By : Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN
An Analytical Brief
The spreading catastrophe in the West Asian region has led many people to believe that the reason for this never-ending conflict is an intent of nurturing the conflict. For a major part of the past three decades, the strategic planning in the Israeli camp has revolved around two significant schools of thought, which are conflict resolution and conflict management. While the domain of conflict resolution emphasizes a negotiated closure to the persistent hostilities, the latter focuses on controlling the situation without working on the underlying causes. Scholars like Sapir Handelman talk about how the conflict management school of thought has prevailed within the Israeli security circles after the Oslo proceedings didn’t see fruition. This also reflects in the policy circles and the approach that is taken by the Israelis towards pursuing a settlement with the Palestinians.
The Military Strategy Magazine has also provided evidence of how this thought manifested itself in practice. Through the accounts of a former commander who served in the Israeli Defence Forces’ Special Forces Directorate, the articles delved into a policy known as the “no comment policy”. This policy entails covert operations, sabotages, air strikes, targeted killings, to deter major confrontations to an indefinite time. This practice treated the absence of war as a temporary condition that required management, rather than a condition to be seeked permanently.
The collaboration of Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and the Forum for Regional Thinking concocted research which was revered and publicized by more than 100 Israeli and Palestinian academicians. The paper highlighted that the Israeli governments avoided any critical battles with Iran or its regional allies before the massacre on October 7, 2023, because that could have resulted in both the countries marching towards actual settlement under tremendous international and domestic pressure. Therefore, the dormancy before the Hamas attack was an attempt towards maintaining the historical rivalry rather than seeking regional peace
A similar pattern was noticed by Chatham House as they observed 75 years of Israeli Palestinian relations, as they highlighted how Israeli forces who prevail in the asymmetric warfare between the two entities, have it in their best interests to nurture the rivalry, rather than negotiating the political and economic costs that would be incurred in case a settlement is in order.
The Camp David Accords in 1978, The Treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the 2020 Abraham Accords are a part of this pattern, where normalizing the relations with Arab states proceeds as the case of Palestine is deferred rather than providing a closure.
The Leap from Management to Permanent Security
Several analysts have suggested that the attack on October 7, 2023, led to the dissolution of the containment model employed by the Israelis thus far. This is evident from the commentaries published in 2025 after Israel and Iran locked horns, deliberating on how Israel’s approach to retaliate was not resolution centric, rather aggravating an already sensitive regional rivalry. The posture witnesses the extension of military operation under the umbrella of establishing permanent security across Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Yemen, etc, with ceasefires being considered as a temporary pause rather than a long-term commitment.
However, the strategy has not been delivered adequately yet. Iran went through critical missile strikes on its nuclear facilities and senior leadership and survived a regime collapse. They were also able to transform a military attack into a political bargain on their own. Therefore, if the goal of the permanent security model was lasting deterrence, the record has been miserable.
The Economic Structure to this Continued Conflict
The domain that is not explored enough in this situation is the institutional and economic structures that have been built around this sustained conflict. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has recorded a 65% of real time increase in Israeli military expenditure in 2024, which is the most visible single year rise since the war in 1967. The amount of spending eased by five percent in 2025, after the 2025 Gaza Ceasefire. The military spending reached up to 7.8% of Israel’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which was the highest burden entailed by any country that year. Israeli debt also rose by at least 30% over the same period. This could be dodged if Israelis moved towards initiatives that promise durable peace. However, this would also hinder the defence sector, reserved linked sectors of the economy and settlement-adjacent industries, who hold a direct financial stake in the market of continuous mobilization.
Israel’s defence exports have grown despite the continuous confrontation. The exports revenue went off the charts as it recorded a record of 14.8 billion dollars in 2024. SIPRI’s 5 – year comparison showed Israel’s share of global arms exports, rising from 3.1% in 2016 to 4.4% between 2021-2025, overtaking the U.K. as they became the seventh largest exporter, as they conduct operations on multiple fronts simultaneously. The air defence systems that have been tested under live fire against Iranian and Houthi missiles, made up almost half these exports. These weapons being battled get a significant advantage over their competitors. These resources have sustained also because of the U.S. support, which have enhanced its stores with an investment above 130 billion dollars, with 12 billion dollars in new Foreign Military Sales, and a further 4 billion dollars in expedited assistance, which were authorized during 2025.
While none of this proves intent, it does elucidate the stake of defence manufacturers, reservist economies and alliances, in the continuation of these confrontations and contestations, in spite of a strategic rationale offered by a single operation.
The Domestic-Political Dimension
Another less examined path is the relation between the confrontation and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s corruption trial, which started in 2020, on the charges of bribery, breach of trust and fraud across three separate cases. There have been document accusations from opposition figures through reports from Associated Press and Middle East Eye, including Yair Lapid, about the appeal for national unity in the name of wartime emergency has led to severe malpractices including delayed trial proceedings, shifting public attention away from these accusations, which are rejected by Prime Minister Netanyahu on the ground of political motivation.
The Times of Israel has also reported that the governing coalition has advanced the repealing of fraud and breach of trust statute, which can afflict the capabilities of judicial oversight of the executive. These tactics are often called out by the opposition leaders as an attempt to the Prime Minister’s effort at a political and legal survival. Research done by Carnegie Endowments for International Peace has also talked about these phenomena depicting a right-wing shift in the Israeli Politics, which exists despite the leaders, embedding incentives against a peaceful and diplomatic resolution.
Criticisms
However, there are observations made by other separate camps as well. Many Israeli officials and scholars have rejected the above school of thought. Israel’s strategic doctrine, which has been articulated since the Begin Doctrine in 1981, has considered preventive and pre-emptive measures as a defensive necessity against actors that have declared their intent of harming the nation. Based on this understanding, many controversial decisions taken by the Israeli Government are considered as a national strategy to deter the repeated and documented threats of Iran and its proxies.
Research Analysts who have favored a negotiated settlement, say that the absence of political will is a strong tenet of this Israeli government, and the long-term demographic and democratic costs of the current skirmish, which the current leadership is aware of. Many scholars have warned against treating Israel as a state with a single intent, as the society has many diverse opinions over the war’s conduct and objectives. There have also been large scale protests directed towards the Govt’s decisions rather than the state’s security posture.
Conclusion
There is recorded evidence of institutional and economical stakes involved in continuous low-grade conflicts. However, there are valid counterarguments to the same as well, which define how the environment is perceived by the Israeli leadership and keeps it at war. The perceptions and opinions vary between people, countries, international blocs, and lawmakers. What is to notice is the nature of the conflict in the region, which has evolved over decades, but not resolved, massacring millions of lives.
