By: Gayathri Pramod

The viability of the Arctic route has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary global geopolitics and geo- economics. The rapid melting of polar ice due to climate change has transformed the Arctic from a frozen periphery into a potential maritime frontier that may redefine the balance of power in global trade, resource extraction, and security architecture. The Arctic Ocean, bordered by Russia, the United States (via Alaska), Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and Norway, has long been considered inaccessible and unviable for sustained navigation or economic use. However, with average Arctic temperatures rising four times faster than the global average (IPCC, 2024), the region has witnessed unprecedented retreat of sea ice, making seasonal navigation increasingly possible through two primary routes — the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s Siberian coast, and the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. These routes offer the possibility of drastically reducing transit distances between Europe and Asia by up to 40%, altering existing maritime networks that currently depend on chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.

The Arctic as a Geo- Economic Corridor

Beyond military and environmental debates, the Arctic’s core attraction remains geo-economic. It promises not only faster transit but also access to immense natural resources: hydrocarbons, rare-earth minerals, and fisheries. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its gas lie north of the Arctic Circle. Russia’s Arctic zone alone could yield vast revenues from LNG and critical minerals. Yet the geo-economic calculus extends beyond resource extraction. Control over the NSR gives Russia the ability to shape emerging Eurasian supply chains. For instance, an integrated corridor linking Arctic shipping → Northern Sea ports → Trans-Siberian rail → China/Europe could redefine continental trade dynamics. Russia’s 2025 invitation for “International Investors” in the NSR, despite sanctions, demonstrates its intent to normalize Arctic commerce and attract Asian capital. Nevertheless, these ambitions face three obstacles: first, sanctions and financial isolation limit Western participation; second, unpredictable ice conditions hinder schedule reliability; and third, the absence of universally accepted transit rules under UNCLOS leaves legal ambiguity. For global shipping firms, these factors translate into risk premiums that currently outweigh time savings.

The opening of the Arctic route presents a radical realignment of global geo- economic structures. From the perspective of maritime trade, the route promises cost efficiency, reduced fuel consumption, and a potential easing of congestion in traditional trade arteries. However, these benefits are unevenly distributed and deeply enmeshed within geopolitical rivalries. Russia’s strategic positioning in the Arctic, through its expansive coastline and exclusive control over the Northern Sea Route, has made it the de facto gatekeeper of this new maritime domain. Moscow’s Arctic strategy, updated in 2023, underscores the region’s significance not merely as an economic asset but as a strategic buffer and resource base to offset Western sanctions following the Ukraine conflict (Russian Federation Arctic Policy, 2023). The Russian government’s Arctic infrastructure expansion—including new nuclear-powered icebreakers, LNG terminals at Yamal and Murmansk, and military bases—reflects its attempt to consolidate control over the NSR while turning it into an energy and logistics corridor connecting Europe and East Asia.

At the same time, China’s self-declared status as a “near-Arctic state” and its Polar Silk Road initiative under the Belt and Road framework signify the increasing convergence of Asian and Arctic geo-economics. Beijing’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper identifies the Arctic as an essential part of China’s long-term strategy to secure trade resilience and energy security. Chinese companies, including COSCO Shipping, have already conducted multiple transits via the NSR, and China has invested heavily in Russia’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects, thereby gaining leverage in Arctic energy logistics. For China, the Arctic is not merely a passage but a strategic complement to its maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. The Arctic route provides Beijing with an alternative to the U.S.-controlled sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

 Thus, the Arctic, which was historically insulated from major power competition, is now a theatre of silent yet profound strategic contestation involving the United States, Russia, China, and, increasingly, middle powers like India and Turkey. The United States, traditionally focused on freedom of navigation and Arctic governance under international law, has recalibrated its Arctic policy since 2022. The reactivation of the U.S. Second Fleet, increased Coast Guard deployments in Alaska, and renewed investments in icebreaker capabilities reflect Washington’s recognition that control over polar routes is essential for maintaining maritime dominance. The U.S. Arctic Strategy (2023) emphasizes the need to counter Russian militarization and Chinese dual-use scientific presence in the region. The creation of the “Arctic Security Initiative” in Congress underscores a bipartisan recognition of the Arctic’s strategic centrality to national security. NATO has also incorporated Arctic contingencies into its defense posture, with Norway hosting recurrent Arctic defense exercises such as “Cold Response” and “Nordic Shield,” designed to enhance interoperability and cold-weather operational readiness.

However, the Arctic’s transformation is not merely a function of power politics but also an economic recalibration in the global supply chain. The Northern Sea Route shortens the Rotterdam–Yokohama transit from approximately 12,800 nautical miles via the Suez Canal to just 7,000 nautical miles, leading to potential savings of 10–15 days per voyage. This has substantial implications for global logistics companies and energy exporters, particularly in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. Russia’s Arctic LNG terminals are increasingly targeting Asian markets, including Japan, South Korea, and India, while Western sanctions have driven Moscow to pivot toward Eurasian cooperation frameworks such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India’s Arctic engagement has been historically limited, but the publication of its “India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development” in 2022 marked a strategic shift.

New Delhi envisions Arctic cooperation through five pillars—science, climate, economic development, connectivity, and governance—emphasizing the intersection between environmental responsibility and energy diversification. India’s energy security calculus is particularly linked to the Arctic through the Yamal LNG partnership with Novatek and Arctic Council observer status. As global competition for hydrocarbons intensifies, Indian policymakers view the Arctic as a supplementary energy corridor, especially as domestic energy demand continues to rise. Moreover, India’s participation in multilateral forums like the Arctic Circle Assembly and cooperation with Russia in ice navigation technologies reflect its effort to expand its maritime geo-economics footprint beyond the Indian Ocean. The viability of the Arctic route, therefore, is not only about navigational feasibility but also about the creation of new patterns of interdependence where energy, trade, and security converge.

From a technological standpoint, the Arctic’s opening represents a frontier of innovation and logistical adaptation. Advances in ice-class vessel construction, satellite-based navigation systems, and weather forecasting have made Arctic shipping increasingly predictable and commercially viable. Yet, the region remains inherently fragile. Seasonal variability, unpredictable ice floes, and extreme weather continue to challenge the reliability of transit. Additionally, insurance premiums for Arctic voyages remain high due to elevated risk profiles. The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code (2017) introduced regulatory safeguards, but enforcement and environmental compliance remain inconsistent, especially under unilateral Russian control of the NSR. Furthermore, environmental activists and indigenous communities have raised concerns about the ecological cost of Arctic commercialization, warning that increased shipping and drilling could exacerbate ecosystem degradation and accelerate climate feedback loops.

The intersection of geo- economics and security in the Arctic is particularly evident in the militarization of infrastructure. Russia’s establishment of bases at Nagurskoye, Tiksi, and Franz Josef Land, alongside radar systems and missile defense, effectively reconstitutes a Cold War–era arc of deterrence along its northern frontier. Western analysts argue that this militarization serves dual purposes—protecting energy infrastructure and signaling deterrence against NATO intrusion. Meanwhile, the U.S., Canada, and Nordic states are enhancing joint surveillance capabilities and under-ice submarine operations. The competition extends to digital infrastructure as well, with Russia and China collaborating on Arctic subsea data cables to reduce dependency on Western communication networks. This emerging Arctic techno-geopolitics indicates that the route’s viability will depend as much on security governance as on climate and technology. Energy exploration remains the single largest economic driver in Arctic geopolitics. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that the Arctic holds nearly 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas reserves. Russia’s energy strategy heavily depends on exploiting these reserves to sustain export revenues amid Western sanctions. The Northern Sea Route enables direct LNG shipments to Asia without relying on chokepoints vulnerable to Western control, such as the Suez or Hormuz. China’s investments in Arctic LNG projects not only ensure energy supply diversification but also solidify its political partnership with Moscow. Meanwhile, Western energy firms face reputational and regulatory constraints in re-entering Arctic drilling, creating an asymmetric advantage for state-backed entities like Rosneft, Gazprom, and CNPC. The Arctic, therefore, represents both a frontier of resource competition and a laboratory of strategic adaptation in a multipolar world.

Geo-economically, the Arctic route could reshape global connectivity by linking the Eurasian landmass through a northern maritime belt. The concept of a “Polar Silk Road” complements China’s overland Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), forming an integrated logistics ecosystem stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. This vision, though ambitious, faces structural and governance challenges. Arctic governance remains fragmented, with the Arctic Council serving primarily as a consultative body lacking enforcement power. The suspension of Russia’s participation in the Council following the Ukraine invasion has paralyzed its operations, further complicating cooperative frameworks. In this vacuum, alternative coalitions—such as the Arctic Five and ad hoc bilateral agreements—are shaping the regional order, potentially leading to overlapping jurisdictions and strategic ambiguity. The Arctic’s viability, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation from global crises and climate trajectories. While climate change facilitates navigation, it also introduces profound instability. The paradox of Arctic development lies in the fact that the very forces enabling its accessibility—global warming and ice melt—also threaten the ecological sustainability that future trade depends on. Thus, the Arctic route represents both an opportunity and a warning: an emblem of human adaptability and a symptom of planetary vulnerability. For global powers, it is both a new Silk Road and a new battlefield—where environmental, economic, and security imperatives collide.

Climate Change, Environmental Risks, and Economic Viability

While geopolitical enthusiasm for the Arctic Route is rising, its practical and environmental constraints are substantial. The region remains climatically volatile, with unpredictable ice conditions, extreme weather, and inadequate emergency response infrastructure. Despite record low ice extents in 2024, satellite data show increased year-to-year variability that complicates commercial scheduling. Insurers remain wary: premiums for Arctic voyages are often double those for conventional routes, reflecting heightened risks of hull damage, environmental liability, and costly rescue operations. Environmentalists argue that growing maritime traffic and fossil-fuel extraction in the Arctic contradict global decarbonisation goals. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has imposed the Polar Code and a partial ban on heavy-fuel oil use, but enforcement remains inconsistent. Spills or accidents in fragile ecosystems could have catastrophic long-term consequences. Moreover, the carbon footprint of ice-class vessels and ice-breaker escorts offsets some of the emissions savings from shorter routes. Thus, while the NSR offers a potential logistical advantage, its economic viability remains contingent on technological innovation, robust safety regimes, and predictable governance. Without these, commercial expansion could trigger ecological backlash and reputational risk for shipping lines.

The Militarization of the Arctic

The re-emergence of hard-power competition in the Arctic is unmistakable. Russia’s build up has been met with parallel measures from NATO members. The U.S. Navy’s 2nd Fleet has resumed operations in the North Atlantic, and allied exercises such as Cold Response and Arctic Challenge have become annual fixtures. Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 has effectively transformed the Baltic–Arctic continuum into a contiguous zone of Western defense coordination. Russia, however, retains significant advantages: advanced under-ice submarine capabilities, hypersonic missile deployment in the Kola Peninsula, and radar coverage across the Arctic archipelagos (Baev, 2024). The strategic logic is deterrence through presence—the ability to deny or monitor adversarial movement in the northern approaches. For NATO, the challenge is maintaining credible deterrence without escalating into confrontation. The militarization also influences economics. Each new base or missile system affects investor perceptions, insurance rates, and maritime risk assessments. The Arctic, once branded as a “global commons,” is increasingly an arena of controlled access.

 Arctic Governance and Legal Framework

The governance of the Arctic is anchored in the Arctic Council, established in 1996 as a forum for environmental and developmental cooperation among eight Arctic states and six Indigenous organizations. However, the Council’s work was partially suspended after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and although limited cooperation resumed in 2024, political trust remains low (Arctic Council, 2024). The resulting vacuum has opened the door for unilateralism: Russia enforces its own navigation laws requiring prior notification and pilotage for foreign vessels in the NSR, a move contested by the United States as inconsistent with freedom-of-navigation principles under UNCLOS Article 234. The erosion of cooperative governance poses risks to both safety and stability. Without agreed mechanisms for search-and-rescue coordination, environmental monitoring, and accident response, increased shipping could heighten the probability of crises. This governance gap underscores the dual nature of the Arctic Route: it is both a promise of connectivity and a test of global order

Conclusion

The Arctic Route embodies the paradox of twenty-first-century globalization: climate change has made possible an economic corridor that itself accelerates environmental degradation; geopolitical rivalries intensify precisely where cooperation is most needed. Russia’s near-monopoly on ice-breaker capacity and infrastructure gives it a commanding geo-economic position but also invites counter-balancing coalitions. The United States and its allies, recognizing that infrastructure shapes influence, are racing to expand Arctic presence. China and India, though not Arctic powers, perceive the region as a strategic variable affecting future trade and energy networks. The Arctic is thus evolving into a new geography of power—one where temperature, trade, and territory converge. Its viability as a global transport artery depends not only on melting ice but on whether states can establish transparent governance, manage environmental risk, and prevent securitization from eclipsing commerce. In sum, the Arctic route’s viability is not a linear question of whether ships can pass through ice-free waters, but a multidimensional challenge that fuses climate transformation, great-power politics, and global energy flows. As the U.S., Russia, China, and India recalibrate their Arctic policies, and as Europe and Turkey explore new alignments, the Arctic becomes a mirror reflecting the broader transition of the world order from a unipolar maritime system to a multipolar oceanic architecture. Its future depends on the delicate balance between competition and cooperation—between the rush for extraction and the need for preservation. The Arctic route thus symbolizes both the promise and peril of the 21st-century geo- economic landscape.

By: Shreya Dabral, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping back in 2013 is one of the most groundbreaking international infrastructure and development initiatives in the contemporary era. It is based on the ancient Silk Road and is meant to increase the connectivity of the region, trade, and economic development in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The program involves more than 150 countries/ international organizations, and it is the largest international cooperation framework by an individual country in the 21st century. But ten years after the establishment, there is still an ongoing debate on whether the BRI has managed to reach its objectives or it has failed on account of political, financial and geopolitical factors. Whether or not it has been successful is a complicated question, as the initiative is multidimensional, its organization changes over time, and the interests of the involved countries contradict each other.

The Vision and Scope of the BRI

The BRI was conceptualized as a two-tier system including the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. An overland Silk Road Economic Belt, which links China to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, is built by means of extensive railway and road networks. At the same time, the Maritime Silk Road is oriented towards sea routes to Chinese ports and Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean. The main aim of the project is to establish a smooth network of trading routes, industrial belts, and energy pipelines that will help in economic interdependence and make China the central part of the global trade.

The Chinese government has indicated that the BRI is geared toward facilitating policy alignment, the connectivity of infrastructure, the free movement of trade, the integration of the financial system, and human to human interactions. It is not just a project of infrastructures but is also an integrated structure of economic diplomacy. By 2024, approximately 75 percent of the population of the world and more than half of the global GDP had signed cooperation agreements with China under the BRI framework. The figures show how the project has gigantic geographic and economic scale, and China has a desire to transform the world trade routes and economic governance.

Economic Performances and Scale of Investments.

Economically, the BRI has brought great results. The USD 1 trillion of investment by China between 2013 and 2023 on the BRI related projects occurred through energy plants, highways, railways, ports, and telecommunication networks. As the Green Finance and Development Center of Fudan University asserts, in 2023 alone, the Chinese invested more than USD 67.8 billion in BRI countries. The project has facilitated the building of key infrastructures like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the Port of Piraeus in Greece.

In Africa, transportation and energy networks have been changed due to Chinese investments. Roads and railways that have been funded by the BRI have linked landlocked nations such as Ethiopia and Rwanda with international markets. The logistic hubs and rail connectivity in China have been used in Europe to reduce the time taken to transport between China and key cities in Europe such as Duisburg and Rotterdam to ensure that the supply chain activities are facilitated. China-Europe freight train network, which is one of the biggest entities of the BRI, has also undergone impressive growth; in 2023, more than 16000 trips were made compared to only 80 in 2013.

Also, the BRI has triggered trade flows between China and the member countries. In 2023, China traded more than USD 2.1 trillion with countries in BRI, which is an increment of 6.2 percent over the years. The program has also offered the development financing options to the countries that experience financial crunch by Western organizations such as the World Bank or IMF. The BRI loans and infrastructure assistance have allowed most developing countries to modernize their sectors of transport, energy and digital communication rapidly.

Strategic and Geopolitical Resolutions.

The BRI is not only a matter of economic success, but it is also important to consider it through the prism of geopolitics and strategy. The long term China has a vision of establishing its influence in the world by establishing an economic network which relies on it. The project enhances China to be a more global creditor and investor, as it can cast soft power and control over decision-making processes of partner states, politically and economically. Construction of ports, railways and industrial belt in South and southeast Asian, African and Mediterranean areas has provided China with strategic positions in areas of strategic significance to world trade.

As an example, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, as a constituent of CPEC, gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea and avoids the Strait of Malacca, which is a crucial yet vulnerable strategic point at sea. Equally, the Chinese investments at Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Piraeus Port in Greece have seen it increase its presence in the maritime industry beyond the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Such actions have cast doubt in the mind of the Western countries over the motives of this move by China as some tend to call the BRI a geopolitical instrument of world domination and not a program of cooperative development.

The United States and European Union have retaliated by launching other programs, including the Build Back Better World (B3W) and the Global Gateway to offset the increasing patriarchal influence of China. The fact that this competition denotes that although the BRI has increased the global reach of China, it has also increased geopolitical conflicts especially with the major western powers, and India, which is quite sceptical about the intentions of the initiative.

Criticism and Challenges

The BRI has been challenged by much criticism though its success despite the achievements it has had cannot be overlooked. The problem of the so-called debt-trap diplomacy is among the most durable ones. Opponents claim that China makes huge loans to developing countries to fund infrastructure projects that do not give sufficient economic payoffs thus leaving the developing countries in a position of unrepayable debts. The situation in Sri Lanka with the leasing of Hambantota Port to China on a 99 years basis after the island was unable to pay loans is often referred to as the best example of this phenomenon. The same debt issues have emerged in Zambia, Kenya, and Pakistan where the issue of repayment has burdened the national budgets.

The other significant issue is that there is no transparency in BRI agreements. Various initiatives have been accused of having obscured contract agreements, exorbitant prices, and of being corrupt. Indicatively, in Malaysia, the government successfully halted a number of BRI projects, in the year 2018, owing to corruption scandals, and overrun. These projects despite being renegotiated later revealed flaws in governance and accountability in the BRI model.

Current issues of concern have also been environmental and social sustainability. Many BRI projects are linked with the carbon intensive sectors like coal and cement thus casting doubts on whether China will ever adhere to green development. The world bank has observed that as much as the BRI can enhance trade in the world up to 9.7 percent, it can also lead to extreme environmental destruction in case the issue of sustainability is not given serious consideration. Moreover, local communities in some of the participating countries have also complained of being displaced, unemployed, transfer of skills to the Chinese companies and this has created resentment and social turmoil in some areas.

Economic Sustainability and Changing Trends.

The own slowdown of the Chinese economy and the world economy in general have also challenged the BRI on its long-term sustainability. Since 2020, the COVID-19 and global debt have made China to rebalance its foreign investment. Numerous BRI projects were postponed or reduced because China was oriented to local recovery and debt management. Boston University Global Development Policy Center states that the average annual Chinese development financing to BRI countries reduced to less than USD 5 billion in 2022 as compared to an average of USD 75 billion between 2013 and 2017. This drastic contraction points to the movement of big investments to the more selective and strategically important projects.

China has attempted to reorient BRI over the past years to the emphasis on high-quality development. This stage highlights the green initiatives, digital connectivity and sustainable financing. The introduction of the Green Silk road and Digital Silk road elements is an indicator that Beijing is trying to close the gaps of the BRI to the global sustainability agenda and the new industries. As an example, China has made more investments in renewable energy projects in Africa and Southeast Asia and encouraged digital infrastructure via the 5G network and cross-border e-commerce systems. This change implies a shift of the quantity based cooperation to quality based implying that the BRI is changing to meet the global economic realities.

Regional Impacts: Successes and Failures.

The BRI has not been successful in all regions. The development of new infrastructures such as the China-Laos Railway has shown real positive returns in the region and this has improved connectivity and improved tourism and trade in South East Asia. The railway was finished in 2021 and it now takes less than 10 hours to transport people between Kunming and Vientiane, which took two days previously. Equally, in Central Asia, BRI investment has re-established ancient trade routes and has eased energy exportation in pipelines to China in the form of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

There have been mixed results in South Asia however. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that was initially expected to result in transformational growth has been faced with delays, financial pressure, and local resistance after environmental and political reasons. In Africa, Chinese-constructed rail systems and power plants have increased the infrastructure, but certain nations are experiencing an increased debt crisis and reliance on Chinese contractors. In Europe, there has been a lack of interest in the BRI since the EU has become more stringent in investment screening as well as keeping in line with the United States on the issues of strategic reliance on China.

Ample or Economic, Strategic, or Symbolic Success?

The success of the BRI is relative, as it is mostly determined by the definition of success. In its economic aspects, the BRI has undoubtedly helped in the infrastructure growth and in the trade growth in the Global South. In a strategic undertaking it has increased the geopolitical sway of China and made it a pioneer of the third world. Symbolically, it has portrayed China as a superpower in the world with the capacity of reforming international relations by collaborating with others, as opposed to fighting them.

But when the measurement of success is in terms of financial sustainability, transparency, and mutually benefiting, then the picture is not so bright. Some of the projects have not achieved anticipated returns on the economy and some nations have ended up with unsustainable debts. Moreover, lack of unified systems of governance has given rise to inefficiencies and a dented reputation in China. Basically, the success of the BRI is relative, it has succeeded in giving China a geopolitical presence and international prominence, yet it has not succeeded in creating an internationally reliable model of global development.

Conclusion

The Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most revolutionary yet debatable projects of contemporary geopolitics that is more than ten years old. It is unmatched in terms of magnitude, ambitions, and spread over the globe and its influence on supporting the development of infrastructure, trade, and connectivity in the developing world cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, its disproportional execution, debt crisis and political scandals demonstrate fundamental structural weaknesses that make its conduction into a genuinely sustainable and collaborative project challenging. The fact that China is moving towards high-quality BRI development is an indication that the country appreciates these drawbacks and strives to meet the evolving demands of the world.

To sum it up, the BRI is a success and a struggle. It has managed to make China the centre stage of the global economic networks and offer an alternative to the western dominated financial systems. However, it is having problems of credibility, sustainability and inclusiveness. The way through which China will be able to reconcile geopolitical aspirations with real needs of global development is the future of the BRI. 

The end product of the endeavor will only be evaluated not by the number of bridges and ports constructed but by the fact that the project led to equitable development, long-term sustainability, and actual international collaboration in a more multipolar world.

By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

The AUKUS trilateral security partnership uniting Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was launched in September 2021 as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific security. Its objectives were to bolster deterrence against China, enhance defence integration, and promote advanced technological cooperation, particularly in nuclear-powered submarines, cyber, quantum, and AI systems.

Four years later, the alliance’s effectiveness remains under scrutiny. While AUKUS has succeeded in realigning strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific, its implementation has been slow and politically sensitive. This article assesses whether AUKUS remains an effective deterrent and strategic instrument by examining three key dimensions: strategic impact, technological integration, and geopolitical legitimacy.

The Strategic Genesis of AUKUS

AUKUS was conceived in response to China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive behavior. Between 2010 and 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) expanded from 210 to over 360 major warships, surpassing the U.S. Navy in numbers. Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea, near-daily air incursions around Taiwan, and island-building campaigns prompted Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. to adopt a forward defence posture.

For Australia, AUKUS represented the most significant defence decision in its modern history—abandoning its French diesel-submarine deal to pursue nuclear-propelled vessels. For the U.K., AUKUS served as a vehicle to project its “Global Britain” ambitions beyond Europe. For the U.S., it institutionalized “minilateralism”—small, flexible alliances to share strategic burdens in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic Effectiveness: Deterrence and Force Integration

The first “pillar” of AUKUS focuses on nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) arguably the partnership’s most visible, yet contentious, component.

• Under the “Optimal Pathway” (2023), Australia will purchase three to five U.S. Virginia-class SSNs by the early 2030s and begin producing eight new “AUKUS-class” submarines in Adelaide by the 2040s.
• The estimated total cost is US$368 billion over 30 years, equivalent to nearly 1.2% of Australia’s GDP annually.

Strategically, the AUKUS SSNs promise long-range endurance, stealth, and power projection, enabling Australia to operate far into the South China Sea. Yet, the submarines’ deterrent effect will not materialize until the mid-2030s, leaving a decade-long capability gap.

Moreover, China’s submarine fleet already includes 80 vessels, of which at least 10 are nuclear-powered. By 2035, it is projected to outnumber the combined submarine fleets of the AUKUS partners in the region.

That said, AUKUS has achieved near-term deterrence through expanded joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and rotational U.S. and U.K. submarine deployments to Australia’s west coast. These moves have already increased allied maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, signaling resolve without provoking open confrontation.

Technological Cooperation: Pillar Two Progress

The second pillar of AUKUS technological and industrial collaboration is less visible but equally crucial. It encompasses:

• Cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) for autonomous systems and intelligence analysis.
• Quantum computing for secure navigation and communication.
• Undersea, hypersonic, and electronic warfare capabilities.

By 2025, over 70 joint research projects are active across these domains. Pillar Two aims to transform AUKUS from a procurement pact into a technology accelerator, aligning military-industrial ecosystems. The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restricts the transfer of sensitive defence technology, frustrating both British and Australian partners. Delays in harmonizing export controls have limited progress in AI and cyber collaborations.

Moreover, industrial capacity constraints threaten execution. The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding backlog already delays its own Virginia-class submarines by up to two years. Australia’s domestic industry, still developing nuclear engineering expertise, faces a workforce deficit of nearly 20,000 skilled workers needed for AUKUS implementation.

Despite these setbacks, AUKUS’s technology-sharing framework represents an unprecedented step in Anglo-American defence cooperation. It effectively redefines what some scholars call a “plurilateral defence alliance” a flexible, non-treaty partnership oriented around capability fusion rather than formal obligations.

Geopolitical Impact: Regional Reactions and Strategic Signaling

The Indo-Pacific response to AUKUS has been mixed.

• Japan and India both members of the Quad have cautiously supported AUKUS, viewing it as a deterrent to unilateral Chinese assertiveness.
• ASEAN nations, notably Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed unease over the nuclear implications, fearing erosion of the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), which enshrines a nuclear-free Southeast Asia.
• China has denounced AUKUS as an “Anglo-Saxon containment coalition,” accusing it of destabilizing the region and violating non-proliferation norms.

Yet, AUKUS has already altered Beijing’s threat perception. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded surveillance in the South Pacific and reinforced facilities on Hainan Island, indicating AUKUS’s psychological deterrence effect.

However, AUKUS also polarizes the Indo-Pacific. By strengthening one bloc while excluding regional organizations like ASEAN, it risks fragmenting security governance and undermining inclusive mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit.

The Future of AUKUS: Is It Still Effective?

Effectiveness depends on whether AUKUS fulfills its strategic purpose deterring China and ensuring Indo-Pacific stability without overextending its partners.

1. As a Deterrent Mechanism
   1. Short term: AUKUS enhances deterrence by presence and signaling rather than capability.
   1. Long term: Its real test will be in the 2030s when AUKUS submarines are operational.
2. As a Technology-Sharing Framework
   1. AUKUS has begun redefining Western defence-industrial cooperation, with joint AI and quantum projects already influencing doctrine.
   1. The alliance’s viability will depend on whether it can translate innovation into deployable defence assets.
3. As a Regional Construct
   1. AUKUS’s exclusivity remains a structural weakness. It could become more effective if it interfaces with multilateral forums such as the Quad or ASEAN to balance deterrence with inclusivity.

Ultimately, AUKUS is neither obsolete nor fully realized. It remains a strategic signal of resolve a declaration that maritime democracies will share the burdens of Indo-Pacific security. Its success, however, hinges on sustained political commitment, industrial capacity, and regional diplomacy.

Conclusion

As of 2025, AUKUS remains strategically relevant but operationally constrained. It has reinforced Western unity, reoriented Australian defence strategy, and complicated China’s military calculus. However, its effectiveness as a defence instrument remains incomplete hampered by timelines, technology transfer barriers, and geopolitical skepticism.

In essence, AUKUS’s success lies less in what it delivers now and more in what it promises for the 2030s: a framework capable of uniting technological innovation with credible deterrence. Its endurance will depend on whether the partners can sustain funding, political will, and regional legitimacy over the next decade. If those conditions hold, AUKUS will not only remain effective it may define the next phase of Indo-Pacific security architecture.

By: Prachi Kushwah, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Xi-Trump Summit held in Busan on May 20, 2020, represented a consequential moment in modern international relations. After two years of intensified economic confrontation and strategic posturing, leaders from the United States and the People’s Republic of China convened with the stated aim of stabilizing a relationship that shapes global politics, trade, and security. This analysis examines the substantive and symbolic changes in bilateral relations that unfolded after the summit, tracing developments through 2025. It evaluates economic shifts, strategic and security implications, technological competition, diplomatic realignments, and broader global consequences. The article takes an academic, analytical tone, synthesizing observable trends and policy outcomes in the period following Busan..

Background of the US-China Relationship

Prior to the Busan meeting, US-China relations had undergone a marked deterioration from the previous decades of managed engagement. Beginning in 2018, the United States implemented tariffs and sanctions aimed at reducing bilateral trade imbalances and targeting Chinese industrial policy. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and subsequent policy choices framed China as a strategic competitor in economic, military, and technological arenas. Chinese leadership, for its part, pursued a combination of domestic modernization goals and expanding international influence, exemplified by major infrastructure initiatives and investments across Asia and beyond. These dynamics set the stage for a summit that many observers hoped would slow the slide toward permanent strategic decoupling..

Key Outcomes of the Xi-Trump Summit in Busan

The Busan Summit did not produce a single major treaty or sweeping accord, but it yielded several measurable outcomes and important shifts in rhetoric. Leaders agreed to resume select trade talks and to create joint working groups to address intellectual property concerns, limited tariff adjustments, and constrained technology exchanges under specific licenses. Importantly, both sides indicated an interest in reestablishing lines of communication on crisis management, particularly in the maritime and cyber domains. While substantive concessions were limited, the summit delivered a reputational pay-off: it signalled a willingness to negotiate and to avoid precipitous escalation. For policy-makers, however, the meeting was a beginning rather than an endpoint — it opened channels that subsequent administrations would thread cautiously..

Economic Shifts Post-Summit

The immediate economic effect of the Busan summit was a modest easing in commercial tensions. Trade flows began to recover from the troughs of 2019 and early 2020, reflecting both political thaw and the resiliency of global supply chains. The United States saw an increase in certain exports to China, notably agricultural goods and selected industrial components, while Chinese firms gradually resumed purchases of energy commodities from US suppliers. Nevertheless, the summit did not resolve structural impediments that had driven the trade war: market access barriers, state subsidies, and divergent regulatory environments remained. Consequently, multinational corporations adopted a strategy of hedging: diversifying supply chains geographically, increasing inventory buffers, and recalibrating manufacturing footprints toward Southeast Asia and India.

By 2022 and 2023, foreign direct investment patterns reflected a more pluralized Asia, with both Chinese outbound investment and US investment into China slowing relative to the pre-2018 era. The cumulative effect was not a return to full economic integration, but a managed competition where commerce continued under tighter guardrails and clearer contingency planning..

Strategic and Security Implications

Strategically, Busan’s impact was subtle but durable. The summit reduced the probability of immediate, high-profile escalations, but it did not eliminate the deep strategic mistrust between Beijing and Washington. The United States continued to strengthen security ties with regional partners, particularly through enhanced cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. The Quad mechanism gained renewed emphasis as a platform to coordinate maritime security, infrastructure resilience, and technology policy. China expanded asymmetric capabilities — both military and dual-use technologies — to assert influence in the South China Sea and beyond. Taiwan remained a central flashpoint: tensions oscillated as both sides tested red lines through military patrols, diplomatic maneuvers, and messaging.

While Busan fostered crisis communication channels, the strategic competition hardened into an era where containment and competition coexisted with selective, issue-based cooperation..

Technological and Diplomatic Realignment

Technology emerged as a principal arena of contestation after Busan. The United States intensified controls on exports of advanced semiconductors and critical manufacturing equipment, citing national security and supply chain resilience. These restrictions prompted Beijing to accelerate domestic capacity-building initiatives and to prioritize research in artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and semiconductor design. In parallel, both governments pursued targeted diplomacy: cooperating on global health initiatives and climate commitments while clashing over norms for cyber conduct and data governance. The result by 2025 was a bifurcated technological architecture: certain elements of the global technology stack became regionally differentiated, with interoperability preserved only where mutual dependencies made decoupling prohibitively costly..

Global Impact and European Response

The Busan Summit reverberated across international institutions and among middle powers. European governments generally welcomed a reduction in bilateral tensions but remained wary of strategic ambiguity. The European Union accelerated efforts to preserve strategic autonomy, negotiating trade and investment rules with Asia while tightening scrutiny of foreign investment and critical infrastructure. Other states, particularly in Southeast Asia, pursued dual-track strategies — enhancing economic ties with China while strengthening security partnerships with the United States. International organizations, including the World Health Organization and climate fora, experienced episodic cooperation between Washington and Beijing as pragmatic necessity trumped ideological divides. Ultimately, Busan’s significance lay in its demonstration that great-power engagement could produce limited, cooperative outcomes even during systemic rivalry..

Domestic Political Constraints and Leadership Change

Domestic politics in both countries shaped the post-Busan trajectory. In the United States, bipartisan skepticism toward China persisted, constraining any rapid rollback of tariffs or export controls. Congressional scrutiny of technology firms and investment screening regimes intensified, reflecting concerns about intellectual property and national security. China’s domestic policy priorities — economic modernization, social stability, and technological self-reliance — limited Beijing’s willingness to make concessions perceived as undermining long-term strategic aims. Leadership changes and electoral cycles influenced policy continuity; subsequent administrations adopted cautious pragmatism rather than wholesale reversals, emphasizing calibrated competition and targeted cooperation..

Sectoral Effects: Supply Chains, Finance, and Energy

Post-Busan developments produced notable sectoral effects. Global supply chains saw structural adjustments as firms diversified suppliers, relocated certain production stages, and invested in regional logistics hubs. Financial linkages experienced both tightening and adaptation: capital flows to China remained substantial but more circumscribed, with regulatory regimes and compliance standards evolving to manage risk. Energy markets reflected pragmatic interdependence: despite geopolitical rivalry, energy trade continued where commercial incentives aligned with strategic hedging. These sectoral patterns reinforced a broader trend: economic interactions persisted but within frameworks that embedded strategic foresight and resilience planning..

Prospects for Cooperation and Rivalry (2025 and Beyond)

Looking forward from 2025, the US-China relationship is likely to remain a hybrid of competition and cooperation. Areas such as climate change, pandemic preparedness, and arms control present windows for pragmatic engagement because global public goods require joint leadership. Conversely, competition in advanced technologies, regional influence in the Indo-Pacific, and differing governance models for digital infrastructure will continue to generate friction. Policy pathways that reduce miscalculation — institutionalized dialogues, crisis communication hotlines, and sectoral coordination mechanisms — can mitigate risks, but they require sustained political will from both capitals. The Busan Summit’s legacy is therefore mixed: it demonstrated that high-level diplomacy can recalibrate relations without resolving core disputes, and it underscored the importance of managing competition to preserve global stability..

Conclusion

The Xi-Trump Summit in Busan on May 20, 2020, served as a focal point for an era defined by strategic competition and selective cooperation. From 2020 through 2025, the bilateral relationship evolved into a managed rivalry characterized by economic interdependence, technological contestation, and episodic diplomatic collaboration. While Busan did not reverse the broader trajectory toward competition, it established mechanisms and a rhetorical framework that reduced the likelihood of abrupt escalation. As policymakers assess the lessons of the past five years, the central challenge remains constructing durable institutions and norms that can accommodate both rivalry and the shared necessities of global governance..

By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

An international momentum is building as a growing number of nations now have formally recognise the State of Palestine, representing one of the most significant diplomatic shifts in recent years. According to media reports, out of 193 UN member states, more than 157 states — including several Western countries that had long sidestepped doing so, have now recognised Palestine. However, this current wave of recognition reflects a fascinating shift from the prevailing pattern, where support mostly came from the Global South and Arab League members. In 2024–25, states such as France, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Canada, and Australia announced official recognition, stressing the necessity to “keep the two-state solution alive”. Amid deteriorating conditions in Gaza and the West Bank, such increasing number of recognitions within Europe and North America has transformed Palestinian statehood from just a regional aspiration into an increasingly accepted aspect of the global diplomatic order.  

This moment is significant because it marks a turning point in the balance of international legitimacy. Governments nowadays view recognition not as a reward after negotiations, but as a prerequisite for initiating a meaningful diplomacy. Widespread recognition strengthens Palestine’s legal standing in the UN general assembly, allowing it to pursue accountability apparatuses that are previously seemed out of reach. More recognitions stretch Palestine’s greater voting support in other global platforms like UNESCO, UNHRC, FAO and WHO etc.

In international law, recognition is the formal acknowledgment or acceptance by one existing state that another state meets the criteria of statehood laid down by international community and is therefore entitled to the rights and duties of a sovereign state. It influence a state’s legal personality at the global level, including its ability to claim sovereignty, to participate in treaties and engage in international institutions such as the UN. Thus, recognition enhances the legitimacy of Palestine’s claims and strengthens its standing to invoke international conventions, particularly in matters concerning occupation and human rights violations.

The legal arguments that supports Palestinian statehood primarily depend on international law principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and the right to sovereignty. The UN Charter along with common Article 1 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights affirm the right of all peoples to self-determination—a major basis for the Palestinian argument. Moreover, the Montevideo Convention (1933) further outlines the four criteria for statehood—defined territory, permanent population, effective government, and capacity for foreign relations. According to its supporters, Palestine substantially fulfils all these conditions. Furthermore, in 2012 the UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, granted Palestine non-member observer state status, and subsequent recognitions by states and international bodies, have consolidated its de facto legal personality.

However, there are numerous constraints and counterarguments challenging full recognition of Palestinian statehood. Critics in this regard, including Israel and some Western legal scholars, argue that Palestine does not adequately meet the “effective government” criterion under the Montevideo Convention, citing divided governance. The Palestinian territories remain politically and administratively divided between the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Countries, such as the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other states have designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation, stating the use of armed attacks and its refusal to recognise Israel’s right to exist. On the other hand, the PA continues to maintain cooperation with Israel in security and administrative matters but has weak public legitimacy due to corruption, lack of elections, and perceived ineffectiveness.

Either way, countless failures to achieve a meaningful and broadly accepted two-state solution have renewed global debate over effectiveness of existing peace initiatives. In the meantime, Israel’s position appears to be more tenuous, both diplomatically and politically. Israel faces growing diplomatic isolation. Sanctions and condemnations has been mounting across various international platforms. This could also mean that Israel will face more frequent UN resolutions challenging its activities in Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, the European Union – Israel’s largest trading partner has proposed sanctions, though it’s still waiting for approval by member states, but that could partially suspend its free trade agreement with Israel. Recognition has its most direct impact at the United Nations, firming up Palestine’s observer status and advancing its effort for full membership status. The repercussion has started to extend beyond diplomacy, evidently reaching economic, cultural, and even sporting spheres. At the same time, reports suggested that the Israeli government is also encountering growing dissent at home, demanding to bring back hostages and most importantly end the war and massacre in Gaza.

Notably, this wave of recognition has come from some of Israel’s traditional allies, many of whom are now questioning its settlement policies and continued occupation. This shift has turned the issue into a matter of serious diplomatic concern. The West initially affirmed Israel’s right to self-defence but have gradually grown critical of its conduct, particularly over civilian harm, and restricted humanitarian access along with intensified military actions in Gaza and tightened control and settlement expansion in the West Bank. Several of its closest allies have also urged Israel to halt its military operations and lift aid blockades to allow relief into the enclave. Except for the United States, most international support now appears to be leaning towards Palestinian statehood. The US is increasingly placed in the position of blocking and vetoing pro-Palestine initiatives. But, by repeatedly doing so it risks being perceived as partial and diminishing its role as a credible mediator. “They are very quickly losing support and sympathy all around the world. Even their closest ally, the United States, I believe, is beginning to have second thoughts about what they’re seeing unfolding in Gaza,” former Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar’s remark about the on-going situation.

To put it in perspective, the recent recognition of Palestine by several Western countries is driven by a combination of legal, moral, and political factors. Western countries abstained from recognition not due to negation of Palestinian rights, but because they consider it as diplomatically risky. Israel as a dependable ally for the West in the Middle East has been another important reason. Only recently—amidst a prolonged deadlock and Israel’s hardline policies, several European states have begun reconsidering this stance. Recent developments on the ground along with shifts in international opinion have amplified these dynamics. Reoccurring conflicts, particularly civilian casualties have made public scrutiny and moral pressure on governments stronger. French President Emmanuel Macron during his speech at the UN session in New York said that “we must do everything within our power to preserve the very possibility of a two-state solution, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security,”. However, France, whose decision to recognise Palestine has been interpreted by some critics as politically motivated, aiming to appeal to certain segments of its domestic voter base. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store also commented that Israel “has damaged its reputation in countries that have always had sympathy for it”. In different parts of the world, public sentiment has increasingly pushed their governments to recognize Palestine. “Recognition” here is seen as a way to put pressure on Israel diplomatically to return to negotiations. The growing support for Palestinian statehood, as a stand for human rights and international law, has apparently intensified advocacy for a two-state solution. Palestinian-led civil society has warmly welcomed the recent developments, projecting them as a step toward greater international legitimacy and justice.

Such support demonstrates not just sympathy for Palestinian statehood, but also frustration with Israel’s political decisions and more importantly proves that international efforts to push for a two-state solution also remain active. Meanwhile, the Middle East’s political scenario is also changing. Israel’s growing cooperation with some Gulf states, like the UAE and Bahrain has given a greater room for the Western countries to recalibrate their position on Palestine without destabilizing broader alliances. Countries that initially followed the U.S. stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue are now more and more willing to act independently.

When the international community offers recognition, it raises a complex question about representation. Countries essentially acknowledging the PA’s role in the West Bank, given its limited control in Gaza, yet this complicates international consensus on what a recognised Palestinian state truly represents. The division further challenges the prospect of a unified negotiating partner in the table, making it easier for Israel to argue that statehood recognition is premature or legally inconsistent.

These perceptions are increasingly viewed as underestimate the two-state framework that much of the world still considers essential for regional stability. Even without immediate on-the- ground consequences, this gradual shift is reshaping how Israel is perceived today—less as a regional stabilizer and more as a state resisting international consensus on conflict resolution.

While this act of recognition is received in some parts of the world as a step in the right direction, but Israel has strongly condemned the recognitions by Western nations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considered the move as an “absurdity,” and a “reward for terrorism”. Experts also noted that, there is little chance that it will alter Israel’s policy. The Israeli government holds firmly that its military actions in Gaza are conducted in self-defence and in accordance with international law, strongly denying all allegations against it. “This will not have one millimetre of influence on policymaking,” said Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser.

Despite the mounting diplomatic drawbacks, Israel continues to hold significant ground, whether it be politically, militarily, or economically. Though recent events hit its economy but Israel still maintained strong support from the US and enjoys leverage through its economic and security capabilities. Israel’s strong domestic institutions, military deterrence capacity, and ability to withstand diplomatic pressure have historically helped it to navigate moments of isolation and crises. Recognition challenges and could weaken Israeli claims but certainly redefine the diplomatic dynamic and political parameters of the conflict. It signals that the international community is increasingly willing to legitimise Palestinian statehood, in spite of Israeli objections and prioritising negotiation frameworks and regional stability. However, these recognitions do not immediately alter any of the on the ground realities. Israel still maintains authority over most of the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, even now as the recognition of Palestine grows, Israel’s practical control, alliances, and economic interdependence allows it to maintain significant ground in regional and global politics. In essence, Israel’s position is not collapsing, but it is gradually fading in terms of global legitimacy and moral authority. Netanyahu already has rejected numerous calls to end the war until Hamas is destroyed and has maintained the status of not recognizing a Palestinian state. Israel has also reportedly considered measures it could take against countries recognising Palestine, including expelling diplomats and closing consulates. Israel’s diplomatic isolation risks developing further strategic challenges. Its relationships and policies with Arab and Western states may become more cautious in the future. At the same time, Israel appears to be more prepared to endure a period of diplomatic isolation, acknowledging the reality that efforts to counter such situations may continue for years.

By: Rudraksh Saklani, Research Analyst, GSDN

The geopolitical discourse surrounding the eastern part of Europe has been nothing short of a roller coaster ride that our global village hadn’t signed up for. However, what’s also an equally stark piece of undeniable reality is that a faithful student and observer of international relations could see it coming through all along. The era of “Cold War 2.0” that has been obsessively centered around the tariff war between United States (U.S.) and China off late has a historical dimension that affects it greatly. The answer, like always, traces its roots in the events and reflections of the past. Within the background context of the Warsaw Pact that once shaped how the region came together and the fundamental subtext of the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the region has had modern-day manifestations expressing themselves through various shifts in policy and practice.

Introductory perspective

As soon as the world was beginning to adjust to the post-Covid realities and making a pivot to the Orient, the latent European whirlwind of undercurrents resurfaced when Russia began what it calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.  Foreign affairs’ academics and analysts who were relying on the Minsk Agreement holding up and who viewed the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 as an aberration were confronted with the suddenness of the supply chain disruptions, oil politics and absolute worldwide chaos in the geo-economic scheme of things, that Europe in particular and the world in general had to begrudgingly brace for.

According to the United Nations’ (UN) definition, Eastern European countries entail Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Sometimes, for academic purposes, the Baltic Republics and the Balkan states are also considered as part of the region.

Another aspect that I would like to underscore is considering how in these polarising times, thanks to social media and newer ways and forms of misinformation, disinformation and information warfare, the Russian aggression in Ukraine has exposed the hypocrisy of the West and the vulnerability of the East, also raising alarm bells with reference to the Russian military’s supposed infallibility and Ukraine’s resilience. As the world, especially the Global South, finds itself in the middle of strict binaries, burdened with the obligation to pick a side, the Indian stance of strategic autonomy has come up differently and effectively, so to speak.

Historical backdrop

The geopolitical importance of Eastern Europe is rooted in the ground reality of it being the fluctuating frontier between empires and ideologies. It has existed for many centuries between the Germanic empire to its west and the realms of the Russians, Ottomans, and Byzantines to its east and south. The area faced almost constant invasions, partitions, and buffer zone political power games – from the Austro-Hungarian ruling setup and Ottoman periods all the way up until the two World Wars.

During the Cold War, it became the Socialist Second world-countries bloc, or more popularly known as the “Eastern Bloc” under Soviet sphere of influence, the frontline in the ideological battle against the West. Its transformation into democratic, market-oriented nations after 1991 ever since the disintegration of the USSR has turned it into a crucial bridge connecting Europe with Eurasia, energy routes, and access to the Black Sea.

Regional dynamics and their impact on rest of the world

As NATO enhances its eastern defense with “Operation Eastern Sentry,” bolstering Poland against Russia, Romania invests in a gunpowder factory reflecting its growing defense role, Bulgaria suspects Russian GPS interference, while Hungary issues a veto threat against Ukraine’s EU membership and Slovakia faces energy disputes post-Russian gas transit agreement expiration, the region has been experiencing such indicative developments one after the other.

There is a commonly felt urgency, now more than ever before, in the conversations all across the board regarding this need for an alternative world order not dominated and dictated by the whims and fancies of the West and also the subsequent de-dollarisation that is being actively considered by many after the weaponisation of dollar through sanctions and freezing of funds by the West. Not to forget, the number of civilian casualties that Ukraine has had to endure (for instance, the Bakhmut meat grinder) for a bone of contention that could have otherwise been averted through dialogue and discussion, had all the stakeholders cooperated transparently and behaved responsibly; not antagonizing.

It is equally important to not get too ahead of ourselves and remind ourselves that Eastern Europe’s geostrategic relevance goes beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as much as many would want it that way, to get their military industrial complexes going. There are other countries in the region with equally complex concerns, aspirations, areas of convergence and discord too, and they deserve to be heard and their issues be discussed in multilateral forums. The limitations of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) & European Union (EU) have also opened up avenues and opportunities for a reset in these power balances, definitions of morality, limited wars, deterrence and nuclear thresholds.

Russia and Eastern Europe – historical ties, defining interventions or interference

The involvement of Russia in Eastern Europe has been indispensable and highly contentious. Historically, Russia has considered the region to be its strategic buffer zone – a domain vital for its security and cultural influence. Due to common Slavic, Orthodox, and linguistic connections, it has maintained close cultural, economic, and military relations with states like Belarus and the Balkans. The energy exports by Russia, infrastructural projects, and military alliances previously gave it great influence in most parts of the region. It was also a counterbalance to Western dominance, proffering another system of governance and regional cooperation, for example, Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union.

However, Russia’s policy has often been viewed by many as rather overbearing and opportunistic, undermining its soft power. The annexation of Crimea in 2014, military intervention in Ukraine in 2022, and hybrid tactics such as cyber-attacks, propaganda, and energy blackmail have alienated the majority in Eastern Europe, as considered by various Western scholars. These actions accelerated NATO and EU expansion, rallying countries like Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states against Moscow. Continuous efforts by Russia to dictate its influence rather than negotiate have sapped confidence in its long-term strategic position.

Consequently, though Russia is vital to the geopolitical makeup of Eastern Europe, it now paradoxically represents the historical base of Eastern Europe but has also become the source of its contemporary insecurity and strategic switch to the West.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU)

NATO’s expansion to the east following the Cold War made Eastern Europe the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security. Deployments by NATO, missile defenses, and operations aimed at deterring Russian aggression have been reported by many. The 2022 Ukraine conflict highlighted NATO’s strategic focus on strengthening its eastern front through troop rotations, air defense measures, and the building up of infrastructure. The military and logistical significance of Eastern Europe is accentuated by its geography, bordering Russia, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. NATO not only defends these countries but also shows that Eastern Europe has become fundamental to global security talks, deterrence methods, and transatlantic political cohesion.

Meanwhile, the European Union’s eastward expansion made Eastern Europe a geopolitical bridge between Western Europe and Eurasia. The processes of EU membership and accession – like in the case of Poland and Romania, but also for candidate countries like Moldova and Ukraine provide support for democratic values, economic transformation, and market integration. The area’s infrastructure, trade routes, and energy pathways connect Europe with the Black Sea and beyond, therefore enhancing its strategic importance. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership policy of the EU underlines how Brussels exerts soft power via aid, regulation, and political alignment.

Role of USA and China in Eastern Europe – flawed yet compelling relationships

For the United States of America, Eastern Europe is key to maintaining the transatlantic security framework and containing Russian influence. Washington’s strategic presence-anchored around NATO installations, military aid, and intelligence sharing consolidates American primacy in the region. The United States simultaneously supports democratic transformations and anti-corruption reforms to embolden pro-Western governance, often accused of engineering-coloured revolutions and regime change operations by its critics. At its core, Eastern Europe reflects America’s geostrategic importance as Europe’s primary security guarantor and a counterbalance to both Russian aggression and China’s growing economic influence in the continent’s east.

China, on the other hand, looks at Eastern Europe as an economic and strategic extension of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under the “China–Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation” framework, 16+1 (now 14+1), Beijing has pursued investment partnerships and infrastructure projects. However, its influence has faced pushback due to debt trap concerns and limited trade reciprocity. Certain countries, like Serbia and Hungary, remain receptive, while others, like Lithuania and Czechia, have reduced contact.

Rail freight traffic via the China-Europe “Middle Corridor,” crossing areas of Eastern Europe, went down in the first half of 2025. Shifts in trade patterns highlight Eastern Europe’s position along crucial Eurasian supply-chain paths; disturbances in this region have far-reaching effects. China seeks to balance all this as it tries to gain considerable ground in the economic and political environment of a region traditionally dominated by the EU, Russia, and the United States.

India and Eastern Europe – strategic partners, mutually beneficial engagement, Global South’s role

India’s meaningful engagement with Eastern Europe is embedded in realism and duly pragmatic, driven by the imperative of trade diversification, defense cooperation, and diplomatic balance. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are the entry points for India into the European market and potential partners in technology and manufacturing. India values Eastern Europe’s neutrality in international politics and garners its support in multilateral forums. New Delhi leverages the goodwill built during the Non-Aligned era to improve cultural and economic relations. Thus, India’s relationship with Eastern Europe reflects its broader objective of reaching out to various poles beyond traditional allies.

The linkages between the Global South, with India as the voice of the Global South, and Eastern Europe rests on shared histories of colonial impact, economic shifts, and political variation. During the Cold War, many Eastern European countries supported liberation movements going on in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the name of socialist solidarity. Eastern Europe, particularly non-EU countries, interacts with the Global South through trade, energy cooperation, and technology sharing. Simultaneously, the Global South looks to Eastern Europe’s post-Communist transition as a model for economic transformation. This emerging partnership represents shared aspirations. With the India-Middle East-European Economic Corridor (IMEC), the benefits of interdependence shall be reaped by all, in a rules-based world order.

Environmental, economic, and trade dimensions of Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe connects Western Europe, Russia, and Asia in terms of environmental, economic, and trade-related concerns and opportunities. Ecologically, it is crucial for the environmental balance in Europe and its energy transition, as it boasts of expansive woodlands, productive lowlands, and river networks, like the Danube and Dniester; thereby supporting farming and transport in different countries.

The Black Sea and Carpathian Basin represent important ecosystems related to climate regulation and sea trade, yet the region has environmental challenges – manufacturing pollution, forest depletion, and coal dependence – that also affect the EU’s climate policy and cross-border green financing as Europe pursues renewable energy sources and decarbonization.

Economically, it has developed from a post-Soviet periphery to a vital hub of manufacturing and logistics. Attracted by competitive wages, skilled labor, and developing digital sectors, it has become an investment destination of Western Europe, the U.S., and lately, Asia. With countries like Poland, Czechia, and Romania becoming vital links in European value chains, especially in the automotive and defense industries, as well as IT services, the region provides important transportation routes for energy and goods coming from Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

According to the EBRD, the economies of its region, especially in Eastern Europe, are projected to grow by 3% in 2025, as it lowered the forecast on the grounds of rising trade and policy uncertainties. A modest growth rate therefore indicates that the region, although still important economically, is quite susceptible to global disruptions and dependent on trade. Eastern Europe is, in true commercial terms, Europe’s gateway to Eurasia. The Baltic, Danube, and Black Sea routes form important trade corridors linking the EU to external markets. Control over these routes has implications for global supply chains, energy supplies, and strategic autonomy.

Way ahead

The period, after the conflict in Ukraine ends, is likely to provide significant opportunities for Eastern Europe’s revitalization and strategic development. The region has the potential of becoming the sought-after spot of Europe’s security and defense architecture, with substantial NATO financing, defense production, and infrastructure development. Reconstruction and economic integration with Ukraine will yield wide opportunities for trade, logistics, and energy transit, positioning countries like the Baltics as entry points for post-war recovery.

Among other opportunities, Eastern Europe can benefit from the EU’s Green and Digital transition: by attracting investments in renewable energies, technologies, and transport development. The handling and subsequent reduction of dependency (through diversification) on Russian energy allows for regional cooperation regarding gas interconnectors, nuclear energy, and renewables. Finally, in the light of changes in the global equilibrium of power, the region can reposition itself within diplomatic frameworks of the EU and across the ocean to shape policies on security and connectivity and ultimately emerge from its reputation as a geopolitical buffer zone to a driver of European renewal and revival.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

U.S. President Donald Trump delivered a speech to the 80th United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2025 that underscored his administration’s nationalist agenda, criticized global institutions, and issued pointed rebukes to several nations including India and China. In this speech he talked about Immigration, climate change, War on Gaza and conflict management. His speech was less a customary diplomatic performance and more a deliberate restaging of his political brand on the world stage.

Delivered with the same rhetorical bluntness that has defined his domestic politics, it was designed to rally a base, unsettle rivals, and force a recalibration of how allies and adversaries interpret American intentions. Because of this speech stitched together populist bravado, blunt rebukes of major powers, and an unapologetic defence of national sovereignty, critical response was sparked from multiple nations.

The rhetoric of confrontation

Trump’s language at the UNGA leaned into confrontation as a strategic choice, not merely a rhetoric. He used direct admonitions toward nations like India and China to dramatize a larger thesis: that established powers are failing their citizens and that international institutions have grown complacent or corrupt. This kind of messaging functions on two levels. Domestically, it reaffirms a portrait of leadership that promises to put perceived national interests above international niceties. Internationally, it communicates that the United States under his influence prefers blunt bargaining and public pressure over quiet diplomacy and coalition-building. The value of such an approach is its clarity of the speech. When leaders speak plainly, civilians and government officials can more quickly gauge intent. The downside is that bluntness erodes ambiguity that traditional diplomacy deliberately preserves.

On of the Trump’s blunt condemnation that drew immediate global attention “Your countries are going to hell” while talking about illegal immigrations in the Prisoners. He mentioned according to the Council of Europe, in 2024 almost 50% of inmates in German prisons were foreign nationals or migrants. The number in Austria for the same was 53%, in Greece it was 54% and in Switzerland it was 72%. He said America on the other hand, acted boldly to controlled illegal migration. After they started detaining and deporting everyone who crossed the border illegally, they simply stopped coming.

Similarly, he also bluntly commented that the Climate change the ‘greatest con job’. He claimed that all of these predictions made by the United Nations and many others, were wrong. According to Trump the primary effect of these brutal green energy policies has not been to help the environment but to redistribute manufacturing and industrial activity from developed countries that follow the insane rules that are put down to polluting countries that break the rules and are making a fortune. He ridiculed past climate disaster predictions and warnings and urged other nations to scrap green energy initiatives intended to reduce carbon output.

Trump also criticised UN for not being able to control conflict in Ukraine and Gaza. He accused UN growing momentum for a two-state solution at the United Nations is a “reward” for Hamas. He said many NATO states have recognizing Palestinian state and shown anger over Israel’s conduct in Gaza. According to Trump this is a barrier to prevail peace in Gaza. Similarly, Trump accused India, China and European countries to stop importing energy products from Russia. He believes that this is increasing the economic and military strength of Russia and causing war in Ukraine. Trump believes in “peace through strength” and warned adversaries against testing American resolve. Trump said that with time, patience, and the financial support of NATO, Ukraine can win back all the lost land.

Emphasizing his “America First” doctrine, Trump also touted U.S. economic achievements, border security measures, and military strength. He urged other nations to adopt similar policies, rejecting what he called “failed globalist approaches”. Trump said he ended seven wars, dealt with the leaders of many countries, and never even received a phone call from the United Nations offering to help in finalizing the peace deal. Trump offer the hand of American leadership and friendship to any nation in that assembly willing to join us in forging a safer, more prosperous world by rejecting the failed approaches of the past and working together to confront some of the greatest threats in history.

Policy prescriptions and practical implications

Beyond rhetoric, the speech pressed three consistent policy themes: sovereignty over multilateralism, prioritization of traditional energy and economic independence over green transitions, and a hardline stance on migration and border control. Each theme contains plausible arguments and clear domestic political mileage. But each also carries international costs.

Sovereignty over multilateralism signals a willingness to withdraw from or undercut institutions when they conflict with national aims. In practice, this may accelerate the trend of selective participation, where cooperation occurs only on transactional terms that favour immediate national benefit. That undermines long-term projects such as climate mitigation, pandemic preparedness, global financial stability that rely on trust and consistent engagement.

Emphasizing traditional energy and pushing back against climate orthodoxy recalibrates alliances formed around green transitions. Countries that have committed politically and economically to renewable pathways will view this as a bid to slow global momentum. The immediate beneficiaries of fossil-fuel suppliers and energy-intensive industries may welcome the short-term relief, but the strategic pivot reduces cooperative leverage on emissions and innovation.

Migration and border control are politically potent themes. Yet, using them as a principal organizing logic for international relations risks turning humanitarian and cross-border issues into security problems. When migration is framed primarily through security, responses become securitized: walls, expulsions, and bilateral pressure instead of collaborative labour agreements, regional development, and humane asylum processes.

Audience and political calculus

Understanding the speech requires reading the intended audiences. First, the domestic audience: Trump’s core supporters reward plain-speaking and perceived strength. By airing grievances on a global stage, he domesticates foreign policy in a way that reinforces his political identity. Second, potential challengers and rivals: public condemnation serves to delegitimize current trajectories in rival states and to invite dissidents and critics to speak out. Third, global elites and technocrats: for them, the speech is a test either to adapt to transactional diplomacy or to push back and reassert multilateral norms.

Trump’s UNGA intervention also appears calibrated to provoke reactions. Public rebukes force the hand of countries that might otherwise stay noncommittal. In that sense, the speech serves a strategic function: it compresses conversation, forcing states to take visible stances that reveal fault lines. But there is a cost to provoking in a forum designed for consensus-building. The UNGA is where countries with vast differences exchanging ideas and sometimes build incremental consensus. Turning the assembly into an arena for combative moral judgments risks diminishing its utility as a space for pragmatic cooperation.

The political calculus is clever because it depends on media dynamics: provocative statements that generate headlines, dominate news cycles, and shape public debate in ways technical diplomacy rarely does. That helps achieve short-term political objectives. However, it is less effective at securing sustained policy outcomes that rely on mutual trust and negotiation. Moreover, diplomatic provocation can produce asymmetric reactions. States with abundant soft power and resilient institutions can absorb public criticism and respond from stable platforms. Smaller states or those with fragile governance may be pushed into defensive postures, aligning more tightly with one camp or another.

Long-term consequences and strategic choices

Within the U.S., Trump’s supporters praised the speech as a bold assertion of American leadership, while critics warned it could isolate the country diplomatically. Officials from India and China condemned Trump’s remarks as “undiplomatic” and “inflammatory,” with some calling for formal censure. On the other hand, some European leaders echoed Trump’s concerns about UN inefficiency, others criticized his confrontational tone.

Trump, however, has gone further in eroding its stature, slashing the money the US spends on the institution and cutting funding for foreign humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations. He’s also withdrawn from the UN’s cultural, health and human rights arms. He acknowledged ending the war in Ukraine had been more difficult than he expected, saying his good relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin hadn’t translated into effective peace negotiations. Trump reaffirmed U.S. support for Israel amid ongoing tensions in Gaza and criticized Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

If the Trump approach becomes a durable style of U.S. engagement, international governance will likely bifurcate. This fragmentation could spur regionalism, where like-minded states consolidate deeper cooperation among themselves while bypassing global institutions. Alternatively, it could encourage other major powers to fill vacuums in leadership roles, reshaping influence networks in ways that do not necessarily align with U.S. preferences. Short-term negotiations will be transactional and public; long-term negotiations might require new agreement less dependent on consensus.

There is also reputational risk. Allies may question U.S. reliability; adversaries may test resolve. Both dynamics increase strategic uncertainty. For businesses, instability in diplomatic posture raises compliance and investment risks, influencing markets and supply chains. For humanitarian challenges, inconsistent U.S. engagement could leave global systems less capable of coordinated response.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s UNGA speech was an unapologetic projection of a political vision that prizes directness, national primacy, and transactional engagement. It accomplished what it likely set out to do: capture attention, consolidate domestic support, and force international actors to clarify their positions. What it did not do was make a strong case for how sustained global problems will be solved in concert. In a world of interdependence, rhetoric without reliable follow-through will not substitute for the slow work of diplomacy. If the goal is to reshape global governance, provocation must be paired with practical pathways to cooperation; otherwise, the speech risks becoming another loud moment that accelerates fragmentation rather than forging durable solutions.

Supporting America in conflict resolution can give one side of the war more power, disturbing the balance of power in that conflict. Trump’s ‘Peace through Strength’ strategy so far has not shown sustainable peace for long time. Supporting America can put the idea of multipolarity into jeopardy. By multipolar global order many countries like India, China, Russia and many others have made economic and political benefits. It has also helped to fight against Western sanctions. Submitting to America is reliable as proven with South-Koria conflict with North-Koria. Opposing this has the potential to change the global power dynamic.

By: Tushar Jain

For years, the United States has presented India as a natural partner in countering China. Washington has praised New Delhi as a like-minded democracy and a pillar of stability in the Indo-Pacific. But behind this cheerful diplomatic language, there is a quieter shift. The U.S. political establishment — especially under Donald Trump — is increasingly uneasy about India’s widening network of strategic partnerships.

To Washington, India’s “strategic autonomy” sometimes looks like India keeping its options open with America’s rivals. Cheaper Russian oil, mineral-focused cooperation with China, and participation in blocs like BRICS have triggered anxiety in U.S. circles that worry about losing leverage in future economic and security architecture.

Trump’s answer? Tariffs — his favourite foreign-policy hammer. By imposing up to 50% duties on Indian exports, Trump was not only playing the trade card; he was also signalling displeasure. The message was simple: If India deepens ties with Moscow and Beijing, there will be a cost.

This confrontation isn’t only about economics — it reflects a tug-of-war over who will shape global power in the decade ahead.

Minerals, Technology and the New Power Game

Critical minerals — copper, cobalt, nickel, manganese, rare earths — have quietly become the currency of global power. They sit inside the technologies that will drive the future: batteries, solar panels, defence electronics, AI chips, and advanced manufacturing.

Whoever controls access to these resources and their supply chains will shape the next strategic era. The U.S. has understood this, which explains Trump’s April 24, 2025 Executive Order fast-tracking American exploration of seabed minerals under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). Even without formally joining UNCLOS or the International Seabed Authority, Washington has decided it cannot afford delays while China and Russia move ahead.

Against this backdrop, India’s efforts to secure minerals — sometimes involving Chinese or Russian partners — complicate U.S. planning. If India rises as an independent technology and supply-chain actor, Washington’s dominance in strategic industries becomes harder to defend.

The Russia–China Factor and India’s Tightrope Walk

Russia’s war in Ukraine transformed Moscow and Beijing into near-strategic twins. China calls itself neutral, but evidence points to deep economic and dual-use support to Russia.

India, meanwhile, is trying to walk a tight line: condemning violence in principle, avoiding direct criticism of Moscow, and dramatically expanding oil imports from Russia. Discounted crude has shifted Russia from a minor supplier to almost 40% of India’s oil basket by 2024 — a change too big for Washington to ignore.

When Modi praised his 2023 meeting with Putin as “excellent,” U.S. policymakers took notice. In their view, large-scale Russian oil purchases blunt Western sanctions and indirectly assist Russia’s war effort.

In truth, India sees these purchases as simple statecraft — energy security first, geopolitics second. But in Washington, the optics landed differently.

Tariffs as Political Pressure

Trump’s response came swiftly. First a 25% tariff, then an escalation to 50%, applied widely across Indian exports. American officials argued they were penalising New Delhi for helping finance Russia through oil.

Economists, however, warned of messy outcomes:

• India’s growth could slip below 6%, against earlier estimates of 6.5%
• U.S. buyers faced higher costs and scrambled to source from places like Turkey and Thailand
• Supply-chain instability ironically rose inside the U.S. market

In short, the tariffs punished both sides. But for Trump, economics was secondary. The goal was to remind India of the value — and vulnerability — of access to the U.S. market.

New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy Isn’t Changing

India’s foreign policy rests on one simple idea: never become dependent on any single power.
So New Delhi juggles priorities — Russian defence ties, BRICS participation, engagement with China where necessary, strong security cooperation with the U.S., and a seat at the Quad.

To Washington, this sometimes feels inconvenient.
To India, it is common sense.

Tariffs may irritate Indian policymakers, but they won’t push India into abandoning multi-alignment — if anything, they strengthen New Delhi’s desire to stay independent.

A Smaller but Notable Concern: North Korea

India’s limited diplomatic contact with North Korea has also contributed to U.S. unease. The relationship is hardly central to Indian strategy, but in Washington’s narrative, every sign of independent Asian diplomacy reinforces the belief that India won’t fully integrate into America’s security umbrella.

Conclusion

Trump’s tariffs do not simply reflect a trade dispute — they reveal a deeper American anxiety. India’s rise as a resource-secure, energy-independent, and diplomatically autonomous power challenges old assumptions about U.S. primacy.

Washington wants India as a partner in containing China. But India wants room to manoeuvre — not a camp to join. And in this new world, access to oil, minerals, and technology supply chains matters more than applause from a superpower.

Tariffs might sting economically, but they won’t change New Delhi’s strategy. If anything, they highlight the very reason India refuses to rely on any single great power: in global politics, friendship is useful — but autonomy is security.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

In many fora that I am part of, an often-heard statement which one gets to discern whenever China’s rise is discussed, is that China is a communist nation or that China is an authoritarian country or that democracies progress slowly. These remarks became the pivot of penning this article to discuss that do democratic nations progress swiftly? Four nations have been studied in this article. China which is a single-party communist nation and Finland, Germany and Japan which have multi-party-political system.

China

In 1950, just a year after the Chinese Civil War had ended, the per capita GDP of China was just US$ 614 in current international dollars (adjusted for purchasing power parity). The same year USA had a per capita GDP of US$ 1974 and that of USSR the other superpower existing that time, had per capita GDP of US$ 1218.

However, China focussed on education as the literacy rate in China in 1949 was just between 20-40%. The communist party on taking over power, made education as one of its foremost priorities and through both formal schooling and literacy programmes was able to achieve school enrolment getting tripled, secondary school enrolment increasing by a factor of 8.5 and college enrolment quadrupling in the first sixteen years.

Though in the initial three decades of modern China, man-made disasters like The Great Leap Forward, The Great Famine and Cultural Revolution happened, but the focus of China from modern education never dithered. After the US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972 which subsequently led to the establishment of the diplomatic relations between USA and China on January 01, 1979, China slowly started became a manufacturing hub as USA realising the vast pool of skilled and educated labour available in China started outsourcing manufacturing to China.

In 2007, when China became the world’s third largest economy, the world realised that not only had China become the global manufacturing hub but was also now a reckonable military power. Sensing the trouble that China was soon to pose to USA militarily the US President Barack Obama announced the Pivot to Asia policy on December 21, 2011 in which bulk of the American troops stationed in the Middle East were moved to the Indo-Pacific region. China had arrived as a superpower when in 2014 it declared that it was ready to fight any nation in all the six domains of modern warfare – land, sea, air, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum and space.

In just 65 years, China had risen.

China has a one-party-political system which has the Chinese Communist Party in total control of governance and military.

Finland

Finland declared independence from Russia on December 06, 1917. Finland had been part of Sweden till 1809 and then it became part of Russia till it became independent in 1917. That year, Finland had a weak economy with poor living conditions and its agrarian economy with poor climatic conditions was not conducive for efficient grain growing. However, the nation underwent rapid industrialisation following the World War II by developing heavy industry and establishing a Nordic-style welfare state.

Crippled by World War II by loss of one-tenth of its territory and manufacturing facilities totally destroyed by the Nazis, Finland became part of the Western European trade-liberalisation movement by joining the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Bretton Woods agreement in 1948 and two years later in 1950 joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Subsequently, tariffs were eased and imports from market economies liberated from 1957. Investments climbed to rapid levels and GDP growth was 4.9% during the period 1950-73.

The agricultural policy introduced in 1950 which encompassed favourable loans and availability of agrarian resources soon led to over-production in several product groups and further to government-subsidized dumping on the international markets. Pension plans were introduced in 1962 and public health-care system was established in 1970.

Finland has a parliamentary republic system which has a President (head of state) and Prime Minister (head of government). Finland has a multi-party-political system with important political parties being the National Coalition Party, Finns Party, Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party.

By 1979, Finland was heavily modernised and was classified as a developed nation. In just 62 years, Finland had transformed.

Germany

After the defeat in World War II on May 08, 1945 and splitting in two nations, Germany found itself divided into West Germany and East Germany. The manufacturing industries had been totally destroyed by the Allied bombings which were carried out with great precision from late-1944 onwards as the Nazi Army under Adolf Hitler starting facing severe setbacks on one front after the other. Agriculture too was badly hit and the German economy collapsed in 1945 which is known as Stunde Null, a term in German languagemeaning “Zero Hour”.

Konrad Adenauer who became the first Chancellor of West Germany on September 15, 1949 and his Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard undertook rapid reconstruction and resurrection of the West German economy, which later came to be known as Wirtschaftswunder, the German term meaning “economic miracle”.

Starting with the Currency Reform which replaced the Reichsmark with the Deutsche Mark as the legal tender and cutting taxes sharply from 85% to 18% on moderate incomes, price controls were also abolished. As a result, food which was in severe shortage, started becoming available easily. Capital stock was rebuilt and economic output started increasing.

West Germany had to pay the victorious Allied nations US$ 2.4 billion per year, as the cost of the occupation as part of the war reparations. The last of the repayment was made in June 1971.

Notwithstanding, the huge amount involved in war reparations, West Germany concentrated on skilling its workers and soon these skilled workers were in great global demand, sending back the coveted foreign exchange to West Germany.

West Germany had a federal parliamentary democracy with the President (head of state) and the Chancellor (head of government). The constitution created a system with separate executive, legislative and judicial branches. West Germany had a multi-party-political system with the prominent political parties being the Christian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democratic Party and the Greens.

The present-day Germany too has the same political system as was prevalent in West Germany.

In 1989, West Germany became a developed nation and within a year on October 03, 1990 both West Germany and East Germany reunified.

Thus, in just a short span of 44 years, West Germany not only became a developed nation resurrecting itself from total destruction post-World War II but also this financial power reunified the nation in only 45 years after being divided.

Japan

After the defeat in World War II, all manufacturing industries in Japan were destroyed by the Allied forces and agriculture and all the scientific institutions were so devastated that Japan started facing famine. The Japanese government was in deep debt and coupled with hyperinflation, the Japanese were in dire straits.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan undaunted by the severe crisis facing the island nation, started economic reforms and the first such measure was the Inclined Production Mode which focussed on production of raw materials. To simulate growth, women were encouraged to work.

Between 1957 and 1973, Japan saw an annualised growth of around 10%. Hayato Ikeda, the Prime Minister of Japan from 1960-64, introduced the Income Doubling Plan which aimed to double the size of Japan’s economy in ten years.

In 1971, Japan became a developed nation. In just 26 years after total destruction in 1945 which included two nuclear attacks in Hiroshima and Nagasaki which scarred the Japanese psyche, Japan had resurrected itself in an economic miracle that came to be known as Kodo Keizai Seicho in Japan.

Japan has a parliamentary constitutional monarch political system wherein the Emperor is the symbolic head of state and the Prime Minister heads the government. Power is separated into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Japan has a multi-party-political system and the prominent political parties are the Liberal Democratic Party, Constitutional Democratic Party, Japan Innovation Party and the Democratic Party for the People.

Lessons learnt from the rise of successful democracies

The rise of the three nations having multi-party-political system democracies discussed above in the article clearly breaks the myth that multi-party-political system nations don’t become developed in a short time duration. It also breaks another myth that independent judiciary is an impediment in a nation’s progress as a developed nation.

For those who want to work, there are no excuses. For those who want to see their nation as a developed nation there are no excuses. Excuses only come into play only when personal interests matters more than a nation’s progress. To blame the dead is the easiest. To answer question’s about one’s performance is the toughest.

Correct policies and right intent propel a nation into the developed category. Blame-game and repeatedly playing-up the past doesn’t and neither does whining and crying whenever anything goes wrong. Accountability and responsibility should be of the highest order if a nation sees itself as a developed one in few decades.

Mao Zedong created blunders in the initial few decades of China after the civil war ended in 1949, be it in form of the Great Leap Forward, Great Famine or the Cultural Revolution. But he isn’t talked about in China for these actions.

Genghis Khan of Mongolia invaded China in 1205 and is regarded as one of the most barbaric invaders ever. But he isn’t remembered in China on a daily basis.

West Germany did not talk of the ills of Adolf Hitler nor did Japan blame its rulers for the devastation caused due to the entry in World War II.  And, neither did Finland keep on criticising Sweden and Russia, the nations that Finland was a part of till 1917.

Learn from the past but don’t repeatedly and regularly play-up the past. As for a person, a nation can only walk fast when looking forward and never backward.

A common lesson that emerges from the progress of China, Finland, Germany and Japan is that all these nations have kept religion away from politics. While in China, religion is a private affair within the four walls, in Finland, Germany and Japan religion has been kept totally away from politics and governance, though publicly one can be religious.

Swami Vivekananda, the famous Indian philosopher and religious teacher, had remarked “A country can never become developed if it’s youth are trapped in religion and caste”. Pakistan and Afghanistan can never become developed nations as both the nations are deeply mired with religion and feudal systems playing the pivotal role in Pakistani & Afghani politics and governance.

As a human can never have the ideal personal life for good professional growth, similarly no nation can ever have the ideal conditions to become developed. Those humans and nations that succeed do so despite having to encounter challenges.

A famous advertisement of yesteryears goes “The world steps aside, for the man who knows where he is walking”. Similarly, the world looks with awe and respect for the nation on the right track and pace to become a developed nation.

Rhetoric doesn’t have a long shelf life; realism does and creates permanency.

The famous Chinese proverb goes “The best time to plant a tree was twenty years ago. The second best time is now”, has a deep meaning for nations aspiring to be developed within a specific time frame.

By: Sanskriti Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

On the surface, the recent turmoil in Nepal may seem like another protest against a government action. However, it stems from a mix of frustration, changing demographics, geopolitics, and long-standing domestic problems. For its neighbour India, what occurs in Nepal affects India directly. Trade, security, identity, and diplomacy all connect. Let’s explore the story. We will look at why the unrest happened, who is responsible, how it ties to India, and what it could mean for both countries.

The Immediate Trigger: Social Media Ban & Youth Anger

 In September 2025, Nepal was hit by a massive wave of protests; because most of the protesters were fairly young people, they were quickly dubbed the Gen Z protests. The reason for the protest was the decision of the government to completely ban or seriously restrict such popular platforms among the population on social networks as Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, X, Reddit, and others. But why was this ban especially explosive? First, for many Nepalese young people, social networks are the way they establish connections, mobilize, express their indignation. Secondly, the ban immediately turned from the suppression of the rights of freedom of speech to a massive protest against corruption, nepotism, high youth unemployment, a feeling that the game is not by the rules. Third, this is a protest about a generation many guys felt that they were deprived of an opportunity as elite children play with some other rules as before.

 

Beyond the Ban: Years of Frustration Boiling Over

To understand why the unrest spread so rapidly, one must look beyond the immediate cause. The social-media ban was simply the match; the real fire had been smouldering for years beneath the surface.

Economic Discontent and Youth Unemployment

Inflation leaves Nepal’s dignified young people in an economic monastery: Jobs are hard to find or when you do find one, they pay so little money going home is out of the question. And no matter how hard you work for them there isn’t much chance of moving up the ladder because now career prospects are restricted too. Many families rely on the money their relatives send from India or the Gulf., It is an irony that quite in the negative sense: once they leave home, young Nepalis can live on but they cannot enjoy Contents of the Constitution. Standard Square’s will not be commensurate. Local people often say, “Just What Will It Be Like After Modernisation?” Any progress achieved will then ultimately reproduce itself in formlessness. Every roof in the village is fitted with a television aerial. All these “achievements.” But for a generation born after the breakup of a monarchy and educated dreams of democracy, capitalism, all this is nothing more than shattered sights.

Corruption and Political Nepotism

The same leading political figures and parties have dominated Nepal’s power structure for decades. Even despite periodic elections and frequent changes in government, there is a great sense among many Nepalese people that the system remains essentially corrupt. Political elites also have a nasty habit of lining their own pockets at the expense of their fellow countrymen. But the youthful activity of these power-holders in attempting to stifle online criticism was as much a confirmation for those who saw it as a reminder the power of Nepal is not responsible, but by inheritance.

A tenuous democracy ever since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, Nepal has been a republic. But the process has been messy and inconclusive. Frequent changes of government, struggles between parties for power, and slowness in implementing the constitution have made institutions weak. The mood of fresh beginnings is replaced by the feeling that nothing can change. The new generation, untainted by the past and yet living with its consequences, now wants to see an authentic alternative to hollow talk of reform.

The Streets Speak: How the Unrest Unfolded

What had started as only student protests suddenly became a national movement. Young men and women tens of thousands of them were carrying banners, shouting slogans and breaching curfews en masse. They were not led by a single party but brought together by common anger. The government response police brutality, tear gas, and mass raids merely widened the divide.

By early September, it was reckoned that across the country at least 19 people had died and hundreds injured. The world turned its attention towards Kathmandu. Local pressure forced the government to lift its ban on social media. Yet by then it was already too late. The call for political change had now unfolded into something much more long term–responsibility, employment, justice. The message was clear: this generation will not remain silent.

India and Nepal: A Relationship of Proximity and Paradox

And the roots. For the deeper meaning of Nepal’s troubles, we must also look southward: to India. India’s relationship with Nepal is one of the closest and most complex in the world. Shared between both the countries is a 1,750 mile long open border, joined cultures, generations of migration, trade and kinship combine in this easy-flowing river to form an inseparable whole. Yet their political relationship has been marked by periods of both friendship and argument. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner, as well as being the primary transit route for international commerce. All manner of goods, ranging from everyday consumer items to foodstuffs and medicines arrive in the country through Indian territory. This interdependent relationship means that when Nepal suffers any earthquake tremor it can be felt by the Indians immediately. At the same time, the closeness between them also brings about conflicts. Many Nepalis think that India has too much say over their country’s affairs, both political and economic, while Indian policy-makers often look at Nepal from the perspective of strategic security especially in terms of China.

The Economic Ripples Across the Border

The protests closed out trade links between the two countries when they closed down highways and cross-border trade posts. Indian border towns such as Raxaul, Gorakhpur and Sitamarhi all reported that as truckloads of goods were stranded in their confines, they had daily losses well over ₹10 crore. Small traders, transporters and labourers on both sides of the border had their means of livelihood disrupted by the turn of events. The turmoil also reminded both countries that their economic destinies are tied together. Economically, the unrest presented India–which has invested heavily in power plants, resources and infrastructure throughout Nepal–with both a financial and public relations problem. The question that faced Indian policymakers was just how to support stability in a way that wasn’t overbearing–a subtle balance that Delhi has struggled with for decades.

Security and Strategic Concerns

In the view of India’s security establishment, Nepal is a vital buffer state between itself and China. The open border while echoing the sweetness of friendship also opens vulnerabilities. During chaotic periods illegal trade, trafficking and extreme movements can all flourish. At the height of the protests, Indian agencies were put on alert, fearing that instability might spill over or be exploited by foreign actors.

Moreover, every episode of turmoil in Nepal sets in motion a geopolitical chess game. China, seeking to expand its influence in South Asia through investments and soft power, often presents itself to Kathmandu as an alternative partner. For India, which regards Nepal as part of its own natural sphere of eminence, the result is tension between the two countries. Therefore, the recent unrest was not simply about Nepal´s internal politics-it was purely of regional competition and realignment of alliances

The Emotional and Cultural Dimension

The India-Nepal relationship, however, is not just strategic. Millions of families on both sides of the border share language, religion, and blood. Hinduism and Buddhism flow into and out of the Himalayas from the fertile plains below. Countless Nepalis work and study in India; Indian tourists and pilgrims spend time at Nepal’s temples and go into the mountains. It is a relationship that is profoundly both deeply personal and political.

But friendship can also gradually give rise to discontent. In Nepal there are people who regard India as a big brother to China, compassionate but domineering. The memory of last year’s blockade which left Nepal suffering from severe shortages and saw many blame India is still fresh. This historical wound injects the suspicion that India is temporarily wrapping Nepal. Some of the protesters carried signs rejecting foreign interference at all in 2025. The nature of their appeal was sovereignty. Nepal should be allowed to depict itself through its own eyes, not those of others.

The Way Forward: Lessons for Both Nations

For Nepal, this turmoil is an uncomfortable but necessary experience. It discloses how pressing it is to fight corruption, create jobs and restore confidence in the institutions. Superficial changes will no longer satisfy a populace that is seeking something solid.

India, however, should regard Nepal as a sovereign partner in its own right, not simply as a sustainer of the Mother Tongue of Chinese Leadership. Real friendship lies in enabling others, not bending them to your will. In a manner that is consistent with its own policy stances and respects Nepalese freedom and choices, providing support for Nepal’s economy, education and communication could move a critical juncture into an epoch of mutual benefit.

The people should benefit both from this same mindfulness and this shared relationship. With an open frontier comes co-responsibility from environmental challenges some Italians may face in the Himalayas to fishing and migration. The disobedience obviously is a sign that stability in Nepal is no longer just a problem for Nepalis. It is a regional imperative.

Conclusion: From Unrest to Renewal

Nepal’s unrest in 2025 was not a case of isolated anger. It was the accumulation for many years of frustration from inequality, injustice, and denial of voice. It was a generational awakening in the nation seeking dignity and clear purpose.

The protests had shown that when the system fails to respond to people’s needs, one can even trigger a revolution in cyberspace.

For India, the turmoil next door is both a wake-up call and a reminder that true neighbourhood policy cannot base itself simply on pragmatism. South Asia’s stability depends upon empathy, understanding, and cooperation. As Nepal manoeuvres its uncertain future, India’s role will be examined: can it be a partner in moving forward rather than an emblem of pressure?

Ultimately, the story of Nepal’s unrest is more than politics. It is about a young democratic nation searching for its place in the modern world and a region struggling to forge relationships based not on power rivalry but mutual regard. If both Nepal and India can extract lessons from this crisis, the tragedy of unrest might yet be turned into a seed for regeneration not only for one country, but also the Himalaya, the heart of South Asian Asia.