By: Yash Gajmal

In the realm of international relations, where stability is often considered paramount, the book “Volatility in International Politics” challenges conventional wisdom by focusing on a critical yet overlooked aspect: the inconsistency in states’ behaviours toward one another. Authored by Eleonora Mattiacci, the book seeks to unravel the complexities surrounding why certain countries exhibit more volatile behaviour in specific moments, introducing a nuanced perspective to the study of international relations.

Traditionally, international relations studies have predominantly explored consistent patterns of change, such as escalation or reconciliation. However, “Volatility in International Politics” ventures into uncharted territory by investigating the origins of inconsistencies, shedding light on instances when states become more unpredictable in their interactions. By doing so, the book prompts scholars to move beyond simplistic classifications of states’ relations as either conflictual or cooperative, stable or unstable.

The central premise of the book lies in understanding volatility as a unique form of change in states’ behaviours, with profound implications for the international arena. Volatility introduces uncertainty, making it challenging to predict future events based on historical behavior or major events. This unpredictability, the authors argue, induces fear and irrational behaviors among actors in the international system, ultimately impacting decision-making and strategies.

Volatility can provide an important missing piece of the puzzle when it comes to current explanations of states’ behaviours. It captures important nuances in behaviors within the international arena that are not well explored in present conceptualizations. In essence, “Volatility in International Politics” offers a compelling departure from the status quo, providing a fresh lens through which to examine the inconsistencies in states’ behaviors.

The author argued that the exploration of factors influencing increased volatility in states’ behaviors unfolds in a three-step argument. Firstly, the theory identifies the permissive condition for volatile behavior, positing that a country’s relative power in comparison to its counterpart is a critical determinant. As relative power increases, states gain more options, both cooperative and conflictual, enabling them to shift between behaviors more effectively.

The second step introduces the catalysing condition for volatile behavior: the presence of a diverse set of domestic interests competing for control over foreign policy definition. In a context of rising relative power, the involvement of competing domestic interests augments a state’s volatility towards its counterpart. This dynamic arises from the potential for each foreign policy decision to impact the distribution of material and symbolic resources among diverse domestic groups, leading to varying consequences.

The final step emphasizes the interaction between a heterogeneous set of domestic interests and an increase in relative power. The simultaneous presence of these factors enhances a country’s volatility in its behaviours toward others. As clashing domestic interests gain representation, a country with greater relative power possesses more options to satisfy these interests, thereby increasing volatility.

In contrast to episodic notions of foreign policy, where international relations are viewed as discrete events, this argument provides a comprehensive explanation for volatility, addressing gaps left by alternative theories centred on mixed signals, leaders, coalitions, and issue-based explanations. The chapter thus enriches the understanding of the intricate dynamics governing states’ behaviors on the international stage.

In chapter, ‘Measuring Volatility’ the author introduces a methodology for measuring volatility in states’ behaviors, challenging conventional approaches prevalent in other fields. Rather than adopting “one solution fits all” methods like standard deviation, the chapter advocates for the Box-Jenkins procedure. This approach, when applied to the time series of states’ behaviors, uniquely overcomes challenges associated with noise and inflation, consistently isolating volatility across diverse cases and time periods. Its flexibility allows for the derivation of patterns directly from empirical records, making it versatile. Moreover, this innovative procedure extends its applicability to studying volatility by other international actors. It highlights the potential of the Box-Jenkins procedure to enhance our comprehension of international politics by revealing the diversity within conventional classifications such as rivalries and alliances. The focus on transitions between cooperation and conflict, rather than merely examining conflict incidence, unveils rich facets of state behaviors. The recognition that volatility varies over time and across cases underscores the importance of explaining this variation and the unique contribution of volatility to the broader understanding of international relations. In recognizing volatility as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, the chapter underscores the necessity of adopting a comprehensive, diverse approach to its study. This involves combining various data sources and triangulating across different methodologies. Overall, the chapter lays the foundation for a well-rounded measurement of volatility.

In chapter, ‘Volatility and Rivals’ the author explores the relationship between power, interests, and the occurrence of volatile behavior in international rivalries. The findings suggest that having more power alone doesn’t necessarily lead to more volatility unless there are divided interests within a country. This challenges theories that solely rely on power to explain erratic behavior in foreign policy, like hedging strategies. The research indicates that when a country holds low relative power, having multiple and diverse domestic interests doesn’t significantly impact foreign policy volatility. However, as a country’s power superiority increases, the presence of varied domestic interests significantly boosts volatility.

In simpler terms, when a powerful country deals with diverse internal interests, it’s more likely to behave unpredictably in international relations. Both factors, power, and interests, are crucial and work together to increase volatility. The varying levels of volatility in how one rival behaves towards another highlight the complexity of these relationships, urging us to look beyond mere conflict. These results open new research avenues. Firstly, they question the assumption that states always act as unified entities in international politics. The chapter suggests that without considering a country’s internal dynamics, predicting volatile behaviour becomes challenging. This raises the question of when assuming states as unitary actors is a valid simplification. Secondly, the findings underscore the importance of delving into the role of leaders in international politics. The analysis hints that change in states’ behaviors might not solely be attributed to leaders, prompting further exploration of how leaders systematically influence these changes. Lastly, the chapter provides mixed results on the impact of contentious issues on volatility, inviting more investigation into this aspect. In essence, this chapter unveils the intricate dance between power, domestic interests, and volatile behavior, challenging conventional wisdom and paving the way for deeper exploration of these dynamics in international relations.

The author also focused how the dynamics of volatility played out in the alliance context, specifically between the United States and France from 1954 to 1966. Three key findings emerge. First, when France’s relative power increased, and a diverse set of interests influenced its foreign policy decisions, volatility between the allies rose. Second, despite relative power not reverting to pre-1954 levels, a decrease in diverse interests’ influence after 1961 led to a reduction in France’s volatility toward the US. Third, explanations cantered on leadership changes failed to account for the shifts in volatility during this period.

The chapter digs into the complexities of alliances, unlike previous studies, this research zeroes in on a shorter timeframe, offering a detailed analysis of how volatile behavior unfolded and its consequences. Notably, the chapter explores how decision-makers perceive and react to volatility in alliance interactions. Statistical tests comparing issues pre- and post-1962 reveal no significant difference in the number of present issues. The chapter emphasizes that issues like communism, European integration, the German question, nuclear weapons, NATO, and French colonialism persisted despite decreased volatility. France and the US dynamically created and reshaped issues, aligning with their political goals.

In 1966, US-France relations were described as reaching a low point, with some scholars even considering France a greater threat to Western unity than Communism during the Cold War. The chapter offers in-depth evidence on the evolution of volatility between allies. It highlights how an increase in relative power became a condition allowing volatility, and diverse interests catalysed it. Importantly, the chapter demonstrates how the proposed theory applies not only during crises but also in everyday foreign policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of various aspects in international relations.

The thing that I personally found interesting is that; this book breaks new ground by offering the first comprehensive exploration of volatility in how countries behave on the global stage. It not only puts forward a compelling explanation for why nations sometimes act inconsistently but also supports its claims with empirical evidence. Understanding volatility, as emphasized in this concluding chapter, carries multiple benefits. It can help mitigate the negative impacts of unpredictable behavior, fill gaps in existing international relations puzzles, and pave the way for further investigations into volatility across various aspects of global politics.

The study prompts a re-evaluation of our assumptions about international politics, urging a nuanced understanding of how change unfolds. By viewing cooperation and conflict as a continuum with diverse dynamics, the book challenges traditional perspectives. It highlights how the uncertainty bred by volatility often leads decision-makers to engage in counterproductive actions, emphasizing the need to break free from cyclic historical understandings. Instead of instinctively fearing volatility, the book argues that a proper understanding of its origins can prevent dangerous aversions, fostering a more informed approach to navigating the complexities of international relations. In essence, the book takes a crucial first step toward unravelling the complexities of volatility in global politics.

The author fails to explore the potential benefits of creative diplomacy, which prioritizes negotiation, compromise, and cooperation to counteract volatility in global relations. Diplomacy, an integral part of statecraft, works to minimize power politics, enabling nations to pursue their interests without resorting to force. It establishes a stable transaction network, reducing the inconsistent shifts in foreign policy linked to volatility. The author overlooks current research on the “security dilemma,” a key factor causing fear, uncertainty in cooperation, and a lack of trust in international relations. This dilemma is the primary, conflict-driven context, where volatility is just a symptom. Understanding the broader context is crucial to grasp the exact role of volatility in the cycle of power competition, escalation, and armed conflict.

Despite shortcomings; in essence, “Volatility in International Politics” provides a fresh perspective, urging scholars and policymakers to navigate the complexities of global interactions with a more nuanced understanding of volatility.

By: Nabhjyot Arora, Research Analyst, GSDN

‘’The United States must refrain from stirring up trouble or taking sides on the South China Sea issue after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that a security deal with the Manila extended to attacks on the Philippine coast guard’’. – Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America 

The South China Sea has re-emerged as a region of contention after a cannon attack damaged a Philippine vessel and injured three navy personnel in March 2024. New Delhi has been supportive of the sovereignty and maritime interests of the Philippines amidst the skirmish following the territorial expansion of Beijing in the South China Sea. The maritime dispute has brought to the fore the relevance of the quasi-security architecture ‘QUAD – The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ in securing the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

QUAD was resurrected as a security grouping in 2017 by the United States, Japan, Australia, and India to uphold democratic values and respect for international law, which could counter the assertiveness exerted by China in the Indo-Pacific. The alliance has its roots in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami aimed at Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) assistance with the formation of a Tsunami Core Group. Formalized by Shinzo Abe – former Prime Minister of Japan in 2007 – QUAD undertook a maritime exercise in the Bay of Bengal later in 2007, which also included Singapore, before getting dormant for a decade due to apprehensions by Australia, against antagonizing China.

Pivot to Indo-Pacific

A pivot to Indo-Pacific was observed in 2021– when the ‘March Declaration’ laid out the spirit of the QUAD – stating: ‘’We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.’’ 

The March 2021 declaration laid out the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with the inclusion of the Philippines towards the formation of QUAD 2.0 – an expansion sought by South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam. The alliance has meanwhile expanded from maritime security to economic and non-traditional security issues with working groups established on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and countering disinformation. There is no mutual defense pact in effect, thereby, the alliance works more as a strategic and diplomatic forum.

QUAD aims for defense cooperation by aligning armies together under the Indo-Pacific Framework, which can be backed by the US Secretary of Defence Llyod Austin outlining military plans in Asia, stating China as the main challenge. The US hosted the first Quad leaders’ summit in March 2021 underlining the importance it placed not only on the Indo-Pacific but on the QUAD. Beijing has been working as per expansionist policy with the militarization of islands and establishment of business hubs under the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Route; whilst China has attempted to represent the alliance as ‘Asian NATO’.

Maritime Security

The dispute between the Philippines and China has highlighted the importance of maritime security enabling adherence to a rule-based order as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS is regarded as the global constitution for the seas signed by 162 nations. The Philippines and Japan have been facing challenges with Beijing over the Senkaku Islands, East China Sea, and South China Sea, however, with the US as a non-signatory to the convention, Beijing has refused any interference by the third parties in the disputed region.

“UNCLOS 1982 is particularly important in that regard as the Constitution of the seas. All parties must adhere to it in its entirety, both in letter and in spirit. I take this opportunity to firmly reiterate India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty.” – Dr. S. Jaishankar

A critical view is made with the effectiveness of QUAD in safeguarding the freedom of navigation, however, with the US engaged in the Hamas-Israel War and the Ukraine Conflict, conflicts in the Indo-Pacific have taken a backseat. The US President Joseph Biden cancelled the trip to the QUAD Summit in Sydney in May 2023 due to impending debt default, following which the heads of government of Australia, India, Japan, and the US met on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan. There have been concerns regarding the escalation of conflict with China, in case of an increased presence of the US in the Indo-Pacific, skirmishes including the claims on Arunachal Pradesh, the Taiwan Conflict, South China Sea issue could pave the way for India to check the hegemonic actions of China.

With the elevation of the alliance to leader-level dialogue and improved cooperation, countries in ASEAN could help maintain stability and check illegal maritime activities. QUAD’s ‘Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness’ seeks to support states in the region in combating illegal maritime activities. Sharing information and satellite data on vessel movement based on the data obtained from automatic identification systems (AIS) provides opportunities to check vessel movements and combat the threat of surveillance by China.

‘’We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.’’ – QUAD March 2021 Declaration

Expansion of the QUAD

QUAD has emerged as a multilateral alliance with the dependency of Japan and Australia on the US for economic and security purposes, while South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand have shown interest in joining the QUAD alliance. ‘QUAD Plus’ or ‘QUAD 2.0’ pertains to addressing regional security challenges, enhancing maritime security, promoting economic stability, and counterbalancing the influence of other powers in the region. The inclusion of Israel, the USA, and the UAE marks the formation of  ‘I2U2’ also known as the ‘Middle Eastern QUAD’, which amongst the ongoing conflict in West Asia becomes imperative for strengthening regional security architecture.

Beijing has been scaling its presence in West Asia, while India has been acting on the ‘Look West’ Policy with the US already engaged in the region. India activating its presence in the QUAD could enable countering the incursions of Beijing on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to the Malacca Strait, and the Red Sea Region, based on cooperation in securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). The US presence remains focused on the South China Sea and the East China Sea, enabling India to secure the Indian Ocean Region.

‘’The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, announced by the Quad grouping, is a testament to our commitment to a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific’’; ‘’building networks and partnerships would be instrumental in ensuring the security and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)’’ – Indian Navy Chief Admiral R. Hari Kumar

Challenges & Way Forward

Challenges remain in securing cooperation especially after the Indo-Russian partnership and Indo-Iran partnership enabled New Delhi to build energy, defense, and economic security. QUAD 2.0 involves the inclusion of the Philippines, however, it excluded the involvement of India raising apprehensions regarding the division between members to expand an already existing alliance in the Indo-Pacific. Israel’s envoy to India – Naor Gilon – made a statement that the expansion of QUAD was not against any one country and the major factor for the countries to come together was due to the instability caused by Iran in the region.

The exclusion of India indicates that QUAD and QUAD 2.0 serve different purposes with the latter having a stronger military focus concerning the South China Sea region and the former emphasizing non-traditional security threats, disaster relief and humanitarian relief measures, climate change, protecting marine resources and fisheries with the formation of Quad Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Mechanism in the May 2022 Tokyo Summit.

The expansion of the QUAD grouping led the US and the Philippines to sign the Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, which provided an opportunity for India to build a defense partnership and enable the Philippines to procure more arms from it. India has been shifting from non-alignment to taking an active role in security dynamics, however, remains cautious against getting entrapped in the Sino-U.S. conflict.

‘’The QUAD also launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which will offer a near-real-time, integrated, and cost-effective maritime-domain-awareness picture. It will enhance the ability of partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and he Indian Ocean to fully monitor their waters’’ – QUAD Summit in Tokyo, May 2022

Security Cooperation & Containment of China

The US House of Representatives passed ‘Strengthening the QUAD Act’ on February 16, 2024 indicating the possibility of an active role the US could play in the Indo-Pacific. The act would enable the establishment of a ‘QUAD Intra-Parliamentary Working Group’ to facilitate closer cooperation between the US, Australia, India, and Japan. It also would establish guidelines for annual meetings and group leadership. Under the act, the group is required to submit an annual report to the congressional foreign affairs committees. The act stresses cooperation on pandemic preparedness, technological innovation, and economic integration, with security cooperation taking a backseat.

A shift in foreign policy has been observed, with Australia pivot to China ahead of the discontent from the grouping, which India is against turning into ‘Indo-Pacific NATO’. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to China despite unstable relations, New Delhi’s trade cooperation despite conflict over border regions, and cooperation by the US on containing Iran and enabling stability in the Middle East highlights the varied expectations and aims in dealing with China. Japan and India agreed to step up security and economic cooperation to boost their ties against the Chinese influence in the region.

Japan aims to improve security cooperation with developing countries, whilst enabling arms trade with India. With Japan standing as a security provider for countries facing the territorial expansion of China, India, and Japan could cooperate to institutionalize the QUAD. With Russia termed as a challenge in the National Security Strategy released by Japan, the division of interests could affect the coherent operations of QUAD. QUAD acts as a deterrent against coercion of any external powers and retains the position of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), however, the internal divide and an increasing military assertion remain a challenge as a grouping to contain China.

‘’The Quad is here to stay. The Quad is here to grow. The Quad is here to contribute.’’ – Dr. S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister, India.

By: Mahima Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) stands as a pivotal framework for cooperation in the Mekong subregion, encompassing Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. This initiative, launched in 2009 by the United States, aims to address shared challenges and promote sustainable development in the region. The geopolitical significance of the LMI lies in its role as a platform for fostering partnerships among key players like the United States and China, along with other regional partners. These countries play crucial roles in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia, with their interests intersecting in the Mekong subregion. The involvement of major powers like the United States and China underscores the strategic importance of the Mekong River basin, not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of security and influence. As such, understanding the dynamics of the LMI and the roles played by these key players is essential for comprehending the broader geopolitical implications within the Mekong subregion.

History and Objectives

The historical background leading to the establishment of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) is rooted in the geopolitical dynamics that have long shaped the Mekong region. The Mekong River, flowing through Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, has been a focal point for regional cooperation and competition among major powers. The strategic interests of countries like the United States and China in the Mekong subregion have been influenced by factors such as trade routes, access to natural resources, and geopolitical influence.

The establishment of the LMI in 2009 marked a significant milestone in regional cooperation, aiming to address shared challenges and promote sustainable development in the Mekong subregion. This initiative reflects a shift towards multilateral engagement and cooperation to tackle transboundary issues like water security, infrastructure development, and environmental sustainability. Major powers, including the United States and China, have recognized the strategic importance of the Mekong River basin, and have sought to leverage their influence through initiatives like the LMI.

Geopolitical dynamics in the Mekong region have been shaped by a complex interplay of economic interests, security concerns, and regional power struggles. The Mekong subregion serves as a critical geopolitical arena where major powers compete for influence and seek to advance their strategic objectives. Understanding these dynamics is essential to grasp the broader implications of initiatives like the LMI and how they intersect with the strategic interests of key players in the region.

The main objectives of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) encompass a comprehensive approach to promoting sustainable development, infrastructure building, water resource management, and regional economic integration in the Mekong subregion. The LMI, initiated by the United States in 2009, aims to foster integrated sub-regional cooperation and capacity building among countries like Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Burma. One of the key goals of the LMI is to facilitate an integrated water management scheme for the lower Mekong River, addressing the clash between plans for harnessing the river’s hydroelectric potential for economic development and traditional uses of the river. Infrastructure building is another crucial objective of the LMI, focusing on enhancing connectivity and developing regional infrastructure systems to support economic growth and development. This includes initiatives to improve transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and other key facilities to boost regional connectivity and trade. Water resource management is a significant area of focus within the LMI, aiming to address transboundary water challenges and promote sustainable use of water resources in the Mekong subregion Furthermore, the LMI seeks to advance regional economic integration by promoting equitable and inclusive economic growth in the Mekong region. By fostering cooperation in areas such as agriculture, food security, education, energy security, environment, and health, the initiative aims to narrow the development gap in ASEAN and support regional stability and prosperity. These objectives align with broader geopolitical goals by enhancing regional cohesion, promoting sustainable development, and countering the spread of influence from other major powers, particularly China.

Geopolitical Implications

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) has far-reaching geopolitical implications on various aspects such as regional security, economic development, and environmental sustainability within the Mekong subregion. In terms of regional security, the LMI serves as a platform for fostering cooperation among Mekong countries to address common security challenges and promote stability. By focusing on initiatives that enhance infrastructure development and sustainable growth, the LMI contributes to building trust and reducing tensions in the region. This collaborative approach helps mitigate potential conflicts over shared resources like water and supports peaceful relations among neighbouring countries.

Economically, the LMI’s emphasis on infrastructure building, water resource management, and regional economic integration plays a vital role in driving economic development in the Mekong subregion. By promoting connectivity, trade, and investment, the initiative creates opportunities for economic growth and diversification, ultimately leading to shared prosperity and development. However, power dynamics among major players like China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India can influence decision-making processes related to economic initiatives in the region. Competition for influence and strategic advantages may impact the implementation of projects and policies aimed at fostering economic development within the Mekong subregion.

Furthermore, the LMI’s commitment to environmental sustainability is crucial for addressing pressing environmental challenges in the Mekong region. Issues such as water pollution, deforestation, and climate change pose significant threats to the ecological integrity of the Mekong River basin and the well-being of local communities. Through promoting sustainable development practices and environmental conservation efforts, the LMI aims to safeguard natural resources and mitigate environmental degradation. However, power dynamics among major players can influence environmental decision-making processes by shaping priorities and approaches to addressing environmental issues within the region.

Challenges

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) faces challenges and controversies that revolve around concerns over dam-building activities, environmental degradation, and competition for influence among external partners. One of the primary issues surrounding the LMI is the contentious nature of dam-building activities along the Mekong River. Plans to harness the river’s hydroelectric potential for economic development have raised environmental concerns and sparked debates over the impact of these projects on the river’s ecosystem and downstream communities. The construction of dams can lead to disruptions in water flow, affecting fish migration, sediment transport, and the livelihoods of local populations that depend on the river for sustenance. Environmental degradation is another significant challenge associated with the LMI, as the Mekong region grapples with issues like water pollution, deforestation, and climate change. Rapid economic development and infrastructure projects can exacerbate environmental pressures, leading to habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, and threats to the region’s ecological balance. Balancing the need for economic growth with environmental sustainability remains a key challenge for the LMI and its member countries, as they navigate the complexities of development in the region while preserving natural resources and ecosystem. Moreover, competition for influence among external partners, particularly major powers like China, the United States, Japan, and others, shapes the geopolitical realities in the Mekong subregion. These external actors engage in various initiatives and investments in the region to advance their strategic interests, leading to a complex web of relationships and power dynamics. The competition for influence can impact decision-making processes related to development projects, infrastructure investments, and policy directions, influencing the geopolitical landscape of the Mekong region. The quest for strategic advantages and economic benefits can sometimes overshadow concerns for environmental sustainability and social well-being, highlighting the delicate balance between development aspirations and the preservation of the region’s natural resources.

The Future of LMI

The future prospects of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) hold significant implications for regional geopolitics, particularly in light of evolving dynamics between major powers in the Mekong subregion. As the LMI continues to play a pivotal role in fostering cooperation and addressing shared challenges among Mekong countries, its potential impact on regional geopolitics is likely to be influenced by the shifting power dynamics among key players like China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India.

One key aspect of the LMI’s future prospects lies in its ability to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia amidst increasing competition for influence among external partners. The intensifying rivalry between major powers, particularly China and the United States, has led to heightened engagement with riparian countries in the Mekong region. The LMI’s success in promoting regional cohesion and sustainable development will depend on how effectively member countries, including the United States and Southeast Asia’s riparian nations, can address differences and balance competing interests related to the use of the Mekong River.

Moreover, as major powers like China expand their presence and influence through initiatives like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the future trajectory of the LMI will be shaped by how these external partnerships evolve. The competition for strategic advantages and economic benefits in the Mekong subregion may lead to both cooperation and competition dynamics among major players, influencing decision-making processes related to infrastructure projects, environmental conservation efforts, and regional economic integration.

In conclusion, the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) stands as a significant framework for cooperation in the Mekong subregion, addressing challenges and promoting sustainable development. The geopolitical implications of the LMI on regional security, economic development, and environmental sustainability are shaped by power dynamics among major players like China, the United States, and others. Challenges such as dam-building activities, environmental degradation, and competition for influence among external partners underscore the complexities of navigating geopolitical realities in the Mekong region.

Looking ahead, the future prospects of the LMI hold potential for influencing regional geopolitics amidst evolving dynamics between major powers. The initiative’s ability to foster cooperation, address shared challenges, and navigate competing interests will be crucial in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. By balancing economic development with environmental sustainability and promoting inclusive partnerships, the LMI can contribute to a more stable and prosperous future for the Mekong subregion while navigating complex power dynamics and fostering regional stability.

By: Kirti Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

“India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present” is a book written by Shivshankar Menon has propounded the whole narrative of the book along the historical lines of geopolitical transitions in a timeline manner, therefore by narrating the story of how India’s journey took the steps of diplomatic interest. With the stalwart news headlines asserting that with the opening of economic doors, China’s share in the world’s GDP rose from about two percent in 1990 to about 18 percent in 2022. The stupendous economic rise has made the country permanently revolving on the global pyramid of South Asia. With the converging victories of the Sino-Pak alliance, the internal instability of both countries has wider implications for the decisive future of the growing turbulence of China in South Asia. China’s strategic involvement with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and India has brought tables of debt devious trap in the security domains for the said countries.

In his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China will deepen relations with its neighbours in accordance with the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefits, and inclusiveness, and the policy of forging friendship and partnership with its neighbours.” However, the geopolitical relations between the nations can only be fostered when pseudo-mutual benefits clear the vision.

In India’s Way, a book authored by S. Jaishankar has blamed “legacy issues” for the growing scuffle between India and China’s problems. The recent developments of China’s longstanding profile to barging into South Asia strategically and engulfing them to burgeon its autonomy in the South Asian region has compelled regional countries to revamp their foreign policies towards China. The proclamation of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” or “Third Era” in the historical narratives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) constitutes a dictum of ‘striving for achievement’. However, in the second era, the policy was ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ as proposed by Deng Xiaoping was a fiasco that turned into the futility of the Chinese policy of sticking to the dictum.

The persistence of deep suspicion of China’s geostrategic movement in the South Asian region is a result of fulfilling its geopolitical interest through tailoring massive infrastructure development and investment programs as a catalyst of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route. The clarity of the posing narrative that China is stepping into this area for mutual benefit is a completely blurred vision primarily to gain support via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or 21st century maritime Silk Road route.

This article endeavours to navigate China’s prospects and the weight that South Asian countries can take to renunciate the pseudo phrase of ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping to weave the rest of the world as a better community to perform state action in interlinked global affairs.’

In long term potential intentions of China’s policy towards South Asia might result in “perpetual oscillation” in foreign policy of South Asian countries where it will be defined through the national interest of concerned states. The proclivities of decision-makers in international opportunities are always dynamic and not static, therefore, it is reflected in domestic capabilities in the international environment.

Evolution of Chinese discourse in South Asia

Broadly, it can be said that China’s discourse in South Asia can be classified into four different kinds of categorization. The multifaceted nature of Chinese discourse has imperatively four watersheds in summarization to understand the larger footprints. The first watershed was through travelogues which resulted in administrative details along with the study of geography, society, and cultural practices of South Asia. Further, in the second watershed, the expansion of Chinese mercantile networks in the Indian Ocean, moreover, by the sixteenth century the focus was shifted toward coastal regions of South Asia through maritime routes. In the third and fourth watersheds, the implication of the dearth of knowledge that was comprehended in South Asia was invisible, henceforth, became distorted. An accurate understanding of Chinese discourse in South Asia was visible only in the late nineteenth century when travellers from Quing China began visiting British India to mark the periodization and caveats on the past discourse to amend them and remove the notion of distorted histories.

In November 2012, President Xi Jinping first mentioned the notion of the ‘Chinese Dream’ to resurrect the Chinese nation by making the armed forces strong. In October 2013, President Xi Jinping asserted ‘The strategic goal of China’s diplomacy with neighbouring countries is to serve the realization of the two “centenary goals” and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ Therefore, it discernible that China’s goal of economic development and geopolitical considerations in its neighbourhood policy expression is to become a hegemon in the region.

In a white paper titled, ‘China’s policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’ where China made a brutal warning statement to small and medium-sized countries to not take sides among big countries. While Xi Jinping’s goal of community to common destiny is a fiasco to believe in since the instances of Sri Lanka in the recent timeline has made it a funeral to accept the fact that China’s interest since the beginning was never for the mutual benefit in the enhancing line of ‘strategic confidence based on socialism which President Xi addressed in 2018 conference.

In the recent past, the combination of Chinese discourse amalgamated with the Chinese Dream as a strategic confidence to spell out BRI as an alternative geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic framework for China to fuel up the long-standing aspiration of taking the domination of the area to its fullest.

Navigating the future aspiration of China’s dreadful mystery in investing South Asian region

Vulnerabilities residing in the South Asian region are inviting China to involve its money and power through the region in receiving experiences from each other’s footprints. The intensity of Chinese activism can manage the neighbourhood political risk to face the special challenges. While people presume only China’s factor for shaping South Asian dissonance, however, internal, external, and most importantly regional factors are the fundamentals to the same. Where the cases of building grand infrastructure to fuelling up the small countries to deceiving with its strategy, one has to keep in mind about Chinese economy taking a troubled position on the global stage. Recently, a report published by IMF stated, that GDP growth for Asia’s largest economy will slow down to 4.6% in 2024 from 5.4% in 2023, and fall further to 3.4% by 2028. On one side, China’s real estate slump and growth of 0.5% in exports which is as good as nothing.

Interpretation of Cold War 2.0 between China and the US

The global and regional disintegration between China and the US can be evident through the trade war between the concerned countries. The analogies are made on the notion of the high dynamics of the Cold War. The contemporary tensions between China and the US are often termed Cold War 2.0, where the conflict which is evident in the Middle East- Israel and Hamas and Russia-Ukraine war is not a sudden event but the result of Cold War 2.0.

In the recent developments Indo-Pacific has emerged as the fundamental flashback while proceeding with Cold War 2.0, notably, China has made a bold step to deploy uniformed police officers to Kiribati. Kiribati is a small island nation in the Pacific with a population of 115,00 people. However, I have given the instances of Kiribati to anticipate the future serious dreadful steps are already being made in India’s neighbourhood. While giving the depth of analysis in India’s neighbourhood region, a Chinese military delegation visited the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to further accentuate cooperation in defense issues. While it is needless to say, the growing strategic inclination of China towards South Asia is a clear indication to counter its strategic rival India for influence in the region by consolidating diplomatic relations with India’s neighbourhood region through “military assistance.”

While making the configuration of Cold War 2.0 visible, the geoeconomic landscape of the bifurcated global system. Simply put, the increased polarised tendency of trade, technologies, and financial systems makes global shifts which shall be discernible in major economic blocs like G20 and BRICS. These major global blocs of economic architecture contribute to a deciding factor for the South Asian region’s economic viability.

India’s way forward in contemporary lens

Under Xi Jinping, China has become a rogue nation, where its closest friends are, North Korea to the east and Pakistan to the South. For Maldives, the recent visit of President Mohamed Muizzu to Beijing is being played by Xi Jinping where Muizzu called China a “valued ally and integral collaborator.” This majorly defines the incredulity of Maldives with the case of Sri Lanka where China blocked the country with its debt trap diplomacy under the weaponization of finance by China. The frame of realpolitik aligns with what Alfred Thayer Mahan, an Admiral in the US Navy, quoted in 1897, “whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia.” Henceforth, this ocean can be one of the deciding factors in the rising emergence of China’s policy of transgression strategically.

Notwithstanding, the recent development in Xi Jinping’s administration China is facing the economic global downscaling. Notably, a long-term, multifaceted challenge to India with China exists in the disputed border with the Line of Actual Control (LAC), along with it, India needs to heed its neighbourhood policy more ostensibly by giving strategic importance to the line of India’s maritime security. Thereafter, China’s military modernization is further escalating in the vision, to complement its BRI project in the prospects, therefore, inviting serious confrontation to be faced by India.

The apprehensive disposition of India has to be amended to sustain a geopolitical factor to transverse Chinese transgression into the South Asian territories. A trend of tense dispositions at the border is unlikely to reverse to its cordial position anytime soon. The three factors through which India’s strategic relation with China can be duly performed. First and foremost, China’s hegemonic rise in South Asia is an alarming stress for India’s security where Morgenthau’s six principles come into play in the pictures. Therefore, in the decisive factors of the disputed border with China (the Line of Actual Control or LAC), the unprecedented proactive and military modernization/expansion of China’s military is the second possibility of India to make a cautious approach with China as K Sibal mentioned ‘diplomacy as an imperative factor while deciding foreign policy.’

According to C. Raja Mohan, it seems a matter of grave concern that if India and China are unable to locate the changing structural shift in the global order then the relationship between the two will no longer be credible or sustainable. Since both are putting a substantial amount of focus on the Global South. The recently conducted NAM and G-77 summit is evidence of the frequency of both India and China leveraging their geopolitical interest in the location. Moreover, China’s pitch escalated on revisiting global economic form whereas India longs for Integration and representation of Global South countries while bridging the gap between Global North and Global South. What lay ahead is, diminishing China’s presence, and this can be substantiated by India’s neighbourhood countries to unite with India to make the region- demographically, economically, socially, and politically self-reliant to the level that India’s neighbourhood need not step in the grab of China’s brutal policy. If the shoulders of strategic actions are slouched by India, then repercussions might have an iota of blameworthiness.

In conclusion, the dynamic nature of international relations is left to be evaluated on the future outcomes of the global summit which underpin the re-alignment of major powers which shall lead through strategic competition, and geoeconomic transition, with hovering bees of military expansion, however, the road for India might be the case as Robert Frost suggests “The Road not taken.”

By: Aastha Agarwal

After the resounding success of his debut book ‘The India Way’ in 2020, S Jaishankar, a veteran diplomat, former Foreign Secretary and the incumbent External Affairs Minister of India (EAM) has brought out his second book called ‘Why Bharat Matters’.

At the outset, the book is pretty compact, a compendium of neatly organised 11 chapters spread across 219 pages. The book explores a series of closely interconnected themes pertinent to Indian foreign policy and its place on the global stage.

Beginning with the title, Why Bharat Matters, there is an evident ‘decolonial’ and ‘anti-colonial’ underpinning, that might have possibly stemmed from the cultural, Indic revival under way in India. Throughout the book, the author asserts that India matters to the world because and when it is more ‘Bharat’, when it sticks with its traditions, its roots, its sanskar, its sanskriti. There are analogous references to episodes from Ramayana to demonstrate India’s strategic culture.

The context of this volume has been set as the last decade which the author calls a ‘deeply transformational era’, both globally and in domestic Indian setting. The author gives an objective picture of current global landscape marked by its challenges and complications like Covid led disruption, sharpening polarisation and the prominence of AI. Coming to how India has significantly changed in its foreign policy approach – he talks of New India that has broken out of the Non Aligned mould and engages vigorously with old and new partners, guided solely by its national interests. Also, the G20 summit has underscored India’s ability to shape global agenda and to emerge as Vishwamitra.

There is an evident ‘hero worship’ tone whenever the EAM speaks of the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi leading India’s civilizational resurgence and addressing India’s national concerns of socio-economic development. He holds PM’s grit of character as the most important factor in catalysing the image of New India, Bharat. Examples being – PM as trailblazer in India’s diaspora outreach starting with 2014 Madison Square event and a leader in climate change mitigation. His Neighbourhood approach, SAGAR vision, De-hyphenation of Israel and Palestine and serious messaging on China have been oft hailed by the author.

Thecontents of the book have been systematically organised where the first chapter presents an objective view of the current global landscape marked by sharp polarisation and explosive impacts of technology and suggests India to tell the world that it stands for rules based order, a Ram Rajya for the benefit of all. In the next chapter, the EAM asserts that foreign policy is not just for external national security but it is an exercise to meet citizen needs in routine and in crisis. The cited examples work effectively in instilling confidence of the people in its foreign affairs machinery. The author also touches upon the power of positive narratives to build coalitions over a protracted period to meet these needs.  There is some repetition in the theme of third chapter that says world is deeply interconnected but more fragile and that AI revolution comes with risks of data security.

The next chapter highlights current global challenges – backlash to globalisation, retreat of USA, increasing salience of China and the rise of mini-lateralism and regionalism to deal with challenges in a diplomatically frugal and localised manner.

The fifth chapter seemed the most interesting most informational to me. However, the tone appeared pretty partisan, pretty boastful of the ‘out of the box’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘visionary’ leadership of the prime minister in foreign policy domain.

He calls his tenure as ‘serious work in progress’ laying the foundation of Indian footprint globally – carefully cultivating SAARC, strengthening relations with major powers, tending adequately to middle powers and catering to every sub region Global south, Central Asia, Gulf and Indian Ocean states.

Again he appears as the mouth piece of the PM who has re-written India’s story on the global canvas making her the largest FDI destination. India’s feats in all areas have been underlined – space, diaspora, digital governance etc. PM has been projected as the foremost cultural ambassador of Bharat facilitating the exchange of best practices and championing fresh initiatives on climate change, counter terrorism and connectivity, and forging India’s entry into SCO, MTCR, Wassennar agreement etc.

Chapter 6 has a creative title and an important subtitle on why India should expand its political diplomatic capital to make friends everywhere. There is an exploration of India’s relations with three permanent members of the UNSC i.e. with UK with its colonial baggage, time tested relations with Russia and partnership with France. There’s a repetition of India’s neighbourhood relations, about India’s energised focus on sub regional engagements from the Nordic, and Central & East Europe, to Latin America and Caribbean, and even in the Pacific islands.

The next chapter explains the background of QUAD, and gives a succinct account of India’s bilateral relations with each of the QUAD members. A common thread appears in setback in relation due to India’s nuclear tests, later normalised though convergence in other areas like supply chain resilience, disaster resilient infrastructure etc.

A complete chapter dedicated to China, explains the importance India’s EAM attaches to this country. This chapter is themed on the constant dilemma on how China might be dealt with – realpolitik versus moralpolitik. It gives a systematic history of post-independence bilateral relations between the Himalayan neighbours highlighting points of conflict and confrontation and their little common space eg at WTO, UNFCCC. Previous dispensations have been blamed for their left wing romance with respect to China until recently when the present regime made a realistic assessment of Chinese capabilities and started to bridge this gap through infrastructure augmentation in border areas including tunnelling, road making.

“Corrosion is the new competition” is succinctly the premise of the next chapter. Borrowing from post modernism, author says ‘Knowledge is power’ and that Psy-ops are new forms of warfare. Here, the author comes up from my favourite analogy from Ramayana. He explains that in the present borderless politics, image and narratives, are key to legitimise and delegitimise. The author politely rebukes previous governments to have chosen the comfortable option of over leveraging of low cost options from outside and thus eroding domestic manufacturing.

Tenth chapter has been named creatively and highlights the divergences in the political, strategic understanding / calculations of the towering leaders post-independence. Nehru’s idealist choices have been sharply criticised and his ‘Asian Solidarity’ dismissed as delusion. He has been charged for harbouring false internationalism at the cost of national interest.

In contrast, Patel has been hailed for his strategic clarity on the intentions Pakistan and China. Similarly the concern of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee on Balkanisation of India have been vented. An interesting revelation comes on Mookerjee’s Cultural Diplomacy, specifically Buddhist Diplomacy with South East Asia. Coming to Dr. BR Ambedkar, it has been mentioned that in addition to his advocacy for social reform and inclusiveness, he was much concerned about India’s foreign policy that alienated most of the world; thus India lost support in UN even for its genuine cause and that non alignment jeopardized our prospects of technological advancement. Minoo Masani has been brought to say that NAM paralysed India to repel attack from China. The author thus cautions that ‘acceptance / prestige’ cannot trump national interests and hard power must come prior to soft positioning.

Thefinal chapter of the book makes a powerful assertion on why the world needs India. It begins by commending India’s multifaceted feats – the successful landing of the Chandrayaan, the diplomatic expansion of G20 to G21 through inclusion of African Union, and the Vaccine Maitri program of the pandemic era that established India as the ‘pharmacy of the world’.

The author brings precedents from history to argue that the global mental space is obsessed with India, beginning with the quest to discover sea routes to Bharat – a country with geographical and demographical weights and notable a cultural, civilisational influence.  

There are empirical evidences quoted on how India – its traditions and modern capabilities matters to the world as India advocates rules based world order (eg. UNCLOS) and champions the cause of global south, multi-polarity and decentralised globalisation.

Nationally, it is a testament of ‘democracy that delivers’ and that done efficiently through massive digitalisation of government services plugging leakages. It has focussed on enhancing the quality of its human resource through conscious efforts in health, education and skilling. Indian Diaspora is truly global and so are India’s capacities to help them in distress. India does treat world as a family and walks the extra mile often showing up as the ‘first responder’ in moments of crisis.

To conclude, despite certain repetition and partisan undertones, there seems no exaggeration. The book is a must read for all those interested in India’s story, students and teachers of politics and international relations. The language is scholarly yet accessible. A Hindi translation seems much warranted to reach wider audiences.

By: Deeplaxmi Patil, Research Analyst, GSDN

Introduction

Nestled amidst the rugged terrain and towering peaks of Central Asia lies a region for its pivotal role in the global opium trade, the Golden Crescent. Encompassing the mountainous landscapes of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, this sprawling expanse serves as the epicentre of opium production and distribution on an unprecedented scale. Despite Iran’s position as a transit country rather than a primary producer, its significance within this illicit network cannot be understated.

The Golden Crescent pulsates with the relentless clandestine operations, orchestrated by a network of smugglers deeply enmeshed in organized crime. Within this shadowy realm, narcotics and weapons, traverse borders seamlessly, guided by the hands of insurgents, terrorists and state-sponsored agents. These actors, driven by a nexus of greed and geopolitical agendas, exploit the region’s tumultuous landscape of war, violence, and political instability to perpetuate their nefarious enterprises.

Among the labyrinthine corridors of this illicit trade, certain groups have emerged as key players, that privy to the clandestine dealings of the Golden Crescent. Baloch separatists, the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps cast a long shadow over the opium trade, leveraging its lucrative profits to fund their operations and further their agendas.

Furthermore, this illicit commerce extends far beyond the confines of the Golden Crescent, reaching into the heartlands of India. States such as Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat find themselves ensnared in the web of opium production, their proximity to the Indo-Pakistan border rendering them both lucrative markets and strategic supply routes for the flow of hashish and heroin.

Routes to the Golden Crescent

Smugglers operating within the Golden Crescent employ a multitude of intricate methods, often enlisting the aid of local communities in their illicit endeavours. These strategies encompass a range of approaches, from utilizing small trucks and heavily armed vehicle convoys to smuggling on foot or with the assistance of pack animals such as donkeys and camels. The flow of narcotics out of Afghanistan predominantly follows three principal pipelines, each carving distinct paths across the geopolitical landscape.

Firstly, the Balkan route, traversing through Iran and Turkey to reach Europe, stands as the preeminent artery of opiate trafficking globally. Its bustling activity underscores its status as the busiest conduit for the movement of illicit substances.

Secondly, the northern route extends through Central Asia, funnelling opium and heroin towards Russia via Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, this trajectory has contributed to a burgeoning HIV epidemic in Russia, primarily attributed to intravenous drug use stemming from the influx of narcotics along this pathway.

Lastly, the southern route serves as a vital channel for heroin emanating from Afghanistan, meandering through Pakistan and Iran before disseminating to destinations across South Asia, African nations and the Oceania region. This route often relies on sea transport, capitalizing on the expansive reach of the Indian Ocean. The vast expanse of this maritime domain poses significant challenges for authorities tasked with interception and patrol efforts, thereby facilitating the efficiency of drug smugglers.

In response to the escalating concerns surrounding narcotics trafficking within the Indian Ocean region, concerted efforts have been made to address this pressing issue. The Colombo Declaration, adopted with the aim of establishing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a “Drug-Free Zone,” represents a pivotal step towards combating the proliferation of illicit substances within this strategic maritime domain.

Efforts to Combat the Drug Menace in the Golden Crescent Region

In response to the escalating global prevalence of drug usage, nations across Asia and Europe are heightening their attempts to tackle the menace of narcotics while fostering collaboration through regional initiatives. Playing a pivotal role in this, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is actively involved in the combat against drug trafficking within the Golden Crescent region, primarily through its Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries.

Central to the objectives of this program is the enhancement of anti-drug capabilities among participating states by advocating for cooperation and facilitating the exchange of crucial information. A notable initiative spearheaded by the UNODC is the Triangular Initiative, which seeks to forge a collaborative effort between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in combating the illegal drug trade.

Within the framework of this initiative, these nations engage in joint operations aimed at disrupting the illicit flow of narcotics across their shared borders. Facilitating this coordinated approach is a Joint Planning Cell situated in Tehran, serving as a hub for intelligence sharing among the involved parties.

To bolster their operational effectiveness, Strategic Border Liaison Offices have been strategically designated along the shared borders of these countries, enabling prompt and synchronized responses to trafficking activities. Since, its inception in 2009, the Triangular Initiative has executed 11 joint operations, including a significant operation in March 2011, resulting in the seizure of over three tonnes of illicit drugs.

Issues with the Golden Crescent

The widespread cultivation and trafficking of opium in the Golden Crescent region has far-reaching consequences, extending beyond the realm of drug-related activities and significantly impacting the socio-economic landscape.

Escalating Opiate Consumption: The proliferation of opium production in these regions has fuelled a surge in opiate consumption among populations across South East and Central Asia. This upsurge in drug use poses significant public health challenges and exacerbates existing social issues.

HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The rampant trafficking and consumption of opiates have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS within the region and beyond. This epidemic has particularly ravaged areas facilitating the rapid transmission of the virus.

Financing Non-State Actors: Non-state actors, including insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, capitalize on the proceeds generated from illegal drug trafficking to fund their operations. This convergence of narcotics trade and insurgent activities perpetuates instability and undermines efforts for peace and development in affected areas.

Taliban Involvement: The Taliban government in Afghanistan has long been implicated in the opium trade, utilizing it as a lucrative source of revenue to sustain its economy and fund its activities. The exploitation of the drug trade by such entities further compounds the challenges faced in combating illicit narcotics trafficking.

Linkages to Other Crimes: The proceeds generated from illegal drug trafficking often find their way into financing various other criminal activities, including money laundering and naxalism. This interconnected web of criminality amplifies security concerns and hampers efforts for law enforcement and governance.

Conclusion

In the heart of Central Asia, the Golden Crescent stands as a stark testament to the intertwined complexities of geopolitics, illicit trade, and societal challenges. With its vast opium production and distribution networks spanning across Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, this region remains a focal point of global concern. The consequences of the Golden Crescent’s prolific opium trade reverberate far beyond its borders, fuelling the rise of organized crime, exacerbating public health crises such as HIV/AIDS, and providing funding for non-state actors and insurgent groups. The entrenchment of the drug trade within the fabric of society poses significant obstacles to regional stability, development, and security.

Addressing the myriad issues plaguing the Golden Crescent demands a multifaceted approach that encompasses not only law enforcement measures but also initiatives aimed at socio-economic development, public health interventions, and regional cooperation. Only through concerted efforts and collaboration can the Golden Crescent begin to shed its notorious legacy and chart a path towards a brighter future for the generations to come.

By: Sourishree Ghosh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The South China Sea (SCS) is the new arena of geopolitical competition and rivalry. The South China Sea not only holds a regional but also global importance. Geographically, this region encompasses a portion of the Pacific region stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the Southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. Historically, the South China Sea played a crucial role as an important trade route which led to economic growth in the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region. The geopolitical competition for influence in the South China Sea has been a sphere of contestation among various regional powers including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. This region has assumed significant geopolitical significance in the region, thereby has become the latest geopolitical hotspot in the present context of world affairs. The article aims to delve into the economic and geostrategic importance of the South China Sea to understand the geopolitical power play in the region.

Economic and Geostrategic Importance of the South China Sea

The political geography of the South China Sea is one of the factors determining the geopolitical significance of this region. The region is at the crossroads of the international maritime routes which connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The global economic importance of this region also lies in the fact that it accounts for over one-third of global maritime traffic, connecting the vast major economies and connecting Asia with the markets of Europe, Africa and Americas. The South China Sea accounts for more than 60% of the global maritime trade, more than 22% of the total global trade and one third of the global shipping.

It is a crucial hub of trade for the economies of East Asia, South Asia, South Asia and beyond. About a million people rely upon the marine economy of the SCS. The access to the energy reserves and fisheries are at risk and it is vital to the lifeline of several South Asian states. This region is the main artery of trade in Southeast Asia which links waterways from Singapore and Malaysia to Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan. This dispute over the South China Sea is a multifaceted dispute. An example is the 105-kilometre-long Singapore Strait which is integral for economic security of Singapore as it is placed on the most critical sea lanes of communication (SLOC). If there is disruption in the South China Sea, there would be severe damage and disruption to the global supply chain. A study by Kerem Cosar and Benjamin Thomas, University of Virginia, published as a working paper by the US National Bureau of Economic Research, states that major Asia-Pacific economies could potentially incur a loss of up to 12% of their GDP in the situation of the closure of key trade routes of the region. Therefore, the South China Sea is a maritime choke point.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, an estimated US$3.37 trillion worth, or 21% of all global trade passed through this region in 2016. The SCS is also a geopolitical chokepoint for the economies connected to this region. The South China Sea accounts for trade which is equivalent to 5% of the global GDP. The region is also a very important world energy trade route as almost a third of the global crude oil and over half of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the South China Sea every year. According to estimates, the South China Sea contains about 190 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves and 11 billion barrels of untapped oil reserves. The competition over access to these resources have been the source of geopolitical conflict among the nations.

China’s imports and exports flow through these waters, so the SCS is integral to the economic and energy security of the region. This region is also one of the biggest maritime routes of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It is also estimated by the US Energy Information Administration, that about 4.7 trillion cubic feet of LNG (which is around 40% of the global LNG trade) passes through this region. So, the energy security of the extra regional as well as regional countries are dependent on the South China Sea. The Sea also contains important mineral resources including rare earth elements. These minerals play a crucial role in modern technology and manufacturing. The freedom of navigation in the SCS, which means that all nations can travel through the sea and utilise the sea for various purposes without the interference or intervention from other nations. According to the Department of Environment and Natural resources, Philippines, the SCS accounts for one-third of the entire world’s marine biodiversity. The region accounts for around 12% of the world’s fish catch. Moreover, its untapped reserves of oil and natural gas are significant, which is estimated to be around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This is integral for the economic growth of the littoral nations.

There are critical security issues with regard to maritime safety and infrastructure in this region. The South China Sea faces the problem of overfishing and this has led to imbalance in the maritime ecosystem of this region. The significance of preserving the marine ecosystem of this region requires maritime cooperation from all nations. Blake Herzinger, civilian Ind0-Pacific defence policy expert, pointed out that food security in the South China Sea can quickly cause national instability in the Southeast Asia region.

Major Players and their Interests in the South China Sea

South China Sea is characterised by an intersection of territorial demands and strategic importance, thereby making it one of the most contentious regions of the world. There are major regional security challenges of this region on account of the ongoing disputes over the islands, reefs and waters. This geopolitical rivalry among major powers has also threatened the peace and stability of this region. There are many regional and extra-regional countries which are shaping the evolving dynamics of the South China Sea. This region has also become the latest arena of clash between the US and China.

The most pressing geopolitical conflict is the delicate and complicated territorial disputes of the region. The strategic location of these islands has made the South China Sea a geopolitical hotspot. The Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) is one of the most disputed islands in this region. It is a resource rich and strategically positioned archipelago. This island is at the heart of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Paracel Islands is another site of territorial dispute. This island is the hub of fishing and world’s fourth most productive fishing zone. This also plays a vital role for the economies of China and Vietnam.

The Scarborough Shoal is a subject of conflicting claims between China and the Philippines. The whole conflict in the South China Sea also revolves around China’s contentious “Nine-Dash Line” claim over territories which overlap and clash with the territories of the maritime waters (Exclusive Economic Zones) of the other neighbouring states, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia. Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. These nations allege that China is establishing its hegemony over this region by militarising this region. The military bases developed by China would give China significant geopolitical leverage in this region and project its power.

The territorial disputes have grown in recent times as states have tried to exert their sovereignty in this region. Historically, the South China Sea has been an arena of disagreements and antagonisms. The regional players such as Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia have high stakes in the region with regard to their national security.

The United States has been playing the role of maintaining the regional equilibrium and supports the claims of some of China’s neighbouring states and implements the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and also upholds the commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty (1951). This treaty mandates mutual assistance if either of the parties is harmed. This injects further complexity into the South China Sea.

A military dispute would lead to disruption of regional equilibrium. China is unilaterally taking aggressive initiatives for changing the status quo in the South China Sea by building artificial islands and militarisation of the SCS. The economic security of China is closely tied with the South China Sea. This region is an arena of geopolitical contestation among major powers. The United States has always maintained a strong presence in the region along with its regional allies, including Japan and the Philippines.

China has been aggressively pursuing its territorial claims and the Chinese Government created artificial islands with military facilities and declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the region. Russia also shares its own set of concerns and interests in this region. In August 2023, the US Navy sent destroyer ships to the coast of Alaska when around a dozen of Russian and Chinese warships were spotted in the nearby international waters.

Japan also has high stakes in this region for securing its commercial and energy needs, thereby supporting the freedom of navigation in the region and territorial conflicts. There has been a substantial increase in the military deployment by the US, Philippines and Japan in recent years to uphold the Freedom of Navigation in the international sea.

The South China Sea also holds geostrategic importance for India’s economy in the context of India’s national security. India also has high geopolitical stakes in the region given India’s trade in the Indo-Pacific Region. A Lok Sabha reply states that over 55% of India’s trade passes through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits. So, the evolving dynamics of the South China Sea would also determine the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. India, as a State party to the UNCLOS, in its foreign policy has put forward its stance that it supports the freedom of navigation and unimpeded commerce based on the principles of international law as reflected in the UNCLOS (UN Convention of the Law of the Sea).

The freedom of navigation through the Special Economic Zones also determines the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the maritime borders of the littoral states. The economic security of the regional states is closely tied with the South China Sea. This region has geopolitical as well as geostrategic importance for the energy and economic security of the littoral countries. To conclude, the ongoing diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea has significant political and economic implications for the future of this region.