By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

Climate change has emerged as one of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century, reshaping ecological systems, economic structures, and governance frameworks across the globe. Among the many consequences of climate change, the disruption of water systems has become particularly significant. Changing precipitation patterns, rising temperatures, glacial retreat, and extreme weather events are altering the availability and distribution of freshwater resources worldwide. For countries like India—where water sustains agriculture, industry, ecosystems, and the livelihoods of more than 1.4 billion people—these transformations pose profound challenges for sustainable development, environmental stability, and long-term national resilience.

India’s water landscape is already characterized by stark contrasts between abundance and scarcity. While certain regions experience devastating floods during the monsoon season, others struggle with prolonged droughts and severe groundwater depletion. Rapid urbanization, population growth, and expanding agricultural demands have intensified pressure on limited water resources. According to several environmental studies, India supports nearly 18 percent of the world’s population but possesses only around 4 percent of global freshwater resources. This imbalance has made water management an increasingly critical policy priority.

In recent years, policymakers, scholars, and environmental experts have emphasized that climate resilience in India must be built around effective water governance. Climate change amplifies existing vulnerabilities by intensifying hydrological variability and increasing the frequency of extreme weather events. Consequently, addressing water challenges requires an integrated approach that combines technological innovation, institutional reform, and community participation. As India seeks to maintain economic growth while confronting environmental uncertainties, placing water at the center of climate resilience strategies has become both a policy imperative and a developmental necessity.

Climate Change and the Intensification of India’s Water Crisis

Climate change has significantly altered India’s hydrological systems, creating new patterns of water stress and environmental vulnerability. Rising global temperatures have accelerated glacial melt in the Himalayas, which serve as the primary water source for several major rivers across South Asia. These glaciers feed river systems such as the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, both of which sustain hundreds of millions of people through agriculture, drinking water supply, and hydroelectric power generation. According to scientific assessments conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, rising temperatures are expected to accelerate glacier retreat and increase seasonal water variability across the Himalayan region. These changes could initially lead to increased river flows but may eventually reduce long-term water availability as glaciers shrink.

Recent climatic events highlight the growing severity of water-related challenges in India. In recent years, extreme flooding in states such as Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Assam has caused widespread damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and human settlements. At the same time, drought-prone regions such as Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Karnataka have faced recurring water shortages, affecting both rural communities and urban centers. The contrasting nature of these crises—floods in some regions and droughts in others—illustrates the complex impact of climate change on India’s water systems. Environmental analysts argue that the unpredictability of rainfall patterns is gradually replacing the traditional reliability of the monsoon cycle.

Groundwater depletion represents another major dimension of India’s water crisis. India is the world’s largest user of groundwater, accounting for nearly one-quarter of global groundwater extraction. In states such as Punjab and Haryana, intensive agricultural practices have led to unsustainable groundwater withdrawal. Reports from the Indian Parliament have indicated that large portions of Punjab have been classified as “dark zones,” where groundwater extraction exceeds recharge levels. This trend threatens long-term agricultural sustainability and highlights the urgent need for water-efficient farming practices and improved groundwater management policies.

Institutional Governance and Policy Responses

The governance of water resources in India involves a complex network of institutions operating at national, state, and local levels. Water is constitutionally designated as a state subject, which means that state governments hold primary responsibility for water management. However, issues such as river basin planning, climate adaptation, and interstate water disputes require coordination between multiple levels of government. This fragmented governance structure has often created policy gaps and implementation challenges, making it difficult to develop a comprehensive national strategy for water security.

Scholars and environmental experts have frequently highlighted the need for institutional reform in India’s water governance framework. Environmental policy expert Sunita Narain has argued that India’s water crisis is largely a crisis of governance rather than simply one of physical scarcity. According to her analysis, inefficient irrigation practices, inadequate urban water management, and insufficient wastewater treatment contribute significantly to water stress. Similarly, water policy scholar Ramaswamy Iyer emphasized the importance of integrated river basin management and participatory governance to ensure sustainable water use.

Recognizing these challenges, the Government of India has introduced several policy initiatives aimed at improving water governance and conservation. The creation of the Ministry of Jal Shakti in 2019 marked an important step toward integrating water resource management under a unified institutional framework. National programs such as the Jal Shakti Abhiyan and the Atal Bhujal Yojana have focused on water conservation, groundwater recharge, and community participation in water governance. These initiatives aim to improve long-term water sustainability by combining policy reforms with grassroots engagement. In addition, these programs encourage rainwater harvesting, watershed restoration, and sustainable agricultural practices in water-stressed districts. By strengthening coordination between central and state governments and promoting local participation, such initiatives seek to build a more resilient and adaptive water management framework capable of responding to the growing pressures of climate change and population growth.

Community-Based Adaptation and Local Water Resilience

While large-scale infrastructure projects and national policies remain important, community-based initiatives have proven equally vital in strengthening water resilience. Historically, Indian communities developed sophisticated water conservation systems tailored to local ecological conditions. Structures such as stepwells, tanks, johads, and traditional rainwater harvesting systems were designed to capture seasonal rainfall and store water for dry periods. These systems demonstrate how indigenous knowledge and local environmental practices can contribute to sustainable water management. Scholars studying traditional ecological systems have often highlighted that decentralized water management practices historically allowed communities to adapt to climatic variability without overexploiting natural resources. Water governance expert Elinor Ostrom argued that local communities are often capable of managing common resources effectively when supported by appropriate institutional arrangements. Her work on common-pool resource management provides an important theoretical framework for understanding how participatory water governance can enhance sustainability.

In recent decades, several grassroots initiatives have revived these traditional systems with remarkable success. One of the most prominent examples is the river restoration movement in Rajasthan led by environmental activist Rajendra Singh. Through community-led watershed restoration projects, local residents in the Alwar district successfully revived several dried rivers and improved groundwater recharge. Similar initiatives in Maharashtra and Telangana have promoted watershed management, soil conservation, and rainwater harvesting to address recurring drought conditions. Environmental historian Ramachandra Guha has observed that many successful environmental movements in India emerged from local communities defending their ecological resources. According to Guha, community stewardship over natural resources often leads to more sustainable outcomes than purely centralized administrative control.

Government programs have also recognized the importance of community participation in water management. The Jal Jeevan Mission, launched in 2019, aims to provide piped drinking water to every rural household in India. The program has significantly expanded access to safe drinking water, reaching more than 15 crore rural households. An important aspect of this initiative is its emphasis on local participation—millions of villagers, particularly women, have been trained to monitor water quality and maintain local water infrastructure. Development economist Jean Drèze has emphasized that participatory development programs are more effective when communities play a central role in implementation and monitoring. Such participatory governance strengthens accountability, enhances transparency, and improves long-term sustainability. These examples demonstrate that integrating community engagement with policy support can significantly enhance both water sustainability and climate resilience in India.

Technological Innovation and Future Pathways for Water Security

Technological innovation is increasingly playing a crucial role in addressing India’s water challenges. Advances in satellite monitoring, remote sensing, and climate modelling have improved the ability of policymakers to track water availability and predict environmental risks. These technologies allow scientists and government agencies to monitor groundwater levels, assess watershed conditions, and evaluate the impact of climate change on water resources. Data-driven decision-making has therefore become an important component of modern water governance. Scholars such as Mihir Shah argue that technology can significantly improve water governance by enabling real-time monitoring of aquifers, irrigation patterns, and rainfall variability. However, Shah emphasizes that technological systems must operate within participatory governance frameworks to ensure that local communities remain active stakeholders in water management.

Urban water management represents another critical area of innovation. Rapid urbanization has placed immense pressure on water infrastructure in cities such as Chennai, Bengaluru, and Delhi. The 2019 water crisis in Chennai, where several reservoirs ran dry and millions of residents faced severe water shortages, highlighted the vulnerabilities of urban water systems. In response, many cities have begun adopting sustainable water management strategies, including rainwater harvesting, wastewater recycling, and decentralized water treatment systems. Environmental policy expert Sunita Narain has argued that Indian cities must transition from “supply-based” water systems to circular water economies where wastewater is treated and reused. Such approaches, she suggests, are essential for ensuring long-term urban water sustainability in the face of climate change.

Future water security in India will depend on the successful integration of technological innovation with policy reforms and ecological sustainability. Emerging technologies such as smart irrigation systems, desalination plants, and digital water monitoring platforms have the potential to improve efficiency and reduce waste. At the same time, scholars emphasize that technological solutions alone cannot resolve the country’s water crisis. Water policy expert Ramaswamy Iyer highlighted that sustainable water management requires combining technological advancement with institutional reform, river basin planning, and environmental protection. Similarly, climate scientists associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stress that climate-resilient water systems must integrate scientific knowledge with governance reforms and ecosystem conservation. Sustainable water management ultimately requires a balanced approach that integrates technological progress with ecological conservation and social equity.

Conclusion

Water has become the central axis around which India’s climate resilience and sustainable development strategies must revolve. The intensifying effects of climate change—from erratic monsoon patterns and glacial retreat to droughts and floods—have revealed the fragility of existing water systems. These environmental transformations are not merely ecological concerns; they have far-reaching implications for agriculture, urban development, energy production, and public health. As India continues to grow economically and demographically, the demand for water will only increase, making effective water governance a critical national priority.

Over the past decade, India has taken important steps toward addressing its water challenges. Policy initiatives such as the Jal Jeevan Mission, Atal Bhujal Yojana, and Jal Shakti Abhiyan demonstrate the government’s commitment to improving water access and promoting conservation. At the same time, community-led initiatives across the country have shown how local participation and traditional knowledge systems can complement national policies. These efforts highlight the importance of combining technological innovation with grassroots engagement to achieve sustainable water management.

Yet significant challenges remain. Groundwater depletion, urban water stress, and climate-driven hydrological changes continue to threaten long-term water security. Addressing these issues will require stronger institutional coordination, improved regulatory frameworks, and greater investment in water infrastructure and research. Equally important is the need to promote water-efficient agricultural practices, strengthen watershed management, and expand wastewater recycling systems in urban areas.

Ultimately, building climate resilience in India will depend on the country’s ability to adopt a holistic and forward-looking approach to water governance. Water must be recognized not only as a natural resource but also as a strategic asset that underpins economic stability, environmental sustainability, and social well-being. By placing water at the core of its climate adaptation strategies, India can transform a looming crisis into an opportunity for innovation, cooperation, and sustainable development. In an era defined by climate uncertainty, the effective management of water resources will determine the resilience of India’s ecosystems, the prosperity of its communities, and the sustainability of its developmental future.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By : Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The recent escalation of hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan marks one of the most dangerous phases in their troubled relationship since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021. What began as periodic cross-border skirmishes along the disputed frontier has rapidly intensified into direct military confrontation involving airstrikes, drone attacks, and large-scale ground engagements. Pakistan has openly described the situation as an “open war,” while the Afghan Taliban government has vowed retaliation against what it calls unprovoked aggression. Although both sides claim significant battlefield successes, the real significance of the current crisis lies not in the casualty figures but in the strategic shift from indirect proxy competition to overt state-to-state confrontation. The central question facing regional observers and policymakers is whether this escalation could evolve into a full-scale war between the two neighbors or whether structural constraints will ultimately push both sides toward de-escalation. 

The immediate trigger for the latest confrontation was a series of attacks along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border in late February 2026. Taliban forces launched operations against Pakistani military posts across multiple frontier districts, including Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika. Islamabad quickly retaliated with extensive airstrikes targeting what it described as militant installations and Taliban military infrastructure. In a dramatic escalation, Pakistani aircraft struck locations in major Afghan cities such as Kabul and Kandahar targets that had rarely been attacked directly in previous episodes of violence. Afghanistan responded with drone strikes and cross-border artillery attacks against Pakistani positions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marking an unprecedented level of military engagement between the two states. Each side has accused the other of initiating the conflict, and casualty figures released by both governments differ significantly, making independent verification difficult. Nonetheless, the scale of military activity suggests that the confrontation has moved beyond routine border skirmishes into a broader strategic contest. 

At the heart of the conflict lies Pakistan’s longstanding accusation that Afghanistan’s Taliban government provides sanctuary to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group responsible for numerous attacks inside Pakistan. Islamabad regards the TTP as one of its most dangerous security threats and has repeatedly demanded that Kabul dismantle the organization’s bases on Afghan soil. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, TTP attacks inside Pakistan have increased dramatically, targeting military installations, police facilities, and civilian infrastructure. Pakistani officials argue that these attacks would be impossible without safe havens across the border. The Afghan Taliban leadership, however, denies these allegations and insists that Afghanistan will not allow its territory to be used against any country. Yet analysts note that the ideological and historical ties between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP complicate Kabul’s willingness or ability to take decisive action against the group. Many TTP fighters fought alongside Taliban forces during the insurgency against NATO and Afghan government forces, creating a network of personal and ideological connections that persists today. 

The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP reflects a deeper paradox in Pakistan’s regional strategy. For decades, Islamabad cultivated militant groups as instruments of influence in Afghanistan, seeking to secure what it called “strategic depth” against India. During the 1990s civil war, Pakistan strongly supported the Taliban movement as it emerged from religious seminaries in southern Afghanistan. After the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistani intelligence agencies were widely accused of providing covert assistance and sanctuary to Taliban fighters while officially supporting the American-led war on terrorism. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, many in Islamabad initially believed the development would produce a friendly government in Kabul that would address Pakistan’s security concerns. Instead, the opposite occurred. Rather than suppressing the TTP, the Taliban government has adopted an ambiguous approach toward the group, occasionally mediating negotiations between Islamabad and TTP leaders but largely refraining from direct confrontation. This shift has left Pakistan feeling betrayed by a movement it once helped nurture. 

Beyond militant sanctuaries, the Pakistan–Afghanistan dispute is rooted in deeper historical and territorial tensions. The central point of contention is the Durand Line, a 2,600-kilometer boundary drawn in 1893 by British colonial authorities to separate British India from Afghanistan. Successive Afghan governments have refused to formally recognize the Durand Line as an international border, arguing that it artificially divides the Pashtun ethnic community that inhabits both sides of the frontier. Pakistan, however, considers the line to be a legitimate and internationally recognized boundary. The dispute has periodically sparked tensions since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, and Afghanistan was notably the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. The Taliban government has not formally recognized the border either, and clashes frequently occur when Pakistan attempts to build fencing or fortifications along the frontier. Thus, the Durand Line remains not merely a geographical boundary but a symbol of unresolved historical grievances and competing national narratives. 

Domestic political dynamics in Pakistan further complicate the crisis. Pakistan’s powerful military establishment plays a dominant role in shaping the country’s foreign and security policies, particularly regardingAfghanistan. In recent years, the military has faced growing criticism over its political influence and the imprisonment of former prime minister Imran Khan. External conflicts often strengthen the military’s position by reinforcing the perception that Pakistan faces existential security threats. Escalation along the Afghan border therefore provides the military with a justification for maintaining its central role in governance and national security. At the same time, Pakistan’s border province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, governed by Khan’s political allies, lies directly on the frontline of the conflict, creating potential tensions between provincial and federal authorities over security management and diplomacy with Kabul. 

Economic and humanitarian factors also shape the conflict’s trajectory. Afghanistan is heavily dependent on Pakistan for trade and transit routes, as it lacks direct access to the sea. Pakistani ports, particularly Karachi and Gwadar, serve as key gateways for Afghan imports and exports. When tensions escalate, Pakistan often restricts border crossings and trade routes, placing enormous economic pressure on Afghanistan’s already fragile economy. Conversely, instability along the border disrupts economic activity in Pakistan’s frontier regions and threatens large-scale infrastructure projects linked to regional connectivity initiatives. Among the most significant of these is the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Persistent insecurity near the Afghan border raises concerns about the safety of Chinese investments and personnel, potentially drawing Beijing into diplomatic efforts to stabilize the situation. 

The regional geopolitical environment further complicates the conflict. Several major powers maintain strategic interests in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, though none appear eager to become directly involved in the fighting. China maintains close economic and military ties with Pakistan and has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects across the country. At the same time, Beijing has engaged with the Taliban government in Kabul, seeking to ensure stability in Afghanistan and prevent extremist groups from threatening China’s western region of Xinjiang. Russia has also expanded its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban in recent years and has sought closer security cooperation with Pakistan as part of its broader strategy to counter Western influence in Eurasia. India, meanwhile, has cautiously reopened diplomatic channels with the Taliban after years of hostility, prompting Pakistan to accuse Kabul of drifting toward New Delhi’s sphere of influence. Although India has not formally recognized the Taliban government, its gradual outreach has intensified Pakistani fears of strategic encirclement. 

For India, the Pakistan–Afghanistan confrontation presents both opportunities and risks. On one hand, escalating tensions along Pakistan’s western frontier could divert Islamabad’s military attention away from its eastern border with India, potentially easing immediate pressure in the long-running rivalry between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. On the other hand, prolonged instability in Afghanistan could create security risks for India’s regional economic and connectivity projects, including its investments in Iran’s Chabahar port and its broader strategy of linking South Asia with Central Asia. Furthermore, militant groups operating in Afghanistan could potentially threaten Indian diplomatic missions or development projects if the security situation deteriorates further. As a result, India has adopted a cautious diplomatic stance, criticized Pakistani airstrikes while avoidedovert involvement in the conflict. 

Another critical dimension of the crisis involves refugee flows and humanitarian pressures. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades, many of whom fled during successive waves of conflict in Afghanistan. In recent years, however, Pakistan has launched large-scale deportation campaigns aimed at repatriating undocumented Afghan migrants. These policies have strained relations between the two countries and increased humanitarian challenges inside Afghanistan, which is already facing severe economic hardship and food insecurity. Renewed fighting along the border could trigger additional waves of displacement, further burdening Afghanistan’s fragile institutions and increasing regional migration pressures toward Iran, Turkey, and eventually Europe. 

Despite the alarming escalation, several structural factors make a full-scale conventional war between Pakistan and Afghanistan unlikely. Pakistan possesses a far more advanced military, including a modern air force, heavy artillery, and nuclear weapons. Afghanistan’s Taliban government, by contrast, commands a force primarily designed for guerrilla warfare rather than conventional interstate conflict. The Taliban’s military strength lies in asymmetric tactics, including insurgent operations, improvised explosive devices, and cross-border raids. While these tactics can inflict significant damage on Pakistani forces, they are unlikely to enable Afghanistan to sustain a prolonged conventional war. Pakistan, meanwhile, must carefully balance its military commitments across multiple fronts, including ongoing tensions with India and internal security challenges from militant and separatist groups. 

Nevertheless, the possibility of prolonged low-intensity conflict remains high. Pakistan may continue to conduct targeted airstrikes against suspected militant bases in Afghanistan, while Taliban fighters and allied groups could launch retaliatory attacks along the border. This pattern of cyclical violence airstrikes followed by insurgent retaliation has characterized previous episodes of tension between the two countries. The current escalation differs primarily in scale and rhetoric, particularly Pakistan’s declaration of “open war,” which suggests a willingness to expand military operations if Islamabad believes its security is under severe threat. 

Diplomatic mediation may ultimately provide the most viable path toward de-escalation. In previous crises, countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have played important roles in facilitating negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban government. China could also emerge as a key mediator due to its close ties with Pakistan and its growing diplomatic engagement with Kabul. However, the broader geopolitical environment, including conflicts in the Middle East and shifting global power dynamics, may limit the willingness or ability of external actors to intervene effectively. The United States, which once played a central role in Afghan affairs, appears reluctant to reengage deeply following its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. 

Eventually, the Pakistan–Afghanistan confrontation reflects deeper structural tensions that cannot be resolved through short-term military actions alone. The Durand Line dispute, militant sanctuaries, refugee pressures, and competing regional alliances all contribute to a volatile security environment along the frontier. Without sustained political dialogue and confidence-building measures, the region is likely to experience repeated cycles of escalation and fragile ceasefires. For Pakistan, addressing militant networks within and beyond its borders remains essential for long-term stability. For the Taliban government, demonstrating that Afghan territory will not serve as a base for attacks against neighboring countries is equally critical for gaining international legitimacy. 

Therefore, while the current escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan represents one of the most serious crises in their modern history, a full-scale conventional war remains unlikely due to significant military asymmetries and mutual strategic constraints. However, the risk of sustained low-intensity conflict and cross-border violence remains substantial. Unless both sides address the underlying drivers of hostility, particularly militant safe havens and the unresolved status of the Durand Line, the frontier will continue to serve as a flashpoint for instability in South Asia. The challenge for regional and international actors is therefore not merely to prevent immediate escalation but to encourage a broader political settlement capable of transforming one of the world’s most volatile borders into a more stable and cooperative space. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026 marks a significant turning point in the evolution of modern warfare. While missiles, drones, and airpower remain the most visible instruments of military conflict, the deeper transformation lies in the integration of artificial intelligence into nearly every stage of military operations. From intelligence collection and data analysis to target identification, logisticscoordination, and post-strike assessment, AI has begun to reshape the pace, scale, and nature of warfare. The American and Israeli campaign against Iran illustrates how algorithmic systems are increasingly embedded in military decision-making processes, compressing the time required to plan and execute complex operations while generating both strategic advantages and serious ethical concerns. 

The escalation of the conflict began on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched a coordinated campaign of air and cyber strikes against Iranian military infrastructure. Fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, and naval platforms targeted missile launch sites, command centres, radar installations, and air defence networks across Iran. Within the first twenty-four hours of the campaign, reports indicated that approximately 1,000 targets had been struck. Such a scale of coordinated attacks would traditionally require weeks of intelligence preparation and operational planning. However, the speed with which these operations unfolded reflected the growing influence of artificial intelligence systems that enabled military planners to process vast volumes of intelligence data and prioritise targets at unprecedented speed. 

One of the central technological tools supporting the campaign was the Pentagon’s Maven Smart System, an intelligence analysis platform designed to process large datasets derived from surveillance and reconnaissance sources. Originally developed to analyse drone imagery, the Maven system integrates satellite images, signals intelligence, intercepted communications, and battlefield reports into a unified analytical framework. Artificial intelligence algorithms within the system help identify patterns and anomalies across these datasets, allowing analysts to detect potential military targets far more rapidly than traditional intelligence workflows would permit. In practical terms, the system assists military planners in narrowing vast streams of raw data into prioritised lists of targets that commanders can evaluate before authorising strikes. 

The impact of such technologies on military operations is often described as “decision-cycle compression.” Modern battlefields generate enormous volumes of information from satellites, drones, radar networks, cyber surveillance systems, and communications intercepts. In earlier conflicts, intelligence teams required large numbers of analysts to manually process this information, a time-consuming process that slowed operational planning. Artificial intelligence now allows this information to be analysed almost instantly. For example, during the opening phase of the 2026 campaign against Iran, AI-assisted systems reportedly helped military planners identify and prioritise hundreds of potential targets within hours, enabling the rapid coordination of simultaneous strike operations across multiple regions of the country. 

Artificial intelligence also played a critical role in intelligence collection and interpretation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Israeli intelligence agencies had spent years monitoring Iranian communications networks, intercepting signals intelligence, and analysing digital data streams associated with Iran’s military and political leadership. Increasingly, AI tools were used to sift through these vast volumes of intercepted data. Algorithms capable of speech recognition and pattern analysis helped identify key individuals, detect unusual communication patterns, and track movements across digital networks. These systems enabled intelligence agencies to monitor Iranian officials more efficiently and identify potential targets within Iran’s command structure. 

In addition to communications analysis, AI systems also assisted in processing surveillance imagery from satellites and drones. Modern military reconnaissance platforms capture massive quantities of high-resolution images covering wide geographic areas. Artificial intelligence algorithms can rapidly scan these images and identify objects that match predefined characteristics, such as missile launchers, military vehicles, radar installations, or weapons storage facilities. By automatically flagging potential targets within these images, AI dramatically reduces the time required analysts to identify military infrastructure and assess its operational significance. 

The integration of large language models into military intelligence systems further accelerated analytical processes. Systems such as Anthropic’s Claude were reportedly integrated with the Maven platform to assistanalysts in organising information and summarising intelligence reports. Large language models are particularly effective at synthesising large volumes of textual information, translating intercepted communications, and generating concise analytical summaries. By automating aspects of information processing, these systems enable intelligence teams to focus more directly on strategic interpretation and operational planning. 

Despite the sophistication of these technologies, AI systems do not operate autonomously in combat operations. Military officials emphasise that artificial intelligence functions primarily as a decision-support tool rather than an independent weapons system. Commanders remain responsible for evaluating target recommendations and authorising strikes. However, the role of AI in generating and prioritising target lists has significantly accelerated the pace at which military decisions are made. In earlier conflicts, identifying a target might require days of intelligence verification. In the current environment, algorithmic systems can generate target suggestions within seconds. 

The growing reliance on artificial intelligence has also transformed the logistical aspects of warfare. AI-enabled planning systems help military commanders allocate resources such as aircraft, missiles, drones, and surveillance assets. By analysing factors such as geographic proximity, weapon effectiveness, and operational risk, these systems recommend which units and weapons are best suited for specific missions. In some respects, the process resembles algorithmic matching systems used in commercial applications, where software rapidly pairs resources with tasks based on multiple variables. For military planners managing large-scale operations, such capabilities significantly improve operational efficiency. 

Artificial intelligence also supports post-strike assessments, another critical component of modern warfare. After a strike operation, reconnaissance of drones and satellites collects imagery to evaluate the damage inflicted on targeted facilities. AI algorithms can compare before-and-after images to identify structural damage, detect destroyed equipment, and estimate whether targets have been successfully neutralised. These automated assessments allow commanders to quickly determine whether additional strikes are necessary or whether operations can move on to other objectives. 

However, the increasing role of AI in warfare has also generated significant controversy and ethical debate. One of the primary concerns relates to the accuracy and reliability of algorithmic systems used in target identification. While AI systems can process enormous amounts of data, they are not infallible. In testing conducted by the United States military, object recognition algorithms used in intelligence analysis reportedly achieved accuracy rates significantly lower than those of experienced human analysts. Mistakes such as misidentifying civilian vehicles as military equipment can have devastating consequences when translated into targeting decisions. 

Another concern involves the phenomenon known as “automation bias,” where human operators place excessive trust in machine-generated recommendations. When algorithmic systems produce target lists or intelligence assessments, there is a risk that analysts may accept these outputs without sufficiently questioning their validity. Over time, reliance on AI systems may also lead to what researchers describe as “cognitive offloading,” where human analysts become less capable of independently evaluating information because they rely heavily on automated tools. 

These risks are particularly significant in high-pressure wartime environments where decisions must be made quickly. When artificial intelligence reduces complex analytical processes to rapid algorithmic outputs, commanders may face pressure to act on machine-generated recommendations without extensive deliberation. Critics argue that the accelerating pace of algorithmic warfare may increase the likelihood of errors and unintended civilian casualties. 

Civilian casualties have indeed become a central issue in the conflict. Reports indicate that the American and Israeli bombing campaign has caused extensive damage to infrastructure across Iran, including schools, markets, energy facilities, and healthcare centres. Investigations into several strikes have raised questions about whether AI-generated targeting data contributed to errors in identifying military objectives. Although military officials maintain that human oversight remains in place for all strike decisions, the role of AI in shaping the targeting process has drawn intense scrutiny from human rights organisations and legal experts. 

The strategic implications of AI-enabled warfare extend beyond individual strikes. Artificial intelligence allows militaries to operate at a tempo that would be impossible using traditional intelligence processes. By compressing decision cycles, AI systems enable rapid escalation of military operations. In the case of the American and Israeli campaign against Iran, the ability to identify and strike hundreds of targets within a single day demonstrated how algorithmic systems can dramatically intensify the pace of warfare. 

Iran’s response to the campaign also reflects the growing influence of artificial intelligence in military strategy. Iranian forces launched missile and drone attacks against Israeli territory and American military installations across the Middle East. Some analysts believe that Iranian targeting decisions were also supported by algorithmic systems designed to identify strategic vulnerabilities in the regional infrastructure supporting American and Israeli operations. Notably, Iranian strikes targeted radar installations and data centres associated with surveillance networks and AI-driven command systems, suggesting an awareness of the technological infrastructure underpinning modern warfare. 

The conflict has also expanded into the cyber domain, where artificial intelligence plays an increasingly important role. Cyber operations accompanying the military campaign targeted communications networks, logisticssystems, and surveillance infrastructure. AI-assisted cyber defence systems help detect anomalies in network activity, identify potential intrusions, and respond to digital threats more rapidly than traditional methods. As cyber warfare becomes more integrated with conventional military operations, artificial intelligence is likely to play a central role in defending digital infrastructure and coordinating cyber responses. 

Another emerging dimension of AI-enabled warfare involves attacks on digital infrastructure. Data centres that support cloud computing services and AI workloads have become strategically significant targets because they store and process the data necessary for intelligence analysis and military planning. During the conflict, strikes on data centres in the Gulf region disrupted digital services and highlighted the vulnerability of the technological infrastructure supporting modern military operations. These attacks demonstrate that future conflicts may increasingly focus on digital systems that underpin information processing rather than physical military installations. 

The integration of artificial intelligence into warfare also reflects broader technological competition among major powers. AI systems developed by companies such as Anthropic, OpenAI, and other technology firms are increasingly embedded in national security infrastructure. Governments are evaluating which models perform best in intelligence analysis, translation, cybersecurity monitoring, and data processing. The involvement of private technology companies in military operations raises complex questions about the relationship between the technology sector and national security institutions. 

At the same time, artificial intelligence remains dependent on human expertise and organisational capacity. Military AI systems require extensive infrastructure, including surveillance networks, data storage facilities, and highly trained personnel capable of managing and interpreting algorithmic outputs. Without these supporting structures, even the most advanced algorithms cannot function effectively. The American and Israeli campaign against Iran demonstrates how decades of investment in intelligence systems, data infrastructure, and military technology have enabled the integration of AI into operational planning. 

Ultimately, the use of artificial intelligence in the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran illustrates the beginning of a new phase in the evolution of warfare. AI does not replace human decision-makers, but it fundamentally changes the speed and scale at which military operations can be conducted. Intelligence analysis that once required thousands of analysts can now be performed by small teams supported by algorithmic tools. Target identification that once took days can now occur within minutes. These changes have the potential to reshape strategic planning, operational coordination, and the nature of military conflict itself. 

The broader significance of the conflict lies in the demonstration that control over data, algorithms, and digital infrastructure is becoming as important as control over territory or conventional military forces. In an era where artificial intelligence shapes intelligence gathering, targeting decisions, and operational planning, technological superiority may increasingly determine the outcome of conflicts. The American and Israeli attack on Iran therefore represents not only a geopolitical confrontation but also a preview of how artificial intelligence will influence the conduct of war in the twenty-first century. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN

Introduction

West Asia remains one of the most geopolitically volatile regions in the world, yet it continues to occupy a central position in India’s foreign policy priorities. The region is crucial for India’s energy security, trade connectivity, and diaspora welfare, while also serving as a strategic theatre where global and regional powers compete for influence. Over the past decade, India has significantly expanded its engagement with countries across the region through defence cooperation, economic partnerships, and emerging connectivity initiatives. However, the intensifying geopolitical rivalries involving Israel, Iran, the Gulf states, and external powers such as the United States have created a complex diplomatic landscape. For India, navigating these competing interests requires a careful balance between strategic autonomy and pragmatic engagement. As regional conflicts and geopolitical alignments continue to evolve, India’s approach toward West Asia reflects not only its national interests but also its broader vision of shaping a stable and cooperative regional order.

 West Asia in India’s Strategic Calculus

West Asia occupies a central place in India’s foreign policy due to its strategic, economic, and geopolitical significance. The region is vital for India’s energy security as a substantial portion of its crude oil and natural gas imports originate from Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq. In addition to energy, West Asia hosts one of the largest Indian diasporas in the world, with millions of Indian workers contributing significantly to India’s economy through remittances. These remittances constitute an important source of foreign exchange and support livelihoods across several Indian states. Furthermore, maritime routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz remain critical for India’s trade and energy transportation, making stability in the region an essential element of India’s national security.

Beyond economic interests, West Asia has also emerged as a significant arena for India’s expanding geopolitical engagement. Over the past decade, India has strengthened diplomatic and economic partnerships with multiple countries in the region while maintaining a policy of balanced engagement. India’s participation in emerging multilateral groupings and strategic partnerships reflects its growing ambition to play a larger role in shaping regional economic and security frameworks. However, ongoing conflicts and geopolitical rivalries in the region—particularly those involving Israel, Iran, and the United States—have created a complex environment that requires careful diplomatic navigation. As global power competition intensifies, India’s engagement with West Asia increasingly reflects the broader challenge of balancing national interests with evolving geopolitical realities.

Diplomacy of Balance: Navigating Rival Regional Powers

India’s West Asia policy has traditionally been guided by a principle of strategic balance, allowing it to maintain constructive relationships with multiple actors that often have conflicting interests. One of the most notable examples of this approach is India’s simultaneous engagement with Israel and Iran. India has developed strong defence and technological partnerships with Israel, making it one of its key security partners. Cooperation in areas such as defence technology, agriculture, cybersecurity, and intelligence sharing has grown steadily over the years. At the same time, India has preserved historically significant ties with Iran, driven by civilizational connections, energy cooperation, and strategic connectivity projects such as the Chabahar Port, which provides India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

This balancing strategy has also extended to India’s deepening partnerships with Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Economic cooperation with these countries has expanded significantly, with bilateral trade, investment, and infrastructure partnerships growing rapidly. Recent economic agreements and strategic partnerships illustrate India’s intention to build long-term economic and technological collaboration with Gulf states. However, increasing geopolitical polarization in the region poses challenges for India’s diplomatic balancing. As rivalries intensify between Iran and Israel or between the United States and Iran, maintaining equidistance becomes more difficult, forcing India to carefully calibrate its diplomatic responses to regional crises. In such a complex environment, India must continue to pursue a pragmatic diplomatic approach that safeguards its economic interests while avoiding entanglement in regional conflicts and preserving its long-standing principle of strategic autonomy.

Connectivity and Geoeconomics: The Promise of New Trade Corridors

In recent years, economic connectivity has become a central pillar of India’s West Asia strategy. One of the most ambitious initiatives in this regard is the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which aims to connect India to Europe through a network of railways, ports, energy pipelines, and digital infrastructure across West Asia. The proposed corridor has the potential to significantly reduce transportation time between India and Europe while strengthening trade integration among participating countries. By linking South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe through a modern connectivity network, the project reflects a broader shift toward geoeconomic cooperation in international relations.

Beyond trade facilitation, IMEC also carries important strategic implications. Many analysts view the initiative as part of a broader effort to diversify global supply chains and offer alternatives to existing infrastructure networks dominated by other major powers. For India, the corridor could strengthen its position as a major hub in global trade networks while deepening economic partnerships with Gulf and European economies. However, the success of such large-scale connectivity projects depends heavily on regional stability and sustained political cooperation among participating countries. Ongoing geopolitical tensions in West Asia therefore pose potential challenges to the implementation of such initiatives, particularly in terms of investment security, infrastructure coordination, and long-term political commitment among partner states.

Emerging Security Challenges in West Asia

The security environment in West Asia has become increasingly complex due to persistent conflicts, shifting alliances, and the growing involvement of external powers. Regional rivalries—particularly those involving Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and various non-state actors—continue to generate instability that affects global security and economic networks. For India, these tensions carry direct implications for maritime security, energy supply routes, and the safety of its diaspora. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of India’s oil imports transit, remains one of the most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints in the world. Any escalation of military confrontation in the region could disrupt shipping routes, trigger volatility in global energy markets, and significantly increase India’s import costs. Consequently, developments in West Asia are closely monitored in New Delhi as part of its broader national security planning.

Recent geopolitical developments highlight the persistence of these challenges. Periodic confrontations between Israel and Iranian-backed groups, the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, and sporadic missile and drone attacks in the Gulf region underscore the fragile nature of regional stability. These security dynamics not only affect regional actors but also create broader economic repercussions for countries that rely on West Asian energy resources and trade routes. For India, the challenge lies in protecting its strategic interests while avoiding direct involvement in regional conflicts. This requires a combination of diplomatic engagement, maritime cooperation, and crisis management mechanisms with regional partners. By strengthening naval coordination, participating in multilateral security dialogues, and maintaining open communication channels with all major stakeholders, India seeks to mitigate the risks posed by an increasingly uncertain regional security environment.

India’s Expanding Role in Regional Diplomacy

As its global profile rises, India is gradually assuming a more active diplomatic role in West Asia. Unlike many external powers whose involvement in the region has historically been shaped by military alliances or ideological commitments, India’s engagement is largely driven by economic cooperation, development partnerships, and political dialogue. This approach has allowed India to maintain constructive relations with countries across the region despite their differing geopolitical alignments. By emphasizing economic development, infrastructure cooperation, and technology partnerships, India presents itself as a reliable partner focused on mutual growth rather than geopolitical competition.

India’s growing diplomatic presence is also reflected in its participation in emerging regional frameworks and multilateral initiatives. Platforms that bring together countries from South Asia, the Gulf, and the broader Indo-Pacific region increasingly recognize India’s potential role as a bridge between different geopolitical spaces. Through such initiatives, India seeks to promote economic connectivity, technological collaboration, and sustainable development across the region. At the same time, India’s long-standing diplomatic relationships provide it with a unique capacity to engage with actors who may otherwise have limited channels of dialogue. By encouraging communication and cooperation among diverse stakeholders, India can contribute to confidence-building measures and broader regional stability. In the long term, this diplomatic engagement may enable India to play a constructive role in shaping a more cooperative regional order.

Strategic Autonomy and the Future of India’s West Asia Policy

India’s approach to West Asia continues to reflect its broader foreign policy principle of strategic autonomy. Rather than aligning exclusively with any particular geopolitical bloc, India has sought to maintain flexible partnerships with multiple actors while prioritizing its national interests. This strategy allows India to engage simultaneously with competing regional powers, expand economic opportunities, and avoid direct involvement in regional conflicts. In a region characterized by shifting alliances and recurring tensions, such diplomatic flexibility has been a crucial element of India’s foreign policy success.

However, the evolving geopolitical environment may test the sustainability of this approach. Intensifying conflicts, growing great-power competition, and increasing expectations from strategic partners could limit India’s room for manoeuvre in the future. India will therefore need to strengthen diplomatic engagement, expand economic cooperation, and support multilateral dialogue to protect its interests in the region. By combining economic connectivity initiatives with proactive diplomacy, India can continue to play a constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in West Asia while safeguarding its long-term strategic objectives.

Conclusion

India’s engagement with West Asia illustrates the delicate balance between geopolitical pragmatism and strategic autonomy that defines its foreign policy. The region’s importance for India extends far beyond energy imports, encompassing trade corridors, maritime security, diaspora welfare, and emerging economic partnerships. As geopolitical tensions persist and global power competition increasingly intersects with regional rivalries, India’s ability to maintain balanced relationships with diverse actors will remain a key diplomatic challenge. At the same time, initiatives focused on economic connectivity and multilateral cooperation provide opportunities for India to contribute constructively to regional stability and development. Ultimately, the success of India’s West Asia policy will depend on its capacity to combine diplomatic flexibility with long-term strategic vision, ensuring that its engagement with the region continues to support both national interests and broader goals of regional peace and economic integration.

At the same time, the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment in West Asia demands that India remain proactive rather than reactive in its diplomatic approach. Conflicts, shifting alliances, and economic transformations in the region will continue to influence global energy markets, trade routes, and security dynamics, all of which have direct implications for India’s strategic interests. By strengthening political dialogue with regional partners, enhancing maritime cooperation, and actively participating in multilateral platforms, India can play a constructive role in promoting stability and conflict management. Furthermore, deeper economic engagement through infrastructure projects, technology partnerships, and trade initiatives will help institutionalize long-term cooperation between India and West Asian states.

Looking ahead, India’s West Asia policy must also integrate emerging global priorities such as sustainable development, renewable energy collaboration, and digital connectivity. As Gulf countries diversify their economies and invest in new sectors, opportunities for partnership in innovation, green energy, and logistics are likely to expand. By aligning its strategic and economic initiatives with these transformations, India can strengthen its position as a trusted and long-term partner in the region. In this sense, West Asia will remain not only a critical component of India’s foreign policy but also an important arena where India’s aspirations for greater global influence and regional cooperation will increasingly unfold in the coming decades.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Prof. ML Meena & Ravi D. Bishnoi

The direct confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States that began in the last week of February has brought West Asia to a strategic turning point where regional war, missile technology, proxy networks and global power competition are appearing together. This conflict is no longer just a military clash between two or three countries; rather, it is gradually becoming an important dimension of a broader geostrategic restructuring. The conflict began when the United States and Israel launched joint air operations under the name operation epic fury and lion’s Roar against several Iranian military and security installations. These attacks targeted military command centers in Tehran, defense production structures in Isfahan and certain missile infrastructures. The objective was to weaken Iran’s long-range missile capability and damage the military structures associated with its nuclear program. In the initial phase, therefore, the attacks were mainly focused on military and strategic structures.

Immediately after these attacks, the way Iran responded took the conflict to a new stage. Moving beyond limited retaliation, Iran targeted the American and Israeli military network spread across the Middle East. In its retaliatory strikes, Iran used Fateh-110, Zolfaghar, Qiam-1, and Shahab series ballistic missiles, along with Soumar and Ya-Ali cruise missiles and long-range attack drones. In fact, the strike range of these missile systems is said to extend from several hundred kilometers to more than two thousand kilometers, which makes them fully capable of targeting Israel and American military bases located in the Gulf region. This strength increases further when the Dastvareh barracks in northwest Tehran geographically manages a wider network very effectively. In reality, such attacks are part of Iran’s well-considered asymmetric deterrence military strategy, in which it knows well how to balance a much stronger opponent through missiles and drones despite limited resources. As a result, the pace with which the United States was advancing through USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) had to be adjusted as Iran’s missile strike capability forced them to move out of its range.

In this context, it is also necessary to understand that in modern warfare it is no longer only the traditional army or air force that is decisive. Low-cost drones, mobile missile systems, and artificial intelligence are also changing the direction of war. Over the past two decades, Iran has invested heavily in its missile and drone capabilities, and this is why, despite relatively limited resources, it has been able to challenge powerful countries such as the United States and Israel.

The most important aspect of Iran’s strategy was that it targeted those bases that are considered the main centers of American military presence in the Middle East. Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Naval Support Activity Bahrain in Bahrain, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, Ali Al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Muwaffaq Al-Salti Air Base in Jordan, and Ain Al-Asad and Erbil Air Bases in Iraq came within the potential range of Iranian missile and drone strikes. These bases were selected not only because of their strategic importance but also because they are key centers for America’s regional air operations, surveillance missions, and logistics networks. From a geopolitical perspective, it must be remembered clearly that if the operational capacity of these bases is affected, the regional military capability of the United States could be directly limited.

The second dimension of Iran’s attacks appears through its proxy network. Several militia groups active in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon intensified attacks on American and Israeli targets. In Iraq, a Shia militia organization claimed a drone attack on a US military facility near Baghdad airport. Similarly, attempts were made to target American soldiers in the Erbil region. Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has rocket reach toward northern Israel, and Iraqi militias attacking US bases made it clear through their activity that this regional conflict is gradually turning into a multi-front proxy war.

To understand this entire conflict, its historical context is also important. Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, relations between Iran and Israel have remained deeply antagonistic. Before the revolution, Iran under the Shah maintained relatively cooperative strategic and economic ties with both Israel and the United States. However, the revolution brought a major ideological transformation. The new Islamic Republic under Ruhollah Khomeini severed diplomatic relations with Israel, closed its embassy in Tehran, and adopted a strongly anti-Zionist position. At the same time, Iran-U.S. relations sharply deteriorated following the Iran hostage crisis, which entrenched decades of hostility. Since then, Iran has increasingly relied on regional proxy networks and ideological resistance to challenge Israeli and American influence in West Asia. Over the past four decades, the two countries have experienced several indirect confrontations, which are often described as shadow wars. In these shadow wars, cyber attacks, covert military operations, and the use of proxy organizations have been key strategies. For example, the Stuxnet cyber-attack that affected Iran’s nuclear energy program and the periodic Israeli air strikes in Syria are considered part of this shadow conflict. However, in the present era another important dimension of this war is connected with maritime geopolitics, or more specifically maritime chokepoint geopolitics. The Strait of Hormuz in West Asia is one of the most important routes for global energy supply. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s total seaborne oil trade passes through this route. If military tension in this region continues to increase or if naval confrontation occurs, it will have a direct impact on the global energy market. This is why the United States decided to further strengthen its naval presence in the Gulf region and reinforce the deployment of aircraft carriers. From the initial attacks to the current confrontation, this naval presence has been actively used.

Within this emerging trend of missile-centric warfare, several possible scenarios appear regarding the future direction of the conflict. The first scenario is that diplomatic pressure may gradually limit the conflict to restricted military actions. This would happen only if Iran’s military capacity becomes extremely weak, or if it compromises its sovereignty, or if civil unrest begins there. However, current trends suggest that this scenario may no longer be effective, especially if, after the death of Khamenei, the population has emotionally united. It now appears more likely that Iran may continue strong resistance in direct confrontation, and even if it suffers military damage, the possibility of surrender seems low; in such a situation the conflict may even shift from conventional war to guerrilla warfare. The second scenario is that the war may spread across the entire Middle East and countries such as Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf states may become fully involved. In such a case, if the conflict becomes more complex than expected, the United States may itself prefer that a third party or mediator appeal for a ceasefire. The third and more complicated scenario is that the conflict becomes part of global power competition, in which countries such as the United States, Russia, and China become indirectly involved. In that case, the war could continue for a long time without any clear decisive result, and instability may persist throughout the region. This would have wide-ranging effects on the security of West Asia as well as on maritime routes.

In this context, the role of the Indian Ocean region and India also becomes important. If American military bases in the Middle East remain under constant threat or their operational capacity becomes limited, the United States may need alternative logistical and strategic support in the Indian Ocean region. In such a situation, the possibility of cooperation from India could also be discussed. However, India’s foreign policy has long been based on strategic autonomy, and therefore India will need to maintain its diplomatic balance in any such situation. Under the current circumstances, India needs to adopt a realistic and far-sighted diplomatic approach instead of an overly generous or unclear position. Current developments indicate that Iran’s position appears stronger than expected, and the limited war strategy with which the United States moved forward now seems to be turning into a partially incorrect assessment. This may also be the reason why the United States has not formally declared it as a war so far.

In the coming years, this conflict will significantly affect not only the regional balance of power but also the direction of global geopolitics. As a result, a geographical pressure arc will emerge in West Asia. This will be a pressure arc in which energy routes, military bases, and great power competition will converge to create a new geopolitical reality. Considering all these possibilities, India must determine its diplomatic position carefully. If India continues to maintain an unclear or excessively neutral stance, it may weaken its strategic credibility and leadership capacity at the international level. Therefore, it is necessary for India to give balanced but clear diplomatic signals so that its national interests remain protected while its global role also remains strong.

By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

The parliamentary elections in Bangladesh were held recently on 12 February 2026. The elections marked one of the most significant political transitions in Bangladesh in decades. The victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, put an end of the Interim government by Muhammad Yunus and opened a new chapter in Bangladesh’s domestic politics and foreign relations.

Two years after a mass uprising that toppled the government of Sheikh Hasina, the country saw the leadership of Muhammad Yunus. Now it is in the hands of Rahman, whose party won 212 of the 300 seats in the parliament. While the election was somewhat exceptional and mostly about governance, democratic reforms, and economic recovery, however, it reignited an old question back into focus— how are relations between India and Bangladesh likely to evolve in the future? To a large extent the answer depends on the perception of India among the general population in Bangladesh.

Why India-Bangladesh Relation Became a Sensitive Issue

India has long been a crucial factor for Bangladesh’s political discourse, and Bangladesh is equally important for India. India-Bangladesh cooperation on trade, energy connectivity, and security extended very efficiently during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. However, critics inside Bangladesh argued that Dhaka had become too dependent on New Delhi. According to many opposition leaders, India was perceived as a state backing the previous government politically and diplomatically. As a result, public sentiment towards India often became negative and begun to shape political conversation.

Anti-Indian remarks became new normal

Anti-India statements and even actions were frequently reported throughout these 18 months period. The most provocative remarks were related to India’s seven Northeastern states. At a protest rally, NCP leader Hasnat Abdullah said “seven sisters will be separated from India,”. Even the interim leader did not refrain from criticising India. In his speech during his visit to China, he specifically described India’s Northeast region as “landlocked” and suggested China to expand its presence in the region, and also Bangladesh could serve as a vital gateway to the ocean. He also added, “Bangladesh can provide huge potential for economic prosperity for the seven sister states, Nepal and Bhutan.” More shocking statement came after a terror attack in Pahalgam district of Jammu and Kashmir, when a retired Major General ALM Fazlur Rahman wrote on social media that, “If India attacks Pakistan, then Bangladesh should occupy all Northeastern states”. Even in his farewell speech, Muhammad Yunus made a point of mentioning the region. Following the political turmoil and transition, there were also incidents targeting minority Hindu communities. Several homes, businesses and temples belonging to Hindus were vandalised by mobs. On 18 December, a Hindu man named Dipu Chandra Das was reportedly lynched and burned by a mob after accusations of blasphemy in Bangladesh. During his tenure, Bangladesh witnessed a significant surge in anti-India sentiment.

Simultaneously, in India, certain politicians and civil society members have expressed a range of offensive remarks targeting Bangladeshis, with some referring to Bangladeshi migrants in derogatory terms such as “termites.” Such language has naturally sparked outrage in Bangladesh and raised concerns about communal tensions and the perception of Bangladeshis in India. Adding fuel to that was the death of Sharif Osman Hadi, who was a key figure in Bangladesh’s 2024 student-led uprising. He was a vocal critic of Indian influence in Bangladeshi politics. So, a claim that India was involved has circulated, adding another layer of sensitivity to India–Bangladesh relations leading Indian authorities to temporarily close visa centres in some areas.

A Political Recalibration in Bangladesh

In 2024, turmoil gripped Bangladesh and it wasn’t long before headlines across major media outlets reported the exile of Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh did not hold an election during this period of 18 months as reforms were being prepared and political tensions were settling.

The BNP secured a clear parliamentary majority, allowing Rahman to form the government and begin shaping Bangladesh’s domestic and foreign policy priorities.  Determined to restore democracy, he stated, “this victory belongs to Bangladesh, belongs to democracy,”. Leaders from around the world, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, congratulated Rahman on social media and later spoke with him to reaffirm India’s commitment to close bilateral ties. In response, the BNP expressed gratitude to India for acknowledging the outcome.

Following his electoral victory, Tarique Rahman signalled that Bangladesh would pursue constructive ties with India while prioritizing its own national interests first. He emphasized that Dhaka seeks cooperation with all neighbours but expects relations to be based on mutual respect, fairness, and reciprocity. Rahman stated that, “The interests of Bangladesh and its people comes first and it will determine our foreign policy.”

Rahman, the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and former President Ziaur Rahman, recently lost his mother. Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, representing India attended the funeral, which General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, BNP secretary took it as a “a positive gesture”. Mentioning about Sheikh Hasina he also stated that “in the long run, she will not remain relevant in politics. Relations between India and Bangladesh can and should move forward beyond her” and “we want to build even better ties.”

BNP’s 31-point agenda presents an opportunity to specify that issues such as trade balance, water sharing, border management, and regional connectivity would likely be approached from a more interest-driven perspective. Rahman’s remarks suggested that his government is likely to focus on recalibrate the relationship in order to project foreign policy that is less aligned with any single external partner.

The new government seems to have adopted a relatively practical approach toward India. Rahman now faces the burden of repairing the strain in relations that developed during the period of the Interim government. Analysts highlighted that the leadership in Dhaka appears to be interested in stabilizing relations rather than escalating tensions. Recently Foreign Minister Dr Khalilur Rahman commented that “We aim to maintain good relations with all countries, especially our neighbours, based on respect and mutual benefit.” There are some early signs of a thaw in relations or at least positive shift from both sides in that direction.

Mixed Public Sentiment

Bangladeshi public outlook towards India are rarely uniform. They tend to reflect several domestic political considerations and broader regional dynamics. People in Bangladesh generally recognize India’s geographic and economic importance. Ranging from trade routes, energy cooperation, to border management, these issues make engagement unavoidable. However, issues such as water sharing, border incidents, and trade imbalances continue to generate uncertainty and fuel a culture of finger-pointing among the general people.

Certain political groups or members and civil society actors remain doubtful of India’s intentions and influence in Bangladeshi politics. People blame India for supporting Hasina. Reflecting this sentiment Humaiun Kobir, foreign affairs adviser noted that, “people in Bangladesh see India as complicit with Sheikh Hasina’s crimes.” Another indication of the tense relations came recently in January, when the Bangladesh withdrew from the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2026 after its cricket board opposed travelling to India. There are very few signs of warm or enthusiastic sentiment towards India among ordinary Bangladeshis at the grassroots level.

However, at present, to a large extent, the focus of the general public priorities tend to focus more on governance, jobs, and global integration rather than ideological positions on India. Although, scepticism towards India still exists, but such priorities have not manifested in anti-India action. For the time being, the outlook is generally mixed, though not entirely hostile.

What the Election Means for India

From New Delhi’s standpoint, the election and the new administration presents both challenges and opportunities. During interim government in Bangladesh, there were repeated calls urging India to hand over Hasina and senior members of Awami League who left the country after the uprising. However, India has yet to respond publicly. The new government may raise the issue to address domestic political expectations.

India seems to be adjusting to a leadership that has historically had a more complicated relationship with it. However, with all changes, there is an opportunity to restructure relations on a broader institutional foundation rather than depending heavily on personal ties with former leaders. Strategic observers and regional analysts believe that the relationship could enter a more interest-driven and somewhat conditional phase, based on economic cooperation and strategic necessities rather than political alignment.

Regional Implications

The political transformation in Bangladesh also has implications beyond India. Strategically, Bangladesh occupies an important position between South and Southeast Asia. Its foreign policy decisions certainly influence regional dynamics involving neighbouring states. This is particularly significant for India, as Bangladesh lies close to the Siliguri Corridor, which is a crucial land link to the seven Northeastern states. Aa a result, New Delhi remains sensitive to Dhaka’s growing engagement with China and Pakistan.

The recent Bangladesh election is widely seen as ending the Awami League’s long alignment with India and initiate potential closeness with Pakistan. China at the same time has intensified its diplomatic connections and investment in Dhaka. Constantino Xavier, a senior fellow at New Delhi think-tank Centre for Social and Economic Progress, said that, “China is steadily building its influence both in the open and behind the scenes, benefiting from the crisis in India-Bangladesh relations”. China’s, the Bay of Bengal, and regional connectivity initiatives further enhance evolving power dynamics. Hence, the election attracted significant attention from both international and regional actors concerned about geopolitical alignment.

Conclusion

One month after the 2026 elections, the outlook for India among Bangladeshis and its new administration appears to be evolving but not drastically changing. Political authority may fluctuate, and debates about sovereignty and influence might still continue, but ground realities—geography, trade, and security still bind the two neighbours together. The 2026 elections therefore revived this discussion, particularly among the new generation of voters, who were prominent during the 2024 protests.

The real test of India-Bangladesh relations will come in the months ahead. If the new government can address domestic interests and expectations while managing relations with India, practically, the post-election period may lead to repositioning partnerships. Therefore, one month after election… it would be too soon to comment on how Bangladesh’s foreign policy towards India will evolve, however, early indications suggest that Dhaka is very likely to pursue a balanced foreign policy and a careful adjustment rather than a dramatic change in attitudes towards India.

About the Author

Trishnakhi Parashar is an enthusiastic and dedicated learner with a Master’s degree in International Relations/Politics from Sikkim Central University. Her academic journey is further enriched by a certification in Human Rights and Duties, a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management from Tezpur University, and a Diploma in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Indian Institute of Governance and Leadership.

Having begun her career at Tech Mahindra, Trishnakhi transitioned into the research field to pursue her deep-rooted passion for international affairs. She is currently interning at Global Strategic and Defence News, where she continues to refine her analytical skills. Her core interests include international relations, terrorism, diplomacy, and geopolitics—fields she explores with rigor and critical insight. Trishnakhi is committed to meticulous research and driven by a determination to contribute meaningfully to global discourse. With a vision to carve out her own niche, she aspires to leave a lasting impact on contemporary international issues.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN

The parliamentary elections held in Nepal on 5 March 2026 represent one of the most consequential political developments in the country since the democratic transition of the early 1990s. The results have produced a dramatic restructuring of Nepal’s political landscape, signalling a generational shift in leadership and a profound transformation in public attitudes toward governance. The rise of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), led by Balendra Shah popularly known as Balen has challenged the long-standing dominance of traditional political forces such as the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist). For India, Nepal’s closest neighbour and one of its most strategically important partners in South Asia, the outcome of these elections carries far-reaching geopolitical, economic and diplomatic implications. The emergence of a new political leadership in Kathmandu offers opportunities for renewed engagement but also introduces uncertainties in the evolving dynamics of India–Nepal relations.  

The 2026 elections were conducted in a highly charged political environment shaped by the youth-led protests of September 2025. These demonstrations, often referred to as the Gen-Z movement, were triggered by deep frustration among younger citizens over corruption, unemployment, political patronage, and perceived authoritarian tendencies within the ruling establishment. The immediate spark came from the government’s controversial attempt to restrict social media platforms, which many young Nepalis interpreted as an attempt to suppress dissent. What began as online mobilisation rapidly evolved into large-scale protests across the country. The demonstrations escalated into violence during the “Day of Rage” protests of 8–9 September 2025, resulting in the deaths of 76 people and injuries to more than 2,000 others. The crisis ultimately forced the resignation of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and the dissolution of parliament. An interim administration led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki oversaw the transition to fresh elections, promising to restore political stability while responding to the demands of the protest movement. 

The elections thus became more than a routine democratic exercise; they represented a referendum on Nepal’s established political order. For more than three decades, the country’s politics had been dominated by a limited group of leaders and parties, primarily the Nepali Congress and various communist factions. While these parties played a central role in Nepal’s democratic transition and the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, their prolonged dominance gradually produced widespread dissatisfaction. Frequent changes in government, factional infighting, corruption scandals and limited economic progress eroded public confidence in traditional leadership. Over the past two decades, Nepal witnessed fourteen changes of government, reflecting chronic political instability that hindered policy continuity and economic development. The Gen-Z protests brought these grievances into sharp focus, highlighting a generational demand for accountability, transparency, and new leadership. 

Against this backdrop, the Rastriya Swatantra Party emerged as a powerful political alternative. Founded in June 2022 by media personality Rabi Lamichhane, the party quickly gained traction among urban voters, professionals and young citizens seeking a break from conventional political practices. Its emphasis on clean governance, institutional reform, and economic modernisation resonated strongly with voters disillusioned by the failures of traditional parties. The entry of Balendra Shah into the party’s leadership further strengthened its appeal. Shah, a civil engineer, former rapper and the widely popular mayor of Kathmandu, had already built a reputation as a reform-oriented administrator who challenged entrenched interests. His ability to communicate directly with young voters through social media and grassroots engagement transformed the RSP’s campaign into a nationwide movement for political renewal. 

The electoral results reflected the depth of this transformation. The RSP delivered a stunning performance, capturing the overwhelming majority of directly elected seats and emerging as the dominant force in proportional representation. The party’s projected overall tally of around 180 seats in the 275-member House of Representatives places it close to a two-thirds majority an achievement rarely seen in Nepal’s democratic history. The outcome simultaneously marked the collapse of traditional parties. The Nepali Congress, once the leading political force in the country, was reduced to a small parliamentary presence, while the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) suffered an even more dramatic decline. The symbolic centrepiece of this political upheaval occurred in the eastern constituency of Jhapa-5, where Balendra Shah defeated former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, a veteran leader who had dominated Nepali politics for decades. The result was widely interpreted as a clear rejection of the old political elite. 

The rise of the RSP reflects broader structural changes within Nepali society. Demographic shifts have significantly increased the political influence of younger voters. Nearly one million first-time voters participated in the 2026 elections, many of whom belonged to the digitally connected generation that organised the protests of 2025. For this generation, ideological debates that once defined Nepal’s political competition have become less relevant than issues of governance, employment and economic opportunity. Their political preferences are shaped less by traditional party loyalties and more by expectations of efficiency, accountability, and transparency. This transformation in voter priorities compelled even established parties to alter their campaign strategies, emphasising economic development and service delivery rather than ideological narratives. 

For India, these political developments carry significant implications. India and Nepal share a unique and deeply interconnected relationship shaped by geography, history, culture and economics. The two countries share an open border of more than 1,700 kilometers, enabling the free movement of people and goods. Millions of Nepali citizens work in India, while large numbers of Indian pilgrims and tourists travel to Nepal each year. Economic ties are equally strong. India is Nepal’s largest trading partner, its principal source of investment and the primary market for its hydropower exports. The two countries also cooperate closely in areas such as energy connectivity, infrastructure development, and disaster management. Given this depth of interdependence, political changes in Kathmandu inevitably influence India’s strategic environment. 

One of the most immediate implications of the election results is the possibility of greater political stability in Nepal. The country’s history of fragile coalition governments has often complicated policy implementation and slowed economic reforms. A strong parliamentary majority for the RSP could provide a rare opportunity for stable governance and long-term planning. For India, political stability in Nepal is generally viewed as beneficial because it reduces uncertainty in bilateral projects and facilitates sustained cooperation. Several major Indian-backed infrastructure initiatives, including hydropower projects such as Arun-3 and cross-border electricity transmission lines, had slowed during the political turmoil of 2025. The emergence of a stable government may enable these projects to regain momentum, strengthening regional energy connectivity and supporting Nepal’s economic growth. 

Energy cooperation represents one of the most promising areas of India–Nepal partnership. Nepal possesses enormous hydropower potential, estimated at more than 40,000 megawatts of economically feasible capacity. However, the country has struggled to develop this resource due to political instability, regulatory challenges, and infrastructure constraints. In recent years, India has become an important partner in Nepal’s hydropower development, both as an investor and as a market for electricity exports. Nepal has already begun exporting several hundred megawatts of electricity to India, and this figure is expected to increase significantly in the coming years. A government committed to economic modernisation and infrastructure development could accelerate hydropower projects, benefiting both countries through increased energy trade and regional energy security. 

At the same time, the new political landscape in Nepal also presents diplomatic challenges for India. The RSP’s leadership has occasionally expressed strong nationalist sentiments and criticised what some Nepalis perceive as India’s “big brother” approach in bilateral relations. Issues such as border disputes, economic dependence, and political interference have periodically generated tensions between the two countries. The territorial disagreements involving Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura remain particularly sensitive. These disputes intensified in 2020 when Nepal published a revised political map incorporating the contested territories. Although both sides have since attempted to manage the issue through diplomatic channels, it continues to influence public perceptions in Nepal. 

Balendra Shah’s political rhetoric has sometimes emphasised Nepal’s need for greater strategic autonomy in its foreign policy. This emphasis reflects a broader trend among younger Nepali leaders who seek to diversify the country’s international partnerships. While such an approach does not necessarily imply hostility toward India, it suggests that the new government may pursue a more assertive and independent diplomatic posture. For India, this means that managing relations with Nepal will require greater sensitivity to Nepali public opinion and a willingness to engage with emerging political actors who may not share the traditional patterns of bilateral engagement. 

Another important dimension of Nepal’s foreign policy is its relationship with China. Over the past decade, China has expanded its economic presence in Nepal through infrastructure investments, trade and development assistance. Many of these initiatives are linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), under which China has financed projects such as highways, airports and hydropower facilities. The expansion of Chinese influence in Nepal has occasionally generated strategic concerns in New Delhi, particularly because Nepal occupies a critical geographical position between the two Asian powers. India traditionally regarded Nepal as part of its immediate strategic neighbourhood, and the increasing involvement of external actors has altered the regional balance. 

The new government in Kathmandu is likely to continue Nepal’s long-standing strategy of balancing relations between India and China. This approach reflects Nepal’s geopolitical reality as a small state located between two major powers. By maintaining constructive relations with both neighbours, Nepal seeks to maximise economic opportunities while preserving its political autonomy. However, the way this balancing strategy is implemented will influence India’s strategic calculations. If Nepal deepens its economic engagement with China through large-scale infrastructure projects or expanded security cooperation, India may view these developments with caution. 

At the same time, the presence of a strong and popular government in Nepal could create opportunities for more constructive regional diplomacy. A leadership that enjoys broad domestic support may be better positioned to pursue pragmatic economic partnerships with both neighbours without being constrained by internal political rivalries. For India, engaging proactively with the new Nepali leadership could help build mutual trust and reduce misunderstandings that have periodically affected bilateral relations. 

Economic cooperation will remain a central pillar of India–Nepal relations in the coming years. Beyond hydropower, the two countries are working to strengthen connectivity through cross-border railways, highways, and integrated check posts. Improved transport infrastructure has the potential to boost trade, tourism, and investment. Nepal’s strategic location between India and China also creates opportunities for it to function as a transit hub linking South Asia with the Himalayan region and beyond. If managed effectively, this connectivity could contribute to broader regional economic integration. 

Another important aspect of bilateral relations is the movement of people across the open border. The India–Nepal border is one of the most unique international frontiers in the world, allowing citizens of both countries to travel, work and reside freely in each other’s territory. This arrangement has fostered deep social and cultural connections but has also created occasional security concerns related to smuggling and illegal activities. Maintaining the benefits of open borders while addressing emerging security challenges will remain an important priority for both governments. 

Ultimately, the 2026 elections in Nepal represent a historic turning point in the country’s democratic evolution. The rise of the Rastriya Swatantra Party and the defeat of established political elites demonstrate the power of generational change and public demand for accountable governance. Whether this transformation leads to lasting institutional reform or simply inaugurates, another phase of political experimentation remains uncertain. Much will depend on the ability of the new leadership to translate its electoral mandate into effective governance and economic progress. 

For India, the moment calls for careful diplomatic recalibration. The political landscape in Nepal has changed significantly, and the assumptions that guided bilateral relations in the past may no longer be sufficient. Rather than viewing Nepal’s political transformation with apprehension, India has an opportunity to engage constructively with the new leadership and support Nepal’s aspirations for stability and development. By strengthening economic cooperation, respecting Nepal’s sovereignty and addressing sensitive issues through dialogue, India can help ensure that the evolving relationship remains mutually beneficial. 

In this sense, the 2026 elections mark not only a domestic political shift within Nepal but also a critical moment for regional diplomacy. As Nepal navigates a new phase of political leadership and policy priorities, the future of India–Nepal relations will depend on the ability of both countries to adapt to changing circumstances while preserving the deep historical ties that have long connected them. If managed wisely, this period of transformation could open the door to a more balanced, cooperative, and forward-looking partnership between the two neighbours. 

About the Author

Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs. 

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress