By: Seetal Patra, Research Analyst, GSDN

The concept of ‘moderates’ in the case of Middle East crisis is no more a practical lens to find a solution to this hot boil of regional and diplomatic tensions. Moderates are those who try and pursue to bring on peace, cannot be emphasized more with the ongoing Israel- Hamas crisis (geo-political and humanitarian). The moderate powers in the context of Aab world, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have been mostly unsuccessful this time around in bringing a truce to end the onslaught of the civilians.

To be sure, the Saudi–Jordanian–Egyptian axis has made enormous effort to achieve peace over the last decade, putting forward ideas such as the Arab Peace Initiative and the Middle East Road Map. While the Israelis have talked about being the only party that wants peace, they have made no similar efforts during this period. Instead, they have sought to weaken the idea of negotiated settlements, such as the Israeli separation wall and disengagement from Gaza. Howsoever hard the moderates might have tried in building a boundary of peace in this region, but they have always fallen short, when it comes to effective state building, and developing a system of checks and balances with true accountability and transparency on the cards for the political process.

The façade of resistance to reform is itself using the ascendence of political Islam as a convenient scare tactic, with a General saying in the halls of the elites, “You open up the system, and the Islamists come in.” The elite’s desire in preserving its privileges grew along with its privileges. Merit as a virtue and state loyalty were subordinated to self-aggrandizement. Religious parties coexist with Arab regimes to control the public arena and fill the vacuum left by repression by offering public services.

Muslim-based parties established a wide and solid base of support through their charitable giving and social activities. In any case, religious organizations had gained a considerable advantage over other civil society groups by the time certain Arab countries considered political reforms in the early 1990s. The political inertia that was intended to protect the status quo for the elites at first and then to “shield” society against radical ideologies instead had the opposite effect, with religious groups using Islam as a political tool becoming more prominent and the ruling elite being perceived by Arab public as less “moderate” and more unaccountable.  Consequently, the argument put forth by those advocating for pluralistic reform in the Arab world is different: “You don’t open up the system and the Islamists—and only the Islamists—come in and garner mass support.”

This unfortunate situation cannot be justified. In contrast to other regions, which have demonstrated the ability to overcome obstacles and progress, even those as severe as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab world continues to insist that its unique circumstances should spare it from engaging in a substantive reform process.

In the Arab world, a third option is desperately needed: a universally moderate political force that is equally committed to peace and reform, as well as to maintaining political and cultural diversity and peacefully achieving its goals. In today’s Arab politics, if not in the hearts and minds of many Arab citizens, such a discourse is mostly lacking. Throughout society and at all times, there must be a core conviction in and dedication to political and cultural diversity. No party can force its cultural beliefs on the rest of society; no party has a monopoly on power or the truth. Pluralism is impossible in any nation unless all sides agree that the state alone should be in charge of maintaining security and using force, and that no other party has the right to use violence to achieve its goals. This implies that non-state entities, like the numerous armed organizations in Iraq or Hamas or Hezbollah, must completely disarm and become part of their respective nations’ political processes.

A diverse range of ethnic and religious groups make up the Arab globe. These include Christians of all denominations; Jews; Muslims, including Sunnis and Shiites; and other schools of law; in addition to Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Chechens, and Berbers. This civil conversation has to aim towards a society that welcomes all of its members and sees variety as a strength. It should also unwaveringly affirm that women have equal rights and are full participants in society and progress. The best chance of bringing about this kind of genuine transformation and ending the impasse in government is through gradual implementation. However, gradual doesn’t have to mean slow or haphazard, one-off initiatives that don’t contribute to a reform process. Gradual needs to be taken seriously.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

In January and February 2024, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) witnessed a wave of mass protests, sit-ins, and strikes as residents demanded the restoration of the wheat subsidy previously granted to the region. The unrest was fueled by the Pakistani federal government’s unilateral decisions, which had long been a source of discontent. This wave of protests mirrored the events of 2022, where similar grievances were aired. Despite these fervent demands and the protests leading up to the budget unveiling, the federal government remained reluctant to provide the necessary funds for GB. Ultimately, the region’s inhabitants continue to face the same challenges, with their demands largely unmet.

In the fiscal year 2024-25, the budget allocation for Gilgit-Baltistan starkly underscores significant disparities when compared to other regions in Pakistan. Despite its strategic importance and unique challenges, Gilgit-Baltistan received noticeably lower funding across various sectors. With a population of approximately 1.25 million spread over 72,496 square kilometers, the region’s federal budget allocation includes a Federal Grant-in-aid of PKR 68,000 million, a wheat subsidy of PKR 15,872 million, and a repayment of principal and interest totaling PKR 165 million. Additionally, there is an allocation of PKR 74,500 million under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), which also includes funds for PoJK. These figures highlight the ongoing inequities in resource distribution that hinder the region’s development potential.

The National Finance Commission (NFC) award is crucial for the financial allocation and development of Pakistan’s regions. However, GB faces significant challenges due to its exclusion from the NFC framework. Without provincial status, GB is not eligible for a direct share of the NFC award, resulting in predetermined, top-down budgetary allocations. This approach undermines local legislation and hampers targeted development efforts. As a result, GB struggles with various development issues, including infrastructure, education, healthcare, and economic growth. The lack of a direct NFC share exacerbates these problems, making it difficult to meet local needs effectively. Addressing the NFC issue is essential for unlocking GB’s development potential and ensuring a fair distribution of resources, which would greatly enhance the region’s economic and social landscape. Former Chief Minister of GB, Hafiz Hafeez-Ur-Rehman, has emphasized the need for participation in the NFC, stating in strong words that GB deserves its share, not charity. 

The Gilgit-Baltistan Finance Act 2022, through the “Gilgit-Baltistan Revenue Authority Bill 2022,” has imposed new taxes on 135 items, significantly impacting the local population. Unlike other regions of Pakistan, the people of GB lack representation in the national legislature, making these new taxes particularly contentious. The taxes have led to a 15-20% increase in the cost of living, affecting essential items like food, fuel, and healthcare, thereby exacerbating the economic challenges faced by the region’s residents. Local businesses predict a potential 25% drop in sales and profitability due to reduced consumer spending as prices rise. This tax imposition is seen as unfair by the residents, given GB’s disputed status and its lack of political voice at the federal level. Furthermore, GB’s infrastructure and investment levels are already lower than other parts of Pakistan, making it harder for the region to absorb these new fiscal pressures. The additional financial burden limits the capacity of individuals and businesses to invest in local development projects, further stalling progress in key areas such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare​.

The Special Investment Facilitation Cell (SIFC) initiative in GB has sparked significant controversy and protests. While the government claims that this project aims to revitalize tourism by renovating 44 dilapidated government guest houses, critics argue that it serves as a strategy for resource acquisition rather than genuine development. Local residents and leaders strongly oppose the SIFC move, asserting that it undermines regional autonomy and disregards the rights and wishes of the local population. The leasing agreements have been labeled as illegal and unconstitutional, emphasizing the need for transparent consultation with local stakeholders. Moreover, concerns have arisen about potential land grabbing and environmental degradation. Forests and public lands are being leased for hotel construction, raising fears that GB’s natural resources are being sold off, endangering both the environment and the livelihoods of the local population. Leader of the Opposition in the GB Assembly, Muhammad Kazim Maisam, has demanded accountability from the government regarding the plunder of resources in GB. The role of the military in economic projects like the SIFC remains controversial, with doubts persisting about the extent and durability of military influence in civilian economic activities.

Development and protest often go hand in hand in GB. The region’s socio-political landscape is shaped by the interplay between government initiatives and public dissent. A prime example is the 2023–2024 Gilgit-Baltistan protests, sparked by a dramatic increase in wheat prices. Local residents, political parties, and civil society organizations expressed their dissatisfaction through demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches across various towns. This clash between economic stability through price adjustments and public discontent highlights the ongoing tension in GB. Awami Action Committee presented a comprehensive 15-point demand list, which included not only the restoration of the wheat subsidy but also the suspension of the Finance Act 2022, the withdrawal of various taxes, and ensuring GB’s share in the National Finance Commission (NFC) award. Additionally, they demanded land ownership rights for locals, the cancellation of mineral exploration leases granted to outsiders, and the allocation of 80 percent of the Diamer Basha Dam’s royalty to GB residents. The list also called for a reliable electricity supply, the end of 22-hour power outages, the establishment of medical and engineering colleges, and the restoration of traditional routes in GB.

The grassroots uprising in GB signifies a broader struggle for autonomy and dignity. As protests continue, the government faces a critical juncture to address economic, service, and human rights concerns. Balancing development initiatives with social justice and local empowerment remains a significant challenge. Economic crises and rising unemployment further fuel protests, with demands for basic necessities like wheat flour, pulses, and power supply. The struggle for economic stability and livelihoods often leads to public dissent and demonstrations. Resource allocation and accountability are also contentious issues. Decisions such as leasing tourism sites or adjusting wheat prices significantly impact people’s lives. When perceived as unfair or detrimental, these decisions trigger protests, highlighting the tension between development goals and public welfare. The dynamic between development policies, public needs, and dissent shapes GB’s socio-political landscape. Policymakers and activists must navigate the delicate balance between progress and citizens’ rights and aspirations.

In conclusion, the socio-political landscape of GB is marked by a persistent struggle for autonomy and equitable resource distribution. The mass protests for the restoration of the wheat subsidy, underscore the region’s ongoing discontent with federal policies. The disparities in budget allocation for GB in the fiscal year 2024-25, compared to other regions, highlight the challenges faced by this strategically important yet underfunded area. The exclusion from the NFC framework exacerbates these issues, hindering targeted development efforts and effective local governance. The imposition of new taxes through the Gilgit-Baltistan Finance Act 2022 has further strained the local economy, increased the cost of living and impacted business profitability. Controversial initiatives like the SIFC have sparked significant opposition, with residents and leaders decrying what they see as resource exploitation under the guise of development. The dynamic between development policies and public needs continues to shape GB’s socio-political environment, with ongoing protests reflecting the broader struggle for dignity and fair treatment.

By: Aidamol Joseph, Research Analyst, GSDN

Throughout their many decades together, relations between China and Philippines have generally been friendly and cordial. Nonetheless, intense problems in both nations have recently caused them to “cool off”, reaching a low point since their diplomatic relations were established in 9 June 1975. China’s determination to assert its disputed sovereignty over the entirely of the vast South China Sea has sparked increasing clashes with its neighbors in recent years, particularly the Philippines.

China and Taiwan border the South China Sea on the north, the Indo-Chinese peninsula (which includes Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) on the west, Indonesia and Brunei on the south, and the Philippines (also known as West Philippine Sea) on the east. It is connected to the East China Sea (both marginal seas of the Pacific Ocean) by the Taiwan Strait and the Luzon Strait. In 2016, trade across the South China Sea was valued at over USD 3.37 trillion, making it an essential global commercial route. 60% of all trade travels via Asia, and one third of all shipping passes through the South China Sea, according to the Center for Strategic and international Studies (CSIS), which estimates that 80% of trade worldwide is carried by sea by volume and 70% by value.  Millions of people rely on this sea’s abundant fishing grounds for their food security and means of subsistence.

Tensions between the Philippines and China have escalated over the last two years, mainly over two disputed territories: Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. The former is about 120 nautical miles (222 km) west of the Philippine Island of Luzon and is considered a part of the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Spratly islands are a group of over 100 islands and reefs, and while the Philippines claims some parts, China lays claim to the entire archipelago. China calls the Scarborough Shoal ‘Huangyan Dao’ while the Philippino name for it is ‘Pantang Shoal’ or ‘Bajo de Masinloc’.

The root causes of the tensions lies in the contested claims over the South China Sea, with China asserting nearly all of the region. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, defying a favorable ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration. On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People’s Republic of China under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China in the South China Sea that the Philippines alleged to be in violation of the convention. China adopted a position of non-acceptance and non-participation in the proceedings. The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as Registry in this arbitration.

China lays claim to nearly all of the Soth China Sea, including the Paracel Islands. Its “nine dash line” claim encompasses up to 90% of the sea, leading to tensions as it has expanded islands and built military installations to reinforce control, especially in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The line comprises nine dashes which extends hundreds of miles south and east from its most southernly province of Hainan. In 1947, China issued a map detailing its claims, and insists history backs up its claims- Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly Island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation. These claims are mirrored by Taiwan. However, critics say China has not been specific about what exactly its claim includes, and that the nine dash line that appears on Chinese maps encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates.

However, in recent months, there has been a rapid increase in tensions between Beijing and Manila. The main focus of it is a dilapidated ship on Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines intentionally left stranded to strengthen their claim to the shoal. Conflicts have arisen recently when Chinese Coast Guard ships have fired water cannons at Philippine resupply boats, forcing Philippino sailors to be injured and causing damage to the ships. The Philippine forces were trying to replenish the forces on board.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) took harmful measures against legitimate Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 23 March 2024, and the United States supports its ally, the Philippines. Resupply vessel suffered major damage that rendered it immobile, and Filipino service members were injured as a result of PRC ships’ frequent use of water cannons and careless blocking tactics. By its actions, the PRC stops regular staff rotations and denies basic supplies to Filipino service members stationed at Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC has repeatedly interfered with Philippine vessels’ ability to exercise their right to freedom of travel at sea and to cut off supplies to this long-standing outpost; this event is just the most recent example of this.

The PRC’s activities exhibit a blatant disdain for international law and destabilize the region. The legally binding ruling of an international tribunal rendered in July 2016 states that Second Thomas Shoal is a low tide feature that is unquestionably within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and that the PRC has no legitimate maritime claims to the waters surrounding it. The United States urges on the PRC to comply by the ruling and stop its risky and destabilizing behavior. The 2016 arbitral decision is final and legally binding on the PRC and the Philippines, as stipulated under the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. The United States reiterates that any armed action against Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including Coast Guard aircraft, anywhere in the South China Sea is covered by Article IV of the 1951 U.S-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

The tensions of the region are echoing in other parts of the world also. Germany has volunteered to arbitrate the conflict if it comes to that. When meeting with Ferdinand Macros Jr, Germany’s Federal Minister for Foreign affairs Annalena Baerbock offered her assistance in reducing tensions between China and Philippines. They emphasized the importance of establishing a peaceful dispute resolution framework and encouraging communication. On January 05, 2024 the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea convened a trilateral Indo-Pacific dialogue. During the discussion, the three nations expressed worry about China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. A series of naval drills in the area have been conducted by China, the US and the Philippines as a result go the events. The US and Philippine Navy ended their cooperative exercises in the South China Sea in January 2024. The coordinated patrol was allegedly being shadowed by the Chinese ships. China launched a second military drill in the area shortly after January 04, 2024 and the Peoples Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command referred to it as a “routine” exercise.

Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US President Joe Biden jointly released a “Joint Vision Statement” on April 12, 2024 outlining a series of economic and defense cooperation initiatives, while slamming China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.”

As hostilities in South China Sea worsen, India has promised to stand behind the Philippines. At a news conference in Manila, External Affairs Minister S. Jayashankar reiterated India’s commitment to supporting the Philippines in preserving freedom and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. He emphasized the need for closer cooperation between India and the Philippine to shape the emerging model in the changing world. India and Philippines formally established diplomatic relations on 26 November 1949. This milestone marks a transformative partnership between the two nations.

Witnessing the multiple clashes between the two countries, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 30 December 2023 released a statement on “Maintaining and Promoting Stability in the Maritime Sphere in the Southeast Asia. According to President Macros, the situation in the area has become “more dire”, and in order to keep the peace, the Philippines would need to work with its neighbors and allies. China is critical of the Philippines attempts and said that the Philippines should not become an “offbeat case” and that any separate “code” without China is unlikely to have recognition from ASEAN countries.

China says the Philippines ignored proposals it put forward to manage their dispute in the South China Sea. Philippines President Ferdinand Macros Jr said they did not reject the deal, but said it stood on a “questionable” premise. He added that China’s claims were not recognized by any country, certainly not by the Philippines.

Relations between China and the Philippines are heating up once more. Because it is the first island chain, the Philippines has a particularly important geostrategic location. Conflict in the area might arise if the Philippines erects a permanent building on the Shoal. This could therefore have an impact on the South China Sea’s regional stability in the absence of code of conduct. Owing to the region’s instability, a single calculation error could trigger a major chaos.

By: Lipun Kumar Sanbad

The question of Taiwan’s independence has long been a significant issue in international relations, particularly involving China, Taiwan, and other nations with interests in the region. Recently, China’s aggressive posture toward Taiwan has intensified, with Chinese leadership indicating their willingness to use force to stop Taiwan from declaring independence. This situation has substantial consequences for global politics, impacting regional stability, international alliances, and economic dynamics. This article examines the implications of China’s position on Taiwan’s independence, focusing on its effects on global politics and India.

Historical Context and Current Situation

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), has a complicated history with mainland China. After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the ROC government retreated to Taiwan, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on the mainland. Since then, Taiwan has functioned as a separate political entity, even though the PRC claims it under the “One China” policy. Despite Taiwan’s effective independence and strong democratic system, it is not widely recognized as a sovereign state due to diplomatic pressure from China.

Recently, the Chinese government has ramped up its rhetoric and military activities around Taiwan. President Xi Jinping has reaffirmed China’s commitment to reunification, stating that China will not rule out the use of force to achieve this goal. Military drills near Taiwan, increased incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and efforts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan demonstrate China’s escalating pressure.

China’s Motivations

Reclaiming Taiwan is viewed as essential for China’s national rejuvenation and territorial integrity. Taiwan’s strategic military and economic significance, due to its location and technological advancements, is crucial for China. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reasserting control over Taiwan bolsters its domestic authority and legitimacy. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), maintaining control over Taiwan is vital for its political legitimacy. The CCP perceives reunification as essential to restoring China’s national grandeur. Failing to prevent Taiwan’s independence could significantly weaken the CCP’s authority, both domestically and internationally.

Taiwan’s geographic location gives it substantial strategic importance. It lies within the first island chain, which serves as a strategic barrier to China’s access to the Pacific Ocean. Controlling Taiwan would enable China to extend its military reach into the Pacific and secure its maritime boundaries. Conversely, an independent Taiwan aligned with the United States or other Western powers would present a major security threat to China. Taiwan plays a critical role in high-tech industries, especially in semiconductor manufacturing. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is integral to the global supply chain for advanced electronics. Gaining control over Taiwan’s technological assets would grant China significant economic and technological benefits.

For China, preventing Taiwan’s independence is also about preserving national unity and sovereignty. The PRC views any move toward Taiwanese independence as a breach of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, a principle that is central to its national policy. China’s position on Taiwan also affects its diplomatic relationships globally. The “One China” policy is a fundamental condition for diplomatic relations with the PRC. If Taiwan were allowed to declare independence, it could embolden other separatist movements within China, thereby undermining the CCP’s control over its other regions.

Global Political Implications

China’s aggressive stance towards Taiwan raises significant concerns about regional security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. A military conflict over Taiwan could involve neighboring countries and major powers, leading to widespread instability.

U.S.-China Relations

The United States has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, balancing its commitment to Taiwan’s defense under the Taiwan Relations Act with its diplomatic recognition of the PRC. China’s forceful actions could force the U.S. to adopt a more definitive stance, potentially leading to direct military confrontation, with severe repercussions for global peace and security.

 Impact on Japan and South Korea

Japan and South Korea, key U.S. allies in the region, would be significantly impacted by any conflict over Taiwan. Both countries have strong economic ties with Taiwan and strategic interests in regional stability. They may increase their military readiness and cooperation with the U.S., further escalating tensions with China.

International Alliances and Diplomacy

China’s actions regarding Taiwan will likely influence international alliances and diplomatic relations, prompting countries to reassess their positions and alliances. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia and India, is likely to become more united in response to China’s assertiveness. The Quad could enhance its military and strategic cooperation, sending a clear message to China about the unified stance of these democratic nations. The European Union, traditionally less involved in Asia-Pacific security issues, might increase its engagement in response to the Taiwan situation. The EU has economic and political interests in maintaining regional stability, and China’s actions could prompt a stronger EU stance on Indo-Pacific security matters.

Economic Consequences

The economic implications of China’s stance on Taiwan are significant, affecting global trade, supply chains, and economic stability. Taiwan is a vital player in the global supply chain, particularly in the semiconductor industry. Any conflict or instability in Taiwan could disrupt the production and supply of semiconductors, affecting industries worldwide, from electronics to automotive manufacturing. If China uses force to stop Taiwan’s independence, it could face substantial economic sanctions from the international community, similar to those imposed on Russia after its actions in Ukraine. These sanctions would impact China’s economy and have broader effects on global trade and investment.

Implications for India

India, as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region, has a vested interest in the Taiwan issue. China’s aggressive posture towards Taiwan has several implications for India’s geopolitical and strategic landscape. China’s actions are likely to push India closer to the U.S., both militarily and diplomatically. The two countries may enhance their defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and strategic alignment to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea could be threatened by China’s assertiveness. As a result, India may increase its focus on maritime security, expanding its naval capabilities and collaborations with like-minded countries to ensure freedom of navigation and regional stability.

The economic ramifications of the Taiwan situation also affect India, given its economic ties with both China and Taiwan. India’s technology and manufacturing sectors could face disruptions if the Taiwan conflict affects semiconductor production. This would necessitate India to diversify its supply chains and seek alternative sources for critical components. The situation could also present opportunities for India to enhance its economic collaboration with Taiwan, particularly in areas like technology, electronics, and renewable energy. Strengthening economic ties with Taiwan could provide India with a strategic edge and reduce its dependence on Chinese imports.

India’s diplomatic approach to the Taiwan issue will need to be carefully calibrated to balance its relations with China and its strategic interests. India will face diplomatic pressures from both China and its Western allies regarding the Taiwan issue. It will need to navigate these pressures strategically, maintaining a balanced stance that upholds its national interests without escalating tensions unnecessarily. India’s role in international forums like the United Nations, G20, and BRICS will be crucial in shaping the global response to China’s actions. India can leverage its position to advocate for peaceful resolution and uphold international norms and principles.

Conclusion

China’s readiness to forcefully stop Taiwan’s independence is a significant development with far-reaching implications for global politics. The potential for military conflict, shifts in international alliances, and economic disruptions underscores the gravity of the situation. For India, the Taiwan issue presents both challenges and opportunities, requiring strategic foresight and diplomatic acumen to navigate effectively. As the global community watches closely, the actions and responses of key players will shape the future of regional and global stability. Ensuring a balanced and peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue is paramount, and it will require concerted efforts from all stakeholders to achieve this goal.

By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Growing India and China competition which was brewing for last few years, the development of India Out Campaign and victory of Mohammed Muizzu in the Maldives Presidential election highlights increased China’s role and influence in the country. The way China is changing the South Asia’s geo-political order, China’s reach and means to undermine India position in the region has become a concern for the India. The recent political upheaval happened due to a social media post has created a rift in India-Maldives relationship and allow President Muizzu to get closer to China. With Maldives getting closer to China under President Muizzu leadership, in coming years the gap and difference between India and Maldives will widen and cause more challenge to India to keep order and stability in South Asia and secure its geopolitical and national interest in the region vis-à-vis the Chinese threat in South Asia.

India-Maldives relationship: An Overview

Considering the current bilateral relationship between India and Maldives, the beginning of the relationship was warming as India became the first nation to recognise Maldives after it gained its independence in 1965 and establish diplomatic relationship. Establishing a healthy bilateral relationship and a closest maritime ally on many occasion Maldives supported India on various multilateral for like the UN, Commonwealth, NAM and SAARC, India supported and assisted the island country financially, militarily and diplomatically over the years. India also executed various projects like the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital, Faculty of Engineering Technology, provided tsunami aid and gave credit-line to address foreign exchange crisis, water crisis and construct houses.

As the Indian investment and Maldives support to India were mutual, a downfall to India-Maldives relations began during former President Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018) as the island nation started to shift towards China. Such a development and growing resentment towards India in Maldives were exploited by opposition parties in October 2020 under ‘India Out’ campaign which continued and became visible in the 2023 Maldives Presidential elections with Muizzu using the campaign to its advantage, thereby causing a rift in the India-Maldives relationship. Mud-slinging on X (formerly Twitter) become a watershed moment in the India-Maldives bilateral relationship and developments in the last few months are a fall-out of Maldives closeness to China and the continued impact of India Out campaign.

The Chinese Factor and Implication on the India-Maldives relationship

Posts on the social media caused a rise of hyper-nationalism on both sides, which was already under stress due to Muizzu becoming President in November 2023 and his closeness and focus on China has alarmed the Indian Government. As damage control measures failed to address the situation, at the time when Indian started to compared Lakshadweep to Maldives as an alternative tourist destination and Maldives counter response further worsened the situation. Since the incident, the reality around the India-Maldives relationship isn’t on a good term, as Maldives has removed the Indian Army personnel from the country. The number of Indian tourists arriving to the island nation fell from first to fifth position within few weeks after an uproar on X.

With a gap in the India-Maldives relations, China emerged as beneficiary in the diplomatic stand-off. Xiang Yang Hong 03, a Chinese surveying ship vital for anti-submarine warfare capabilities docked briefly in Maldives. Such Chinese manoeuvre in the Indian Ocean region has cautioned India. In return Indian Coast Guard Ship Samundra Paheredar visited Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei in April 2024. Later, the Indian Navy concluded an operational deployment in the South China Sea when three naval ship destroyer Delhi, fleet tanker Shakti and anti-submarine corvette Kiltan made port call which started with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei on May 26, 2024.

The situation in India-Maldives relationship emerged due to Maldives President Muizzu calls to defend national security and interests and restrict any foreign power interference in country’s internal matters. Although, social media post and response has impacted the relations between India and Maldives,  incidents like scrapping of India-Maldives hydrography agreement reflects that the year ahead is bleak for India and Maldives. Once India occupied the top spot in foreign visitors visiting Maldives and currently it has witnessed a fall of 54% between March 2023-24 as only 8,322 Indian tourist visited Maldives. Witnessing such a fall in tourist and its impact on Maldives economy, Ibrahim Faisal, Tourism Minister of Maldives on May 06, 2024 called upon the Indian tourists to return.

With the Muizzu government working to break free from his country’s dependence on India, withdrawal of Indian hydrographic ships from Maldives, welcoming Chinese ship and joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative will compel India to further strengthen its Indian Ocean region strategy. As China presence has increased in Maldives, India can’t afford to ignore and should ensure they remain strong and steadfast in their ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and undermine new Chinese adventure in the Indian Ocean region. However, Maldives alignment with China can be seen as the Muizzu government’s means to address challenges emerged due to strained relationship with India, knowing such an alignment comes with an inherent risk.

The recent, outreach by the Maldives Tourism ministry illustrate nation is grappling with a debt of US$ 1.3 billion which today constitute 20% of nation’s total debt. On the other hand, India proposed reduction of its financial aid by 22% to Maldives for the financial year 2024-25 has worried the Muizzu government. Getting closer to China has caused criticism from opposition and public unrest towards the Maldives government, on the other hand, they’ve ensured relation with India didn’t deteriorate further and get into a Chinese debt trap and faced a financial crisis situation as witnessed in Sri Lanka in 2019.

As the challenge posed by distancing itself from India isn’t economic in nature, the statement made by Maldives Defence Minister Ghassan Maumoon on May 12, 2024 that the  inability of Maldives pilots to fly three Dornier aircrafts due to unspecified reason have become a concern for the Muizzu government, which were flew by Indian personnel till May 10, 2024. With Maldives grappling with economic and military problem, Maldives President Muizzu vision and inclination toward China has caused trouble for the country.

Conclusion

However, seeing Maldives President Mohammed Muizzu step to ask Indian army personnel from the country to stop any interference from any foreign power in their internal affairs should come as a sort of relief for the Indian government. As the Indian government approval of extending a budget support of US$ 50 million to Maldives has been hailed by Maldives Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer as a true gesture of goodwill which signifies and strengthens the longstanding friendship between India and Maldives during his visit to India in May this year.

The visit of the Maldives President Muizzu for the swearing-in ceremony of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for his third consecutive term on June 04, 2024 has raised hopes of the return of normalcy in relations between India and Maldives.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

The AUKUS accord signed in September 2021 created ripples in the Indo-Pacific, potentially enabling Canberra to acquire nuclear powered submarines by the 2030s. The tripartite pact signed by the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (USA) and Australia aim at containing the expansionist tendencies of Beijing, as stated by the US President Joe Biden regarding ‘investing in our greatest source of strength, our alliances’.

Pillar I of the AUKUS Pact enables Canberra to acquire and develop nuclear submarine technology by the 2030s, which will be shared in the core group inclusive of the UK, the US, and Australia. The US will sell three second hand submarines to Canberra, before any new vessels could be commissioned.

Pillar II of the pact include Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea as potential members enabling cooperation in the development of military technologies such as quantum technology, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, undersea capabilities, electronic warfare systems, and advanced cybersecurity.

The expansion of the pact has been, however, criticised by the Foreign Minister of China, stating that the alliance could destabilize the region due to potential nuclear proliferation in the South-Pacific. The US Department of State, on the other hand, has reduced export restrictions enabling military and technology transfer to Britain and Canberra under the AUKUS Pact.

Nuclear Proliferation and International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

The US International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restricts transfer of technology critical to the national security, military and intelligence; however, the US State Department’s Directorate of Défense Trade Controls (DDTC) is no longer required to license or approve defense articles, enabling the industries to operate in licence-free environment. Australia, UK, and Canada are the countries exempted from the ITAR, which prevents the US defense technology from illegal usage and obliges corporates to access the US military technology after qualifying the licensing requirements. Approvals would still be required for items included in the ‘excluded list’ governed by an international arms control agreement called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The alliance can operate in sync with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Five Eyes Intelligence, with Australia, UK, Canada, and New Zealand already a part of the alliance, where changes to the ITAR would enable private companies to safeguard the technology. It has been reported that the defense companies will no longer be required to seek approval from the State Department prior to any export, re-export, re-transfer, or temporary import of defense articles from the US, thereby only a secret level clearance would be required to mitigate the risks involved.

US lawmakers remain sceptical of the exemptions introduced, due to an increase in espionage activity affecting Australian defense industry. Challenges remain due to workforce protests and delays in establishing maintenance facilities in Western Australia. New Zealand, meanwhile seeks to revoke the anti-nuclear stand, to join the Pillar II of the AUKUS Pact; it has been engaged in displaying solidarity for freedom of navigation and shipping in the Red Sea Region, amidst the ongoing Israel-Palestinian War.

New Zealand and UK remain affected by cyberattacks sponsored by Beijing, though the latter maintains diplomatic relations with Beijing. UK undertook arms exports to Israel, however, an escalation in offensive to Rafah, would result in a ban on British arms exports by the US, underscoring the alliance.

Canada aims to boost defense spending and seek procurement of equipment as the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines remains crucial for protecting the sovereignty of Canada in the Arctic; while the Pillar II can augment information security against cyberattacks in the Arctic.

Nuclear Proliferation in the Indo-Pacific

Nuclear proliferation in the Indo-Pacific, on the other hand, is regulated by the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty which bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of signatories to the treaty. The treaty also bans dumping of radioactive waste at sea, an issue highlighted by the Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles that the government will not accept nuclear waste from partner countries under the AUKUS Legislation – which includes ‘managing, storing, and, disposing of radioactive waste from an AUKUS submarine’, where AUKUS submarine stands for an Australian or a UK/US owned submarine. Canberra will accept low-level of nuclear waste from the UK and the US as a part of the deal, however, concerns have been raised against the disposal, wherein, the Defense Minister would be allowed to designate any area as a nuclear waste facility, however, there could be protests from local communities against the threat of emissions.

The SPNFZ Treaty also bans the use of nuclear explosive device against parties to the treaties or protocol parties’ territories and the testing of nuclear explosive device within the zone. There have been apprehensions regarding the operational control of Canberra over the submarines, after the architect of AUKUS and the Deputy US Secretary of State Kurt M. Campbell issued a statement that the submarines would be an extension of US naval capabilities, deployed by a close allied force.

The statement thereby, seems to pose a threat to sovereignty of Canberra, due to dependence on the US for the development of nuclear propulsion technology. Further, a wide discrepancy in funding could lead the latter to exert military and strategic dominance, though the pact seeks to maintain balance of power, with the Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reiterating that the deployment of military assets in the event of conflict will be made as a sovereign nation. Australian defense companies have also expressed concern over Canberra’s efforts to replicate a U.S.-style export control regime, worrying that it could inhibit their ability to do business with non-AUKUS countries.

Manufacturing backlogs and supply chain disruptions in the submarine industry could hamper timely delivery of submarines; meanwhile, investment made by Canberra has been backing up production at the shipyards, which could be aided by the potential development of submarines designed by the UK. Canberra backing up funding to augment production capacity in the UK and the US, however, has drawn criticism back in the country. Easing of licensing requirements by the US Department of Commerce could enable exports within the AUKUS member countries.

AUKUS Pact could turn out crucial for the infrastructure development in South Australia and Western Australia, in addition to generating employment, with civilian and military personnel deployed to cooperate with manufacturing companies and navies in the US and the UK; in addition to delivering skill and training-based courses relevant to the nuclear-powered submarine plan in Adelaide, which would enable employment generation in Australia.

Multilateral Alliances and Arms Race – AUKUS Pillar II

Nuclear propulsion technology could enable Canberra to develop its own nuclear-powered submarines to be delivered by the early 2040s. The development remains crucial, with reports of an attack by a Chinese fighter jet, which eventually hit an Australian helicopter in the Yellow Sea, near western coast of South Korea.

Seoul and Tokyo proposed to join the alliance, where the technological capabilities could augment regional security. However, there have been apprehensions raised regarding the protection of sensitive information, as accusations regarding the stealing of military secrets could potentially disrupt participation in Pillar II. The political instability in addition to economic influence from Beijing, could in turn result in imposition of economic sanctions and boycott.

Tokyo diversifying the supply chains away from Beijing, could emerge as key defense partner, however, the security architecture remains vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The security clearance bill, thereby, remains critical to prevent any potential information leaks. Tokyo has been engaged in a territorial dispute with Beijing, over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; which led Washington and Tokyo to upgrade defense industrial cooperation on advanced technology under the Pillar 2 of AUKUS.

The Prime Minister of Japan – Fumio Kishida, with reference to the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, stated that – ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ calling for Beijing to peruse peaceful resolution with Taiwan. The US, meanwhile authorized a military aid package worth USD 12.5 billion for the submarine funding dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region, with Australia contributing USD 4.6 billion funding commitment to the submarine capability.

Strategic Deterrence – Asian NATO

The funding is open to the Indo-Pacific region and non-NATO allies, as Washington aims to move to the model of ‘lattice fence’ of multilateral alliances, against the ‘hub and spokes’ system of bilateral alliances, acting as strategic deterrence in the region. The US remains a non-signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though, maintaining a collective international rule-based order might provide a strategic upper hand to the AUKUS alliance with the nuclear proliferation acting as a deterrent against the military expansion by China.

Beijing, meanwhile claims expansion of AUKUS to potentially spark a regional arms race in the region, however, the recent incidents of coercion and blocking the Coast Guard Vessels from delivering supplies to military outpost in Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) led countries in the Indo-Pacific including Japan, the US, and Philippines cooperate to secure the principle of freedom of navigation and uphold the UNCLOS.

Ayungin Shoal is a low tide elevation within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, claimed by Beijing. The blockade preventing delivery of supplies to military outpost in the South China Sea invokes the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which obliges the US to protect Manila in case of an attack by a foreign agent. Maritime tensions between Beijing and Manilla make the deployment of submarines in the Asia-Pacific critical for the protection of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), with territorial disputes raised by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan in the South China Sea. Beijing, however, raised apprehensions that, arming the countries with nuclear weapons could turn the alliance into ‘Asian NATO’.

The United States Presidential Elections in November 2024 could as well affect the expansion of the AUKUS Pact, as the country could divert funds to meet domestic manufacturing targets, transfer of military aid amidst ongoing Ukraine War and Israel-Palestinian Crisis. Elections in the UK and Australia by May 2025, with potential territorial claims by Beijing, amidst ongoing recessionary crisis would potentially decide the way for AUKUS to secure the maritime order.