By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Bangladesh 2024 election held on 07 January, resulted in the return of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for the fourth time straight term and fifth all over.  The Awami League (AL) got victory by winning 225 out of 300 seats. India welcomed the victory of Awami League on winning the 2024 election. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted on ‘X’ to congratulate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that “We are committed to further strengthen our enduring and people-centric partnership with Bangladesh.”

In recent years Bangladesh has achieved significant economic growth under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In 2020, United States committed to be “a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region” with Bangladesh. In 2022, Ito Naoki, the ambassador of Japan, said Bangladesh is a vital country in geopolitical terms. In 2022, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron visited Bangladesh to “consolidate” France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the Bangladesh 2024 election results have triggered protests and violence at many places in the country, leading to mass arrests and crackdown on the opposition. This has raised questions against the legitimacy and fairness of Awami league’s victory. It could also have geopolitical impact on Bangladesh’s balancing strategy, affecting the technological, economic, political, military and diplomatic relations throughout the fourth consecutive term of Sheikh Hasina.

Bilateral Relations of Bangladesh

Bangladesh has multiple diplomatic relations with many nations in the world including India, China, United States, Japan, among others with mutual benefits such an economy and defence. The biggest source of humanitarian aid for Bangladesh is Japan, looking forward to increase economic ties with Bangladesh as was confirmed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Japan in 2023 by three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Similarly, Australia signed the Australia-Bangladesh Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement in 2021 to boost its trade with Bangladesh.

The geographical location of Bangladesh connects south Asia to Southeast Asia increasing its strategical importance in the Indo-Pacific region, especially to India. Since, India covers 4100 km of the border of Bangladesh and has illegal immigrants issue and Human Trafficking in states such as West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. The majority of these migrants are the people from Rohingya because of Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. Bangladesh is trying to solve this illegal immigration issue, since India is a close neighbour and strategically powerful ally. India also has strategic impact due to Islamist extremist group probably of violence in the bordering states, although India supports the status quo and considers the ruling party in Bangladesh as an ally.

Maritime security is an important part of Bangladesh since 90% of their international trade is done through sea. Bay of Bengal is also considered to have gas reserves, which makes it a bigger challenge to Bangladesh. Bangladesh aims to coexist in the Indo-Pacific region with many multilateral partnerships for maritime security with peace and diplomacy. For instance, the maritime boundary resolution with India (2014) and Myanmar (2012), the Ganges water sharing agreement (1996), the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (1997), and the Land Boundary Agreement with India (1974).

Bangladesh geographical location has strategic significance. China is trying to become globally stronger with the help of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is developing multiple maritime projects with the help of Maritime Silk Road Initiative. For instance, in 2023, Sheikh Hasina inaugurated its first submarine base with the help of China. With Myanmar having political instabilities, Sri Lanka has a lot of debt with a weak army and navy compared to India and China, and India not having strong strategic relation with China, China has a chance of a foothold in the Bay of Bengal.

Bangladesh, being the second biggest defence customer of China, has strong strategic ties with China. China sees Bangladesh as a “strategic development partner” and has sought to build strong economic and defence relationship with Awami League government. China stated, on the occasion of 96th anniversary of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, that both China and Bangladesh is looking forward to strengthen their military with peace and friendship. But because of dissatisfaction in arms deals with China, Bangladesh has many defence dials with India as well, worth US$500 million and both Bangladesh and India held fifth annual defence dialogue in 2023.

It is essential for India that Bangladesh has better relation with the United States, since America is an ally to India. If Bangladesh has better and stronger relation with China compared to India, it could have detrimental effect to India’s strategic defence. China also keeps warning Bangladesh against United States. Although Bangladesh has multiple ties with US as well with US being the biggest trading partner of Bangladesh. Bangladesh had US$ 7.8 billion trade ties in 2020, which kept increasing and becoming US$ 10.5 billion in 2021 and US$ 13 billion in 2022.

Impact of Bangladesh 2024 Election

The victory of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resulted to a campaign of strikes, violence and protests in many places within the nation asking questions against the legitimacy of the ruling party and their politicians. Not only the opposition party but many other countries have expressed concerns about Bangladesh 2024 elections. For instance, United States of America says Bangladesh election is not free or fair and United Nation too has expressed concerns about violence and irregularities in the elections. However, against all violence and boycott from the main opposition party, the Awami League was triumphant in the 2024 elections.

As the Awami League has won the elections, they have promised to work on the development of the nations by implying “friendship to all, malice to none” policy, given by the father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has anticipated to work on democratic values, economic dynamism, multilateral engagement and upholding international law and institutions while protecting our national interests.

Bangladesh has to balance the diplomatic relations with both India and China since both the countries has grown their economical and defence rivalry within last few decades. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, winning the four consecutive victories in the Bangladesh elections, has been trying to balance the bilateral relation with many countries. Under Awami League, Bangladesh has balanced the international influence by making bilateral and multilateral partnership and receiving foreign aids all while trying to grow their economy and military defence. For instance, trade between India and Bangladesh was about US$ 15 Billion in 2022 and the trade between Bangladesh and China was near US$ 25 Billion in the same year. Bangladesh has been balancing economic and technological ties with both India and China such as Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (BCIM), which has granted access of Mongla port to both countries.

The Awami League claims Bangladesh to be the second-largest economy in the entire South-Asia. Bangladesh has future planes for advanced technology development in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and renewable energy. According to the Awami League future plane of action, Bangladesh will become a near trillion-dollar economy by 2030, enhancing the regional economic balance and stability. The Awami League also working to solve the illegal immigration issue by repatriation of all displaced Rohingyas to Myanmar. Bangladesh, being a secular and democratic country, is also looking forward to fight terrorism or any extremist act.

On the contrary, according to the critique of opposition political party ‘Bangladesh Nationalist Party’ – (BNP), Bangladesh has lost respect not only nationally and internationally. The Bangladesh Nationalist party claims that the Awami League is corrupt and instead of securing foreign investment the Awami League has been busy fending off criticisms. This corruption led to violation of human rights, Bangladesh’s democracy and constitution resulting in sanctions from the international community. At the same time, Bangladesh’s economy also continues to deteriorate due to country’s political crisis. The Foreign exchange reserves have reduced to less than $ 20 bn USD simultaneously increasing the external debt on Bangladesh by $ 100 bn USD.

Conclusion

Both Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist party have opposite views on the each other. They both claim the other one to be irresponsible, corrupt and undiplomatic. Similarly, they both criticise each other by claiming that the country will lose its image and economic value in the opposition’s hand. According to Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, the government of Bangladesh is willing to eliminate anyone and anything if the government sees it as a threat. The government, military, and the law have become corrupt thought out the years. The political scenario of Bangladesh is violent and there seems less probabilities for the improvement anytime soon.

The balancing act of Bangladesh has served rather well for the nation to maintain its multilateral relations. Regardless of who comes in power, both Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist party claim to be committed to the development of the nation by the means of trade, defence and multilateral cooperation through peace and diplomacy. For the future, Bangladesh should continue its balancing act by improving relations with other nations through peace and diplomacy for technological, economic and military development.

By: Pinkle Gogoi, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

The recent victory of Bhutan’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the National Assembly elections holds significant implications for the nation’s foreign policy, particularly its ties with India. Economic recovery took centre stage during the election campaign, with the PDP emphasizing a commitment to modernizing bilateral relations through investment and commercial ties with Indian cities like Mumbai and Bangalore.

The article discusses the evolving foreign policy dynamics, noting the shift in power from the outgoing Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) party to the PDP. Despite the economic focus of the election, cooperation with India remained a key theme among all major parties, with the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) party explicitly underlining the need for closer ties with New Delhi.

Historically, Bhutan has had to delicately balance relations with its large neighbours, particularly China and India. The 2017 Doklam standoff and subsequent developments in Bhutan-China boundary talks have added complexity to the diplomatic landscape. The article highlights the differing threat perceptions of Bhutan and India concerning China, with Bhutan primarily concerned about herders from the north swamping its remote hinterlands.

While Bhutan’s relations with China have intensified in recent years, its unique and trust-filled relationship with India has been sustained by regular high-level visits, dialogues, and socio-economic support. India has played a pivotal role in Bhutan’s economic development, particularly in the hydropower sector.

The article also discusses the potential opening of a Chinese embassy in Thimphu and its implications for India. It notes the delicate balance Bhutan maintains between its neighbors, guided by its sensitivity to India’s security concerns. The recent visit of Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk to India in November 2023 set the stage for enhanced connectivity and economic cooperation between India and Bhutan.

The focus on improving India-Bhutan connectivity, the development of the first-ever rail connection between Bhutan’s Gelephu and Assam’s Kokrajhar, and the exploration of new avenues for economic and commercial ties were key outcomes of the royal visit. The article underscores that hydropower cooperation is likely to remain central to the India-Bhutan bilateral economic partnership.

As the newly-elected Tobgay government takes charge, the article anticipates a continuation of efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. It emphasizes the significance of ongoing projects and agreements, highlighting areas such as trade, technology, cross-border connectivity, and mutual investments. The Tobgay government is expected to seek additional funds from India for Bhutan’s economic stimulus package, maintaining a guided approach in pursuing relations with India.

Elections 2024

The runoff election held in Bhutan on January 09, 2024 resulted in Tshering Tobgay and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) claiming victory over their opponents. They defeated former bureaucrat Pema Chewang and the Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP).

The PDP secured a significant win, capturing 30 out of the 47 seats in the national legislature. The election saw the participation of 3.2 lakh out of the registered 5 lakh Bhutanese voters.

This victory comes after a primary election in November 2023, where three parties, including Lotay Tshering’s ruling centre-left Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa party, were ousted.

Tshering Tobgay, aged 58, is noted for his background as a conservationist and a former civil servant. He holds a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University. Tobgay founded the liberal People’s Democratic Party in 2007 and had previously served as the prime minister from 2013 to 2018.

It will be interesting to observe the developments and policies that Tshering Tobgay and the PDP implement during their term in office.

The report highlights Bhutan’s democratic process as a promising and transparent model, contrasting it with the situations in neighbouring countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, where election fairness is often a subject of concern. Even after the incumbent’s removal in November, Bhutan maintained a peaceful political transition without reported crackdowns, violence, or imprisonment of opposition figures on politically motivated charges. 
Indeed, Bhutan’s transition from a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy in 2008 is a remarkable accomplishment. Despite retaining a symbolic role for the monarch, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, actual political authority lies with elected officials, reflecting the country’s commitment to democratic principles.

The evolution of Bhutan’s democratic system over the past 15 years is noteworthy. From the initial elections that featured only two competing parties, the recent runoff election involved five candidates. This growth in the number of candidates suggests a maturing democratic process and a broadening political landscape.

Furthermore, the shift in election dynamics is evident in the candidates’ engagement with specific promises and positions. In contrast to earlier elections, candidates in the recent race presented more defined stances, providing voters with a more nuanced and challenging decision-making process. This development signals the increased sophistication of Bhutan’s democratic framework and the growing engagement of both candidates and voters in the political process.

The continued progress of Bhutan’s democracy is a positive sign for the nation’s political development, showcasing a commitment to expanding political participation and fostering a genuinely competitive and vibrant democratic environment.

Economy

The backdrop of Bhutan’s recent election was marked by significant economic challenges. The nation’s tourism industry is grappling with the prolonged impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, and a staggering 29 percent youth unemployment rate adds to the economic woes. With over half of Bhutan’s population under 30 years old, classified as ‘youth,’ addressing youth unemployment becomes a critical concern.

Furthermore, data indicates that one in eight individuals in Bhutan is currently “struggling to meet their basic needs for food” and other essentials. Over the past five years, Bhutan’s GDP has shown sluggish growth, averaging around 1.7 percent. This economic stagnation has contributed to a surge in young people emigrating from Bhutan, seeking better opportunities, with destinations like Australia becoming increasingly popular.

The economic challenges present a complex backdrop for the recently elected Tshering Tobgay and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Their victory comes at a time when the country is grappling with the aftermath of the pandemic, high youth unemployment, and a slow GDP growth rate. Addressing these economic concerns is likely to be a priority for the new government as it takes office, with a focus on revitalizing key sectors and exploring strategies to retain and create opportunities for the youth population.

Geopolitical Implications

India remains a key player in Bhutan’s political and economic landscape, acting as the country’s largest donor and ally. The recent election victory of Tshering Tobgay and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) comes at a critical juncture as Bhutan faces economic challenges, with India expected to play a crucial role in the nation’s recovery.

India is actively involved in funding various infrastructure projects in Bhutan, with a newly announced railway project being among them. Bhutan, known for its untapped hydroelectric potential, presents an opportunity for collaboration with India, making it a potentially lucrative client.

Despite the strong ties between India and Bhutan, the region has been a stage for tensions involving China. The Doklam border region, claimed by both China and Bhutan, witnessed clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in 2017. Recent satellite photos released by India’s NDTV purportedly show a Chinese military presence on land claimed by Bhutan. Bhutan, while not maintaining formal diplomatic relations with China, engaged in joint cooperation with Beijing under the previous Prime Minister, Lotay Tshering. He signed a cooperation agreement in October 2023, outlining the responsibilities of a joint technical team in delineating the border between the two nations.

The article underscores the delicate geopolitical balance Bhutan must navigate, caught between the longstanding alliance with India and the complexities arising from its proximity to China. The evolving dynamics in the region will likely be a significant factor in shaping Bhutan’s foreign policy and economic strategies under the new government.

Conclusion

The recently elected Bhutan Prime Minister, Tshering Tobgay, is perceived as pro-India, marking a significant shift in the country’s political landscape and offering a boost to India’s strategic interests in the region. This contrast in diplomatic inclinations becomes crucial against the backdrop of recent tensions involving Bhutan and China.

Tobgay’s pro-India stance has been acknowledged by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who, extended his congratulations to Tobgay via Twitter (now X). In his tweet, Modi expressed his “heartiest congratulations” to Tobgay, referring to him as a friend, and conveyed anticipation for working together to strengthen the “unique ties of friendship and cooperation” between India and Bhutan.

The congratulatory message from Modi underscores the importance India places on fostering strong and cooperative relations with Bhutan under Tobgay’s leadership. As the geopolitical dynamics in the region continue to evolve, Tobgay’s pro-India position is likely to play a crucial role in shaping regional alliances and partnerships.

The article concludes by highlighting the potential collaborative efforts expected between India and Bhutan under Tobgay’s premiership, further solidifying the close friendship and cooperation that has long characterized the relationship between the two nations.

By: Ananya Sharma

Introduction

The rise of China as a regional hegemon in South Asia is an inevitability that cannot be ignored. China’s rich political and economic history has led to its establishment as a formidable force in the region. China’s presence in South Asia can be classified into four historic and distinctive phases (Godwin, 2019). The ancient phase saw an emphasis on trade, cultural exchange, and Buddhism studies. In the medieval phase, there was a development of Buddhist art, architecture, and technological advancements. During their remote phase, China distanced itself from South Asian affairs as European colonialism began to gain power in the region. However, the fourth phase was marked by a significant shift in China’s stance towards South Asia. During the Cold War, they actively supported socialist movements and saw themselves as leaders of the global communist movement, motivated in part to counter the influence of India and the Soviet Union. Presently, the People’s Republic of China is the second-largest economy in the world after the United States of America, and its current positioning in South Asia is characterized by opportunities, growth, competition, and tensions (Wright, 2020). This paper aims to explore the factors contributing to China’s rise as a regional power in South Asia, delving deeper into its political, economic, and strategic objectives. It will first delve into China’s growing presence in South Asia, in the economic, political and security spheres. It will then go on to discuss how countries in South Asia have responded to their rise using strategic alliances and partnerships. The final section will investigate the implications of China’s dominance in the region and finally offer some suggestions for the future.

It is important to understand the rise of China and its consequent impact on the regional order as it has significant implications for the balance of power in the region and gives an insight into the changing partnerships and alliances which will aid policymakers to anticipate potential conflicts, opportunities for cooperation and effective policies to manage China’s rise in the region.

China’s growing presence in South Asia

For a comprehensive understanding of China’s rising economic imprint in this region, one must have a clear grasp of South Asia’s geography. The South Asian Region (SAR) is formed by seven nations: Sri Lanka, India, China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, and the Maldives. Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and India all share a border with China. SAR has 22% of the global population and is currently the centre of middle-class expansion (Romi Jain, 2018). The U.S. has considerable economic and trading ties with South Asian nations, which enabled it to have a massive influence on regional affairs in South Asia (Saylor Academy, 2016).

Essentially every nation in South and Southeast Asia is now influenced by China’s presence. China has altered the power dynamics in the region by sponsoring infrastructure projects, developing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and fostering trade and investment ties (James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, 2023). The world economy’s centre of gravity has shifted to South Asia as a result of China’s resurgence as a significant economic force. China ranks first in economic relations and second in economic resources, which include variables like economic scale, international leverage, technology, and connectivity, according to the Asia Power Index, which analyses power in all possible fields (Romi Jain, 2018). China professes to be a regional “integrator,” which I feel has consequences. It has the authority to wield influence and generate interdependencies in the region. They have offered nations loans, grants, and technical assistance. The link between China and South Asian economies in terms of bilateral trade has never been better. Improved infrastructure and communication across the subcontinent have been promised by regional economic projects like the BRI. Countries, policymakers, and critics disagree, arguing that once their interests are served, they will no longer act in the country’s best interests (Grossman, 2020).

Although China approaches SAR nations differently, it pursues the same eventual outcome. They would be dependent on China. Links between China and these nations go back to the cold war, as seen most prominently by its “all-weather” alliance with Pakistan. They provided military equipment, assisted in the development of nuclear weapons, and aided them in all confrontations on Indian and Chinese border crossings. Nevertheless, with the developing friendship between India and the United States, both China and Pakistan have agreed to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the foundation of BRI. The goal of CPEC is to link Western China and Western Pakistan. This will alleviate China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ as they will be the greatest consumer of energy by 2023 (Singh, 2018).

Nepal, another nation in the area, has joined the BRI. According to the website of the Nepalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Chinese support to Nepal is divided into three categories: grants (free aid), interest-free loans, and concessional loans… Upper Trishuli Hydropower Project- Power Station and Transmission Line Projects (Concessional Loan); food/material aid (Grant) in 15 bordering districts of northern Nepal; Kathmandu Ring Road Development Project with Flyover Bridges – (Grant); and Pokhara International Regional Airport (Loan) are some of the key ongoing projects under Chinese help” (Romi Jain, 2018). China has also obliged Bangladesh, a low-income nation in SAR. They have been yearning for infrastructure such as roads and bridges. and power – projects. With weak institutions and poor infrastructure, they find it tough to find a grounding in the developed world. China has come to Bangladesh’s rescue which they have eagerly accepted (Romi Jain, 2018).

Traditionally, India dominated the region, but it failed to match the expectations of the countries in the region. However, China is cultivating goodwill among the SAR nations by offering aid and material assistance to them. This is a means of limiting India’s presence on the subcontinent. China’s BRI programme offers infrastructural connections spanning Asia, Africa, Europe, and South Asia. China has completed BRI projects in Sri Lanka, which has increased the country’s electrical supplies. From 2016 and 2018, Pakistan and Bangladesh were the leading receivers of Chinese investment. Yet not all nations in the area support the BRI programme and have reservations about the additional help that China so generously provides. In contrast to Bhutan and India which have not joined the BRI (Jacob, 2019).

The BRI projects will have the same negative effects on the region, despite their promises of improved connectivity, increased commerce, economic growth, and connectedness. The effort, for instance, has drawn criticism for harming the environment. Several nations worry that they may fall prey to “debt trap diplomacy”, which refers to China’s strategy of using debt to further its geopolitical objectives (World Bank Group, 2019). Dept trap diplomacy has been seen in Sri Lanka with the Hambantota Port, the apprehension of other countries with context to this seems legit. Even though there isn’t much literature that proves that debt-trapping countries are China’s hidden intentions, there are multiple case studies that support this theory. Security considerations are a significant issue with this endeavour. The BRI is unpopular in India since it crosses through its territory, Gilgit-Baltistan. Militants have targeted and even killed Chinese workers who had been in Pakistan. I believe that another downfall of this project could be that a lot of countries will be forced to be at China’s whim in the biggest project they undertake. Notwithstanding, China faces numerous issues with this project. In my opinion, this project that is driving China to seize control and alter the regional order in SAR is the BRI effort (Awasthi, 2018).

Responses to China’s rise in South Asia

Recently, Sino-Indian undercurrents have become widespread. The Act East Policy became the foundation of Indian foreign policy after 2014, giving it fresh life. The reactions to China’s growing influence have been varied. Some nations have embraced China’s investments, while others are acting on the other end of the spectrum to balance their strength.

With the Cold War’s historical context and India’s growing proximity to the US, China felt endangered. Yet nothing in international relations is static. India has always had a multipolar vision of Asia. Following 2014, the Modi government expanded bilateral and multilateral relations with ASEAN since they shared the same goal. India and China have been at odds over several topics, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, CPEC, and the Line of Actual Control conflict. Nonetheless, India is now a component of all existing South Asian platforms. ASEAN countries expect India to strengthen the region and act as a counterweight to China. Myanmar and Australia have also been included in Act East Policy. India has adopted a strong stance in the conflict over the South China Sea. The bilateral ties between India and Japan are another alliance that keeps Beijing on its toes. With their rise, India and Japan have altered the regional security system (Sujan R. Chinoy, 2020). This will guarantee that Asia stays multipolar. Vietnam and India have improved their ties. Vietnamese ports in the contentious South China Sea have been made available to Indian ships. Indonesia has presented China with one of its most difficult challenges. The dilemma of Malacca. Indonesia has made it clear that if the Malacca strait falls into the hands of unfriendly players, China would be deprived of its oil source. India and Indonesia enjoy friendly maritime ties. Indonesia has granted India access to this port as part of its overall commercial infrastructure development. China is hence quite worried. The Malaysian Prime Minister has ordered a reassessment of all 3 key Chinese projects in the nation, anticipating that they would not provide the advantages promised. This indicates the fear of countries vis-a-vis China’s “aid”. Myanmar contributes significantly to the power balance as well. To establish its influence in the Bay of Bengal, China seized key areas of the peninsula. Myanmar’s new leadership has resulted in strengthened relations with India. India and Australia have joined hands to contain China’s overarching presence in the region. India is a part of QUAD, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has improved defence cooperation between member countries, primarily, India Australia Japan and the US (Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, 2019).  The securitization of the QUAD makes China uneasy. Improved Indo-US relations over the past few years have empowered India to be a worthy balancing muscle against China. The Communication, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCSA) became the prime outcome between India and the United States. The US has encouraged India’s presence in the Indo – Pacific, and the two countries have conducted tri-services exercises. The Indo – Pacific has also given India and Japan a good opportunity to contain China’s dominance. The alliances formed in SAR are majorly in response to China’s rise. India from their ‘non-aligned’ stance has turned to be more proactive. India and China have tried to establish bilateral relations, PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have met numerous times – yet their relations seem more to be driven by insecurity and competition than cooperation. This has curtailed full growth for the region. Sino – Pak relations are detrimental to India, and the growing closeness of Indo – US relations pushes China and Pakistan closer (Singh, 2018). Countries have managed to form meaningful alliances and strategic partnerships to boost infrastructural development, strengthen their military capabilities, and increase trade. These partnerships and alliances are attributed to a response to China’s rise. In my opinion, this serves two main purposes for the region; first, if countries focus on further strengthening these ties, it could empower countries making them less dependent on China which also allows them to be completely sovereign to make political decisions that are fully in favour of their country and not influenced by anyone else. Second, strategic partnerships in the region can also act as a balancing factor towards western hegemony.

Implications for the regional order in South Asia

China’s growing influence has impacted the regional order in innumerable ways. Implications of the same could be broadly divided into 5 categories. First, the economic impact, which in my opinion is the most evident. BRI and other investments made by China in South Asian countries, as discussed above can translate into development for the region, however, it raises economic concerns for smaller nations such as unequal power dynamics, corruption, and debt sustainability. The security impact of the expansion of China’s military powers and assertiveness is a big implication for the regional order. Their growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean has made India fear a potential strategic encirclement. China has also phenomenally increased its involvement with the countries in SAR, this is a diplomatic impact that comes hand in hand with the rise of China (Art, 2010). Their primary motivation remains to underpin India’s dominance in the region. Which has resulted in closer ties between India, Japan, and the US. Counterbalancing China’s rise on the contrary is what brings historic rivals together. Another factor that plays up in these power equations is China’s unflinching support towards Pakistan, this political implication suggests, China’s support for authoritarian regimes that undermines democratic institutions in the region. The environmental impact that infrastructural projects taken on by China has raised questions, rightfully so, about environmental degradation, particularly in the areas such as the Himalayas and the Brahmaputra Basin. All these factors mentioned above play a huge role in changing the Balance of power dynamics in the region. Indo – China competition stands at the centre of all these factors. In my opinion, smaller states could benefit from this rivalry, they could empower themselves, however, the chance of getting crushed if a full-blown conflict ever broke out it would paralyse their functioning. Hence, self-sufficiency should be the end goal for them. They need to tactfully establish their relations with both India and China. China’s debt diplomacy as discussed earlier has also been a significant implication for the regional order. Sri Lanka and Maldives have faced the brunt of it, and many others fear the same (Brian Lee Crowley and Shuvaloy Majumdar and David McDonough, 2017).

In this final section, I would like to discuss the potential for conflict and cooperation in the region. The rising influence of China has very evidently made the region a perfect breeding ground for both cooperation and conflict. The first potential conflict would be between India and Pakistan. China’s military, political and economic aid to Pakistan is a major bone of contention between India and China. The CPEC passing through the disputed territory of Kashmir is a huge security concern for India. China blocked India’s move to declare Maulana Azhar a global terrorist, this is because China needs Islamabad’s help in quelling the terror network in the western province of Xingjian. Another potential conflict is the escalation of the LAC dispute between India and China. The Chinese military has shown aggression in the past which was responded to by the Indian Army with equal force. These escalations can further into full-blown conflicts if the two big powers in the region don’t resort to cooperating with one another (David M. Malone, 2010).

Keeping that in mind, there also have been attempts to bolster cooperation in the region. India and China have met at numerous international forums and multilateral organizations like the BRICS group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). India and China are part of these organizations intending to promote economic cooperation, conjoining in the domain of security and the cultural sphere. However, the tensions in my opinion currently outweigh the cooperative measures that are undertaken. The two countries must share a common vision and need to be less insecure about each other’s presence in the region for true cooperation and growth to occur.

Conclusion

The regional order has been significantly impacted by China’s ascent in South Asia. China has resorted to using a variety of methods to increase its influence in the area. The driving forces behind this expansion have been economic might, border militarization, and infrastructure development. China has recently grown increasingly forceful and hostile, which has had a significant impact on the SAR. The growing competition between India and China, which drives the South Asian narrative, is one of the most significant shifts in the area. China now totally succeeds India as the main power in the area, which it previously held. The path involves CPEC, financial aid, and assisting smaller nations in developing infrastructure. adopted by China to amplify its hegemony. I think China will continue to take an aggressive approach in this region in order to further its geopolitical goals in the future. It won’t let India make a declaration of supremacy. Having said that, India and many other countries like Bhutan, Vietnam, and Indonesia in the region and coming together to counterbalance China’s position. One such potent illustration is the Malacca Strait dilemma. Future issues will arise for China if its stance incites hostility among the region’s nations. When it comes to security, China needs to be more sympathetic to India’s attitude towards Kashmir if it wants to create a constructive partnership. Now, India sees it as a tremendous violation of its national sovereignty. South Asia is not yet a unipolar zone. China’s supremacy is actively being restrained by international groups like SAARC, ASEAN, and SCO. It is critical to keep in mind that China’s growing influence in South Asia extends beyond only economic and military considerations and encompasses soft power operations as well. China has been pushing its media, language, and culture there, which has allowed it to establish a presence and win over the hearts and minds of the populace. For India, which has always possessed a cultural and linguistic edge in the area, this has posed a serious issue. India must increase its efforts to market its soft power assets and forge closer cultural and academic linkages with the nations of South Asia if it is to compete with China in this area. India can only expect to offset China’s increasing influence in the world by achieving this. However, to promote a brighter future for the region, India and China need to function cohesively, and they need to strengthen their economic ties. Asia can emerge as a force to reckon on the global stage if both countries, engage in producing meaningful outcomes. This can be possible through better diplomatic efforts, and confidence-building measures such as humanitarian aid, cultural exchange etc. Capitalising on shared interests such as making Asia the new epicentre of the world economy and boosting growth by helping smaller nations develop sustainably could be another way forward. China and India need to address the imbalances caused by the reasons mentioned above for a brighter future for the region of South Asia.

By: Darshan Gajjar, Research Analyst, GSDN

The year 2024 is the year of elections, with over 50 countries going to vote in their respective polls, the biggest test of democracy so far. The most notable of them would be those in the US, the UK, and India. As of January 20, 2024 we already saw the conclusion of the general elections in Bangladesh, with incumbent Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League securing the majority, and on the small island of Taiwan, where the current Vice-President and Presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Mr Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, swept the polls.

While the Bangladesh elections were instrumental in deciding the future of the country in the face of rising extremism in the domestic society, the elections in Taiwan have global geopolitical implications. Let us examine how the victory of the DPP in Taiwan can affect the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and can potentially lead to another Taiwan Strait crisis.

Victory of the Democratic Progressive Party

Before going into the geopolitical intricacies of this election, let us first analyse the victory of the DPP in electoral terms and when the new president can likely take over the reign of Taipei. On January 13, 2024 along with the elections of the legislature, the presidential elections were also held in the island of Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, William Lai of the DPP swept the polls, securing 40.1% of the votes, defeating Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), both of whom secured 33.5% and 26.5% of the votes, respectively.

Though William Lai is all set to become the next president of the Republic of China (official name of Taiwan), his party, the DPP, fell short of the majority in the country’s legislature, getting only 51 seats out of 113. By contrast, the KMT was able to secure 52 seats, the TPP 8 seats, and independent candidates two seats, making it difficult for the new president to drive his legislative agenda.

China’s Reaction to This Elections

Citizens of democracies love elections, for periodic elections give them an opportunity to decide who will lead their government, giving them influential power in deciding the fate of their country. Conversely, tyrannical regimes despise elections because they don’t want people to interfere in deciding who governs the country.

When elections happen in Taiwan, it is obvious for totalitarian China to oppose them not only for historical reasons but also for ideological and political reasons. We shall come to historical linkages in a later part of this piece, but for now, let us see how China responded politically and diplomatically to the election in Taiwan.

Just days after the results of the election were announced, China conducted joint combat patrols around Taiwan, a sign of deep discontent against William Lai. China preferred to have the KMT government in Taiwan, which is at this time sympathetic to the current ruling CCP on mainland China, instead of William Lai’s DPP, who is considered to be a China hawk and whom China called a separatist and is well known for his pro-democracy and anti-China stance.

Further, China has started diplomatic efforts to make sure countries around the world do not take cognizance of the Taiwanese polls because China considers Taiwan to be a part of the PRC. Two Southeast Asian countries, Singapore and the Philippines, which congratulated the Taiwanese new president, faced a strong diplomatic reaction from the Chinese foreign ministry, with it even making solemn démarches to Singapore.

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said, “On behalf of the Filipino people, I congratulate President-elect Lai Ching-te on his election as Taiwan’s next President. We look forward to close collaboration, strengthening mutual interests, fostering peace, and ensuring prosperity for our peoples in the years ahead.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning, in response retaliated by telling Philippines against interfering in China’s internal affairs, even stating, “We would like to make it clear to the Philippines that it should refrain from playing with fire on the Taiwan question.” Defence Secretary of the Philippines Gilberto Teodoro Jr. retorted by accusing China of stooping to “low and gutter-level talk.”

Historical Background and Chinese Anxiety vis-à-vis Taiwan

In January of 1912, a few years before the commencement of the great war (World War I), the collapse of the Qing dynasty in October 1912 after more than 250 years of imperial rule, followed by the Xinhai Revolution, led to the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC). Then, revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen was elected as the first provisional president of the ROC. Although Sun Yat-sen tried to establish a centralised governance system, eventually the ROC was fragmented, with regional warlords controlling different parts of the country.

The warlord rule in China coincided with the end of World War I and the signing of the famous Treaty of Versailles, which surrendered German control areas of China to Japan instead of reinstating them with China. The student movement started on May 4, 1919 famously known as the May Fourth Movement, under the influence of which China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. In the aftermath of this movement, the Kuomintang (KMT) was established on October 10, 1919 and the Communist Party of China was founded in July 1921.

Initially, both parties worked together in what historians call a northern expedition that aimed at freeing China from warlords and unifying it, however, the differences between both parties since 1927 resulted in the Chinese Civil War. Though both parties collaborated during World War II against imperial Japan, after World War II, the struggle for power continued.

One by one, the CCP strengthened its hold on mainland China, eventually exiling the KMT and its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, to the small island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan. The Chinese Revolution in 1949 established the People’s Republic of China, which claimed to be the sole representative of the Chinese people. In the initial years, western countries, especially America, denied recognising Mao’s China, but with the passing years and the convergence of interests during the Cold War, Americans forced themselves to work with the PRC to weaken the overall sphere of influence of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

China promotes what it calls the One China Policy, under which it claims that there is only one China in the world, and that is the People’s Republic of China, led by the CCP, and Taiwan, though has autonomy in administration and in governance, is also part of mainland China.

Taiwan’s Journey Ahead and Challenges for Mr. William Lai

From time to time, Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, have reiterated their stance to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Further, nationalist Chinese hawks often called for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. In 2022, during a major party meeting, President Xi stated, “We insist on striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and best efforts, but we will never promise to give up the use of force and reserve the option to take all necessary measures,” signalling the possibility of a ground invasion of the island.

In the face of evident Chinese ambitions, Washington, too, is determined to secure Taiwan from any Chinese military aggression. President Biden stated in 2022, in this context, that the U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, a clear shift from its position of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. William Lai, who is already being portrayed as the pro-independence and anti-China president, has to sail carefully amid this great power politics.

It will be interesting to see if William Lai successfully negotiates with America the deal, which the Biden administration already rejected earlier, to procure anti-submarine helicopters, which will help it deter China in the maritime domain. Additionally, it is very unlikely that the legislature, in which the opposition KMT holds the majority of seats, can approve an additional increase in the defence budget, making his agenda repugnant.

Another such critical sector is the semiconductor chip industry in Taiwan, in which the country is a leading manufacturer. Mr. Lai has promised continuous support to the chip-making industry of the country, which is not only instrumental for Taiwan but also for the entire globe due to the heavy demand for its chips in the global electronics and computer markets.

With the US being engaged in proxy wars in eastern Europe and west Asia, in addition to growing domestic discontent against President Xi in China, the possibility of a ground invasion of Taiwan cannot be denied. In the near future, the new president has to take decisions that make it possible to deter such aggressions not only militarily but also economically and ideologically.

By: Deeplaxmi Patil, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

The rise of right-wing politics globally has become a significant challenge to democratic societies, with various countries experiencing an upsurge in right-wing extremist ideas and groups. This phenomenon is characterised by the dissemination of divisive and hateful ideologies, often facilitated by modern communication tools, such as social media platforms. The evolving nature of these ideologies and their means of distribution underscores the need for coordinated international efforts to address the growing threat.

The post-9/11 era, initially dominated by the global war on terror, witnessed the emergence and spread of right-wing extremism as a parallel threat. While the focus was on groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, right-wing extremism gained traction globally. Social media played a crucial role in connecting like-minded individuals across geographical boundaries, enabling the exchange of ideas, and fostering the growth of right-wing movements. Europe, historically familiar with right-wing ideologies, experienced a surge in the 2010s. Factors such as increased immigration from Muslim countries, movement within the European Union, and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas by populist politicians contributed to the rise.

The mainstreaming of right-wing ideologies within political parties and among politicians became a concerning trend in the 2000s. Leaders like Viktor Orban in Hungary incorporated anti-immigrant and exclusionary narratives into their political agendas. Orban’s actions, including undermining democracy and suppressing dissent, led to public protests.

Jair Bolsonaro’s ascent to the presidency in Brazil in 2018-2019 showcased the continued emergence of right-wing extremism. Bolsonaro’s campaign advocated for a return to Brazil’s perceived glory through attacks on institutions, minorities, and violence against various groups. His endorsement of Trump further illustrates the interconnectedness of global right-wing movements.

The rise of right-wing politics globally has marked a notable shift in geopolitical dynamics. Fuelled by factors such as economic inequality, immigration concerns, and a backlash against globalisation, right-wing movements have gained traction in various regions. This shift often manifests in nationalist ideologies, emphasising protectionist policies and a focus on national identity.

Geopolitically, this trend has implications for international relations. Some right-wing leaders adopt an assertive and isolationist stance, challenging existing alliances and fostering a more transactional approach to diplomacy. Multilateral institutions face scrutiny, with a preference for bilateral agreements. The rise of right-wing governments has also led to increased emphasis on sovereignty, impacting global cooperation on issues like climate change and human rights.

Furthermore, these movements may contribute to a more polarized international system, with nations aligning based on shared ideological values. This polarization can complicate diplomatic efforts and potentially lead to increased geopolitical tensions. The impact of right-wing politics varies across countries, and not all movements share identical ideologies. Nonetheless, the global rise of right-wing politics introduces complex challenges to the established geopolitical order, influencing international cooperation and reshaping alliances

Right Wing Politics in Europe and Americas

The rise of right-wing politics globally represents a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, with distinct regional variations. The provided data highlights that this trend is not universal, as some major democracies, such as Germany and the United States, are currently led by centre-left governments. Nevertheless, the overarching pattern suggests a growing inclination towards right-wing populism, characterized by distrust of liberal democratic institutions.

One prominent aspect of this trend is the erosion of confidence in key pillars of liberal democracy, including fair elections, an unbiased media, religious tolerance, and political pluralism. Populist leaders often challenge these foundations, contributing to a sense of uncertainty and instability. The comparison to the early 1930s, a period marked by the rise of authoritarianism, emphasizes the potential threat to democratic norms and values.

In Europe, the data points to a surge in right-wing populist movements. Italy’s Prime Minister, Georgia Melon, associated with movements seeking to resurrect Italian fascism, underscores the shift towards more conservative ideologies. In Hungary and Poland, where democratic traditions may be less deeply rooted due to Soviet domination, hard-right influences have been present for some time. The rise of Marine Le Pen in France and the substantial presence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the German parliament further illustrate the increasing influence of right-wing politics across the continent.

Scandinavia, traditionally a model of political moderation, is not immune to this global trend. The rise of right-wing populists in Sweden and Finland suggests a departure from the region’s historical political landscape.

The diversity within right-wing movements is highlighted, with some primarily driven by nationalism, others by racist or reactionary ideologies, and yet others being Eurosceptics seeking to emulate the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. This heterogeneity makes it challenging to define a cohesive political group but emphasizes a common thread of scepticism towards liberal democratic principles.

The recent victory of Milei’s government in Argentina underlines that the appeal of populism extends beyond Europe, persisting in Latin America. This region, with a history of maverick political leaders, continues to be susceptible to populist influences. The economic challenges faced by Argentina further indicate that populist movements can gain traction during periods of crisis.

The global impact of Donald Trump’s election in 2016 is a significant catalyst for the rise of populism. Trump’s presidency served as a model for other right-wing leaders worldwide, inspiring, and emboldening movements that challenge established democratic norms.

In summary, the rise of right-wing politics globally is a complex and varied phenomenon with regional nuances. While some democracies maintain centre-left leadership, a pervasive trend towards right-wing populism is evident, posing challenges to the foundations of liberal democracy. The diverse nature of these movements underscores the importance of analysing each case individually while recognizing common threads of scepticism towards democratic institutions.

Geopolitical Implications of Right-Wing Politics

Shift in Alliances: Right-wing leaders often pursue a more unilateral and nationalist approach, leading to shifts in traditional alliances. This can create uncertainties and reshape geopolitical dynamics as countries reassess their partnerships.

Trade Policies: Right-wing movements tend to emphasize protectionist trade policies, challenging the existing global economic order. Trade tensions and the renegotiation of agreements can impact international commerce and disrupt established economic relationships.

Nationalism and Isolationism: Right-wing ideologies often prioritize national interests and may advocate for isolationist policies. This can result in reduced cooperation on global issues, hindering collective efforts to address challenges such as climate change and pandemics.

Impact on International Institutions: Right-wing movements may express scepticism or opposition to international institutions. This challenges the effectiveness of organizations like the United Nations and the European Union, potentially weakening their ability to address global issues through multilateral cooperation.

Migration and Border Policies: The rise of right-wing politics is often associated with stricter immigration policies. This can strain relations between countries and contribute to geopolitical tensions, particularly in regions dealing with migration challenges.

Human Rights Concerns: Some right-wing governments have faced criticism for their stance on human rights. This can strain diplomatic relations and influence global perceptions of the commitment to democratic values and individual freedoms.

Regional Stability: Right-wing movements may impact regional stability by influencing regional conflicts or exacerbating existing tensions. Their approach to diplomacy and security issues can have ripple effects on neighbouring nations.

Ideological Polarization: The global rise of right-wing politics contributes to ideological polarization, with countries aligning based on shared values. This can lead to increased diplomatic friction and hinder coordinated responses to shared challenges.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the geopolitical implications of the rise in right-wing politics are complex and multifaceted, affecting international relations, trade, cooperation on global issues, and the stability of regions around the world. To effectively combat the global rise of right-wing extremism, the importance of international cooperation is significant. Building coalitions and leveraging multilateral organizations are proposed as essential strategies to address the transnational nature of the threat. As democratic societies grapple with the implications of these ideologies, collaboration becomes a crucial tool in preserving equality, the rule of law, an inclusive civil society, and respect for human rights on a global scale.

By: Barsha Hazarika, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Narrative Unfolds

In a remarkable turn of events on December 6, 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin embarked on an extraordinary one-day whirlwind tour to the Middle East. This historic journey saw him making a brief stop in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before heading to Saudi Arabia, escorted by an entourage of four fighter jets.

Touching down in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, on a Wednesday, Putin’s arrival coincided with the United Nations COP28 climate talks hosted by the city. The grandeur of the occasion was marked by the presence of four UAE military jets, symbolically trailing smoke in the hues of the Russian flag, as they executed a flyby and a resounding 21-gun salute, welcoming the Russian leader to the Presidential Palace.

Subsequently, Putin hastened to Riyadh, where he engaged in a significant face-to-face meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), marking their first encounter since October 2019.

While in Abu Dhabi, the Russian President took the opportunity to meet with Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), President of the UAE, expressing admiration for the robust state of Russia-UAE relations. Putin also extended congratulations to the Gulf Arab country for hosting COP28, a global event that had commenced six days prior to his visit.

Upon arrival in Abu Dhabi, Putin received a warm welcome from the UAE’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, at the airport. The Ilyushin-96, accompanied by four Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, set the stage for a ceremonial greeting at Qasr al-Watan palace. The welcoming spectacle included a 21-gun salute and Emirati military jets leaving behind trails of smoke in the red, white, and blue colors reminiscent of Russia’s flag.

Noteworthy is the evolving closeness between Putin and key Middle Eastern figures, namely President Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. It was only fitting that Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were chosen as the initial Arab capitals for Putin’s visit, marking a continuation of the diplomatic ties forged since February 2022.

During discussions that spanned a spectrum of topics, from regional conflicts like Gaza to global concerns such as oil production, Ukraine and Sudan, MbZ released a statement emphasizing the leaders’ commitment to “strengthening dialogue and cooperation for stability and progress.”

Simultaneously, Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia witnessed a significant milestone, with MbS declaring that the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia had reached unprecedented heights. Stressing the importance of exchanging information and assessments on regional affairs, Putin echoed the sentiment, highlighting the necessity for ongoing dialogue.

MbS went on to affirm that Riyadh’s collaboration with Moscow had enhanced security across the Middle East, expressing optimism about the positive global impact of their future political interaction and cooperation. The leaders also delved into discussions on Israel’s actions in Gaza and various other sensitive international issues.

Among the multifaceted topics explored during their meeting, energy industry collaboration and advancements in technology emerged as focal points, as reported by Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency.

Background

A noticeable pivot from Ukraine to the escalating Gaza crisis has taken place on the global stage since October 7, 2023 capturing President Vladimir Putin’s government’s strategic attention. The evolving narrative, with reduced emphasis on the 23-month-long conflict in Eastern Europe, conveniently aligns with Moscow’s ambitions to assert influence and pursue interests in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the region has witnessed a surge in anti-American sentiment amid the deepening Gaza crisis.

Against this backdrop, Putin embarked on a one-day visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia on December 6, 2023 marking his inaugural trip to the Arab world since Russia’s comprehensive invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to Al Jazeera, Putin’s meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince occurred against the backdrop of falling oil prices, despite OPEC+ commitments to further cut production. The Russian leader’s international travels have been limited since March 2023, following an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant accusing him of deporting Ukrainian children.

Crucially, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, having not ratified the ICC’s founding treaty, hold no obligation to apprehend Putin on their territories. Moscow has deftly capitalized on the United States’ isolation within the United Nations regarding the ceasefire discourse amid the Israeli war on Gaza in October. This diplomatic maneuvering exploits the Biden administration’s steadfast support for Israeli actions in the besieged enclave, presenting an opportune moment for Putin to navigate international dynamics in the Middle East.

Focus of Putin’s Middle East Visit

Vladimir Putin’s journey to the Middle East serves as a crucial component of his broader campaign to showcase the perceived failure of Western efforts to isolate Moscow through sanctions related to the Ukrainian conflict. His diplomatic mission aims to convey a distinct message to the broader Arab-Islamic world. Russia stands apart from the United States concerning the Palestinian cause.

The core of Putin’s communication is that, in contrast to the US, Moscow aligns with the international community in advocating for a ceasefire and insists on resolving the Palestinian issue in accordance with established international law, rejecting any attempts to sideline or dismiss it.

Despite Moscow’s steadfast stance on Palestine, Russia has historically maintained a nuanced and balanced position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, diverging from Washington’s unequivocal support for Israel. While fostering positive relations with Israel, Russia has concurrently underlined its support for Palestinian statehood. Significantly, Moscow recognizes Hamas not as a mere terrorist organization but as a legitimate political entity representing Palestinian interests.

This diplomatic strategy allows Russia to engage with both sides, navigating the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a pragmatic approach. While fostering ties with Israel, Moscow upholds its commitment to the Palestinian cause, stressing the need for a resolution that adheres to international legal principles. This duality positions Russia as an influential mediator with the capacity to engage diverse stakeholders in the region.

By asserting its unique stance on Palestine and strategically navigating the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Putin’s visit to the Middle East underscores Russia’s role as a key player in regional diplomacy, challenging the narrative of isolation propagated by Western sanctions related to the Ukrainian war.

Outcomes and Implications of the Visit

The diplomatic maneuvers initiated by Vladimir Putin in the Middle East are set to yield significant outcomes, shaping regional dynamics and global perceptions. In a strategic sequence, Putin hosted the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 07, 2023 a day after his visit to the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Putin’s commentary on Israel’s two-month bombardment of Gaza positions and the United States’ diplomatic efforts as unsuccessful, presenting an opportunity for Moscow to step in as a mediator. Leveraging its amicable ties with both Israel and the Palestinians, Russia seeks to redefine its role in regional conflicts, challenging Western dominance.

While the West interprets this move as Russia’s quest for enhanced influence in the Middle East, it is acknowledged that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while unlikely to replace the US with Russia as their security guarantor in the near future, view their ties with Moscow as a means of asserting autonomy from Washington. This aligns with the consistent strategy of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, balancing partnerships with global powers in an evolving, multipolar international order that deviates from Western centrality.

The symbolism of Putin’s warm reception in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh on December 6, 2023 resonates powerfully. It sends a message to Western capitals that Russia is not perceived as a rogue or pariah state in the Arab region. The visit underscores the assertiveness of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, signaling that they don’t merely follow Washington’s directives, even while relying on the US for security.

Despite their security dependencies on the US, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh exhibit a willingness to pursue independent foreign policy agendas when aligned with long-term national interests. This presents a challenge for the Biden administration, which expresses concerns over the growing closeness between the Gulf nations and Russia. Efforts to pull Saudi Arabia away from Russia, particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, have proven challenging, with the US, UK, and EU seeking to pressure the UAE to curb its role in Russia’s sanctions evasion.

However, the ability of the West to create distance between Russia and its Gulf allies remains uncertain. The GCC states, despite their wealth, display a multi-aligned foreign policy approach, refusing to permanently align with a single geopolitical camp. Their relationships with Russia, as seen in responses to the Ukraine invasion, mirror the broader stance of the Arab region and the Global South, navigating partnerships with both Western powers and adversaries like Russia and China.

In this multipolar world with fluid realities, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s preparedness to join the BRICS bloc highlights the shifting geopolitical landscape. As they engage in multi-alignment, the Middle East is becoming a pivotal arena where global powers must navigate nuanced relationships to influence regional outcomes. Welcome to a new era marked by multipolarity, where alliances are dynamic, and strategic autonomy is paramount, an era that is undeniably here to stay.

By: Anjali Mahto, Research Analyst, GSDN

More than a dozen suspected terrorists on New Delhi’s “Most Wanted List” were killed in various Pakistani cities beginning in 2022. All of them were involved in terror attacks on Indian security forces and other assets. The militants were linked to organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), the Khalistan movement, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).

Among those murdered were Zahoor Mistry on March 01, 2022, a terrorist affiliated with JeM was involved in the hijacking of an Indian Airlines IC-814 plane from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999, as were LeT’s Maulana Ziaur Rehman and Mufti Qaiser Farooq who died in 2023 on September 12 and October 01, respectively. On October 11, 2023 Shahid Latif, another prominent JeM operative and alleged mastermind of the 2016 Pathankot attack, was shot dead by three unknown individuals on a motorcycle in Sialkot, Punjab.

The most recent victim was top LeT commander Adnan Ahmed, popularly known as Abu Hanzala, who was assassinated outside his Karachi home in convening night of 2 and 3 December 2023. He was a close associate of terror organization founder Hafiz Saeed and the mastermind of the 2015 attack on a BSF convoy in Jammu and Kashmir’s Udhampur.

A failed assassination attempt in 2021 on the life of LeT founder and mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Hafiz Saeed, happened in Lahore. This followed a series of assassinations following a similar pattern, anonymous men riding motorcycles targeting militants accused of terrorism in India.

Pakistan on Attacks

Pakistani officials involved in the investigations have linked the assassinations to a hostile country’s intelligence organization, hinting India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Some allege that a hostile intelligence agency has set up a network of local assassins, some of whom are discontented former law enforcement officers, to carry out these targeted executions. It is further alleged that India runs this network through operatives stationed in a Gulf state, most likely the UAE, and also that New Delhi has shared the names and whereabouts of several terrorists with Islamabad over the years, and several have been killed by unknown assailants.

Following a press conference held by then-Pakistan Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah in 2021 in response to a blast near Hafiz Saeed’s apartment in Lahore, Islamabad has kept down the mysterious assassinations of militants linked with the LeT, JeM, HuM, and the Khalistan separatist organization. This is interpreted as an attempt to conceal the identities of the “most wanted terrorists” in India. Pakistan has remained silent on the possible executions of these militants, presumably due to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) pressure. Pakistan has guaranteed the international terrorist funding and money laundering watchdog that it will take credible and long-term measures against terror groups operating within its borders.

Three prominent Let/JeM terrorists were killed in the first two weeks of November 2023, including a close friend of Maulana Masood Azhar and the LeT’s head recruiter, but neither the Pakistani government nor the media have publicly acknowledged them as terrorists. Maulana Raheem Ullah Tariq, a JeM leader and close friend of Maulana Masood Azhar, was assassinated on November 13, 2023 in Karachi. The incident was presented in Pakistani media as the assassination of a local preacher. Former LeT terrorist Akram Khan, also known as Akram Ghazi, the chief of the LeT’s recruitment unit, was shot dead on November 9, 2023 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur tribal district. In Pakistani media, he was referred to as a “muezzin,” or someone who announces the call to daily prayers. On November 5, 2023, Khwaja Shahid, also known as Mian Mujahid, was allegedly kidnapped and later found beheaded near the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Shahid was a prominent LeT figure and one of the masterminds behind the 2018 terrorist attack on an Indian Army camp in Sunjuwan, Jammu which claimed seven lives.

Other terrorists killed in Pakistan by unknown gunmen

• On October 21, 2023 Dawood Malik engaged in anti-Indian actions. Malik was a prominent member of Lashkar-e-Jabbar and had a strong relationship with Maulana Masood Azhar, one of the terrorists most sought in India.

•  Syed Khalid Raza (February 27, 2023), a former Al-Badr Mujahideen commander, was assassinated in Karachi. He was connected to Hizbul Mujahideen head Syed Salahuddin and was particularly instrumental in infiltrating militants into the J&K district of Kupwara.

•  Imtiyaz Alam (February 21, 2023) also known as Bashir Ahmad Peer, was a commander in the Hizbul Mujahideen. He was killed in Pakistan’s Rawalpindi. He had been in Pakistan for more than 15 years and had a significant part in the terrorist actions in the Kashmir valley. He had been in Pakistan for more than 15 years and had a significant part in the terrorist actions in the Kashmir valley.

• Syed Noor Shalobar (March 04, 2023) accused for recruiting terrorists in the Kashmir valley and collaborating with the Pakistan Army and Inter-Service Intelligent (ISI) of Pakistan, was killed in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.

• Malik Sardar Singh (May 6, 2023), also known as Paramjit Singh Panjwar, the head of the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and had been placed on India’s most-wanted list,

was slain not far from his Lahore, Pakistan, house.

• Abu Qasim Kashmiri, also from Jammu and also known as Riyaz Ahmad, was the main man behind the Dhangri assault in Rajouri on September 8, 2023. In Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), he met his demise.

Pakistan as Safe Haven

After the 9/11 attacks, several non-state regions of the world were identified as directly endangering national security. These uncontrolled regions, sometimes known as “safe havens,” provide terrorists and other enemies the space they need to plan and prepare for strikes. Extremists are able to plan, organize, raise money, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in certain regions of the world with a degree of relative safety since they are still either ungoverned or poorly governed.

Since December 2001, the United States Secretary of Defense has considered northwest Pakistan to be a safe haven for terrorists. Many Taliban fighters and al-Qaeda members crossed the border into Pakistan after the Taliban’s defeat in Afghanistan. Specifically, al-Qaeda and other militants looking to attack coalition and American forces in Afghanistan as well as launch operations in other nations, such as India, have made the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, a politically unstable region that primarily operates outside the purview of Pakistani civil and military forces, their center of activity.

Pakistan has been charged by India for sustaining the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir by arming and funding militant organizations and smuggling terrorists trained by the state across the border to conduct attacks in both Indian-administered Kashmir and mainland India.

News reports indicate a growing body of evidence tying Pakistani intelligence to militant groups, some of which are responsible for assaults against US interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Since 9/11, Pakistan has been involved in the majority of important terror plots in Great Britain.

On February23, 2023, India used its Right of Reply (RoR) against Pakistan at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), accusing Pakistan of providing terrorists with a place to hide out. The primary point of contention between India and Pakistan that cannot be overlooked, according to S. Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs (MEA), is terrorism. A nation whose “basic industry” is terrorism is unlikely to succeed.

Pakistan has been accused of state-sponsored terrorism

Pakistan’s participation in terrorism through its sponsorship of multiple designated terrorist organizations has led to accusations of state-sponsored terrorism.  Numerous nations, notably the US, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan’s neighbors, have regularly accused Pakistan. Pakistan has persisted in offering sanctuary to a few terrorist organizations that are focused on the region.  It allowed organizations that were aimed toward India, such the LeT and its front groups, and the JeM, to operate from its territory. These groups included the Afghan Taliban.

Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, was killed by US Navy SEALs during Operation Neptune Spear in his bunker at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Although Hafiz Saeed, the co-founder of LeT, was indicted by Pakistani authorities in 2020 and given an extra 31 years in prison in 2022, they have refused to release him into Indian custody. Sajid Mir, a top leader of LeT and one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) most wanted individuals, was successfully convicted in Pakistan in May, 2022 on charges of financing terrorism. After that, he received a 15-year prison sentence.

These actions led the FATF to removed Pakistan from the “gray list” of nations identified as having strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism) systems in October 2022 after Pakistan made notable progress. Pakistan was first placed on the gray list in 2008 and has remained on it since 2018.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are concerns regarding the possible involvement of foreign intelligence services in the wave of targeted killings that have occurred in Pakistan, especially involving people connected to terrorist attacks against India. The pattern of these secret operations which is consistent, and the supposed links to organizations such as RAW, point to a complicated geopolitical dimension. As India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorism on behalf of the state, the designation of Pakistan as a terrorist safe haven continues to be a difficult subject. The recent removal of Pakistan from the FATF’s “gray list” is indicative of the continuous efforts made to resolve issues pertaining to money laundering prevention and countering terrorist financing. The state of affairs highlights the complex security difficulties in the region and the continuous fight against terrorism and the unknown killings are raising questions whether Pakistan is still a safe haven of terrorists.

By: Kashif Anwar: Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Historical relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia is intertwined and can be traced to 7^th century AD, as throughout the history, their borders have overlapped one another, as witnessed during ancient kingdoms and empires like the Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Empire, Malacca Sultanate, Johor Sultanate, and Bruneian Sultanate. As a result, it promoted interaction between the Indonesian and Malaysian people, who trace their origins to the other side, which helped them establish diplomatic ties in 1957. A decade later, establishment of the ASEAN in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines highlighted depth of Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. Like other countries of the world who often enjoy a healthy relationship with a particular nation despite their differences and issues, such aspects are visible in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Indonesia-Malaysia relationship

As there has been a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia throughout the history of the Malay Archipelago which continue to enhance connection and cooperation between both nations. Despite such connection, there always suspicion of the other’s military power, possible plans for domination, and hidden agendas which to some extent present in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia. After establishing diplomatic relationship in 1957, the period between 1957 and 1967 and later between 1985-2017 which viewed as troubled phase in the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. However, such aspect often results due to government policies and their priorities like when national issues and problems become a priority then concentrating on the issues that involved other country.

With both nations tied by a common religion, language, proximity and cultural heritage, often engage from one diplomatic spat to another over the years. Despite such aspect, Indonesia and Malaysia also enjoys a warm and cordial relation and in 2005 the bilateral relationship was enhanced, allowing both state head to have annual consultation. Further, both nations have also demonstrated their relationship through an active engagement and worked to provide a sound framework for the relations to prosper, economic cooperation which has greatly benefitted both sides. In 2022, the bilateral trade stood at US$ 27 billion which has under-score their economic interdependence and shown willingness to bolster trade through Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) to foster economic growth and integration along their border.

Prospects and Issues in the relationship

Considering the intricate world of international diplomacy, nations are working to strengthen their relationship with other like-minded nations and address the gap in their bilateral relation. Such aspect is clearly visible in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia partnership which stands as a noteworthy example of the effectiveness of collaborative efforts in the realm of global politics. As it allows both nations to strengthen their economic partnership which serves as a foundation upon which both countries have built a harmonious and mutually beneficial connection which allow them to enhance cooperation across various sectors. However, despite such a connection, both countries have difference and issues like the territorial and maritime dispute which emerged due to their colonial past, Indonesian migrant worker condition in Malaysia issue and the trans-border illegal logging are few of them, namely.

Despite the difference in issues, it allows Indonesia and Malaysia to expand cooperation in other fields too like in defence cooperation, strengthening cultural relations and are working to improve in-take of students and tourists. Such steps and interaction and exchange at high level like to counter the Covid-19 pandemic or fighting the threat of extremism and Islamophobia and between people have shaped the framework of the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship and assisted over the years. Further, since 2020, both nations have worked to address the territorial and border issue in the case of Ambalat region and Sulawesi Sea. As during Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s visit to Malaysia in early 2023, two significant agreements were reached regarding the delineation of their territorial waters in specific sections of the Straits of Malacca and the Sulawesi Sea. As a result, both nations have committed to addressing additional land boundary disputes with the goal of resolution by June 2024. 

In the case of trade and economy, they view the potential for expansion in broadening trade horizons and look for ways to look beyond palm oil sector and venture into collaborative infrastructure ventures. As they continue to fortify their trade networks, invest in each other’s economies, and engage in transformative infrastructure projects, Indonesia and Malaysia are not only poised for a remarkable economic growth but also positioned as drivers of regional stability and progress in Southeast Asia. Considering changing geopolitics in the South China Sea and around the Malacca Strait due to expansion of Chinese naval, commercial and maritime activities in the region, Indonesia and Malaysia signed Memorandum of Understanding in 2022 which will strengthen military cooperation and undertake joint military exercises like Malindo Kekar Exercise, periodic bilateral dialogues and consultations on strategic issues related to defence and military as a common interest and also promote strategic information sharing.

With Indonesia and Malaysia being impacted by China’s claim in the South China Sea dispute as later unlawful claim and expansion in the southern most region of the 9-dash line has overlapped maritime territories of Indonesia and Malaysia. On the other hand, considering the economic and trade weight with China has kept Indonesia and Malaysia’s response to the Chinese actions minimal. Furthermore, both nations continue to display the politi­cal intent to oppose Chinese control and long-term strategic intent in the South China Sea region, which so far has resulted in overlapping efforts to improve their own maritime capabilities and increase security cooperation with the US and its allies. As both nations have strategic partnership with the US, they’re viewed as a fulcrum in the Southeast Asian region to counter China and ensure a stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

For many decades, both nations have cooperated in policing the Malacca Strait, and changing geopolitics in the Southeast Asia and South China Sea to provide them an opportunity to enhance their strategic partnership. However, despite such cooperation and understanding between both nations who have only improved their bilateral relationship over the decades from economic to trade to cultural interaction and has solidified their bilateral relationship and partnership.

On the other hand, Chinese activities in the South China Sea region has become a concern for many countries in the Southeast Asia and has often undermine the impact and credibility of ASEAN. Malaysia’s reluctance to accept grand narrative, perception, and role to play to counter China remain a hurdle in the Southeast Asian region is of immense importance. As the 2017 Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, regular patrolling, coordination and intelligence sharing mechanism, provides a sense of hope and has allowed others to address the limitation which comes with Malaysia to counter Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

By: Pinkle Gogoi, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Chile, long hailed for its social and economic progress in Latin America, faced a significant disruption to its positive image in 2019 when widespread civil disorder erupted. While the country’s health system garnered attention for its successes, underlying issues, possibly rooted in a two-tier system, have persisted. Examining the evolution of Chilean health policy in comparison with developments in pensions and education is crucial for a comprehensive understanding. The enduring power of elites, a barrier to reform, is highlighted, suggesting a need for politicians to confront historical legacies and push for changes that go beyond the achievements made thus far. The two-tier system, rooted in policies of the dictatorship, underscores the deep-seated challenges that continue to shape Chile’s social and economic landscape. Further progress in health and other sectors necessitates a nuanced approach that addresses political and historical complexities, challenging the entrenched interests that have impeded reform.

The crisis that erupted in Chile in 2019 has deep-seated roots in the country’s historical trajectory, extending back to the 1950s. The foundation was laid with the legislation of a National Health Service in 1952, a move spearheaded by Senator Salvador Allende, a socialist and physician, representing a significant step towards universal health coverage. However, this reform fell short by excluding certain sectors like the military, police, civil servants, and private employees. Subsequent administrations, including that of President Eduardo Frei Montalva in the 1960s, implemented social reforms, progressive taxation, and substantial investments in healthcare infrastructure, earning both praise and criticism. Allende’s Marxist manifesto in the 1970s aimed at strengthening health services for the poor, but faced immediate opposition. The turning point occurred in 1973 when a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte replaced the government, implementing radical economic policies influenced by Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics. Described as a “shock doctrine” by Naomi Klein, this regime dismantled institutions dating back to the 1950s and transferred significant state activities to the private sector. The impact on crucial sectors like pensions, education, and health during this period laid the groundwork for the crisis that unfolded in 2019, marking a complex interplay of political, economic, and social factors in Chile’s history.

The privatization of pensions and the changes to the education system during the Pinochet regime indeed had significant and lasting effects on Chilean society.

Pensions

Under Pinochet, the decision to privatize pensions in the early 1980s was a central part of the economic reforms. Workers were mandated to contribute 10% of their monthly wages to individual accounts managed by Pension Fund Administrators (AFP). The idea behind this was to promote individual responsibility and create a more market-oriented pension system. However, the outcomes of this policy have been a subject of considerable debate.

One major criticism of the privatized pension system is the excessive management fees charged by the AFPs. These fees have been seen as disproportionately benefiting the pension fund administrators rather than the pensioners. Critics argue that high fees have eroded the potential returns on pension contributions, leaving many retirees with lower-than-expected pensions. This has contributed to widening inequality among pension beneficiaries.

Additionally, the reliance on individual accounts exposed retirees to market fluctuations, leading to concerns about the adequacy and stability of pensions, especially during economic downturns. The privatized pension system has faced calls for reform to address these issues and ensure a more equitable and secure retirement for all citizens.

Education

The Pinochet regime’s reforms in education involved transferring schools from the Ministry of Education to local authorities and introducing a voucher system. The voucher system allowed families to use government-issued vouchers to choose between public and private schools, with the funding following the student. While the intention was to introduce market competition and increase choice, the consequences were mixed.

While some families benefited from the ability to choose schools, critics argue that the voucher system exacerbated social stratification. Affluent families had greater means to supplement the vouchers, leading to an increase in social inequalities in education. Moreover, the shift did not necessarily result in improved educational standards overall.

Research and subsequent analysis have shown that the voucher system did not lead to a significant enhancement in educational outcomes. Instead, it was criticized for perpetuating socio-economic disparities in access to quality education. In later years, there have been efforts to reform the education system to address these issues and promote greater equity and quality in education.

In both the pension and education sectors, the legacies of these policies are still present in contemporary Chilean society. Efforts to reform these systems have been ongoing, with a focus on mitigating inequality and ensuring better outcomes for all citizens.

Health

The Pinochet regime did not change the health system initially, though it progressively cut funding. Then in 1979 it replaced the Servicio Nacional de Salud with the Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud, and replaced a health fund, the Servicio Médico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA) with a new one, the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA). Employees contributed 7% of their gross income. The fund also covered unemployed persons. They implemented reforms, including of taxation and social welfare. President Bachelet reformed pensions in the late 2000s to help the poorest 60% of the population. The reformed pensions did not depend on contribution history, but left core elements of the privatized scheme in place. Education policies from the dictatorship also persisted despite a 2006 “Penguin Revolution”, when high school students revolted against the segregation of public and private schools and a 2011 revolt by university students demanding an end to the free-market approach to education. In the health sector, President Lagos seemed to make substantive reforms in Plan AUGE, enacted in 2004. This required timely access to high-quality health care by public and private providers, along with financial protection, for a list of health conditions. The initial list of 25 health conditions expanded incrementally to the current 85. President Sebastián Piñera announced inclusion of another 5 at the onset of the crisis of 2019. But he also left in place the inherited structures. He did not tackle widespread co-payments required of all except some groups (such as the unemployed, FONASA groups A and B). All others [ISAPRES and FONASA (Groups C and D)] pay from 0 to 20% of the total price of services. The continued strength of conservative forces and, especially the military in the early years of democratic governments, represented a political consensus favouring minimal reforms without dismantling fundamental power structures.

The Crisis of 2019

Protests of July 2020 were no longer on the streets but had merged into popular criticism of the government’s pandemic response, began on 17 October 2019 when students jumped turnstiles in the Santiago subway system to protest against a 30 Chilean Peso (approximately 4 US cents) fare increase during peak hours. The increase was small but imposed during growing discontent with overcrowded carriages and already high fares. Protests soon escalated. Large crowds gathered in peaceful rallies to demand major changes to social protection policies including pensions, education, and health. Then violence erupted; the police were unable to control the situation, despite deploying considerable violence themselves.

The government declared a State of Emergency on October 19, 2019, giving the Armed Forces responsibility to restore order in the capital. The use of troops evoked the history of brutality by the Chilean dictatorship. Deploying the military did not restore calm. On October 20, 2019 the general in command declared a curfew from 10 pm to 7 am, the first during democratic rule in Chile. Violence, including human rights violations, mushroomed. On October 23, 2019 President Sebastián Piñera responded to growing demands with an “agenda social” (social agenda), measures to alleviate concerns about the health system including a ceiling on out-of-pocket spending, an insurance plan to cover drugs, and an agreement between the Central Nacional de Abastecimiento (National Centre for Supply) and the most important private drugstore companies to reduce the price of medicines for those who obtained health care from public providers.

Despite this “agenda social”, peaceful rallies and violent protests continued, now nationwide. On November 15, 2019 representatives of almost all Chile’s political parties represented in the bicameral Congress signed The Agreement for Peace and a New Political Constitution. It included provisions for referenda, a first scheduled for April 26, 2020. It was then postponed to October 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was to ask Chileans if they agreed to creation of a new constitution; and if so, who should prepare it? A new constitution would replace the one left by the Pinochet regime, which prioritized a market economy over social protection. Piñera’s government simultaneously escalated repressive measures. On November 21 & 26, 2019 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published reports on human rights violations in Chile since the start of civil disorder. Both reports included evidence of excessive force by police during protests, including use of shotguns loaded with rubber pellets blamed for more than 220 eyes injuries. The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Office recommended changes to police practices.

Chile’s health system: a success story?

Chile had been making progress economically and socially despite the lack of fundamental reforms. That is why the eruption of widespread public discontent surprised many. Chile boasts the highest per capita Global Domestic Product (GDP) in South America, and, in 2010, was the first country from that continent to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Social progress was especially apparent in the health sector. In 2010, the World Health Report described Chile as an “in the right way country”, highlighting its progress to Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Early analyses of implementation of the Plan AUGE, intended to improve access to facilities near peoples’ homes, reduced waiting times, improved quality, and caps on co-payments (maximum 20% of the price and no more than one month’s family income for the family in a year), reported a 30% an increase in use of health services for conditions such as type 2 diabetes and hypertension and improved survival after acute myocardial infarctions. President Michelle Bachelet extended health coverage further during her second term, enacting the 2015 Ley Ricart Soto. It established Financial Protection System for High-Cost Diagnostics and Treatments, not previously covered, and diagnostic investigations and treatments for oncological, immunological, and rare diseases. The Law also established a commission to set priorities. It was made up of two members of patient organizations and twelve renowned specialists in public health, medicine, bioethics, economy, health law, and drugs named by the Ministry of Health. While attribution of changes in health outcomes to a particular policy is always difficult, there are signs that these policies have improved access to health care facilities. The Health Access and Quality Index, part of the Global Burden of Disease program, measures deaths that should not occur with timely and effective care, adjusted for the risk profile of the population. Despite starting at similar levels, Chile pulled ahead of Argentina and Uruguay after 2000. Use of health services for conditions covered by AUGE increased, in some cases dramatically.

Problems remain

Health reform has been a high priority for Chile’s leaders in since Pinochet’s rule. Wide inequalities remain and benefits from reform have flowed unevenly to groups in the population. Vasquez and colleagues showed that service utilization increased for all groups and inequalities narrowed, but by 2009 a pro-rich pattern of consultations with dentists, specialists, and other physicians persisted, findings that are supported by research on measures such as specialty visits, laboratory tests, and hospitalization. All demonstrate concentration of utilization by the most affluent households, and of emergency visits by those with fewest resources. Patients report continuing barriers to care, especially co-payments. Out-of-pocket spending is high by OECD standards and many households experience catastrophic costs. In 2018 Chile´s health expenditure per capita was US$ 2182, one of the lowest among OECD countries; it has grown rapidly, at a rate among the highest of OECD countries. As a percentage of GDP, spending increased from 6.8% in 2010 to 9.0 % in 2011. Polling reveals persisting disaffection with health care. Wide inequalities persist in availability, affordability, and utilization of health services. Death rates among those waiting for treatment of conditions not covered by AUGE have increased. Chile’s economic system has made it one of the most economically unequal countries in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.49. Wealth inequality is harder to measure but seems to be even higher, with the share of GDP owned by billionaires the highest in the world (excluding tax havens).

Where does the power lie?

The commitment of successive Chilean governments to implement change is not in doubt but they have been unable to make major changes to the two-tier system created by the dictatorship. In the health sector, powerful private insurers remain unscathed. Silva argued that a coalition of business leaders and landowners influenced policies of the Pinochet regime and their power persisted after the democratic transition. The legacy amounts to an implicit agreement between them and subsequent governments to permit democracy, but without challenging much of the status quo. Chile is not unique in this; elsewhere fundamental political and economic reforms. They show that changes in de jure power, such as those brought about by a transition to democracy, can be offset by changes in de facto power, especially where the stakes are high for elites.

Conclusion

The Italian writer Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, in his novel The Leopard, described an aristocratic Sicilian family finding ways to retain influence during the Italian Risorgimento, delivering the famous quotation: “everything must change so that everything can stay the same”. On the surface, everything has changed in Chile. But as to the distribution of power, everything has stayed the same. The recent crisis drew attention to weaknesses in the health system but, if our analysis is correct, to be effective the response will not just be a technical fix but a fundamental reassessment. Recently, Crispi and colleagues wrote: “Chile must decide have left existing power relationships largely intact. Notable examples include the transition from communism in Europe, where many of the previous leaders transformed overnight into “democrats” and the rapid recovery of slave owning families in the Confederate states after the American civil war. Acemoglu and Robinson developed an equilibrium model to explain this, in which they distinguish the “elite” from the “citizens”. The former hold de facto power even though the latter have de jure power if the time has come for a profound structural change, based on a different set of political and ethical principles”.