Lipulekh-Limpladora-Kalapani region has harmed the long-standing ties between the two countries. The conflict worsened the personal relationship of both the countries, leading to hostile feelings. Areas of dispute like Kashmir, Siachen Glacier, Aksai Chin, Sir Creek, and Doklam has been a reason for contention between countries like India, Pakistan, Bhutan, and China (Nayak, 2023). These grievances and disputes are fueled nationalism, geo-political factors, and historical grudges. China plays a significant role in the dynamics of South-Asia. The Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI) increased China’s presence in South Asia. The BRI serves a way for China to ensure economic development in Asia. Nepal who has been historically dependent on India, views China as a new partner, and an alternative to its dependence on India. Thus, the 2020 standoff was viewed by several scholars as an outcome of growing Chinese influence in South Asia. China is trying to challenge the Indian sway in the region. China has also established a strategic post at Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. The recent military pact between Male and China, and withdrawal of Indian troops from Maldives is also a concern for India and USA. Pakistan is a key partner in China’s BRI project. This new-fashioned Cold War has had profound impact on the regional dynamics of South Asia, threatening its internal stability.

Terrorism poses one of the most significant threats to the stability of South Asia. The South Asian countries have not been able to create a “truly pluralistic society”. Pakistan in particular has been the breeding ground for several terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). These groups have been the perpetrators of terror and violence not only in Pakistan, but in the neighboring South Asian countries as well. Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia have been accused of funding extremist movements in the region. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and its subsequent withdrawal from the country had long lasting impacts on the regional security of Soth Asia. Political Instability still remains a major source of concern in the region. Nepal transitioned from a monarchy to a republic in 2008, after decades of Maoist insurgency. However, the region’s political landscape is still not stable, and undergoes frequent government changes. Bangladesh is currently struggling with severe political turmoil. The protests against job quotas steamrolled into a much broader movement which has led to the ousting of Sheikh Hasina. Her sudden exit will have far reaching consequences on the bilateral relation of Bangladesh with its South Asian neighbors. Amidst the ongoing struggle, transboundary water cooperation between India and Bangladesh is a critical area that needs attention.

Poverty and unemployment remain one of the most critical factors contributing to instability in South Asia. Countries like Afghanistan and Nepal remain plagued by poverty. 20 percent of the population in South Asia still lives under the international poverty line (TM Tonmoy Islam). This fuels social discontent and distrust. The rise of Taliban and Mujahedin, and the subjugation of Rohingyas in Myanmar led to mass migration to the neighboring South Asian countries, particularly Bangladesh. This creates a security dilemma, which further increases tension. South Asia’s reaction to mass exodus has always been positive despite its own complex ethnic structure. The region is extremely susceptible to natural disasters like cyclone, floods, and droughts. These have become more frequent in the past few decades. Countries like Bangladesh and Maldives faces existential threats from rising sea levels. South Asia is an agriculture intensive region, thus making this region extremely susceptible to climate change. Both India and Pakistan are still grappling with water crisis, which further exacerbates the difficulties regarding the sharing of Indus River water.

Unrest and Instability in South Asia is a result of several complex factors like poverty, political instability, colonial baggage, territorial dispute, terrorism, weak civil institutions, environmental challenges, and geo-political rivalries. The consequences of the instability are far reaching, and have an impact on world politics as well. A stable South Asia is crucial for development of India. India’s Neighborhood First Policy, and institutions like SAARC play a significant role in mitigating the tensions in the region. Peaceful relationship and synergetic co-development of the South Asian countries should be the ultimate goal.

By: Samadrita Goswami

Afghanistan has always been a fragmented state lacking little to no centralised authority. Afghanistan only came to be recognised as a sovereign state in 1919 after the Third Anglo-Afghan war.  Considering the geographic location, it was considered as a strategic buffer zone to the British, which was separating British India from Czarist Russia. The post-World War II era saw the beginning of bloc politics started between the US and the USSR and Afghanistan was brought in the middle of a new ‘Great Game’. Afghanistan, along with being a scattered state, came to be the most affected in experiencing a series of “hot” turmoil due to the politics of the cold war. Adhering to its name, Afghanistan is known as the Grave of Empires, it has always resisted against foreign invasion, from the British, Russians and finally, the Americans.

The Rise of the Taliban

Victoria Schofield states that the Soviets did not bring peace and prosperity but instigated the total breakdown of Afghanistan since 1979 which resulted in a jihadist uprising in the country that further took the shape of insurgency after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. It has been brought to attention that these Afghan guerrillas were getting sufficient financial aids from the US between 1981 and 1985, the aid marked a significant rise from US$ 30 million to a staggering US$ 280 million. Given the geography of Afghanistan, there is not much scope for its agrarian aspirations so, it depended on the production of drugs, especially opium. It can be said that throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Afghanistan ran on the “generosity” of both the blocs who eventually suffered from a “donor fatigue” and left the country in a more deepened disaster.

Another aspect of the rise of the Taliban regime has to be the deficiency in the root of its problem that is education. Since the mid-1980s, Afghan Islamists established Islamic boarding schools with international funding which followed the traditional Deobandi school of Sunni Hanafi Islam. These young boys were educated in accordance to Islamist philosophy, which included military training, front-line engagement, and militant activities. In the late 1980s, alumni of these institutes became prominent preachers in mosques across Afghanistan and Pakistan, advocating for militant warfare.

According to Abdulkader Sinno, Afghanistan was never a liberal democracy where popular will inevitably resulted in a new ruler. Understanding how the Taliban’s objective led to ground successes is crucial for making a convincing case. Sinno gives some reasons as to why the Taliban regime rose to prominence by stating how they successfully incorporated local Pushtun leaders by appealing to their followers, using their specialised knowledge of Pushtun power dynamics, and capitalising their own momentum.

With the rise of the Taliban regime, the position of women has been an integral theme to be discussed. Although, oppression of women can be often associated with the Medieval Islamic world, it has to be considered that Muslim women, in the Middle Ages had the right to own property and often independently on contrary to the European Christian women in the era. Juan R.I. Cole tries to explore the workings in the public and private spheres in Western political thought relating it with the Afghan distinction of the inner and outer domain. Radical fundamentalism in any religion undermines a rational public realm, promoting authoritarian leadership, sexism, and religious domination.

Why did the Taliban regime die down

Hannah Arendt has pointed out, there are major distinctions between a popular movement in opposition and one facing the problems of governance once in power. Revolutionary movements can have underlying tensions resulting from the leader’s own personality and political ideas. Like many earlier revolutionary groups, the Taliban failed to differentiate between leading a popular military movement and operating a functioning state.

The most important factor as to why the Taliban regime became ineffective in 2001, was the invasion launched by the US after the 9/11 terrorist assault took place. In early October 2001, the United States initiated an air campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, while the United Front forces in northern Afghanistan captured Mazar-e Sharif. Soon the rest of their forces, which had been positioned in the Panjsher Valley north of Kabul, moved against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Kabul. In several major cities, such as Herat and Kabul, the city’s youth, who were fed up with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, took up arms and freed city centres before the arrival of United Front and coalition forces. This by no means guaranteed the Talibani regime’s annihilation but rather a hibernation which remerge to its fullest as the Ashraf Ghani’s government fell in 2021 coincided with the withdrawal of American troops.

The 2021 Taliban Takeover

The Afghan administration, supported by the US had lacked proper legitimacy and ability, monopolised international funding and established a massive corruption cartel. In 2020, under Trump administration, a negotiated peace agreement with the Taliban was signed, excluding the Afghan government. Since then, suspicion and tensions within the Afghan administration have grown. Finally, the Taliban took power but it also assured that Afghanistan would not be a breeding ground for terrorist activities against the US. Jhang Ji-Hyang points out that with the US presence in Afghanistan disintegrates, counter-terrorism would halt rapidly and the wanning of a liberal structure is inevitable.

Since the Taliban regained control in 2021, Afghanistan has faced enormous humanitarian and political issues. The international world has largely isolated the Taliban administration owing to concerns about human rights issues, notably those affecting women’s rights and minorities. Despite initial pledges of moderation, reports from 2023 and 2024 show a tightening authoritarian control, with severe Islamic rules being implemented more strictly. Afghanistan’s economy remains unstable, relying primarily on international help, which has declined under the current leadership. Furthermore, while the Taliban claim to be preventing terrorist activity on Afghan soil, regional instability has grown, increasing fears about the rebirth of extremist organizations. As the global geopolitical environment changes, the Taliban’s Afghanistan remains a focal point for worldwide discussions about terrorism and human rights and regional security.

By: Baadshah Chatterjee

For the first time in American history, Kamala Harris, an African-American woman on her father’s side, born in Jamaica, and Asian on her mother’s side, born in India, was chosen as the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, one of the two major parties. She is also married to a Jew, Douglas Amhoff, and hence she represents a distinct minority. In the 2020 elections, President Joe Biden chose her to serve as his deputy mainly so that she would bring him votes from among the minority groups in American society.

Since she was chosen as a presidential candidate, Harris is running a similar election strategy and her success is also dependent on the mobilization of minorities.

Defining a minority is always a relative function against a majority. In the United States it was not always about “whites” versus “blacks”. There were a majority and a minority among the whites as well. Jews came from Europe to the United States in the first waves of immigration to it, and were considered a minority group on religious-ethnic grounds. Against the Protestant majority, the Catholics were also a religious minority, and only in 1960 was the first Catholic president, John Kennedy, elected. The most prominent minority group is that of blacks, “Afro-Americans”, who came to the United States to serve as slaves. It was a minority group based on race and color.

The involvement of Minorities in Politics

The involvement of minorities in politics is mainly related to the history of African-Americans. Historically, one can see its beginning in the American Civil War (1861-1865) which led to their release from the shackles of slavery.

The first African-American elected to the Senate was Hiram Rebels, a soldier in the Northern Army, and that was in 1870.

But he served in Congress for only one year. After him in 1875, another African-American senator, Blanche Bruce, was elected, but from 1881 to 1967, no African-Americans were elected to positions in Congress, and they continued to suffer from racism and severe discrimination, especially in the southern states.

President Abraham Lincoln who started a civil war to free black slaves was the head of the Republican Party, but in the twentieth century, this party became conservative while the Democratic Party became liberal, and were more sensitive to minority rights. That’s why most of them chose candidates on her behalf. The involvement of African-Americans in politics through the Democratic Party developed in three stages: in the 1930s and 1940s during the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt; in the fifties and sixties mainly during the period of President Lyndon Johnson and at the beginning of the twenty-first century with the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president in the history of the United States.

Roosevelt built a broad coalition of workers, intellectuals, minorities (Jews, African-Americans, Catholics) and southerners, who were conservative, but voted Democratic, as a generational protest against Lincoln’s Republicans. Even then, the Democrats read the changing demographic map of the US and took advantage of it.

By: Inzam PI

Both Jews and Palestinians are victims of the ongoing conflict. Negating one against the other will not lead to a solution. You may disagree, but the only thing Palestinians can do now is forgive the violence and horror that Zionists have inflicted upon them and vice-versa. Of course, I am not here to suggest what they both should or should not do. Forgiveness is powerful but painful and necessary for a peaceful future. However, acts of forgiving from their side won’t be possible as long as Israeli political leaders’ heinous obsession with war and the United States’s biassed approach towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. Israel gives nearly zero importance to UN resolutions as well as the ruling of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Furthermore, these organisations lack the necessary enforcement mechanisms to effectively implement their rulings.

Answering the following question is crucial to avoid falling into false narratives in a world where information is abundant. Is the Israel-Palestine conflict a religious conflict or a product of colonialism? Drawing from Edward Said’s critique of the clash of civilisation, Prof. A.K. Ramakrishnan often says, “Please don’t fall into the trap of the clash of civilization.” In my opinion, it is indeed an offshoot of colonialism, which gradually triggered hatred against each other and took the form of what appears to be a religious conflict. Colonial Zionism interrupted peace and harmony and instilled poisons of sectarianism and hatred in the minds of the people, which destroyed the coexistence between diverse communities living in Palestine. Ussama Makdisi clearly states in his book “The Age of Coexistence,” “Advents of British-backed colonial Zionism in Palestine sought to transform the multireligious land of Palestine into a national Jewish state, led by Ashkenazi Jewish settlers.” He further argues that the British Mandate viewed Arabs and Jews as irreconcilable antonyms. It started with dividing the ruins of the Ottoman Empire under British and French colonial rule, which resulted in sowing the initial seeds of Zionism into the land of Palestine. As a result, the Arab-Jew distinction, or the process of othering, was later orchestrated in the form of a Zionist agenda. Be it the Nabi Musa riots, the Hebron Massacre, the pogrom of Jews in Baghdad, or the Hadessah medical envoy incident, almost everything was an outcome of a well-articulated colonial project that spread disinformation and instilled fear among the people against each other. A thorough reading of history without subscribing to any false narrative is inevitable to understand the complexity and different layers of the conflict. On the one hand, anti-colonial resistance and years of pain involuntarily mixed with anti-Jewish sentiment; on the other hand, anti-Arab perception combined with Zionist arrogance led to a further acceleration of hatred towards each other. Hatred was inevitable.

The crucial question is, Can Israelis and Palestinians Achieve a New Era of Coexistence? The answer is yes. A two-state solution is still possible to revive the age of coexistence, but only side by side. Looking back into history, Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived harmoniously in the land of Palestine before the British invasion and the rise of settler colonialism. Zionism’s political project acted as a catalyst for communal riots, inciting suspicion and hatred among Arabs and Jews alike. Zionism was highly successful in turning the Jews against Arabs and vice versa by employing crooked strategies, deceit, and betrayal of innocent indigenous people. No need to say more; the UN partition plan in 1947 itself was a colonial baked cake where only one child got the cake, but the other remained starving. In other words, the partition plan paradoxically produced only one state, the state of Israel, while implicitly allowing the newly formed state to oppress and dehumanize the other.

If someone is labelling Hamas as a terrorist organisation, I will have a different say on it. The current ruling party of Israel, Likud itself, traces its roots back to a ruthless terrorist organisation named Irgun, later renamed to Lehi and taking the current form. However, for Israelis, Irgun and Haganah militants represented the pillar of their right to self-determination. In my opinion, if someone argues that the Likud party embodies the democratic ethos and the current Israeli government is democratic, I will view it from a different perspective. Former Prime Ministers of Israel, such as Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, actively participated in far-right nationalist and aggressive military organisations such as Irgun and Lehi, all while enjoying complete impunity. Using the same logic, I would like to argue Hamas cannot be considered a terrorist organisation since it is a democratically elected body.

Indeed, Hamas’s 7th October attack on Israel was a condemnable act of violence. Innocent civilians should not be indiscriminately killed, even for the sake of liberation. However, accepting and understanding the underlying reasons behind the formation of a so-called terrorist organisation and the later democratic victory of Hamas is equally important. The earlier Palestinian resistance to colonialism had subscribed to numerous forms, which include non-violent gatherings, petitions, public speeches, discussion, pleas, etc. However, it failed to achieve the objective of preventing the British from unwaveringly supporting the colonial Zionists. Thus, for Palestinians, Hamas is an integral part of their resistance against occupation. Moreover, they consider it an organisation that could reach and address Palestinian grassroots issues. It has emerged as their representative body, democratically winning both elections and the hearts of the people, while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation has consistently failed to find a solution to Palestinians’ ongoing suffering.

Highlighting Israel as the only democratic country in the so-called war-torn West Asia region is nothing more than an organized attempt to whitewash genocide, assisted by the weaponization of artificial intelligence and targeted killing of civilians in Gaza. Similarly, we cannot use the historical baggage of Jews and the ongoing persecution of Jewish minorities worldwide as a justification for the surveillance, dehumanisation, and indiscriminate killing of Palestinians.

People on both sides have suffered a lot. Enough is enough. The issue requires immediate resolution. Reviving an age of coexistence again is the need of the hour today. A two-state solution is essential, or else one country will treat the other as second-class citizens, and the chain of discrimination will be never-ending. Israel’s treatment of people in the so-called Occupied Palestine Territory (OPT) exemplifies the same. An ecumenical framework, existing side by side, and a method of coexistence should be the way ahead.

But again, the question arises: is that possible? Though the other ministers in his own cabinet demand the end of war and a ceasefire, Netanyahu, backed by his minions like Itamar Ben-Gvir, won’t let that happen. There is a growing allegation against Netanyahu that he merely seeks to maintain his power in the States, using it as a tool to conceal corruption and political instability within the country. These allegations are neither mere rhetoric nor unsubstantiated.

Regarding the role of the United States, will US election results provide any hope for the future of Palestinians? I would say, no. Neither Trump nor Harris will be interested in mediation or permanently settling the issue. Although Harris attempts to portray her as a progressive and saviour of the oppressed, she will also follow in Biden’s footsteps in a different way. Harris is in fact equal to Biden; the opinion and stance are the same, with a marginal change in the nature and tone of talking. Israel is now digging their own grave. As Prof. Bansidhar Pradhan from Jawaharlal Nehru University once said, “I am not afraid of the future of Palestine. But I am afraid of the future of Israel.” Almost the majority of the international community has turned against the Netanyahu-led, horrendous war on Gaza. The ego and arrogance of Israel’s political leaders could potentially incur significant costs for the country.

By: Anuraag Khaund, Guest Author

Along with the Himalayas and Eurasia, the Indian Ocean has also emerged as an important hot-bed of geopolitical rivalry between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or China. The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean and covers some 20 per cent of the global water surface. Its heightened importance stands from its geographic location as a key trade and energy supply conduit straddling between the economic engines and commercial ports of North Atlantic and the emerging and high energy consuming economies of Asia- Pacific. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) encompasses international shipping lanes connecting the economies of East Asia and South East Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and the East African states. The IOR is home to an emerging market of 2 billion people in 32 littoral states and is a rich reservoir of resources in terms of huge deposits of rare earth elements (REE), 15 per cent of fish deposits and around 40 per cent of the world’s offshore oil production. The real value of IOR lies in the presence of critical Sea-Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) located in its expanse notably the Straits of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Straits of Malacca which saw around 39 per cent of the global energy maritime trade pass through its spaces in 2017. Among these straits, the Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca are quite significant. A major portion of the oil and energy supplies originating from West Asia passes through these two SLOCs before reaching their destination in the East Asian economies of China, Japan, and South Korea and in the Malacca alone, the global trade value passing through its waters are valued a US$ 3.5 trillion. This includes two-thirds of China’s trade volume, 40 per cent of Japan and a third of global maritime trade. For China, the Malacca becomes crucial as around 80 per cent of its energy imports including oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) are shipped through this narrow SLOC which are vital for the functioning of the world’s second largest economy.

Given the above situation, it is no surprise that the IOR and especially the need for control over the SLOCs especially Malacca has emerged as high agendas in the Chinese strategic perception. In the case of Malacca, considering its role in terms of energy supplies mentioned above, there has emerged anxieties about the SLOC being used as a chokepoint by powers such as the US and increasingly India by placing a naval blockade on the same−a sentiment highlighted by then Chinese President Hu Jintao as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’.  This anxiety or dilemma has led Beijing to search for alternative routes to secure its energy shipments through projects such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang province through an overland route to the Pakistani port of Gwardar and the laying out of pipelines between Yunnan in Southern China and the port of Kyaukphu in Myanmar as part of the Chinese led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of global infrastructure development and connectivity initiative announced in 2013. This search for alternative routes has also sparked Chinese interest in the long-buried but recently re-emerged idea of the Kra Canal− a canal across the narrow Kra Isthmus in Thailand joining the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea and thereby offering an alternative route to the Straits of Malacca. While the arguments in favor of the proposed Canal range from reducing the burden of traffic in Malacca and providing a shorter route in terms of time taken and cost reduction to boosting the Thai economy, concerns have also been raised over Beijing’s participation in the Kra Canal which could allow the latter to bring Thailand under its ‘debt trap’ thereby eroding Thai sovereignty as well as the Canal’s potential as a shorter route for Chinese naval ships to enter the Indian Ocean. For India, the latter part is crucial given its own security and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, especially the Andaman Sea which abuts the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well as the eastern Indian seaboard. However, if India plays its cards well, it can turn the potential strategic disadvantage of the Kra Canal into an opportunity to increase its influence in the IOR. This constitutes the central theme of the paper which begins by outlining the history and basic features of the Kra Canal followed by the potential ways through which India can engage with the Canal to its own advantage.

The Kra Canal/Land Bridge

The Isthmus of Kra is a narrow strip of land in southern Thailand linking the Malay Peninsula with mainland Southeast Asia. As mentioned above, the Kra Canal is a proposed man-made canal across the Isthmus which plans to connect the South China Sea (SCS) via the Gulf of Thailand to the Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean. It would be located 500 miles south of Bangkok and 120 miles north of Thailand’s border with Malaysia. The principal motivation driving the construction of the Canal has been its potential to reduce the sailing time as well as provide a shorter connectivity route between eastern Asia and the Indian Ocean. As per certain studies, the canal if and when constructed would reduce the distance between the two regions by 700 miles or around two-three days of sailing time as compared to the conventional routes around the Straits of Malacca.

The idea of exploiting this canal can be traced back to the 17^th century during the reign of monarch Narai the Great who in 1677 had mooted the idea of a canal connecting the western and eastern coasts of the Ayutthaya Kingdom (then Thailand) in order to facilitate the rapid movement of troops to counter the neighbouring Burmese kingdom. To that end, the monarch had sought the assistance of the French colonial power in order to transform his vision into reality; however, the idea was dropped as it was unfeasible. Yet, the idea of a canal connecting the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea was subsequently pursued by the British and French colonial powers who undertook studies in 1843, 1849, 1863, 1872 and 1883 respectively. Because of the number of studies taken during these years, several prospective routes for the Canal were identified, especially the one titled ‘9A’ was thought to hold the most promising potential. However, the plans for construction were scrapped until it was revived again by a Thai industrialist KY Chow in 1972 but it did not see the light of the day owing to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the resultant oil crisis. At the same time, powers such as Japan, in the wake of the crisis, had shown interest in the Kra as an alternative route for securing oil supplies vis-a vis the over-crowded and pirate infested Malacca straits. The idea was revived again in 2000 by the then Thai Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra who constituted a committee to conduct a feasibility study. Again, the project was sent to the backburner by the military coup in 2006. However, the idea lingered within circles such as the Thai Canal Association (TCA) and the Thai-Chinese Cultural and Economic Association (TCCEAT). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2015 between the private entities of China-Thailand Kra Infrastructure Investment & Development Company and the Asia Union Group for constructing the canal, but both the Chinese and Thai governments later backtracked and denied any ‘official involvement’ in the project. Moreover, the government of PM Prayuth Chan-o-cha which came to power following a military coup in 2014, did not give much priority to the canal. Yet the potential of the Canal in bringing economic windfall to the tottering Thai economy led the Government to form an ad hoc committee in 2020 to re-examine the feasibility of the project whose report was submitted to the Thai parliament in 2022 but was rejected by the House with 144 votes against as opposed to 121 votes for the Canal. The latest re-iteration of the idea was done by PM Srettha Thavisin in the forums of the third Belt and Road Forum (BRF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) but in a different avatar as a land-bridge instead of the old idea of Canal.

The proposed land-bridge over the Kra Isthmus, which seeks to replace the Canal, is envisioned as connecting the eastern and western coasts of Thailand through overland dual track rail and road links extending around 120 km. The multi-modal transport corridor would connect the deep-sea port in Chumphon province on the Gulf of Thailand with the upgraded port of Ranong on the Andaman Sea into a deep-sea port. The rationalisation for the project, whether in the form of Canal or Land-bridge has been the need to address the congestion of maritime traffic along the Straits of Malacca as well as the benefits of time and cost reduction to vessels plying between the Indian Ocean and the SCS. The Straits of Malacca is witness to 80,000 vessels transiting its waters on an annual basis[i] and by 2030, it is expected to rise to 140,000 vessels as per World Bank data[ii]. Hence, if realised the Kra project could potentially help re-route most of this traffic given its advantages such as reduction of distance and time in terms of 700 miles and two to three days.

However, there have raised serious issues and doubts regarding the feasibility of the project. Firstly, the benefit of time reduction by two-three days is not enough to induce large vessels to take the Kra route. Moreover, the construction cost of the canal would have to recovered through the levying of a transit fee upon ships, which, as per some estimates, would amount to US$ 115,000 per vessel, per transit. In such a scenario, it would make sense to use the International Shipping Lane of Malacca which does not charge any transit fee. In addition, the functioning of the Canal or the Land-Bridge would require the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), transhipment and bunkering infrastructure which would necessitate finding funding of around US$ 30-80 billion. Another major area of concern is the ecological and environmental impacts of the project due to the differing water level between the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand. This would especially affect the livelihood of 40,000 fishermen in both the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand given the project’s potential adverse implications upon marine ecologies and fishing reserves. Along with fishermen, the construction of the canal would also lead to the displacement of 65,000 villagers. The brunt of the Canal would have to borne by the Thai tourism industry in the Isthmus of Kra which is estimated to contribute around 40 per cent of revenue to the Thai economy. The third major concern about the project is its impact upon the neighbouring port and transhipment facilities such as Singapore and Port Klang in Malaysia which given their efficiency and other logistical advantages would be able to mount considerable challenge to the Kra. The fourth major factor hindering the realisation of the project is its potential negative consequences upon Thailand’s internal and external security. The construction of the Canal would lead to a physical bifurcation of sorts between Thailand’s northern regions and its southern parts which has been a hot-bed of Malay insurgency and separatism which has led to the loss of 7000 lives since the movement’s resurgence in 2004. In this context, the canal or any project in the Kra Isthmus would be interpreted as separating the ‘deep south’ from the rest of the country while the insurgency itself would hinder any efforts at construction[iii].

On the external front, the nature of the Kra Canal and its strategic implications would draw Thailand into the midst of the increasing Sino-US rivalry thereby affecting its traditional ‘bamboo diplomacy’ or the flexible way of conducting diplomacy without bending to either side. It is to allay such concerns that the Thai government has also approached countries such as US, India, and Australia to fund the project. With regard to Chinese investment, anxieties have also been expressed over the project becoming ‘a white elephant project’ like Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan and making Thailand similarly dependent on China through the policy of ‘debt trap’. Meanwhile, the removal of Thavisin from the post of PM by the order of the Constitutional Court on account of ethical violation over appointment of a Cabinet member accused of bribe charges only serve to highlight the volatile nature of Thai domestic politicsand their implications on the fate of big projects like the Kra which now seems to be in limbo.

A Strategic Opportunity for India

Despite the speculations regarding its strategic value for the Chinese, the Kra Canal or Land-bridge has certain limitations which raises doubt as to its strategic utility. Given its geographic location, shipments destined to pass through the Kra Canal or from it to other parts of the IOR would have to navigate through the maritime space of the Indian Ocean and its chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz and the Palk Straits which could be interdicted by hostile navies. In addition, the ships bound for the canal would have to pass through the Andaman Sea which falls under the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of India and thus would not carry the immunity of ‘innocent shipping’ as in the case of Malacca or Sunda. In addition, the difficulties as well as the volatility of domestic Thai politics mentioned earlier would prevent Beijing from putting much impetus in the project for the time being.  

However, the apparent strategic benefits of the Canal also cannot be overlooked by Beijing, especially in a time of increasing pressure on its manoeuvres in the IOR due to the actions of countries like US, India, and groupings like QUAD and AUKUS. As pointed out earlier, the construction of the canal would provide the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) with a relatively easier gateway to the Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea in particular as compared to the Malacca Straits from the SCS. Moreover, the construction of the Canal through Chinese funding and as part of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) of the BRI would allow Beijing to wield considerable influence in the functioning of the project, especially in case it ends up increasing Thailand’s dependency on Beijing. In addition, the project would also allow the diverting amount of significant shipping activity northward towards Chinese controlled ports or ports with Chinese influence such as Kyaukphu and Chittagong.

The most important and crucial takeaway for Beijing regarding the Kra Canal is its strategic value in the larger scheme of ‘String of Pearls’ or Chinese controlled/ influenced ports dotting strategic points in the Indian Ocean. Along with the Chinese-upgraded Ream naval base in Cambodia situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Thailand, the control of the Kra Canal or the ports of Ranong and Chumphon would allow Beijing the ability to monitor the passage between the Andaman Sea and the SCS. Moreover, along with its control over the transhipment ports of Kyaukphu in Myanmar and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the Kra Canal would ensure the smooth and safe passage of Chinese shipments bound for West Asia and Europe while also facilitating the unhindered movement of Chinese energy shipping.  Finally, from the perspective of India, the Chinese control of the Kra Canal or its ports would buttress Beijing’s encirclement of the Indian Ocean and allowing the PLAN power projection opportunities in the Andaman Sea close to India’s eastern coastline and strategic territories such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. More adversely for India, the Kra Canal in the ‘String of Pearls’ would also facilitate the unhindered movement of Chinese ‘research’ vessels mapping the Indian Ocean seabed destined for Maldives and Sri Lanka whereas the current route taken by these vessels through the Sunda Strait does not ensure a smooth passage given the patrolling by Indonesian Coast Guard.

What should India do? While some critics have labelled the Indian concern over the Kra project as ‘much ado about nothing’ given the uncertainties surrounding the latter and the lack of any official formal announcements regarding the same by either the Thai or Chinese governments, yet given the stakes involved India cannot ignore the potential consequences of a Chinese controlled Kra Canal/ Land-bridge. The re-iteration of the idea again in 2023 in the forums of APEC and the BRF, together with the Chinese search for overcoming the Malacca dilemma. Hence, as has been opined by former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale, while much about the Kra project remains tentative, yet given the ‘emergence of the Bay of Bengal (encompassing the Andaman Sea) as new economic hub as well as arena of geopolitical competition, India should also start preparing itself. The following paragraphs will highlight the possible steps which can be taken by New Delhi to turn the Kra Canal into a ‘strategic opportunity’.

As a first step, the Indian government should ramp-up the development of naval and transhipment infrastructure of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in order to utilise their strategic location straddling major sea lines of communication. Located around 700 miles southeast of the Indian landmass, the islands share Indian maritime delimitation zones with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand. Moreover, the islands are just a day’s sailing distance away from the Straits of Malacca and share proximity with strategic locations such as Sabang in Indonesia and the Coco Islands of Myanmar. Most importantly, the mouth of the Kra Canal would be 350 miles east of Port Blair the capital of the archipelago. Along with the steps taken to develop military infrastructure such as revamped airfields and jetties, focus should also be put on fast-tracking the development of the transhipment facility of the Galathea Bay in the Great Nicobar Island which plans to act as a feeder to the ports of Colombo and Singapore as well as handling cargo from Myanmar and Bangladesh. Given the proximity of the Galathea Bay to Thailand’s Ranong deep-sea port at the mouth of the Kra Isthmus, both these projects could be synergised to benefit each other thereby increasing Indian stakes and participation in the Kra project. This could be further explored as to how the Kra connection via the Galathea Bay could be further utilised to benefit Indian states along the Bay of Bengal.

Along with this the link between the Galathea Bay and the Kra Canal could also be synergised with the evolving Andaman-Aceh Initiative connecting the Islands with the port of Sabang in Aceh province. This triangular web of connectivity between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Sabang port at the mouth of the Malacca and the Ranong port at the Kra Canal would allow India not only multiple options for shipping its trade destined for the SCS but also could be utilised for its strategic value in enabling greater Indian naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. Such a linkage would fit well with India’s own ‘Necklace of Diamond strategy’ designed to counter Beijing’s String of Pearls. The ‘Necklace’ entails seeking access to strategic locations such as Duqm in Oman, Changi Base in Singapore, Chabahar Port in Iran and Assumption Island in Seychelles by entering agreements with the countries concerned while strengthening strategic partnerships with oceanic countries like Japan, Vietnam and Australia. The (informal) inclusion of the Kra Canal in the ‘Necklace’ is further enhanced by the interest expressed by countries such as US, Australia and Japan in developing the project, all of which are currently major partners of India in the Indo-Pacific. Along with Sabang, another potential connection which could be utilised is that between Kra and the developing Hon Khoai deep sea port in southern Vietnam. To be developed with mostly US financing, the port and its interest in utilising the canal could lead to greater Indo-Vietnamese engagement with Vietnam already being an integral part of the Necklace. Hence, before the potential transformation of the Kra into another Chinese pearl, India along with its partners should seize the initiative and include it as a Diamond.

However, a question arises as to whether India can generate enough capital on its own to able to unilaterally invest and influence the Kra project akin to China. This is all the more evident in the fact of the extent of availability of surplus capital in China which resulted in the BRI− such level of capital cannot be matched by the US nor major powers like Japan on their own. Hence, the ideal way would be to invest in the project through partnerships or through multilateral initiatives of which India is a part. Firstly, given the ambivalence among ASEAN countries towards the project, India should try to use its relations with the latter through the various ASEAN-India forums to bring them all, including Thailand on the negotiating table to discuss the collective costs and benefits of the project as well as try to promote joint India- ASEAN partnership especially with Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam to invest and develop the Canal/ Land-bridge. Following the Indian principle of emphasis on ‘ASEAN Centrality’ with regard to the Kra Canal would also prevent any form of total Chinese takeover of the project and its unnecessary tangling in major power competition with US. The interest of US, Australia, and Japan in the Kra Canal could be channelised along with India through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) under the working group on infrastructure development. This is also helped by the fact that the Thai government had also invited investment from the QUAD countries as mentioned above in 2020-21.

Along with QUAD, multilateral platforms such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative on Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) of which India and Thailand are both members as well as the multilaterals’ focus on infrastructure development, connectivity and trade and investment facilitation. Another forum for initiating Indian investment is the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) forum led by India where the Kra project could be covered under the pillar of ‘Maritime Connectivity’ of the IPOI. The multilateral and multi-partner nature of these investments as well as the emphasis on transparency, debt sustainability and respect for sovereignty in the official statements of India and US on connectivity would allay the Thai anxieties over loss and erosion of sovereignty compared to unilateral Chinese initiatives.

Finally, the strategic naval benefit of the Kra can be utilised through the Indian forum of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) which entails maritime domain awareness, anti-piracy operations, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) and naval cooperation and naval exercises with allied and friendly navies in the Indo-Pacific. The Thai Navy stationed in the ports or across the Kra Canal could be invited to be a part of the exercises thereby increasing Indo-Thai naval cooperation. At the same time, such exercises involving the Indian and Thai navies in the Canal or at the port of Chumphon, with participation from Vietnam would send signals to Beijing to not involve in any adventure across the Canal to Andaman Sea while highlighting Indian Navy’s ability to enter the SCS. Such signalling could also be buttressed with occasional joint Indo-Thai-Vietnamese patrols in the SCS thereby transforming the Canal’s initial disadvantage for India into an advantage.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean has emerged as the new ground of Sino- Indian rivalry with Beijing and New Delhi jostling for influence in the maritime domain. It is in this background that the Kra Canal/ Land-bridge project rises to importance especially for India. The project, if realised under Chinese investment and subsequent control, would allow Beijing a smooth passageway from the SCS to the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean bypassing the Straits of Malacca. Such a situation would be detrimental for Indian security which is intertwined with the maritime space of Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean. Hence, despite the project’s apparent non-appearance as of now but given the stakes involved, India should be prepared with possible steps to be taken should the project see the light of the day or is able to garner enough attention from China to transform into a reality. On the first sight, India should try to seize the initiative through the developments of its assets in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, seeking investment through multilateral forums like QUAD, IORA and BIMSTEC and even seek to include the canal in its ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ given the convergence of its major partners like US, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam in the project. Further strategic utilisation of the project to counter Chinese adventurist moves vis a vis the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean could be done by including the Canal and the Thai Navy in the SAGAR activities.

Indian Minister of External Affairs (MEA) Dr S Jaishanker had noted, back in 2016, the ‘interactive dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives−a universal proposition−is on particular display in our (Asian) continent’ and warned against countries using connectivity ‘as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choies’−evident in Chinese projects in South Asia and the IOR that has the capability to undermine our security and interests. At the same time, in The India Way, Dr Jaishankar emphasises on the Indian vision of connectivity which ‘underlined the importance of trust and respect for sovereignty, transparency, viability and sustainability’ which in ‘essence was a call for an Asia of cooperation, rather than of rivalry’[iv]. Hence, the definition of an India −defined Asia of cooperation could be realised in the Kra project.

In his latest work Why Bharat Matters Jaishankar draws analogies between the events of the epic Ramayana and its principal characters Lord Rama and Lord Hanuman with India’s current foreign policy experience. Just like Rama had to undergo various trials and tribulations to realise his warrior prowess, India too would have to pass through difficulties in the external environment to realise its potential. Similarly, like Lord Hanuman who was made unaware of His own divine powers as a result of a curse and would later realise it after being reminded of the same and by performing his role in the events of the epic, India too would realise its potential as it engages more with the world and its extended neighbourhood. Perhaps the Kra Isthmus provides an opportunity for both.