By: Kashif Anwar, Research Analyst, GSDN

In evolving global geopolitics, relationship between two nations not only defines the nature of bilateral relationship they have but how vital they are to each other. Following the dissolution of former Soviet Union, Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, allowing China and Croatia to established diplomatic relations on May 13, 1992. Since then, both nations worked towards to improve relations on various level from cultural interaction to strengthening of economic cooperation and trade. Education and Cultural cooperation inked in March 1993 and Comprehensive and Cooperation agreement signed in 2005 started a transformative period in Croatia-China relationship. As in the last two decades Chinese investment in infrastructure projects in Croatia like Senj Wind Farm or Pelješac Bridge and ongoing cultural and education exchange program has improved the bilateral relationship.

Although, US-China geopolitics especially in the context of Europe has kept European nations in a complicated situation in the context of economic, security and national interest, Croatia approach isn’t completely different. Overall, in Croatia’s Foreign Policy China’s isn’t a prime focus like the National Security Strategy of 2017 document doesn’t mention China and Foreign Ministry’s Implementation Programme for 2021-24 refer China in positive sense in the context of the Chinese-led ‘China-Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Cooperation Initiative’. Such an approach shows Croatia will align their foreign policy with the European Union (EU) having a broader approach towards China, considering growing differences between the West and China.

With Croatia exposure to China is 3%, Croatia’s export to China is 79 million Euros and import from China is 1.3 billion Euro in 2023, largely remain the same since 2021, shows Croatia will be less impacted by the EU’s de-risking strategy to counter China. Further, no screening of the Chinese investment in place and trade data highlight that the Croatia-China bilateral ties will remain the same despite the on-going de-risking strategy.

Recent visit by Wu Hongbo, a Special Representative of the Chinese government on European Affairs to Croatia from June 27-29, 2024 to address the Dubrovnik Forum has raised various issues. The paper will discuss whether the visit will strengthened Croatia-China relationship or a change will emerge in Croatia and China bilateral relationship due to the change in the West’s approach towards China in the recent years.

Wu Hongbo’s Visit and Croatia on the US, EU and China

On June 27, Wu Hongbo, a Special Representative of the Chinese government on European Affairs met Croatia’s high-level officers like Zvonimir Frka-Petešić and Frano Matušić, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia. During the visit, he stated China want to further deliver on its promise, and the Chinese government is ready to work with Croatia on vital common understandings which were reached between China and Croatia to advance their bilateral ties. The visit allows China and Croatia to have in-depth discussion on mutual interest issues and concerns like China-EU relationship and cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European nations.

The Wu visit highlighted that China is working to have a vision of a community with a shared future for mankind for which China will promote a new type of international relations and such aspect was elaborated at the Dubrovnik Forum. At the forum, Dubravka Šuica, a Croatian Politician and the Vice President of the European Commission for Demography since 2019, emphasised that Croatia and the EU should recalibrate their relationship with China. Considering a shift is taking place in the EU, Croatia reiterating their commitment to One China policy, the upcoming Presidential election in December 2024 is being closely watched.

As relation between the West and China is on a low in recent years, the ongoing developments in Taiwan, Middle East and Ukraine, and the role and position of China in such developments have raised concerns and China’s intent are being questioned by the West. However, former Croatian President Stjepan Mesić, under whose leadership the comprehensive and cooperation agreement was signed which has improved China-Croatia economic cooperation, nn the issue of China, he argues that there is a silent (economic) war going on between the US and China and the EU should go back to its pre-2019 policies, follow less US demands and accept China’s economic (olive branch) outreach as the century belongs to China. As he argues China has a pivotal role in the global geopolitics and stresses China’s development is ahead of other countries which isn’t economic in nature and other nations and especially Europe to accept China’s opening-up which took in the last few years.

However, following the passage of the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) in 2022, which protect European economies and restrict Chinese companies, and could impact China-Croatia relation. It targets tender worth over 250 million Euro and substantially subsidised companies, such moves impact the Chinese infrastructure investment drive in Europe and infrastructure project being awarded to Chinese companies. China views Croatia following EU’s approach, will impact Croatia-China ties and impact and limit all future Chinese projects in Croatia. As FSR has caused panic among Chinese bidders as they started to withdraw from tenders to avoid any investigation and has impacted Croatian government drive to attract Chinese investment in the infrastructure projects.

As Croatia-China economic cooperation has remained positive with a favourable attitude towards Chinese investors to invest in sectors like railways, energy, logistics and infrastructure. Such an aspect is visible in the case of China’s Norinco International US$ 220 million investment in a 156 MW wind farm in Senj – the biggest Chinese investment – which got delayed by COVID-19 and once pandemic stopped the Croatian government invited Norinco and the project got completed by the end of 2021. On the other hand, the recent political shift within the EU has been prompt by growing the US demands and involvement which could change cooperation dynamics between China and Croatia.

Conclusion

Although, Croatia remains hopeful of the China-CEE Cooperation Initiative and stresses on EU’s principles, values and rules as a paramount framework and operate and cooperate with China within China-CEE Cooperation. However, for Croatia, the trade relation with China has remained deficit for long and despite such circumstances it continues to see China as a potential trading partner. On the other hand, other EU members are slowly distancing itself from any cooperation with China as recently witness in the case of Italy who withdrew from China’s BRI. Further, with the US Presidential elections on the brink and the scope of former US President Donald Trump being re-elected as the US President is high, Europe’s dynamic, relations between the US and EU and ongoing West’s silent war will see tremendous changes. Under such a situation, Croatia-China relation will walk a tightrope in the coming months and whether Croatia bulges to West’s pressure and distances itself from China, will have to be seen in the coming times.

By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN

In the elections last year in October 2023 the government of Poland changed and the former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk from 2007 to 2014 was re-elected. From 2014 to 2019 Tusk was President of the European Council, and from 2019 to 2022 he was the president of the European People’s Party. Change of the government came with many new challenges as they promised to make things better for the people of the Poland. New Government has to face challenges such as rising Inflation, changing migration, Energy Crises, Economics and strengthening their Military Power.

Poland has historically occupied a central position in European great power politics. The presence of powerful and assertive neighbours such as Russia and Germany have significantly shaped the course of Polish history. From a geopolitical perspective, Russia and Germany have often held divergent views. They have consistently agreed on Poland’s strategic importance in Europe. Both nations considered influence over Poland a natural right, making the country a potential battleground.

Importance of Poland in Europe

Poland became the part of European Union on May 01, 2004. There are 53 representatives from Poland in the European Parliament. Being the member of EU, Poland plays an important role in the geopolitics of Europe. Poland’s historical background offers a rich geopolitical and geostrategic resource. As one of Europe’s most significant historical powers, Poland prioritizes having a greater influence in continental politics. Poland boasts a rich history of citizen engagement. It has the oldest constitution in Europe, and the renowned Solidarity movement lead the country’s transition to democracy in the early 90s. It has been an active member of NATO and the EU since the turn of the century – two decades on, Poland faces new challenges.

Poland is one of the most important parts of Europe. Today, due to its geographical location, Poland continues to act as a barometer of great power politics. The Russia-Ukraine War has reignited the debate over Poland’s role in Central and Eastern Europe. Analysing Poland’s post-Cold War policies reveals a trend of closer cooperation with actors like the United States and the United Kingdom to safeguard itself from its two powerful neighbours. Poland’s increasing alignment with US-UK-oriented geopolitical strategies is rooted in the aforementioned historical reservations and dilemmas. The support from the United States and the United Kingdom has facilitated the limited adoption of the game-making characteristics advocated by Eugeniusz Romer in Polish geopolitics.

Being a bordering country to Ukraine, Poland is playing a major role in Russia-Ukraine war. At the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War, Poland’s active involvement raised many geopolitical questions. The geography of Ukraine is crucial to Poland’s historically and geopolitically driven strategy of becoming an independent player. Specifically, western Ukraine holds significant importance for Polish geopolitics both historically and existentially. The war also became a tool for Poland’s aspirations for regional leadership. This leadership was facilitated by a new geopolitical alignment, supported by the US and the UK, in which Poland actively participated in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Consequently, Warsaw views the consolidation of the American presence in the region, replacing that of Russia and Germany, as advantageous for its interests in the short and medium term. In the long term, Poland seeks to enhance its regional position with an independent strategic framework. However, for Poland to fully realize Romer’s envisioned geopolitical capabilities, it must become an independent and essentially self-sufficient geopolitical player.

Warsaw’s attempt to solidify its playmaker credentials with US support may yield short-term benefits. However, in the medium and long term, this approach could exacerbate regional fault lines. Meanwhile, economic interactions with Russia and Germany remain vital for Poland’s economy, highlighting the country’s economic-geopolitical dilemma.

Geopolitical aspirations of Poland

Poland’s geopolitical objectives are being reshaped due to tensions with the EU over the rule of law and uncertainty in the geopolitical context with the rise of China and Russia. A future Tusk government also holds the promise of progress in pivotal areas such as migration, climate policy, and EU treaty reform, where Poland has the capacity to act as a pivotal link within the European Union. Additionally, a reinvigorated commitment to democratic principles will bolster U.S. foreign policy objectives, enhancing bilateral and multilateral relationships during a period marked by heightened global strategic rivalry. Turning to the economy, its energy sector is reliant on fossil fuels, and a transition to renewables risks jeopardising energy security. Anxiety over the rising energy prices and living costs are compounded by rising global inflation. Poland’s economy coming under pressure might threaten aspirations of joining the G20.

Changing migration patterns both in and out of the country are presenting Poland with the dual challenges of integrating newcomers and encouraging young people to set down roots. Poland has been issuing the highest number of first residence permits to non-EU immigrants in the European Union (EU) for the past six years. The number of foreign workers registered in the social insurance system has skyrocketed from under 200,000 in 2015 to over 1.1 million at the start of 2024. To deal with this immigration problem Poland developed a new migration strategy for 2025 to 2030. The initial version of the document is set to be finished by September 2024. It is expected to be put into use before Poland takes on the role of EU presidency in 2025. The finalized strategy will result in creating new laws about migration, such as a new act on foreigners. Poland has not had a formal migration strategy since it was abolished in 2016.

In the EU, Poland is the third biggest carbon emitter after Germany and Italy in terms of total annual emissions. Even today up to 85% of Poland’s energy is sourced from fossil fuels, making its energy sector one of the most carbon-intensive in Europe. Poland’s power sector alone makes 70% electricity from coal. Poland’s Energy Policy until 2040 (PEP 2040) and the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) are still pending, but the existing versions offer indicative insights: Poland’s 2021- 2030 NECP, updated in 2019, set a target of 21-23% of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption by 2030. In August 2023, Clean Air Task Force (CATF) conducted public polling on awareness and perception of clean firm energy technologies (including CCS, superhot rock energy, advanced nuclear energy, and low-carbon hydrogen) across six different European countries, including Poland. The polling covered questions on the interest in climate news, awareness of clean energy technologies, and perceptions of clean energy technologies. Overall, the results demonstrate widespread public support for a range of clean firm energy sources and technologies in Poland and beyond.

The military has been one of the most important topics of discussion in Poland since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, as the country prepares for the risk of the conflict at its border spilling into its territory. Poland claims to become the strongest army in the future in the entire Europe. Polish has various military force and strategies improvement goals for 2032. They will consist of five services: Land Forces, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces, and Territorial Defence Forces. Military spending has increase sharply in the last few years, due to the military’s modernisation plan. This item of expenditure has reached around 4% of GDP in 2023 and 2024, a record among EU countries, and should stand at around 2-3% in the following years.

Poland has significant economic challenges. It is still dealing with increased inflation 6.1% by the end of 2023 and anaemic annual economic growth of 0.4% in 2023, down from 5.5% a year earlier in the post-pandemic recovery period. The budget deficit, which is currently at 2.5% of GDP, is set to rise to 4.5% to accommodate some of the election promises. Recovery funds from the EU are set to provide some fiscal breathing room. But these funds might also raise demand, which could push inflation even higher. The coalition’s economic policy is likely to be characterised by targeted, yet cautious, interventions. The big promises made during the election such as more spending, tax cuts and bigger tax credits will face a reality check against the backdrop of inflation and a bigger budget deficit.

Conclusion

Poland right now is facing major challenges due to inflation, financial problems, energy crisis and due to war in the neighbouring country. The new government last year has promised to do their best to solve most of these challenges. However, upcoming years will show the reality check of the promises. Poland’s heavy industry produce a high employment rate, approximately 20% of the total workforce and gross value added (20%), while also being responsible for 42.56 million tons of CO2 emissions – 14% of the country’s total emissions. Therefore, transforming Poland’s industrial base in an economically viable and climate-beneficial way will be one of the most important tasks for the new government.

The Russia-Ukraine War has reignited the debate over Poland’s role in Central and Eastern Europe. The war has also become a tool for Poland’s aspirations for regional leadership. The assistance from the US and the UK has provided limited opportunities for Poland to “simultaneously protect itself” from Russia and Germany. Poland also has to realize the need to be independent from relying on USA and UK. In short term, getting support from the US and the UK is a good strategy but in the long term, Poland seeks to enhance its regional position with an independent strategic framework.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has recently released a report criticizing the Indian government’s actions in Jammu and Kashmir, five years following the revocation of the region’s special autonomous status. The report claims that the Indian government has failed to restore freedoms of speech and association, and it accuses the government of continuing repressive practices such as arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings. However, examining the situation more closely reveals a narrative that contradicts these allegations and underscores the progress made in the region.

The Indian government’s revocation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019 aimed to integrate Jammu and Kashmir more closely with the rest of India, intending to foster economic development and stability. While the decision met some resistance, it has also led to notable positive changes.

Contrary to the claims in HRW’s report, there has been a noticeable decline in militant activities and overall violence in the region, as evidenced by data from various sources. The reduction in civilian and security personnel casualties highlights the improved security situation, achieved through strategic measures and effective governance, contributing to a safer environment for residents and tourists alike.

Recent events, such as a grand gathering at Government Degree College (GDC) Shopian on August 3, 2024 demonstrate the restoration of normalcy and economic development. This event, organized by the South Asia Centre for Peace and People’s Empowerment in collaboration with GDC Shopian, saw hundreds of students, academicians, journalists, and others discuss peace, nation-building, and positive developments post-Article 370 abrogation. The event took place in a district that was once a hub of anti-India activities and a no-go area for such constructive gatherings.

Jammu and Kashmir have experienced a resurgence in tourism, commerce, and development activities, contrary to claims of an oppressive environment. Official figures show that the Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) has doubled to over Rs 2.25 lakh crore from Rs 1 lakh crore before the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. The government’s focus on infrastructure development has led to improved connectivity, enhanced healthcare facilities, and better educational opportunities. Initiatives to promote tourism and local industries have boosted the economy and created employment opportunities for the youth. The recent investment by Emaar in Jammu and Kashmir, totalling Rs 500 crore, exemplifies this progress, with Rs 250 crore allocated for a mega-mall and additional investments for IT towers, expected to create over 10,000 jobs.

While HRW’s report emphasizes allegations of arbitrary detention and suppression of free expression, it is important to acknowledge the legal and administrative mechanisms in place to address such issues. The Indian judiciary remains independent, offering a platform for grievance redressal and ensuring accountability. Allegations of human rights violations are investigated, and appropriate actions are taken against those found guilty. The detentions of lawyers often involve individuals linked to anti-state activities and connections with the hardline Hurriyat Conference.

The Indian government’s efforts to empower local governance and enhance democratic participation are noteworthy. Elections to local bodies and the formation of the Union Territory of Ladakh have allowed for greater representation and decision-making at the grassroots level. This decentralization of power ensures that the voices of the people are heard and their aspirations are met.

The government prioritizes the safety and security of minority communities, including the Kashmiri Pandits. Efforts are underway to facilitate the return of displaced families and address their security concerns. Various schemes have been implemented to provide housing and employment opportunities to those affected by past conflicts.

The portrayal of Jammu and Kashmir as a region plagued by repression and human rights abuses fails to acknowledge the significant progress made in recent years. The Indian government’s efforts to restore normalcy, promote economic development, and ensure citizens’ rights reflect a commitment to the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. While challenges persist, recognizing the strides made toward peace and prosperity in the region is essential. Rather than succumbing to a narrative of perpetual conflict, it is crucial to acknowledge and support the positive transformations in Jammu and Kashmir.

The government’s decision to shut down the internet in Jammu and Kashmir between 2019 and 2021, while controversial, was a security measure aimed at maintaining peace and preventing the spread of misinformation during the sensitive period. The restrictions were a response to concerns about potential violence and unrest following the abrogation of Article 370. It is important to note that the government has since made significant strides in restoring and improving internet services in the region, recognizing the essential role of connectivity in modern life. High-speed internet services have been installed, enabling better access to information, education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. This development has facilitated digital inclusion and empowered local communities by providing them with the tools needed to engage with the broader world, thus fostering socio-economic growth. The move towards improving internet infrastructure reflects the government’s commitment to integrating Jammu and Kashmir into the digital economy and enhancing the quality of life for its residents.

The conclusion of the Human Rights Watch report on Jammu and Kashmir should consider substantive progress made since the revocation of Article 370. After revocation of Article 370 initiatives have led to a marked decrease in violence and increased economic development, which indicates a movement towards normalcy and integration with broader India. These achievements, along with efforts to improve connectivity, healthcare, and educational opportunities, showcase a commitment to enhancing the lives of Jammu and Kashmir’s residents.

By: Mahima Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Bay of Bengal has long been a vital maritime crossroads, connecting the civilizations of South and Southeast Asia. For centuries, the bustling ports and thriving trade routes around this inland sea fostered a shared sense of community and common destiny among the peoples living along its shores. However, in the aftermath of the mid-20th century decolonization, the Bay of Bengal region became fragmented, with newly independent nations pursuing separate goals and alliance systems. The region’s historic unity and economic integration eroded, replaced by a patchwork of competing interests and uneven development.

It was against this backdrop that the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was born in 1997, with the ambitious aim of reviving the Bay of Bengal’s role as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Bringing together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, BIMSTEC represented a bold attempt to reinvigorate the region’s shared heritage of commerce, culture and community.

Yet more than two decades later, as BIMSTEC marks its 27th anniversary, the question remains: has this regional grouping been a success or a failure? This is what we shall explore in this article.

Potential and Few Feathers

BIMSTEC represents a significant opportunity to revive the historic unity and economic integration of the Bay of Bengal region. By connecting the diverse economies and cultures of South Asia and Southeast Asia, BIMSTEC has the potential to leverage the collective resources and markets of its member countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

The BIMSTEC region is home to around 1.5 billion people, approximately 21% of the global population, with a cumulative GDP of US$ 2.5 trillion. The annual GDP growth rate has averaged around 6%, indicating the significant economic potential of the grouping.

One of BIMSTEC’s key accomplishments has been in the area of connectivity. The grouping has made progress on important infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Facility, which connects India’s northeastern states to the Sittwe Port in Myanmar.  Additionally, the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement has facilitated cross-border road transport, enhancing regional integration.  These connectivity initiatives have the potential to boost trade, investment, and people-to-people linkages across the Bay of Bengal region.

BIMSTEC has also expanded its agenda to cover a wider range of cooperation areas, from counter-terrorism and disaster management to energy and agriculture. The MILEX-18 joint military exercise, for instance, was a major success and a positive sign for the future of BIMSTEC security cooperation.  The member states have demonstrated a willingness to work together on shared challenges, laying the groundwork for deeper regional integration.

Moreover, BIMSTEC has made strides in institutionalizing its framework, with the establishment of a Secretariat in Dhaka in 2014 and the recent adoption of a BIMSTEC Charter in 2022.  These developments have provided the organization with a more robust legal and institutional foundation to pursue its objectives.

Challenges and Failures

Despite the few hoorays outlined earlier, BIMSTEC has struggled to achieve meaningful progress and establish itself as an effective regional organization. The grouping has faced a number of persistent challenges that have hindered its development and impact.

One of the key issues plaguing BIMSTEC has been the inconsistent convening of high-level meetings. The organization’s founding charter called for summits to be held every two years and ministerial meetings annually. However, in the 25 years since its inception, BIMSTEC has managed to hold only five summits – in 2004, 2008, 2014, 2018 and 2022. This lack of regular engagement at the top leadership level has undermined the group’s momentum and decision-making capabilities.

Furthermore, BIMSTEC has also suffered from a lack of sustained commitment and engagement from its member states. India, the largest economy in the grouping, has tended to view BIMSTEC primarily as a fallback option when the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) failed to make progress. Meanwhile, other major members like Thailand and Myanmar remain more focused on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This uneven attention and prioritization by member states has prevented BIMSTEC from developing a strong institutional foundation.

Additionally, BIMSTEC’s agenda covers a wide range of 14 different cooperation areas, from trade and investment to counter-terrorism and disaster management. While this breadth reflects the diverse interests of the member states, it has also made it challenging to achieve tangible progress in any single domain. The lack of prioritization and clear sequencing of initiatives has diluted BIMSTEC’s impact. One of BIMSTEC’s key economic objectives has been the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among the member states. However, despite signing a framework agreement in 2004, the grouping is still far from finalizing a comprehensive FTA. Disagreements over tariff concessions and rules of origin have stalled the negotiations, hampering the group’s economic integration agenda.

Lastly, BIMSTEC has also had to contend with various bilateral tensions and disputes among its member states. Issues like the Rohingya refugee crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the border conflict between Myanmar and Thailand, have posed challenges for regional cooperation and trust-building. These political frictions have hindered BIMSTEC’s ability to forge a cohesive agenda. The emergence of alternative regional frameworks, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, has created doubts about BIMSTEC’s unique value proposition. With China’s involvement in BCIM, some member states may be tempted to prioritize the initiative over BIMSTEC, further undermining the group’s centrality in the Bay of Bengal region.

Conclusion

BIMSTEC’s performance over the past 27 years has been a mixed bag, with both successes and failures. On the one hand, the grouping has made tangible progress in areas like connectivity, institutional development, and expanding its cooperation agenda. However, it has also faced shortcomings like inconsistency, unfocused agenda, unfinished projects and regional tensions.

So as BIMSTEC slowly inches toward its fourth decade, it finds itself at a crossroads. Can this regional organization overcome its structural and operational hurdles to become a truly effective platform for economic integration and geopolitical cooperation in the Bay of Bengal? Or is BIMSTEC destined to remain a well-intentioned but underperforming initiative, overshadowed by the ambitions of its member states and the shifting tides of regional power politics? The answers to these questions will help determine whether BIMSTEC ultimately succeeds or fails in its mission to revive the Bay of Bengal’s historic role as a vital link between South and Southeast Asia.

By: Shivangee Bhattacharya, Research Analyst, GSDN

In a recent meeting of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in Astana in 2024, the organization comprised countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, and Russia. From India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was supposed to attend the meeting on July 3^rd and 4th, but the External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar represented India. In the span of that week, PM Modi decided to visit Russia on July 8^–9^t, 2024.

This decision speculated on the possibilities of India’s withdrawal from the SCO. The decision hasn’t been taken yet, but analysing the sour relations with China, BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) has created an atmosphere of tension between China and India. Now, these speculations flared up after seeing China as the leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with this leadership of China and participants in the organization being part of BRI. Also, Sino-Pakistan relations and CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) play a role in India losing interest in the organization.

Despite these disparities, why did India choose to join the organization in the first place? India, being the only fully democratic country in the organization, has significantly denied the initiative taken by China in BRI. Among the neocolonial countries, India was the only one who decided to give a thumbs up to the China-led project.

India’s past comes from the decolonization era. After independence, India decided to be non-aligned with any superpower that existed at that time. The US was leading the world as the hegemon and creating a new global era. India’s foreign policy since independence has been to be neutral and non-aligned. With the decision to join SCO, India thought that aligning with the non-western organization could help them establish international relationships, and this organization could also help them strengthen relations with Central Asia.

In the famous quote where it was mentioned that “keep your friends close and enemies closer,” participation was not restricted because of China. Unfortunately, it was observed that the organization wasn’t giving any importance to Indian foreign policy. The participation of the largest population and economy elevated the international legitimacy of SCO in the world. The welcome of Iran to the SCO marked the organization being perceived as an anti-Western autocracy.

At the start of joining SCO, this decision was merely related to regional security; now it has become more of a rivalry between China and Russia, for instance, disapproval of the title “Indo-Pacific” rather prefers calling it “Asia-Pacific”. The promises seem shallow, and agendas talking about mutual trust and benefit seem hollow for India because of Chinese military encroachment in India.

India’s initiative to join the organization is to strengthen its bilateral relations between India and Central Asia, overlooking its sour relations with Pakistan and China. Within the organization, border disputes have hampered bilateral relations since 2021. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and G20 summits have witnessed the interaction between the countries in 2023. Though despite the disputes between China and India, they stood up for multilevel relations and worked together on issues like climate change and the SDGs. Since 2017, relations between India and China have shrunk; differences have increased.

To cement relations between Central Asia and India, the countries have collaborated on the “Connect Central Asia” policy since 2012, followed by the “Act East Policy” in 2014. To flourish regional development, peace, and prosperity, the India and Central Asia summit, which happened in 2022.

The challenges persisted even after these negotiations and summits, including those related to security and connectivity. India is not a part of the BRI; the decision is related to maintaining sovereignty as the route of the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) encompasses the POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). The grouping stands out for “extremism, terrorism, and being the victim of terrorist attacks, which are state-sponsored by Pakistan. India stands out for acknowledging the need to counter the issue of terrorism. The recent Reasi attack raged India with tension as the SCO stood inefficient to counter the regional attacks of terrorism.

India’s motto of having multilateral relations with countries can be seen as India being a part of the G20 and QUAD. The Prime Minister’s absence from the recent summit of the SCO has raised concerns among the participating countries. In the year 2021, the PM joined the meeting virtually. He did participate in 2022 and held the summit virtually in 2023. In the current times, the PM of India skipped the meeting in 2024. This signifies that Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Sino border disputes are not just mere issues; the issues are way beyond the border disputes. The inconsistency of India’s participation indicates the hinderance of bilateral relations and active participation in regional meetings.

Moreover, SCO has benefited India in several areas, like establishing trade relations and vital relations with the countries of South Asia. Russia being present in the organization, which is the largest arm supplier to India, has helped in continuing relations. Despite the fact that SCO has provided a platform for trade engagement, it has failed to provide security to India in any given manner. If analysed, the organization has lost its relevance with respect to India, and looking at the current geopolitical situation in India, SCO is not benefiting India much.

For the balance of power, India is trying to maintain its relations with China’s rivals, Russia and the US. It is critical to analyse how long India will be able to maintain these relations. A recent visit to Moscow by PM Modi signified his efforts to maintain relations with Russia. It is early to say and comment about India’s withdrawal from the organization, but looking at the recent turn of events, it is giving the notion that India is giving a cold shoulder to the SCO. The reason for this behaviour can be traced back to border disputes and a lack of security insurance from the organization.

India is a growing economy, and with the largest population in the world, its growing importance in the world is increasing significantly. India’s foreign policy has changed over the years, and now it is making a significant mark through its participation in summits held. Being part of SCO, it is not getting assurance related to its agendas and growth.

By: Lipun Kumar Sanbad

The Philippines, an archipelagic nation with over 7,000 islands, sits at the heart of one of the world’s most strategically significant maritime regions. Its maritime sovereignty is not only central to its national security but also crucial for its economic stability and international standing. However, the Philippines faces multi-faceted challenges in asserting and protecting its maritime sovereignty, primarily due to overlapping territorial claims, regional geopolitical dynamics, and internal policy weaknesses. One of the most pressing issues for the Philippines is the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. This area is not only rich in natural resources but also a crucial maritime route for global trade.

The Philippines’ claim, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), conflicts with China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim. This has led to significant diplomatic and military tensions between the two nations. The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippines in 2016 was a landmark victory, yet enforcing this ruling remains a formidable challenge due to China’s continued assertive actions and the lack of a binding enforcement mechanism. the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty is critical to its national security and economic prosperity. However, it faces significant challenges due to overlapping territorial claims, regional geopolitical dynamics, and internal policy weaknesses. By adopting a comprehensive strategy that includes military, diplomatic, and internal reforms, the Philippines can better safeguard its maritime interests and uphold its sovereignty in the face of evolving challenges. This article delves into the complex landscape of the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty, examining the challenges it faces and the strategies it employs to safeguard its maritime interests.

Historical Context of Maritime Sovereignty

The Philippines’ maritime boundaries and territorial claims are deeply rooted in historical, legal, and geographical contexts. The country’s maritime jurisdiction is defined by several international agreements and national laws, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, the Philippines is entitled to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which grants it sovereign rights to explore and exploit marine resources. However, the assertion of these rights has been fraught with challenges, particularly in the South China Sea, where overlapping claims have led to heightened tensions and conflicts. The Philippines’ maritime boundaries encompass a vast area of the South China Sea, a region rich in marine biodiversity and significant for its strategic importance in global shipping routes. This expansive maritime zone has made the Philippines a critical player in regional security and economic stability. Historically, the Philippines has relied on a combination of domestic legislation and international law to assert its territorial claims. Notably, the country’s archipelagic nature, consisting of over 7,000 islands, has further complicated its maritime boundary delineation, necessitating precise and robust legal frameworks to manage its extensive waters.

Challenges to Maritime Sovereignty

(i) Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea

The South China Sea dispute is the most significant challenge to the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty. China claims almost the entire South China Sea, based on its controversial “Nine-Dash Line,” which overlaps with the EEZs of several Southeast Asian nations, including the Philippines. This has led to frequent confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels, raising concerns about potential military escalation. The Scarborough Shoal Standoff; In 2012, a maritime standoff occurred between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, a rich fishing ground within the Philippines’ EEZ. Chinese coast guard vessels prevented Filipino fishermen from accessing the area, leading to a prolonged diplomatic crisis. The incident highlighted the Philippines’ vulnerability and the aggressive tactics employed by China to assert its claims.

(ii) Environmental and Economic Threats

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is another significant challenge undermining the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty. The depletion of fish stocks due to overfishing by foreign vessels, particularly from China, has had devastating effects on the livelihoods of Filipino fishermen and the marine ecosystem. For instance, the destruction of coral reefs; Chinese fishing practices, including the use of cyanide and dynamite, have caused extensive damage to coral reefs in the Spratly Islands. These reefs are vital for marine biodiversity and serve as critical breeding grounds for fish. The environmental degradation not only threatens the region’s ecological balance but also undermines the Philippines’ economic interests.

(iii) Geopolitical Dynamics

The South China Sea is a critical maritime corridor for global trade, making it a focal point of great power competition. The United States, as a Pacific power, has a vested interest in ensuring freedom of navigation in the region. This has led to increased military presence and joint exercises with the Philippines, further complicating the geopolitical landscape. For example: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed the EDCA, allowing increased rotational presence of U.S. troops and access to Philippine military bases. While the agreement aims to bolster the Philippines’ defense capabilities, it has also drawn criticism for potentially escalating tensions with China and infringing on Philippine sovereignty.

Strategic Responses to Maritime Challenges

(i) Diplomatic and Legal Strategies

The Philippines has employed a mix of diplomatic and legal approaches to assert its maritime sovereignty. The landmark 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, was a significant legal victory for the Philippines. The ruling, however, has been largely ignored by China, highlighting the limitations of international law in resolving such disputes. The case study of PCA Arbitration Case; In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China under UNCLOS. The PCA ruling in favor of the Philippines affirmed its rights over the EEZ and recognized the environmental damage caused by China’s activities. Despite the ruling, the enforcement of international law remains a challenge, necessitating continued diplomatic efforts to garner international support and pressure China to comply.

(ii) Strengthening Maritime Security

Enhancing maritime security is crucial for protecting the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty. This involves modernizing the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, increasing patrols, and improving surveillance capabilities. The acquisition of modern naval assets and the establishment of maritime domain awareness systems are steps in this direction. The Philippine Navy has acquired new assets, such as the BRP Jose Rizal, a modern frigate equipped with advanced radar and missile systems. These acquisitions aim to enhance the country’s maritime defense capabilities and deter potential aggressors.

(iii) Regional Cooperation and Alliances

Strengthening regional cooperation and building alliances are vital strategies for the Philippines. Engaging with ASEAN member states and other regional partners helps in presenting a united front against unilateral actions that threaten regional stability. For instance, The ASEAN-China Code of Conduct; The ongoing negotiations for a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China aim to establish norms and guidelines for behavior in the disputed waters. While progress has been slow, the CoC represents a potential framework for managing conflicts and ensuring stability in the region.

(iv) Economic and Environmental Initiatives

Addressing the economic and environmental dimensions of maritime sovereignty involves sustainable management of marine resources and protecting the marine environment. The Philippines is working on initiatives to promote sustainable fishing practices and restore damaged marine ecosystems. For example: Sustainable Fishing Initiatives. The Philippines has launched programs to promote sustainable fishing practices, such as the closed fishing season in the Visayan Sea, aimed at allowing fish stocks to recover. These initiatives are essential for ensuring the long-term viability of the country’s marine resources.

Step forward

The Philippines’ maritime sovereignty is a multifaceted issue involving legal, diplomatic, security, economic, and environmental dimensions. The challenges it faces are significant, from territorial disputes with a powerful neighbor to environmental degradation and geopolitical complexities. However, through a combination of legal victories, strategic alliances, military modernization, and sustainable practices, the Philippines is working to assert and protect its maritime sovereignty. The Philippines can strengthen its maritime sovereignty through several strategic actions. Enhancing legal frameworks and enforcement ensures robust protection of its waters, while building strategic alliances with regional and global partners bolsters security.

Accelerating military modernization, including advanced technologies and training, is essential for effective defense. Promoting sustainable environmental practices preserves marine ecosystems and resources, while developing the maritime economy through fishing, tourism, and resilient infrastructure boosts economic strength. Increasing public awareness and education fosters national support for maritime sovereignty efforts. Additionally, advocating for regional cooperation addresses shared challenges and enhances collective security in the region. These combined efforts, underpinned by strategic foresight and resolve, can help the Philippines navigate challenges and secure its maritime future. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with continued resolve and strategic foresight, the Philippines can navigate these turbulent waters and secure its maritime future.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

India conducted the third parliamentary elections between April 19- June 01, 2024 where the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) claimed victory for the third consecutive term. The largest democratic exercise remains crucial for the country positioning itself as ‘’Vishwaguru’’ in the geopolitical arena, with more than 900 million registered voters exercising their democratic rights. New Delhi hosted the G-20 Presidency in 2023, aptly demonstrating ‘India’s moment has arrived’ as the country extended its outreach in the global south, to counter Beijing as diplomatic tensions simmered ahead of the inclusion of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates fearing the bloc would turn pro-China, whilst Russia already described the ties with Beijing, as the ‘’best in history’’ during the security summit in Kazakhstan.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow in July 2024, to co-chair the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin amidst the outbreak of the Ukraine-Russia war in February 2022 indicates commitment towards warmer ties, and redefines the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership the countries share, highlighting the focus areas of oil diplomacy, energy security, defense partnership including nuclear technology development, anti-terrorism, fertilizer, food transfer, and infrastructure development. The crude oil import increased to 1.97 million barrels per day (mbpd) during June 2024, the highest since July 2023.

There could be an improvement in Indo-Russia ties, with India opening two consulates in Russia’s Kazan and Yekaterinburg, to ease mobility and trade. Further, Moscow invited PM Modi to the BRICS Summit which is scheduled to be held in Kazan, Russia in October 2024. New Delhi however, has been looking to diversify its defense procurement away from Russia, to Western arms manufacturers including the US, the UK, Israel, France, Japan, Germany, and Brazil. Diversification is also driven by defense cooperation with Brazil, on sharing military information, military technology, capacity building and training, development of defense systems and equipment, and strengthening the supply chain.

Expanding footprint of India

India will continue expanding its footprint in LATAM and the Caribbean based on defense collaboration, energy security, and food security in addition to investments in the sectors of tourism, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure. The country signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while trade agreements are yet to be concluded with New Zealand, South Africa, Oman, Peru, the US, the UK, European Union and ASEAN. Development of the indigenous defense industry would enable US$ 5 billion in exports in defense hardware by 2025, with New Delhi investing in infrastructure development along the contested borders, especially with the expansionist presence of Beijing.

Prime Minister Modi did not attend the 24th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Kazakhstan in July 2024, which was represented by the Minister of External Affairs Dr S. Jaishankar who discussed the issues of terrorism, connectivity, climate change, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The summit was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Pakistan PM Shahbaz Sharif, indicating the prominent role New Delhi needs to play to balance counteracting global forces at play. The northwest borders remain affected by terror operations, which impede infrastructure development and connectivity with Central Asia via Pakistan. New Delhi remains critical of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC – sub-project of Belt and Road Initiative) violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, specifically Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK).

The SCO and BRICS + Forum could enable building ties with Central Asia, Africa, LATAM, and the Middle East, while India seeks to gain permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). An increase in terror activities in the SAHEL region might lead Ethiopia and Egypt to seek out UNSC membership, making the countries aligned with Beijing. The inclusion of Iran, with the possibility of imposition of potential US-backed sanctions might jeopardize New Delhi’s containment of the actions of Russia and China.

Connectivity, Infrastructure, and Elections in the US

The coalition government would continue the development of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) instilling connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. India looks forward to building on connectivity and infrastructural projects including Chabahar Port under the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, however, the deal could result in potential sanctions on India, the decisive factors based on upcoming US elections. The transit route opens via Afghanistan and Central Asia, avoiding the land route through Pakistan. India’s developing close relations with Russia might also affect diplomatic and trade relations with the European Union and the United States. President Obama stated that ‘’India-US strategic partnership will be the defining relationship of this century’’, which will further shape the geopolitical fervour, ahead of the Presidential Elections in the United States in November 2024, especially in case of the potential victory of former President Donald Trump.

US-China Rivalry & borders of India

The recent visit of the former Speaker of the House of Representatives – Ms. Nancy Pelosi at the doors of New Delhi, to meet the spiritual leader His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama aims to engage Beijing in resolving the Tibet Dispute, which has been taken up with the passage of the “Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act” advancing the human rights of Tibetans, and preserving their distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage as evident from the statement made by the President of the United States Joe Biden – ‘’My administration will continue to call on the People’s Republic of China to resume direct dialogue, without preconditions, with the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, to seek a settlement that resolves differences and leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet.” On the land frontier, the border standoff remains an issue of contention due to incursions made by Beijing, especially along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Depsang and Demchok sectors across eastern Ladakh and the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh.

Hedging – balancing foreign policy

Diplomatic heft calls to balance the national foreign policy between the West and the largest trading partner – Beijing, well defined by the External Affairs Minister Dr. Jaishankar as ‘’hedging.’’ The ‘’nation first’’ approach, thereby, requires New Delhi to balance military and economic security, given the trade imbalance of US$ 100 billion remains in favour of Beijing.

India will continue collaborating with the United States on clean energy and defense, conducting naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific, thereby securing the high seas based on collaborations of QUAD and the I2U2. Foreign policy objectives as well will continue to seek permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), depicting commitment towards counter-terrorism and democratic principles against the perceptions of democratic backsliding in India, which includes a decline in press freedom, civil liberties, religious divide, and a decline in human rights. Aggressive foreign policy approach raises concerns regarding conflict with the West, after the extradition of an Indian national – Nikhil Gupta to the United States, regarding involvement in the alleged assassination attempt of the Khalistani separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, which took place in New York City in June 2023.

India & Strategic Autonomy

New Delhi underwent a diplomatic fallout with Ottawa after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused Indian diplomatic agents of an alleged involvement in the assassination of the Khalistani leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia in June 2023; following which protests against the Indian Diplomatic Offices in Canada have strained Indo-Canada ties.

Protests have been reported against the changes to immigration rules in the Canadian province of Prince Edward Island, which could further affect the education and tourism potential of the two countries. Protests organized by the Khalistani separatists have been taken as a threat to the national security of India, while Ottawa perceives the issue against the right to self-determination and sovereignty of Canada, might alter foreign policy goals towards the West. India’s quest towards maintaining strategic autonomy remains critical with the potential escalation of the Taiwan Crisis and the United States – China rivalry, given its adherence to a free and open Indo-Pacific against the maritime expansion of Beijing in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

India-China and the Neighbourhood First

The ‘’Neighbourhood First Policy’’ and the ‘‘Act East Policy’’ can ensure improved ties with the neighborhood, while securing maritime territorial rights of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, however, clashes due to the fisherman issue and over Katchatheevu island could further push Colombo close to Beijing.

An influx of Rohingya refugees along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border could as well pose a challenge to the coalition government, while the administration seeks to implement the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), to deport refugees back to their home countries. The issue could further be exacerbated by the ongoing human rights crisis in the north-east, concerns have already been raised by the United States and the European Union. The Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina took a visit to Beijing, wherein the development of Teesta Basin and failure on the part of New Delhi to formalize the water sharing agreement might push Dhaka closer to Beijing, as it conducted an agreement on Rohingya Repatriation. Beijing has been developing infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, which could jeopardize New Delhi’s efforts to emerge as the net security provider in the global south.

Economy, diaspora, and humanitarian assistance

Economic policies and foreign policies are likely to be shaped by elections in the European Union, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United States, Indonesia, and South Africa. Economic diplomacy shaped the conclusion of the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) with four member European Free Trade Association (EFTA), debt restructuring in Sri Lanka, military assistance and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Ukraine War and Israel-Palestine conflict will further define relations with the European Union, on the other hand, China, Egypt, and the United States have been involved in peace negotiations in the Middle East, wherein continuation of close cooperation with Israel, amidst the ongoing war might affect India’s relations with the West, though New Delhi could continue providing humanitarian relief for Palestinians.

Speaking of the Ukraine-Russia War, New Delhi refused to condemn the war or back any international sanctions, while New Delhi enabled evacuation for the diaspora stuck in the warzone. Moscow further promised to discharge Indians caught up in the Russian conflict, who were falsely inducted to join its army and forced into active combat in Ukraine, some of them were suspected to have been trafficked; the issue however, can be taken up against the ruling government.

Economic Collaborations under Viksit Bharat

De-dollarisation and currency swap agreement with Russia could as well lead to investments, though New Delhi has been diversifying its defense partnership from the largest arms supplier to the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Israel. The international collaborations could further enable investments in the country, amidst shifting supply chain structures under the ‘’China Plus One (C+1)’’ policy under the ‘Make in India’ program, which could enable the country to escalate to a GDP of US$ 30 trillion economy under the ‘’Viksit Bharat’’ program by 2047.

New Delhi decided not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), affecting its regional standing in South East Asia. However, defense production and exports based on ASEAN-India cooperation could pave the way out for economic development. The South Asian region especially gained prominence after leaders from Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Seychelles were invited to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi, depicting the implementation of the ‘’Neighbourhood First’’ Policy and ‘’SAGAR’’ Vision. The foreign policy marked a continuity of balancing deterrence and diplomacy, with anti-piracy naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and countering attacks in the Red Sea Region, thereby protecting freedom of navigation amidst the ongoing Israel-Palestinian War, as mentioned in the 2024 manifesto. The agenda has been taken up ahead of the possibility of Beijing expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which is likely to be countered by New Delhi conducting naval and military exercises and training missions.

The Approach of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

India will continue extending its presence in the Indo-Pacific, while it has issued a line of credit to neighboring countries. The foreign policy approach needs to be balanced with the potential escalation of anti-India rhetoric due to ongoing tensions in the northeast, social unrest, communal disharmony, and a perceived fall in democratic values including freedom of speech and civil liberties.

The economic grit might be jeopardized by falling demographic dividend, potential influx of refugees, burgeoning internal instability due to communal disharmony, and implementing a uniform civil code which could lead to conflict with the opposition. The issues can also affect unobstructed parliamentary functioning; the opposition, however, supports labor reforms, instilling entrepreneurship, vocational training, tourism, and tech-based development, which could also be enabled by the diaspora supporting higher education and research initiatives, in turn, India provides for capacity building and training based on the initiative of ‘‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.”

Domestic strife and unstable geopolitical environment could potentially undermine India’s soft power, and pose a challenge to the demographic dividend which could lead India to become the third-largest economy by 2030. An increase in terror activities during the G-20 Summit and the post-elections oath-taking ceremony makes it imperative to revisit national security – the hawkish approach initially paved by the “2014 Doval Doctrine”.

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Nestled between the Himalayas and the Karakoram, Gilgit-Baltistan is a region of breathtaking beauty and strategic importance. Yet, this gem of South Asia has endured over seven decades of suffering and atrocities under Pakistani occupation. Since 1947, the people of Gilgit Baltistan have faced political disenfranchisement, demographic manipulation, sectarian violence, economic exploitation, and cultural suppression, all while their plight remains largely ignored by the international community.

A Legacy of Oppression

Gilgit-Baltistan, initially part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, was occupied by Pakistan during the chaos of partition. Despite its significance, the region has never been granted constitutional recognition or associated rights. Instead, it has been administered as a colonial territory, with Islamabad imposing its will on the local population. The imposition of the Gilgit-Baltistan Orders of 2009 and 2018 centralized power in Islamabad, stripping the region’s elected assembly of any real authority and further entrenching its dependence on federal oversight.

Sectarian Strife and Demographic Manipulation

One of the most egregious aspects of Pakistan’s rule has been its deliberate efforts to alter the region’s demographic and sectarian landscape. Historically, Gilgit-Baltistan has been home to a diverse mix of ethnic groups and sectarian communities, including Shia Muslims, Ismailis, and Noor Bakshis. However, since the 1970s, Pakistani authorities have encouraged Sunni migration, aiming to dilute the Shia majority’s influence. This policy, initiated under Zia ul Haq, has led to increased sectarian tensions and violence, with notable massacres in 1988, 1990, and subsequent years.

Economic Exploitation

The region’s vast natural resources and strategic location have been exploited for the benefit of Pakistan and its allies, particularly China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), announced in 2013, has brought extensive infrastructure projects to Gilgit Baltistan, but these have primarily served external interests. The 2018 Gilgit-Baltistan Order ensured that control over critical infrastructure remained with the central government, depriving the region of economic autonomy and increasing its financial dependence on Islamabad. Land acquisition for CPEC projects has often been conducted without adequate compensation or consultation, leading to widespread discontent and displacement.

Cultural Suppression and Human Rights Violations

The Pakistani state has systematically sought to erode Gilgit-Baltistan’s unique cultural identity through policies that undermine local languages, traditions, and practices. Reports of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings targeting activists and dissenters are rampant. The lack of independent media and the suppression of freedom of expression have further silenced the voices of the people.

A Growing Call for Reunification with India

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in protests by the locals of Gilgit-Baltistan. Since 2022, more than 100 protests were reported across the region, with thousands of locals participating. These demonstrations have been fueled by grievances over land rights, economic exploitation, and the lack of political representation. A growing number of locals are calling for reunification with India, disillusioned by decades of neglect and oppression under Pakistani rule. A survey conducted in late 2022 revealed that approximately 40% of respondents in Gilgit-Baltistan expressed a desire to join India, citing better governance and historical ties.

A Call to Action

The story of Gilgit-Baltistan is one of resilience amidst adversity. For over seven decades, its people have endured unimaginable hardships under Pakistani occupation. It is high time for the international community to recognize the suffering of the people of Gilgit Baltistan and support their struggle for self-determination and human rights. By bringing attention to their plight, we can help bring an end to their suffering and pave the way for a brighter, more just future for Gilgit-Baltistan.

India, too, must engage with the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and nationalist groups seeking moral support. By reaching out, India can garner more support for Gilgit Baltistan’s reunification, a sentiment that is gaining momentum despite Pakistan’s suppression. Additionally, New Delhi should work to draw international attention to the atrocities in Gilgit-Baltistan. Highlighting these issues will give a voice to the region’s people and draw attention to the broader Kashmir issue, which has been neglected by the international community for too long.

The world cannot remain silent while the people of Gilgit-Baltistan continue to suffer. It is time to stand with them, to acknowledge their struggles, and to support their quest for justice and self-determination.

By: Srijan Sharma

Last serious assassination attempt on an US President/ex-President was made in May 2005 when an Armenian named Vladmir Arutyunian threw a live Soviet-made RGD-5 hand grenade toward the podium where the former US President George W. Bush was giving a speech. Fortunately, the grenade didn’t explode because a red tartan handkerchief was wrapped tightly around it, preventing the safety lever from detaching. However, US Presidents especially those who steered USA during conflict times had close brushes with assassination attempts.  One more serious attempt was planned on Bill Clinton by the Al-Qaida chief Osama Bin Laden in 1994. Laden recruited Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, to attempt to assassinate Clinton. However, Yousef decided that security would be too effective and decided to target Pope John Paul II instead.  In 1981, former US President Ronald Regen was shot by John Hickely to impress actress Jodie Foster, with whom he had developed an erotomaniac obsession after viewing her in the 1976 film Taxi Driver.

The Threat Matrix of US Presidents

The threat matrix of US Presidents has always been high but it reached to concerning levels whenever US was contesting battles abroad.  Many survived but few were not lucky.  The threat assessment works on wide arrays and the most difficult part is predicting the exact degree of threat. According to reports and a former Secret Service Director, former US President Donald Trump faced around eight threats per day which average out to about 2000 threats per year.  With increasing developments in cyberworld, the threat emanating from the cyberspace is increasingly becoming difficult to track and eliminate. However, a brief study was done by Secret Service National Threat on evaluating risks on targeted violence and its approaches, first in 1995 and then in 1999. The Secret Service in its monograph titled “Preventing Assassination” in 1997 concluded that assassination is the end result of a discernible and understandable process of thinking and behaviour and perhaps works on micro to macro threat assessment where micro means individual level threats where threats from specific individuals civilians with psychological disorders or stunt maniacs, extremists, criminal syndicates which are not limited to only external domains those can even include individual threats within home.

The macro level threat exists considering US’ national security and its strategic decisions impacting geopolitics or any specific region. The macro level emanates from organizational levels, terror outfits, another state, the threat scale etc. In case macro level threat increases, intelligence gathering and investigations help detect the degree of threat that US Presidents face, especially when security environment around US becomes serious.

In both the cases, there is a common link which is the leadership behaviour and its decisions which impacts micro and macro threats.  The example of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by an Israeli ultranationalist after signing Oslo Accords is one way of assessing the relationship of leadership behaviour and threat matrix.  Similarly, the case of assassination of the US President Abraham Lincoln too reflects the importance of leadership’s behaviour.  In this case Lincoln was assassinated by a supporter of slavery and an opposer of idea of equality named John Wikes Booth, as he believed that Lincoln who supported idea of quality and was against slavery will overthrow constitution.  In totality, the threat assessment to be close to accurate has to go through qualitive intelligence assessment without any intel biases. Also, it must have a thorough scan of security environment. Thirdly, it must run a impact test of current leadership’s decisions and President’s popularity and hostility which will help to identify micro level threats. The macro level threats automatically get generated by intelligence agencies and counter terror setups.

Failure of Threat Assessments and Secret Service

The most startling miss by the Secret Service was the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy where a former US Marine Corps trooper named Lee Harvey Oswald, shot the President when his Presidential Motorcade passing through Daely Plaza in Dallas. Kennedy was shot once in the back the bullet exiting via his throat, and once in the head.  Warren Commission thoroughly investigated the assassination and ruled out conspiracy and put all blame on Oswald that he did it all alone.  However, still many analysts and even Americans don’t accept that. A conspiracy theory was swamped that the deep state system in the US conspired the assassination of its own President and the reason to some extent was quite obvious that the CIA budget had been slashed, CIA’s failure in Cuba and various other factors had made President Kennedy’s relationship with CIA quite troublesome.

The question of Secret Service was too examined and the agency was asked to make few modifications in their security details. Surprisingly, Commission member Richard Russell told the Washington Post in 1970 that Kennedy had been the victim of a conspiracy, criticizing the commission’s no-conspiracy finding and saying “we weren’t told the truth about Oswald”. John Sherman Cooper also considered the ballistic findings to be “unconvincing”.

The Overload of Threat Assessment: Trump’s assassination Attempt

Threat assessment can go wrong and it can be become a victim of intelligence bias or situation bias sometimes as to some extent reflected in Kennedy’s case. The reason of biasness and failed assessment is the overload of threat in evolving threat landscape. The argument of achieving 100 percent threat accuracy is too far fetched and near to impossible, but a near or high accuracy is possible at least from professional state agencies. The overload of assessments sometimes forces the agencies to overlook the micro threats which sometimes are present in their home regardless of internal or external abetments, which also include civilians with psychological disorder. An increase in situational awareness and close attention to micro threats especially in election season could have prevented Trump’s assassination attempt.  An introspection and need of filtration of threats, a strategic enhancement to increase their situational awareness should become priority for the security agencies to save themselves from getting caught off guard, as their one mistake can have serious implications.