By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Since highly enriched Uranium was discovered, the authorities of Iran and the UN watchdog have been discussing the nuclear safeguard. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection report on January 22, 2023, confirmed that enriched uranium up to 83.7% had been found at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located in the south of Tehran (capital of Iran) – controlled by ‘Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’ (AEOI). This Report has put Iran under the suspicion of many nations for trying to make nuclear weapon grade material to potentially develop Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

According to the 2015 nuclear deal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was limited to enriching uranium up to 3.67% for 15 years and allowing the IAEA to inspect the nuclear facilities. According to the IAEA, 3.67% enriched uranium is sufficient for peaceful nuclear energy use; anything above that could be considered as a threat. Although the weaponization of uranium material can only be done at 90% or higher uranium enrichment, 83.7% is very close to it.

Uranium Stockpile in Iran

Since February 2021, Iran has restricted the IAEA’s complete ability to monitor and inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran has also been producing 60% enriched uranium since 2021. IAEA estimates the Iranian nuclear stockpile is more than 18 times larger than expectation. Though experts believe Iran has no use for 60% pure uranium. In January 2023, Grossi warned that Iran now has enough uranium to produce nuclear bombs if it chooses, because Iran’s Stockpile of U-235 at 60% purity has reached 70Kg and 20% purity has reached 1000kg.

The IAEA’s inspection report of February 2023, stated that Iran has 434.7 kg of 20% enriched uranium, which is 48 kg more than the 386.4 kg mentioned in the November 2022 report. Similarly, Iran has 87.5 kg of uranium at 60% purity, which is 25 kg more than the 62.3 kg mentioned in the previous report. The IAEA also estimated an increase of around 87 kg in Iran’s total uranium stockpile, making it 3760.8 kg as of February 12, 2023.

According to the IAEA, 42 kg of uranium of 60% purity is the approximate amount needed to possibly make a nuclear explosive device. Although experts believe, in practical, some material is wasted during enrichment; therefore, more than 55 kg of the same purity level will be needed. Currently, Iran has enough Uranium stockpile to make several Nuclear bombs. According to March 31 IAEA report, Iran has stockpiled 114Kg of 60% pure Uranium and if the enrichment reaches to 90%, it is sufficient to develop three nuclear bombs.

In 2023, between June to November Iran slowed down the average enrichment to 3 kg per month, but at the end it increased to 9 kg per month. After November 2023, Iran installed 6 new advanced centrifuge cascades and have the total of almost 7400 advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow facilities, resulting the increase of average increase of enrichment. As of February 2024, Iran continues to enrich nuclear material approximately 7 kg per month up to 60% purity. As of March 2024, Iran has the total stockpile of 5525.5 kg including 712.2 kg of 20% purity, 2396.8 kg of 5% purity, 1934 kg of 2% purity, 121.5 kg of 60% purity and 361 kg of unidentified enrichment level of UF6 in chemical form.

Global Impact of Enriched Uranium discovery in Iran

Enriched Uranium discovery in Iran has raised concern not only for the IAEA but all over the world that Iran might use that material for the production of a nuclear bomb. For instance, European authorities have said that it would force them to break the 2015 nuclear agreement. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated that “There is no plausible civilian justification for such a high enrichment level”. Similarly, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen said there are two options to deal with Iran: either reimposing the UN ‘snapback’ sanctions that enshrined the 2015 nuclear deal or attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities with military force. Although, IAEA says military attack on nuclear facilities is illegal.  

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom accused Iran to violate ‘Security Council Resolution-2231’ last year when Iran supplied drones to Russia during the Russia-Ukraine conflict even though Iran knows that Russia might use the Drones to target the Nuclear Facilities. The US and Iran were trying to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, but because of the indirect negotiations, it broke in September 2022, although Biden says the US is ready to make a deal if Iran is willing to comply. This 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal has been wavering since Donald Trump abandoned it in 2018.

CIA director Bill Burns stated that US intelligence has found no evidence against Iran’s uranium weaponization. He also stated that Iran might not have yet made any decision for the weaponization, but their enrichment program has advanced enough that if Iran chooses to make a weapon out of the enriched uranium, it will be ‘the matter of weeks‘. Burns also showed concern that Iran was now nearing to become a nuclear state since they have also been advancing their missile systems by stating that “What we also see are signs that…Russia is proposing to help the Iranians on their missile program and also at least considering the possibility of providing fighter aircraft to Iran as well”. Saudi Arabia has shown signs of obtaining the nuclear weapon if Iran ever successfully detonates one.

The US defence authority Colin Kahl stated that with this advanced technology, Iran might make one nuclear bomb’s worth of fissile material in just 12 days instead of 12 months. Though Iran will take more than one year to restarting a complete weaponization program which was stopped in 2003, but with Russia’s help it could be sooner than expected. Iran is the closest to test a nuclear weapon for the first time. In early 2000s, Iran was developing the ‘Project Midan’ to identify the location for the nuclear testing. Iran also possess the nuclear weapon design and have the ballistic missiles.

Other than that, there are few EU sanctions including missile, nuclear and other weapon, that has expired in October 18, 2023. On which Iran said it will be illegal for the EU to maintain sanctions on Iran. Re-establishing 2015 JCPOA deal and limiting Iranian stockpiling at this point will not stop the Uranium weaponization in Iran, because Iran has enough material to develop two Nuclear bomb. Thought one nuclear bomb is not enough to deter Iran from nuclear threat. Grossi said that there will be instability if the IAEA is unable to tell world that the nuclear program of Iran is completely peaceful.

Response from Iranian Authority

In defence, Iran says that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was enriching uranium up to 60% purity, but the traces of an extremely high enrichment might be an ‘unintended fluctuation’. The traces of 83.7% enriched uranium were found while inspecting the two interconnected cascades of advanced centrifuge machine used to enrich uranium up to 60% at Fordow facility. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) authority Behrouz Kamalvandi says that this fluctuation might be a momentary side effect of trying to achieve 60% purity or while replacing the feed cylinder in November 2022. Iran nuclear authority Mohammad Eslami stated that the IAEA’s inspector had made a mistake and the report is ‘incorrect’. Mohammad Eslami also stated that the discovered particles cannot even be seen with a microscope, and the volume was also small. On June 11, 2023, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed that Iran is not trying to make a nuclear bomb by stating if ‘we wanted to develop a nuclear weapon, we would have done so and the west would not have been able to stop’.

While IAEA Director General Grossi visit to Iran in February 2023, he mentioned an improvement in the relation between the IAEA and AEOI since Iran was ready to cooperate with them. The IAEA chided Iranian authorities that they made a change in those cascades without informing since these particles were discovered after the inspection. The Iran and the IAEA came to an agreement in April 2023, to reinstalling the monitoring equipment to regain access to information, people, and places to ensure nuclear safeguards, which was limited by Iran since February 2021. But the gap of three years has made monitoring difficult for the IAEA to make sure that all the nuclear material is under the safeguards.

However, the scenario changed quickly. In June 2023, Supreme leader of Iran wanted a new nuclear deal with some changes, which will help Iran to maintain its nuclear threats. Iran has shown sign of compliance by slowing down the Uranium enrichment production. But the West was sceptical about it. On September 16, 2023, the Director General IAEA, stated that Iran has withdrawn the safeguard agreement from inspectors which were assigned to verify activities of the Iranian facilities. This step of Iran has further deteriorated the hope of restoring the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal.

Recently, Iran has diluted some of their enriched nuclear material. The rate of dilution has been more than the production of new enriched material, due to which the stockpile of 60% enrichment purity has fallen slightly, from 128.3 kg in October 2023 to 121.5 kg in March 2024, a total reduction of 6.8 kg.  As of now, Iran has enough enriched weapon grade nuclear material for 2 nuclear weapons. The US expressed that the Iran should ‘downblend’ all of its near weapon grade material and not just some of it.

It is not cleared why Iran down blending the enriched material at the same time also enriching new material, which doesn’t have any civil use. Iran says they have all rights for enriching the nuclear material up to high level of purity, all while denying the intentions to make a nuclear weapon. In January 2024, director general of IAEA sated that Iran is ‘very close’ to making the nuclear weapon. At the rate they are progressing it may only take few weeks to make the weapon of mass destruction.

Conclusion

Although, Iranian authority claimed to enrich uranium unintentionally, they changed the cascade in Fordow fuel enrichment facility without informing the IAEA and have been enriching nuclear material up to 60%. Iran has no civilian use for even 60%, let alone 83.4% purity. Simultaneously, they are trying to improve missile technology with the help of Russia, all while the IAEA monitoring system is limited. While Russia is trying to help, EU missile sanctions are also about to expire in October 2023. This will give Iran freedom over EU monitoring.

While US is distracted dealing with Ukraine and Israel, and IAEA’s attention also divided to the Ukraine’s power plants safety, Iran may speed up its nuclear program. Despite the repercussions, it seems very likely for Iran to develop nuclear weapon and become the Nuclear armed nation. Right now, Iran has enough weapon grade material to develop several nuclear bombs and they might potentially be closing to test the first nuclear weapon. If Iran is really not trying to develop the nuclear weapon, then Iran needs to cooperate by giving full control of its nuclear fuel cycle program to IAEA for better safeguards of nuclear material and to ensure that the nuclear power is only used for peaceful purpose.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

Introduction

A non-communist regime popularly construed as a “pseudo-democracy”, Singapore is home to the ‘healthiest’ and the most ‘disciplined’ population of the world fashioning one of the world’s most effective and efficient governments at work. The city-state has retorted immaculately to the snobbish “little red dot” remark (which was made by B.J. Habibie, in 1999, then President of Indonesia) with its incredible accomplishments. Thriving on the themes of ‘survival’, ‘prosperity’, and ‘order’, Singapore assumes a remarkable role in the Indo-Pacific region. Being located at the eastern mouth of the Malacca Strait, the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific and one of the world’s most important chokepoints, Singapore has become a very vital commercial hub for trade and various other services. With a strategy to become ‘East Asia’s equivalent of New York or London’, Singapore has established a commanding position and also articulated a rigorous capability development plan which obviously flows from its overall strategic posture and outlook.

Internal dynamics

The so-called ‘little speck on the map’ compared to its ‘massive neighbors’, has successfully grown into the third largest economy of Southeast Asia. It is ranked among the world’s most competitive economies. Post independence, Singapore witnessed a rapid development from a low-income country to a high-income country. Singapore was ranked the best country in the world in Human Capital Development in 2019. Starting from traffic rules to cleanliness, the regulation of citizen behavior has yielded great results in Singapore’s success. The condition at the time of independence was horrifying, yet the People’s Action Party (PAP) headed by Lee Kuan Yew brought about fundamental changes by introducing efficient economic and social policies.

Centralized, top-down and integrated policies coupled with one-party rule, totally against the western conceptions of a democracy, led to the establishment of a ‘parochial rule’ in the hands of one leader and his successors. As described by William Safire (1995), a New York Times columnist, Singapore is a family dictatorship which reflects the “old-fashioned European totalitarianism”. So far Singapore has been ruled by three leaders: Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong (Yew’s son), who is also the current Prime Minister of Singapore. Yew had an unmatchable impact on Singapore. His governance was a mixture of the Western style democratic institutions and the Asian-style hegemonic political party system.

Oscillating in a continuum where democracy stands at one end and authoritarianism at the other, Yew strongly bent towards a total control of the country in each and every aspect which was best evident in the 1980s when he totally went far from open and pragmatic policies. Surprisingly, his rule achieved universal support and legitimacy. In the 1990s Singapore was in the hands of Goh, a close aide to Yew who took charge with utmost sincerity and dedication to Yew and his empire. In 2004, Yew’s son Lee Hsien Loong assumed office and is serving till date. Through Yew’s guidance and mentorship, Loong has been successfully leading Singapore.    

The opposition party/parties have very little say partly due to the factional politics and partly due to the rigid rules that curtail any opposition groups or any other dissenting voices thus representing an altruistic state (in Hegelian terms) which prioritizes solidarity and order over interest group competition. Parties like the Barisan Socialists, the Singapore Democratic Party and the Worker’s Party exist just for the sake of existing. The prevalent rigidity is also reflected in the fact that Singapore has a unicameral legislature and steady bureaucratization. In spite of a rigorous bureaucratic control, Singapore experiences less corruption as compared to other Southeast Asian states as evident from its inclusion in the five least corrupt countries in the world in the annual ranking of the Transparency International.

Despite being a country with an ethnically heterogeneous population, the society is quite homogeneous culturally and people have one thing in common and that is their distinct Singaporean identity.

Role in the Indo-Pacific

Apart from its domestic success, the city-state also plays a predominant role in maintaining security and stability in South East Asia if not the Indo-Pacific region. Singapore believes in the concept of “total defense” when it comes to security, with five important pillars: military, civil, economic, social and psychological. The government has adopted a “comprehensive, technocratic, forward-looking approach to security that greatly informs the country’s unique social model.” It is to be noted that Singapore is a mixture of capitalist and socialist economics, with emphasis on the former.

In the new international era, Singapore is maintaining a balance by interpreting China to the US and the US to China. It is Singapore’s dream to achieve peace with and between China and the United States. Any conflict between the US and China or any other power in the Indo-Pacific could derail the postwar Asian miracle and threaten Singapore’s economic or physical security.

Singapore maintains a strong security cooperation with the US which was formalized in the Strategic Framework Agreement which was signed by US President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in Washington in July 2005. Singapore thus relies on extra regional powers like the US to maintain a balance of power and to prevent a larger power from dominating the smaller Asian states. Back in the 1990s when US base negotiations with the Philippines had failed, Singapore provided the US military access to facilities in Singapore to fill the security void and to ensure a US presence in the region.

Some analysts predict that Singapore is so keen on US cooperation because they think that the US is much more preoccupied with Iraq and the Middle East and is not paying enough attention to Asia. Even when it comes to other states in South East Asia, Singapore maintains a specific balance. For instance, Singapore’s policy towards Taiwan is one where Singapore is trying to balance its interests in expanding its economic relationship with China and in helping to manage China’s rise as a peaceful actor in the Asian security system.

Besides playing an active role in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Singapore also has a Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with major powers like the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia which provides additional security to Singapore. Singapore has calibrated its ties with the regional greater powers like India, Japan, the United States, and China very carefully. Given the current trends, Singapore seems well-positioned to continue expanding its strategic space and overall security through continued military modernization and geopolitical balancing achieved through bilateral and multilateral means.

Conclusion

After a careful analysis of Singapore’s state of affairs, we can say that the “little red dot” is not so little and it is an exception in Southeast Asia in terms of culture, ethnicity, geography, state capacity, and level of economic development. Singapore is destined to play a vital role in international trade, commerce, and finance as long as the ships need the Malacca Strait to transport food, manufactures, and oil between Asia and the world.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

‘Bring the weapon; do you support Fano?’ – a question amongst that many Amnesty International officials asked to the victims of civilian attacks made by the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The Horn of Africa has emerged as a geopolitical zone of conflict, with the security crisis coming to the fore after clashes were reported between the government troops and the ENDF insurgents in the Amhara Region on March 01, 2024. The government extended the state of emergency for four months until June 2024, which was initially imposed on August 04, 2023 over months of volatile clashes between the military and militiamen in the Amhara region.

The region is also affected by an ethnic conflict between Oromo and Amhara (Ethiopia’s largest communities) in Western Tigray. The government enabled a federal arrangement for the ethnic groups to create their own state by a referendum as per the provisions laid out in the 1994 constitution. The relations between the central government and ethnic groups in the Tigray Region, however, broke down as the government made efforts to disband and reintegrate the ethnic armed groups into the mainstream community, which was met with strong opposition and armed confrontations with the government security forces.

The federal government has been accused of launching military attacks on civilians against their alleged support for the ethnic armed rebellious groups including Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Fano is an insurgent group that operates without a formal leadership structure and is spread out into groups in the region. The group backed the federal troops in the Tigray War carried out from November 2020 to November 2022. The war ended in the signing of the Ethiopia–Tigray Peace Agreement (Pretoria Agreement) between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), under the mediation of the African Union on November 02, 2022. The peace deal called for:

• the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region
• cessation of hostilities, including the end to hate speech
• restoration of essential services in the Tigray region
• access to humanitarian aid in the Tigray region
• disarmament of TPLF combatants
• commitment to protect civilians – especially women and children
• taking steps toward the implementation of a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.

The conflict continues despite the signing of the peace deal, as the government is accused of disregarding Amhara’s security. Further, there have been apprehensions regarding the centralization of power by Prime Minister Abey Ahmed with the dismantling of state paramilitaries across the country in April 2023. Declaration of an emergency in Amhara followed in August 2023, which allowed for roadblocks to be imposed, suspension of transport services, imposition of curfew, and military to take over in certain areas.

Human Rights Violations

The ongoing conflict pose a threat to the country’s stability – the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) reported repeated outbreaks of violence including raids carried out by the forces, highlighting at least 45 extrajudicial civilian killings undertaken by the government security forces on January 29, 2024 in the village of Merawi (Amhara). Similar killings were reported in the regions of Seba Tamit, Bahir-Dar, Abune Hara, and Lideta neighbourhoods of the Kebele 14 area from August 2023 to October 2023. The government stated that the attacks are a part of ‘joint security operation and house-to-house surveillance’ conducted to eliminate the extremist forces.

The EHRC reports of violations of international humanitarian law carried out by the regional forces in Tigray and Oromia including extrajudicial executions, bomb attacks, and enslavement of women carried out during the civil war, which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. There were reports of ethnically-targeted attacks and violence against Tigrayans living in Amhara and Afar regions. The ongoing emergency provisions in the Amhara region have resulted in internet shutdowns, communication blackouts, preventive detention, and curtailment of the freedom of speech and media, despite signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement which also amounts to a violation of the right to life.

Amnesty International reported on the social and economic impact of the violations of international humanitarian law. The conflict has resulted in the displacement of civilians, with over 60,000 people reported to have fled to Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopia is home to more than 3,779,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs), with the majority of refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. The United Nations (UN) reports that ongoing violence and drought have left about 20 million people in critical need of emergency humanitarian aid. The drought conditions affecting eastern and south-east Ethiopia can also lead to  famine conditions  as observed in 1984-85.

The conflict can undermine the essence of the Pretoria Agreement, hinder reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts, and result in potential sanctions by the United States (US) in case of human rights violations. The US government announced a pause in its food assistance program due to widespread corruption and aid diversion in 2023; while the humanitarian aid resumed in December 2023, humanitarian assistance required for the IDPs is hindered due to roadblocks and only 14 percent of those targeted for food aid had received it by January 21, 2024.

Deal with Somaliland & Access to the Red Sea

The country is the world’s most populous landlocked region, which lost its coastline after the secession of Eritrea in the 1993 War of Independence. Ethiopia is thereby dependent on the Addis-Djibouti Corridor for international trade and aims to gain access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia signed a deal with Somaliland on January 01, 2024, to access the Port of Berbera for commercial marine operations and naval activity in the region. Ethiopia, meanwhile offered support for the declaration of independence for Somaliland. The deal poses a threat to the regional stability in the Horn of Africa, as Somalia claims authority over the self-governing breakaway state of Somaliland, despite of autonomy announced in 1991.

Ethiopia gained the ownership in 2017, with a 19 percent share in the Port of Berbera (Gulf of Aden), however, the country failed to make timely payments which resulted in the fall of the deal. There have been reports that Ethiopia might step back from the deal due to potential regional implications as well as intervention from Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia. Further, incongruity in the terms of the deal suggests that the facility will have both military and commercial purposes, against the claims made to build only a naval base. Ethiopia considers access to the port as a means to strengthen maritime security, and economic and political influence in the region.

Internationalization of Conflict

An escalation of conflict in the Horn of Africa due to the potential fall of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia could give rise to the activity of Al-Shabaab in East Africa. The terror group is reported to have increased international recruitment from Ethiopia and Kenya. International Security Studies (ISS) reports that there have been attempts by the terror group to call for youth in Ethiopia to fight against the federal government. Ethiopia is a part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), though the forces are set to exit Somalia by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of Ethiopian soldiers as a part of African Union peacekeeping missions amid the potential rise of conflict could pave the way for Al-Shabaab to expand its terror operations.

Somalia in turn termed the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and is backed by the US, UK, and Türkiye. Kenyan Prime Minister William Ruto in association with the regional bloc of The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been enabling to mediate the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, where the leaders reached an agreement termed as ‘Nairobi Declaration’ on February 28, 2024, and February 29, 2024. Ethiopia and Kenya released a joint statement pledging to respect the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of states’ without naming Somalia. Kenya assured of the security of the Lamu Port, South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, which provides Ethiopia an alternative to Port Berbera.

Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti raised apprehensions regarding the possibility of Ethiopia taking military means to gain access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia, however, lacks military capabilities to escalate the conflict, though the resurfacing of the issue can draw regional blocs of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia and the UAE to contain any power play in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Further, it could jeopardize the revenue source for Djibouti, which relies on shipping fees from Ethiopia against the access to the Port of Djibouti.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

Egypt has raised opposition to the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile upstream from Egypt to Sudan. The project is undertaken as a potential violation of international law and a 2015 agreement on the development of the dam on mutual understanding; with Ethiopia filling the dam upstream threatens the water supply to Sudan and Egypt downstream. The dam lies in northern Ethiopia’s highlands accounting for 85 percent of the flow of River Nile in the region, which remains critical for the energy security of 60 percent of the population in Ethiopia, in addition to aiding energy requirements for Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Eritrea.

Conclusion

The country affected by internal conflict, food insecurity, humanitarian crisis, high inflation, foreign debt, and FOREX crisis relies on aid package negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Union (AU); while joining the BRICS forum could boost the investment opportunities and post-conflict reconstruction. Ethiopia as a key member of counterterrorism missions undertaken in association with the AU and the United Nations (UN) since 2007 highlights the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. Potential escalation of the conflict could affect the containment of internal security crisis with Ethiopia relying on drones from China, Turkey, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are deployed against the advance of insurgent groups. Reconciliation and recovery efforts with the mediation of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in the humanitarian crisis and diplomatic resolution of the conflict in the Horn of Africa could pave way for balance of power in the region already affected by geopolitical turbulence of civil war in Sudan and Houthi Attacks over the Red Sea.

By: Swaraj Parameswaran

Introduction

With India geographically being the seventh-largest nation on earth and reportedly the most populous country, there is great need for it to develop a coherent, successful grand strategy if it wishes to economically and militarily grow in these times of geopolitical uncertainty. This article examines and analyses the various elements of the Indian Grand Strategy before concluding that, while India has a good grand strategy, the success of this strategy depends on it avoiding a few pitfalls.

Grand Strategy and Middle Power Nations

According to Paul Van Hooft, Grand Strategy is ‘the highest level of national statecraft that establishes how states, or other political units, prioritize and mobilize which military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their interests.’        

While it’s widely agreed that superpowers can’t survive without a grand strategy, there’s been debate about its relevance to middle-powers. But a grand strategy, as shall be explained, can be very effective for a middle-power like India to carry out its foreign policy. More than anything, and to summarize its relevance, a grand strategy helps middle-power nations maximize influence with limited resources, helps navigate power dynamics, ensures stability, helps form coalitions, and strengthens their soft power.

Earlier, Indian grand strategy was associated with the principles of ‘Nehruvianism’, which focused on alleviating poverty, taking a non-aligned stance in Cold War politics, and globally spreading morality and peaceful coexistence. While these principles still survive, India has, adapting to externalities such as the end of the Cold War, tweaked existing elements and added a few new ones in its pursuit to be a great-power and create a multipolar world.

Elements of the Indian Grand Strategy

India is an exceptionally diverse nation with a multitude of languages, religions and cultures. Pakistan, through Kashmir, and Khalistani separatists in foreign nations have frequently sought to undermine this unity by instigating grievances among the local population. Its greatest internal task is to maintain its unity in this cultural diversity.

While poverty has drastically reduced since Independence, a huge share of the population still does not have immediate access to healthcare and education. Securing latest medical technology and restricting import duties on essential grains like ricecan help achieve the required health security to serve as a foundation for long-term growth.  

China and Pakistan, collectively, pose an existential threat to India. Securing Asiabecomes crucial in this scenario. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, and Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ and military land incursions have forced India to strengthen alliances with other nations, particularly the US. Through alliances like the Quad, it attempts to reduce the Chinese domination of Asia, and seeks to balance against it. India also aims to have good relations with South-East Asian nations and Middle-Eastern powers due to their cultural similarities and overlapping histories. This strengthening of ties with Asian nations is a broader expansion of its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy- where India focuses on strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours like Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka- to augment and further trade and commerce among them.

With a rich culture, history, and diaspora, and having served for centuries as a haven for myriad religious minorities, India has immense soft power. Through its exercise in forums like SAARC, BIMSTEC, and ASEAN, where cultural and diplomatic relations between nations is prioritised, India attempts to increase its likeability in the international community, grow its tourism and education industries, and further the spread of decolonial and moral values.

Multi-Alignment. This is a revamped version of its traditional Non-Alignment policy. The focus is on building relationships without getting into binding alliances, as seen in many of India’s dealings with Western European nations and the USA. This protects its agency while fostering mutually-beneficial ties to ensure its security.

Through its growing economic strength and historical yet universally applicable treasure trove of philosophical knowledge, India also seeks to play a bigger role in international organizations, influencing decisions on issues like climate change and acting as a potential intermediary in global conflicts. Through these institutions, India seeks a greater role in major decisions that have, heretofore, been dominated by superpowers; it seeks more influence on a global stage, in proportion to its share in the global population.

India, ultimately, seeks to create a peaceful, multipolar world where it can pursue its interests and receive the great-power recognition it believes it deserves.

Analysis

While still favouring the diplomatic route, in the face of security threats, India has begun attaching greater importance to hard power, coalitions and realpolitik. This, while not exactly signalling the end of its idealistic approach to world politics, marks a shift towards a more pragmatic India that’s not afraid to flex its strength as a nuclear power and growing economy.

A good grand strategy prioritizes what’s essential and identifies the nation’s core interests. It is also cohesive, dynamic, and has clear-cut interests that it prioritizes when confronted with challenges. For middle-powers like India, it is important to either bandwagon with or balance against superpowers, in light of its significantly lesser might and resources. Middle-powers need to be skilled in diplomacy if they wish to retain their agency and, simultaneously, ensure their security and pursue their individual interests. Else, as has so often happened in the past, they could easily become pawns entangled in superpower politics, risking exploitation of their resources.

India’s grand strategy has got a lot of things right. Its priorities- national unity, security, growth, and global involvement- are clear-cut. It refuses to commit itself into a binding alliance, while still balancing China with the help of the US, and, incredulously, forces the US to get on board with its policies. It has also expanded its multi-aligned stance by relying on forums like the Quad, ensuring it’s not dependent on any single power. In the midst of great-power politics, refusing to explicitly pick sides, it exploits opportunities available to it, such as the import of Russian oil after the breakout out of the Ukraine War. This refusal to commit, while occasionally drawing criticism from some nations, gives India the wiggle room to strategically analyse world politics without being rushed into making harmful choices.

To ensure the success of this strategy in the long-run, India should decrease but not rid itself of its scepticism of the West, for India will have to increasingly depend on the West due to China’s land border and Indian Ocean aggressions. It must also occasionally be willing to ditch its neutrality, especially if human rights are at stake and its own national interests are not threatened. This will build credibility in the international community, and show that India, rather than being governed by self-interest, stands for humanitarian causes that align with the philosophical wisdom it aims to spread. And, to reduce costs and reliance on foreign defence deals, India must develop its science and defence industries, must strive to be one of the nations at the forefront of space exploration, AI evolution, and microchip development.

Conclusion

India’s grand strategy focuses on national unity, soft power, and the alleviation of poverty, while taking a multi-aligned stance in global politics. By relying on the West, but refusing to commit to a Western alliance, it refuses to lose its agency and be threatened by superpower imperialism. India’s grand strategy not only maintains its ‘middle power’ status, but also provides it with a strong foundation to achieve its ambition of becoming a great-power. This strategy is coherent, self-motivated, and dynamic- more or less suitably crafted for the world we live in.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

The Indo-Pacific region with its ever-expansive dynamism spans 36 countries spread across major continents, 16 time zones, more than half of the world’s biggest and most popular cities, 7 fastest-growing markets, 7 of the 10 largest armies of the world, more than 20,000 islands, and approximately 60 percent of the total world population and is still growing. The region has gained extreme importance in recent times because the trajectory of maritime geopolitics will herald the global politics of the 21st Century. According to a study conducted by experts, it has been predicted that by 2030, the Indo-Pacific will be home to the five largest national economies: the United States, China, India, Indonesia, and Japan. The region has emerged as a highway for important energy transfers to the ‘energy hungry’ nations of the world. However, with a rising trajectory of sea-borne trade, there seems to be an increase in asymmetric threats. In this article I would focus on the three C’s: the China threat, other major challenges in the region including the South China Sea dispute and cooperation in the region which together will give us a lucid and wholesome understanding of the region.

China

The contest for the Indo-Pacific traces deep geopolitical currents while witnessing emerging threats from various quarters especially from China. China’s expansionist policy is at the expense of weakening the neighboring states. China’s “nine-dash line” policy encroaches the sovereignty of other states because China seems to claim its ownership over other countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), a move which has been declared invalid by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in the Hague in 2016. Beijing is seeking to convert international waterways and other countries’ EEZs into its own territorial waters. Moreover if China somehow unilaterally captures the South China Sea it would close major parts of the sea to foreign fishing and forbid foreign governments from any kind of resource extraction in the region. Managing strategic competition with China has been a major challenge, most prominently in recent times.

But China’s rise is not without any resistance in the region. Indonesia and Malaysia portray a stronger defense of their maritime interests against China. American and Japanese warships unequivocally sail the South China Sea. China asserts its presence in the Indian Ocean along with Russia, Iran and South Africa for naval exercises. In Australia, the China debate has been sharpened. The scenario in Sri Lanka is very contradictory where China is asked, on the one hand, to hand back the Hambantota port and urges other nations to dilute China’s influence, and on the other hand they are celebrating a Chinese built artificial island off Colombo. Taiwanese Democracy is seeking non-interference from the Chinese Communist Party in its internal matters.

The trouble is that China feels risk and discomfort in the term ‘Indo-Pacific’. It feels it is a strategy of the Quad members (the United States, Japan, India and Australia) to contain its power and exclude as well as sideline it from the major events taking place in the region. In this context, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi publicly rejected the Indo-Pacific as an ‘attention-grabbing idea’ that ‘will dissipate like ocean foam’. China describes much of the world as simply ‘the Belt and Road’ (China’s own project of connecting the major continents of the world including Asia, Africa and Europe through land and maritime networks) which is very much an opaque term entwined with an inward-looking purpose. The ‘Road is the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics’, a strategy to extend Chinese influence into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Today Asia is divided into two big contests of ideas: China’s Belt and Road versus the Indo-Pacific championed by Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia, France and the United States. The term Indo-Pacific is a message to an ascending China that it cannot expect others to accept its self-image as the center of the region and the world.

Despite the setbacks, China keeps on expanding its economic, military and diplomatic activities in the Indian Ocean where it is trying to establish an Indo-Pacific strategic system, where the actions and interests of China as the most powerful state of the region affect the interests and actions of others. The region’s foremost strategic challenges are thus China-centric. The Chinese navy is expanding rapidly in the sea space and they have two major reasons for deploying force in distant waters: ‘offshore waters defense’ and ‘open-seas protection’. China is combining the ‘soft power’ (persuasion and attraction) with ‘sharp power’ (internal political interference), to neutralize opposition and reconfigure the Indo-Pacific game board, from Australia to Sri Lanka, Pakistan to the Pacific Island states. China has growing interests at stake in the Indian Ocean, some of which are legitimate, some questionable, and it has no intention of recognising this zone as India’s backyard or sphere of influence. The China factor also worsens the India-Pakistan hostility.

Many observers assume that China’s rise will continue, largely unabated, into the future: “Through the Belt and Road and its growing military footprint, China’s problems are becoming the world’s problems, and the world’s problems are becoming China’s. China relies on coercion, whether in the form of armed force, geoeconomics or political interference. The vital question for others, then becomes how to manage such coercion without it ending in conflict or capitulation.”

Challenges

There has been an abrupt rise of tensions between China and its neighbors over sovereignty, resources and security. In this context, the South China Sea is of immense importance as it is a zone which is rich in hydrocarbon and protein resources. Chinese strategists believe that the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea collectively represent an area in which they need to develop military control in order to counter external threats and to increase the level of security of China’s coastal region. In order to counter China’s dominant attitude, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 by the Southeast Asian nations. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, China and Taiwan, all claim their sovereignty in the South China Sea. But China claims sovereignty over the features of all of the island groups that fall within the nine dash-line in the South China Sea. The Chinese government maintains a suspicious ambiguity about the line’s meaning.

Friction is also caused with the United States which relies on freedom of navigation in maritime East Asia. The US tries to ensure its position in East Asia and that is why it tries to maintain the region as an open, maritime system. States like Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Singapore all maintain friendly relations and cooperate with the US because they benefit politically and economically from remaining outside China’s control.

Apart from the tensions in the South China Sea, there are several other threats in the region which need to be addressed immediately. The foremost among the rising maritime threats affecting the security and free flow of trade in the region is Piracy. ‘Piracy is the bane of modern seafarers. It is a transnational crime which has made a considerable impact on commercial shipping. There are some major piracy hotspots like the Horn of Africa, the Malacca Straits, the Indonesian waters, and the South China Sea. Modern piracy has emerged in Somalia which has resulted in a complex problem. It has emerged as a lucrative criminal industry with transnational characteristics.

Apart from the threat of piracy, there is a major threat of maritime terrorism. Oceans are being misused as a part of the supply chain dynamics for incidents ashore. There is also a rise in Narco-terrorism. Drug trafficking shares a close linkage to maritime terrorism since it is often used to finance terrorism, insurgencies, and piracy activities directly or indirectly. India lies in the pivot of the Golden triangle and the Golden crescent – the two infamous drug producing areas – and is used as a transit point seaward for both.

Pollution and oil-related environmental disasters at sea are a serious concern for environmentalists. Alongside several cons, they affect the free flow of trade and shipping. Most littoral governments are also concerned about major oil spills or wrecks of oil tankers at narrow approaches to harbors, and choke points affecting the flow of shipping traffic.

The South China Sea (SCS) region has emerged as a global flashpoint and as a major maritime challenge for all the users and stakeholders. The SCS has a geostrategic significance because it functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean enabling rapid shipment of goods and deployments of armed forces.

Cooperation

Cooperation and collaboration against maritime threats and challenges affecting the region is a common affair. However, this requires sensitivity and a wholesome understanding of the security concerns of other countries – an aspect which becomes difficult to achieve given the vastness of the region. India and the US are considered to be the fundamental maritime states that have a responsibility to help all the other littoral states towards capacity building and the maintenance of “maritime order” in the region. An evolving matrix of cooperation would enhance “maritime bonding” at various levels between the maritime agencies and the navies. A continued cultivation of allies and partners by bigger players such as the United States and sustained investment in international engagement is essential. Countries like India, Australia, Japan and some ASEAN countries are expanding security cooperation with each other in the face of rising assertiveness of China. There is also a prominence of middle power coalitions these days which include cooperation in various fields like security dialogues, intelligence sharing, military capacity building, technology sharing, agenda setting for regional forums and coordinated diplomatic initiatives to influence both US and Chinese strategic calculations or form ‘minilateral’ arrangements that do not include China or the US. All these would reinforce the multipolar quality of the Indo-Pacific order.

Along with strengthening defense ties, the United States is also trying to integrate economically with the Asian economies. It has been launching multinational partnerships with South East Asian and South Asian states in areas of agriculture, food security, connectivity, education, energy security, environment etc. In this respect there are initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor and Lower Mekong Initiative. It is also working on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that seeks to bring together economies from across the Pacific into a single trading community. The US has also reached out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build an Indo-Pacific region.

India, on the other hand, preserves strategic autonomy in the region which allows it to create a web of cooperative relations with all the stakeholders based on mutual interest and benefit. India also plays a vital role in securing and safeguarding the trade routes crossing the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. Regional initiatives like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) intends to secure sea lanes and maritime governance.

The Indian Navy is cooperating with navies of the region to tackle disasters, narcotic smuggling, gun running, etc. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is an initiative in this direction. India also contributes to the African Union Mission in Somalia and has begun bilateral and trilateral naval coordination and patrolling with China, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar and the Seychelles in Africa. Efforts have also been made for strengthening organizations like Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). India is also working with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Nepal for closer trade through the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The Mekong-Ganga initiative, launched in 2000 involving India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has recently expanded its ambit to include trade, investment, energy, food, health and highway connectivity. India has also associated itself with triangular strategic partnership between India-Russia-China and in the areas of trade, technology transfer and resource sharing. In the Pacific, New Delhi is conducting naval partnership with Hanoi and pursuing oil exploration with Vietnam. Even India and China participate in multilateral cooperation processes such as the free trade schemes in South-east Asia.

Conclusion

The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific is testimony to the fact that it will remain a disputed zone even in the future. China as the major power of the region keeps it embroiled in conflicts even though it promised to make its rise ‘peaceful’. Other players try to maintain the region as a zone of cooperation and mutual benefit for trade and various other purposes while also trying to resist Chinese dominance.

By: Anjali Mahto, Research Analyst, GSDN

China’s economic achievements over the past thirty years have been spectacular. In 2022, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached US$ 18.3 tn, which is 73% of the United States’ GDP, and its per capita income was about US$ 13,000. With 35% of the rise in global nominal GDP, China has been the main driver of global economic expansion. China’s enormous government spending during the 2008–2009 recession contributed to the global economy’s survival and rebound. However, as the world is on the edge of a global recession, a repeat of China’s 2008–2009 economic rebound is less likely due to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Moreover, others contend that domestic vulnerabilities including a weak institutional framework and an ineffective banking system made China’s economic collapse inevitable.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s economy grew by only 3% in 2022 and 5.2% in 2023, recovering from three years of severe “zero Covid” control measures. However, the optimistic recovery scenario does not project a return to the country’s high growth rates since 1978, when annual GDP growth averaged about 10%. China’s private-sector restrictions and stringent lockdowns have disrupted supply chains and harmed investor confidence since the outbreak began. Furthermore, the population reduction in January 2022 raises concerns about the future workforce.

Despite surpassing the government’s 5% growth target last year, the Chinese economy faces obstacles such as low private investment, poor consumer confidence, and high youth unemployment, all of which point to potential future issues.

Why the economic decline?

Economists and analysts believe that China’s era of double-digit growth is probably ended because the country’s previous economic model has reached its end and the future is unpredictable. Due to high inflation and an extended period of deflation, China faced difficult economic conditions outside when it reopened in January 2023 following the relaxation of severe “zero-COVID” regulations. Rising inflation discouraged people from purchasing Chinese goods, and discouraged domestic buyers from resuming their purchases. The real estate crisis persisted in November 2023, with prices falling by 0.5% annually—the biggest decline in three years—and home sales falling to half their December 2020 levels. Developers were in danger of defaulting.

China’s massive labour pools, which have fueled its low-cost industrial foundation, are diminishing due to an aging population, slowing birth rates, and debt-laden real estate and infrastructure projects. Since 2008, total factor productivity has fallen from 2.8% to 0.7% per year, demonstrating that real estate and infrastructure expenditures are yielding lower returns.

China’s economy has been largely dependent on the expansion of its investments, which have been supported by an ineffective banking system. This dependence grew following the global financial crisis of 2008. By lowering growth that is heavily reliant on investments and emphasizing household spending as the primary driver of GDP growth, the government hopes to rebalance the economy. To enhance employment growth, this involves shifting away from physical capital-intensive growth and producing more growth from the services sector than from low-skill, low-wage manufacturing.

China’s heavily reliant real estate sector, which accounts for 30% of GDP and 70% of household wealth, poses significant economic challenges with 60-80 million empty apartments and 20 million unfinished ones. If the sector declines by one-third, 10% of production would need to be replaced. Despite Beijing’s avoidance of a major Western-style bailout, 50 developers have been placed on a list for government support. Efforts to reduce property reliance have had mixed results, with electric vehicle and green energy industries making strides and semiconductors struggling. In 2019, Beijing poured US$ 29 bn into its semiconductor industry, but corruption and inefficiency were reported. The country faces significant local government debt amounting to US$ 12.6 tn or 76% of economic output in 2022 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a downgraded credit rating from stable to negative by Moody’s citing the real estate crisis and shrinking population.

China’s President Xi Jinping has prioritized political control over the economy, blurring the lines between the state and the ruling Communist Party. This has led to a regulatory crackdown on tech, financial services, and private education industries. In 2023, the National Financial Regulatory Administration was established to regulate the financial industry. However, other changes including anti-espionage law have raised concerns about the legality of foreign consulting and business intelligence work as China has investigated consulting firms Bain & Company and the Mintz Group, fining the latter US$ 1.5 mn in August 2023. This has resulted in a stronger state-led approach in deciding China’s industries. Moreover, US sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine have increased the cautiousness of geopolitical risks among Western investors as sanctions mean that you need to pull up quickly as there would be a lot of money.

China requires fundamental reforms, and economic challenges have highlighted President Xi Jinping’s leadership. He has shifted from a “growth at all costs” to a “high-quality growth” strategy, emphasizing resilience to external pressure, equal wealth distribution, and less reliance on export-driven growth to build an economy fueled by domestic consumption and pursue cutting-edge technologies such as advanced semiconductors and quantum computing. This move recognizes China’s new reality and the necessity for new narratives to retain the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After all, the communist government is not raising corporate tax rates.

Major challenges for 2024

The IMF anticipates 5.4% growth in China’s GDP, but economists expect a decline in 2024 due to structural challenges such as high debt and low birth rates. According to Goldman Sachs, China’s foreign investment deficit reached US$ 11.8 bn in September 2023, while capital outflows hit US$ 75 bn, the largest level in seven years.

The consumer price index dropped in November 2023 by the most in three years, indicating that China’s deflationary forces have gotten harsher. Due to low domestic demand, producer price inflation has been negative for more than a year. This has resulted in a decline in production, a rise in unemployment, a decline in wages, and an increase in real borrowing costs since 2016.

China’s government implemented stimulus measures in 2023 in response to weak aggregate demand and decreasing prices. The People’s Bank of China reduced policy interest rates, probably due to poor loan demand and a weaker currency and the Central Economic Work Conference proposed relaxing monetary policy but no large-scale stimulus.

Chinese consumer confidence is at a historic low, with households storing savings in liquid assets like bank deposits which earlier they would have spent on real estate, reaching a record level of Renminbi (RMB) 135 tn. The long COVID pandemic has been a major cause, and support measures in the housing sector by the government have not restored confidence or increased sales. The state-owned banks are being asked to provide more loans to property developers to support developer financing.

China’s economy is facing low investor confidence due to rapid Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exit, with foreign firms not only reluctant to make new investments but also selling assets and remitting earnings. Geopolitics and other factors contribute to the collapse, making it uncertain if foreign investors will return in 2024.

The World Bank has reduced its forecast for Chinese GDP growth for 2024 from 4.8% to 4.4% due to the country’s property sector weakness and potential overdraft on future growth. The University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Yi Fuxian argues that China’s economic growth over the past decade has been an overdraft on future growth that may never materialize. However, Northwestern University’s Nancy Qian Nancy Qian argues that China’s economic performance is less concerning than Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries like Spain, Italy, and Sweden, and Yu Yongding, a former member of the People’s Bank of China argues that China can achieve higher growth rates than most developed economies in the future.

Is there really an economic downturn in China?

The State Administration of Foreign Exchange revealed data in 2022 that showed that half of China’s US$ 6 tn in foreign exchange reserves are “hidden.” China’s export surplus has likely increased, and a large amount of China’s foreign exchange reserves are not included in the People’s Bank of China’s official records. Rather, these reserves also referred to as “shadow reserves,” are kept by organizations like policy banks and state commercial lenders. According to Brad Setser, a former US Treasury and trade official, this poses a new risk to the global economy given China’s size and centrality in it.  Setser emphasized the lack of transparency regarding China’s reserves as a concern, as any actions taken by China will have an enormous impact on the rest of the world. China’s reserves have been instrumental in funding the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to develop global infrastructure, was originated from China’s efforts to diversify its foreign exchange holdings after the 2008-09 financial crisis. Despite domestic debt issues, China remains a massive global creditor, and the weight of its foreign exchange accumulation continues to be felt worldwide.

Conclusion

In conclusion, China’s economy has performed remarkably well over the last thirty years, but there are still a lot of challenges and uncertainties ahead. With structural problems like high debt, low birth rates, and a reliance on investment growth posing significant challenges, the era of double-digit growth appears to have ended. The problem is made worse by the collapse in the real estate market, low investor confidence, and geopolitical tensions.  Despite a slowdown in growth, China remains a global economic powerhouse with significant foreign exchange reserves, yet the lack of transparency about these reserves creates new risks to the global economy. China’s US$ 3.1 tn shadow reserve raises questions if it is purposefully keeping it secret, and whether it intends to have a substantial negative influence on the world economy. China has suffered significant economic losses, but with such a large reserve, it may resume its role as a major driver in global economic growth, opposite to what economists predict. China’s transition towards a “high-quality growth” strategy under President Xi Jinping reflects a shift in priorities towards resilience and domestic consumption. However, the extent to which China can navigate these challenges and maintain its economic trajectory remains uncertain.