By: Shashank Khandwe, Research Analyst, GSDN
Myanmar has historically been part of a syncretic region that experienced the political and cultural influences from both India and China. This influence has often lasted in different periods, factored by the domestic political situation in the country. While the post-World War II period saw distinct presence of Indian businesses in Rangoon, the recent decades have observed increasing Chinese domination in Myanmar’s decision-making mechanisms, which raises concerns for India.
Myanmar’s ties with China dates to the lineage traced by the Bamar tribe (Myanmar’s majority tribe) to Tibet. Their engagements date back to the 12th century CE, when the Song dynasty of China began exchanges with the Pyu dynasty of Burma. In the contemporary period, Myanmar became one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China and established official diplomatic relations in 1950. Recognizing the importance of friendship and shared cooperation, their bilateral relations has been titled as ‘Pauk-phaw’ (siblings in Burmese language). This continues to reflect the share of China in Myanmar’s trade and investment figures. As a resource-rich, least-developed country, Myanmar realizes the importance of China as a source of foreign investment. In the past seven months itself, Myanmar has managed to attract around US$ 40 million in investment from China. It has also emerged as the largest trade partner of Myanmar, with bilateral trade in FY 2022-23 stood at around US$ 2159.412 million.
With the coup by the State Administrative Council (SAC) Junta in 2021, this relation has taken a new dimension. China remained one of the few states to recognize and maintain ties with the military regime. As western condemnation pushed the country farther towards China, concerns emerged for other neighbors like India as the former backed the new regime with its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). China’s long border of around 2000 kms with Myanmar and its strategic interests in its domestic markets and investments pushed for increased role in maintaining domestic stability in Myanmar. On these lines, China brokered a ceasefire in January 2024 at Kunming between the military Junta and the armed organizations led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. As this arrangement eventually fell through, immense pressure from the Chinese side forced the armed groups to unilaterally extend a ceasefire against the Junta forces in North Myanmar.
On the economic front, Chinese infrastructural engagement has seen new development post-coup, with the announcement of three new trade projects that would add on to the existing framework of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These include the construction of a new railroad Indian Ocean route that would connect the Chengdu (Sichuan province) of mainland China to the Yunnan province, extending to the Shan state in the North of Myanmar. The second project aims to create a new trade route between the Chongqing municipality in southern China to Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar. And lastly, a maritime trade route has been envisioned that would connect the Beibu gulf port (Guangxi province) to the Yangon port in Myanmar.
Meanwhile, India’s engagement with the Junta regime has been a tight rope-walk between its economic and strategic interests and its credentials for democracy and human rights. This has created a discontinuity in India’s engagement, where Myanmar has remained central to India’s Act East Policy and has reflected in its multidimensional interactions with the southeast Asian country. Infrastructural investment takes primacy in this, with the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport (KMMTT) project that connects the mainland east coast of India to its Northeastern states through the territory of Myanmar. The control over the Sittwe port became a major strategic advantage to India in this project, as it supports in countering China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy around the Indian subcontinent. It also reduced the cost and time in transportation of goods from mainland India to the Northeast by almost 50 per cent. Particularly for the Rakhine state of Myanmar, it has created opportunities of economic development and increased trade ties with India, in line to the ambitions of ‘Act East’ policy.
Despite the project being almost completed, what remains crucial is the domestic political dynamics that appear to be changing in the region. Particularly for the Kaladan project which falls in the Rakhine state, the presence of the Arakan army has created concerns for the Indian side, as they control the Rakhine state and aim to maintaining an inclusive administration. Doubts emerge on these ambitions as the potential clashes with the Rohingya militant groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) remains a possibility. Its manner of dealing with the Indian side on the Kaladan project would set an example for the future interactions. What is apparent is the greater influence that China has managed to have on the rebel forces in the vicinity of its borders, like the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), compared to India’s engagement with Arakan Army (AA). This has ensured greater security to Chinese economic interests in the region compared to India.
Similarly on the issue of the refugees, China has had a distinct approach to that of India. Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts has repeatedly led to internal instability and displacement of local population. Since 2016, the Rohingya issue has emerged as a crisis leading to the ethnic cleansing and displacement of millions of ethnic Rohingya Muslims by the Tatmadaw forces and Rakhine Buddhists. China’s stakes in the region are enormous, including its presence on the Kyaukphyu port and the connectivity projects from Rakhine to Yunnan, to the health and security concerns from a potential refugee crisis. Nevertheless, China continued to protect the Myanmar forces on international platforms like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and calls on the ideals of sovereignty and non-intervention in the international law to prevent any action against the perpetrators.
China’s stand comes from the realization that any support to intervention in Rakhine would naturally extend to the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This is also supplemented by its belief system of prioritizing development to human rights, and focus exclusively on its economic interests in Myanmar like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With the case in International Criminal Court still pending with issues on jurisdiction, China continues to stand against the international pressure on the matter. It keeps Chinese aligned with the junta regime and its economic calculations in the country.
Meanwhile, India’s approach to the Rohingya crisis evolved with time. Initially the Indian response was like China of not taking an active stand and calling it an ‘internal matter’ of Myanmar. India has similar border security concerns as China, in addition to the Bangladesh factor. While the government addressed the Rohingya’s in Bangladesh as ‘displaced persons,’ the vocabulary changed to ‘illegal immigrants’ when in India. The political rhetoric for the Rohingya refugee situation merged with that of Bangladeshi migrant problem in the Northeast states. Gradually, the government came up with plans of deportation of the migrants and support to the Bangladeshi administration with management of the refugee camps.
India also believed that the long-term solution for the refugee crisis is the development of Rakhine state, which brought India in alignment with the ASEAN. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries have themselves failed to provide any sustainable roadmap to the Rohingya problem. The ‘five-point consensus’ that the ASEAN countries put forth has failed to take off. Their response has been divided largely because of the individual differences these countries have in their relationship with the military junta. It has reflected the limitations of the institution and its ‘consensual’ approach to problem-solving.
While India’s position was developed with concerns of internal security and stability, the eventual decision of deportation drew criticism from human rights groups and international media. It has put India in a difficult spot, without solving the actual issues of resettlement of refugees and its challenges to India-Bangladesh relations. The latter has expressed deep concerns about the crisis as Bangladesh hosts around a million Rohingya refugees and did not receive sufficient support from both India and China. These responses from domestic actors or a third country like Bangladesh does not translate into comparable political pressure on China, meanwhile India finds itself struggling within these variables as it tries to engage with the Junta regime. China has found itself in a relatively stable position even on these lines.
The Myanmar issue continues to be another frontier of struggle between India and China. On the challenges of dealing with the Junta regime or issues like the Rohingya crisis, both India and China have attempted to engage with the domestic actors in proportion to their strategic and economic stakes in the country. The recent visit of military Junta leader Min Aung Hliang to Kunming represents the continued importance that China gives to his role in Myanmar’s political future. Similarly, China has pushed for the military regime’s engagement with Chinese-led multilateral forums, reducing the leverage that ASEAN once held on the Junta government. To prevent loosing further ground in the situation, ASEAN has pushed for a renewed support to the five-point consensus to restore political stability in Myanmar.
While the National Unity Government (NUG) and the rebel forces deny any engagement with the Junta forces, Chinese stand underscores the economic rationale without concerns of political morality. India meanwhile has been unable to frame a long-term plan with its democratic credentials and as a responsible regional power. The recent engagement with the military officials is a welcome step, as it shifts the discourse to a ‘Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned solution’ of the present crisis, and helps India navigate the complexities in Myanmar.
