By: Manvi Banta, Research Analyst, GSDN

“One can change friends, but one cannot change neighbors”: This quote from a former Indian prime minister applies to China and Japan as well. Given their geographical proximity, both countries have a pressing need to find ways to cooperate and coexist.  Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that China-Japan relations are at a “critical stage.” The contentious issues like the detention of Japanese nationals in China, limits on semiconductor exports, and China’s import ban on Japanese seafood.

The bilateral relationship has long been plagued by wartime crimes, but amid strategic maneuverings, diplomacy between these two Asian superpowers has become more complicated. China and Japan are currently embroiled in a number of conflicts, including the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a constant source of tension. Their relationship is also strained by economic challenges, such as China’s prohibitions on importing Japanese seafood after the release of nuclear wastewater from Fukushima, and Japan’s export limits on semiconductors. Geopolitical alignments further heighten tensions. China’s worries about regional security dynamics are compounded by Japan’s close links to the United States.

The relationship is complicated and deeply influenced by history, including Japan’s invasion of China and the war crimes carried out during that conflict, such as the Nanjing Massacre. The past still affects perceptions and interactions between the two countries. Japan has failed to fully address and acknowledge its wartime crimes, irking the Chinese people. 

China raises continuous objections to the visits and offerings made at Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates 2.5 million Japanese war dead – including 14 wartime leaders convicted as war criminals. On the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio sent an offering to Yasukuni and several members of his Cabinet, including Defense Minister Kihara Minoru visited the shrine. In response, China “lodged serious protests to the Japanese side” over what Beijing called “an erroneous attitude towards historical issues”. China urges Japan to honor its commitment of recognizing and reflecting on its history of aggression, stay prudent on historical issues such as the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine, make a clean break with militarism, stick to the path of peaceful development, and take concrete actions to earn the trust of its Asian neighbors and the international community.

Despite a deeply contentious past, China and Japan have engaged economically as well as diplomatically for over 50 years. After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, four major documents were signed that serve as the cornerstone of their relations: the China-Japan Joint Statement of 1972, the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, the China-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998, and the China-Japan Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests issued in 2008.

Over the years, Japan has contributed significantly to China’s modernization, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s through investment, technological transfer, and economic aid. These periods of cooperation boosted economic growth in both countries and also stabilized their relations, fostering a level of interdependence. Further strengthening their economic ties, the countries integrated their economies through trade, investment, and regional initiatives like the ASEAN Plus Three framework.

However, trade and technology have become a point of ongoing tension between China and Japan. For example, Japan had announced export restrictions on 23 types of semiconductors manufacturing equipment, aligning with U.S. policy. Although Japan did not explicitly target China, this move – which requires manufacturers to obtain export clearances for every region – is anticipated to impact Chinese companies’ access to cutting-edge chipmaking technologies. 

Japan’s action of stopping shipments of semiconductor manufacturing equipment made by companies such as Nikon Corp and ASML Holdings bolsters the U.S. strategy to curtail China’s technology sector. This decision was aimed to stop China from manufacturing advanced chips that would improve its military capabilities. Considering the importance of semiconductors to China’s economic and technological advancement, restrictions on this sector would significantly impact a number of industries, including electronics, automobiles, and telecommunications.

In addition, China’s concern over Japan’s release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear facility led to a ban on all Japanese seafood imports in 2023. Along with affecting Japan’s seafood industry, the ban emphasizes the fragility of trade relations between the two nations.

Despite these challenges, China and Japan remain economically intertwined. China stands as Japan’s largest trading partner, while Japan plays a crucial role as a major provider of technology and investment to China. In fact, China ranks as Japan’s third-largest investment destination, with direct investments reaching over 1 trillion yen (equivalent to US$ 9.2 billion) in 2022, marking a 4.4 percent increase from 2021. Both countries can enjoy economic incentives if they settle their differences amicably in order to prevent adverse effects. The primary challenge to their stability is striking a balance between security concerns and the economic advantages.

Japan comes under the security umbrella of the United States. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1951 ensures U.S protection to Japan in the event of an attack, enabling Japan to concentrate on its economic growth while depending on U.S. military support. This security partnership has grown even stronger, as pointed out by U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. The two leaders praised the “new era of U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation,” with an emphasis on enhancing military cooperation, working together to create modern defense technologies, and integrating their defense communication networks.

The bilateral relationship has long been plagued by wartime crimes, but amid recent strategic maneuverings, diplomacy between these two Asian superpowers has become more complicated. China and Japan are currently embroiled in a number of conflicts, including the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a constant source of tension.

Japan’s action of stopping shipments of semiconductor manufacturing equipment made by companies such as Nikon Corp and ASML Holdings bolsters the U.S. strategy to curtail China’s technology sector. This decision was aimed to stop China from manufacturing advanced chips that would improve its military capabilities. Considering the importance of semiconductors to China’s economic and technological advancement, restrictions on this sector would significantly impact a number of industries, including electronics, automobiles, and telecommunications.

Focusing on the mission and responsibilities of ruling parties, both sides engaged in candid discussions on the important responsibilities and roles that the two countries should assume to maintain international order based on international law amid global upheavals. The ruling parties held in-depth discussions on enhancing mutual trust, expanding cultural exchange and deepening mutually beneficial cooperation. They agreed to adhere to the principles established in the four China-Japan political documents, following the direction of their leaders.

They pledged joint efforts to comprehensively advance the strategic, mutually beneficial relations between China and Japan, aiming to build a constructive, stable relationship that meets the requirements of the new era. They agreed to promote the implementation of the consensus reached by the two governments, accelerate communication and consultation, and address one another’s concerns in a proper manner. Both sides confirmed that they will continue to promote practical cooperation between the two countries through exchanges between ruling parties, and agreed in principle to hold the 10th meeting under the exchange mechanism in Japan this autumn.

By: Shivangee Bhattacharya, Research Analyst, GSDN

In recent decades, China’s interaction with Latin America has seen exponential growth with Mexico moving perceptibly from one of the countries with little stake to becoming one of China’s top partners in Latin America. Being the second-largest economy in Latin America, Mexico is fairly significant to China in trade terms and as an influencer in the region. The article, however, will look at the many issues that will consolidate and define the dynamic of the Sino-Mexican relationship historically, tuning into the impact of the economic bond network, diplomatic cooperation, and the challenging facets of their relationship. Fresh changes-like widening trade agreements, addenda to existing ones, and promotion of investments-further bring forth the significance of the bilateral ties in an evolving and ever-faster global landscape.

History

The first contact that China and Mexico had was when the silver trade on a global scale started during the 16th century. This made Asia and the Americas get connected through the Pacific routes of the Spanish Manila Galleons. Initially, in 1972, though not always well-knit, their diplomatic relations were characterized by great form. With the course of time, the nature of the relation shifted gradually yet gradually for good. The developing pattern of this time is especially characterized with the onset of China as an entry of a member of World Trade Organization on 2001, on the other hand the same country, had started giving major economic blows in the international field. All the named processes are of a crucial nature to the relation of Mexico and China, as it involves the diversification, and de-risk of the economic partnerships of both countries.

Economic Relations

The life of China-Mexico relations is trade. The two countries trade with each other and it has emerged as an issue. The latest report has revealed that Mexico’s trade with China is second to only to the US. China is not the first country with which Mexico trades from Latin America, Brazil is. Data from official sources show that the bilateral trade has almost reached US$ 110 billion in 2022 despite the temporary setbacks marked by the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus. Most of the time, Mexico supplies oil, coal, and agricultural products to other countries, while China provides electronics, machinery, and manufactured goods. However, the trade relations are littered with inconsistencies. The trade deficit of Mexico with China is in the negative, which always creates divisions within the policymakers and entrepreneurs. It is this deficit in trade alongside the fact that Chinese investors and Mexico could not share a common cause that led to the demand for new investment and infrastructure that would help the economy grow uncontrollably as a result.

Investments and Infrastructure

In recent years, China has increased its investments in Mexico, focusing on energy, mining, and manufacturing sectors. The Belt and Road Initiative has also contributed to China’s economic presence in Mexico. Mexico is not a signatory to the BRI, but Chinese companies have been involved in the infrastructure sector, including railways, ports, and energy facilities. Some of the most notable examples are the participation of Chinese companies in the Tren Maya project, which is a major railway development intended to enhance tourism and economic growth in southern Mexico. Another example is the State Grid Corporation of China, which has invested in Mexico’s electricity sector, a sign of growing interest in Mexico’s energy market.

Challenges in Economic Relations

Economic ties are not without challenges. The firms of the Mexican industries, especially textile and electronics, view Chinese imports as competition to their local production. On the other hand, there is the issue of the Chinese infrastructure projects concerning quality and environmental implications. In this regard, both sides must strengthen their regulatory frameworks and establish increased cooperation between the private sectors of each country.

Diplomatic and Political Cooperation

China and Mexico have developed strong diplomatic relations through multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the G20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Mexico has been a strong supporter of the One-China policy, which has been the bedrock of their diplomatic relationship, while China has supported Mexico’s desire to play a more significant role in Latin America.
Their cooperation has been strengthened through recent high-level visits and dialogues. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador made commitments in 2023 to deepen cooperation in trade, technology, and cultural exchanges. It shows a mutual interest in building a multipolar world order and opposing unilateralism. Cultural and educational exchanges have also played a role in deepening bilateral relations. Confucius Institutes in Mexico and academic exchange programs have contributed to mutual understanding between the two countries. The growing popularity of Mexican culture in China, such as food and music, also offers an opportunity for soft power diplomacy.

Challenges in China-Mexico Relations

Geopolitical Pressures

It has been put against the larger U.S.-China tensions. Since Mexico shares close proximity to the United States, geographically and economically, it requires fragile diplomacy in balancing relations with China. Currently, the United States is Mexico’s largest trading partner. Any balance shifting towards China will be questioned at Washington.

Trade Imbalances and Economic Concerns

The large and perennial trade deficit of Mexico toward China is evident in the matter mentioned above. Sometimes, some Mexican firms present a complaint based on unfairness due to competitors in the field of imports in China, supposedly receiving state support. The work required in coping with such claims involves establishing balanced mutual investment and exchange.

Regulatory and Environmental Issues

Chinese investments in infrastructure and energy projects in Mexico have sometimes drawn criticism regarding regulation and environmental practices. For both parties to keep enjoying long-term cooperation, ensuring that these investments meet Mexico’s sustainability goals as well as those of its regulations is essential.

Recent Developments

Recently, China and Mexico have begun to expand their economic and political cooperation. New trade agreements that focus on agriculture and technology provide opportunities for further cooperation in these areas. Recent business news show that Chinese tech companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi expand their presence in Mexico, as Mexican companies look for opportunities in the fast-expanding consumer market in China. The COVID-19 pandemic reminded the world of the need for cooperation in public health. China has sent medicines and vaccines to Mexico; this is one example of improving relations during the pandemic. There is a good opportunity to pursue joint research on healthcare and biotechnology.

Conclusion

China-Mexico relations are emblematic of the intricacies in modern international cooperation, balancing prospects for growth and challenges based on economic asymmetry and geopolitical dynamics. Both countries should continue to better understand each other and try to address issues they share, thus unlocking both their full capacities. A prosperous future for bilateral relations between Mexico and China in both trade and political areas is foreshadowed by the proliferation of new bilateral agreements, heavy investments, and cultural exchanges recently witnessed.

Balance and sustainability could be achieved from such a strategic partnership only after correcting trade imbalances, obtaining international regulatory compliance, and successfully finding ways to live with the subtle complexities of Sino-U.S. relations. The stronger the relations get between China and Mexico, the more arduous times it will be for USA as on its southern borders will be its biggest global competitor, both economically and militarily ie China.

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has caused a significant change in the Middle East’s geopolitical scene, leading to increased influence for both the United States and Israel. In this situation, the breakdown of Assad’s power marks a strategic win for these countries and acts as a pathway for more extensive regional changes involving power relations and alliances. The resulting power void in Syria has given the United States chances to adjust its involvement, allowing it to work with new partners and reinforce its role in a historically complicated region. At the same time, Israel’s need for security drives it to take advantage of Syria’s instability, placing itself as a defence against Iranian expansion in the area. This initial analysis lays the groundwork for a better understanding how these geopolitical changes intersect, highlighting the complex relationship between internal turmoil and international strategic goals, as shown in the picture.

The Syrian Civil War, which started in 2011, changed the regional situation, causing effects that go far beyond Syria. The conflict began due to strict government control, economic issues, and people wanting democracy. As the war continued, different groups like the Islamic State and Kurdish forces came into play, making the complex relationships and conflicts even more tangled. Assad’s fight to stay in power strongly affected the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Notably, the collapse of Assad’s government has opened doors for more Western involvement, especially from the United States and its partners, who see a chance to shift their power as Iran strengthens its position in the area. This lack of stable power, along with Israel’s growing influence, raises important concerns about future regional stability and the possible changes in relationships among Middle Eastern countries.

The collapse of Assad

Assad’s collapse presents multiple strategic advantages for the United States. Firstly, it deals a severe blow to Iran, which has invested billions of dollars and thousands of lives in sustaining Assad’s rule. Even the US military post Al-Tanf plays a pivotal role in effectively regulating and blocking the Iran land corridor to Syria, which has been used to transport weapons, ammunition, and drugs to Hezbollah, Lebanon, located in the highly strategic M2 Baghdad-Damascus highway, Al-Tanf military post is strategically placed to support Israel for expanding its geopolitical and strategic affairs in the Levant region. A collapsed Assad regime disrupts Iran’s plans for regional dominance and limits its ability to funnel resources and arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This aligns with Washington’s long-term goal of curtailing Iranian influence in the region. Therefore, the weakening or collapse of his regime would allow Washington to achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. One of the US’s foremost strategic motives in seeking Assad’s fall is to dismantle the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.

Iran’s deep influence in Syria poses a long-term threat to US allies in the region, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s access to Syrian territory has facilitated a steady flow of weapons to Hezbollah and other proxy militias, undermining Israel’s security. By weakening or toppling Assad, the US aims to disrupt this corridor and diminish Iran’s ability to threaten Israeli and Gulf security. Additionally, the fall of Assad could potentially erode Russia’s influence in the region. Since 2015, Moscow had invested heavily in propping up Assad, both militarily and diplomatically. Russia’s presence in Syria served as a strategic foothold in the Middle East, offering access to Mediterranean ports and a platform to challenge NATO’s southern flank. For the U.S., Assad’s collapse would weaken Russia’s long-term strategic depth and create an opportunity to roll back Russian influence in a region traditionally dominated by Western allies.

Energy security is another dimension of US interests. Syria’s geographical location makes it a potential transit hub for oil and gas pipelines that could bypass Russia and Iran. With Assad out of power, the US could facilitate infrastructure projects that align with its broader energy strategy in the Middle East, reducing European dependence on Russian gas supplies. Militarily, the US presence in Syria—through its bases in the northeast and partnerships with Kurdish forces—has provided a strategic advantage in countering extremist groups and monitoring Iranian movements. Exercises such as “Eager Lion” in Jordan and ongoing joint military drills with Gulf allies serve as extensions of this broader strategic framework. The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim have become symbols of Moscow’s resurgent military power in the Middle East. These installations allow Russia to project power into the Mediterranean and provide leverage against NATO’s southern flank.

The collapse of Assad’s regime could create conditions in which Russia’s long-term military presence in Syria becomes untenable, further isolating Moscow from the region. Finally, Assad’s collapse would allow the US to facilitate a political transition in Syria that aligns with Western interests. A more compliant government in Damascus could allow the United States and its allies to secure favourable energy deals, curb the flow of refugees into Europe, and rebuild Syria in ways that economically and politically benefit Western stakeholders. On the other hand, for Israel, Syria under Assad has long been a complex and multi-layered security challenge. While the Assad regime had largely maintained a stable ceasefire along the Golan Heights, it has simultaneously acted as a conduit for Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah and other militant groups. Additionally, the collapse of Assad’s regime creates opportunities for the United States to establish stronger alliances with emerging power centres in Syria, particularly among Kurdish forces and moderate Sunni groups, which have often looked to the US for support against both Assad and extremist groups like ISIS. The United States also benefits strategically from Assad’s diminishing power in terms of regional counterterrorism objectives while at the same time placing a strategic foothold in the region.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, extremist factions like ISIS and al-Nusra Front thrived in the power vacuum created by Assad’s inability to maintain control over vast swaths of territory. While significant progress has been made in dismantling these extremist networks, remnants remain scattered across Syria. A weakened Assad regime, without the resources or legitimacy to reclaim these areas, allows the US military and its allies to maintain a long-term presence in strategic areas like northeastern Syria under the guise of counterterrorism operations. This not only serves to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups but also ensures that the United States retains influence over resource-rich regions in Syria, including oil fields. The Syrian regime’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah represents one of the most pressing security threats facing Israel.

Israel’s strategic calculus in Syria is deeply intertwined with its broader objective of countering Iran. Iranian entrenchment in Syria has brought the Islamic Republic dangerously close to Israel’s borders, leading to frequent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. A collapsed Assad regime would disrupt Iran’s logistical and operational networks, undermining Tehran’s ability to maintain a steady supply chain to Hezbollah. Furthermore, it would allow Israel greater freedom to operate militarily in Syrian territory without the risk of significant retaliation. Moreover, Assad’s collapse would provide Israel with an opportunity to shape post-war Syria in a way that reduces threats along its northern border. While Israel might not seek outright regime change—fearing the potential chaos of jihadist groups filling the vacuum—it would benefit from a fragmented Syria where no single actor has overwhelming power. Such a scenario would limit Iran’s ability to consolidate control and provide Israel with strategic depth.

Additionally, the collapse of Assad’s regime could create openings for Israel to normalize relations with Syria under a new leadership. Israel has successfully pursued normalization deals with several Arab states under the Abraham Accords. A post-Assad government, weakened and in need of international legitimacy, might be more inclined to engage in dialogue with Israel. Despite the clear strategic advantages that Assad’s downfall offers to both the United States and Israel, the scenario is fraught with risks. The Syrian opposition is deeply fragmented, with extremist factions such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and remnants of ISIS still holding pockets of territory. A power vacuum following Assad’s collapse could see these groups gain significant ground, creating a scenario reminiscent of post-Qaddafi Libya—a failed state plagued by warring militias and extremist strongholds. Moreover, Assad’s regime enjoys considerable support among specific segments of the Syrian population, including religious minorities such as Alawites and Christians, who fear persecution under a Sunni Islamist government. The power vacuum could lead to protracted civil strife, refugee crises, and a humanitarian catastrophe on an even larger scale than witnessed thus far. For the US and Israel, managing the aftermath of Assad’s fall would require significant investments in reconstruction, governance, and counterterrorism efforts—commitments neither country may be willing to undertake fully. Without a clear and coherent plan for Syria’s post-Assad future, the geopolitical gains could quickly unravel into new threats.

However, Assad’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah has made his regime an existential concern for Israel. Throughout the Syrian conflict, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions within Syria, aiming to prevent the establishment of permanent Iranian military infrastructure near its borders. The weakening or collapse of Assad’s regime would likely disrupt the strategic foothold Iran has built within Syria. Without a central governing authority in Damascus, Iran would face significant challenges in maintaining its supply lines to Hezbollah, and its proxies in Syria would become far more vulnerable to Israeli military action. Moreover, the chaos following Assad’s potential departure could allow Israel to increase its intelligence operations and possibly form covert alliances with local factions that share a common interest in countering Iranian influence. Israel also stands to benefit from the potential emergence of a fragmented Syria. A divided Syria, with semi-autonomous regions controlled by different ethnic and sectarian groups, would pose far less of a strategic threat to Israel than a unified state aligned with Iran. Such fragmentation would make it difficult for any single actor—be it Iran, Hezbollah, or a successor to Assad—to consolidate power and pose a significant military challenge to Israel.

Furthermore, the disintegration of Assad’s rule could open pathways for Israel to strengthen its relationships with Syrian minorities, including the Druze and Kurdish communities, thereby creating new layers of strategic partnerships in post-Assad Syria. However, it is important to note that the collapse of Assad’s regime is not without risks. The power vacuum left behind could potentially lead to further chaos and instability, similar to what occurred in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Extremist groups, including remnants of ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, could exploit this chaos to regain strength and establish territorial control. While this scenario could justify an extended US and Israeli military presence in the region, it also carries significant risks, including prolonged conflict, humanitarian disasters, and increased hostility towards both nations.

Another significant consequence of Assad’s collapse would be the shifting dynamics among external stakeholders in the Syrian conflict. Russia, which has invested heavily in maintaining Assad’s grip on power, would face significant geopolitical setbacks if Assad were to fall. Moscow’s naval base in Tartus and its airbase in Latakia represent critical strategic assets for Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Assad’s collapse would not only jeopardize these assets but also undermine Russia’s broader ambitions in the region. This could create openings for the United States and Israel to expand their influence while diminishing Russia’s leverage in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For Iran, Assad’s downfall would represent a catastrophic loss. Without Assad, Tehran would lose its most important Arab ally and its primary conduit for arms transfers to Hezbollah. This would force Iran to recalibrate its strategy, potentially shifting focus towards Iraq and Lebanon to compensate for the loss of Syria. However, this shift could stretch Iran’s already thin resources, weakening its ability to project power across the region. In a broader regional context, the weakening of Assad’s regime could have ripple effects on other actors, including Turkey and the Gulf states. Turkey, which has long opposed Assad, would likely seek to expand its influence in northern Syria, particularly in Kurdish-held regions.

Meanwhile, Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have historically supported anti-Assad factions, would see Assad’s collapse as a vindication of their policies and an opportunity to increase their sway in post-war Syria. While the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime would introduce new uncertainties and potential risks, it would also offer significant strategic advantages to both the United States and Israel. For Washington, Assad’s downfall aligns with its objectives of countering Iranian influence, maintaining a military presence in Syria, and preventing the resurgence of extremist groups. For Israel, Assad’s collapse represents an opportunity to disrupt Iranian supply lines, weaken Hezbollah, and reshape the strategic dynamics along its northern border. Both nations, despite their differing priorities, share a common interest in ensuring that post-Assad Syria does not become a staging ground for future threats. However, the path forward remains fraught with challenges, and any attempts to capitalize on Assad’s weakness must be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences in an already volatile region.

By: Aastha Agarwal

The new Ram Mandir at Ayodhya was inaugurated on January 22, 2024, after the temple premises being closed for over 500 years marking a historic milestone in India’s spiritual landscape.

The event had profound political significance since it had been a key promise on the BJP manifesto for decades and the Prime Minister himself performed key consecration rituals. The inauguration ceremony was attended by several key leaders of BJP including PM Modi, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and Union Defence Minister while key opposition boycotted the invite. Prominent saints, icons from film industry and several industrialists like Late Sh. Ratan Tata, were in presence.

A massive fund of Rs 2100 crores was raised through Sri Ram Janmabhoomi Mandir Nidhi Samarpan Abhiyan conducted across India in 2021, with donations pouring in from leading corporate houses, ordinary citizens and members of the diaspora. This exceeds the estimated cost of construction of the Ram Mandir complex of Rs 1800 crores (including main temple structure, landscaping, ancillary facilities and a Ramayana Museum). The following Deepawali celebration in Ayoydhya in 2024 set two Guinness World Records for lighting millions of clay lamps.

On February 15, 2024, the Apex Court struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme reinforcing transparency and accountability in election funding.  Introduced in 2018, the scheme allowed anonymous political donations through bonds issued by the State Bank of India (SBI) in fixed denominations with donors’ identities known only to the bank.

The scheme was challenged on grounds of promoting opacity, enabling unchecked foreign funding, and disproportionately benefiting the ruling party. The five-judge constitutional bench held that the scheme violated voters’ Right to Information and jeopardised democratic foundations by risking undue influence on elections, specifically from corporates. The court also mandated that SBI disclose details of transactions since 2019 along with cessation of further bond sales. The verdict called for greater scrutiny of political donations to strike a balance between transparency and donor privacy. 

In March 2024, Delhi’s sitting Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate allegedly for Delhi Excise Policy Scam, following months of investigations by the Enforcement Directoarte and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in relation with now repealed Delhi Liquor Policy.

Though this is not the first time a sitting CM has been arrested for corruption/scam (Lalu Yadav, Jayalalitha etc.), but the CM not resigning from office and running the administration from prison was unprecedented. His arrest as well the its timing sparked intense debates on political vendetta and the Union government using central agencies to hound political opponents just before the Lok Sabha Elections.

India went through its 18th General Elections from April 19 to June 1, 2024, bringing in place PM Modi for a rare and historic third term (only Nehru had this feat).

However, this victory came with a declined number of seats at 240 (2019- 303 seats), and a coalition government was formed with NDA allies like TDP (16 seats) and JD (12 seats). The election also saw a substantial gain for INC that won 99 seats, to claim the position of opposition after a decade. Regional parties performed exceptionally well in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, signalling voter discontent on issues like unemployment.

Voter turnout was massive with over 642 million votes cast, and the highest ever women participation with 312 million votes.

• Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Singh passed a landmark Decision on SC/ST Reservations allowing sub-classification of SCs and STs to ensure that benefits of reservation reach the most backward, most deprived groups. The court ruled in a 6:1 majority, affirming that sub-categorization was constitutionally valid. The court held that this subclassification should be based on robust data that presents a clear picture of social and economic backwardness of the groups.
• India faced great human losses this year with the demise of business man and philanthropist Sh. Ratan Tata on 9^th October, tabla Maestro Zakir Hussain on 15^th December and former / 13^th PM Manmohan Singh on 26^th December 2024.

Padma Bhushan Mr Ratan Tata, the esteemed industrialist and Chairman emeritus Tata Sons, passed away at the age of 86 in Mumbai. More than an entrepreneur, he was known to the world as a philanthropist who prioritised national interest and public welfare over profits. The launch of Tata Indica (India’s first passenger car), Tata Nano (affordable car for Indian families), the acquisition of Jaguar and Ford Land Rover, rebuilding efforts after Taj Attacks, Tata Education Trusts (TISS, TIFR) benefitted Indians in multifaceted ways. His funeral was conducted with full state honours in Mumbai, as condolences poured in from across the country and world.

Zakir Hussain, the iconic tabla maestro, passed away on December 15, 2025, at the age of 73 in San Francisco due to a rare lung disease. Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, Padma Vibhushan, and recipient of 4 Grammy Awards was globally celebrated for his extraordinary charisma and skill and contributions as performer, composer and teacher.

Former PM Manmohan Singh passed away at the age of 92 after brief hospitalisation. The nation remembered his unmatched legacy as a finance minister in 1991 when he introduced the LPG reforms in India; as a PM he was pivotal in finalising the Civil Nuclear Deal with the USA in 2008 in the direction of India’s energy security; and as a public servant who brought key initiatives like the Right to Information Act. His integrity and reputation in the field of politics is enviable. The government declared a period of national mourning for seven days​ to honour his life and death.

The ongoing archaeological excavation in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh has unfolded region’s deep-rooted history intertwined with religious and cultural narratives. The discoveries – a series of wells like the Mrintujay Kup, used for religious purposes and the reopening of Kartikeshwar Mahadev Temple can play a crucial role in revitalising local heritage.

The excavation has gained a communal character due to advocacy by a religious group called Sanatan Sewak Sangh, lobbying for restoration of these ancient temple remains.

One Nation One Election Bill proposal was introduced in the Lok Sabha as the Constitution 129^th Amendment Bill along with Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill 2024 during the Winter session. The bills propose conducting elections for the Lok Sabha as well as State Legislative Assemblies simultaneously, as was the case in early independence years, precisely until 1967.

Under new Article 82A, the term of all state assemblies will co terminate with the full term of the Lok Sabha. In case Lok Sabha is prematurely dissolved, amended Article 83 will allow mid-term election only for the unexpired term. The UT Laws Amendment Bill will seek to align the duration of Legislative assemblies of UT with the duration of LS and State Assemble elections.

The benefits include – reduced costs and administrative burdens. It will also curb policy paralysis by minimising periods of Model Code of Conducts and increase voter turnout, by decreasing electoral fatigue.

However, regional parties have expressed concerns that such a move will marginalise local voices under the shadow of National issues. Also, it seems difficult to build political consensus on the idea.

India’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) surpassed $1 trillion for the first time since 2000, demonstrating India’s strong position in the global market. India has successfully attracted foreign capital and investments to sustain her long-term growth.

The Government of India, also brought in around 102 tonnes of gold from the Reserve Bank of England in 2024 as part of its broader policy of RBI to increase its domestic gold holdings. As of September 2024, India held 854.73 metric tonnes of gold, with approximately 60% now stored within the country. This repatriation is a strategic move to handle geopolitical risks, and particularly concerns about the freezing of foreign reserves, as seen in the case of Russia. By bringing more gold home, India aims to enhance its financial sovereignty and reduce vulnerability to international conflicts, which seem to be on rise even in 2025.

By: Dhritiman Banerjee

The MENA region and Afghanistan have become increasingly important focal points among experts on National Security issues. While, these states have been prominent throughout the modern history of armed conflict because of their natural resources and their geo-political significance. They gained the attention of experts particularly in the final years of the Cold War following the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq conflict as well as the rise of international terrorism and more prominently the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This emphasis continued throughout the 1990s and gained prominence post 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan and later the formulation of the Bush doctrine and the Iraq War. The Bush doctrine was the cornerstone of the early years of the Global War on Terror and aimed to provide a Grand Strategy to counter the new threat posed by violent non-state actors like terror groups to international security. The doctrine focused on US military intervention in states identified to be sympathetic to terrorist organizations and thus ‘rogue states.’

Some of the key principles of the strategy can be said to be pre-emptive military intervention to topple regimes friendly to terrorist groups and establish liberal democratic regimes. This strategy is based on the theory of democratic peace which holds that democracies have a lower probability of going to war with other democracies and thus, it was assumed that support of terrorism and religious extremism was a direct result of authoritarian rule and political oppression. Therefore, introduction of market based liberal democracy to the targeted states would lead to a decrease in sympathy for extremist sentiments and reduce international terrorism. However, it can be said that this strategy in retrospect suffers from some severe lacunae particularly in its validity as a cogent grand strategic doctrine. A grand strategy for a state can be defined as related to the long-term national interest of the state. Thus, for a cogent grand strategy, there should be an attempt to analyze from a long-term lens rather than formulate a doctrine for short term gains. This is the most important drawback of the Bush doctrine as a viable grand strategy. This is because to be long term, Grand Strategy has to be proactive and not reactive which in the case of the Bush doctrine was the latter as it was more a response to 9/11 rather than a long term solution to the problem of international terrorism which was a reality since the 1980s and had escalated in the 1990s with the 1993 World Trade Center Attack (also one of the targets of 9/11) and attacks on foreign missions of the United States.

Therefore, it would be wrong to say that international terrorism as a threat emerged as a direct result of 9/11 but 9/11 did start the Global War on Terrorism as the event directly had a paradigm shift on the perception of terrorist groups as a threat to national security. This is because terrorist groups are an example of violent non-state actors just like insurgent groups. The only difference being insurgents and terrorists being that terrorists not only attack high value political targets but also innocent citizens to send a political message while insurgent groups attack only high value targets associated with governments to create political change. However, differences in political messaging being also one of the major differences between insurgents and terrorists. This is because insurgents generally are dissatisfied with their government and want political change through violent means while terrorists have their own radical vision of government and often follow a larger meta-narrative of politics and society. Both insurgent groups and terrorist groups as seen during the Cold War can also be used by powerful states to fulfil objectives of foreign policy particularly while pursuing adversarial relations with other equally powerful states.

Thus, the non-recognition of these features by the Bush doctrine made the strategy very limited in its objectives and a sub-optimal response to the threat. One of the important features of the Bush doctrine also was its lack of recognition of sectarian conflict within religious extremists and ignorance of the support to terrorist groups more as state policy rather than ideological agreement. The doctrine also did not recognize political repression by authoritarian states based on sectarian lines and using religion as a political tool rather than an ideology. In fact, the only two proper examples of terrorist regimes would be the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and ISIL rule in parts of Iraq and Syria both of which were on the radical, hardline, internationalist, totalitarian and extremist understanding of religion. The latter is particularly important in this discussion as the emergence of ISIL was a direct effect of the fallout of the American withdrawal in Iraq in 2011. In contrast, Iran stands as more a theocratic authoritarian state which uses a sectarian idea of religion to reaffirm its authoritarian rule and supports violent non-state actors like terrorist groups and militias more as foreign policy goals against its adversaries rather than as supporting them as distinct allies in the regime.

While regimes under Saddam Hussein, Colonel Gaddafi and Bashar Al Assad were more despotic civilian dictatorships which may also cater to religious extremists to make them instruments for the security of their despotic regimes. All these different types of regimes including terrorist regimes, theocratic authoritarian regimes and despotic civilian dictatorships may pursue capabilities to produce Weapons of Mass Destruction which may include chemical weapons and may escalate to a  nuclear arsenal for propagation of their despotic rule, to pursue sectarian conflict, elimination of insurgent groups, effective weapons in international armed conflict and particularly for terrorist regimes to escalate their attacks on civilian and political targets. The last of these is the most dangerous reality confronting the present international order and thus requires a strong military strategy to effectively counter it. While all these types of regimes engage in egregious violation of human rights which may escalate to crimes against humanity, their objectives and motivations behind them vary and while such acts should be rightly responded through effective military action focusing on R2P (responsibility to protect) doctrine, the strategies of response are different and must vary according to the type of actor performing the act.  Oversimplification of such a complex reality made the Bush Doctrine extremely ineffective as a grand strategy.

However, what is more important with regards to the Bush doctrine is its implications for military actions focusing on counter-terrorism. Carl Von Clausewitz famously describes war as the continuation of politics by other means whereby force is used to bend the adversary to one’s will. But the great General also makes another important point i.e., military strategy is subservient to political objectives and the political will to fight. The assumptions of the Bush doctrine make the political objectives of military action extremely vague and thus make appropriate military responses difficult to effectively neutralize terrorist groups. An important example in this regard can be the American relationship with Pakistan during the start of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and its transformation during the Obama administration when military action for counter-terrorism purposes was authorized in North-West Pakistan particularly in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region and finally the US-Pakistan relationship post Operation Neptune Spear. The transformation of Pakistan as a key American ally in the War against Terror due to its strategic connection with Afghanistan to a potential candidate of distrust highlights the limitations of Bush doctrine. In fact, the serious lacunae of the Bush doctrine were reflected in the American perception of Pakistan as an ally. This is because while Pakistan may not be a theocratic state or a completely despotic dictatorship, it is nevertheless a state with authoritarian tendencies and has a connection with promoting and supporting violent non-state actors in South Asia and does promote extremist religious organizations in domestic politics often with the support of the Pakistani military establishment which has a record of subverting democratically elected regimes in the country. Pakistan also has a considerable history of proliferating dual use to nuclear technologies to states such as North Korea and Iran to fund its own nuclear weapons program.

Therefore, due to the sub-optimality of the Bush doctrine as a grand strategy, the American approach to the emergence of terrorist groups as a new and important national security threat remained inadequate particularly if understood with regards to its strategy of military action and its decision to select states to be key allies in this new and innovative campaign. However, the need to create an effective military strategy to counter international terrorism through military means is the need of the hour if the tendency of terrorist groups to act like militias and participate in civil wars and inter-state international conflict is considered and their use of the internet to promote their extremist ideologies and make gullible citizens unconnected with these actors conduct lone-wolf actions is considered. The threat of these actors developing nuclear weapons or at least having access to chemical and radiological weapons accentuate the present danger of international terrorism. Thus, to conclude, while it should be noted that the Bush doctrine was not an optimal grand strategic doctrine, nevertheless it was significant because it recognized international terrorism as a serious threat to global security and realized the need to create a robust military response to neutralize this threat which was a step in the right direction and is part of its enduring legacy. In fact, as a fitting ending to this article it will be correct to point out the struggles faced by the Afghan people after they failed to resist the temptations of choosing to replace the democracy endorsed by the Americans with the Taliban regime.

By: Aishwarya Dutta

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2018 Shangri-La address provided a broad framework for India’s Indo-Pacific vision. The speech asserted India’s geographic definition of the Indo-Pacific as being “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas,” providing a comprehensive physical boundary for its initiatives. One of the major highlights of India’s Indo-Pacific vision, as was evident from Modi’s speech, was the importance of partnerships and the benefit of collaborations highlighting a shift from “isolation to active engagements.” Thus India showed a clearer interest in deepening engagements with the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Indo-Pacific region, reinstating its agenda for a Free, Open and Inclusive Indo-Pacific.

For these smaller nations or island states, New Delhi perhaps wished to position itself at the forefront and to play a crucial role in stabilizing a hostile and unstable environment laden with security issues through cooperation and ingenious solutions in an era of new great power competition. India is also granting development assistance to the SIDS countries. It was not until China began to shift the security contours in the Indian Ocean that New Delhi started to look toward its neighboring island states and even beyond that. In this article we would try to understand India’s changing focus and its relations with four vital small island states- Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives and Sri Lanka, in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2016 India created a new division within the MEA, called the Indian Ocean Region Division (IOR), which brings together the island nations of Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka for better coordination of initiatives and policies in the Indian Ocean. The division created a noticeable shift in India’s foreign policy approach, acknowledging the importance of the maritime domain in its foreign policy arrangements. The islands in the Indian Ocean are located closer to prime sea-lanes, thereby providing trouble-free access and influencing over important chokepoints and waterways. Securing the maritime neighborhood in western Indian Ocean has gained high importance. Some of these island nations provide immensely critical sea-lanes (trade routes) that connect eastern Africa and the Gulf with Southeast and East Asia and beyond. Preceding the creation of the IOR Division, Maldives and Sri Lanka were part of the South Asia neighborhood while Mauritius and Seychelles were under the Africa Division. Thus, the IOR Division is a necessary and indispensable effort to view the island states through a maritime prism as opposed to a continental South Asian one.

India and Seychelles signed several MOUs/Agreements including: Renewable Energy Cooperation, MOU for Cooperation in the field of Hydrography, Bilateral Air Services Agreement, MOU on cyber security (2018); MoU on Small Development Projects, MOU between the Foreign Service Institute India and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Seychelles; Cultural Exchange Programme for the years 2018-2022, to name a few.

Maldives occupies an important spot under India’s “Neighbourhood First” Foreign Policy, which aims to bring stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Also, both Maldives and India are key players in maintaining safety and security of the IOR, thus contributing to India-led Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision. Despite all the controversies which arose between the two states a few months back, Maldives has accepted the fact that India is an indispensable partner that they can’t lose.

With diplomatic relations dating as far back as 1948, India and Mauritius have been involved in several high-level political engagements with the two countries’ leadership based on mutual respect and trust. Since 2005, India has been among the largest trading partners of Mauritius. Apart from providing grants, investing in several projects and also giving aid from time to time, India has also signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) with Mauritius in 2021(Mauritius being the only African country to have such an agreement with India). There are several Indian Public Sector Undertakings in Mauritian land like Bank of Baroda, Life Insurance Corporation to name a few. The key reason for the special ties between both the countries is the fact that Indian origin people comprise nearly 70% of the island’s population of 1.2 million.

Despite the existence of two maritime agreements of 1974 and 1976 there are certain irritants between India and Sri Lanka. The major issue is the current status of Katchchativu, a small barren island in the Palk Bay area. Through the 1974 agreement, India agreed to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over Katchchativu but with some safeguards to its Indian fishermen through Article 5. But the article was vague enough for the Sri Lankan government to argue that the agreement did not give any fishing rights, but only the rights to dry their fishing nets, to rest, and to the right of pilgrims to visit the island for religious purposes. After the civil war in Sri Lanka in 1983, the Indian fishermen found it difficult to operate their fishing activities. The Sri Lankan Navy became unfriendly to Indian fishermen owing to their inability to distinguish between genuine fishing vessels and boats used for smuggling goods for Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Consequently, indiscriminate firing and killing of Indian fishermen became common. Despite various uproars, the humanitarian aspect of the problem was overlooked by both countries. Various options like issuing identity cards to Indian fishermen and letting the islet, in perpetuity, to India have been explored, but not converted into action.

The maritime domain is significantly new in India’s strategic thinking and driven by the leadership at the top. It is no surprise that despite creating the IOR Division in the MEA, New Delhi failed to view the region as a whole. While India placed Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka under the IOR umbrella, it left out the western islands of Comoros and Madagascar, the only two other islands in the Indian Ocean, until December 2019, which reflects India’s tendency to be reactive in its approach rather than to have a coherent, vision-oriented framework. This, of course, continues to change and develop within New Delhi’s foreign policy discussions.

While both Maldives and Sri Lanka now have a much warmer relationship with India, the political shift in Malé and Colombo was a loud wake-up call for India. New Delhi found itself in need of a better relationship with its island neighbors, as well as challenged to offer better alternatives to Beijing-led initiatives. As India examined its options in the wake of a dramatically altered neighborhood led by an increasing Chinese presence, the potential of maritime partnerships became clear in India’s choices. By 2018 the Indo-Pacific had provided excellent opportunities for New Delhi to re-emerge as a key security player aimed at securing its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. At this point the government finally took steps to provide a vision statement for the Indo-Pacific (as presented in Modi’s keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018). As India announced its Indo-Pacific vision, partnerships became the central pillar of New Delhi’s strategy in realizing this vision.

By: Aastha Agarwal

On January 01, 2024, the BRICS, in line with Johannesburg Declaration of the 15^th Summit, opened its doors to embrace 5 new countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The expanded body rechristened as BRICS+ carries massive politico-economic weight accounting for 46% of global population and 35.6% of global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity. The expansion shows the group’s attractiveness for emerging countries while providing a fresh, fertile pitch for India to stage its south-south cooperation diplomacy. 

India’s diplomatic prowess shone in full swing in February 2024 with the release of EIGHT Indian Navy veterans sentenced to death / life imprisonment/ other terms by Qatari agencies on charges of espionage. MEA leveraging its legal assistance and varied diplomatic channels enabled the commutation of their sentences and their safe repatriation home. The episode reflects India’s robust amplitude in Gulf!

It’s been a SUPERNAL year for India in the sporting universe as well. The nation celebrated Men’s ICC World Cup victory coming in after more than a decade with overwhelming ecstasy, tears, traffic jams and tequilas. A SIXER in the Paris Olympics and the latest stellar World Chess Championship 2024 conquest of “Lord of the Board” Gukesh D. becoming the 18th and youngest undisputed world champion, at the age of 18 years and 195 days.

With Israel Hamas conflict spiralling out in all wrong directions bringing in new actors, India has shown a genius diplomatic manoeuvre maintaining strong relations with both Israel and Arabs. It condemned the terrorist acts on Israel while staying committed to Palestinian statehood through a two state solution. India also supported the UN Resolution calling for ceasefire and humanitarian aid to Gaza.

“Trump 2.0 and Modi 3.0 combo” is set out to bring economic advantages to India with shared pro-business posture and focus on decoupling supply chains from China possibly placing India as US manufacturing hub. QUAD may be intensified providing strategic safety in the Indo-Pacific churning. Trump’s return also ignites hope for India’s increased access to US oil and LNG resources. However, tariffs from reciprocal trade, H1B restrictions, and Trump’s polarising tendencies need to be navigated skilfully.

India and China have a charged border with frictions occurring in Arunachal Pradesh lately. The resolution was reached in October on following key pillars – disengaging from contentious points and patrolling as before 2020 standoff. The agreement was triangular in nature with military and diplomatic engagements on one hand and high-level discussions between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. EAM S Jaishankar, has called this as cautious optimism, with complete cognizance of fundamental disagreements in sectors like Depsang and Demchok. 

Sheikh Hasina, the ex -Prime Minister of Bangladesh, was ousted in August 2024 after a wave of intense protests against her touted “authoritarian” regime. On one hand, India sheltered Hasina, while maintaining diplomatic ties with interim government for the sake of regional security. India has been vocal on protection of minorities and revival of democratic norms in Bangladesh despite being wary of increasing Bangladesh-China-Pakistan axis. India’s foreign secretary visited the riot torn country to project India’s commitment to stability while high level talks have been scheduled to explore and revitalise stalled economic and trade relations. 

Finally, after a decade of recognising 21^st June (summer solstice) as International Day of Yoga, the world celebrated its inaugural World Meditation Day on 21^st December 2024, (winter solstice) on the theme “Meditation for Inner Peace and Global Harmony,” clearly aligning with UN Sustainable Development Goals. Gurudev Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, piloted a global ‘dhyana’ session as he emphasised the benefits of meditation in mental clarity, emotional resilience and societal harmony. The date also marks the start of Uttarayana in Indian tradition, an auspicious period for inner reflection. Another feat in India’s Soft Power Diplomacy!