By: Bhaskar Jha, Research Analyst, GSDN
Introduction
The War in the Middle-East region between the UD-Israel axis and Iran, which started on February 28, 2026, ending with a recent halt, after a vehement catastrophe which lasted a month and a half, hold a plethora of lessons for the People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese Leadership. While Iran is not a competitor as strong as China to the U.S., the conflict and the resistance showcased in the war, witnessed tactics related to precision and missile saturation, and broader lessons regarding a alliances and economic crash-out, providing an opportunity to prepare to Beijing, as it can test its area-denial strategies, and make an overall assessment of the situation as they plan to invade Taiwan.
A variety of analysts from various research centres and think tanks forecast Chinese dependence on Pentagon tactics, which will have a direct impact on any potential operations cross-strait. The following article will examine the major lessons, that can be taken the on-going confrontation between the U.S and Israel, and Iran. Through the following article we will witness a caution that is re-enforced, owing to the resistance shown by Iran, and the mistakes made by the two sides till now.
A Brief Overview of the War between Israel and the U.S. and Iran
The skirmish commenced as the U.S and the Israeli forces struck Iranian leadership, following a peace talk, which encompassed the assassination of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini, along with plenty senior members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which led to a firm retaliation from Iran. The Iranian forces responded with a massive attack, with the first five days encompassing a devastating 550+ ballistic missiles and 1500+ drones, with 120+ ballistic missiles and 1100 drones towards Gulf and Israeli targets respectively.
The war began with US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian leadership, nuclear facilities, and ballistic missile infrastructure, including the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior IRGC commanders. Iran retaliated with massive barrages: in the first five days alone, it launched approximately 550 ballistic missiles and 1,500 drones toward Gulf targets, plus 128 ballistic missiles and 1,100 drones at Israel. By mid-March, Iran had fired roughly 850 ballistic and cruise missiles in total.
The axis incorporating the U.S. forces, Israelis and the allied gulf states showed a firmer air and missile defence, against what the initial pessimism from the analysts suggested, with UAE intercepting most of the missiles launched against it, and Israeli forces safeguarding all its crucial targets. The U.S. and Israeli forces on the other hand destroyed most of Iranian targets, ruining over 400 missile launchers, with the assistance from advanced AI-targeting, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tactics, which incorporated drones and satellites. The war between the two sides escalated, causing a lockdown of the Strait of Hormuz, which has caused severe economic disruptions for many countries. Moreover, the devastation of refineries, factories, and plants also hampered world trade significantly, especially afflicting the global energy markets. The U.S. misconception of a quick victory, despite warnings from the upper echelons in the U.S, Central Command.
There was a continuous exchange of conditions for a ceasefire, with a halt seen as both sides decided to employ diplomatic methods for the next couple of weeks. These developments and resulting devastation a variety of lessons for the Chinese leaders.
Assessing the limits of Missile Saturation and the capacity of resilience in the Advanced Defence systems
One of the pivotal elements of China’s employed strategy for Taiwan has incorporated cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, to intimidate U.S. and allied bases in the Western Pacific region, with the objective of tackling the air and naval assets and create a amphibious and blockade operation. Moreover, the Iran War has also revealed faults and cracks in the strategies and the assumptions taken up until now. One of the examples for the following can be the Iranian barrages, who were while large, still neutralized to a very large extent, which suggests that the defence systems of U.S. and allies might exceed the interception rates assumed earlier when kept the Taiwan intervention in mind.
A foreign affairs analyst for Carter Malkasian has also mentioned how a few improvements in the interception rates could make a significant number of US bases and ships operational enough to tackle the invasion led by the People’s Liberation Army. The destruction of launchers on the ground has proven to be more economically convenient than intercepting missiles in flight, which is an issue, which the PLA needs to address, by improving aspects like mobility and air defence systems. It also implies that Beijing would require a heavier missile stockpile, improved hyper-sonics, and subsequent approaches including cyber and electronic warfare. Therefore, the first requirement for this war is recalibration which is evident in China’s recognition of the risks of its military centric playbooks which is higher than expected if not guaranteeing operational paralysis of US Forces.
Foreign Affairs analyst Carter Malkasian notes that even modest improvements in interception rates could leave enough US bases and ships operational to degrade PLA invasion forces significantly. Destroying launchers on the ground proved cheaper and more effective than intercepting missiles in flight; a vulnerability the PLA must now address through better hardening, mobility, or air defences. For Taiwan, this implies China may need far larger missile stockpiles, improved hypersonics, or alternative approaches (e.g., cyber and electronic warfare) to achieve A2/AD effects. The war thus prompts recalibration: Beijing recognizes that its missile-centric playbook risks higher-than-expected attrition without guaranteeing operational paralysis of US forces.
The Human Intelligence and “The Enemy Within”
Another major lesson that the People’s Liberation Army has taken from the current geopolitical differences and the following skirmishes is mitigating the threat from Human intelligence which could be the potential “enemy within”. Most of the U.S. and Israeli strikes were successful because of the efficient Human Intelligence units who penetrated the Iranian Surveillance systems. Cheng-Yu Wu, who is a Taiwan based analyst observes the same as he talks about the following phenomenon being significantly threatening for China, owing to its export of surveillance tech to Iran and the US/Israeli circumvention post export.
In the case of Taiwan, this exposes internal vulnerabilities, whether because of espionage, disloyalty amongst the elite, or cyber infiltration, during operations of high intensity. The concerns for Beijing here revolve around targeting command and leadership disruption. China can also move towards advancing counter-intelligence measures and work on protocols for preserving and protecting the leadership, as rapid attacks, especially in the case of Iran, were intimidating, disrupting continuity of the government or military in a cross-strait crisis.
US Power, Alliances and the faith in Diplomacy
The war between US, Israel and Iran showcased US ability to use its power to sustain operations that are distant, even if they must indulge in muti-domain strikes. However, there are also weakness revealed in the following process which encompass drone warfare challenges, consultation gaps between the allies, and a centralization in decision-making which is influenced heavily by the whims of the President of the United States.
The PLA considers this impulsiveness of Trump as a double-edged sword, where, while the behavior can lead diplomatic gaps and relationship strains between the U.S. and its allies, the unpredictability of the decision making can be a threat which Beijing will have to mitigate through elements like Personal diplomacy or economic incentives. However, the timing of the U.S. strike on Iran while peace talks were being held in Oman, induces uncertainty in diplomacy, reinforcing the second lesson which is the blind faith in peace.
If considered from a perspective of a scenario where China invades Taiwan, it suggests that China cannot trust on the values upheld by the U.S. or its allies, merely because of the instability and the unpredictability in the decision making of President Donald Trump. However, the war also brings an opportunity for the People’s Liberation Army, as the U.S. engrossment in the Middle-east can act as a distraction and thus, a buffer which delays its reaction in the Indo-Pacific. The domestic US political situation can stall US reactions, even post ceasefire.
Propaganda and the Illusion of Victory
The PLA’s fourth lesson is the acknowledgement that the authoritarian propaganda cannot replace the realities encountered in the battlefield, especially against a country like the U.S. The narrative control tends to fail in the context of modern warfare, particularly facing the ones which have a superior firepower like the case of the U.S. The U.S also struggled in the domain of information warfare as exaggerated claims made by the parties corroded the international credibility held by both.
This also provides Beijing with an opportunity where the narratives set could actually help showcase its action against Taiwan as defensive.
Becoming Independent
From an economic perspective, the war led to a disruption of global markets, due to the blockade at the Strait of Hormuz and refinery damages, leading to circumstances which exposed vulnerabilities of all countries. This bases the foundation for PLA’s fifth lesson which revolves around self-reliance, highlighting the significance of domestic markets and supply chain diversification.
From a Taiwanese point-of-view, the strain on the Chinese markets due to the trade disruptions caused by the Strait of Hormuz blockade, might make China understand the economic costs of the invasion which can lead to semiconductor trade halts and global disruption, potentially tilting Chinese preferences towards Grey-zone tactics rather than direct invasion.
Implications on Chinese Strategy for Taiwan
The following lessons taken collectively suggest towards a more cautious approach taken for reassessment. While the war between Iran and US showcased aspects of an asymmetric and multi-domain warfare, it also elucidated that a strong artillery and missile saturation aren’t enough against firm and resilient defence systems. Moreover, the confrontation in the West Asian region also projected US dominance, despite domestic instabilities. However, the circumstances are different in this particular case where China possesses hypersonic missiles of superior quality, integrated air defence systems and more industrial depth compared to Iran, and in the case of a conflict near the South China Sea during the Taiwan invasion, US will also be dependent on more allied bases, fighting from a greater distance.
However, the current skirmish in the Middle-East might delay the confrontation. Malkasian also points out how the higher expected losses can push Xi towards focusing on build up, economic coercion, diplomacy or other grey zone tactics over a full-scale military action. While the US engagement in the Middle-East does create an opening, Trump’s unpredictability increases risks. Beijing is not abandoning plans for reunification, but there is a requirement for preparation, and greater precision.
Conclusion
The Iran has provided a strategic mirror to China, exposing the strength and limitations of the U.S. forces, while also revealing gaps in its own preparation. A detailed study on the U.S. tactics incorporating launcher destructions and the reaction of U.S. Alliances based on relevant stress testing, Beijing can get actionable intelligence which could enhance its A2/AD doctrine, internal security and managing escalation. However, the escalation of the Iran War and the economic cost involved, and incomplete victories underscore the possibilities of unpredictability and mutual destruction.
For Xi Jinping and PLA, the main lesson to be learnt is patience, working on advancing its defences, becoming economically independent, and asserting its dominance through the grey-zone tactics in the region. China’s recalibration posts the Iran War will shape the future of the South China Sea, for years to come.
