By: Anuraag Khaund, Guest Author

As the western front of India remains at boil in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, further west in Afghanistan, a new strategic re-alignment was being attempted. On 21 May, Beijing was witness to the coming together of the Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi, Pakistan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar and the Acting Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi on the occasion of the informal China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meet. The meeting coming on the heels of the recent India-Pakistan conflict as well as in the immediate aftermath of the first ministerial level contact between Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar and his counterpart in the Taliban regime has raised eyebrows regarding the said trilateral meeting.

Most voices have raised concerns whether the latter is an attempt to rope in Afghanistan or specifically the Taliban to be a part of the China-Pakistan axis aimed at encircling India which now also includes a hostile Bangladesh. What further vitiates the above sentiment are some of the outcomes of the Trilateral Meeting which appear inimical to India’s strategic and security interests. Foremost amongst them is the elevation of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan including exchange of ambassadors under the aegis of Chinese facilitation and the promotion of the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan thereby making Kabul a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Such actions are aimed only at embedding the Taliban regime into the China-Pakistan strategic nexus and political- economic networks but also undermining India’s position in Afghanistan and the broader sub-continent.

The unprecedented show of solidarity exhibited by the Taliban in its condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack labelling it as ‘undermining regional security and stability’ has rattled Pakistan, especially its military- intelligence establishment which once welcomed the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021 as the return of its ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. However, such hopes were dashed with the rise in tensions between the new Afghan rulers and their former patrons which culminated in the airstrikes and cross border skirmish of December 2024. The eruption of conflict was paralleled by the increase strategic outreach  undertaken by India as seen in the meeting between Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri and Muttaqi in UAE during January 2025 which was preceded by the Indian interactions with figures such as Acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and the presence of an Indian ‘technical team’ in Kabul since 2022 to maintain New Delhi’s engagement with the Afghan people. Such strategic alignment and the resultant strengthening of India’s position in Afghanistan coupled with strained ties with Taliban would have rendered Pakistan into a disadvantageous position and faced with the prospect of conflict on its eastern as well as western fronts.

Hence, the elevation and strengthening of diplomatic ties through the exchange of ambassadors would not only strengthen the channels of communication between Islamabad and Kabul but also create stakes especially for the Taliban regime in maintaining a stable bilateral relationship. The exchange of ambassadors would further elevate the level of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban as compared to the junior technical level Indian presence. For China, the cessation of hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial not only for its interests of stability along its borders with the latter two and the protection of investments like CPEC but also the undermining of Indian opportunity to bolster its position by exploiting the tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.

The extension of the CPEC into Afghanistan not only reflects the long-standing Chinese interest in enhancing its economic footprint in Afghanistan through connectivity and cooperation projects but also ulterior strategic designs specifically aimed at India. Firstly, the above extension  into Afghanistan would transform the Taliban into a stakeholder in the CPEC which passes through the Gilgit- Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) thereby complicating Indian calculations and any actions regarding the area. In addition, the inclusion and participation of Afghanistan in the CPEC would allow Kabul access to the port of Gwadar thereby affecting the prospects of Chabahar as an alternative outlet for Afghan international trade while also diluting its strategic value in enhancing India-Afghanistan economic and humanitarian linkage and connectivity.

At the same time, the embedding of Afghanistan into CPEC by extension, the BRI would also allow Beijing greater influence over the Taliban which it can be used to achieve objectives ranging from unfettered access to Afghanistan’s reserves of Rare Earth Elements (REE) to facilitating Pakistan’s proxy war with India. Reportedly, intelligence agencies have raised concerns that the above expansion of the CPEC and the construction of logistical hubs in Afghanistan could lead to the creation of a ‘Terror Corridor’ allowing Pak-supported outfits as well as ideological bedfellows of the Taliban like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) along with groups based on Afghan soil such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to send militants over to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) along with the cross-border funneling of weapons, funds and drugs. All of these occurring under the plausible deniability of China and in collusion with Pakistan and a pliant Taliban regime bound into a relationship of dependency with both Islamabad and Beijing through Gwadar and CPEC. Such fears are not unfounded given the threat issued by the Afghanistan based outfit Al- Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and a Pakistan seeking to settle scores after its humiliation in the current conflagration with India.

The extension of the CPEC also lays the possibility for its joining with the strategic Wakhan Corridor sharing borders with Pakistan (PoK) as well as China and Tajikistan. While attitudes of both China and the Taliban are at odds vis-a-vis the feasibility and safety of the aforementioned corridor, yet the possibilities created by a pliant Taliban regime and an economically interconnected non-hostile Af-Pak landscape might tempt Beijing to link CPEC with Wakhan thereby creating another outlet for the Terror Corridor utilizing the proximity to PoK. From Chinese perspective, security challenges such as the Uyghur militants and ISKP could be managed by exploiting Taliban’s conflict with the latter  as well as using the ‘good offices’ of Pak sponsored groups like JeM in re-directing the accumulated ‘jihad momentum’ towards India through the CPEC-Wakhan into J&K.

The above-described situation, undoubtedly would put India in a tight spot critically affecting its foothold in an already constrained space in the Af-Pak region. The ‘restriction of Indian influence in Afghanistan’s political and security landscape’ as being the aim of the trilateral meeting was also confirmed by local media outlets. Hence, there should be no qualms about the urgency of India to step up its game to counter the nefarious designs of the China- Pakistan ‘iron brotherhood.’

First and foremost is the need to urgently expedite the development of the Chabahar port and the related infrastructure such as the railway line connecting the port to the city of Zahedan along the Iran-Afghanistan border and further extension of the same to Zaranj in Nirmuz province of Afghanistan. The swift completion of the above railway stretch from Zaranj to Chabahar will facilitate seamless utilization of the port and accomplish Afghanistan integration into the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connectivity project spearheaded by India, Iran and Russia. In addition, New Delhi should also emphasize the benefits and advantages offered by Chabahar and the INSTC vis-a vis CPEC especially in terms of stability and security. Given the frequency of insurgent attacks and blasts along the CPEC and its transit through the restive province of Balochistan, the Taliban’s quest for international trade and commerce would be better suited by Chabahar and the Zahedan-Zaranj line. Iran should also be roped in to highlight the advantages and benefits of the same not only because of Iranian stakes in Chabahar but also the because of shared concerns regarding the re-emergence of a Pakistan-controlled or aligned Afghanistan given the strained relations between Tehran and Islamabad over Pakistani support for anti-Iran militants.

 While concerns might arise due to the Trump administration’s rescinding of the earlier sanction-waiver on Chabahar in February 2025 as well as the uncertainty over the future shape of US-Iran ties in the midst of the Gaza conflict and nuclear talks, India should not budge and remain steadfast in the pursuance of its own interests and issue-based alignment with Iran as an exercise of New Delhi’s strategic autonomy vis a vis Washington and Tehran. The practice of strategic autonomy by India without any hesitation for apparent American displeasure or ire is justified in light of the hastily Trump imposed ceasefire in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and the facilitation of IMF bailout to Pakistan despite evidence of its usage in funding terrorism by Islamabad. Not to mention the detrimental effects to Indian interests in Chabahar on adhering to US preferences. Even as American military assistance for Pakistan continues unabated along with the signing of lucrative cryptocurrency deal between Trump and Islamabad. Faced with such blatant disregard of Indian interests, should New Delhi reciprocate?

Coming to US again, its reviewing of whether to designate the Afghan Taliban as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’  is itself an indication of Washington according primacy to national interest over the concerns of others or the wider international community. Similarly, Trump’s outreach to Syrian interim president Ahmed-al Sharaa, a former US Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the lifting of sanctions upon Syria again underlines the importance attached to pragmatism and strategic interest over consideration of norms or perceptions of others. Hence, it would be duplicity on the part of US to call out India over the pursuance of its own strategic interests regarding Iran. Moreover, the Trump’s administration’s quest of re-establishing its presence in the Bagram air base and the seeking of ‘limited intelligence presence’ ( intelligence cooperation) in Taliban ruled Afghanistan have no chance of fructifying with a Kabul under the control of China and Pakistan. Therefore, it would be in America’s own interest to allow the strengthening of India’s footprint in Afghanistan which is only possible through successful execution of strategic projects such as Chabahar and the INSTC. Vice-versa US presence as a counter to Chinese influence in Afghanistan would also benefit India.

Finally, in view of the fluid and unstable nature of the variables affecting India’s Afghan interests, it would be not be wise for New Delhi to keep all its eggs in one basket or bank only upon a single actor (Taliban regime)− a mistake repeated during the Afghan republic era of Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai administrations. Simultaneous to its incremental engagement with the ruling Taliban regime, New Delhi should also reach out and establish contacts with the exiled anti-Taliban resistance groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF)  based in Tajikistan and led by Ahmad Massoud. In this regard, India can draw upon its legacy of providing support to the erstwhile Northern Alliance, the earlier anti-Taliban resistance from 1996-2001 led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the father of the current NRF leader.

In addition, New Delhi should also utilize the goodwill towards India present among prominent members of the resistance such as ex Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh as evident in the latter’s vocal support for India’s conduction of Operation Sindoor against Pak-based terrorism. However, India should double down in its efforts before it is outmaneuvered by Pakistan whereby Islamabad was reportedly exploring channels of communication with the NRF as well as partnership with Tajikistan aimed against the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the December 2024 border clash.

Let not the winds blowing from the Hindukush and Pamirs blow us away from the soil of Kabul as we hold on.

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of modern international relations’s most transformative and ambitious foreign policy and development projects. Launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the initiative was initially introduced as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), symbolizing the revival of the ancient Silk Road that once connected China to Europe through Central Asia. Over time, the initiative evolved into the Belt and Road Initiative, embodying a multidimensional framework of economic corridors, trade networks, digital infrastructure, energy cooperation, and cultural exchanges. This vision encompasses more than a singular infrastructural project; it represents a strategic endeavor by China to position itself at the center of a new global order, reshape international trade routes, and reinforce its economic and diplomatic reach far beyond its borders.

The BRI comprises two primary components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road Economic Belt consists of land-based corridors that seek to connect China to Europe via Central Asia, Russia, and the Middle East. This segment primarily involves the development of transcontinental railways, energy pipelines, roadways, and industrial parks, aiming to reduce the over-reliance on maritime trade routes and to strengthen China’s integration with the Eurasian landmass. Meanwhile, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road focuses on sea routes that stretch from China’s eastern seaboard to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe through the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and beyond. These two prongs envision a vast network of interconnected infrastructure projects that facilitate trade, investment, and political cooperation.

Over a decade into its implementation, the BRI has expanded its geographical footprint extensively, with more than 140 countries and international organizations having signed memoranda of understanding with China to participate in the initiative. These agreements span diverse sectors, including transport, energy, digital infrastructure, and industrial development. Investments under the BRI framework have ranged from constructing high-speed railways in Southeast Asia to deep-water ports in Africa, oil pipelines in Central Asia, and smart city technologies in the Middle East. China’s financial commitments to the BRI are enormous, estimated to exceed US$ 1 trillion, primarily financed through Chinese policy banks such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, as well as commercial lending by state-owned enterprises and local governments.

Despite these ambitious goals and expansive activities, the success of the BRI remains a subject of intense debate and is multifaceted. Proponents argue that the initiative has brought much-needed infrastructure, connectivity, and economic stimulus to developing countries, filling gaps left by traditional Western-led development institutions. They contend that the BRI promotes mutual development and South-South cooperation. However, critics raise concerns about the political and economic implications of the initiative, including fears of debt dependency, erosion of sovereignty, lack of transparency, and the projection of Chinese strategic interests under the guise of economic cooperation. Moreover, geopolitical tensions have intensified as rival powers such as the United States, India, and the European Union increasingly view the BRI as challenging the existing international order.

This paper is dedicated to critically assessing the extent to which the Belt and Road Initiative has succeeded in fulfilling its stated and implicit goals. It does so by examining the initiative’s economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions. The economic analysis focuses on trade flows, infrastructure development, investment patterns, and debt sustainability. The strategic dimension explores China’s use of the BRI to secure energy routes, project military influence, and expand its technological standards. The geopolitical assessment evaluates how the BRI has altered alliances, regional balances of power, and the global perception of China’s rise. Ultimately, the paper contends that while the BRI has achieved several noteworthy accomplishments and consolidated China’s influence in various regions, its long-term success remains uncertain and contingent upon how China addresses the internal and external challenges confronting the initiative.

The Genesis and Objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative

The conceptual roots of the Belt and Road Initiative can be traced to China’s internal economic transitions and strategic recalibration in the early 21st century. After three decades of rapid industrialization, China faced several structural challenges, including overcapacity in heavy industries, declining productivity growth, regional inequality, and the need to move up the global value chain. Moreover, the 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated financial system. It prompted Beijing to seek alternative global engagement models that would not be overly reliant on Western markets or institutions. In this context, the BRI emerged as a forward-looking strategy to export China’s surplus industrial capacity, create new markets for its goods and services, and integrate developing countries into a Sinocentric economic order.

Announced in two speeches by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, the BRI was presented as a vision to promote international cooperation and shared development. On the surface, the initiative appears benign and inclusive, emphasizing principles such as policy coordination, connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchanges. However, the underlying objectives of the BRI are far more complex and strategic. One key goal is to promote economic interdependence between China and other regions, thereby creating leverage in international negotiations and reducing the risk of economic isolation. By deepening infrastructure connectivity and cross-border investments, the BRI helps China to secure stable trade routes, energy supplies, and raw materials essential for its continued growth.

Another primary objective is to expand China’s soft power and diplomatic influence. Through its provision of development finance and infrastructure, China presents itself as an alternative to the West and a Global South champion. Unlike traditional Western development models that often come with governance and human rights conditions, Chinese-led projects under the BRI often emphasize mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. This approach has made the BRI particularly attractive to authoritarian regimes and developing countries that feel marginalized by the global financial architecture. Consequently, the initiative serves as a diplomatic vehicle to enhance China’s standing in the global south and to counterbalance Western influence in key strategic regions.

The BRI also serves a domestic political function. It reflects President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and his ambition to craft a personal legacy of national rejuvenation and global leadership. The initiative is closely tied to the “Chinese Dream” of national resurgence. It is often framed as a key pillar of China’s aspiration to reclaim its historical role as a central player in global affairs. By launching a project of such a global scale, the Chinese leadership aims to project confidence, assertiveness, and an image of inevitable ascendancy.

Additionally, the initiative is designed to address China’s security concerns and geostrategic vulnerabilities. For example, the over-reliance on maritime trade routes, particularly the Strait of Malacca, has long been viewed by Chinese strategists as a potential choke point that rival powers could exploit in times of conflict. Through the development of alternative land routes via Central Asia and Pakistan, as well as strategic port acquisitions in the Indian Ocean and Africa, the BRI attempts to circumvent this “Malacca Dilemma” and ensure energy and trade security. Moreover, by investing in volatile regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa, China aims to promote stability and create favorable conditions for Chinese companies operating abroad.

An important but often overlooked goal of the BRI is exporting Chinese standards and governance models. As China invests in smart cities, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure under the “Digital Silk Road” framework, it simultaneously promotes its technological platforms, regulatory frameworks, and cybersecurity protocols. This technological dimension allows China to shape the rules and norms of emerging digital economies, thereby challenging the dominance of Western firms and institutions in the digital space. The BRI is not merely an economic development project but a multidimensional strategy reflecting China’s global aspirations and internal imperatives. It seeks to address structural challenges within the Chinese economy, expand geopolitical influence, secure critical trade and energy routes, and promote a vision of global order that is more reflective of China’s interests and values. As such, understanding the BRI requires moving beyond its surface-level rhetoric and delving into its complex interplay of economic, strategic, and ideological motivations. In the following sections, this paper will critically examine how these ambitions have translated into tangible success, considering both achievements and the emerging challenges confronting the initiative on multiple fronts.

Economic Dimensions of the BRI: Successes and Limitations

The economic rationale behind the Belt and Road Initiative has always been central to its global appeal and strategic execution. At its core, the BRI was conceived to internationalize China’s economy, mitigate industrial overcapacity, and stimulate trade and investment across borders. In the initial years, this vision bore substantial fruit. Chinese state-owned enterprises, often supported by concessional loans from Chinese banks, spearheaded massive infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and Europe. High-speed rail lines in Southeast Asia, energy pipelines in Central Asia, highways in Pakistan, and deep-sea ports in Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Greece demonstrated the initiative’s expansive economic footprint.

One of the early signs of success was the increased trade volumes and improved connectivity among participant countries. Nations with previously poor infrastructure were suddenly linked to regional and global markets, accelerating economic activity. The China-Europe Railway Express, for example, significantly reduced the time and cost of transporting goods between China and Europe, providing a competitive alternative to sea freight. Similarly, the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) opened up new trade possibilities for Pakistan, granting it improved access to energy and transportation networks. In Africa, Chinese-funded infrastructure under the BRI filled substantial gaps left by Western donors and international financial institutions, many of which had retreated from large-scale infrastructural development.

From China’s perspective, the BRI also helped reduce regional disparities within its borders. Western provinces like Xinjiang and Yunnan, which lagged behind the coastal regions in economic development, became key nodes in transnational connectivity projects. The initiative justified massive domestic investment in these regions, enhancing social stability and economic opportunity. Additionally, by facilitating capital outflows and creating external demand for steel, cement, and machinery, the BRI helped absorb surplus industrial capacity, threatening to destabilize China’s domestic economy.

However, the economic success of the BRI is far from uniform and has increasingly come under scrutiny. Several projects have been criticized for being economically unviable, poorly planned, or executed without considering local needs and capacities. The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka became emblematic of these concerns when the Sri Lankan government, unable to service the Chinese debt incurred during construction, was forced to lease the port to a Chinese state-owned company for 99 years. This incident intensified fears of “debt-trap diplomacy,” a term critics use to describe how Chinese lending practices could lead to losing sovereignty and strategic assets in host countries.

Debt sustainability has emerged as a significant limitation of the BRI, especially in low-income and politically unstable countries. According to estimates from the World Bank and the Center for Global Development, several BRI participant countries are at high risk of debt distress due to large-scale borrowing from Chinese lenders under opaque terms. Many countries cannot generate sufficient revenue from the funded projects, leading to fiscal strain and growing dependency on Beijing. This has prompted calls for greater transparency in loan agreements, better risk assessment, and more inclusive planning processes involving local stakeholders.

Another significant economic challenge is the limited participation of local labor and firms in BRI projects. Chinese companies often import their workers, machinery, and technology, limiting the transfer of skills and economic benefits to host communities. This approach has led to local resentment, protests, and labor disputes in various countries, including Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Indonesia. Critics argue that instead of fostering inclusive development, the BRI often reinforces a model of dependency that benefits Chinese interests disproportionately. Despite these limitations, dismissing the BRI’s economic impact would be inaccurate. The initiative has catalyzed a renewed global interest in infrastructure development, prompting competing efforts such as the European Union’s Global Gateway and the United States’ Build Back Better World initiative. In this sense, the BRI has forced a global recalibration of development financing and infrastructure priorities, placing connectivity and regional integration at the center of economic policy discourse.

Strategic Dimensions: Security, Influence, and Power Projection

Beyond its economic goals, the Belt and Road Initiative is deeply embedded in China’s strategic calculus. Developing strategic infrastructure—such as ports, energy corridors, and digital infrastructure—has allowed China to project power and secure long-term geopolitical advantages in various regions. One of the most illustrative examples of this is the development of ports under the “String of Pearls” strategy, which includes facilities in Gwadar (Pakistan), Djibouti, Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Piraeus (Greece). While these ports are ostensibly commercial, they also serve dual-use purposes, with potential military logistics and naval presence applications.

Establishing China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, adjacent to a BRI-funded port, highlights how economic initiatives can blur into strategic power projection. This convergence has alarmed rival powers, particularly the United States and India, who see the BRI as a means for China to expand its military footprint under the guise of economic development. The growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and infrastructure development in key chokepoints have intensified strategic competition and altered the security dynamics in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, the BRI facilitates the projection of soft power and ideological influence. China has sought to promote its values and governance model through cultural exchanges, educational programs, media cooperation, and Confucius Institutes. The Digital Silk Road, which includes investments in telecommunications, surveillance systems, and e-commerce platforms, allows China to set technological standards and export its approach to digital governance. In countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Pakistan, Chinese firms have played a central role in developing national surveillance and internet infrastructure, raising concerns about authoritarian technology exports and the erosion of democratic norms.

The BRI has also enabled China to consolidate bilateral relationships and build regional coalitions. By offering attractive financing packages with minimal conditionality, China has been able to bypass multilateral institutions and engage in direct state-to-state diplomacy. This model has been particularly effective in regions where Western influence receded or was viewed suspiciously. For example, in Central Asia, the BRI has reinforced China’s strategic presence at the expense of Russia’s traditional influence. Despite tensions in the South China Sea in Southeast Asia, several countries continue to welcome Chinese investments as part of their national development strategies.

However, China’s strategic gains have not gone unchallenged. The United States and its allies have increasingly viewed the BRI as a tool for Chinese hegemony and have responded with counter-initiatives to limit Beijing’s influence. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, has emphasized infrastructure development, maritime security, and technological collaboration as part of its strategic counterbalance to the BRI. Similarly, the G7-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment aims to offer a transparent and sustainable alternative to Chinese financing. China’s strategic ambitions have also encountered resistance from the BRI partner countries. Concerns about sovereignty, environmental degradation, corruption, and political interference have led to the suspension, renegotiation, or cancellation of several BRI projects. In countries such as Malaysia, Myanmar, and Tanzania, newly elected governments have sought to revise or withdraw from Chinese-funded projects, reflecting domestic pushback against perceived Chinese overreach. These incidents reveal that the BRI’s strategic success is not guaranteed and depends heavily on local political dynamics and public sentiment.

Geopolitical Dimensions: Global Reordering and Resistance

Geopolitically, the Belt and Road Initiative challenges the liberal international order established after World War II. The initiative embodies an alternative vision of global connectivity that prioritizes state-led development, non-interference in domestic affairs, and bilateral cooperation over multilateralism and liberal norms. By positioning itself as the architect of this new order, China seeks to reduce Western dominance in global governance and offer a model of development that aligns with the interests of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.

The BRI’s expansion into Europe has caused divisions within the European Union, as some member states, such as Italy and Hungary, have signed on to the initiative despite opposition from Brussels. This has undermined the EU’s collective foreign policy stance and created opportunities for China to exploit internal differences. Similarly, the BRI’s outreach into Latin America and the Caribbean has brought China into the traditional sphere of influence of the United States, raising concerns in Washington about strategic encroachment and ideological competition.

At the multilateral level, China has used the BRI as a platform to push for reforms in global governance institutions. Through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, China has sought to create alternative mechanisms that reflect its priorities and reduce its reliance on institutions dominated by Western powers. While these efforts have gained some traction, they also raise questions about transparency, accountability, and the long-term consequences of a parallel global order.

However, the geopolitical landscape surrounding the BRI is becoming increasingly contested. The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with growing concerns over Chinese influence, has led to a reassessment of the BRI’s risks and benefits. Supply chain disruptions, rising debt burdens, and geopolitical tensions have caused delays and cancellations of many projects. Additionally, China’s domestic economic slowdown and shifting political climate have prompted a recalibration of the BRI itself. The emphasis has moved toward “small and beautiful” projects that are more sustainable and commercially viable rather than the grandiose infrastructure schemes of the early years.

Nevertheless, the BRI has established China as a central player in the evolving global order. Whether through economic leverage, strategic positioning, or ideological outreach, the initiative has reshaped international perceptions of China’s rise. It has also triggered a wave of counter-initiatives and forced other major powers to revisit their development and foreign policy strategies. In this sense, even amid resistance and recalibration, the BRI has fundamentally altered the geopolitical terrain.

Conclusion

More than a decade since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains one of the most ambitious global undertakings of the 21st century. Framed as an economic connectivity and infrastructure development project, the BRI has evolved into a multifaceted instrument of China’s global strategy, encompassing economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions. This research has shown that the success of the BRI cannot be evaluated in binary terms. Instead, it exists on a spectrum characterized by significant accomplishments alongside notable challenges and recalibrations.

Economically, the BRI has succeeded in expanding trade routes, increasing Chinese foreign direct investment, and addressing infrastructure deficits across Asia, Africa, and beyond. It has facilitated regional integration, improved transportation efficiency, and opened new Chinese goods and services markets. For several developing countries, BRI projects have offered a vital alternative to traditional development financing, allowing for the rapid construction of highways, railways, energy grids, and ports. At the same time, however, this success has been undermined by unsustainable debt burdens, lack of transparency, and limited local participation. The prevalence of Chinese labor and materials in BRI projects and governance issues has generated backlash and accusations of neo-colonialism, leading to delays, renegotiations, or even cancellations of significant contracts.

Strategically, the BRI has served as a powerful extension of China’s geopolitical footprint. Creating dual-use ports, energy corridors, and digital networks has allowed Beijing to enhance its influence beyond its borders. The initiative has helped consolidate relationships with strategically important countries, strengthened supply chains critical to China’s long-term energy and trade security, and challenged existing Western-led global structures. By embedding itself deeply in partner countries’ political and economic infrastructures, China has advanced its ambition to become a global leader. However, this strategic reach has also provoked significant resistance. Regional powers like India and global actors, including the United States and the European Union, have responded with alternative frameworks to curb Chinese dominance. These competing initiatives have triggered a reassertion of influence in regions where China once operated with little contestation.

Geopolitically, the BRI has played a transformative role in reshaping the international order. China has sought to project an alternative global development model that emphasizes state-led investment, non-interference, and bilateral cooperation, thereby presenting itself as a viable counterweight to Western liberalism. The establishment of parallel financial institutions like the AIIB has further enabled Beijing to challenge the primacy of Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, the geopolitical environment has grown more complex and adversarial recently. The pandemic, rising nationalism, a slowing Chinese economy, and geopolitical flashpoints such as the Russia-Ukraine war have exposed the fragility of global connectivity and compelled Beijing to adopt a more cautious and sustainable approach. This has been evident in the shift toward “small and beautiful” projects, more attention to risk management, and an emerging focus on “green” and digital BRI efforts from a Debt-Trap Diplomacy.

In sum, the Belt and Road Initiative has been partially successful. It has achieved much in terms of physical infrastructure creation, market expansion, and China’s global voice amplification. At the same time, it has also encountered structural, political, and ideological resistance that limits its full realization. The BRI’s future will likely depend on its ability to adapt to a rapidly changing global landscape, address concerns about debt and sovereignty, and foster more inclusive and transparent development partnerships. If China manages this recalibration effectively, the BRI could remain a cornerstone of 21st-century globalization. It may become a cautionary tale of overreach and contested ambition if not.

By: Pritam Sarbabdiya

The recent Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir underscores a hard reality in the realm of intelligence, strategic, and security affairs, the idea of achieving or ensuring permanent or absolute solutions to security threats like that of terrorism remains an elusive myth. Despite years of progress and preparedness through intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism strategies, and military presence, the attack has revealed an inherent limitation that no amount of planning or technology can ensure complete security. This piece delves into why the notion of a permanent solution is a myth, highlighting the realistic objectives of any state about the idea of security is about: minimising, retaliating, and safeguarding threats and risks.  

The immediate reaction that ruled the entire discourse points out various aspects that resulted in the deadliest Pahalgam terrorist attacks, many experts and certainly politicians have stressed various reasons whether its ‘intelligence failure or miscalculation’, to that of the government’s incapacitation to ensure absolute security in Jammu Kashmir, which can be unfolded before the citizens in future investigation. Watching the horrors, that have sent shockwaves across India and the world many asked a significant ‘What is the permanent solution’ to this decade-old problem? After the abrogation of Article 370 and extensive military presence in the valley, many expected that the issue of terrorism would be eradicated from the land of Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in chronic normalcy both in the lives of people and the heaven on earth. However, this attack has brought everything back to square one and brought out a debate on the table about ‘Can States ensure complete security?’

The notion of a permanent solution or absolute security to terrorism and strategic threats is not new but remains constantly evasive. Security threats today are no longer traditional, those days are gone when enemies or elements of threats were easily identifiable, the modern threat prospect includes trans-national terrorist networks, equipped with the same modern advantages that the states are also equipped with, for instance, when states rely on intelligence, the adversaries opt for significant counter-intelligence, simultaneously, no matter how many troops are deployed to ensure security, it is not practically possible to secure every inch or corner of the landmass.

Terrorists with the advantage of hiding their identity using both money and influence also succeed in carrying out operations using strategic loopholes employed by security agencies. The challenge is not just limited to India, internationally, for instance countries around the world struggle to guarantee complete protection against threats, whether it’s the United States of America or Israel who are seen as countries having both technology and intelligence to counter threats from enemies. However, history shows a different picture, the 9/11 in America or the recent Hamas attack on Israel on October 07, 2023 question the very claim of strategic edge these countries possess and exemplify how most tactically advanced systems can be circumvented by unforeseen situations. The United States and Israel even after having internationally acclaimed intelligence agencies namely, the CIA and the Mossad failed to stop the mentioned events.

Similarly, in India’s case, the tragic incidents of the 2008 Mumbai attack, the Uri attack in 2016, and later the 2019 Pulwama attack, epitomise that even after extensive efforts of intelligence agencies, and armed forces, the government cannot promise total protection or absolute security. As, ‘Security is a matter of degree, not of totality’, it should be understood in relative terms, as today’s security may be tomorrow’s crisis. Acknowledging, the limitation of ensuring complete security, governments and security agencies must focus on three achievable and practical goals encircled around, minimise risks, retaliate against attacks, and safeguard their citizens and country’s interests. Firstly, minimisation involves reducing the vulnerability and impact of potential attacks by employing a robust intelligence-gathering framework based on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology, risk assessments, preventive security measures, and awareness programs.

Secondly, Retaliation serves as a deterrent and a mechanism of signalling that terrorist acts have consequences, not only for immediate perpetrators but also for their subsequent direct and indirect sponsors and supporters. This can be through diplomacy, economic action, and also demonstrative military action. Thirdly, Safeguard is about actions and policy decisions focused on protecting resources, and citizens, at the time of crisis, and even beforehand using a threat prediction system. These proactive strategies do not fully claim to prevent all attacks but try or aim to mitigate as much as causalities, preserve subsequent order in the state, ensure a sense of confidence among the public, and maintain the continuity of further action. 

In conclusion, The Pahalgam terrorist attack should serve not merely as a moment of grief but as an occasion for strategic introspection. It reminds us that the pursuit of absolute security is not just only futile but also very impractical to promise. As a result, India and other countries must embrace and elevate a strategic doctrine rooted in pragmatic realism, like the one that is currently driving India’s foreign policy, one that emphasises threat minimisation, demonstrative retaliation, and robust safeguarding.

By: Sofiqua Yesmin, Research Analyst, GSDN

Nestled in the eastern Himalayas, the Kingdom of Bhutan has long maintained a delicate balance between its two giant neighbors, India and China. Historically, Bhutan has cultivated a special relationship with India, rooted in the 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which has shaped its foreign policy and ensured close strategic alignment with New Delhi. Bhutan’s lack of formal diplomatic relations with China, combined with its policy of avoiding ties with any permanent members of the UN Security Council, reflects its cautious approach to international engagement However, recent developments particularly Bhutan’s intensified border negotiations with China and Chinese infrastructure activities in disputed territories have sparked debates about whether Bhutan is tilting toward Beijing, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. This article explores Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China through recent examples, assesses the extent of any perceived tilt, and examines the implications for Bhutan, India, and the broader Indo-Pacific region, drawing on reliable sources such as academic analyses, think tank reports, and international media.

Bhutan’s Historical Stance and India’s Influence

Bhutan’s foreign policy has been shaped by its geographical position, sandwiched between India to the south and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region to the north. The 1949 treaty, updated in 2007, allows Bhutan greater autonomy in foreign affairs but maintains close coordination with India, particularly on security matters. India remains Bhutan’s primary trading partner, financier of hydropower projects, and provider of military training, with the Royal Bhutanese Army relying on Indian support to secure its borders. This relationship is critical given Bhutan’s proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip connecting India’s mainland to its northeastern states, which is strategically vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Bhutan’s historical ties with China have been limited, marked by a lack of formal diplomatic relations and ongoing border disputes along their 477-km frontier. These disputes, dating back to the 1950s when China annexed Tibet, center on areas like the Doklam Plateau in the west and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north, with China recently claiming Bhutan’s eastern Sakteng region. Since 1984, Bhutan and China have held 24 rounds of border talks, with agreements in 1988 and 1998 to maintain peace and the status quo along the border. Bhutan’s cautious approach stems from its desire to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries and preserve its sovereignty, guided by its philosophy of Gross National Happiness.

India’s influence has historically deterred Bhutan from pursuing closer ties with China. For instance, during the 2017 Doklam standoff, when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in the disputed tri-junction area, Indian forces intervened on Bhutan’s behalf, halting construction after a 73-day confrontation. This incident underscored Bhutan’s reliance on India for security and its reluctance to engage China independently. However, recent developments suggest Bhutan may be reevaluating its approach, driven by domestic pressures and China’s persistent diplomatic and territorial advances.

Recent Developments Signaling a Potential Tilt

1. Bhutan-China Border Negotiations and the 2023 Beijing Visit

A significant indicator of warming Bhutan-China relations is the resumption and acceleration of border talks. In October 2023, Bhutanese Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji made a historic visit to Beijing, the first by a senior Bhutanese official, marking the 25th round of boundary negotiations the first since 2016. The visit followed a 2021 memorandum of understanding (MoU) outlining a three-step roadmap to expedite border demarcation, finalized during a 2020 expert group meeting. During the 2023 talks, Bhutan and China signed a cooperation agreement establishing a joint technical team for border delimitation, signaling progress toward a potential resolution.

Chinese officials expressed optimism about establishing diplomatic relations, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice-President Han Zheng hosting Dorji warmly. Dorji reportedly indicated Bhutan’s willingness to “strive for an early settlement of the boundary question and advance the political process of establishing diplomatic ties”. This rhetoric alarmed Indian observers, as Bhutan’s traditional policy avoids diplomatic relations with major powers, including China. The timing of the visit, amid strained India-China relations following the 2020 Ladakh clashes, raised concerns in New Delhi about Bhutan drifting toward Beijing.

Bhutan’s urgency to resolve the border issue may stem from domestic pressures. Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, in a 2023 interview with La Libre, emphasized that all three parties Bhutan, China, and India have equal stakes in resolving the Doklam dispute, a departure from Bhutan’s earlier deference to India’s strategic concerns. Tshering’s remarks suggest Bhutan seeks a pragmatic solution to secure its northern borders, possibly involving a land swap where Bhutan cedes Doklam for northern territories like Jakarlung and Pasamlung. Such a deal could grant China strategic access to the Doklam Plateau, threatening India’s Siliguri Corridor.

2. Chinese Infrastructure in Disputed Territories

China’s construction activities in Bhutanese-claimed territories provide compelling evidence of Beijing’s assertive approach and Bhutan’s constrained response. Since 2015, China has built over 22 villages, roads, and military outposts in Bhutan’s northern Beyul Khenpajong region, particularly in the Jakarlung and Menchuma valleys, covering areas revered for their cultural and religious significance. Satellite imagery from September 2023 revealed new outposts in Jakarlung, suggesting China’s intent to establish permanent control. These actions violate the 1998 agreement to maintain the status quo, challenging Bhutan’s sovereignty.

In 2020, China escalated tensions by claiming the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in eastern Bhutan, a region never previously disputed, during a Global Environment Facility meeting. This claim, alongside construction in the west and north, is seen as a pressure tactic to push Bhutan toward a border deal favorable to Beijing. For example, the village of Gyalaphug in Beyul, developed since 2015, includes extensive infrastructure, indicating long-term Chinese presence. Bhutan’s response has been notably restrained, with officials maintaining “disciplined silence” to avoid antagonizing China or India. This reticence, coupled with ongoing talks, suggests Bhutan may be open to conceding some territories to secure peace, a move that could align it closer to China.

3. Bhutan’s Domestic and Economic Pressures

Bhutan’s evolving stance is also driven by internal factors. Since transitioning to a constitutional monarchy in 2008, Bhutan has faced growing economic challenges, including youth unemployment (19% in 2024) and outmigration, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2024). Hydropower exports to India remain a key revenue source, but non-hydro sectors lag due to high trade costs and a small domestic market. The 13th Five-Year Plan (2024–2029) and the ambitious Gelephu Mindfulness City project aim to diversify the economy through foreign investment and tourism, but these require regional stability.

China’s economic success and Belt and Road Initiative appeal to some Bhutanese elites, who see engagement with Beijing as a path to development. The 2021 MoU and 2023 talks reflect Bhutan’s pragmatic approach to resolving border disputes to unlock economic opportunities, such as trade routes through Tibet. However, Bhutan’s democratic government faces pressure to balance economic growth with sovereignty and India’s security concerns, complicating its China policy.

Assessing the Extent of Bhutan’s Tilt

While recent developments suggest warming Bhutan-China ties, the notion of a significant “tilt” toward Beijing must be qualified. Several factors indicate Bhutan is navigating a delicate balance rather than aligning with China:

1. Continued Reliance on India

Bhutan’s strategic and economic dependence on India remains robust. India finances 70% of Bhutan’s hydropower projects, which account for 30% of GDP, and provides critical security support. The election of Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay in January 2024, whose People’s Democratic Party is seen as pro-India, signals continuity in Bhutan’s India-centric policy. Tobgay, who served as prime minister from 2013 to 2018, is expected to prioritize India’s interests, particularly regarding Doklam, and maintain close consultation with New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swift congratulations post-election underscored the enduring partnership.

Bhutan’s historical perception of China as a threat, rooted in the 1950 Tibet annexation and subsequent refugee influx, persists among its leadership and Buddhist populace, who share cultural ties with Tibet. The 2017 Doklam intervention by India reinforced Bhutan’s trust in New Delhi as a security guarantor, making a full pivot to China unlikely.

2. Bhutan’s Strategic Silence and Non-Alignment

Bhutan’s approach to China reflects its long-standing policy of strategic silence and non-alignment. By engaging China in border talks, Bhutan seeks to reduce tensions without committing to formal diplomatic relations, which would provoke India. Analysts like Yun Sun from the Stimson Centre argue that Bhutan is unlikely to negotiate without India’s involvement, especially on Doklam, which requires tripartite consent. Bhutan’s rejection of China’s Sakteng claim in 2020 and its cautious rhetoric during talks demonstrate its intent to protect sovereignty while avoiding confrontation.

Bhutan’s “disciplined silence” on Chinese construction, as noted by commentator Tenzing Lamsang, is a pragmatic strategy to avoid escalation while maintaining dialogue (India Today, 2023). This approach allows Bhutan to explore economic benefits from China without alienating India, aligning with its GNH philosophy of balanced development.

3. China’s Aggressive Tactics and Bhutan’s Constraints

China’s territorial encroachments, such as the construction of Gyalaphug and Pangda villages, place Bhutan in a difficult position. With a population of 727,145 and a small military, Bhutan lacks the capacity to counter China’s actions directly. Beijing’s “salami-slicing” strategy gradual territorial expansion through infrastructure mirrors its tactics in the South China Sea and along the India-China border, pressuring Bhutan to accept a deal that legitimizes Chinese gains. For instance, China’s offer in the 1990s to cede 495 km² in the northern valleys for 269 km² in Doklam was rejected due to India’s concerns, but recent talks suggest Bhutan may revisit this swap.

Bhutan’s willingness to negotiate does not necessarily indicate a pro-China tilt but rather a pragmatic response to China’s growing presence. The 2023 Beijing visit and cooperation agreement reflect Bhutan’s attempt to manage this pressure diplomatically, but any agreement ceding Doklam would likely involve India’s approval, limiting the extent of Bhutan’s alignment with China.

Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region

Bhutan’s evolving relationship with China has significant implications for the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the context of India-China rivalry and the broader geopolitical contest.

1. India’s Strategic Concerns

A Bhutan-China border deal, especially one ceding Doklam, would undermine India’s security. Control of Doklam would give China a vantage point over the Chumbi Valley and proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, enhancing its ability to threaten India’s northeast. Indian analysts warn that New Delhi cannot afford to lose Bhutan as a “reliable security partner” in the Himalayas, prompting calls for deeper engagement with Thimphu. India’s response includes increased economic aid, such as $500 million for Bhutan’s 13th Five-Year Plan, and military cooperation to reinforce the partnership.

2. China’s Regional Ambitions

China’s push for a border deal and diplomatic relations with Bhutan is part of its broader strategy to expand influence in South Asia, challenging India’s traditional dominance. By establishing settlements in Bhutan, China seeks to create “facts on the ground,” pressuring Bhutan to concede territory and potentially open the door for Belt and Road investments. A successful deal could embolden China to pursue similar tactics with other neighbors, escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

3. Bhutan’s Small-State Agency

Bhutan’s engagement with China highlights the agency of small states in navigating great power competition. By balancing dialogue with China and loyalty to India, Bhutan asserts its sovereignty while mitigating risks. However, its limited resources and China’s territorial assertiveness constrain its options, underscoring the challenges faced by small states in the Indo-Pacific.

4. Broader Indo-Pacific Dynamics

Bhutan’s border talks occur amid heightened Indo-Pacific tensions, with the U.S., India, and allies like Japan and Australia countering China’s expansionism through frameworks like the Quad. A Bhutan-China deal could weaken India’s position, prompting a stronger U.S.-India alignment to secure the Himalayan frontier. Conversely, Bhutan’s balanced approach could inspire other small states to engage China diplomatically without fully aligning, fostering a multipolar regional order.

India’s Perspective

From India’s perspective, Bhutan’s engagement with China is a cause for concern but not yet a definitive tilt. New Delhi views Bhutan as a critical buffer against Chinese aggression, particularly after the 2020 Ladakh clashes, which killed 20 Indian soldiers. The Doklam Plateau remains a flashpoint, with India wary of any agreement that enhances China’s strategic position. India’s close ties with Bhutan, reinforced by economic aid, military training, and cultural affinity, provide leverage to maintain influence. However, India must address Bhutan’s economic challenges and youth unemployment to prevent Beijing’s economic allure from gaining traction.

India’s strategy includes deepening engagement with Bhutan while countering China’s regional influence. Prime Minister Modi’s visits to Bhutan in 2019 and 2024, alongside increased funding for hydropower and infrastructure, aim to solidify the partnership. India also leverages its role in regional forums like SAARC and BBIN to integrate Bhutan economically, reducing its reliance on China. Nonetheless, India must tread carefully to avoid pressuring Bhutan, which values its autonomy and non-alignment.

Conclusion

Bhutan’s recent engagement with China, marked by the 2023 Beijing visit, accelerated border talks, and China’s territorial encroachments, suggests a pragmatic shift rather than a definitive tilt toward Beijing. Driven by domestic economic pressures and China’s assertive tactics, Bhutan seeks to resolve its border disputes to ensure stability and development, but its deep ties with India and strategic caution limit the extent of alignment with China. India remains Bhutan’s primary partner, with Tobgay’s pro-India government and New Delhi’s economic and security support anchoring the relationship. However, China’s infrastructure activities and diplomatic overtures pose challenges, potentially reshaping Bhutan’s foreign policy and Indo-Pacific dynamics.

For India, maintaining Bhutan’s trust requires addressing its economic needs while reinforcing security cooperation. For Bhutan, balancing India and China demands careful diplomacy to preserve sovereignty and avoid entanglement in great power rivalries. The Indo-Pacific region watches closely, as Bhutan’s choices could influence the balance of power in the Himalayas and beyond. While Bhutan is not yet tilting decisively toward China, its evolving stance underscores the complexities of small-state agency in a contested geopolitical landscape.