The post-World War II period saw the importance of Italy in the European context. The early 1950s witnessed the efforts of countries towards the integration of Europe, a project which was constantly backed by the Italian government. However, widespread political instability, fragile administrative structure and substandard policy coordination sabotaged Italy’s participation compared to the contributions of Germany or France. Despite this, Italy showcased its commitment towards economic and political integration by becoming one of the six founding members of the European Community (EC). The country’s commitment was rooted in the recognition that European integration would facilitate its alignment with the Western Bloc, thus ensuring its security and economic opportunity.
For Italy, the European Community was a platform for political and economic modernisation within which the country could enhance its domestic position. The initial domestic hostility towards integration within the country faded in the face of these newfound opportunities. From the mid-1970s, opinion surveys undertaken expressed the strong and consistent consensus built within the Italian public in favour of unifying Western Europe and extending cooperation. The country remained at the forefront in favouring actions towards a unified political and economic European Union.
At every crucial point in the process of European integration, Italy constantly advocated for the improvement of European institutions and wider policy coordination at the EU level. In 1970, Italy proposed a federal union in support of direct elections to the European parliament and a rise in the power of the parliament members. Similarly, Italy was at the forefront in campaigning for reforms such as the Single European Act of 1985, the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.
Italy’s dedication to European integration can be perceived through its efforts to stabilise and integrate the Western Balkans into the European political and economic system. The region of the West Balkans, comprising Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, underwent border disputes, ethnic rivalries, political tensions, foreign influence and instability, making their accession to the EU a painstaking process. However, institutions such as the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) and the Central European Initiative (CEI), endorsed and supported by Italy, spearheaded the process while maintaining the regional balance.
The country’s importance in Europe also stems from its geographical position, allowing it to act as a bridge between Europe, Africa and West Asia. During the Italy-Africa Summit, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni reiterated the country’s efforts to establish and strengthen ties. She expressed, “Italy is making a precise foreign policy choice, which will lead to giving Africa a place of honour on the agenda of our G7 presidency.” The conference focused on the Mattei Plan, which was instituted to “reflect Italy’s commitment to fostering development and cooperation across Africa.” PM Meloni defined the plan as a “new approach to Africa” while stressing Italy’s aim to internationalise and Europeanise the Mattei Plan, thus inadvertently acting as a link between Europe and Africa.
Italy’s role in the international sphere depicts its ability to balance its desires of European integration while expanding its Mediterranean ambitions. Regardless of the country’s volatile domestic politics and changing governments, Italy’s governments have maintained their Mediterranean orientation. Furthermore, the country’s Mediterranean stance has altered its perception in the eyes of the United States of America as well as the EU states. Previously, the US has beckoned Italy’s help in stabilising Libya, Lebanon and Tunisia. Over the past decade, Italy has strengthened its Mediterranean positioning while navigating the opportunities and challenges posed by its geopolitical environment. By doing so, the country has constantly endeavoured to leverage its Mediterranean position, policies and identity to strengthen its foothold in both Europe and the Atlantic.
Furthermore, Italy’s foreign policy reorientation has reflected the country’s diverse Mediterranean and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) interests. The Sahel region, a region associated with violent regional conflicts and instability, alongside Tunisia and Libya, has become a focal point of Italy’s foreign policy action. This strategic shift of Italy can be understood through its realigned diplomatic priorities and deployment of military and international civilian missions. These missions focused on the MENA regions, aimed to develop partnerships with local governments while reinforcing Italy’s coordination with its European, NATO and transatlantic counterparts. This novel reorientation was backed by a notable increase in the funding for African operations of 16 per cent in 2018 as compared to the 9 per cent in 2017.
Italy’s location at the centre of the Mediterranean grants it a natural sphere of influence over the region. The Italian peninsula bridges the gap between Europe and the eastern Maghreb. Strategically located, the Italian coastline lies in close proximity to the main Mediterranean maritime route stretching from the Suez Canal to the Strait of Gibraltar. Additionally, the strategic location of the Italian ports provides them with an exclusive connection with landlocked Central European countries such as Switzerland, Austria and Hungary. In addition to this, the ports of Trieste, Genoa, Livorno, Gioia Tauro and Naples have been considered as the “powerhouses for centuries, linking Europe, Asia and Africa”. While these ports rate low on the sustainability scale, they are known to handle a large quantity of goods and passengers, facilitating both international and domestic trade.
Geographical advantage aside, Italy’s economic prowess ranks it third amongst its EU member-states, behind Germany and France. With a GDP of US$ 2.372 trillion, the country represents 12 per cent of Europe’s GDP and ranks 10th in terms of World Economies. In 2022, the International Monetary Fund estimated Italy’s GDP Per Capita (PPP) to be approximately US$ 54,259, just under the EU-27 average of US$ 56,970. Italy, therefore, marks its spot as a major economic power within the European Union. However, this superior economic position is not without weakness, including a history of political instability and investor mistrust.
Although economically significant, observers view the state as a potential source of risk which could sabotage the European system with its unresolved vulnerabilities and issues. Within Europe, Italy’s political system is perceived to be highly unstable, thus jeopardising its credibility and investor confidence. In 2011, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was pushed out of power after nearly bankrupting the country. What followed was an onslaught of reforms and measures to regain Italy’s position amongst the world economies. Slashing of public spending alongside measures against tax evasions did contribute to growth from 2015 onwards, but it was struck down when the Italian GDP fell by -9 per cent in the aftermath of the global pandemic, COVID-19.
In the post-pandemic years, the Italian economy witnessed a slow growth of 0.7 per cent in 2023 as compared to the 3.9 per cent of 2022. However, its economic performance trumped the Eurozone Average of -0.4 per cent. Reduction of energy renovation measures, monetary tightening, staggering public deficits, and a rapidly ageing population disadvantage Italy compared to its European counterparts. Furthermore, despite being the second largest manufacturing power in Europe, the sector witnessed a deceleration with a 2.5 per cent fall in production primarily due to the reduction in the production of durable goods.
The international politics experienced drastic changes with the appointment of US President Donald Trump, whose policies prioritised America while imposing exorbitant tariffs on its trading partners. Following the announcement of the new tariff regime, Prime Minister Meloni became the first European leader to visit President Trump to negotiate the effects of the imposition on the European Union. Her diplomatic prowess and strategic actions earned her the favour of President Trump, making her the only European leader to attend his inauguration. Meloni’s far-right politics provide her an ally in Trump, who, like her, shares an aversion to “woke” politics, immigration, and policies of diversity, equity and inclusion. As per international analysts, Meloni’s strengthening alliance with Trump advantages Europe by neutralising the weakness posed by the political instability in Germany and France under former Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron, respectively.
Despite differences in stances regarding Ukraine, the US-Italy relationship has flourished. Italy has openly declared its support for Ukraine despite the contrary position of the Trump administration. In 2025, Rome conducted the fourth edition of the Annual Ukraine Recovery Conference, intended to gather monetary and diplomatic support for the country in the war against Russia. As per reports, the Meloni administration will disclose a €300 million scheme for Italian companies to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, while European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is anticipated to unveil EU guarantees in favour of investment.
Despite the Trump administration’s indifference towards Ukraine, Italy’s pro-Ukrainian stance has not tainted the relationship. The imprisonment and subsequent release of Italian Journalist Cecilia Sala in exchange for the US-issued arrest of Iranian national Mohammad Abedini illustrated the extent of diplomatic influence PM Meloni has over the Trump administration. Despite Trump’s position of deserting NATO- a military alliance heavily depended on by Europe for its security, the country’s favourable position with Italy offers hope that Rome could serve as a bridge between the US and Europe, allowing Washington to preserve its influence over the region.
Italy’s significance in European geopolitics lies in its ability to forge its geography with strategic, economic and diplomatic orientation while cultivating a rising Mediterranean position. From its early commitment to European integration to its evolving role in MENA affairs, Italy has continued to position itself as a catalyst for regional stability and political cooperation. Despite its internal vulnerabilities, Italy has undertaken new avenues to establish European expansion, maintaining itself as a conduit between Europe and Africa while simultaneously building stronger ties with the United States. By navigating its Atlantic relations while sustaining its European commitments, Italy has sought to mitigate the void created by France and Germany’s recent political turbulence.
In recent months, people in Japan have become used to waking up to alerts warning of missiles flying overhead. These aren’t drills or false alarms; they’re real missile launches, mainly from North Korea, and they’ve become more frequent in 2024 and 2025. For many, the sound of the J-Alert system has gone from shocking to routine. Schools pause their classes, commuters are told to stay underground, and conversations about safety are now part of everyday life.
North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, especially the testing of solid-fuel ICBMs, have triggered serious concern across Japan. In response, the Japanese government has increased defence spending, strengthened its alliance with the United States, and taken steps that would have been unthinkable a decade ago, like acquiring counterstrike capabilities. The official explanation is simple: deterrence and national security. But the roots of this tension go much deeper than that.
North Korea’s missile tests have become a familiar and unsettling part of life for people in Japan. In March 2024, a solid-fuel ballistic missile flew directly over Hokkaido, triggering the national J-Alert system and sparking immediate panic. Just ten months later, in January 2025, another missile passed over Okinawa, once again forcing millions of residents to seek cover. These incidents aren’t isolated; they’re part of a pattern of increasingly aggressive missile launches that have escalated regional tensions and unsettled daily life in Japan.
The psychological toll is hard to ignore. Frequent emergency alerts have led to what some experts are calling “fear fatigue.” While people are still concerned, the repetition has made many numb or sceptical. A 2025 public opinion survey found that nearly 70% of Japanese respondents were worried about North Korea’s actions, yet nearly half also expressed doubt about whether the government’s response strategies were actually effective or realistic. For schoolchildren and rural communities, where shelter infrastructure is limited, the impact is especially stark. Some schools have introduced regular missile drill routines, and parents worry not just about safety, but about the emotional toll on their children. Life has started to revolve around a kind of quiet, constant anxiety.
In response, Japan has made significant policy shifts. Defence spending is at its highest level since World War II. The government has expanded cooperation with the United States and invested in counterstrike capabilities, a move that reflects a new interpretation of Japan’s pacifist constitution (Article 9). These are historic changes, but whether they actually make people feel safer remains an open question.
The hostility between North Korea and Japan isn’t only about missiles and military threats, it’s also rooted in history that has never really been resolved. Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945 remains a deep and painful wound, especially for North Korea, where anti-Japanese sentiment is part of national identity and political ideology. The colonial period was marked by forced labour, cultural suppression, and violence, all of which continue to shape how North Korea sees Japan today.
North Korea often portrays Japan as a fascist and imperialist threat, not just in official speeches but in school textbooks, media, and public events. This image isn’t simply about the past—it’s used to justify North Korea’s military buildup and nuclear ambitions. In Pyongyang’s eyes, a strong defence is needed because the old enemy has not changed. From the Japanese side, efforts at reconciliation have been inconsistent. While there have been official apologies, many Koreans, North and South, view them as too vague or insincere. The issue of comfort women and forced labour remains especially sensitive. At the same time, conservative Japanese politicians have been accused of downplaying or erasing wartime atrocities in school curricula and public discourse.
For North Korea, then, Japan isn’t just a strategic rival. It represents a historical humiliation that has never been addressed properly. That emotional weight makes diplomacy harder because any engagement is filtered through decades of unresolved anger and mistrust. This isn’t just politics, its memory, identity, and pride. And that’s much harder to negotiate.
For Kim Jong-un, Japan is a convenient and familiar villain. Blaming external enemies is a common tactic used to distract from internal problems, and North Korea has plenty: ongoing food shortages, harsh international sanctions, and dissatisfaction among elites. By launching missiles and warning of foreign aggression, the regime rallies public unity and deflects criticism. These shows of force are framed as acts of national pride and survival, reinforcing the image of North Korea as a strong and independent state standing up to its historical oppressors.
On the Japanese side, the political use of tension looks different but serves a similar purpose. In recent years, particularly under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, there has been a clear shift toward a more assertive defence posture. In 2024, the government approved plans to acquire counterstrike capabilities, marking a major reinterpretation of Japan’s postwar constitution. The move was widely seen as a response to public anxiety and a way to gain support from right-leaning voters who want a tougher stance on national security.
Among all the sources of tension between Japan and North Korea, the abductions issue stands out as one of the most emotionally charged. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, North Korean agents kidnapped at least 17 Japanese citizens, most of them young, and brought them to North Korea to train spies or serve in other covert roles. The Japanese public was largely unaware of this until the early 2000s, when Pyongyang admitted to a few of the abductions during a rare diplomatic thaw in 2002.
Since then, the issue has remained deeply personal and politically sensitive. North Korea maintains that the matter is closed, claiming that some abductees have died and others were returned. Japan, however, insists the full truth has not come out. Without a full accounting and return of all remains or survivors, Tokyo refuses to consider any move toward diplomatic normalisation.
The Japan–North Korea standoff doesn’t exist in a vacuum; it’s shaped and intensified by the roles of two major global players: China and the United States. Both powers have their own stakes in Northeast Asia, and their actions often complicate any chance of de-escalation between Tokyo and Pyongyang.
China, while not openly defending North Korea’s missile tests, remains its closest ally and economic lifeline. Beijing sees North Korea as a strategic buffer against U.S. influence in the region and is wary of anything that would destabilise the status quo. At the same time, China is increasingly uncomfortable with Japan’s growing defence posture. Japanese military modernisation and closer ties with the U.S. are viewed in Beijing as a threat, not just to regional balance, but to China’s own ambitions in places like the East China Sea, where territorial disputes with Japan are ongoing. In this way, China’s rivalry with Japan indirectly fuels Pyongyang’s narrative and defiance.
The United States, meanwhile, plays the role of Japan’s primary security partner. U.S. military bases on Japanese soil make Japan a key part of Washington’s strategic footprint in the region, but also a target in North Korea’s eyes. Under the Biden administration’s 2024 Northeast Asia Strategy, the U.S. upgraded its missile defence systems in both Japan and South Korea. Then, in 2025, large-scale trilateral military drills involving all three countries further antagonised North Korea, which saw them as preparation for regime change.
Despite the hostile rhetoric and rising military posturing, there have been small but meaningful efforts to open channels of communication between Japan and North Korea. In 2024, a quiet round of backchannel talks was held in Mongolia, a neutral ground where Japanese and North Korean diplomats met for informal discussions. While no major breakthroughs came out of it, the meeting itself signalled that both sides, at least behind the scenes, may still see value in dialogue.
In parallel, South Korea has been pushing for what it calls “audience diplomacy”, creating public support for peace by engaging with citizens across the region. Japan has expressed interest in similar outreach efforts, with the possibility of joint engagement programs that include all three nations. Civil society groups, including NGOs focused on peace education and youth exchanges, are also quietly doing the work that governments often won’t.
Still, these efforts are fragile. They’re often overshadowed by missile tests, military drills, and political speeches aimed at scoring points at home. But they remind us that diplomacy isn’t always loud or headline-making. Sometimes, the groundwork for peace is laid in small, easily overlooked moments, ones that may one day matter more than we expect.
The tension between North Korea and Japan is often framed in terms of missile ranges, sanctions, and military alliances, but the reality is far more complex. As it has previously been argued, the standoff is deeply shaped by historical trauma, emotional memory, and political performance. It’s not just about what’s happening in the sky or on radar screens; it’s about what’s left unresolved in the past, and how both governments continue to use that tension to serve internal agendas.
There’s also a growing sense of fatigue on both sides. Ordinary people, whether in Tokyo or Pyongyang, are less interested in grand narratives and more concerned with safety, stability, and dignity. Many Japanese citizens don’t want to live in constant fear of missile alerts, just as many North Koreans likely want a life free from isolation and insecurity. But policies focused only on military deterrence or political symbolism are unlikely to meet those needs.
Peace in this region isn’t going to come all at once, and it probably won’t come soon. But peace doesn’t always mean treaties and summits. Sometimes, it starts with smaller acts: quiet diplomacy, cultural exchanges, or simply choosing dialogue over escalation. Those small steps matter.
A student in Hokkaido, when interviewed after a missile drill in early 2025, said, “I don’t want to learn how to hide. I want to learn how to live.” That one sentence captures what’s at stake. Moving forward, leaders on both sides, and their allies, need to listen to voices like that and focus less on power, more on people.
In International Politics, the universally accepted oldest actor is known to be the state. But with the advent of globalisation, there have been advent of multiple actors outside the purview of the state, such as MNCs. TNCs, IGOs, NGOs, Civil Societies, Terrorist Organisations, Religious Organisations or Diasporas, termed as non-state actors. In modern day affairs of the state these actors have made an impact over the decision-making process. As an off-shoot of globalisation, the cyber space has emerged as the newest strand in international politics. The virtual communities have been serving as an influencer of states’ decision-making.
International politics is known to be governed by various policies which emerges from a proliferation of various state actors, alongside the backing of the principle of good governance. Having said that, the key consideration argument is that a major role of state decision-making and policy design is being influenced by the emergence of various non-state actors within international politics, ranging from sub-state actors, inter-governmental organisations, MNCs and TNCs, NGOs, communities within cyberspace various international groupings with criminal intent, and extremist and terrorist organisations, leading to a phenomenon regarded as the depleting role of the state.
The idea of good governance, coupled with globalisation and global change has given rise to multiple non-state actors and new forms of multi-actor and multilevel governance. One of the major underpinnings of globalisation has been technological change or development of Information and Communication Technologies. The internet and international telephony have been one of the key tools of transnational networking, which have contributed to the growth of non-state actors’ involvement in global governance. Although states also benefit from the development of ICTs, but its returns are enjoyed by the non-state actors more. It reduces the ability of the state to act as a gatekeeper between state polity and international governance, thus enabling easy and cheap communication across boundaries which facilitates transnational governance. This helps non-state actors to monitor state and corporate behaviour and to assess their adherence to international and transnational standards.
With the rapid development and the advancement of ICTs in the 21st century, the world has witnessed the emergence of a number of non-state actors in the cyberspace. Although different cyberspace non-state actors (CNSA) operate with different motives – some are financially motivated, which the others have some sort of political motivation. Nevertheless, all these actors have a growing crucial importance within society with the capability to influence state decision. With the passage of time, the number of non-state actors operating in the cyberspace, using cyber tool in warfare to make a hard attribution similar to conventional warfare, are increasing. The asymmetric nature and the low barriers for entry within the cyberspace have been a growing concern for every government, thus influencing various legal actions. This makes the cyberspace an interesting arena for both the nation-state and the non-state actors.
Cyberspace non-state actors can be classified based on their motivation, form of organisation, and their relation to the host state. Some CNSA could help the government financially, by providing them with the profits generated by malicious activities or conduct operations for the political or ideological motives of the state. Some CNSA operates unofficially, but under the control of the host state, i.e., military and intelligence agencies, while some offer immunity to state’s actions to foreign entities. On the contrary, a starkly different kind of CNSAs are the ones which have no connection to the state, rather has political or ideological motives which opposes the state’s ideology, i.e., terrorist organisations or extremist groups operating within the cyberspace.
Organisations within the cyberspace operating with criminal intent, have cumulatively been regarded as world’s third largest economy after the United States and China. Cybercrime was estimated to cost US$ 10.5 trillion annually to global economy by 2025, according to the Internet Crime Report 2020 which was released in 2021. The resultant causes of cybercrime activities often include destruction of data and infrastructure, intellectual properties, and theft of personal and financial data, which more often than not poses a threat to the state structure. Herein lies the question of the degree and kind of damage cyberspace non-state actors pose to nation-state.
To understand the role CNSAs play in state diplomacy, we can cite the example of the collective called ‘Anonymous’ operating in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is significant from the spectrum of international law and geopolitics. In this particular scenario a non-state actor, with unmarked territory or any territorial sovereignty, is moving war to a state. With reference to this, a number of questions arise – how would international law be applicable in such scenario? What are the possible state actions to bring peace? How would cyber diplomacy play out in this regard? To understand this, it is imperative for us to understand the negative and positive impacts these actors have over state decisions.
From a negative standpoint, the certain CNSAs work with the aim to damage critical infrastructures, private businesses and government organisations, which ripples out a direct impact on the economic and social stability of the government. The issue of individual privacy is also questioned with the presence of a string CNSA in a particular state. With the emergence of Artificial Intelligence and Deepfake AI tools, impersonation of any individuals sits at the fingertips of cyber criminals, making state prone to unforeseen threats. International Politics has witnessed a number of cyber threats over the years. Examples can be cited of the Stuxnet Virus which attacked the Iranian Nuclear Program, the cyber-attack in Estonia in 2007, and the attack on Ukrainian rocket forces and artillery by group called Fancy Bear in 2014 and 2016.
The positive side of the spectrum is that if these CNSAs are taken to act within the purview of the state, it could bear encouraging effects socio-economically. In an era where cyberspace is dictating the way of life, and the introduction of Metaverse and augmented reality determines the way we connect socially or how we work, the usage of these actors within the state system as ‘competent tools’ would increase the state’s capability to secure the socio-economic spheres of cyberspace. As long as the aim and motive of the CNSAs align with that of the state, it benefits both the parties involved. It enhances cyber-competence, while also being available to be used a tool of retaliation which often beyond laws and regulations.
The states do often opt to enter into collaboration with CNSAs for using them covertly in cyberwarfare. Often the usage of conventional techniques of warfare comes with certain political, legal, and military burden, and the adherence to the IHL becomes absolutely imperative. Thus, opting to use irregular forces, i.e., cyberwarfare helps state skip the burden of IHL rules and regulations. It also helps the state move past the questions of legality due to the difficulty in tracing the link of the attack between the state and a cyberspace non-state actor.
To conclude, cyberspace and the actors within it are growing important with the passage of time which poses a severe concern for states. With the fast-paced advancement, newer forms of technologies will be at the disposal various non-state actors operating within the cyberspace. It might have a two-fold reaction towards state polity. It could either pose a direct threat to the state, or it can be brought under state legitimacy to carry out covert operations or to secure more efficient cyberspace for the state. Nevertheless, there will be a constant oscillation of the impacts of the emergence of non-state actors within the cyberspace and the ready availability of advanced technologies for them. The state’s reaction towards such actors would determine whether or not it would increase or decrease the gravity of the issue of cyber defense.
Bangladesh, China & Pakistan’s flags: source Internet
On July 04, 2025 Lieutenant General Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in a seminar in New Delhi candidly spoke of Pakistan receiving live updates of the Indian Army’s vectors from China, as the two nuclear-armed neighbours were embroiled in the 88-hour military confrontation from May 07-10, 2025. The General Officer also mentioned of China using Pakistan as a live laboratory for testing its weapons.
Little earlier, on June 19, 2025, officials of China, Pakistan & Bangladesh met in Kunming to discuss forming a new grouping aimed at boosting regional connectivity and cooperation. The Kunming meet came close on the heels of a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral in May 2025 which resulted in the thawing of Pakistan & Afghanistan’s turbulent relations since Taliban 2.0 returned to power on August 15, 2021.
The messaging is clear. Efforts are on at a break-neck pace to create an alternative to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which has been comatose after its Kathmandu summit in September 2014 where Pakistan, Nepal & Sri Lanka had proposed including China as a full-fledged member of SAARC, to which India had objected. After 2014 no SAARC summit has been held.
The new South Asian alliance sans India, which is in the pipeline and can be officially announced anytime soon, aims to sideline India in its own neighbourhood.
On the face of it, any non-military alliance should not raise hackles. However, when China gets involved in forming non-military alliances, the issue acquires an underlying military overtone. In all non-military alliances that China has been pivotal in creating after Xi Jinping has become China’s President in 2013, there has been a latent military aim.
The most prominent case in point is the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) which on the façade aims for infrastructure development but has military aims ingrained deeper. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is the flagship project of the BRI. Included in the CPEC is the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor which is a 3000-kilometer road linking China’s Xinjiang region to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which would obviate China’s “Malacca Dilemma”. For China, the Gwadar-Xinjiang Corridor is the jugular vein in case the Malacca Strait was to be ever blocked by the Indian Navy or the US Navy.
China’s planning of encircling India by the sea-route is complete. With the Gwadar port of Pakistan, the Hambantota port of Sri Lanka and the Cox Bazar port of Bangladesh firmly in the Chinese grip and PLA activity having been noticed in the Laamu Atoll of Maldives and Kyaukphyu island of Myanmar, the String of Pearls as the Chinese maritime strategy of encircling India is complete.
While China & Pakistan have been in a tight embrace since 2013, the fleeing of Sheikh Hasina from Bangladesh on August 05, 2024 gave the opportunity China was looking for, to encircle India by the land-route. Sheikh Hasina during her being in power for 15 years had been inclined towards India and had firmly resisted the Chinese pressure to sway away from the Indians.
But after August 05, 2024, Bangladesh has openly gravitated towards China. Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s ruler since August 2024, not only eyed the seven north-eastern states of India but also invited China to expand its influence in the region in a statement on April 01, 2025, that further damaged the India-Bangladesh relations which have been on a downhill since August 2024.
On May 27, 2025 came reports of China rebuilding the Lalmonirhat airport in Bangladesh which is just 20 kilometres from the strategic 22-kilometres-wide Siliguri Corridor of India, also known as the Chicken’s Neck, which connects the seven north-eastern Indian states with the balance of the country.
Of the seven countries that comprise South Asia, China has signed BRI with five excluding India and Bhutan. China doesn’t have a formal group alliance with the South Asian countries though one-on-one bilateral agreements exist.
China which is one of the principal founders of BRICS & SCO alliances which are non-military in nature, but has always tried using these forums for furtherance of its core interests. The reason that China hasn’t been successful in using BRICS & SCO for military interests is because of the presence of India in these two forums.
However, the new South Asian alliance, though officially will be an economic alliance, will be fully utilised for China’s military interests as India will not be made part of it. It is then the encircling of India by the land-route will be put into effect by China, though a major portion of it has already been done. The 3488-kilometre-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China & India and the 740-kilometre-long Line of Control (LOC) between Pakistan & India have been totally integrated by China & Pakistan because of their close military ties that encompasses all the six domains of modern warfare ie Land, Sea, Air, Cyber, Electromagnetic Spectrum & Space which are commonly known as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) or Full Spectrum Operations (FSO).
China is the only country in the world which in 2014 has stated that its military is prepared to fight in all the six domains of modern warfare. Till date no other country has expressed so. Not even, the USA which had propounded the Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in 2001 and has the biggest defence budget at US$ 1 trillion, has intimated its readiness to fight in all the six domains of war.
To the six domains of modern warfare, China has added the seventh domain-Water! On July 09, 2025 Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh said China’s mega dam being built on Medog on River Brahmaputra (known as River Yarlung Tsangpo in China) is a ticking water bomb and poses an existential threat. The dam being built at a cost of US$ 137 billion is to be completed by 2030.
USA is clearly rattled by China’s military might. On April 12, 2025 Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy the 11 aircraft carriers of the US Navy in just 20 minutes. He further stated that internal war games of the US military indicated the USA losing to China. War games are conducted in all militaries the world over to assess the readiness of military strategies and are designed to simulate real-war scenarios.
The flagging of the grave danger that China poses to the US military which for long as been regarded as powerful and potent, is a clear warning to the world and specially those countries that face the Chinese threat. Ignoring or underestimating China’s military prowess, will be detrimental and devastating.
The China Challenge
While India has always had a clear victory over Pakistan in all the military confrontations with Pakistan in 1947-49, 1965, 1971, 1999 and 2025, it is the China challenge that poses difficulties ahead.
India lost the war against China in 1962 and as on date China is thirty years ahead of India in military preparedness. General Manoj Naravane (Retd), the 28th Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army in his article in The Print on August 07, 2023 has expressed concern over the result of the two-front war that China & Pakistan will wage on India.
Much water has flowed since this article was published in 2023. After the regime change in Bangladesh in 2024, it is unlikely that Bangladesh will ever have normal ties with India again due to the close proximity that Bangladesh now has with both China and Pakistan. Nepal too is now firmly in the Chinese grip. On December 05, 2024 Nepal and China inked the framework for BRI cooperation, a good seven years and seven months after both the countries had signed the MoU on BRI. This development formally endorsed Nepal’s involvement in BRI opening floodgates for Chinese investments in Nepal.
General Anil Chauhan, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces on July 08, 2025 remarked that the convergence of interest between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh will have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.
Last year, Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command on October 28, 2024 stated that China is conducting the largest military buildup in world history. Early this year, on January 08, 2025 Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, the Indian Air Force Chief expressed concern over increased militarisation by China and the rapid pace at which the Chinese defence technology is growing.
On November 06, 2024 China announced the successful testing of Death Star, a weapon system which combines pulses of microwave radiation into a single powerful beam that can destroy enemy satellites in space. Also, on June 22, 2025 China achieved unprecedented breakthrough in satellite communication by using a 2-watt laser to transmit data at 1 Gbps thereby maintaining high-quality signal over 36,000 kilometres, without the need for complex infrastructure on the ground.
China on December 22, 2024, placed a massive government order of 1 million lightweight kamikaze drones to a private Chinese drone manufacturer Poly Technologies, be delivered by 2026. On April 21, 2025 China started mass production of humanoid robots with 11 manufacturers in China given confidential specifications and strict timelines, thereby signalling intent for defence use.
India is now staring at a war with China and Pakistan in which Bangladesh and Nepal will fully support China – whether it is militarily or infrastructure use, that time will reveal. But support rendered during a war can’t certainly be termed as an act of neutrality. China’s planning of encircling India both by the sea-route as well as the land-route is nearing fructification.
An often-asked question is that why did China not openly support Pakistan militarily in the recent India-Pakistan Conflict 2025 when the Pakistanis were being hammered badly by the Indians? The answer is pretty simple. China will not get embroiled in any military confrontation till it wages the war for Taiwan in 2027 as Taiwan is China’s first and foremost military aim.
Another question that is generally asked in various fora is that China lost its last war with Vietnam in 1979. It has been over 46 years that China has not taken part in any military confrontation. So why worry about China’s military prowess now? The answer to this question too is pretty simple. China has heavily invested in technology in the last four decades. As on date, China leads in 57 of the 64 critical technologies in the world. And, the USA is leading in the balance seven technologies. In the future wars that China will wage non-kinetic warfare will precede kinetic warfare. Once non-kinetic warfare has unleashed mayhem and chaos, only then will kinetic warfare start which will be for a short duration as the critical infrastructure of the country being attacked will be crippled due to non-kinetic warfare.
On July 09, 2023, the US President Joe Biden stated that China will wage a war for Taiwan and South Tibet. China calls Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. The Director of National Intelligence, USA in both its Annual Threat Assessments reports of 2024 & 2025 has predicted China, Pakistan and India inching towards war.
Whatever terminology be given to the war that is on India’s horizon that is a decade away in 2035, whether one-front reinforced war, two-front war or three-front war, China stands as a formidable military challenge, not only to the USA but to India as well, as the first three military targets with timelines for China are Taiwan in 2027, Spratly Islands in 2029 and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in 2035.
China’s interest in Arunachal Pradesh started from 2007 when it became the world’s third biggest economy and two years later in 2009, it started issuing stapled visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh desirous of visiting China. Since 2017, China has renamed 92 places in Arunachal Pradesh five times in 2017, 2021, 2023, 2024 and on May 14, 2025 just a couple of days after the ceasefire of the India-Pakistan Conflict.
Adding to China’s discomfiture with India is the announcement of His Holiness The Dalai Lama about his successor. The tensions between China and India will increase further after the successor is announced.
India has exactly one decade to increase its economic and military preparedness, for China is India’s main threat. Pakistan & Bangladesh are the subsets of this main threat.
The Way Ahead for India
Reduce trade with China: India needs to reduce its trade with China. For every dollar worth of trade, a part of it China is using to strengthen its military which in the times ahead will wage a war on India. It is indeed ironical in 2020 when the Galwan Valley Clash took place between China & India in which 20 Indian Army soldiers were killed in action, the trade that year between India & China stood at US$ 87.5 billion. The trade volumes kept on increasing year-on-year till 2023 when it peaked at US$ 136.2 billion. However, in 2024 the trade between the two nations dipped to US$ 127.8 billion. India has to further reduce its trade with China.
Increase in Defence Budget: India’s defence budget has been reducing as its percentage of GDP since 2019. From 2.5% of the GDP in 2019, the defence budget of India has reduced to 1.9% of the GDP. Chanakya had quoted centuries ago that from the strength of the treasury, increases the strength of a nation’s army. With China announcing to supply latest weaponry to Pakistan which includes the fifth-generation J-35A fighter aircrafts while plans are afoot to induct the sixth-generation J-36 and J-50 fighter aircrafts in the Chinese Air Force (known as PLAAF), the Indian military needs more money. On July 07, 2025 the Indian Defence Secretary RK Singh stated that the defence expenditure would be increased from 1.9% to 2.5% of the GDP.
In-house defence technologies: In the event of a nation going to war, what will matter is domestic defence production and defence technologies so that in case of any supply chain disruptions, the war production isn’t affected. While Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make in India initiatives have proved very successful for the Indian defence sector, but India is still heavily dependent on foreign technologies. In the last 15 years, India has imported about US$ 20 billion worth of weapon systems but no worthwhile Transfer of Technology (ToT) has ensued. This is because most nations are wary of ToT.
To obviate, reliance on imported defence technologies two aspects need immediate consideration. One, to have increased number of Doctorates (PhD) in Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics (STEM). Two, increase the budget for Research & Development (R&D) as percentage of the GDP. R&D plays a major role in a country becoming a manufacturing hub, apart from business-friendly laws, low taxes and skilled manpower.
The world’s two biggest manufacturing hubs ie China & USA are also the world’s two top nations in having the largest PhDs in STEM. In 2019, China produced 49,498 PhDs in STEM and USA produced 33,759 whereas India produced 700 PhDs in STEM. Of these 700, a whopping 70% have renounced Indian citizenship. The last known figures available in public domain of Indian PhDs in STEM are of 2019. By 2025 China is projected to have 77,179 STEM PhDs which would be nearly double of the 39,959 projected STEM PhDs of USA the same year.
The figures for spending on R&D also show startling facts. According to a study conducted by the Indian government think-tank Niti Aayog in 2022, while USA spent 2.9% of its GDP on R&D, China spent 2% of its GDP and India spent 0.7% of its GDP on R&D. The R&D spending as percentage of GDP has dipped to 0.64% of the GDP for India in 2024 whereas for China it has increased to 2.68% and for USA to 3.5% of the GDP. Interestingly in 2024, Israel’s spent 5.4% of its GDP on R&D.
Conclusion
On May 18, 1998 the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes had rightly remarked China being India’s main threat. So much was the political pressure on George Fernandes that he had to withdraw his statement five years later on May 04, 2003. In hindsight, George Fernandes was absolutely correct. China is indeed India’s main threat.
About the Author
Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.
BRICS & SCO logos and India’s flag: source Internet
There has been a lot of debate within India of late about how relevant are multilateral institutions like BRICS and SCO today in a changing world, and also how the recent Summits of both these Forums, failed to take India’s interests on board. There are some who have even argued that maybe it is time for India to exit BRICS and SCO as they seem more driven by China and hence also provide a shield to its ally Pakistan, which does not align well for India.
So, for starters, let’s take a quick look at what happened in the recent BRICS and SCO Summits. At the 17th Summit of BRICS held recently, the leaders of the BRICS nations adopted the “Rio de Janeiro Declaration” hosted by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. India is also a signatory to this declaration and Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the Summit. This year however both the Russian and Chinese Presidents skipped the Summit which also dampened the significance of the gathering.
The Rio Declaration condemned the April 22 terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, denounced cross-border terrorism, but avoided directly criticising Pakistan for promoting and exporting the terrorism. So that is certainly not something that made India happy. It is also important to note here that Pakistan is not a member of BRICS but its all-weather friend China is.
At the recently held Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meet in Qingdao in China, which was attended by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, India declined to sign the joint communiqué that was to be issued at the end of the meeting. India was obviously unhappy with the draft joint statement which noted the SCO’s concerns over the situation in Baluchistan in Pakistan, but was silent on the terrorist attack in J&K of India. The SCO as of today has India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as its members States.
As a result, what we have in India is a great deal of chatter of one: how useful are these multilateral forums for India today and two: if India should just walk out of these Forums. I would argue that India should not leave any of these multilateral forums, BRICS, SCO and other such groupings where China is perhaps today able to pursue its agenda more effectively. My logic is that while the recent BRICS and SCO Summit have a harsh lesson in store for India, these forums still have a great deal of use for India on the global stage.
India needs to recognise that what has happened in the recent BRICS and SCO Summits is somewhere reflective of the changing world equations. With Donald Trump as the United States President, we have a world and a world order that is being tested and changed almost every day. China, which is today the world’s largest manufacturer, is flexing its muscles on the global stage. China is also in a position today to challenge the US hegemony and role in global politics. India must accept that it has to now tweak its foreign policy and its agenda in multilateral forums like BRICS and SCO to incorporate these new equations and still make it work for India.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, and Operation Sindoor has also helped establish that, China today is firmly behind it. The kind of logistical support that China provided Pakistan in Operation Sindoor goes to prove that Pakistan today is a military asset to China, and hence India should be ready to see an opposition to its attempts to expose Pakistan, being blocked by China.
There can be no denying that BRICS, SCO, as is the case with other multilateral institutions, are full of internal differences. But it will serve India little to walk away. India has to argue its case while simultaneously carving its destiny as an aspirant global power. India needs to work more with the US and Forums like Quad (India, US, Japan and Australia) which at their core aim to keep China in check. Here also, with President Trump’s erratic decision-making habits, Quad will not be a smooth ride for India.
As India counters a growing and aggressive China in the region and globally, and attempts to walk in coordination with the US, the challenges at various multilateral forums will likely grow with time. What India needs at this point is an internal reset, a re-evaluation of how it plans to counter these challenges. Merely walking out of Forums that disappoint one is the easy solution; the real test of diplomacy would be to stay put and manoeuvre India’s interest in a rapidly evolving world order.
About the Author
Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9
The relationship between Israel and Iran, long characterized by a “shadow war” involving covert operations, cyber-attacks, and proxy conflicts, has been a defining feature of Middle Eastern geopolitics for decades. Tensions had been steadily mounting, with confrontations in 2024 serving as a grim prelude to a more overt and dangerous phase of hostilities. These earlier clashes signaled a shift from indirect engagement to a willingness for direct military exchanges, setting the stage for the events of June 2025.
June 13 to 25, 2025, witnessed an unprecedented escalation into direct and sustained military conflict between Israel and Iran. This confrontation significantly involved the United States, inflicted considerable human and material costs on both sides and culminated in a tenuous US-brokered ceasefire, leaving the region on a knife’s edge.
This report will outline the chronological progression of this 12-day conflict, detailing the initial Israeli offensive, Iran’s retaliatory measures, the subsequent escalation involving US military intervention, the profound humanitarian impact, the complex diplomatic maneuvers leading to a ceasefire, and the varied international reactions to this critical period of instability.
I. The Spark: Israel’s Offensive and Initial Retaliation (June 13 – June 15, 2025)
The simmering tensions between Israel and Iran boiled over on June 13, 2025, marking the beginning of a direct and intense military confrontation that would last for twelve days. This period was characterized by a major Israeli offensive, followed by swift Iranian retaliation, setting a dangerous precedent for the days to come.
Israel’s Initial Large-Scale Operation (June 13)
On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a significant and anticipated military operation against Iran. The primary targets of this offensive were strategically chosen, focusing on Iran’s nuclear facilities, key military sites, and critical regime infrastructure. The stated rationale behind this operation was twofold: to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, an ambition Tehran has consistently denied, and to respond to nearly two years of escalating conflict with Iran-backed militant groups. Reports indicated that Israel employed a combination of airstrikes, utilizing warplanes and drones, some of which were allegedly smuggled into Iran before the operation.
Expansion of Israeli Strikes (June 14-15)
Following the initial wave of attacks, Israel did not relent. On June 14 and 15, Israeli airstrikes expanded in scope, extending to include targets within Iran’s energy industry. The intensity of the offensive was sustained, with Israel unleashing airstrikes across various parts of Iran for a third consecutive day. Israeli leadership also threatened the application of even greater force, signaling a commitment to achieving its strategic objectives.
Iran’s Immediate Retaliatory Actions (June 13-15)
Iran’s response to the Israeli offensive was swift and forceful. Beginning on June 13 and continuing through June 15, Iran initiated a series of missile and drone attacks targeting Israel. Iranian missiles reportedly struck several locations in Israel, including the Nevatim and Hatzerim military bases. Civilian areas and cities such as Beersheba, Tel Aviv, the Negev region, and Haifa also reported missile impacts. Tehran was quick to claim success for its retaliatory strikes, asserting “precise hits” and highlighting what it described as its “growing offensive missile power”. This initial exchange set a dangerous tit-for-tat pattern that would characterize the conflict in the days that followed.
II. Escalation, US Intervention, and Continued Hostilities (June 16 – June 22, 2025)
The conflict rapidly intensified following the initial exchanges, drawing in international actors and culminating in direct military intervention by the United States. This period was marked by sustained hostilities, significant military actions by both Israel and Iran and early, though ultimately insufficient, diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis.
Intensified Military Exchanges and Diplomatic Overtures (June 16-20)
From June 16 to June 20, Israel and Iran continued to trade heavy strikes, with civilian populations in flashpoint areas bearing the brunt of the escalating violence. Iran undertook several notable military actions during this phase. Air defense systems were activated in Bushehr, the location of Iran’s only operating nuclear power plant, indicating heightened alert levels. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced it had fired its “17th wave of missiles” at Israeli military facilities. Furthermore, Iranian military spokespersons claimed the use of long-range and ultra-heavy missiles against Israeli military sites, defense industries, and command and control centers.
On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted on June 16 that Israel’s strikes had significantly set back Iran’s nuclear program. Amidst the escalating military actions, tentative diplomatic efforts emerged. On June 20, Iranian and European officials met in Geneva for talks. An Iranian source described the discussions as initially tense but having become “much more positive.”
However, Iran firmly maintained that its uranium enrichment capability was a “bold red line” and non-negotiable. Concurrently, then-US President Donald Trump indicated he would allow up to two weeks for negotiations before deciding whether to launch further US strikes on Iran.
Direct US Military Involvement (Around June 21-22)
The window for diplomacy proved short. As the conflict wore on, the United States moved towards direct military intervention. President Trump held Situation Room meetings, for instance on June 18, to discuss US options. Sources indicated that while he was receptive to arguments, including from Israel, that only the US could decisively neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions, he was also wary of becoming bogged down in a prolonged foreign conflict.
Around June 21-22 (local time), the United States launched direct military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. The targets were three key Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. These were described as among the “most critical and fortified sites” in Iran’s nuclear program, which Israel had reportedly been unable to destroy with its arsenal. The US military employed B-2 stealth bombers, which dropped “bunker-buster” bombs (Massive Ordnance Penetrators) on the Fordo and Natanz facilities, while Tomahawk cruise missiles struck the Isfahan site. The stated objective of the US operation was the “destruction of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity” and to “stop the nuclear threat posed by the world’s number one state sponsor of terror”. However, a preliminary classified US intelligence report, emerging around June 24, suggested that the American bombing had set back Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months, raising questions about the long-term efficacy of the strikes.
III. The Human Cost: Casualties and Civilian Impact
The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran exacted a significant human toll, with casualties and widespread disruption reported in both nations. The use of ballistic missiles, drones, and airstrikes in populated areas led to civilian deaths, injuries, and displacement, underscoring the devastating impact of modern warfare on non-combatants.
Casualties in Israel
According to data compiled after 12 days of fighting (by June 25), Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel resulted in the deaths of approximately 28 people. Notably, all but one of these fatalities were civilians. The conflict also led to over 3,000 wounded, with Israel’s Health Ministry reporting a total of 3,238 people hospitalized. Among the hospitalized, 23 were seriously injured, 111 moderately, and 2,933 lightly. An additional 138 individuals suffered from acute anxiety, and the conditions of 30 others were undetermined at the time of reporting.
The vast majority of casualties in Israel were civilians. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that only seven soldiers were hurt in one missile impact in central Israel, and one off-duty soldier was killed in Beersheba Iranian attacks also caused significant material damage and displacement. Israeli authorities stated that more than 9,000 people were displaced from their homes, dozens of which were damaged or destroyed. At least 31 ballistic missile impacts were reported in populated areas or on critical infrastructure sites, including a power station in southern Israel, an oil refinery in Haifa, and a university in central Israel.
Casualties in Iran
Assessing the full scale of casualties in Iran proved more complex due to varying reports from different sources. However, available information indicated a substantial number of deaths and injuries.
On June 16, CNN reported at least 224 people had been killed in Iran since hostilities began.
By June 21, The Defense Post, citing the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), a US-based NGO, reported that Israeli strikes had killed at least 657 people in Iran. This figure included 263 civilians (among them, HRANA had verified the identities of more than 20 children, mostly in Tehran) and 164 members of the military
By June 24, HRANA, as reported by Wikipedia, stated that over 900 people had been killed and over 3,000 wounded by Israeli strikes. The Iranian Health Ministry also reported over 4,000 people wounded
An updated HRANA report on June 24 detailed 974 killed (comprising 268 military personnel, 387 civilians, and 319 unidentified individuals) and 3,458 injured
Beyond the overall numbers, Israeli strikes reportedly targeted and killed several senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. Among those named were IRGC Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri, IRGC commander Hossein Salami, senior IRGC commander Gholam Ali Rashid, and IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh.
Nuclear scientists reported killed included Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber (who led the SPND’s Shahid Karimi Group), Fereydoon Abbasi, and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi. Ali Shamkhani, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, was initially reported killed but later confirmed to be alive, albeit severely injured.
Disruption to Daily Life and Evacuations
The conflict caused significant disruption to daily life in both countries. In Israel, emergency restrictions led to the closure of schools and workplaces for a period. The heightened security risks also prompted the evacuation of foreign nationals. For example, South Korea arranged for the evacuation of its citizens from both Israel and Iran, highlighting the international concern over safety and the conflict’s broader impact.
IV. The Path to a Fragile Ceasefire (June 23 – June 25, 2025)
After nearly two weeks of intense military exchanges and escalating tensions, diplomatic efforts, primarily spearheaded by the United States, led to the announcement of a ceasefire. However, the path to this uneasy truce was fraught with accusations, violations, and uncertainty, highlighting the deep-seated mistrust between the belligerents.
US-Brokered Ceasefire Announcement (June 23)
On June 23, 2025, then-US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire. The terms of the agreement reportedly included a phased halt to hostilities, with Iran expected to cease strikes on Israel 12 hours before Israel would stop its attacks on Iran. This announcement offered a glimmer of hope for de-escalation after days of escalating conflict.
Initial Fragility and Accusations (June 23-24)
The nascent ceasefire was immediately tested. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office thanked President Trump for his role and declared that Israel had achieved its primary objective of “eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat”. However, the situation on the ground remained volatile.
Mutual accusations of violations quickly surfaced. Israel accused Iran of a “severe violation” of the ceasefire by launching missiles after the truce was supposed to be in effect and vowed a forceful response. Iran, in turn, denied violating the truce. Reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) indicated that Iran conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel around the time the ceasefire was due to be implemented. Five of these attacks occurred before the ceasefire officially went into effect (12:00 AM ET on June 24), one at 12:06 AM ET, and another around 3:25 AM ET. One such post-ceasefire Iranian missile attack reportedly killed four people in Beersheba. In response to these perceived violations, Israel conducted retaliatory strikes, including an attack on an Iranian radar installation north of Tehran.
The fragility of the ceasefire drew a sharp reaction from President Trump, who reportedly expressed intense anger as the truce appeared to falter. He was said to be particularly unhappy with Israel at one point, publicly urging them via social media: “DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS”.
Ceasefire Takes Hold (June 24-25)
Despite the initial breaches and heightened rhetoric, by June 24-25, the ceasefire began to take hold more firmly. Both Israeli and Iranian officials issued statements affirming their commitment to the truce, conditional on the other side’s adherence. In Israel, signs of a return to normalcy began to emerge as authorities lifted emergency restrictions. Schools and workplaces, which had been closed due to the conflict, started to reopen. Ben Gurion Airport, the country’s busiest international gateway near Tel Aviv, was expected to fully reopen on Wednesday, June 25, allowing thousands of passengers to travel.
In a common pattern following such conflicts, both Israel and Iran declared victory in the 12-day confrontation, each framing the outcome as favorable to their strategic interests.
Lingering Tensions and Unresolved Issues
The ceasefire, while holding, did not resolve the underlying issues that fueled the conflict. Iran announced on June 24 that it was taking measures to continue its nuclear program and was assessing the damage to its facilities caused by Israeli and US strikes. This statement underscored Tehran’s defiance and its intention to press forward with its nuclear activities. Meanwhile, President Trump continued to insist that Iran’s nuclear program had faced “obliteration,” a claim that contradicted some intelligence assessments suggesting a more limited setback. These diverging narratives and Iran’s stated intentions pointed to a future where tensions over its nuclear ambitions would likely persist.
Key Points: Path to Ceasefire
US President Trump announced a ceasefire agreement on June 23.
Initial period marked by accusations of violations from both Israel and Iran.
Iran reportedly launched missiles post-ceasefire deadline, causing casualties in Beersheba.
Israel retaliated for perceived violations.
By June 24-25, the ceasefire largely held, with both sides claiming victory.
Iran vowed to continue its nuclear program, indicating unresolved core issues.
Global Reactions and Diplomatic Landscape
The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, marked by its intensity and the direct involvement of the United States, elicited a wide range of reactions from the international community. Global and regional powers, as well as international organizations, weighed in on the crisis, reflecting diverse geopolitical interests and concerns over regional stability and nuclear non-proliferation.
United Nations
The United Nations voiced grave concerns throughout the escalation. UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued stark warnings, fearing the conflict could spiral into “a fire no one can control” and potentially lead to a “catastrophe”. He described the US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites as a “perilous turn” for the region. Guterres consistently urged for an immediate ceasefire and a return to “serious, sustained negotiations” to de-escalate the situation and address the underlying causes of the conflict.
Major Powers
United States: Beyond its role as a direct military participant and the primary broker of the ceasefire, the US administration, under President Trump, emphasized that it did not seek regime change in Iran, stating a desire to avoid “chaos”. This stance aimed to manage perceptions of US objectives amidst its significant military intervention.
European Union: The EU’s response was characterized by calls for de-escalation but also by internal divisions. Officially, the EU called on all sides to exercise restraint, abide by international law, and refrain from actions that could worsen the crisis. However, significant disagreements emerged among member states regarding the legality of Israel’s strikes and the extent of its right to self-defense. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself, a position that was not unanimously supported by all EU members, highlighting the complexities in forging a unified European stance. Diplomatic efforts included talks in Geneva where German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, along with other European officials, engaged with Iran in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to de-escalate the nuclear aspects of the crisis.
United Kingdom: The UK Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House of Commons on June 16, updating Parliament on the evolving conflict and the government’s response.
France: France reaffirmed its commitment to diplomacy as a means to resolve the tensions, aligning with broader European calls for de-escalation.
Russia: Moscow condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, expressing concern that the escalation posed risks of further destabilization across the Middle East.
China: Beijing’s response evolved during the crisis. Initially, China condemned the Israeli attack on June 13 as a “violation of Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity”. However, its rhetoric subsequently shifted to become more measured, focusing on brokering dialogue and a ceasefire rather than outright denunciation of Israeli actions. Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly urged a ceasefire in a phone call with the Russian leader. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged with his Iranian and Israeli counterparts; in his call with the Israeli Foreign Minister, he termed Israel’s strikes “unacceptable” but notably refrained from using the word “condemning”.
Key Regional and Other Nations
Japan: Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba initially condemned Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military targets as “totally intolerable”. However, Japan later appeared to distance itself from G7 statements that affirmed Israel’s “right to defend itself,” with Prime Minister Ishiba emphasizing Japan’s position of urging “maximum restraint” from both Israel and Iran.
South Korea: Seoul expressed alarm at reports of Iranian missiles penetrating Israel’s sophisticated missile defense systems The South Korean government took practical steps by evacuating its nationals from both Iran and Israel and raising travel alert levels for these countries, urging citizens to leave immediately.
Saudi Arabia: A key regional power, Saudi Arabia welcomed the US-brokered ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran on June 24, reflecting a broader desire within the Gulf region to see a reduction in tensions that could threaten regional stability and economic interests.
VII. Conclusion: An Uneasy Calm and an Uncertain Future
The twelve days from June 13 to June 25, 2025, marked a perilous chapter in the long-standing animosity between Israel and Iran. The period witnessed a rapid and dangerous escalation from targeted Israeli strikes to widespread Iranian retaliation, direct military intervention by the United States, and significant human and material costs. The eventual US-brokered ceasefire brought a halt to the immediate hostilities, but it settled upon a landscape fraught with unresolved tensions and deep-seated mistrust.
Recap of the 12-Day Crisis
The crisis began with a major Israeli offensive targeting Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, justified as a preemptive measure against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and a response to ongoing
proxy conflicts. Iran retaliated with missile and drone barrages against Israeli targets. The conflict quickly escalated, drawing in the United States, which launched its own strikes against key Iranian nuclear facilities. This period was characterized by significant casualties on both sides, particularly among civilians, and widespread disruption. Diplomatic efforts, primarily led by the US, eventually culminated in a fragile ceasefire agreement that took effect around June 24-25.
Immediate Aftermath
In the immediate aftermath, an uneasy calm descended upon the region. The ceasefire, though initially marred by accusations of violations, largely held. Both Israel and Iran publicly claimed strategic victories, seeking to project strength and resolve to their domestic and international audiences. While the region stepped back from the brink of a wider conflagration, it remained on high alert. The lifting of emergency restrictions in Israel signaled a tentative return to normalcy, but the psychological scars and the heightened sense of insecurity lingered.
Unresolved Issues and Future Outlook
The ceasefire did little to address the fundamental drivers of the conflict. Iran’s nuclear program remains a central point of contention, with Tehran vowing to continue its efforts and assess the damage to its facilities. The conflicting assessments of the impact of Israeli and US strikes on this program—with the US claiming significant degradation and some intelligence reports suggesting a more limited setback—highlight the ongoing uncertainty. The deep-seated animosity and competing regional ambitions of Israel and Iran persist, suggesting that the ceasefire is more of a pause than a resolution.
The long-term effectiveness of the US strikes in deterring Iran’s nuclear progress and the overall durability of the ceasefire remain highly uncertain. Future provocations, miscalculations, or shifts in the regional balance of power could easily reignite hostilities. The underlying security dilemmas that plague the Middle East have not been resolved, and the potential for future conflict remains significant.
Broader Implications
The June 2025 conflict carries several broader implications:
Regional Volatility: It starkly underscored the volatile security dynamics of the Middle East and the ease with which long-simmering tensions can erupt into direct, large-scale military confrontations.
Great Power Involvement: The direct US military intervention highlighted the potential for regional conflicts to draw in global powers, with significant implications for international stability and power balances.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The focus on Iran’s nuclear facilities raises critical questions about the future of nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the region and globally. The attacks could perversely incentivize Iran or other nations to accelerate clandestine weapons programs as a deterrent.
Humanitarian Concerns: The significant civilian casualties and displacement serve as a grim reminder of the human cost of such conflicts and the challenges of protecting non-combatants in modern warfare.
In conclusion, while the ceasefire of June 25, 2025, provided a temporary reprieve, the Israel-Iran relationship and the broader Middle Eastern security landscape remain precarious. Addressing the root causes of instability, fostering credible diplomatic channels, and strengthening non- proliferation regimes will be crucial to preventing future, potentially more devastating, conflicts.
Key Takeaways from the Conflict
Unprecedented direct military escalation between Israel and Iran over 12 days.
Significant US military intervention targeting Iranian nuclear sites.
Substantial human cost, with hundreds killed and thousands wounded on both sides.
A fragile US-brokered ceasefire halted immediate hostilities but left core issues unresolved.
Iran’s nuclear program remains a central point of contention and future risk.
The conflict highlighted extreme regional volatility and the potential for wider escalation.
The contemporary world has undergone significant military transformation, with the technological and scientific advancements of a few international players overshadowing the others. Laser technology innovation materialising out of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enabled the country to top the list as a trailblazer in scientific innovation and development. The potential of the country to redefine modern warfare has raised concerns amongst prominent international powers, especially the United States of America.
In 2022, a paper published by Professor Yao Jianquan and team in the Journal of National University of Defence Technology was lauded as a leap in integrating hypersonic weapons with 6G technology for the purpose of a space defence system. An eminent laser scientist, Professor Yao, appraised the experiment as a “critical improvement in China’s near-space defence”. The experiment successfully achieved a “complete penetration” of signal-blocking shields around hypersonic weapons using electromagnetic waves. Furthermore, this development enables Chinese scientists to rectify the problem known as a “black barrier”. This issue arises when a hypersonic weapon is unable to maintain communication with the outside world due to surface blockade of electromagnetic waves created by ionised gas. Additionally, the black barrier hinders radar detection and identification of hypersonic weapons due to the presence of the plasma shelter.
The creation of this laser device by Professor Yao and his team has been extensively explored for the adaptation to military applications such as high-speed communication in space and radar for stealth aircraft detection. Furthermore, the invention generates continuous electromagnetic wave beams in the terahertz band, which would travel across the plasma shield created by the hypersonic weapon at 10 times the speed of sound. Thus, wiping the “black barrier” out of existence.
A year later, in 2023, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) claim of a “major breakthrough” in energy weapons technology. As per the report, scientists at the National University of Defence Technology in Changsha engineered a cutting-edge cooling system. In a move that could alter modern warfare, this state-of-the-art technology would enable high-energy lasers to remain charged without heating, making them capable of shooting laser beams indefinitely. Furthermore, it would eliminate the damaging heat expended during the usage of high-energy lasers.
As per laser weapon scientist Yuan Shengfu, “This is a huge breakthrough in improving the performance of high-energy laser systems.” Previously, in the field of laser weapon development, the issue of cooling had hindered desirable progress. Even attempts of innovation by US organisations such as the Middle Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), Space-Based Laser (SBL), Navy Advanced Chemical Laser (NACL) and Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) proved to be unfruitful. While a portion of these weapons were able to destroy supersonic missiles during a US military field test, they were ultimately cancelled due to the weight of the lasers and their sheer size. According to Mr Shengfu, whereas US missiles have a limited range of only a couple of kilometres, the newly developed Chinese laser beam is capable of surpassing their performance. Former British military official, Steve Weaver, commented on X (formerly Twitter), “If they have overcome the heating and distortion issues as claimed, in a (relatively) small enough unit for deployment, this is a big breakthrough considering the US failures in this area.” The advanced cooling system, combined with optimised gas flow to reduce heat production, has increased China’s potential to alter methods of modern warfare. According to researchers, a reduction in vibration, turbulence, and improved mirror cleanliness make the system a superior innovation. Additionally, this new development would help extend the range, engagement, and damage while significantly reducing logistical costs.
With a flair for theatrics, China unleashed a new high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon upon the world named the Death Star. With its name inspired by the popular sci-fi franchise Star Wars, the HPM was first tested in 2024 by combining minute electromagnetic waves to create an enormous focused laser beam. According to Euro Weekly, the Death Star has an accuracy of at least 1,100 miles with an ability to incapacitate orbiting satellites, turning them into mere space junk. While other anti-satellite missiles pollute space, HPM does not leave behind a debris trail, thus rendering it impossible to trace. Additionally, as per SCMP reports, the HPM weapon is equipped with exceptional precision such that vehicles transmitting the beams can synchronise within 170 picoseconds. Scholars have speculated that the country would use the Death Star to target communication and navigation systems pertinent to missile guidance.
While China’s laser technology developments have raised concerns amongst Western players, the technological prowess it showcased during the Russia-Ukraine War is particularly noteworthy. Developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, the Low Altitude Laser Defence System (LASS), better known as the Silent Hunter, made headlines when it shot down Kyiv’s drones, with its laser “piercing holes into a steel plate” before ultimately burning the Ukrainian drones. First unveiled during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, the weapon is specifically made to “search, track, blind and neutralise enemy drones.” The Silent Hunter possesses characteristics that set it apart from traditional aerial defence weapons. The power of the electric fibre optic laser ranges from 30 to 100 kilowatts with a target range of 4 kilometres. Additionally, its laser can penetrate five two-millimetre steel plates from a distance of 800 meters or one five-millimetre plate from 1 kilometre.
The Silent Hunter comes in two versions as well as four power modes. Accounting for better adaptability and ease of transportation, the weapon can either be mobile or stationary. This means that it can either be mounted on a 6X6 wheeled chassis or deconstructed into separate sections of approximately 200 kilograms. Additionally, the 5-kilowatt, 10-kilowatt, 20-kilowatt and 30-kilowatt power modes equip the Silent Hunter with a target capture of over 4 kilometres and an interception radius ranging from 200 metres to 400 metres. The LASS is also capable of neutralising a target with a speed less than 60 m/s and a diameter less than 2 metres. However, the major advantage of the Silent Hunter stems from its cost-effectiveness. It is estimated that the use of each system costs less than £10, distinguishing it from existing traditional missiles.
For the Chinese, 2025 is a year of advancement in laser technology, ranging from laser-based imaging systems to nuclear fusion through laser technology. Earlier this year, Chinese scientists disclosed a laser-based imaging system capable of reading minute texts as concise as one millimetre from approximately 1.4 kilometres away. By manoeuvring the method of active intensity interferometry, the imaging system overcomes externalities such as degraded resolution and atmosphere. Although the purpose of the innovation remains unclear, experts have raised concerns regarding its utilisation in surveillance, privacy and spying. However, some Chinese reports suggest that the usage of the laser would primarily pertain to archaeology and wildlife monitoring.
Mianyang, a city in the Sichuan province, became the centre of global attention with its development of nuclear fusion through laser technology. While details of the developments remain hidden from the public, if successful, it would modify the country’s nuclear capability. This particular technology, which intends to emulate the exothermic reaction of the Sun, may serve as a loophole to advance China’s nuclear weapon capabilities without explicitly violating international treaties. The advancements in Miyang are a leap forward in bridging the nuclear gap between China and the US. In terms of size, the Miyang facility dominates the National Ignition Facility of the United States and is furnished with a 50 per cent larger experimental bay, which could make it the largest laser fusion site in the world. This facility would allow the Chinese to improve weapons and conduct blasts without “real-world tests.”
Despite their technological advancements, the PRC has been accused of using its laser technology to harm US pilots. In 2018, China was accused of interfering with US military aircraft and injuring the pilots in the country’s overseas military base at Djibouti. Following this incident, America launched a formal diplomatic protest with Beijing as well as issued a notice to the US airmen. The notice stated “to exercise caution when flying in certain areas in Djibouti, which was issued due to lasers being directed at US aircraft on a small number of separate occasions over the last few weeks.” Furthermore, the notice described a particular incident when an aircrew flying a C-130 sustained two minor eye injuries due to exposure to military-grade laser beams. Military-grade laser beams, also known as dazzlers, emit potent light beams which can traverse vast distances and irradiate cockpits while momentarily blinding pilots. Again in 2020, the US Navy accused China of firing military-grade lasers at the P-8 Surveillance aircraft. The US Indo-Pacific Fleet issued a statement in which it condemned the actions of the PRC as “unsafe and unprofessional.” “Weapons-grade lasers could potentially cause serious harm to aircrew and marines, as well as ship and aircraft systems”, stated the Pacific Fleet.
Following this incident, the US undertook precautions to protect its airmen from the powerful laser technology of the Chinese. In 2023, the US Air Force purchased specially made laser protective eyewear after reported incidents of the Chinese military firing military grade laser beams at Western aeroplanes increased. As per the announcement made by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Centre’s Human Systems Division, the eyewear is supposed to provide protection against ballistic as well as laser threats. In the next three years, the US Air Force intends to acquire over 42,000 pairs of glasses and visors. The head of the eyewear initiative at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, Captain Pete Coats, expressed in a press briefing, “The health of the eye is so important to our pilots. The consequences of getting lasered without having proper protection could not only prevent the pilot from flying and landing an aircraft safely, but also cost them their career. So, we aim to ensure the right eyewear is available to everyone.”
China’s strides in laser technology development have long challenged the dominance of the West. Despite the scepticism around the validity and authenticity of China’s laser innovations, they have undoubtedly caused concern in the United States. As China moves forward with its plan to bridge the nuclear gap between itself and the US, these advancements not only signal a shift in technological leadership but also a recalibration of global power dynamics. From rectifying significant optimisation issues to creating high-powered lasers, China’s technological mission is methodical and efficient. However, while such developments have the ability to transform methods of modern warfare, they also contain the ability to evade accountability and jeopardise security. Given the pace and precision of such developments, the superpower has to be increasingly wary about the Asian giant. Their ability to outshine existing defence systems and develop modern equipment makes them a strategic threat that can no longer be sidelined.
On June 13, 2025, protests erupted in Belgrade in response to leaked reports suggesting that the Serbian government was quietly negotiating territorial compromises with Kosovo. Demonstrators flooded the streets near the National Assembly, voicing frustration not only over the Kosovo issue, but also over growing discontent with the government’s broader handling of national affairs. The protests turned violent by nightfall, with riot police dispersing crowds and dozens injured. While such demonstrations are not new in Serbia, this latest unrest marked a culmination of deeper and longer-standing tensions.
Serbia has been navigating a complex set of challenges for years. Its refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independence continues to strain its international relations. At home, economic stagnation, democratic backsliding, and a resurgence of nationalist rhetoric have added to public frustration. Over the past year, the government has faced criticism for increasing censorship, sidelining political opposition, and consolidating power.
These domestic issues have now collided with international concerns. In June 2025, the European Parliament suspended Serbia’s EU accession talks, citing a lack of progress on rule-of-law reforms and concerns about press freedom. Meanwhile, NATO has deployed additional troops to northern Kosovo following violent clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, raising fears of a regional escalation.
The current crisis in Serbia cannot be fully understood without revisiting the unresolved traumas of the 1990s. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia left a legacy of ethnic division, political instability, and deep societal scars across the Balkans. Serbia, as the largest successor state, was at the centre of this collapse. The wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and later in Kosovo were marked by widespread violence, displacement, and war crimes, many of which still await full accountability. For many Serbians, especially those who lost family or fled their homes during this period, the past remains painfully present.
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, a move recognised by over 100 countries but still firmly rejected by Belgrade. For Serbia, Kosovo is not only a territorial matter but a deeply symbolic issue tied to national identity and historical memory. The Serbian constitution still defines Kosovo as an integral part of its sovereign territory, and the refusal to accept Kosovo’s independence remains a core tenet of both state policy and public sentiment.
In the years following the 2008 declaration, Serbia and Kosovo fell into what many analysts have termed a “frozen conflict”: a state of formal peace but with no viable resolution. While international actors have attempted to mediate, both sides have often treated dialogue as a strategic tool rather than a genuine path toward compromise. Over time, this has only deepened mistrust.
Under President Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party, nationalist rhetoric has re-entered the political mainstream. Narratives of victimhood, sovereignty, and external betrayal have shaped domestic discourse, particularly around Kosovo. Vučić himself, a former information minister during the Milošević era, has leveraged these sentiments to consolidate political control and suppress dissent.
As one displaced Kosovo Serb recently told Deutsche Welle, “They talk about us like pieces on a chessboard, but we are the ones who lost homes, memories, and futures.” This sentiment captures the emotional undercurrent beneath the headlines: a population still living with the consequences of a war that officially ended, but never truly concluded.
The crisis in Serbia escalated dramatically in mid-2025, with a series of political, social, and economic developments converging to expose deep fissures within the country’s governance and its place in the international order. These events have intensified public dissatisfaction and raised international concerns about regional stability in the Western Balkans.
The most immediate spark came in June 2025, when leaked documents revealed that the Serbian government had been engaged in covert negotiations regarding potential territorial adjustments with Kosovo. The leak suggested that President Aleksandar Vučić’s administration was considering redrawing boundaries in northern Kosovo, an area dominated by ethnic Serbs, without public consultation or parliamentary debate. This revelation triggered widespread protests in Belgrade and other cities. What began as peaceful demonstrations quickly turned violent, as riot police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds. Over 40 people were reportedly injured, and multiple journalists were detained while covering the unrest. Civil society groups accused the government of deploying surveillance tools and spyware to monitor protest organisers and suppress dissenting voices.
Meanwhile, violence between ethnic Serbs and Albanians in northern Kosovo has also intensified. In early June, several deadly incidents occurred near the divided town of Mitrovica, prompting NATO to deploy additional peacekeeping troops to the region. The clashes included road blockades, arson attacks on municipal buildings, and reports of armed confrontations. Both Pristina and Belgrade blamed each other for the instability, and fears of a broader conflict have resurfaced. For residents in border regions, the situation remains tense and unpredictable.
On the international front, Serbia’s relationship with the European Union suffered a major setback. In response to growing concerns about democratic backsliding, media control, and the erosion of judicial independence, the European Parliament announced in June 2025 that it would suspend all accession talks with Serbia. This decision, though expected by some, dealt a serious blow to the country’s European integration ambitions. In reaction, Belgrade has shown signs of pivoting further towards strategic partnerships with Russia and China, both of whom continue to invest in Serbian infrastructure, energy, and defence sectors, largely without the governance conditionalities required by Western institutions.
Compounding these political tensions is a worsening economic situation. Serbia has been grappling with an energy crisis since late 2024, driven by rising global fuel prices and a disrupted regional supply chain. This, combined with soaring inflation, particularly in food and utility costs, has hit working-class Serbians hardest. Public frustration over declining living standards has only added fuel to the political fire, with many citizens expressing disillusionment not only with the current government but with the broader political system.
At the heart of Serbia’s current turmoil lies a steadily deepening crisis of governance. Over the past decade, President Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) have gradually consolidated power, reshaping the country’s political landscape in ways that have eroded institutional independence and narrowed space for dissent. While presented to the public as a path to “stability and national unity,” this concentration of power has come at a significant democratic cost.
One of the most concerning developments has been the systematic undermining of press freedom and judicial independence. Independent media outlets face intense political pressure, financial strangulation through state advertising bias, and targeted disinformation campaigns. Investigative journalists, particularly those reporting on corruption or state surveillance, often experience harassment or lawsuits. Meanwhile, the judiciary has increasingly lost its autonomy, with key appointments and decisions perceived as influenced by political actors close to the executive.
The culture of surveillance and disinformation has further narrowed the space for open debate. Civil society organisations and human rights defenders report frequent monitoring and bureaucratic hurdles. Some have been branded as “foreign agents” for receiving international funding, creating a climate of suspicion and hostility. These developments have prompted a growing number of young Serbians, particularly academics, activists, and professionals, to leave the country, contributing to a worsening brain drain.
The opposition, meanwhile, remains fragmented and largely ineffective. While public discontent has grown, no single party or leader has emerged with a strong, unifying alternative to the SNS. The 2024 municipal elections became a flashpoint, with widespread allegations of voter suppression, media bias, and ballot manipulation. The aftermath saw renewed protests, but momentum was quickly lost amid government crackdowns and the absence of a coordinated opposition strategy.
Serbia’s internal crisis cannot be separated from its complex position on the global stage. As the Western Balkans once again draw international attention, Serbia finds itself walking a diplomatic tightrope between East and West, seeking to preserve strategic autonomy while increasingly leaning on non-Western partners for political and economic support.
Russia continues to cast a long shadow over Serbian foreign policy. Moscow remains a vocal supporter of Belgrade’s stance on Kosovo, consistently backing Serbia in international forums such as the UN Security Council. This alignment is not only symbolic; it is also strategic. Serbia depends heavily on Russian gas supplies and defence cooperation. Additionally, pro-Russian narratives dominate segments of Serbian media, influencing public opinion and reinforcing scepticism toward the European Union and NATO. Even after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belgrade has resisted joining Western sanctions, citing national interests.
China’s growing economic presence has added another layer to Serbia’s geopolitical balancing act. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has funded major infrastructure projects, including highways, railways, and energy facilities. While these investments have helped modernise key sectors, they have also created growing dependency and raised concerns over transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental degradation. Protests over Chinese-owned mining operations in eastern Serbia reflect rising public unease about unchecked foreign involvement.
On the other side, Western engagement has faltered. The EU’s inconsistent approach to enlargement, frequently delayed timelines, shifting benchmarks, and political hesitations has bred frustration among Serbians. The recent suspension of accession talks in June 2025 has further widened the credibility gap. Meanwhile, the United States has scaled back its direct involvement in the Balkans, focusing on broader global realignments.
Beyond politics and geopolitics, Serbia’s crisis is deeply rooted in a growing sense of social disillusionment, especially among the younger generation. Many young Serbians find themselves trapped between the unhealed wounds of past wars and a present marked by limited opportunities, shrinking freedoms, and a deepening sense of stagnation.
A major symptom of this discontent is the surge in emigration. Over the past two years, Serbia has witnessed record numbers of young professionals and university graduates leaving the country, primarily for Germany, Austria, and Canada. According to local NGOs, the primary drivers are not just economic hardship, but also a lack of trust in institutions and the perceived absence of a future worth investing in at home.
At the core of this unrest is an unresolved identity crisis. Serbia remains rhetorically committed to EU membership, but government actions often suggest a deeper cultural alignment with Slavic allies like Russia. This duality, between Western aspirations and Eastern loyalties, leaves many citizens feeling politically disoriented and socially divided.
The crisis unfolding in Serbia today is layered and deeply consequential. Politically, the erosion of democratic norms and concentration of power have weakened institutions and trust. Geopolitically, Serbia’s balancing act between East and West has led to increased instability and uncertainty, both domestically and across the region. Psychologically, the collective exhaustion of a population caught between unhealed historical wounds and a lack of meaningful progress has created a sense of national drift.
This is no longer just a question of borders or leadership; it is about the soul of a country, and by extension, the stability of the Western Balkans. Serbia’s direction will influence not only its own future but also the trajectory of neighbouring states still navigating the legacy of the Yugoslav wars.
As a sociology student, I’ve often found myself captivated by Egypt’s unique position in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It isn’t just about pyramids or abstract geopolitics—it’s the living, breathing ways Egypt shapes and is shaped by everything from youth protests to water politics. The more I read, the clearer it becomes: Egypt doesn’t just matter in MENA—it anchors it. Its history, military strength, population dynamics, religious authority, cultural power, and economic policies intersect with some of the most pressing challenges and transformations across the Arab and African worlds. Understanding this helps contextualize how domestic developments reverberate regionally. Egypt’s influence acts as both a mirror and a mold for the aspirations and struggles across neighboring nations.
Strategic Geography and the Suez Canal
Geographically, Egypt occupies an extraordinary position. At the intersection of Africa, the Arab world, and the Mediterranean, it controls one of the planet’s most vital trade arteries: the Suez Canal. As of May 13, 2024, nearly 12% of global trade flowed through this narrow waterway. But in that same year, the canal faced a serious crisis. Attacks by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea diverted ships away from the route, leading to a 61% collapse in revenue, from US$10.25 billion in 2023 to just US$ 3.99 billion. Traffic fell from over 26,000 ships to roughly 13,200. Egypt responded quickly, expanding a 10-kilometer section of the southern canal, which is now helping boost capacity by 6 to 8 ships a day. The Suez Canal is more than infrastructure—it’s leverage, and Egypt is well aware of its geopolitical value. It symbolizes national pride, and every policy linked to it reverberates far beyond Egypt’s borders. With climate disruptions and regional instability increasing, the importance of the Suez Canal is only expected to grow in coming decades.
Population Power and the Energy of Youth
With a population of over 111 million in 2025, Egypt is the most populous Arab country. Even more striking is that about 63% of its people are under the age of 30. This massive youth demographic, while full of promise, also presents pressure points. Youth unemployment hovers around 15%, and it’s especially dire for young women—over 37% remain unemployed. Still, Egyptian youth are highly engaged and digitally connected. Many have created startups, feminist podcasts, environmental campaigns, and art collectives that challenge existing norms. They aren’t waiting for change—they’re demanding it, online and offline. Young people’s role in shaping political narratives—especially through social media—is now central to understanding state-society relations. Whether in protests or digital spaces, their voices are too significant to ignore. Their capacity to transform societal norms and participate in transnational activism positions them as critical agents in Egypt’s democratic evolution.
Economic Shifts and Regional Energy Leadership
Egypt’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 stands at about US$ 347 billion nominally, with a purchasing power parity (PPP) of over US$ 2.37 trillion. The economy is dominated by services, followed by industry and agriculture. The country has suffered from inflation, which has hovered around 20%, causing significant cost-of-living concerns. However, the energy sector offers a promising future. The Zohr gas field, which now produces over 20 billion cubic meters annually, along with liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity (7.5 million tons in 2024), positions Egypt as one of Africa’s largest natural gas exporters. On February 6, 2025, a US$ 3.1 billion deal with the European Union (EU) and Germany to expand LNG infrastructure reinforced Egypt’s role as a vital alternative to Russian gas. Additionally, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum positions Egypt at the center of multilateral energy diplomacy. By leveraging its geographic advantage and production capacity, Egypt is carving out a permanent seat at the global energy table.
Military Power and State-Society Dynamics
Egypt maintains one of the largest and most powerful militaries in the region, with over half a million active personnel. It receives US$ 1.3 billion annually in United States (U.S.) military aid and collaborates with global powers like France and Russia. Domestically, the military not only fights insurgency in places like the Sinai Peninsula but also builds infrastructure and operates development projects. This blurs the boundaries between the state and military—creating what some scholars call a “deep state” but also ensuring stability during moments of economic or political crisis. It’s an unusual setup, but one that makes Egypt distinct. Military presence in civilian sectors often limits dissent but also prevents state collapse in times of crisis. Understanding civil-military relations is crucial to decoding Egypt’s political behavior.
Religious Soft Power Through Al-Azhar
Al-Azhar University, based in Cairo, remains one of the most important centers of Sunni Islamic thought. Its fatwas, sermons, and theological interpretations influence Muslim communities from Nigeria to Malaysia. On June 30, 2024, Al-Azhar launched a digital campaign to counter online radicalization and promote moderate Islamic teachings. This combination of tradition and tech shows how Egypt continues to adapt its religious institutions to meet modern global challenges. As a student of sociology, it fascinates me how much religious authority can act as a geopolitical tool in the 21st century. Al-Azhar’s reputation lends Egypt soft power in regions where hard influence may not reach. Its voice shapes theological debates across vast transnational networks.
Cultural Influence and Arab Media Domination
Egyptian culture—its music, cinema, literature, and TV—continues to dominate Arabic-language entertainment across the Middle East and North Africa. Iconic figures like Umm Kulthum still echo through playlists, while Egyptian series lead regional streaming platforms. Egyptian Arabic is so familiar across the Arab world that it often becomes the default in entertainment. In 2025, Egyptian cinema is gaining critical international attention again, and film festivals like El Gouna are becoming cultural diplomacy tools. Egypt speaks to the region not just through embassies, but through screens and songs. Cultural production acts as a form of narrative diplomacy—projecting a vision of Egypt that blends nostalgia, resilience, and leadership.
Urban Planning and the New Administrative Capital
Egypt’s Vision 2030 reform plan includes an ambitious US$ 58 billion New Administrative Capital project outside Cairo. This futuristic city is already partially operational, with government offices and embassies relocating there. While the project has faced critiques over displacement and elite-focused planning, it marks Egypt’s intention to modernize infrastructure and relieve Cairo’s congestion. Watching this unfold feels like a real-time sociology class on urbanization, governance, and inequality. The city is designed with smart infrastructure and green technology in mind. But its accessibility to lower-income Egyptians remains contested and symbolically significant. It raises key sociological questions about who cities are built for, and whether modernization can coexist with inclusive development.
Diplomacy and Mediation in a Troubled Region
Egypt’s foreign policy is both historical and active. Since signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Egypt has taken on a recurring role as mediator between conflicting parties in the region. In 2025, it helped broker ceasefires between Israel and Hamas and facilitated aid corridors into Gaza. It also sent medical aid and field hospitals to war-affected areas in Sudan and Libya. Egypt’s role isn’t necessarily neutral, but it’s consistently engaged—and that gives it diplomatic credibility few others in the region possess. Egyptian diplomats often work behind the scenes in multilateral forums, providing stability in otherwise unpredictable contexts. This diplomatic strategy allows Egypt to navigate competing allegiances with the Gulf states, Western powers, and African nations, asserting itself as a regional anchor in diplomacy.
The Nile and Ecological Sovereignty
More than 90% of Egypt’s population lives near the Nile River, and about 97% of Egypt’s water needs come from it. The ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has reached international courts in 2025. Egypt, facing rising climate threats, is heavily investing in desalination plants and promoting water-saving agriculture. These actions aren’t just economic—they’re existential. For Egypt, control over the Nile is a question of survival, sovereignty, and national pride. International pressure for equitable water sharing is growing, making hydro-politics a defining issue of Egypt’s regional diplomacy. Egypt’s domestic water strategy—blending public awareness campaigns, technology upgrades, and infrastructure development—illustrates how environmental issues are being nationalized as security threats.
Africa Policy and Continental Influence
Although often seen through a Middle Eastern lens, Egypt is a key player in Africa. In 2025, it continues to chair African Union (AU) committees, lead peace talks in the Sahel, and push for trade and connectivity projects like the Cairo–Cape Town Highway. Egypt’s Africa policy is now more visible than ever, with diplomatic and commercial investments spreading across the continent. It seeks leadership not only through historical prestige but through practical cooperation on health, energy, and infrastructure. Cairo’s involvement in African innovation forums and regional climate summits has helped rebrand Egypt not just as a bridge but as an engine of African development.
Health Diplomacy and Humanitarian Aid
Health diplomacy is one of Egypt’s understated strengths. After becoming a major vaccine producer in North Africa post-COVID, Egypt has extended medical outreach to places like Libya and Sudan. In 2025, Egyptian doctors delivered trauma care in conflict zones, acting out what scholar’s call “civic solidarity.” This mix of humanitarianism and soft diplomacy helps Egypt maintain regional goodwill, even in politically complex zones. Its aid is also part of an image strategy to position Egypt as a stable regional caretaker and provider. Egypt’s push for South-South cooperation in global health—through World Health Organization (WHO) partnerships and vaccine diplomacy—further strengthens its soft power credentials.
Environmental Policy and Climate Innovation
Facing threats like sea level rise in Alexandria and desertification inland, Egypt has taken several proactive steps. In May 2025, it launched Africa’s largest floating solar farm on Lake Nasser. As an active participant in Conference of Parties (COP) climate summits, Egypt champions climate financing and regional adaptation plans. These are not just symbolic efforts—they reflect Egypt’s role as a serious actor in environmental diplomacy in the Global South. Green policy is fast becoming a pillar of Egypt’s international development model and soft power toolkit. Egypt’s partnership with organizations like the African Development Bank and the United Nations Environment Programme is pushing regional green transformation with Egyptian leadership at its core.
Gender Rights and Social Transformation
Egypt is slowly becoming more inclusive. As of 2025, women make up around 27% of parliament, and national mentorship programs aim to empower girls in rural regions. While women still face systemic challenges, especially in labor participation (just 16.9% compared to men’s 70.3%), reforms in harassment laws and public representation are pushing Egypt forward. These aren’t just gender stories—they’re social revolutions in slow motion. Increasingly, Egyptian feminists are collaborating across borders, connecting gender struggles to broader movements for justice and equality. Women-led civil society groups are also documenting everyday challenges with a view toward policy reform, making gender equality not just a slogan but a collective project.
Technology, Innovation, and Digital Diplomacy
Egypt’s tech scene is growing. In 2025, it hosted the first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Tech & Ethics Forum and continues to expand digital infrastructure, e-learning, and artificial intelligence (AI) programs. From offering rural digital ID access to enhancing cybersecurity, Egypt is embedding technology into development. This tech-forward approach is not only economic—it’s deeply sociological, reshaping how people access rights, resources, and representation. The digital divide remains a challenge, but Egypt is committed to inclusive digital transformation. With smart city projects, youth-led coding initiatives, and partnerships with global tech firms, Egypt is reshaping how power, identity, and governance function in digital space.
Conclusion: Egypt as Anchor and Aspiration
In the Middle East and North Africa region, Egypt remains indispensable—not just for what it was, but for what it is becoming. It blends hard power with soft influence, tradition with innovation, and diplomacy with pragmatism. As a student, I don’t just study Egypt—I learn from it. Egypt matters because it teaches us how nations adapt, survive, and lead in turbulent regions. It is not flawless, but it is foundational. Whether through summits, protests, or stories on a screen, Egypt continues to shape the MENA region’s future—one decision, one movement, one generation at a time. For sociologists and political scientists alike, Egypt offers a rare case of multi-layered influence that evolves with its people, crises, and ambitions. It serves as a living laboratory of governance under stress, youthful activism, and transregional diplomacy, making it a compelling subject for critical scholarship and regional imagination alike.
Just as we pledge never to lose an inch of our territory, we must now resolve never to lose a single byte of our data.
“A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes.” This quote, often attributed to Mark Twain, has travelled far and wide ironically embodying its own message. The quote itself is a lie that has been accepted as fact for decades. And in that paradox lies the perfect entry point to understanding the age-old, ever evolving weaponization of information. Long before the internet, tweets, or deepfakes, ancient rulers mastered the art of manipulating information. The divine right to rule claimed by pharaohs, emperors, and kings was often a well-spun fiction to consolidate power. In the Artha Shastra, Chanakya systematically detailed how misinformation could be used in espionage, warfare, and governance. Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, famously wrote: “All warfare is based on deception.” These civilizations understood what we are only now being forced to confront: the control of information is the control of minds.
Digital Vulnerability
In today’s social media era, information has been weaponized in unprecedented ways. Every decision we make from what to eat, whom to vote for, to what we believe about global events is influenced by what we see, hear, and share online. Algorithms amplify content not for truth, but for engagement. This creates echo chambers where facts bend to bias. One of the biggest challenges is that humans are psychologically wired to believe information that aligns with their existing worldview. Disinformation campaigns exploit this cognitive bias. Repetition creates familiarity, which we often mistake for truth. In the digital era, this process is accelerated. With deepfakes, AI-generated images and voice clones, it is nearly impossible to distinguish reality from fabrication. The battlefield of truth is now personal.
Rewriting Reality
Information warfare is not merely about spreading lies, it is about shaping perception. Pakistan has long understood this and deployed it consistently as a core element of its strategic doctrine, often with considerable tactical success in shaping international narratives. During the Kargil Conflict in 1999, despite initiating the intrusion, Pakistan attempted to frame it as a spontaneous uprising by Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’, even as Indian Army recovered bodies of Pakistani soldiers complete with military IDs. Similarly, after the Indian Air Force struck Jaish-e-Mohammed terror training camp in Balakot, Pakistan immediately pushed global narrative that ‘no damage’ was done and that the strike was a ‘political stunt’. During Operation Sindoor,Pakistan suffered severe setbacks: its forward airbases were struck, terror infrastructure was degraded, and key military installations were neutralized. But within hours, a parallel digital war was launched with fake videos, distorted casualty reports, and selective footage rapidly disseminated via social media and sympathetic global influencers to downplay the extent of the damage and project India as the aggressor.
A coordinated global narrative has increasingly emerged with the aim of portraying India in a negative light, often by selectively highlighting internal challenges while ignoring context, constitutional safeguards, or ground realities. This narrative is perpetuated through a network of ideologically aligned NGOs, think tanks, international media outlets, and activist scholars who frame India as an illiberal democracy. Social media further amplifies this narrative, with hashtag campaigns and viral misinformation frequently originating from adversarial countries and sympathetic diaspora groups. These efforts, subtle and sustained, seek to undermine India’s democratic image, erode its diplomatic credibility, and influence global policymaking by weaponizing perception.
Defending the Information Frontier
To counter this threat, India must embed information dominance into its national security doctrine. A National Information Warfare Command should be established, bringing together military, intelligence, diplomatic, and media experts to lead coordinated narrative responses. A 24×7 Narrative Management Cell must monitor global and domestic trends, rapidly debunk misinformation, and disseminate verified counter-narratives. Indian embassies abroad must be equipped with localized digital content and trained personnel to counter false narratives in real time. We must also promote credible Indian voices in international media and academia; scholars, journalists, and public intellectuals who can articulate India’s perspective with clarity and credibility. The Armed Forces must institutionalize Information Operations as a key operational domain alongside land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Dedicated information warfare units should be tasked with offensive and defensive narrative-building, especially during cross-border operations, insurgency control, or hybrid conflicts. Strategic partnerships with global tech platforms like Meta, X, and YouTube are essential to track and dismantle coordinated influence operations. Equally critical is a nationwide media literacy movement that trains citizens especially youth to identify fake news, deepfakes, and propaganda. Finally, as responsible citizens, it is our moral duty to indulge in responsible sharing, critical thinking, and digital hygiene to be the first line of defence in this information warfare.
Way Forward: Sovereignty of Information
Information warfare today is not fought on the battlefield but in browsers, news feeds, and comment sections. Just as we pledge never to lose an inch of our territory, we must now resolve never to lose a single byte of our data. In the digital age, sovereignty extends beyond borders, it includes the integrity of our information.
