By: Rishya Dharmani, Research Analyst, GSDN
The prospect of simultaneous elections holds promise for some and peril for others. Supporters argue that it frees democracy from the curse of vested and repeated disruptive electoral cacophony; which breeds corruption, populist offerings, mushrooming costs, and logistical nightmares in organising this gargantuan exercise. Detractors contend that it violates the basic structure by diluting parliamentary democracy and ‘nationalises’ federal politics. Simultaneous elections are not a new concept and are practised in different combinations in Sweden, Germany, Japan, the Philippines, etc. Wider consultations and discussions will conclude whether it is apt and needed in India and in what form.
The Union Cabinet has vetted the recommendations of the High-Level Committee on One Nation One Election (ONOE). The latter had proposed concurrent elections to Lok Sabha and state assemblies in the first phase. Within 100 days, elections will be held for local bodies. In practice, simultaneous elections to Lok Sabha and state assemblies had been a norm in the 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 elections. However, rampant abuse of Article 356 led to disruption in several state assemblies’ tenures, and the cycle of the synchronised polls broke. The 170th Report of the Law Commission had maintained that separate elections to states’ legislatures should not be a rule but an exception.
Critics argue that if simultaneous elections are held with 2029 LS polls, then assembly tenures of 17 state assemblies will be curtailed, violating the federal principle that it will undermine regional politics by presidentialising elections, overshadowing local concerns. Coinciding elections till 1967 did not make India a unitary state; on the contrary, it led to better coordination between the Union and states. Some maintain that while regional parties may see a reduced expenditure in the eventuality of simultaneous polls, they may be unable to create discourses making regional demands. The centrist narratives may dominate the political landscape, and local issues may be sidelined, curtailing a pluralist political system. This is disputable as despite the “national wave” favouring the BJP in the 2014 elections, Biju Janata Dal in Odisha increased its vote share from 37% in the 2009 elections to 44% in 2014. Continuous elections one after another may, in effect, foster biases in voter choice, coopting her to choose the party that won the most recent election. Gaps in electoral cycles allow time for introspection and deeper engagement with policy alternatives offered by political parties.
Contrarian research by IDFC Institute on ONOE shows that it induces 77% of voters to select the same party for both state and national legislatures, dropping to 61% if there is a six-month gap between elections. Another fact comes from the Tamil Nadu elections in 1989, 1991, and 1996, when the votes polled by INC and AIADMK differed in state and national elections. In the 2014 Arunachal Pradesh elections synchronised with Lok Sabha parties got different vote shares nationally and in the state. It can be concluded then that electoral fortunes depend on the localised nature of politics, like the presence of alternatives, political contests, voter bribery, and community dynamics, and cannot be generalised. ONOE has the potential to generate a unified and single-minded national resolve on significant issues – a key trigger for the nature and content of third-generation reforms.
Operationalising simultaneous elections would require 18 amendments to existing laws and 13 constitutional amendments. The first constitution amendment bill will deal with the transition to a simultaneous electoral system and the eventuality of premature dissolution of legislatures, which Parliament can pass without states’ ratification. Article 82(A) will be inserted for a fixed five-year term, and another amendment to Article 327. It will discuss the modality of fresh elections for “unexpired term”. The second constitutional amendment will involve panchayat and municipal elections, requiring half of the states’ legislatures’ ratification. There are provisions for preparing a single electoral roll for the entire country and synchronising local bodies’ elections with Lok Sabha and state assemblies. Fixed tenure of five years for Lok Sabha and State assemblies will necessitate amendments to Articles 83, 85, 172, and 174 dealing with the duration and dissolution of two legislative bodies. Article 356 would also need to be amended.
The debate over the cost of election vs the cost of democracy is raging in this context. The Election Commission has called Indian elections the “largest event management exercise on earth during peacetime”. Expenses ranging from voter outreach events, star campaigners’ expenditures, personnel costs, etc., have ballooned legally reported election-related expenses, with almost 3-4 times the amount spent in the parallel black economy. EC has calculated that ONOE can be conducted in US$ 79.5 billion. In perspective, the 2024 Lok Sabha elections cost more than US$ 1000 billion approximately, whereas the combined US presidential and Congressional elections cost US$ 6.5 billion in 2016. However, a counterargument states that EC would need to simultaneously arrange 2.5 million EVMs and VVPATs (currently possessing only 1.2 million) for streamlined polls.
Some contend that elections are the lifeblood of democracy, and their value cannot be judged by the once-in-a-five-year expense they generate. However, taxpayers’ money can be diverted towards much more virtuous developmental goals promising substantive welfare more than procedural satisfaction of a successful election. Given the precarious nature of the external security situation with a simmering two-front war – India’s defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP clocked less than 2% in the 2025 Budget. Even internally, a continuous cycle of elections incentivises political parties to foster a bureaucratic-politician nexus to recover money spent on recurrent elections via corruption and black money, hurting the prospects of the real economy in the long run. Some allege that public works are virtually suspended during the electoral heat, resulting in a monumental waste of government resources.
Till 2021, the country experienced elections of 2-5 state assemblies every six months. Repeated promulgations of the Model Code of Conduct suspend major developmental work and welfare schemes, as noted by the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s 79th Report. ONOE will nip policy paralysis in the bud, producing less disruption of everyday public life due to road shows, noise pollution, and paper waste through campaigning material. It will ensure the stability and predictability of programmes with policy continuity. Otherwise, the current system predisposes the political class to opt for safe and revadi policies, avoiding politically risky, unpopular transformational change. Fixing “full term” at five years will encourage long-term visionary policy-making, deepening representation, and truly enabling elections as a “festival of democracy”.
It is well-known that Indian elections tend to be a spectacle of larger-than-life political drama and high-decibel knockouts. For months altogether, all elements of public life (from boardrooms to drawing rooms) are consumed in this tamasha – imperilling the cause of good governance. If we were to look at this issue from the perspective of human security, then we would find that the mammoth expense (including black money), a stranglehold on public life and raucous disruption of civility in campaigning necessitate some level of simplification and pruning of electoral process. ONOE (with some modifications) seems apt to sanctify the conduct of elections. The threat of ‘presidentialising’ of the electoral outcome is present in the current scenario. However, with concurrent polls, critics point to the ’subservience’ of state legislatures to the term of Lok Sabha, while constitutionally, this hierarchy is unacceptable. Policymakers need to be cautious of fomenting federalist dissensions on this front and need extensive consultations to resolve these cracks in the proposed format of ONOE.
Reduced accountability is possible as artificially fixing rigid electoral cycles impinges on voter choice and lessens democratic will. A parliamentary system is founded upon executive responsibility to legislature, which will be compromised if fixed tenure is imposed. Since the 1951 elections, 60% of Lok Sabha MPs were never re-elected to the lower House after their first term ended, signalling that irrespective of the tenures of legislatures, accountability to the electorate is strong in India. The High-Level Committee has proposed that in case of the dissolution of the legislature prematurely, another election is proposed to be conducted for an “unexpired term.” By-elections will be clubbed together and held once a year. In the event of loss of confidence, midterm elections will usher in a new government for the remaining term, for which voters may find fewer stakes to vote or less incentive for contestants to stand in the poll fray.
One way to deal with this conundrum is to hold simultaneous elections in two phases; if the
assembly or Lok Sabha gets dissolved mid-way, then EC can coordinate elections with the next phase for the remaining term, or if less tenure remains, then president rule can be imposed. The goal is to quell voter fatigue stemming from repeated elections and reduced turnout in elections that are held later. In Sweden, elections towards Riksdag (parliament), county council assemblies and municipal councils take place on the same day – saving valuable time and effort for voters, candidates and polling officials. To quell the premature dissolution of assemblies, the German model of a constructive vote of no confidence can be adopted to dissuade factionalism and horse trading from toppling governments.
Concurrent polls also offer rationalised security forces deployment, who otherwise are diverted from their core competency year-round to man electoral booths. A counterargument is that simultaneous elections will demand huge manpower to be utilised simultaneously, creating an opportune moment for security risks as 4,719 companies of CAPFs. EC would need to secure an additional 2.6 million ballot boxes and 1.8 million VVPATs. The issue of harmonising elections with geographical, weather, cultural (festivals), and security challenges is also noted. And yet, the Indonesian experience of the world’s largest single-day election, with Presidential, Vice Presidential, Parliamentary, Regional Assemblies and Municipal elections on the same day, indicates that it is possible to smooth over logistical roadblocks. The 2024 Lok Sabha election saw more than 600 million voters exercise their franchise, while the European Union has only over 400 million registered voters. Managing the world’s largest electorate is a humongous task, but EC is more than competent in evolving SOPs with trial and error.
The report of the 22nd Law Commission should be awaited in this regard. Concerns of regional parties and some political activists on ONOE should be given due importance. EC can also consider reducing electoral phases to reduce expenditure and maintain voting momentum. Further, as in Sweden, fixed dates can be announced for Parliamentary and municipal elections for predictability in election management. A modified version of ONOE, where the country could be divided into zones for electoral purposes, will stymie the regional concerns of centrist forces usurping the agenda as local issues will remain in the fray. The way forward is to host a broader debate within the parliament and civil society on ONOE.
From a strategic perspective, ONOE impacts the federal relationship between the Union and states – whether this mock unification of polling cycles can produce the consciousness of programmatically aligned and purposive governance is a moot question By, proposing to rationalise expenditure and other human and material costs – it favourably disposes the exchequer to allocate the said funds on capex and other prudent heads. The predictability of elections also lessens the volatility of stock markets and opportunistic fluctuations in capital markets. Take the case of Belgium, where the parliamentary elections are held every five years in tandem with the European elections- and this periodicity flushes out possibilities of bad actors manipulating outcomes due to the foreseeability of the electoral timetable. It also helps the stakeholders to plan their electoral strategies in time adequately.
There are also fears that the ONOE can translate into ‘one voice’ – since if the national legislature collapses, state assemblies would likewise dissolve, thereby contravening the federal principles. This and other lacunae of the Indian electoral system, including defection and horse-trading, can be curbed by the German example of ‘constructive no confidence’ motion. However, due to fracas raised on some disconcerting points – the government must provide clarity and tread the path of wider consultations on the prospect of simultaneous elections. The argument that separate elections enable regional politics to thrive and that ONOE risks binding India into artificial synchronicity is worth pondering. Given that India currently has a thirty-year window to race up towards Viksit Bharat status – we cannot afford to have fundamental divergences such as these, as a sound electoral system is the foundation for a stable and visionary political leadership.
