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October 15, 2025
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Is China’s closeness to Canada creating Problems for the USA?

By: Abhinav Prakash, Research Analyst, GSDN

China, Canada & USA’s flags: source Internet

This year marks the 55th anniversary of China-Canada diplomatic ties and the 20th anniversary of the China-Canada strategic partnership. Both sides are viewing this as an opportunity to promote and improve bilateral relations. China and Canada’s past diplomatic relationship was filled with a series of cooperation, challenges and mutual skepticism. On this occasion, they agreed to resolve past frictions, and advocated for stronger business ties in areas like clean energy, technology, and trade.

In the recent past, Canada-China ties have been a source of tension for the United States. Due to the trade war, Canada is attempting to diversify its trading partnership rather than being completely dependent on US, as Trump in February 2025 imposed 25% tariffs on goods and 10% tariff on Canada’s oil and energy, which he announced would increase up to 35% in August 2025. The reason cited for the recent action is to hold Mexico, China and Canada accountable for illegal immigration, flow of fentanyl and other contraband drugs into US.

The US consistently remains the first and largest trading partner of Canada. The bilateral merchandise trade between the US and Canada significantly declined from US$ 968.4 billion in 2023 to US$ 762.1 billion in 2024. Whereas, China is the second largest trading partner of Canada with bilateral merchandise trade of US$ 119 billion and US$ 117 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively.

As Trump aggressively remarked, “I deal with every country, indirectly or directly. One of the nastiest countries to deal with is Canada. We don’t need Canadian lumber, we don’t need their energy, we don’t need anything. We certainly don’t want their automobiles”, also referred “Prime Minister of Canada as Governor Trudeau” and made a disproportional estimate of the American trade deficit with Canada, proclaiming that “Canada was meant to be the 51st state because we subsidize Canada by US$ 200 billion a year.” These insensitive words from President Trump were totally unacceptable and against the sovereignty and integrity of Canada.

The above remarks have sparked retaliatory actions, threats and boycotts of American goods in Canada, and resulted in bitterness between the two historically friendly nations. Pew polling shows 59% of Canadians now view the U.S. as their greatest threat, up from just 20% in 2019, driven by contentious U.S. policies. Former Canadian P.M. Trudeau remarked “I suggest that not only does the Trump administration know how many critical minerals we have, but that may be even why they keep talking about absorbing us and making us the 51st state.”

The Trade war has acted as a catalyst in China and Canada relations. They already had the 2018‑2028 Memorandum of Understanding, for collaboration on emissions trading systems, carbon pricing, technology exchanges, including ministerial-level dialogues. The resumption of the Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETC) in 2025 after Mark Carney became P.M and a meeting between the Canadian Minister of International Trade and China’s Minister of Commerce in Paris, indicates a deliberate effort to resume the dialogue and address outstanding trade issues between Canada and China.

In May 2024, the expanded Trans Mountain Pipeline (TMEP) began its commercial operations in Canada, TMEP has allowed Canada to expand its market beyond the United States, which was previously its largest customer, China has emerged as the primary buyer of Canadian crude shipped through the expanded pipeline, which will strengthen their partnership in energy sector. The China-Canada Business Council (CCBC) has initiated a Canadian Agri-Food Mission to China in November 2024, emphasising on Canada’s commitment to agri-food exports.

Cultural relations between China and Canada have served as a bridge for mutual understanding, facilitated by student exchanges, joint initiatives, and community programs. The Canada-China Scholar’s Exchange Program remains active, offering scholarships to Canadian students, faculty, and professionals for studies or research in China and to Chinese scholars for research in Canadian studies in Canada.

In June 2025, the Chinese Embassy in Canada organized a symposium on China–Canada relations, bringing together nearly 20 experts and representatives from major Canadian universities, think tanks, media outlets, and business councils deliberating cooperation across trade, agriculture, energy, climate, and people-to-people exchanges.

China-Canada cooperation and closeness is only observed in sectors like trade, energy and education and culture. This means Canada strongly aligns and has historic strategic partnership with the US. The Arctic Security issue is the bone of contention between Canada and China; The melting ice caps will present China and Russia an alternative sea route to major markets of Europe. China calls itself a “nearby Arctic state” and its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, describes China’s priority in “shipping, resource development, regional governance and science” and has a “Polar Silk Road Plan” in the Arctic region.

In 2020, the Canadian government blocked Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd. from acquiring TMAC Resources Inc., which is a Canadian gold mining company that operates in the Arctic. The decision was based on national security concerns, specifically under the Investment Canada Act, which allows the government to review foreign investments that could be detrimental to national security.

In December 2018, Canada arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in December 2018 at the request of the US. The aftermath of the event was Chinese retaliation and detention of two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, which observers describe as “hostage diplomacy”. The Canadian federal government has banned Huawei and later ZTE from working on Canada’s fifth-generation networks over security concerns. The government also ordered the withdrawal of 5G equipment from Huawei and ZTE used in Canada.

During October 2024, Canada imposed 100% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and 25% on steel/aluminum. In response, China reciprocated with 100% tariffs on Canadian peas, canola, rapeseed oil, and 25% tariffs on seafood and pork. Canada’s International Trade Tribunal found evidence of domestic investigations on trade dumping that steel strapping from China may have harmed domestic industry through dumping and subsidies, with preliminary determinations expected by August 8, 2025.

The Canadian government in June 2025 has ordered Chinese surveillance camera manufacturer Hikvision (Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co), to cease operations in Canada over national security concerns. Hikvision has faced many sanctions and restrictions by the United States, over the past five years for the firm’s dealings and the use of its equipment in China’s Xinjiang region, where human rights organizations have documented abuses against the Uyghur community and other Muslim population.

Canada might appear drifting towards China in terms of trade and economic relations especially during the Trump regime, but overall, China-Canada partnership has undergone lots of turbulence in recent past years. “A full reset of Canada-China relationship isn’t feasible… government should focus on building stable, respectful diplomatic relations… to manage disagreements and mitigate any possible worsening of the relationship…” says the former Canadian diplomat & geopolitical advisor Michael Kovrig.

How are India-US Relations Faring Under Donald Trump 2.0?

By: Sanskriti Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

India & the US’ flags: source Internet

India and the United States (US) have had a rocky relationship in the past because of changing governments, global events, and regional needs. The return of Donald J. Trump to the White House in January 2025 marked the start of a new chapter in the relationship between the two countries. With Trump 2.0 once again focusing on the “America First” doctrine, it is important to look at how this administration affects India-US relations in terms of trade, defense, technology, immigration, and people-to-people engagement.

Strategic and Defense Cooperation

The India-US strategic partnership has stayed strong during Donald Trump’s second term. India is still seen as an important partner in the Indo-Pacific for keeping China’s power in check.


In March 2025, joint military exercises like Yudh Abhyas and Malabar were held again, which was a big step forward. These drills not only made it easier for the Indian Armed Forces and the US Armed Forces to work together.

The Trump administration has also given the green light for the sale of high-tech defense gear worth about $3.5 billion, such as MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones and advanced artillery systems. Trump’s transactional foreign policy often looks for clear benefits for both sides. India has skilfully dealt with this by strengthening its role as a net security provider in South Asia.

Trade Relations and Economic Diplomacy

Trade is still a hot topic in the India-US relationship, but it is changing. There were tariff wars and India was kicked out of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) during Trump’s first term. Trump 2.0 hasn’t brought back GSP, but trade talks picked up speed after the India-US Trade Dialogue in New Delhi on April 17, 2025.


At this meeting, both sides agreed to work together to fix trade imbalances and make it easier for people to do business in areas like e-commerce, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. A big result has been the announcement of a $1.2 billion bilateral investment package that will focus on clean energy and infrastructure.

Even with these gains, Trump’s protectionist stance still makes things hard for Indian exporters. His government has also put new tariffs on some steel and aluminium goods, which has hurt India’s manufacturing sector. But the fact that the two economies are becoming more dependent on each other may stop both sides from taking extreme actions.

Technology and Cyber Cooperation

The collaboration in technology, especially in semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity, has become a key part of India-US relations. In February 2025, the two countries launched the US-India Future Tech Partnership during US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s visit to Mumbai on February 10, 2025. 

This partnership, supported by an US$ 850 million joint innovation fund, aims to improve research collaborations, promote secure digital infrastructure, and address cyber threats from both state and non-state actors. With both nations cautious about technology dependence on China, this partnership strengthens their shared strategic interests. 

Additionally, the presence of Indian-origin CEOs in major American tech companies and the ongoing growth of Indian IT firms in Silicon Valley are important factors in solidifying this relationship.

Immigration and Diaspora Engagement

Immigration policy under Trump has been strict. Trump 2.0 has introduced more limits on H-1B visas. These changes start on March 1, 2025. They tighten the eligibility criteria for high-skilled workers, which greatly impacts Indian professionals.

However, Trump has also proposed a merit-based immigration reform bill in June 2025. This bill includes measures for speeding up green cards for highly skilled workers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. The Indian-American community, which makes up over 75 percent of H-1B visa holders, has welcomed this change cautiously.

Additionally, Trump has increased efforts to connect with the Indian diaspora. He recognizes their political importance in key US states. His participation in the “Namaste America” event in Houston on May 5, 2025, received significant attention. It highlighted cultural ties and the role of Indian-Americans in connecting the two democracies.

Climate Change and Energy Cooperation

Climate policy is still a point of contention. Trump 2.0 has rolled back several environmental regulations, withdrawn from international climate agreements, and promoted fossil fuels. However, energy cooperation with India has continued in practical ways.

In June 2025, India and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for a US$ 500 million joint investment in green hydrogen technology and bioenergy research. While the Trump administration focuses on energy security instead of climate responsibility, India’s climate leadership has led to selective partnerships in clean energy.

The US still exports liquefied natural gas (LNG) and crude oil to India. This helps diversify energy sources. These actions provide economic benefits to the US and support India’s move toward sustainable energy.

Geopolitical Convergence and Divergences

The political landscape of Trump 2.0 has major implications for India. With Washington choosing a more unilateral foreign policy, India’s strategic independence faces both challenges and opportunities.

On one hand, Trump’s confrontational approach toward China gives India more room to strengthen defense and technology partnerships with the US. On the other hand, Trump’s unpredictable stance on global alliances, including strained relationships with NATO and scepticism about the United Nations, creates uncertainty.

Additionally, Trump’s decision to cut aid to several countries, including Pakistan, has received a positive response in New Delhi. His support for India’s role in regional stability, especially in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal, has led to better defense intelligence sharing.

Nonetheless, differences still exist. Trump’s tepid support for multilateral institutions, inconsistent position on Russia, and transactional diplomacy have often limited deeper institutional cooperation.

Human Rights, Democracy, and Value-Based Diplomacy

India-US relations have often been seen as a partnership based on shared democratic values. However, under Trump 2.0, diplomacy focused on values has been overshadowed by strategic and economic interests.

Concerns about human rights, press freedom, and religious freedoms in India have not been addressed as openly during Trump’s administration. This approach has helped avoid public diplomatic tensions, but it has also faced criticism from civil society groups on both sides.

Still, informal talks and visits by parliamentary delegations have kept the lines of communication open. These efforts allow for discussions about concerns without upsetting the overall relationship.

The Road Ahead

As Donald Trump transitions into his second term, the India-us relations possibly are sleek but multifaceted corresponds to a program of resilience. Strategic and defense cooperation are plentiful, especially as tied through Technology and Energy, extreme -come what may – pressure on Economic relations has thus far been progressively constructive.

While immigration and climate issues raise friction between us, both countries seem committed to a dialogue on working through the differences without abandoning the opportunity for bilateral opportunities through Trump’s transactional diplomacy. This said, it is certainly not a cookie-cutter approach, but India as an emerging new global power level, will need to adopt a more independent and assertive, diversified foreign policy.

At the end of the day like the first Trump term, the partnership however, will be based not on ideologies, but on shared interests, strategic need and mutual benefit. These factors will likely only evolve and become salient as more uncertainty defines our global environment. The world seems to need pragmatism, this is likely the basis of enduring partnerships, particularly between India-US partnership.

Relationship between Russia and North Korea: An Analysis

By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

North Korea & Russia’s flags: source Internet

Russia and North Korea have a convoluted history of relations constructed of features of history, geopolitics, and regionalism. With the world trying to come to terms with the dangers of the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and moves toward strategic games by Russia, the dynamic of this relationship takes a more prominent role. The article attempts to give a comprehensive overview of Russia-North Korea relations with a focus on its historical background, their economic, military and diplomatic interaction, and other aspects of the relationships and how this might impact the security of the region and the world.

Historical Context

Russia-North Korea relations may be traced back to World War II. The peninsula of Korea was split into two different states: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The central feature about the Soviet Union is that it was the main factor that set up the communist regime in North Korea as it offered economic and military assistance that put the basics of the political scenario in North Korea.

During the first years after division the dominance of the Soviet Union prevailed. North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, followed a Stalinist style of governance which was largely dependent as far as development of economy and military was concerned by the Soviet assistance. The aid of the USSR was not only financial but also came in terms of the military training, equipment and ideological direction, which only strengthened the power of the regime.

The Korean War and The Aftermath

The Korean War (1950-1953) became another milestone of the relationship between Russia and North Korea. The Soviet Union’s support of North Korea in its invasion into South Korea was another imperative in the conflict. The war left the situation in a stalemate hence the creation of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and an ongoing separation of the peninsula.

The post-war USSR still gave much assistance to North Korea that played a very important role in its reconstruction and growth. It is during this time when North Korea was getting militarized and advanced weapons and technology were provided to them by the Soviet Union. The friendship cropped up between the two countries that included the ability of the two nations to support each other and North Korea acted as a buffer state against the effects of the United States in the region.

 

Dynamics of the Cold War

During the Cold War, North Korea had a good relationship with USSR because they shared ideological beliefs as well as common interest. The Soviet Union saw North Korea as an essential ally in its campaign against influence of the U.S. in East Asia. North Korea, on the other hand, depended on the Soviet to keep its regime in power and follow its dreams of accumulating military power.

Nevertheless, the relationship did not go on so well. Tensions were present in the 1960s due to the Sino-Soviet split since North Korea was trying to balance between the two communist powers. Efforts at independent action in foreign policy made by Kim Il-sung brought him to clash with Moscow, although the general necessity of allies preserved the alliance.

The Post Cold War Era

In 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union brought a fundamental change in the state geography of East Asia. North Korea being badly hit economically, desired to retain its bond with Russia though with reduced finances. The decade of the 1990s was marked by the survival crisis of North Korea whereby its foreign policy had to be re-examined.

Russia itself was caught up with its internal problems at the time such as the economic disturbance and political instabilities. This forced Moscow to have little capacity to give North Korea significant support. Yet, the two countries remained highly involved in diplomatic relations, with the intention of North Korea trying to capitalize its history and become popular among the Russians.

Geopolitical Dynamics: China and its Emergence

Since China became a global power in the late 20th century, its association with North Korea became very important. China rose to become a regional powerhouse due to the left economic reforms that were started by Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s. Since it realized that both Russia and China were important to its relations, North Korea tried to make a relationship with Beijing.

The shift in strategy could be observed during the early 2000s when both countries tried to work together over the problem of regional security. To put an equal weight against the role of China, Russia tried to enhance its relationship with Pyongyang. The North Korean-Chinese relationship has however been typified in most times with a certain amount of tension in the way that the activities that North Korea is involved in may not augur well to the interests of China.

Nuclear Crisis in North Korea

Nuclear crisis in North Korea has been the cusp of the region and it has affected relations between Russia and North Korea. Russia became more complex when North Korea was creatively engaging in its nuclear program. Although Moscow has criticised North Koreas nuclear test, it has been urging a dialogue and openness to an isolated approach.

This is quite a sophisticated position which reflects Russian need to keep its influence in the area and resolve the issues of security. Russia has taken the role of intervener in the crisis and has been playing the role of promoting a diplomatic solution to the crisis and this will have the United States, South Korea, and China included.

The International Sanctions and its Role

The issue of the North Korean nuclear program has posed difficulties to economic cooperation following international sanctions directed towards the country. Nevertheless, Russia has frequently been against these sanctions and has always argued in favor of a dialogue and interaction. This position has enabled certain trade to remain open through under the dim light of international interest.

These sanctions have also influenced North Korea to look at other economic partners and Russia appears as the possible partner that may help in bypassing these sanctions. The association has been defined through a certain level of pragmatism whereby the two countries want to leverage on their collaboration despite the pressure imposed on them.

Economic Relations: Investment and Trade

There are not many economic contacts with Russia and North Korea, but there have been some changes depending on the politics of the moment. Trade has been stimulated in these past few years, especially in the aspects of energy, agriculture, and infrastructural development. Russia has tried to invest in North Korea infrastructure such as building of railway lines and energy generation.

This increase in economic cooperation is reflected by the development of the Rajin-Khasan railway project which links the Far East of Russia to North Korea. The purpose of this project is to improve the connection of trade and the distribution of goods between the two countries. Furthermore, Russia has shown interest in joint energy ventures among them which involves North Korea natural gas provision.

Economic Cooperation and the Effect of Sanctions

The sanctions imposed on North Koreans have greatly affected the economy of the country, which had to depend more on the foreign partners. Russia has come out as a possible economic rope to North Korea since it is prepared to trade with North Korea as well as investing in vital sectors. Nevertheless, the sanctions have added pressures to economic collaboration since the two countries have to deal with the dynamics of foreign investigation.

Nonetheless, Russia has been pursuing the desire to put its economic presence in North Korea. The two countries have been carrying on negotiations in order to improve the trade relationship, having in mind areas like agriculture, mining and energy. Economic cooperation potential is also quite high, especially since North Korea is approaching economic diversification of its relations.

Future of Economic Relationships

In the future, the situation in economic relations between Russia and North Korea will hinge on a number of factors, among which it is possible to distinguish a geopolitical situation, the existence of international sanctions and the desire of both countries to establish real cooperation with each other. With North Korea still suffering with regard to its economy, it is even possible that its economic relations with Russia grow stronger.

Military Cooperation: Past Military Relationships

The closest military ties existed between Russia and North Korea during the Korean War, when the Soviet Union supported the North greatly. This alliance has remained intact as over the years Russia has been providing North Korea with military guns and weaponry. Past collaboration on military affairs has provided the basis of the current peaceful cooperation existing in the field of defense.

Recent Developments in Military Collaboration

During the current years, cooperation in the sphere of military activities has acquired new colors, especially when speaking about nuclear plans of North Korea. Russia has raised alarm about violence that could erupt in this region and has even tried to pose itself as a spokesperson in the events that are happening between North Korea and the United States.

There has been observed joint military exercises and exchange of military personnel as an indication of the willingness to enhance defense relations. Further, Russia has supplied military technology and gear to North Korea, an action that has strengthened the two countries defense dealings.

Consequences of the Military Collaboration

Military relationship between Russia and North Korea implies potential consequences to the security regime within the region. The possibility of military cooperation is high as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear prowess and this is very alarming to the other countries in the neighborhood and also to the international community. Engagement of Russia in military collaboration with North Korea can be seen to hinder the resolving of the nuclear crisis, and this may cause more tensions in the region.

Diplomatic Engagement: High-Level Visits and Summits

Diplomacy Russia-North Korea relations have been off-set by high-ranking visits and summits. It is specific because the interest of North Korea in Russia is reflected in the meetings of the leadership in 2019 and 2021 with the head of that state, Kim Jong-un. Such meetings involved the improvement of bilateral relations, and the promotion of security in the region.

In these summits the two leaders focused on the importance of embracing each other and working together on some of the issues such as economic growth and security. The high-level encounters act as a stage to deliberate on common grounds as well as commit to working together.

Multilateral Forums

Russia had engaged in multilateral meetings over the North Korean problem, such as the Six-Party Talks. These discussions have had their fair share of obstacles however, the inclusion of Russia into the process attests to its desire to reach a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. The multilateral approach will enable Russia to deal with other stakeholders such as the United States, South Korea and China in an attempt to deal with the complexities of the situation in North Korea.

The Problems of Diplomatic Interaction

Irrespective of the endeavours of diplomatic involvement, there are obstacles in the Russia-North Korea relationship. The tensions in the region of North Korea and its nuclear program as well as the difference in the interests of the regional powers makes the field of diplomacy even more problematic. The competing interests of other stakeholders especially the United States and South Korea usually challenge the position of Russia as a mediator.

Regional Implications: Korean Peninsula and Beyond

Russia and North Korea relations have a huge implication to the Korean Peninsula and East Asia as a region. With the threats between North Korea and the United States going on, the role of Russia as a potential mediator gains higher significance. Also, the relationship has influenced the dynamics of regional security especially due to the influence of China.

The involvement of Russia with North Korea acts as a contraction to the dwelling of Americans on political dominance in the region, which makes the geopolitics of the region tough. The future Russia-North Korea relations will depend on the flow of the historic preconditions, economic manipulations, and military alliances.

What the United States is and What the United States Responds to

Russia-North Korea relation has been watched carefully by the United States as the U.S. looks through the prism of its strategic interests. The reaction by Washington has been the imposition of sanctions and diplomacy to isolate North Korea and at the same time limit the influence by Russia in the region. The U.S. has been worried about the possibility of military relations between Russia and North Korea especially on the aspect of selling arms and technology transfers.

The Role of China

One thing that cannot be overlooked is the role of China in the relationship between Russia and North Korea. China is the major trade partner and ally of North Korea hence controls most of its activities. The interest of Russia in North Korea could be held in the perspective of the necessity to oppose the penetration of additional influence of China in the region. The relations which will develop among these three countries will determine the future of stability and security in East Asia.

Conclusion

The interconnection between Russia and North Korea is rather complicated and multifactorial, the process of connection is predetermined with historical links, geopolitics interests, and the play of forces in the region of occurrence. The relationship between the two countries will keep growing as they pursue their interests in the 21st century, with concerns about its impact on peace in the region and the world at large. This sort of relationship remains important to understanding the larger structural aspect of geopolitics in East Asia.

The future course of relations between Russia and North Korea will be written by the interrelation of the historical legacies, mutual economic interests, military cooperation and relations. North Korea will also depend more on Russia as it struggles with the economy and geopolitics pressures hence the closeness. On the other hand, the relationship between North Korea and Russia will be determined by Russian strategic interests in the region where the latter will want to balance its relations with other regional powers.

To summarize, Russia and North Korea have formed an ever- evolving association that is going to take its bearings on the geopolitical affairs of East Asia. The two countries will enjoy fruitful cooperation in the 21st century as they work out the dynamics of the century and the cooperation will bring sweeping consequences to regional security and international relations.

BRICS 2025: Has Anything Been Achieved?

By: Chethana Enugula

BRICS 2025: source Internet

When the BRICS countries met again in their regular summit in 2025, concerns about relevance, success, and future direction hung heavily over the bloc. With the world’s geopolitical and economic map changing rapidly, as new alliances are forged, technological revolutions emerge, and new economic threat areas appear, the 2025 summit was the main event to watch, with hopes of seeing some progress or even further division. This article looks deep into the results of the BRICS 2025 summit to determine whether the group had achieved anything major or had merely reaffirmed its current rhetoric.

Background: The BRICS Vision

The BRICS bloc appeared at the beginning of the 21st century, and the idea behind it was to change the global order so that the voice of the emerging economies could be strengthened. These were originally called the BRIC term, which economist Jim O’Neill coined, but later it was considered official after the inclusion of South Africa in 2010. Collectively, they had over 40 percent of the world population and almost a quarter of the GDP across the world by the 2020s.

BRICS has undergone a transition over the years from an economic association of powers into a political alliance that promotes multipolarity, reforms of international organizations (such as the UN and IMF), and increased cooperation between the South and South. The intraregional differences, the bilateral difference, especially that between India and China, and the variation in economic directions have, however, dented the cohesiveness of the group.

The Situation of the 2025 Summit

December 2025 marked the 2025 BRICS summit held in Cape Town, South Africa, with anticipation and skepticism in mind. The last couple of years have witnessed the world suffering the aftermath of the pandemic, inflation, geopolitical conflicts (the current Russia-Ukraine war), and technological decoupling between the West and China.

In this background, BRICS endeavoured to establish its relevance. In its turn, South Africa, as the host, was interested in promoting a revitalized unity and cooperation among its members and in proposing BRICS as an alternative to the Western-centric multilateral bodies, including G7 and NATO.

Significant Topics and Agendas to Be Discussed

– The Economic Cooperation and the BRICS Currency Initiative

The BRICS currency proposal, which has received so much publicity as a possible successor to the US dollar in intra-group trade, also dominated headlines at BRICS 2025. Initially, the concept was floated in 2023 when there was increased discontent with the financial systems dominated by the dollar.

Although a full-fledged BRICS currency is still way beyond its implementation, the new task force was created at the summit to discuss the technical and policy aspects of the proposed currency. The countries were willing to use local currencies more in trade and enhance the mechanism of settlements by relying on the New Development Bank (NDB).

Was there any gain?

Improvements were not material. Political commitment is rising, but actual implementation will take a number of years.

– Strategic autonomy and geopolitical gearing

At a time when the world is divided into more polarized blocks, the BRICS leaders once again committed to strategic autonomy. They reiterated multipolarity, non-interference in internal policies, and diplomacy, which diplomatically criticized the Western sanctions and interventions.

India and China insisted that the world be restrained from the wrangles of conflict, but they differed in their disagreements concerning certain points, such as Ukraine and Taiwan. Russia wanted to find a diplomatic ally and an alternative economic source through the use of the forum due to the ongoing sanctions.

Was there any gain?

The group has succeeded in having unity in diversity, which is not a small achievement. Nevertheless, the absence of specific solutions left the boundaries of the political coordination of BRICS open.

– BRICS+ and Regional Integration

The BRICS 2025 witnessed the further development of the BRICS+ mechanism, where such countries as Argentina, Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia joined the talks. The topic of formulating new members was discussed as well, but there was no agreement.

The outreach multiplied the bloc’s soft power and legitimacy in the Global South. However, institutional reforms must be implemented; otherwise, it is likely to dilute the key aims of BRICS countries.

– Sustainable development and climate change

Emphasis was given to environmental cooperation, and BRICS countries pledged to increase the sharing of green technologies and the development of renewable energy. India and Brazil focused on climate financing, whereas China suggested the BRICS Green Development Fund.

There were good proposals about what should be done; follow-up will play a critical role. One of the concrete products was the establishment of a Green Task Force.

– Technology Sharing and Technology Transformation

With the emerging trend of digital economies in the world, BRICS 2025 initiated the “BRICS Digital Partnership Initiative,” which serves the purpose of promoting cooperation in the areas of AI, cybersecurity, and digital infrastructure.

In India, a new Digital Innovation Center was announced in Bangalore to incubate BRICS-nation-based start-ups.

Yes. It was one of the most practical outcomes of this summit, which could have increased technology self-sufficiency among the members.

The Role of the New Development Bank (NDB)

The NDB, commonly referred to as the BRICS Bank, remained at the center stage. The bank has secured 10 billion in new lending in 2025 in its target areas of infrastructure and clean energy, as well as pandemic preparedness. The bank has also established its first regional office in Cairo to serve the African development needs.

Challenges before BRICS

Even though the summit was held on a positive note, many old issues remain:

–        Internal Threats: Indo-Chinese tensions and different national interests reduce the ability to act together.

–        Economic Asymmetries: The economic power of China greatly outweighs the rest of the members, and hence, the issue of dominance is brought into question.

–        Institutional Weaknesses: BRICS does not have a permanent secretariat, and it is hard to coordinate and continue.

–        Absence of Enforcement Mechanisms: Enforcement structures are rare when it comes to agreements; many agreements are declaratory only.

Impression and Western interpretations

The emergence of BRICS 2025 was looked on as wary encouragement by Western analysis. On the one hand, they accepted the possibility that the bloc could reorder global governance; on the other hand, they were not confident in its unity. Some viewed the summit as a symbolic meeting with minimal geopolitical effect; others were concerned about not underestimating its overall trend.

To counter this appeal, the G7 has stepped up its efforts to befriend the developing nations and provide them with alternatives in the form of funding and infrastructure offers.

Civil society manifestation and the public mood

Interestingly, BRICS 2025 involved increased input from the civil society as compared to its earlier editions. The marquee summit was accompanied by youth forums, academic exchanges, and media panels, which raised such issues as digital literacy, environmental justice, and cultural exchange.

Did we get anything? A Fair Verdict

BRICS 2025 indeed failed to bring about game-changing developments, but it made some modest accomplishments that might define its future course. Both the growth of discussions and the renewed attention to the use of local currencies, digital innovation, and cooperation on the environment comprise actual (though small-scale) progress.

Yet the summit also highlighted the structural weaknesses of the bloc. Unless something more institutional and powerful, and the resolution of the internal contradictions, occurs, BRICS may be at risk of stagnation or a complete lack of revenue.

Conclusion

The BRICS 2025 summit was more about an incremental change and not a breakthrough. Although the group failed to present spectacular reforms, such as introducing a shared currency or designing new international rules that would be binding, it reinforced its promises of multipolarity, economic integration, and reforms of international institutions. Concrete measures entailed putting extra focus on trade in local currency, the opening of the Digital Innovation Center in India, and suggestions of further cooperation on green technology and climate finance. These developments indicate that BRICS is making marginal but significant progress in terms of cementing its position as a platform of the opposite economies and an alternative to global governance.

Nonetheless, the summit revealed long-term internal weaknesses. The rivalry in the political sphere, particularly between India and China, and the imbalance in terms of economic scale and power, particularly with China, also restrain joint efforts. The lack of an effective institutional framework or binding processes also undermines the considerations of BRICS being able to deliver on what it promises. Nevertheless, all failings have not made the group obsolete, at least to the Global South, which sees it as a source of collective voice and collaboration beyond the confines of the forums that are probing the Global South. With this in mind, it is perhaps not seen that BRICS 2025 was a turning point but as a gradual and positive step forward in the developmental process that the group is taking.

The Great American Pushback: Lessons for Nations at War Risk

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

USA’s flag: source Internet

The 1975 Hindi-movie Sholay which starred two Indian superstars Amitabh Bachchan and Dharmendra was based on everlasting friendship between the two, and is till date referred to as the finest movie ever made in India.

Since 1867 after the British North America Act created the Dominion of Canada that saw the emergence of Canada as an independent nation, the relations between USA & Canada have been typical of the close friendship that the movie Sholay portrays. However, all changed on December 18, 2024 when Donald Trump, the then President-elect of the USA spoke of incorporating Canada as the USA’s 51st state. After Donald Trump’s inauguration as the USA’s 47th President on January 20, 2025, on multiple occasions has the American President reiterated his desire of seeing Canada as part of the USA. The relations between Canada and the USA have been on a downhill ever since.

Relations between the USA and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 32-nation military alliance too have been on the rocks after Donald Trump’s ascendancy to power. With the USA asking NATO members to step up defence spending to 5% of the GDP to Donald Trump casting doubts on NATO solidarity on March 07, 2025 including threats of the USA abandoning commitments to the alliance, clearly didn’t have the NATO members reassured.

The Great American Pushback didn’t exactly begin with Donald Trump’s return to the US Presidency after a four-year period. China’s emergence as the world’s third biggest economy in 2007 was the year when The Great American Pushback had first started which gained intensity after China became the world’s second biggest economy in 2010.

USA’s three blunders have catapulted China to the powerful position it is in today – US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China from February 21-28, 1972 culminating in formal diplomatic relations between the two superpowers on January 01, 1979, President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy announced on December 21, 2011 and Donald Trump’s policies after his return to the American Presidency on January 20, 2025.

The USA’s first blunder of President Richard Nixon’s visit to China from February 21-28, 1972 culminating in formal diplomatic relations between the two superpowers on January 01, 1979 saw the emergence of China as a manufacturing hub as the USA started procuring manufactured goods from China in large magnitudes. Soon China became the world’s manufacturing hub with 36.7% of the global manufacturing being done on the Chinese soil. This brought in financial strength that the Chinese so badly had wanted. Monetary power saw the military strength of China increase at a breakneck speed, with China emerging as the undisputed leader in 57 of the 64 critical technologies in the world.

America’s second blunder saw the US President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy announced on December 21, 2011 which resulted in bulk of the US military in the Middle East being moved to the Indo-Pacific Region to counter the growing aggressiveness of China.

Though in the intervening period of 1979 to 2011, there occurred an occasion which led to the turbulence between China and the USA known as The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that lasted from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996 which was a military confrontation between China and Taiwan. It entailed the USA getting embroiled in. Clearly, the USA didn’t pretty much not learn a lesson of China’s military designs in annexing Taiwan and continued business as usual with China. China’s economic and military might kept on steadily increasing after The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

And the USA’s third blunder proved to be Donald Trump’s policies after his return to the American Presidency on January 20, 2025. Be it Donald Trump declaring Canada as the USA’s 51st state or riling the NATO alliance or the tariff war that was unleashed on the world on April 09, 2025. The Great American Pushback peaked in 2025.

After China became the world’s second biggest economy in 2007, as it started flexing its muscles militarily, The Great American Pushback was off the block. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, the Americans were found wanting as China stood rock-solid behind Russia. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Americans were found wanting yet again.

The US led-Multi Coalition Force in Afghanistan had started facing serious challenges soon after they were inducted in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Eight years later, President Barack Obama announced an additional 17,000 troops to be deployed in Afghanistan to the existing 37,000. The top US military commander in Afghanistan was changed on May 11, 2009. Finally, the US had to beat a hasty retreat at midnight of August 15, 2021 leaving the Afghanis in lurch.

The Americans failed to capitalise on Arab Spring that spread across much of the Arab world that started in Tunisia in January 2011 and soon spread to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan. With the notable exception of Jordan, the American gains in the other 12 nations that witnessed Arab Spring were insignificant.

As the Arab Spring was weakening by end-2011, President Barack Obama announced the East Asia Strategy also known as Pivot to Asia on December 21, 2011 under which bulk of the American troops stationed in the Middle East were moved to the Indo-Pacific Region to counter the growing aggressiveness of China. The vacuum that was created in the Middle East as a result of this policy, saw Russia & China making strong gains in the Middle East specially amongst the Arab nations.

It was around this period that Hamas which had taken power in the Gaza Strip on June 14, 2007 started being supported clandestinely by China. This started increasing the power of Hamas substantially and finally when Hamas struck on Israel on October 07, 2023, Israel and in turn the USA, were found wanting as the main benefactor of Israel is the USA. The Israel-Hamas War continues 22 months on.

Iran which has been under the US-led economic sanctions since the last 38 years won the pyrrhic victory over Israel in the 12-day war that lasted from June 13-25, 2025. This was another blow to the global dominance that the USA once enjoyed.

On the Russia-Ukraine War front too, that started with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 the USA hasn’t been able to ensure Ukraine’s victory with the Russians occupying 20% of the Ukrainian territory as on date. Ukraine’s repeated pleas for American troops has had no effect and Ukraine continues to be hammered militarily by Russia.

And finally, President Donald Trump’s Trade War announced on April 09, 2025 just 79 days into his second Presidency, proved to be the bete noire for whatever was left of the American credibility. The world soon lost count of the Tariffs that Donald Trump was unleashing every other day and countries like China, Brazil etc were clearly undeterred. The Great American Pushback was reaching greater proportions.

India which has gravitated towards the USA after the announcement of the Pivot to Asia policy in 2011, too was not spared by Donald Trump’s jibes. 26 times the American President has taken credit for the ceasefire announced after the 88-hour India-Pakistan Conflict 2025, despite India categorically stating that no third country played any role in the ceasefire with Pakistan after the short but intense military confrontation in May 2025.

Rubbing salt further, Donald Trump invited the Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir to lunch in the White House in June 2025. Not to forget, the American President praising Pakistan in handing over a dreaded terrorist to the USA, in his inauguration speech on January 20, 2025. And on July 26, 2025 the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, thanked Ishaq Dar, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for “Pakistan’s partnership in countering terrorism and preserving regional stability”. Though it well known globally that Pakistan is the epicentre of terrorism and the pivotal factor for South Asia’s regional stability.

Overwhelming majority of the Global South that comprises 134 nations out of the 195 nations that exist in the world today are in strong Chinese & Russian grip. The European Union including the Western Europe countries are slowly tilting towards China.

Australia and Japan who constitute the four-nation Quad alliance along with the USA and India are gravitating towards China. The Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s statement “Engaging with China is in our interest to build a stable & secure region” on July 13, 2025 during his six-day visit to China clearly shows the Australian change in stance towards China, a far cry from 2020 when Australia had called for an international inquiry to probe China’s involvement in the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Another Quad alliance member Japan and a long-term ally of the US in the North East, South Korea are in fast-paced talks since July 01, 2025 for trilateral cooperation with China amid the US Tariff War unleashed by President Donal Trump in a proactive effort to safeguard regional stability and economic resilience.

Thus, The Great American Pushback is now global from Australia to South America, from Western Europe to Africa.

Lessons for Nations at War Risk

On January 17, 2024 Grant Shapps, the British Defence Secretary warned of multiple war theatres opening up in the next five years which would involve Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. How prophetic his words have turned out to be with the recently concluded Israel-Iran War and the US-Iran military strikes. And this year, on May 31, 2025, Pete Hegseth, the US Defence Secretary warned that China is actively training to invade Taiwan.

Clearly, the era of the 21st Century wars has already started with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas War. And is set to intensify in the coming years. The nations at war risk and dependant on the USA need to learn from The Great American Pushback.

After 1979 war with Vietnam in which China was defeated, China focussed on its economic and military preparedness as the USA was embroiled in every war and conflict the world over. Since the USA gained independence on July 04, 1776, till date it has taken part in 204 wars and conflict in the world, directly or indirectly.

China has not taken part in any war or conflict in the world directly or indirectly since its defeat to Vietnam in 1979, baring two instances.

One, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that lasted from July 21, 1995 to March 23, 1996, though in this military stand-off, no life was lost. Two, the Galwan Valley Clash on June 15, 2020 with India which has been covered in detail by the author.

The famous quote “Choose your battles wisely because if you fight them all, you’ll be too tired to win the really important ones” is an apt reflection on China and the USA with a great lesson to the nations at a war risk.

It is very important that nations at war risk develop defence technologies domestically. For, during wars there is no guarantee of any nation supplying the weapon systems. A strong Military Industrial Complex based on the rock-solid foundation of domestic defence technologies will rule out dependency on foreign suppliers. Be it the USA, Russia, China or Isreal, all have a robust Military Industrial Complex pivoting on domestic defence technology bedrock.

Ukraine finds itself in a tight-spot as the American defence supplies are not forthcoming at the rate Ukraine requires and the biggest handicap of Ukraine is the absence of a Military Industrial Complex for this prolonged war.

Sample this. During the three-day period July 07-09, 2025, Russia launched more than 1300 missiles and drones at Ukraine. The USA has an annual production rate of 500 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles per year. Two such missiles are required by Ukraine to neutralise one incoming Russian projectile. Clearly, the mathematics don’t add up. Cost wise, one Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles costs US$ 7 million to manufacture. The USA can’t guarantee Ukraine supply of such expensive defence systems for a prolonged period.

Take another case of M1A2 Abrams tanks. Annually, 30 tanks are produced in the USA. Russia by contrast, produces 300 T-90 tanks every year. Even if the USA want to help Ukraine with more armour, it has to first look after its domestic defence requirements. Thus, having minimal scope to help Ukraine in this issue.

Countries at war risk should refrain from crying hoarse repeatedly about conspiracy theories as it is a distraction from economic & military aims and objectives. It is a well-known fact that as in a person’s professional life, rarely does anyone help. Similarly, as a nation progresses very few nations have a helping attitude. Nations should focus on the future goals. Another point needs mentioning is that nations at war risk should learn from history and not remain stuck-up in History, and prepare for the future keeping in mind the lessons learnt.

And finally, the nations at war risk should not count for help on the alliances they are in. In the present era, talks and treaties have lost relevance. It is only hard power that will matter.   The USA hasn’t proved to be trusted ally in the last two decades. The present American geopolitics can be easily summarised in one word “Transactional”.

The quote “Transactional leaders tend to look at the world through a lens of punishment, rewards, and or exchange for motivation. While transformational leaders focus on listening, collaboration, and leading by example” holds great weightage for the USA as the era of modern wars has already begun. For long, the USA had been regarded as the bulwark of democracy but since 2007, has been abjuring from this great responsibility that had become synonymous with America.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

China’s Space Prowess: Warning Bells for the USA

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By: C Shraddha

China’s Tiangong space station: source Internet

Collaboration was the cornerstone of the Chinese Space Programme in the initial days. The 1950s saw the People’s Republic of China (PRC) partnering with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through a technology exchange programme. Towards the end of the decade, renowned scientists Zhao Jiuzhang and Qian Xuesen from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) proposed the need to advance Chinese involvement in the research and launch of indigenous satellites. As the Sino-Soviet alliance crumbled under divergent interpretations of communist ideologies, the independent efforts of China helped safeguard its space ambitions. 

In 1958, the director-general of the CAS Institute of Geophysics, Zhao Jiuzhang, formed a group of scientists and engineers known as Group 581 to commence China’s satellite and space research programme. However, despite this initial feat, China lacked the industrial and material capabilities essential to boost its space programme. Conscious of the lack of research prowess in the field of upper atmosphere, magnetosphere, ionosphere and interplanetary physics, Zhao led efforts in creating the first space science research institute in China

Despite the initial setback, by the 1960s, the country had acquired rudimentary knowledge in space sciences while obtaining semiconductor and launch vehicle capabilities. In order to exhibit its newfound competence, Zhao proposed to develop and launch China’s first man-made satellite. Thus, marking its name in the space race, on April 24, 1970, the country successfully launched the heaviest satellite of the time, Dong Fang Hong. 

With the onset of the 21st century, China’s accomplishments in its space programme positioned it as one of the world’s leading space powers. In January 2019, China became the first country to successfully deliver a rover on the Moon’s far side, enabling the first close observation of the “dark side of the moon”. The Chang’e-4 mission with its landing platform and Yutu-2 rover made a soft landing on the Von Karman Crater in the South Pole-Aitken basin on the far side of the lunar surface after 26 days of take-off. This successful mission enabled scientists to delve deeper into the understanding of the Earth and the nascent solar systems. As per Chinese officials, after a thousand days on the dark side of the lunar surface, the Yutu-2 rover covered a total distance of 2,754 feet on the lunar surface while acquiring approximately 3,632.01 gigabytes of data. 

While the world experienced an unprecedented pause due to the global pandemic in 2020, China was focused on continuing its pioneering missions. In 2020, China launched the first independent interplanetary mission to Mars, Tianwen-1, consisting of a trifecta- lander, rover and combination orbiter. Scientists believe that a successful Mars landing requires precise skills and execution, as the atmosphere of the planet requires rovers to have heat protection during descent. China’s ability to deliver such sophisticated and complex mechanisms on its first missions is a feat that sets it apart from other space powers. As Cornell University Aerospace Engineer Mason Peck rightfully commented, “A successful landing would put China among elite company”. According to the Tianwen-1 team, the intention of the mission encompassed a broad scientific agenda. But the main goal of the orbiter was to “map Mars’ morphology and geology while using a Mars-Orbiting Subsurface Exploration Radar instrument to measure soil characteristics and water-ice distribution.” Additionally, the rover would also acquire data on the ionosphere, gravitational and electromagnetic field, as well as communicate with Earth. 

In the same year, China’s plans to progress in the domain of space-based broadband internet services came to light after the country submitted a filing with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for “a constellation of nearly 13,000 satellites.” As per the state media house Xinhua, in 2024, the first group of satellites under the GuoWang mega-constellation or “national network” was launched along with the Long March-5B rocket and Yuanzheng-2 from the Wenchang spaceport. The project undertaken by the state-owned China Satellite Network Group Co Ltd was declared a success as the satellites “entered into their predetermined orbit.” Envisioned as a competitor to Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starlink, this Chinese mission focuses on supplying broadband services both domestically and internationally while fulfilling China’s security objectives.  

On November 29, 2022, the country launched the Shenzhou 15 mission from the Gobi Desert with three astronauts, who docked with the Chinese Space Station, Tiangong or heavenly palace, six hours later. Their mission marked the final stage in completing the space station’s construction. With this, China became the third country to operate a permanent space station after the United States and Russia. However, China’s independent effort in building and operating Tiangong sets it apart from the collaborative efforts of the other space powers. According to scholars, this feat marks the country’s effort to be self-reliant in an era where power dynamics influence space ambitions and vice versa. As per reports, Tiangong was designed to have its own propulsion, power, living quarters and life supporting systems while providing refuelling power to China’s newest telescope Xuntian. Additionally, the indigenous space station will allow the country to promote space research while bypassing the sanctions enforced by the US regarding the usage of the International Space Station. 

Continuing its intention of rivalling SpaceX’s Starlink, the country launched a second group of satellites under the G60 constellation mission. Initially, eighteen satellites were launched into a preset orbit on Long March 6A rockets under the supervision of the state-backed Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST). Popularly known as the Spacesail, Qianfan or thousand sails, the project intends to launch over 10,000 low-orbit constellation satellites to enable international network coverage while pushing towards 6G connectivity. According to the Senior Vice-President of SSST, Lu Ben, the company has an ambitious goal of launching 648 satellites by 2025. Furthermore, they intend to accomplish the first phase of the G60 mission by 2027 with 1,296 satellites providing global coverage. “We plan to further enhance the constellation’s services by lowering the satellite orbit from over 1,000km to 300-500km, facilitating direct mobile connections and advanced IoT applications, with a goal of having over 15,000 satellites by 2030”, said Lu. 

The year 2024 was a testament to China’s immense space capabilities. On October 15, 2024, the government released the Mid-to-Long Term Plan for Space Science Development, which laid out the country’s plans to dominate the international space arena by 2050. Co-authored by CAS, the Chinese National Space Administration and the China Manned Space Agency, the plan outlines seventeen focus areas and five scientific themes encompassing research on space-based gravitational wave detection, Sun-Earth connection, space weather observation and microgravity science. The development roadmap is strategically divided into three phases. Phase 1 consists of achieving pertinent scientific breakthroughs via “lunar and planetary exploration” by 2027. Phase 2 involves the development of a lunar research station and advancement in high-precision space observation by 2035. The final phase of the plan involves leading the international space programme through scientific breakthroughs and deep space missions.

In light of this comprehensive roadmap, China’s current scientific development in space sciences remains consistent and strategic. The Chang’e-6 space mission showcased the country’s determination to become a global space power. On May 3, 2024, the PRC launched Chang’e-6 from the Wenchang Space Launch Centre in Hainan with the aim of collecting samples from the far side of the lunar surface. Given the complexity of the mission, a successful retrieval of the samples would make China the first country to achieve such a feat. It ended its 53-day exploration on June 25, with the return module successfully landing in Inner Mongolia with samples of rock and soil collected from the South Pole-Aitken Basin, thus creating history. 

The Deputy Chief designer of the mission, Wang Qiong, wrote, “After the lunar samples are delivered to the laboratory, we will first unseal the sample container, extract the samples, and separate the samples collected on the lunar surface from those drilled under the surface. A portion of the samples will be stored permanently, while another portion will be stored at a different location as backup in case of disasters. Then we will prepare the remaining portion, and distribute it to scientists in China and foreign countries in accordance with the lunar sample management regulations.” According to scientists, these samples will enable further research and enhance human understanding of lunar history. 

The lunar efforts of China are unbound. In 2024, PRC scientists revealed plans to construct egg-shaped igloos on the lunar surface as part of colonisation efforts. Initially structured to withstand the unforgiving environment of the moon, subsequent designs would account for cosmic radiation and temperature fluctuations, as stated in reports. According to news reports, the structure would include designated working and living spaces, potentially built using 3D printing technology and robots. Using lunar soil samples collected from previous space missions, Chinese scientists are experimenting with brick-making techniques for future lunar settlements. 

China’s development of space prowess is a testament to its growing influence in the international sphere. From its early dependence on Soviet assistance to being the first country to successfully collect samples from the dark side of the moon, Chinese innovation and infrastructure have developed beyond competition. The strategic and calculated missions undertaken by the country have helped position it as a major space power. The unveiling of the long-term roadmap to dominate the international space arena by 2050 further reiterates China’s commitment to sustained scientific advancement and strategic autonomy. Through milestones such as the Tiangong space station, the country is establishing itself as a space power opposite to the United States. As countries compete to dominate the space race, China’s ability to match or surpass US accomplishments showcases the former’s strategic foresight, technological advancements and rising potential in redefining global leadership in outer space. 

The China, Pakistan, Afghanistan Nexus: India’s new Challenge in Asia

By: Chethana Enugula

Afghanistan, China & Pakistan’s flags: source Internet

The collusion of their strategic interests has propped up a new challenge for India – a strong three-sided grouping and a menace with multidimensional implications threatening the security, economic and diplomatic outlook in South Asia. This new nexus fuelled by the spread of the Belt and Road Initiative of China, the economic stability and military modernization effort of Pakistan and the legitimacy of international recognition of Afghanistan governed by the Taliban regime opens opportunities to restructure the present power status quo in the region and even surround India with the strategic challenges.

In India’s view, the regional setup consisting of many influential neighbours is not a mere diplomatic contest but an actual threat to the national interests of the country. The plan endangers the stability in the region, border security, and existing trade routes that all rely on India’s position as a central power in the region. The military, economic, and diplomatic aspects of the trilateral form a complex multi-front security dilemma that makes India thoroughly reconsider its value system of defense and foreign policies.

Genesis and Evolution of Trilateral

The so-called trilateral dialogue mechanism was officially initiated back in 2017 to enable China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to develop political confidence, hone anti-terrorism collaboration and promote economic integration in the region. It soon encountered some potholes, with Pakistan and Afghanistan rubbing each other in the wrong way, but top-level contact has managed to renew and keep it alive over the last few years.

There was a true turning point when the foreign ministers informally met in Beijing in May 2025. They once again promised to combine their efforts in security and economic connectivity. They ended the affair with some of their major successes. Pakistan and Afghanistan decided to improve their embassy relations at the diplomatic level and appointed ambassadors, which was a hit endorsed by China. They also approved a widening of the Belt and Road initiative and indicated preparations to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan. All these commitments helped the talks shift from just talks to real actions towards greater integration.

Through the two-day interaction, the key agenda was counter-terrorism, eco-integration, the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) footprint, and trust-building. The best moment of it all was in July 2025 when Russia acknowledged the Taliban officially, giving the bloc real diplomatic traction and insinuating that other governments could follow soon.

Strategic Objectives of the Trilateral Members

China’s strategic goals in the Trilateral are strongly interconnected with BRI and CPEC, but having pro-BRI incumbency of Burhanay in Afghanistan may bring a new route into the world of Beijing, the Wakhan Corridor, which will give direct overland access to China, skirting geopolitical strangles and making Beijing the coordinator of the main trade in the region. In the meantime, the Afghanistan state, with its untapped mineral reserves valued at $1 trillion (copper, rare earth, lithium), gives China the bargaining chip in its approach towards the Taliban regime in the context of resource diplomacy; state-owned enterprises have already started discussing the extraction rights of oil and copper projects.

Security issues support economic reasons. Beijing is keen on ensuring that the anti-China militant groups do not spread to Xinjiang or Pakistan, whereby CPEC-related also suffered the loss of Chinese lives in several militant attacks since 2021. Pakistan, in turn, views CPEC as a lifeline, including much-needed infrastructure and energy schemes through which it sustains its economy, as well as increases its geopolitical influence by enabling Afghanistan to gain access to Gwadar Port and new pipelines to Central Asia. Islamabad also considers the CPEC extension to be an effective counter-strategy to the so-called Indian encirclement strategy, which ties regional stability to economic growth.

Pakistan is also highly dependent on Chinese military equipment, as 81 percent of the Chinese military imports in Pakistan come in the form of J-10C fighter jets, J-35 stealth fighters awaiting delivery, and HQ-9 air-defense systems rolling out. This strategic deal provides Pakistan with a hedge against India, which has had high military capabilities, as it was reported in May 2025 to have given the strategic visions in the India-Pakistan conflict by providing Beijing with live-standing situations regarding the movements of the Indian troops.

The issues of international isolation and huge economic distress are piling up in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The regime is resorting to the trilateral deal, which is a potential saviour in the name of legitimacy and development. The overall objective is to board the BRI and continue with CPEC, which can result in much-needed foreign investment, especially in the mineral-rich country.

Impact on India’s Security Interests

The emerging “China-Pakistan-Afghanistan” trilateral nexus presents complex security considerations to India and produces a challenge that is not only multidimensional but also emanates from a military, economic, and political battlefield.

First is the rising China-Pakistan military nexus, which is the most pressing among the three. Beijing maintains the defense posture of Pakistan through large arms sales, the result of which is the ability of Pakistan to hedge against India. The large field tempo of engagement observed in the May 2025 battle, a collaborative, rapid-paced, and integrated threat involving the real-time sharing of intelligence and the use of UAVs in China, resembles a well-orchestrated threat.

The second problematic front is Afghanistan. Though the Taliban have been promising to be cooperative in counter-terrorism, the government continues to serve as a hub for various terror groups. According to reports published by the United Nations, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Affiliates of Al-Qaeda are permitted to practice and launch assaults along with the Taliban regime. Organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed that had past connections with Al-Qaeda and were also found in the earlier version of the Taliban still threaten the Indian nation, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

The emerging nexus also exposes India’s geographic vulnerabilities, especially the Line of Actual Control with China and the critical tract in the Siliguri Corridor. This Strait is only 20-22 km across, crosses Assam and is the only terrestrial connection between India and its northeastern states, which opens this Corridor to yet another unending source of danger. Beijing’s swelling infrastructure in the Chumbi Valley heralds the encirclement possibilities that can see Indian forces extended along several borders.

There is also economic rivalry. The Chinese-led plan to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan provides a landlocked Kabul with easy access to the Gwadar port in Pakistan in response to the India-led International North-South transport corridor and Chabahar port. The project will pose a direct challenge to the long-term Central-Asian connectivity dreams of New Delhi because it provides an alternative way in which trade can be carried out to Central Asia.

India’s Strategic Response

India is being multilateral and multifaceted by combining modernization of its military, outward relationships, and additional economic routes. 

The modernization of the military places an emphasis on the indigenous manufacturing of the products in the context of the “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” principles, which lowers foreign sourcing and increases the autonomy of the technological production in the military sector. The major improvements come in the form of native helicopters and Apache assault helicopters, as well as state-of-the-art innovations such as AI-powered drones and electromagnetic arms. 

Realizing the weaknesses of the Siliguri Corridor, India is also planning alternative routes of northeastern connectivity with the major investment of border infrastructure in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Planned projects include India-China border roads, advanced landing grounds, and new railway lines so that forces can be quickly deployed and avoid reliance on the vulnerable Corridor. 

Diplomatically, India applies the Neighbourhood First policy when dealing with immediate neighbours using consultative and outcome-based engagements. India continues to support humanitarian assistance and development aid to Afghanistan, as well as attempting to thwart Chinese and Pakistani influence by realistically engaging them, even as it continues to beef up its influence in the country in the face of strained relationships. The enhanced alliances with the Quad members and states of the Central Asia region provide flexibility and influence on diplomatic platforms and strategic dimensions to overcome trilateral problems. 

On the economic front, India is moving fast towards the development of alternative corridors, especially the use of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the operationalization of Chabahar Port. These projects give the Central Asian and Russian countries important access routes that bypass Pakistan.

Future Scenarios and Implications

The future of the trilateral is determined by multiple factors, including enhancing integration on the one hand and major internal problems on the other. One of them is formalized bloc deepening, where further Chinese economic investment in the region, the growth of CPEC opening Afghan mineral resources, and a greater degree of security cooperation would take place. The international endorsement that is indicated by the diplomatic upgrade of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the recognition of the Taliban by Russia is an indication that the consensus is growing in acceptance of this bloc.

Nevertheless, there are high internal obstacles that may block complete realization. The stability of Taliban regimes is uncertain, and as long as the country has internal conflicts, as well as threats from rival groups such as ISIS-K. The ability of the Taliban to actually control terrorist activities, especially those with regime connections, is doubtful in spite of the promises. The CPEC project has security risks, is not financially feasible, can disrupt the economies, has risks of debt burden, and the current delays in the projects have viability issues.

Recommendation

India needs to be more focused on a quick acceleration of indigenous defense production with an emphasis on the technological growth of its AI-based systems, hypersonic systems, and advanced air defense, among others. Additional progress on border infrastructure, especially in sensitive regions such as Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, is vital in order to avoid operational readiness and the ability to respond in time.

The step up in intelligence gathering of terror groups against Afghanistan-based terror organizations, as well as multilateral pressure against the Taliban to take verifiable counter-terrorism measures, will solve short-term security questions. On the economic front, the new willingness to proceed with INSTC and the operationalization of Chabahar Port further offer major connectivity options to Chinese-controlled routes.

On the diplomatic front, the revival of the philosophies of the Neighbourhood First Policy by emulating pragmatic flexibility, with the support of more powerful entities as well as alliances and the search for new alliances with greater strategic interest, provides greater spheres of influence working against the influence of China. India has developed potent public diplomacy to frame its regional role and strategic vision, which is the fundamental story that meets the concerns about encirclement.

Conclusion

The China-Afghanistan-Pakistan, theoretically and practically, is a developing, serious problem that needs to be met soundly and strategically with a mixed approach. The extent of strategic autonomy that can enable India to safeguard its national interests is the capacity to be resilient, innovative, and proactive in all major spheres: military, economic, and diplomatic. The long perspective indicates an even more competitive, multi-polar S. Asia where India’s strategic fortunes will be decided by its overall reaction to this complicated geopolitical issue, and its regional influence/connectivity ambitions remain securely intact.

Escalation at Hypersonic Speed: What China’s Rocket Force Means for U.S. Security

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By: Ahana Sarkar

People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s emblem: source Internet

In August 2023, China conducted hypersonic missile drills near Taiwan, manoeuvres that sent alarm bells ringing across Pentagon war rooms. Among the projectiles reportedly tested was the DF-27, a long-range, manoeuvrable missile capable of striking targets thousands of kilometres away, including U.S. military bases in the Indo-Pacific region. To many observers, the message was unmistakable: Beijing is no longer content with regional dominance; it is actively positioning itself as a global strategic peer to the United States.

At the heart of this ambition lies the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), the successor to the Second Artillery Corps and a key pillar of China’s military modernisation since its rebranding in 2015. Tasked with both conventional and nuclear missile operations, the Rocket Force embodies China’s evolving doctrine of strategic deterrence, rapid escalation control, and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) warfare. Its arsenal now includes advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), dual-capable medium-range missiles, and cutting-edge hypersonic glide vehicles, many of which threaten to outpace U.S. missile defences.

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is arguably the most critical arm of China’s military modernisation. Formally established in 2015 during sweeping PLA reforms, the Rocket Force was elevated from a branch of the ground forces (the Second Artillery Corps) to a full-fledged military service. This shift wasn’t merely bureaucratic; it signalled a growing Chinese emphasis on strategic deterrence and long-range strike capability.

Today, the Rocket Force operates across several missile brigades scattered throughout China, each housing underground facilities, mobile launcher units, and increasingly sophisticated command-and-control networks. It holds both conventional and nuclear missile forces, capable of engaging regional targets like Taiwan and Japan as well as intercontinental adversaries such as the United States. Its force structure and doctrine prioritise Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD); a strategy designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating freely in East Asia, particularly in a Taiwan contingency.

PLARF’s arsenal has become a showcase of China’s technological leaps. The DF-21D, dubbed the “carrier killer,” can target moving U.S. aircraft carriers. The DF-17, a hypersonic glide vehicle, poses new challenges to missile defence due to its speed and manoeuvrability. The DF-26 is a versatile system, capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads, and aimed at both regional bases and U.S. assets in Guam. Meanwhile, the DF-41 ICBM, with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), significantly expands China’s nuclear reach.

What’s even more alarming is the strategic shift underpinning these capabilities. China’s traditional doctrine of “minimal deterrence” is being replaced by notions of “escalation control” and “war control”, ideas that suggest China wants to manage, not avoid, future conflicts. The 2021 discovery of over 200 new missile silos in Xinjiang and Gansu provinces, confirmed via satellite imagery, underscores this shift. Rather than signalling restraint, the Rocket Force now embodies a form of strategic coercion, blurring the line between deterrence and dominance.

In July 2023, China’s Rocket Force, the arm of the military tasked with operating the country’s most advanced and strategic missile systems, underwent a sudden and deeply unsettling purge. Without a public explanation, top leadership figures, including General Li Yuchao, the Rocket Force’s commander, and key deputies, were removed and placed under investigation. What made the event even more remarkable was not just who was purged, but who replaced them: individuals with no prior experience in the Rocket Force, such as Wang Houbin from the Navy and Xu Xisheng from the Air Force. The move triggered a flurry of speculation both inside and outside China, as analysts scrambled to understand why Xi Jinping would abruptly gut the very institution responsible for managing China’s nuclear deterrent and long-range strike capabilities.

One plausible explanation is corruption. Reports, including leaks from U.S. intelligence, pointed to major procurement scandals, missile silos filled with water instead of fuel, faulty components, and widespread misappropriation of military funds. But corruption alone doesn’t explain the scale and timing of the purge. Loyalty concerns appear to be equally central. Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign has long served a dual purpose: punishing mismanagement while consolidating control over the military. In replacing experienced insiders with personal loyalists from other service branches, Xi signalled that political reliability may now outweigh professional competence in the most sensitive corners of China’s armed forces. Another possibility is that the purge was part of a broader strategic recalibration, aimed at tightening discipline within the military before a major regional crisis, perhaps related to Taiwan, escalates. Regardless of motive, the consequences are deeply troubling. The lack of transparency in the chain of command raises serious questions about who controls China’s nuclear arsenal and how decisions might be made in a crisis. In a force designed for rapid response and tight escalation control, gaps in leadership and institutional knowledge increase the risks of miscalculation.

From Washington’s vantage point, the evolution of China’s Rocket Force represents more than just another chapter in great-power competition; it is a genuine strategic disruptor. For decades, U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy operated on the assumption that China maintained a modest, restrained arsenal focused on “minimal deterrence.” That era is rapidly ending. As of 2023, Beijing is believed to have surpassed 500 nuclear warheads and is on track to more than triple its stockpile by 2035. This expansion, combined with the construction of hundreds of new missile silos and the deployment of mobile launch systems, means that China is no longer a secondary nuclear player but an emerging peer competitor with a credible second-strike capability. In a future conflict, Washington can no longer assume it will have escalation dominance or that Beijing’s nuclear use would be limited, slow, or predictable.

Even more alarming is China’s lead in hypersonic weapons technology, which further tilts the balance. In 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle that reportedly circled the globe before hitting its target, an act that U.S. officials admitted took them by surprise. While the U.S. continues to experiment with hypersonics, China appears to have operationalised multiple systems, including the DF-17. This creates a missile gap, not in numbers, but in time and precision. Beijing may be able to strike U.S. assets before defences are activated, undermining both deterrence and crisis management.

China’s ability to target U.S. forward-deployed forces is also a growing concern. Bases in Guam, Okinawa, and South Korea, as well as carrier strike groups operating in the Pacific, now fall within the range of various Rocket Force systems. This limits the U.S. military’s freedom of movement in the Indo-Pacific and complicates contingency planning, especially in the event of a Taiwan crisis. The Rocket Force’s speed of deployment, combined with its opaqueness, further compounds the danger. Without a clear doctrine of nuclear signalling, as exists between the U.S. and Russia, there is a significant risk that the U.S. could misinterpret a Chinese missile movement as preparation for war, when it may be meant as a bluff or deterrent.

China’s dramatic buildup of its Rocket Force has sent shockwaves far beyond Washington. The ripple effects are reshaping the security architecture of the entire Asia-Pacific region, prompting allied states to rethink their defence postures, deterrence strategies, and long-standing assumptions about U.S. security guarantees. Nations that once relied heavily on American military protection are now hedging against uncertainty. Japan, long constitutionally constrained, is in the midst of its most significant rearmament since World War II, including the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities and new missile systems. South Korea, while still under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is now openly debating whether it should pursue its own nuclear deterrent, a discussion once confined to the political fringes. Meanwhile, Australia’s partnership in AUKUS reflects a deeper strategic recalibration, as Canberra moves toward acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and potentially developing its own long-range strike capabilities.

The United States, too, has begun adjusting to this new reality. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review was the first to formally acknowledge that the U.S. must now contend with two near-peer nuclear competitors, China and Russia, simultaneously. In response, Washington is investing more heavily in missile defence, hypersonic programs, and INF-range missile systems previously prohibited under arms control agreements. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, backed by growing congressional support, is pouring resources into forward deployments and alliance-based force integration.

But beneath these moves lies a deeper and more dangerous consequence: the erosion of strategic stability. As China’s Rocket Force becomes more advanced, more numerous, and more ambiguous in its deployment and doctrine, the risk of inadvertent escalation grows. In a high-stakes crisis, both sides may feel pressure to act first, whether to disable a perceived threat or to avoid losing launch capability in a first strike. The logic of “use it or lose it”, long a relic of Cold War instability, is returning in new, technologically sophisticated forms. And unlike the U.S.-Soviet model of arms control and crisis communication, the U.S.-China nuclear relationship lacks the transparency, mutual confidence, and institutionalised dialogue needed to manage such risks.

To fully understand the threat posed by China’s Rocket Force, it is important to consider counterarguments and to evaluate them critically. One common claim is that China’s missile buildup is fundamentally defensive, a response to what Beijing perceives as U.S. encirclement through alliances, missile defence systems, and freedom of navigation operations near its coast. While it is true that China views the United States as a strategic rival, defensive postures do not typically involve the construction of hundreds of new missile silos, the development of manoeuvrable hypersonic weapons, or the expansion of dual-capable missile systems capable of ambiguous signalling. These are tools of coercion and escalation, not simply deterrence.

Another argument holds that China is merely catching up. The United States, after all, still possesses a far larger nuclear arsenal. But this comparison misses the point. The concern is not raw numbers; it is the doctrinal ambiguity, the rapid modernisation, and the fusion of conventional and nuclear capabilities within the Rocket Force that make crisis management so dangerous. A missile launch from a dual-capable system like the DF-26 could provoke a disproportionate response simply because its payload is unknowable in real time.

Finally, some argue that the recent purges within the Rocket Force reveal internal weakness rather than growing strength. But this, too, is deceptive. Instability within a nuclear command structure is more alarming than comforting. The removal of experienced leadership, the imposition of political loyalists, and the absence of transparency only heighten the risks of miscalculation or unauthorised action during a crisis. The danger, therefore, lies not in China’s weakness but in its unpredictable strength.

China’s Rocket Force today represents far more than a modernisation of military hardware; it embodies a profound shift in strategic posture, political control, and global risk. No longer confined to the doctrine of minimal deterrence, the force has evolved into a multifaceted threat, equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, dual-capable missile systems, and an expanding nuclear arsenal. But the true danger lies not only in the weapons themselves, but in the opacity, internal instability, and unchecked ambition that now define the Rocket Force’s trajectory. For the United States, this raises urgent questions, not just about how to deter Beijing, but how to avoid stumbling into a catastrophic miscalculation in an environment that is becoming more complex by the day.

In a world where artificial intelligence guides targeting systems, hypersonics reduce reaction time to minutes, and political purges fracture command continuity, the risk of a crisis spiralling into war is no longer hypothetical. It is disturbingly plausible. The more ambiguous China’s posture becomes, the more likely the United States is to misinterpret signals or respond with excessive caution or aggression.

To meet this challenge, the U.S. must adopt a balanced strategy: strengthening its own missile defence and deterrent capabilities while simultaneously investing in arms control diplomacy, crisis communication channels, and military-to-military dialogue. The Rocket Force can no longer be treated as a shadowy, marginal player; it is now a central force shaping the future of international security. Ignoring it would be a strategic error. Understanding and responding to it with clarity, caution, and resolve is not just prudent, it is essential.

Strategic Culture and Civil-Military Synergy in India: Rethinking the Clausewitzian Divide

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By: Alshifa Imam

Indian soldier: source Internet

The study of India’s strategic culture may be interesting by virtue of India’s unique historical experience and geopolitical context. Specifically, I have described a mixed ongoing relationship between militaries and civilian political actors, typically described by the Clausewitzian phrase, “war is politics by other means.” Generally, the “Clausewitzian divide” of the traditional model, focuses on war’s political ends—in the hands of civilians—and war’s means—in the hands of soldiers. In India, neither military authority nor civilian leadership has been completely disparate or entirely fused, indicating essential trends that have important implications for the defense doctrine and strategic positions of India.

The following article will examine the development, contemporary, and ongoing complexities of India’s strategic culture within civil-military relations and doctrine, while questioning the importance and utility of Clausewitzian duality in understanding India’s strategic framework.

India’s Strategic Culture: Historical Legacies and Foundational Themes

In India, strategic behavior is influenced by philosophical traditions that stem from its ancient civilization, emphasizing doctrines such as ahimsa (non-violence) and moral causation. A notable historic-philosophical development relating to India’s military forces was Ashoka’s reversion to pacifism and moral high ground following the Kalinga war, as well as the path of the Gandhian legacy that critically informed a great deal of the independence movement in the twentieth century. There is cultural restraint in physical force. After independence, Jawaharlal Nehru’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy” reinforced the state’s predisposition to neither aligning with nor taking on the characteristics of a state that utilizes armed violence as a political tool. The military, while respected and trusted for its outputs, existed separately from the formulation of policy and ultimately strategy, signaling cultural concerns about the grasp of martial power, and preparation of civilian control measures to avoid politicization of the military.  

The Indian state established and entrenched the supremacy of civilian decision-making authority over the military as a formal response to their partitioning and the threat of military coups in neighbor states, Pakistan and Bangladesh; therefore, while ensuring civilian control, the state created a gap in the articulation of strategic ideas and an undercurrent of thought, which are important pathways for military doctrine development.

 Civil-Military Relations: The Indian Model and Its Discontents

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) of India developed a model where senior civilian bureaucrats became the primary intermediaries between politicians and the military, which insulated the military from politics but also excluded them from strategic policy discussions and resulted in a reliance on bureaucracy for input in policy development, even in areas requiring significant operational knowledge.Key features include:

  • Deliberate exclusion of service chiefs from the Cabinet Committee on Security except by invitation
  • Separation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from decision-making on key security matters
  • Absence of integrated defense structures until late reforms such as the 2020 establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

The resultant strategic culture has often been described as reactive and defensive. Civilian leaders, wary of military adventurism, entrusted the armed forces with implementation rather than formulation of military policy. This division has led to:

  • Lack of inter-service coordination, especially evident during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the subsequent border conflicts with Pakistan
  • Doctrinal inertia, with innovation often stymied by institutional silos
  • Missed opportunities for leveraging military advice toward integrated national security objectives

Clausewitz’s ideal is a synergistic relationship, not a rigid separation, between political aims and military means. Yet, Indian civil-military relations have often resembled a form of parallel play, rather than functional synergy. While civilian control ensures democratic stability, its insufficiency for holistic strategy creation is manifest in several key episodes, notably:

  • The lack of high-level consultation during the 1965 war resulted in poorly coordinated military operations and premature ceasefire
  • Civilian avoidance of operational oversight at times denied the political leadership a granular understanding of military realities

Doctrinal Development: From Defensive Orthodoxy to Deterrence by Punishment

Following its independence, India relied on a doctrine of defense defined by territorial integrity and the requirement for minimum force. The legacy of partition and repeated tension and conflict along its borders led to a reliance on a British model of frontier defense and virtually no doctrinal development until the war in 1962 revived a consideration of India’s strategic environment and generated a deeper situational analysis.

The 1980s produced a doctrine for armored innovation under the Sundarji Doctrine which separated holding Corps to blunt aggression and strike corps that weighed armored counter-offensives, both considered as a doctrinal innovation. The clearly organizational philosophy expressed in the Sundarji Doctrine was conventional deterrence and mobilizing large reserves large reserves was premised on quick-strike, high-intensity wars with imaginable limited objectives.

However, the system exposed severe weaknesses:

  • The slow mobilization during Operation Parakram in 2001–02 revealed the impracticality of massed, centralized strike corps
  • Doctrines remained slow to adapt to new modes of war, such as sub-conventional threats and grey zone conflict

Prompted by the limitations of previous doctrines, India developed the “Cold Start” doctrine—envisioning rapid, integrated offenses across the border to achieve limited objectives before international intervention. Although never formally promulgated, its principles have permeated doctrine and active force deployments.

Recent years have witnessed:

  • Greater attention to jointness and integration of services
  • The adoption of network-centric warfare and technological modernization
  • Proactive use of military force for punitive operations, as seen in cross-border counterterrorism strikes

Key policy changes such as the appointment of the CDS and the establishment of joint theatre commands are recent attempts to narrow the civil-military gap and cultivate an integrated strategic planning culture. At the same time, there seems to be growing appetite to use military force for purposes that are not entirely defensive.

An assertive Indian military needs to be integrated tightly into the national decision-making processes, so that the country could use force to achieve its national interests. This may take time, but must be developed in a sequential manner.

 Contemporary Challenges and Imperatives

India’s security landscape is complicated by open, unresolved borders with China’s occupation in the near north and the LEGAL occupation by Pakistan to the northwest. The context of frequent skirmishes is compounded by numerous sub-conventional multi-domain threats: insurgency and terrorism. Further complicating the issue is the problem of maritime competition and some of the challenges associated with expanding interests in the Indian Ocean Region.

To fulfil its great power aspirations and rationally react to multi-domain threats, India must begin to make some reforms:

  • Ensuring military representation in strategic policy formation and evaluation
  • Enhancing inter-service cooperation and doctrinal jointness
  • Building a tradition of critical debate and professional military education within the civil and military establishments alike
  • Recalibrating civilian-military relations toward a relationship characterized by constructive engagement, mutual respect, and shared strategic vision

Rethinking the Clausewitzian Divide: Toward Synergy Rather Than Separation

While the Clausewitzian trinity—politics, military, and people—emphasizes interaction and balance, the Indian experience demonstrates the hazards of over-insulation. The key lies in achieving synergy rather than mere subordination:

  • Civilian control must not equate to military exclusion from strategy deliberations
  • Military professionalization should not come at the cost of strategic illiteracy among political leaders and bureaucrats
  • Integration mechanisms—like the CDS and joint planning bodies—should be empowered, not symbolic

India’s strategic culture, long marked by restraint, is adapting toward assertiveness out of necessity. This transformation demands an equally forward-looking approach to civil-military relations, where the Clausewitzian divide gives way to Clausewitzian dialogue.

Conclusion

India’s experience as it develops its strategic culture is full of contradictions—traditional norms of restraint in tension with modern requirements of assertiveness; a strong tradition of democracy existing alongside a persistent civil-military gap. As the global and regional context becomes increasingly complex, India must move away from older paradigms of separation and towards paradigms of synergy, commensurate with a state that aspires to regional leadership and global purpose. Changing the civil-military compact—and with it, the intellectual foundations of strategic doctrine to meet the demands of the 21st century—is essential to achieve these aspirations.

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