By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has caused a significant change in the Middle East’s geopolitical scene, leading to increased influence for both the United States and Israel. In this situation, the breakdown of Assad’s power marks a strategic win for these countries and acts as a pathway for more extensive regional changes involving power relations and alliances. The resulting power void in Syria has given the United States chances to adjust its involvement, allowing it to work with new partners and reinforce its role in a historically complicated region. At the same time, Israel’s need for security drives it to take advantage of Syria’s instability, placing itself as a defence against Iranian expansion in the area. This initial analysis lays the groundwork for a better understanding how these geopolitical changes intersect, highlighting the complex relationship between internal turmoil and international strategic goals, as shown in the picture.
The Syrian Civil War, which started in 2011, changed the regional situation, causing effects that go far beyond Syria. The conflict began due to strict government control, economic issues, and people wanting democracy. As the war continued, different groups like the Islamic State and Kurdish forces came into play, making the complex relationships and conflicts even more tangled. Assad’s fight to stay in power strongly affected the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Notably, the collapse of Assad’s government has opened doors for more Western involvement, especially from the United States and its partners, who see a chance to shift their power as Iran strengthens its position in the area. This lack of stable power, along with Israel’s growing influence, raises important concerns about future regional stability and the possible changes in relationships among Middle Eastern countries.
The collapse of Assad
Assad’s collapse presents multiple strategic advantages for the United States. Firstly, it deals a severe blow to Iran, which has invested billions of dollars and thousands of lives in sustaining Assad’s rule. Even the US military post Al-Tanf plays a pivotal role in effectively regulating and blocking the Iran land corridor to Syria, which has been used to transport weapons, ammunition, and drugs to Hezbollah, Lebanon, located in the highly strategic M2 Baghdad-Damascus highway, Al-Tanf military post is strategically placed to support Israel for expanding its geopolitical and strategic affairs in the Levant region. A collapsed Assad regime disrupts Iran’s plans for regional dominance and limits its ability to funnel resources and arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This aligns with Washington’s long-term goal of curtailing Iranian influence in the region. Therefore, the weakening or collapse of his regime would allow Washington to achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. One of the US’s foremost strategic motives in seeking Assad’s fall is to dismantle the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.
Iran’s deep influence in Syria poses a long-term threat to US allies in the region, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s access to Syrian territory has facilitated a steady flow of weapons to Hezbollah and other proxy militias, undermining Israel’s security. By weakening or toppling Assad, the US aims to disrupt this corridor and diminish Iran’s ability to threaten Israeli and Gulf security. Additionally, the fall of Assad could potentially erode Russia’s influence in the region. Since 2015, Moscow had invested heavily in propping up Assad, both militarily and diplomatically. Russia’s presence in Syria served as a strategic foothold in the Middle East, offering access to Mediterranean ports and a platform to challenge NATO’s southern flank. For the U.S., Assad’s collapse would weaken Russia’s long-term strategic depth and create an opportunity to roll back Russian influence in a region traditionally dominated by Western allies.
Energy security is another dimension of US interests. Syria’s geographical location makes it a potential transit hub for oil and gas pipelines that could bypass Russia and Iran. With Assad out of power, the US could facilitate infrastructure projects that align with its broader energy strategy in the Middle East, reducing European dependence on Russian gas supplies. Militarily, the US presence in Syria—through its bases in the northeast and partnerships with Kurdish forces—has provided a strategic advantage in countering extremist groups and monitoring Iranian movements. Exercises such as “Eager Lion” in Jordan and ongoing joint military drills with Gulf allies serve as extensions of this broader strategic framework. The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim have become symbols of Moscow’s resurgent military power in the Middle East. These installations allow Russia to project power into the Mediterranean and provide leverage against NATO’s southern flank.
The collapse of Assad’s regime could create conditions in which Russia’s long-term military presence in Syria becomes untenable, further isolating Moscow from the region. Finally, Assad’s collapse would allow the US to facilitate a political transition in Syria that aligns with Western interests. A more compliant government in Damascus could allow the United States and its allies to secure favourable energy deals, curb the flow of refugees into Europe, and rebuild Syria in ways that economically and politically benefit Western stakeholders. On the other hand, for Israel, Syria under Assad has long been a complex and multi-layered security challenge. While the Assad regime had largely maintained a stable ceasefire along the Golan Heights, it has simultaneously acted as a conduit for Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah and other militant groups. Additionally, the collapse of Assad’s regime creates opportunities for the United States to establish stronger alliances with emerging power centres in Syria, particularly among Kurdish forces and moderate Sunni groups, which have often looked to the US for support against both Assad and extremist groups like ISIS. The United States also benefits strategically from Assad’s diminishing power in terms of regional counterterrorism objectives while at the same time placing a strategic foothold in the region.
Throughout the Syrian conflict, extremist factions like ISIS and al-Nusra Front thrived in the power vacuum created by Assad’s inability to maintain control over vast swaths of territory. While significant progress has been made in dismantling these extremist networks, remnants remain scattered across Syria. A weakened Assad regime, without the resources or legitimacy to reclaim these areas, allows the US military and its allies to maintain a long-term presence in strategic areas like northeastern Syria under the guise of counterterrorism operations. This not only serves to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups but also ensures that the United States retains influence over resource-rich regions in Syria, including oil fields. The Syrian regime’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah represents one of the most pressing security threats facing Israel.
Israel’s strategic calculus in Syria is deeply intertwined with its broader objective of countering Iran. Iranian entrenchment in Syria has brought the Islamic Republic dangerously close to Israel’s borders, leading to frequent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. A collapsed Assad regime would disrupt Iran’s logistical and operational networks, undermining Tehran’s ability to maintain a steady supply chain to Hezbollah. Furthermore, it would allow Israel greater freedom to operate militarily in Syrian territory without the risk of significant retaliation. Moreover, Assad’s collapse would provide Israel with an opportunity to shape post-war Syria in a way that reduces threats along its northern border. While Israel might not seek outright regime change—fearing the potential chaos of jihadist groups filling the vacuum—it would benefit from a fragmented Syria where no single actor has overwhelming power. Such a scenario would limit Iran’s ability to consolidate control and provide Israel with strategic depth.
Additionally, the collapse of Assad’s regime could create openings for Israel to normalize relations with Syria under a new leadership. Israel has successfully pursued normalization deals with several Arab states under the Abraham Accords. A post-Assad government, weakened and in need of international legitimacy, might be more inclined to engage in dialogue with Israel. Despite the clear strategic advantages that Assad’s downfall offers to both the United States and Israel, the scenario is fraught with risks. The Syrian opposition is deeply fragmented, with extremist factions such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and remnants of ISIS still holding pockets of territory. A power vacuum following Assad’s collapse could see these groups gain significant ground, creating a scenario reminiscent of post-Qaddafi Libya—a failed state plagued by warring militias and extremist strongholds. Moreover, Assad’s regime enjoys considerable support among specific segments of the Syrian population, including religious minorities such as Alawites and Christians, who fear persecution under a Sunni Islamist government. The power vacuum could lead to protracted civil strife, refugee crises, and a humanitarian catastrophe on an even larger scale than witnessed thus far. For the US and Israel, managing the aftermath of Assad’s fall would require significant investments in reconstruction, governance, and counterterrorism efforts—commitments neither country may be willing to undertake fully. Without a clear and coherent plan for Syria’s post-Assad future, the geopolitical gains could quickly unravel into new threats.
However, Assad’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah has made his regime an existential concern for Israel. Throughout the Syrian conflict, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions within Syria, aiming to prevent the establishment of permanent Iranian military infrastructure near its borders. The weakening or collapse of Assad’s regime would likely disrupt the strategic foothold Iran has built within Syria. Without a central governing authority in Damascus, Iran would face significant challenges in maintaining its supply lines to Hezbollah, and its proxies in Syria would become far more vulnerable to Israeli military action. Moreover, the chaos following Assad’s potential departure could allow Israel to increase its intelligence operations and possibly form covert alliances with local factions that share a common interest in countering Iranian influence. Israel also stands to benefit from the potential emergence of a fragmented Syria. A divided Syria, with semi-autonomous regions controlled by different ethnic and sectarian groups, would pose far less of a strategic threat to Israel than a unified state aligned with Iran. Such fragmentation would make it difficult for any single actor—be it Iran, Hezbollah, or a successor to Assad—to consolidate power and pose a significant military challenge to Israel.
Furthermore, the disintegration of Assad’s rule could open pathways for Israel to strengthen its relationships with Syrian minorities, including the Druze and Kurdish communities, thereby creating new layers of strategic partnerships in post-Assad Syria. However, it is important to note that the collapse of Assad’s regime is not without risks. The power vacuum left behind could potentially lead to further chaos and instability, similar to what occurred in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Extremist groups, including remnants of ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, could exploit this chaos to regain strength and establish territorial control. While this scenario could justify an extended US and Israeli military presence in the region, it also carries significant risks, including prolonged conflict, humanitarian disasters, and increased hostility towards both nations.
Another significant consequence of Assad’s collapse would be the shifting dynamics among external stakeholders in the Syrian conflict. Russia, which has invested heavily in maintaining Assad’s grip on power, would face significant geopolitical setbacks if Assad were to fall. Moscow’s naval base in Tartus and its airbase in Latakia represent critical strategic assets for Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Assad’s collapse would not only jeopardize these assets but also undermine Russia’s broader ambitions in the region. This could create openings for the United States and Israel to expand their influence while diminishing Russia’s leverage in Middle Eastern geopolitics. For Iran, Assad’s downfall would represent a catastrophic loss. Without Assad, Tehran would lose its most important Arab ally and its primary conduit for arms transfers to Hezbollah. This would force Iran to recalibrate its strategy, potentially shifting focus towards Iraq and Lebanon to compensate for the loss of Syria. However, this shift could stretch Iran’s already thin resources, weakening its ability to project power across the region. In a broader regional context, the weakening of Assad’s regime could have ripple effects on other actors, including Turkey and the Gulf states. Turkey, which has long opposed Assad, would likely seek to expand its influence in northern Syria, particularly in Kurdish-held regions.
Meanwhile, Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have historically supported anti-Assad factions, would see Assad’s collapse as a vindication of their policies and an opportunity to increase their sway in post-war Syria. While the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime would introduce new uncertainties and potential risks, it would also offer significant strategic advantages to both the United States and Israel. For Washington, Assad’s downfall aligns with its objectives of countering Iranian influence, maintaining a military presence in Syria, and preventing the resurgence of extremist groups. For Israel, Assad’s collapse represents an opportunity to disrupt Iranian supply lines, weaken Hezbollah, and reshape the strategic dynamics along its northern border. Both nations, despite their differing priorities, share a common interest in ensuring that post-Assad Syria does not become a staging ground for future threats. However, the path forward remains fraught with challenges, and any attempts to capitalize on Assad’s weakness must be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences in an already volatile region.
